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APAXXX10.1177/00030651211042377John Dall’AglioSex And Prediction Error, Part 2

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John Dall’Aglio 69/4

SEX AND PREDICTION ERROR,

PART 2: Jouissance and The
Free ENERGY PRINCIPLE IN
NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS

Jouissance refers to an excess enjoyment beyond (yet tied to) speech and
representation. From the perspective of some Lacanian analysts, jouis-
sance is precisely what testifies against any relationship to the brain—
jouissance “slips” out of cognition. On the contrary, it is argued here that
jouissance has a central place in contemporary neuropsychoanalysis. In
part 1 of this series the metapsychology of jouissance was presented in
relation to the real and symbolic registers. Here, in part 2, Mark Solms’s
neuropsychoanalytic model of Karl Friston’s free energy principle is sum-
marized. In this model, “predictions” aim to resolve prediction errors—
most notably, those signaled by affective consciousness. “Surplus
prediction error”—prediction error that arises at the point where the
predictive model fails—is proposed to be a neural correlate of jouis-
sance. This limit within prediction is analogous to the real as a structural
negativity within the symbolic.

Keywords: neuroscience, consciousness, repression, real, jouissance,

Lacan

A s an extensive discussion of bio-reductionism is beyond my scope

here, I will make only a few brief remarks on the matter.1 In general,
psychoanalytic concepts (such as jouissance) are not reducible to neural
structures or functions. In neuropsychoanalytic “dynamic localization,”
1For more extensive discussions defending Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis from criticisms

of bio-reductionism, see Dall’Aglio (2019, 2020) and Johnston (2013a).

Department of Psychology, McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal

Arts, Duquesne University.
Submitted for publication January 2, 2020.

DOI: 10.1177/00030651211042377 715

 John Dall’Aglio

psychic functions are not housed in neural structures. Rather, they emerge
between constellations of activity in various neural centers (Kaplan-Solms
and Solms 2002). Individual parts are thereby necessary but not sufficient
for a given psychological function (Dall’Aglio 2019). Moreover, a neuro-
biological basis for a psychic function does not explain that function—it
merely describes its properties in another register. Psychic functions must
be explained in psychological terms (Solms 2015a), and often psychoana-
lytic concepts shed light on neurobiological functions.
This, however, does not mean that knowledge flows exclusively from
psychoanalysis to neuroscience, as Blass and Carmeli (2007) would have it.
Knowledge from one field can enrich the other, by providing converging
evidence, by challenging contradictory ideas, or by suggesting different
relationships among concepts (Dall’Aglio 2020, 2021). Neuropsychoanalysis
is a dialogue, not a reductionistic translation (Solms 2015a). As Verhaeghe
(1999) notes, Lacan’s registers (real, imaginary, and symbolic) are concep-
tual tools with which one may dissect phenomena (e.g., an analysand’s
speech, psychoanalytic theory, history, science). Drawing relationships
between neuroscience and Lacanian registers is an instance of such concep-
tual knifework.

A Naturally Unnatural Brain

Moreover, neuroscience has increasingly “de-naturalized” the brain,

finding that the brain is irreducible to its natural pre-givens. For example,
neuroplasticity shows that brain structure changes based on individual
experience (Ansermet and Magistretti 2007). The brain is “naturally”
(i.e., genetically) programmed to be open to “unnatural” (i.e., not genetically
programmed) influences. Epigenetics—systems that control the extent of
gene expression—extend this logic beyond ontogeny. Environmental
experiences may be encoded in epigenetic effects on the individual and
even the individual’s offspring. The social world can thus warp the genetic
guidelines for the brain—the latter is unthinkable without the environ-
mental histories that shape it.
Ansermet and Magistretti (2007), in a Lacanian vein, emphasize how
neuroplasticity opens a “gap” between the brain and its environment.
Insofar as neural traces left by experience are subject to continual modi-
fication based on visceral signals and past memories, the “trace of experi-
ence” is not faithful to that experience. In other words, the structure of the
brain—its developed neural networks—bears the mark of social history

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without being reducible to that history. The brain, while shaped by its
experience, is not a mere reflection of that experience. Thus, the object
we call the brain necessarily contains much that is beyond the brain. As
Ansermet and Magistretti put it, the brain seems “genetically determined
not to be genetically determined” (p. 8).
These neuroscientific findings resonate with Freud’s “infantile help-
lessness”—developed by Lacan as the “body-in-pieces”—which describes
the premature state of the newborn (Johnston 2013a). To put it simply, the
organism as an organized unity does not exist from birth. For Freud
(1914), the unity of the ego is not pre-given; it must be constituted by a
turn to the social world (see part 1). This psychoanalytic “subject-to-be”
resonates with the “premature” (i.e., genetically indeterminate) brain
whose constitution does not exist without the mark of the social environ-
ment (Johnston 2019).
I hope this openness on the side of neuroscience will assuage
antireductionist objections.2 Identifying a neural correlate of a psychoana-
lytic concept does not replace that concept—it opens the door for interdis-
ciplinary suggestions and new ideas. I will now turn to one such bridge:
jouissance in the neuropsychoanalytic model of predictive coding.

O f P redictions A nd P rediction E rrors :

K arl F riston ’ s F ree E nergy P rinciple

According to the free energy principle (Friston 2010), the brain operates
like a Bayesian inference machine, generating probabilistic “predictions”
about experiences. These predictions are compared to sensory feedback,
and any resulting discrepancy is called “prediction error,” “surprise,” or
“free energy.”3 In this model, the brain is not a passive recipient of sen-
sory impressions. Rather, it actively explains its experiences by construct-
ing a “predictive model.” “Prediction” is operationalized as a probabilistic
inference of the cause of a sensory input, either from within the body (i.e.,
interoception) or from the external world (i.e., exteroception). Prediction
error is the unexplained or unexpected part of experience, a measure of
entropy in a system (Friston 2010).

2For a more general discussion of the problem of associating the psychoanalytic mind with

the brain, see Blass and Carmeli (2007) and Dall’Aglio (2021).
3There are mathematical differences between the terms surprise, prediction error, free

energy, and entropy, but they are not essential to my argument and I will use them interchange-
ably. (For precise distinctions, see Friston 2010.)

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Self-organizing systems (such as the brain) try to maximize evidence

for their own existence (i.e., their predictive model)—that is, they optimize
their predictions, minimizing prediction error (Connolly and van Deventer
2017). There are two broad ways to minimize prediction error: perception4
(i.e., updating the predictive model) and action (i.e., selecting inputs that
support the model). What matters is not the accuracy of the model per se,
but the minimization of prediction errors (Friston 2012).
The free energy principle can be applied from basic biological sys-
tems in the body (e.g., cells) through higher psychological functions
(Connolly and van Deventer 2017) such as perception, action, and atten-
tion (Parr and Friston 2018). Organized in a hierarchical fashion, unre-
solved prediction errors from lower levels drive changes in higher-level
predictions. Top-down predictions then feed back down to the lower levels
to “explain away” the ascending prediction error. However, not all predic-
tion errors are equal—not all errors are significant enough to reach higher
levels. “Precision” marks the salience of a given prediction error. Prediction
errors with higher salience are more likely to drive the updating of predic-
tions. Precision may be registered by different neurotransmitter systems
(e.g., dopamine, serotonin) in different domains, such as cognition, per-
ception, and interoception (Parr and Friston 2018).
In sum, the brain constructs a hierarchical predictive model that
explains inputs. Inputs are in themselves prediction errors (i.e., unex-
plained quantities). Predictions decrease prediction errors by providing
probabilistic explanations of their causes. Prediction therefore falls on the
side of what is explained and understood. Prediction error falls on the side
of what is unexplained. “Precision,” or salience,5 marks which prediction
errors are significant and require changes (through perception or action)
in the predictive model. For Friston (2010), it is a biological imperative to
minimize prediction error and maximize the efficacy of the predictive
model.
4One should not understand prediction (especially perception) as the simple absorption of

sensory input. Prediction requires the active engagement of the brain in anticipating its experi-
ence and adjusting its internal models. Such mechanisms involve motoric brain functions (e.g.,
cognitive control). Thus, motor logic applies to both action and perception. The relevance of this
point will be seen when I come to discuss the motoric unconscious.
5I will use the terms precision and salience interchangeably. Precision is also applied to

predictions. When so applied, it refers to confidence in the prediction—that is, how likely it is
to explain the ascending prediction error. More precise predictions more efficaciously explain
inputs. When applied to prediction errors, precision (better understood now as salience) refers
to the importance of the prediction error. These two applications converge in the following way:
the violation of precise (i.e., confident) predictions arouses salient prediction errors.

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Figure 1. Medial and lateral views of the brain (top) and Freud’s
topographic and structural models (bottom)

Dark blue = sensory projection cortex; light blue = sensory association cortex; green = motor
projection cortex; yellow = motor association cortex; red = autonomic nuclei; magenta =
arousal nuclei; white = basic emotion circuits. Freud’s models are color-coded to show the cor-
responding areas in neurofunctional anatomy. Reproduced from “The Conscious Id” (Solms
2013, Neuropsychoanalysis), copyright © The International Neuropsychoanalysis Society,
reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com on behalf of The
International Neuropsychoanalysis Society. (To see figure in color, go to online version at
APA.SAGEPUB.COM.)

M ark S olms ’ s N europsyc h oanalytic

M odel O f T h e F ree E nergy P rinciple

The Conscious Id and the Unconscious Ego

Friston’s free energy principle has been vigorously incorporated into

Mark Solms’s neuropsychoanalytic metapsychology. This model (see
Figure 1) begins with the dynamic localization of the id to the upper
brainstem and limbic structures, and the ego to the neocortex (Solms
2013). Sensitivity to the internal milieu of the body and to the pressure of
somatic demands are functions of the id, whereas exteroception and cog-
nition are functions of the ego (Freud 1923). These functions correspond
to the upper brainstem (and associated limbic areas) and the neocortex,
respectively.

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As Solms points out, the structures associated with id functions are

intrinsic to consciousness. If one damages upper brainstem structures,
one significantly impairs—or even destroys—consciousness. On the
other hand, one can damage swaths of the neocortex and, though the qual-
ity of consciousness changes, the subjective feeling of being conscious
remains. Hydranencephalic children, who are born without a neocortex
but intact limbic and upper brainstem structures, are striking examples
(Merker 2007). These children have no functional cortex (i.e., no repre-
sentational or cognitive systems), but they are fully alive with affective
consciousness. They show clear emotional responses to experiences with
others. Animal studies (Moruzzi and Magoun 1949) and human studies
(Penfield and Jasper 1954) have supported the central role of the upper
brainstem and limbic system in generating consciousness. The cortex
(ego) cannot be conscious without the brainstem (id), yet the brainstem
can be affectively conscious without the cortex (Solms 2013).6

Affective Consciousness, the Preconscious, and the Unconscious

This reverses the traditional Freudian equation of the id with the

nucleus of the unconscious (Freud 1923). Rather, it appears that the id is
the fount of consciousness—specifically, affective consciousness7
(Panksepp 1998). Affective consciousness is nonrepresentational in
itself—it is the raw feeling state of being. Affect signals unmet needs,
either within the body (e.g., hunger) or socioemotional needs within the
brain (e.g., attachment). There are seven of these emotional needs or
instincts: SEEKING, LUST, CARE, PLAY, PANIC (attachment needs),
RAGE, and FEAR (Panksepp 1998).8 When these needs are unmet, they
generate unpleasure. Meeting them generates pleasure. In other words,
these affective systems follow the homeostatic logic of the pleasure prin-
ciple (Solms and Turnbull 2002).
6One might argue that this localization suggests a “housing” in neural structures, as
opposed to a dynamic between structures. See Hartmann Cardelle (2019) for an extended discus-
sion of this issue. I suggest that one should read Solms’s localizations as dynamic localizations
to the multiple systems within the cortex or brainstem/limbic system, both of which are consid-
erably heterogeneous.
7I am focusing on Panksepp’s affective neuroscience because it is the most prevalent in

contemporary neuropsychoanalysis. One should note, however, that subcortical affective con-
sciousness is not agreed-upon in the neurosciences. LeDoux and Brown (2017), for example,
argue that Panksepp’s instincts are nonconscious and that the “emotional” quality derives from
cortical interpretations of this subcortical nonconscious arousal.
8The all-capitals style is Panksepp’s convention for a formal taxonomy of these neural

circuits.

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Although these emotional instincts come with innate behavioral

responses (e.g., PANIC-protest drives the organism to SEEK its care-
giver), these action plans are only “rough and ready.” In other words, they
are insufficient to deal with the unpredictable complexities of life. The
child must learn how to meet its needs. This is reflected in the “holes”
inherent in the structure of these affective systems—neuroplasticity
allows experience-dependent learning of what to FEAR, what to attack
(RAGE), and so on (Dall’Aglio 2019; Solms and Turnbull 2002).
Learning to meet these needs is the task of the ego. The ego (neocor-
tex) is in itself preconscious, becoming conscious only when aroused by
affective consciousness ascending from the brainstem (Solms 2013).
Solms (2017) localizes the unconscious to the automatized action plans
(i.e., behavioral responses) in the basal ganglia and cerebellum. In con-
trast to the declarative, representational processes of the neocortex,
automatized plans do not permit reflective thought—they operate outside
awareness as nondeclarative (i.e., nonrepresentational) memory systems.
They operate and repeat independently of self-reflective cognitive con-
trol. The ego strives for automatization of action plans that meet our (id-
based) socioemotional needs in the outside world.

Dynamic Localization of the Free Energy Principle

At this level of analysis, one can dynamically localize free energy to

the activity of subcortical emotional systems, which are functions of the
id. Specifically, affective consciousness signals the precision of predic-
tion error, salient prediction errors that demand the predictive work of the
cortex (Parr and Friston 2018; Solms 2019). Panksepp’s emotional needs
are potent sources of prediction error because of their high position in the
brain’s need-hierarchy (Connolly 2018). The cortical ego serves the sec-
ondary process of binding the ascending prediction error and forming
predictions to meet these needs (Kaplan-Solms and Solms 2002; Solms
2019). For example, the medial prefrontal cortex (a neocortical area) is
involved in the suppression of activity of subcortical affective circuits. It
is argued that the cortical ego’s top-down suppression of subcortical id-
affects represents the predictive resolution9 of prediction errors (Carhart-
Harris and Friston 2010). By learning how to meet these needs, the ego

9As this predictive work might be considered the “binding” of ascending prediction error,
one might find a link with Bion’s “thinking” here (see Mellor 2018).

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Table 1. Comparison of concepts in computational

neuroscience (free energy principle), brain
structure/function, and Freudian theory
Free Energy Neural Structures and Freudian Structural
Principle Activity Model

Prediction error Affective consciousness, subcortically Id, drives

generated
Prediction (perception/ Neocortex, basal ganglia (automatized Ego
action) unconscious), self-reflective consciousness

can better reduce the free energy of the id. Table 1 summarizes Solms’s
incorporation of the free energy principle.
In sum, the cortical ego generates a predictive model that aims to
satisfy socioemotional needs (i.e., resolve prediction error). Affects gen-
erated in the id are felt as prediction error and are surprising. Surprise
here does not refer only to surprise as a “sensory affect” (Panksepp
1998)—it is “surprise” as what is not predicted, what is unexplained.
Optimization of predictions increases evidence for the ego as agent by
minimizing free energy associated with the external world and the inter-
nal body.
As mentioned above, the ego has different kinds of prediction at its
disposal, the two major classes being declarative and nondeclarative.
Declarative predictions are representational, including perception, mental
imagery, thinking, episodic and semantic memory, and so on. They are
accessible to the self-reflective ego, as their representational content can
be brought to mind and thought through (i.e., working memory). By con-
trast, nondeclarative predictions (e.g., procedural action plans and emo-
tional memories like fear-conditioning) are outside self-reflective control
and operate in an automatized fashion. Nondeclarative predictions are
nonrepresentational, outside of declarative thought and devoid of seman-
tic meaning. They have high precision relative to declarative predictions
and are therefore difficult to change. Correspondingly, declarative predic-
tions are more malleable (i.e., have greater neuroplasticity and lower pre-
cision) compared to nondeclarative predictions (Solms 2019).
Just as prediction error drives the updating of the predictive model,
affective consciousness drives changes in the cortical ego. This is how
Solms (2014) interprets Freud’s statement that “consciousness arises

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instead of a memory-trace” (Freud 1920, p. 25). If affective conscious-

ness is salient prediction error, then the activity of affective consciousness
drives changes in memory-traces (i.e., predictions), a process called
“reconsolidation.” As Solms notes, Freud’s statement can be interpreted
literally. The arousal of affective consciousness literally dissolves the
memory-traces of the prediction associated with the error (Solms 2015b).
Affective consciousness arousal dissolves memory-traces, allowing new
traces to form. In other words, prediction error allows the updating of
predictions by removing old predictions that were insufficient to resolve
prediction errors. Neuroscientific research in the field of reconsolidation
points to the necessity of surprise (i.e., prediction error) in this process
(Beckers and Kindt 2017; Schroyens, Beckers, and Kindt 2017).

Repression: Premature Automatization

Against criticism that this cognitive unconscious (i.e., procedural

habits) has nothing to do with the psychoanalytic “dynamic unconscious”
(i.e., the repressed), Solms (2017) posits “premature automatization.” He
points out that self-reflective consciousness (i.e., working memory, the
capacity to actively think and hold items in mind) is a mental space for
prediction formation and problem solving. The infant, however, is faced
with many problems it cannot solve, especially given its many instinctual
needs and limited working memory capacity. Solms proposes that the
infant, rather than sit endlessly trying to solve insoluble problems, “cuts
its losses” and automatizes predictions that do not work. For Solms, the
repressed corresponds to these “prematurely” automatized action plans.
Because these solutions do not satisfy emotional needs, they produce pre-
diction error (i.e., affect) when they are repeated. Patients suffer from
these affects, the consequences of their prematurely automatized (nonde-
clarative, unconscious) predictions that fail to meet their emotional needs.

Jouissance Is Surplus Prediction Error

I propose to dynamically localize jouissance to the surplus prediction

error in neural functions,10 most notably the salience indicated by affec-
tive consciousness (see Table 2). Affective consciousness has properties

10It is important to remember that this does not exhaust our understanding of jouissance.

The concept may still be applied at other levels of analysis, such as race (Miller 2017), sex
(Zupančič 2017), and politics (Žižek 2018).

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Table 2. Comparison of Mark Solms’s neuropsychoanalytic

model of the free energy principle and the Lacanian
metapsychology of the real of jouissance
Neuropsychoanalysis: Lacanian metapsychology:
Surplus prediction error The real of jouissance

Unexplained, outside of representation Excess outside the symbolic

Felt as affective consciousness, surprising
(unpredicted)
Prediction error is produced alongside
prediction (i.e., expected prediction error)
Fundamental bedrock of consciousness and
cognition
Motivates predictive work (e.g., action;
updating models) to meet needs
Felt as a surplus enjoyment (tension,
excitation)
Negativity is (re)produced with every attempt
to symbolize it
Constitutive negativity of the subject
Motivates the subject to bind the tension

of the Lacanian real (Dall’Aglio 2019). It is nonrepresentational in itself.

That is, when viewed in its raw form, unmodulated by neocortical cogni-
tive and self-reflective consciousness (e.g., hydranencephaly), affective
consciousness signals raw emotional vicissitudes with no representational
binding. The prediction errors of affective consciousness are surprising
insofar as they fall outside of representation and action (i.e., predictions)—
that is, they are not expected or explained. And yet, affective conscious-
ness is at the core of all consciousness and motivates predictive work—just
as the real, as the extimate center, motivates signification. As a foreign
tension from the perspective of the predictive model, affective conscious-
ness is a “fount of jouissance.” It is an excess outside of, yet extimately
riveted to, the predictive agent.
Importantly, jouissance is not simply equivalent to all affect (see part 1).
Prediction error that arises in the normal flux of homeostasis (e.g.,
Mommy left, I feel PANIC, but I cried and got her back, so the PANIC is
gone) is not jouissance. Rather, jouissance refers to the surplus or resid-
ual prediction error that arises beyond predictive capacities. These pre-
diction errors have a particularly salient and intense quality to them—they
arise at the failure of the predictive model to achieve homeostasis.
To be clear, I am not reducing jouissance to surplus prediction error.
Rather, when the brain is viewed at the level of neural centers, residual
prediction error (i.e., excess affective consciousness) may be considered
a neural correlate of jouissance. I believe this level of analysis (e.g.,

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instead of ion-channels) is most suitable for psychoanalytic meta-neuro-

psychology (see Dall’Aglio 2019).

A Neuropsychoanalytic Lens on Lacanian Theory

Viewing jouissance as surplus prediction error (i.e., excess affect)

gives me an opportunity to suggest something Lacanian theory might
gain from dialogue with neuropsychoanalysis.11 Panksepp’s seven emo-
tional instincts (1998) are well established as universally present across
mammals. However, Lacanians sometimes dismiss a plethora of emo-
tions (and instincts), instead privileging anxiety (e.g., Fink 2019) and
drive. Neuropsychoanalysis would challenge this position. First, there are
at least two types of anxiety: PANIC and FEAR. Second, and more impor-
tant, all seven instincts are equally significant within the brain. Indeed,
the lack of focus on emotions is a general criticism of Lacanian theory
(Bernardi and de Bernardi 2019).
I do not suggest that Lacanians simply submit and equalize all
affects—clinical work remains the final “court of appeals” (Solms 2013).
However, I propose that Lacanians consider the following. Recall my dis-
cussion in part 1 on instincts being “hooked” into the logic of excess.
Affect that arises in this circuit deserves the name jouissance—it is a
surplus enjoyment beyond the subject’s homeostatic capacities.
As I argued in part 1, a Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis would suggest
that Panksepp’s instincts are vulnerable to such hooking. Premature
automatization is an excellent example of this susceptibility. Here instinc-
tual aims have been directed toward something that repeatedly ruptures
homeostasis, producing surplus affect (i.e., jouissance). Instinct has
drifted beyond the logic of homeostatic need and entered the circuit of the
drive. The Lacanian emphasis on anxiety might thus be formalized as a
focus on “surplus prediction error” that could emerge with any of
Panksepp’s instincts12 (e.g., surplus RAGE, surplus PLAY, surplus CARE,
surplus FEAR).
One might reply that any excessive affect takes on an anxiogenic
quality. This may be the case, and it would have implications for how
neuropsychoanalysis conceives these instincts when they transgress their
11Here I continue a line of thought initiated in Dall’Aglio 2020.
12Insofar as all instincts are warped by this drift toward drive (and, as elaborated below,
necessarily involve some excess tension on the motor axis), one might make a Lacanian neuro-
psychoanalytic pronouncement: “The Instinct does not exist.”

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homeostatic limits. For instance, surplus CARE might no longer appear

as CARE in a straightforward fashion; it may be “misfelt” (Johnston
2013b). However, it would be equally fruitful for Lacanians to consider
what new theoretical work could emerge by considering jouissance as
surplus prediction error along these many axes.

Are Predictions Signifiers?

If surplus prediction error corresponds to jouissance, are predictions

then signifiers? If predictions are understood as neural traces (Solms
2015b), one might be keen to reach this conclusion (see, e.g., Ansermet
and Magistretti 2007). Further, predictions come from the social world
(Holmes and Nolte 2019). Although we are born with rudimentary pre-
dictions, the bulk of our predictive model must be developed via social
interaction13 (the “de-naturalized” brain). Even at the most basic level of
predicting our interoceptive signals, our predictions are largely shaped by
our primary caregivers (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris 2017).
The picture is more complicated, however, particularly at the level of
neural centers and broader brain regions. One should distinguish between
traces (i.e., predictions) at different levels of the brain (Dall’Aglio 2019). It
is beyond my scope here to discuss the role of different types of predictions14
for Lacanian theory. Here it is most essential to distinguish between non-
declarative (i.e., nonrepresentational) and declarative (i.e., representational)
predictions. For now it suffices to put prediction on the side of the symbolic
and surplus prediction error on the side of jouissance, the real.

I nsig h ts F rom T h e M otoric U nconscious

Jouissance, Dopamine, and Motor Tension

To develop this link between surplus prediction error and jouissance,

it will be fruitful to engage with another neuropsychoanalytic model of
13This is perhaps analogous to Lacan’s placing signifiers in the Other, the social order

(Verhaeghe 2004).
14One reason the present discussion of predictions as signifiers is insufficient is that it does

not differentiate nondeclarative predictions and prediction error, both of which have elements of
the real (see Dall’Aglio 2019); nor does it distinguish imaginary and symbolic predictions. For
example, language (a system of predictions) involves motor articulation (symbolic) and mean-
ing (imaginary). Yet Lacan also speaks of the “real” aspect of the signifier (i.e., the “letter”).
Capturing these different dimensions of prediction would require a more complex dissection of
the Lacanian registers, including how the real “refracts” in all three registers: imaginary real
(e.g., phenomenal experience of emptiness and nothingness), symbolic real (i.e., purely empty
signifiers and concepts; mathematical formulae), and real real (i.e., absolute negativity;
Johnston’s corporeal negativity) (Johnston 2019; Žižek 2004).
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jouissance, one proposed by Ariane Bazan and Sandrine Detandt. This

venture will facilitate a more detailed sketching of the relationship
between the real and the symbolic in the brain (Dall’Aglio 2019).
Bazan and Detandt (2013) localize jouissance to the mesolimbic
mesocortical dopaminergic SEEKING system. Importantly, the SEEKING
system is objectless. It is a motivational system promoting engagement
with the world, thriving on excitation and uncertainty (Solms 2012).
Solms discusses this paradoxical instinct by describing its innate predic-
tion: “engagement with a source of uncertainty provides maximal oppor-
tunities to resolve that uncertainty” (Solms 2019, n. 41).
As Bazan and Detandt (2015) note, SEEKING is active with respect
to surprising stimuli, whether the valence is positive or negative. They go
a step further to emphasize arousal over valence; the experience of plea-
sure and unpleasure is secondary to a more rudimentary, structurally
excessive (i.e., traumatic, unbound) somatic arousal.15 Phasic dopamine
spikes triggered by surprise in the SEEKING system are highlighted as
quintessential instances of this arousal.
These dopamine spikes “mark” the contingent (and historical) instance
of an unexpected, surprising encounter (Van de Vijver, Bazan, and Detandt
2017). Because there are no intrinsic action plans (i.e., predictions) associ-
ated with SEEKING activity besides the generalized “engage with uncer-
tainty,” this mark is necessary to associate learned motor plans (and, later,
more complex responses) to arousal. These marked motor plans are
granted “incentive sensitization,” the value given to motor and representa-
tional traces associated with the dopamine spike (Robinson and Berridge
1993). Sensitization of these motor plans fills them with tension tending
toward discharge (i.e., action execution) whose very excitation is reward-
ing. Their execution is deeply associated SEEKING arousal due to their
capacity to “bind” the tension. Indeed, they are repeated whenever a simi-
lar need-arousal takes place (Bazan and Detandt 2013), much like the
automatized action plans discussed above.
For Bazan (2012), these action plans always retain some baseline
reserve of tension because not all actions are completely executed (e.g.,
motor incoordination, cortical inhibition). From the inhibition of motor

15I claim that this arousal is still affective, but in the sense of the unbound jouissance of

das Ding, a “primary affect” that operates beyond the symbolic pleasure principle (Lacan
1959–1960; see part 1). This is one way to approach the difference between Panksepp and
LeDoux. Panksepp’s raw affective consciousness is neither straightforwardly emotional nor
simply nonconscious—it is a traumatic, unbound jouissance. Cortical interpretation (prediction)
tames this arousal into standard emotion.

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plans, more complex motor representations and mental imagery arise

(Jeannerod 1994). Thus, Bazan (2011) gives the signifier a neural basis as
a motor articulatory pattern,16 emphasizing (and shedding light on) the
materiality of the signifier. Bazan and Detandt (2013) dynamically local-
ize jouissance to this motor tension in these “marked” action programs
(i.e., signifiers) associated with SEEKING arousal.17
In my view, the SEEKING excitation bound to these marked action
patterns corresponds with surplus prediction error—it is a surplus excita-
tion, not tension-reduction. By localizing jouissance to surplus prediction
error (and not just SEEKING), I suggest extending the dopaminergic
marking dynamics described by Bazan and colleagues to any excess pre-
diction error (e.g., other instincts, interoceptive events). Thus, mecha-
nisms of neural sensitization (beyond the dopaminergic) may underlie
jouissance or different features of jouissance (e.g., the “kindling hypoth-
esis” [Dimitriadis 2017] or “central sensitization” in psychosomatic dis-
orders [Woolf 2011]). This maintains a broader view of the real within the
brain (Dall’Aglio 2019), fitting with neuropsychoanalytic “dynamic
localization” (Kaplan-Solms and Solms 2002). Indeed, jouissance char-
acterizes the entire body—for Lacan (1972–1973), the body is a body of
jouissance. Because of its role in SEEKING, however, dopamine activity
may underlie the excitatory enjoyment of jouissance. As Bazan and
Detandt (2013) note, the dopaminergic marking mechanism is considered
one suitable neural substrate of jouissance, not its exclusive substrate.
Future neuropsychoanalytic research should inquire whether such dynam-
ics (i.e., jouissance bound to motor patterns) require an intersection with
SEEKING or whether they can occur without SEEKING.18

16One should note that the “linguistic” thereby has its roots in nondeclarative motor sys-

tems, in addition to its more familiar place in the left cortical hemisphere (Dall’Aglio 2019).
17Importantly, by localizing jouissance to incentive-sensitized motor programs, any

instinctual action is necessarily marked by this excess. While this may elide any difference
between drive and instinct (insofar as the motor end is necessarily marked by jouissance), it
would then be important to emphasize Lacan’s distinction (1972–1973) between phallic jouis-
sance (i.e., enjoyment within the law of phallic signification) and other jouissance (i.e., enjoy-
ment not-all within phallic signification). This topic is beyond the scope of this three-paper
series.
18See Ryan (2015) for a case of bilateral globus pallidus lesions resulting in a loss of

SEEKING engagement but then, after engagement with other instinctual systems, a reengage-
ment with the world. In such cases, we should explore whether there has been neuroplastic
recovery within SEEKING or whether alternative systems are capable of such redirection.

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 Sex And Prediction Error, Part 2

The Disjuncture between Real and Symbolic

By highlighting jouissance at the interface between arousal (i.e.,

SEEKING) and action plans (i.e., motor predictions), Bazan and Detandt
(2013, 2015) focus on the disjuncture between internal bodily arousal and
action that engages with the external world. I propose that we read this as
a site of deadlock (i.e., impossibility) between the real and the symbolic
in the brain (Dall’Aglio 2019). Let us look at this disjuncture more
closely.
Bazan and Detandt (2013) describe two “axes” of jouissance: (1)
bodily arousal; (2) historical, contingently marked action plans filled with
tension.19 In our context here, bodily arousal refers to salient affective
consciousness, and historically marked action plans refer to predictions
(nondeclarative action plans) that bind ascending affective conscious-
ness. This helps us distinguish between two dimensions of jouissance
outlined in part 1: traumatic, unbound jouissance (das Ding), and bound
jouissance.
On the historical (symbolic) side, the marked, tension-filled action
plans correspond to the “sticking” of jouissance to signifiers (Zupančič
2017). Any act (and consequent binding) is better than remaining helpless
before the pressure of the drive (Bazan and Detandt 2015; Solms 2017).
These marked motor programs are thus nondeclarative signifiers that bind
jouissance—they are “jouissance-filled,” engendering their own excit-
atory enjoyment (i.e., incentive sensitization), which drives continuous
pressure for repetition. This is the neuropsychoanalytic perspective of
jouissance being intertwined with signifiers. Insofar as there is some orig-
inal, raw encounter with the arousal of affective consciousness (prior to
any marked motor plans), such an encounter might approximate das
Ding, the traumatic real that demands metabolization of jouissance via
the symbolic.
One can also discern the two types of repetition (see part 1) at this
disjuncture between SEEKING and motor traces. Insofar as the motor
traces repeat in order to reproduce an historical (i.e., symbolic) event (e.g.,
a previously executed action plan), there is repetition as commonly under-
stood—the mechanical repetition of this or that past trace that is jouissance-
filled. On the other hand, as a dynamic interaction—that is, the repetition

19These axes are very similar to the two axes of the drive described by Johnston (2005),
which are also divided along real-symbolic lines.

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 John Dall’Aglio

of the disjuncture itself between the jouissance-filled motor traces (i.e.,

historical, symbolic) and the arousal of prediction error (i.e., SEEKING,
real)—there may be repetition that demands the new. Insofar as the
dynamic “marking” of the surprising encounter is repeated, such a repeti-
tion motivates the creation of new predictions. Importantly, there is enjoy-
ment in both cases: one concerns a repetitive surplus (i.e., jouissance-filled
traces), whereas the other confronts a more radical excess.
These two axes—jouissance-filled motor traces and traumatic,
unbound jouissance—and their dynamic interaction elaborate a crucial
dynamic localization of the disjuncture between the real and the symbolic
in the brain, the negativity of symbolic failure that demands the new. With
traumatic jouissance (i.e., das Ding) on the side of the encounter with affec-
tive consciousness and bound jouissance on the side of nondeclarative
motor plans, one has highlighted a neural parallel where jouissance (i.e.,
surplus prediction error, SEEKING) is linked to the symbolic (i.e., marked
prediction). In addition, one has delineated the traumatic real and the pri-
mordial attempt of the symbolic to bind the tension. Moreover, the opera-
tion of these dynamics in response to surprise and excess excitation points
to the problematic of neural systems drifting away from homeostatic need
and instead grappling with the problem of the drive.

W h y does prediction fail to reac h h omeostasis ?

S ituating t h e real wit h in t h e b rain

It is notable that the dynamics described above operate at the point of

predictive failure—that is, the point of surprising surplus, where there is
no prediction that a priori is prepared to resolve the prediction error. There
is an underlying question here: Why do humans not achieve homeostasis?
Why does our predictive system fail to eliminate prediction error? Why
are we left with this surplus prediction error that I call jouissance? In
other words, how should one situate negativity (i.e., the real) in the brain,
insofar as negativity is the name for the point of failure of symbolic, pre-
dictive homeostasis?

Lenses of Disjuncture

One approach is to reflect, quite simply, that life is complicated. The

external world is always changing, as are our visceral states. Because the
brain selectively samples from the external world and the internal body

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via its sense organs, its view of the complex environment is incomplete.
Prediction can never fully keep up with the changing environment, always
leaving some prediction error.
Via Freud, however, the problem runs deeper. It is not civilization
(i.e., the external world) that causes our discontents, but rather the inevi-
table conflict of the drives (Johnston 2005). In fact, these intrapsychic
conflicts reverberate in civilization. Moreover, as I argue in part 1, drive
itself has a self-defeating nature: “Sometimes one seems to perceive that
it is not only the pressure of civilization but something in the nature of the
[sexual] function itself which denies us full satisfaction and urges us
along other paths” (Freud 1930, p. 105).
Solms (2020) posits certain “structural antagonisms,” though he does
not use the term. For example, he highlights intraneural conflicts, such as
the inevitable conflict between Panksepp’s instincts. For example, attachment
needs demand secure safety, yet SEEKING demands novelty. Whereas
the predictive model aims at eliminating prediction error, SEEKING
seeks the increase of prediction error. Even if the innate prediction of
SEEKING is to engage with uncertainty to reduce uncertainty, the fact
that one SEEKs uncertainty is at odds with the homeostatic goal of
prediction.
Another Solmsian disjuncture is the contrast between declarative and
nondeclarative predictions (Solms 2018). Nondeclarative predictions are
by definition inaccessible to declarative mechanisms. Some part of the
predictive system is necessarily alien to the rest of prediction. The inevi-
tability of premature automatization—which, for Solms, forever leaves
homeostasis at risk for imbalance—leans toward the “structural” nature
of predictive imperfection.
As I have noted in discussing SEEKING and marked motor traces,
there is also a disjuncture between affective consciousness and the motor
traces called on to bind the tension. In need-satisfaction, the motor plan is
tagged with incentive sensitization, becoming jouissance-filled and
engendering surplus excitation. This is a possible mechanism by which
instincts are hooked into SEEKING excess (see part 1), diverging from
homeostatic goals and aiming at the repetition of motor traces.
Moreover, as Bazan and Detandt (2013) argue, this excess (i.e., dopa-
mine spike, motor incentive sensitization) is necessary due to the lack of
attunement between vegetative, visceral systems (i.e., those generating
bodily needs; the “invertebrate body”) and the musculoskeletal motor

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system (i.e., the “vertebrate body”) that must act in the world to satisfy
those needs. In a Lacanian vein, they emphasize that there is no predeter-
mined guarantee or knowledge of which particular action will meet the
need. Thus, the surprising enjoyment (i.e., dopamine spike) is necessary
to associate the adequate action with need-satisfaction. Importantly, this
disjuncture is not unique to humans—it is likely present in all verte-
brates.20 In a tone resonating with the “coincidence” of negativity and
representation (see part 1), Bazan (2011) speaks of the failure of the motor
system to completely eliminate the tension—a “shortfall of action”—
which is at the basis of representation. Disjuncture has a productive
aspect.
Johnston (2019) suggests that this bodily disharmony is most pro-
nounced in the human brain, as evident in the disharmonious relation-
ships among neural systems. Developing insights from neuroscientists
like David Linden and Antonio Damasio, Johnston (2013a) emphasizes
how evolutionarily ancient brain systems associated with affective con-
sciousness (e.g., the brainstem) sit together in an uncomfortable “kludge”
with evolutionarily recent neocortical (cognitive) systems (Linden
2008).21 Rather than a unified system called “the Brain,” disparate brain
systems developed separately, along different lines.
The “brain” is thus composed of several layers of “sedimentation,”
with the thalamus—to use Damasio’s terms (2010)—as a “marriage bro-
ker” between an “odd couple”: the primitive, nondeclarative brainstem
and the representational neocortex (Johnston 2019). Despite their radi-
cally opposed functions, these systems are forced to interact to facilitate
survival. Thus, the brain’s “natural” (i.e., structural) state is one of incon-
gruity. In Lacanian fashion, Johnston insists “there is no intracerebral
relationship” (Johnston 2013a, p. 59). In other words, a formula for intra-
cerebral unity and harmony among brain systems does not exist. There is
a “natural” disjuncture (Dall’Aglio 2019).
Moreover, this “natural” incongruity is not simply a need-deficiency
remedied in biological terms. As discussed at the beginning of this paper,
the premature helplessness of the infant—mirrored in the “kludge-y” and
genetically open nature of the brain—prompts the turn to a “denaturalizing”
symbolic-imaginary reality (i.e., speech, images, etc.). In this way, the
20Thus, animals may be posited to have some sort of jouissance—another point where

neuropsychoanalysis can pose a challenge to Lacanian theory.

21See Dall’Aglio (2019) for a more extensive discussion of this topic in relation to

Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis.

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structural negativity of the brain (here manifest as the disharmonious

relationships among brain systems) has a causal role in the turn to the de-
naturalizing social world (Johnston 2019).
All these approaches (i.e., conflict between instincts; disjuncture
between declarative and nondeclarative; disjuncture between predictions
and affective consciousness) are valid neuropsychoanalytic conceptions
of structural negativity (i.e., the real) within the brain (Dall’Aglio 2019).
With the present integration of predictive coding with Lacanian theory, I
venture to suggest another lens of disjuncture.

T h e O riginally Lost P rediction

I have argued that surplus prediction error corresponds to jouissance and

that predictions correspond to signifiers.22 Recall, from part 1, that the
“originally lost signifier” is one way to name the structural negativity
(i.e., the real) within the symbolic (Zupančič 2017). In Lacanian fashion,
one might invent the phrase “originally lost prediction” to designate the
negativity within prediction.
Allow me to be precise. This formulation (the “originally lost predic-
tion”) serves not only to map neuroscience in Lacanian terms.23 It also
allows us to link the disjunctive nature of the brain to the enjoyment of
surplus prediction error (i.e., jouissance). Zupančič’s originally lost signi-
fier (2017) designates the real firmly within the symbolic (see part 1). The
signifiers that demarcate the contours of this negativity are those to which
jouissance (arising at the negativity) sticks. To put the matter simply,
negativity is the site of enjoyment.
In terms of predictive coding, the originally lost prediction is the
(real) point within the (symbolic) predictive model that is the limit of
prediction, the point where prediction fails. The failure to achieve homeo-
stasis engenders surplus prediction error. Therefore, the originally lost
prediction is the point of surprise, unexpectedness, and the unknown
within prediction. Such uncertainty is precisely what excites SEEKING,
which, as Bazan and colleagues have shown, “sticks” to the motor traces
on the precipice of the predictive model (i.e., incentive sensitization). The
22I have referenced this point elsewhere (Dall’Aglio 2020), but here I fully develop my

argument.
23Although bridging neuroscience with notoriously antinaturalist Lacanian theory is no

laughing matter.

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predictions that fail to overcome this disjuncture are those which are
jouissance-filled.
The “originally lost prediction” is a way of emphasizing the struc-
tural (“original”) disjuncture within prediction where uncertainty (“lost
prediction”) may be marked. This contrasts with a view of two opposing
entities with a gap between them (Johnston 2005)—the gap is within pre-
diction. For example, consider how the free energy principle does not
simply oppose free energy to prediction. This is observable in the predic-
tive model’s calculation of expected free energy (Fotopoulou 2013; Parr
and Friston 2018). Recall that a prediction is a probabilistic inference of
the cause of a sensory input. It is probabilistic, not absolute (even if the
self-conscious ego feels sure of its reality). While the expected prediction
error and the encountered prediction error may differ, this computational
operation points to the fact that prediction is not an absolute resolution of
prediction error. What the brain takes to be its reality (i.e., its predictive
model of the world) is itself missing something, even though this “reality”
may be experienced as a phenomenological whole. There is an uncer-
tainty within prediction.
I propose that the expected free energy calculation is not simply a
cold expectation of error. It is meaningful, betraying a limit within predic-
tion. Indeed, the incompleteness (i.e., negativity, the real) within predic-
tion (perhaps indicated by expected prediction error) is the necessary
structure of prediction that allows surplus prediction error to drive
changes in the predictive model. Negativity is the well of creativity and
the potential for predictions to slip from their “natural” pre-givens.
It is for this reason that I characterize the failed predictions—those at
the precipice of the predictive model, beyond which is the chasm of the
real—as jouissance-filled. Even though they “predict” affective con-
sciousness, they do not totally remove prediction error; they are doomed
to endlessly repeat. They are the signifiers that mark the contours of the
real within the symbolic. Moreover, they themselves bind and engender
jouissance, the incentive sensitization that grants them an exciting,
rewarding quality beyond their homeostatic aim.
Thus, the predictions that demarcate the failure (i.e., the originally
lost prediction) within prediction are paradoxically the ones that are
enjoyed. In other words, the particular way we fail—the motor plans that
mark the point of unpredicted surprise—is our particular way of deriving
jouissance.

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 Sex And Prediction Error, Part 2

I make this Lacanian reading in the spirit of neuropsychoanalytic dia-

logue. It is a suggestion intended to stimulate discussion and engagement.
To illustrate precisely how the negativity within prediction is the site of
enjoyment, I will discuss the child who famously uttered “ooo-aaa,”
fort-da.

Beyond T h e F ree E nergy P rinciple

On the paradox of a death drive that violates the pleasure principle, Freud
(1920) discusses a game invented by a child (presumably his grandson).
He describes the child, age one and a half, as “not at all precocious” but on
“good terms” with his parents and well behaved; “he never cried when his
mother left him for a few hours,” but he was “greatly attached to his
mother” (p. 14). The child had a “disturbing habit” of throwing away small
objects while saying “ooo,” which Freud interprets as fort [“gone”] (p. 14).
This expression was accompanied by “interest and satisfaction,” although
Freud attributes “greater pleasure” to a second act whereby the child some-
times pulled the toy back, uttering da [“there”] (pp. 14, 15).
One might suppose that the child has a secure attachment, given his
bond with the mother and his good behavior on her disappearance.
Nevertheless, separation from the mother would still arouse PANIC and
the corresponding prediction to SEEK the lost mother. One might suggest
that the child had learned a “secure attachment” prediction: “Mommy
will return, I just need to wait.” But this would still arouse some quota of
tension associated with the emergence of the gap.
Yet the child does not just sit there with the tension, nor does he cry.
Instead he invents a game. Whereas Freud speculates an attempt at mas-
tery over the mother’s disappearance, Lacan (1964) uses this scenario to
illustrate the emergence of objet a (i.e., the toys thrown around). Recall
that objet a is the materialization of negativity, an excessive presence in
the representational world. It is the object of the drive, the ungraspable
excess whose repetitive use allows the subject to derive jouissance (see
part 1).
When faced with the traumatic disappearance of the mother—the con-
frontation with negativity—the child invents a game by playing with
objects, metabolizing the drive arousal at the site of the gap. Freud’s dic-
tion is fortuitous: although there was “greater pleasure” attached to the da,
Freud recognizes the “interest and satisfaction taken in” the fort (pp. 15, 14).

735
 John Dall’Aglio

While da might stand in for the return of the mother, which would reduce
PANIC-tension, fort marks the “interest and satisfaction,” an excitatory
enjoyment—that is, jouissance. Fort marks a contour of the real: “gone” is
a signifier that stands in for what is absent. That the fort (i.e., throwing toys
away) was repeated more than the da (i.e., their return) highlights the inde-
pendence of jouissance from tension-reduction (Lacan 1964).
Here we have an aberration of PANIC. The predictions concerning
fort do not aim at the mother’s return or a substitute attachment. Rather
than tolerate the surplus jouissance of PANIC, the child puts this predic-
tion error to use. He invents a game which, if we are to agree with Freud
that the object stands in for the mother, might increase PANIC prediction
error. In this way, PANIC has deviated from its “natural predictive course”
and has been hooked into the logic of drive by targeting objet a. Chiefly,
rather than this aberration being cause for discontent, the child gets his
enjoyment—he does not cry and takes great joy from the game. In other
words, the child found a way to enjoy his jouissance (Fink 2011).
This example illustrates how the real—as the failure of homeostasis
(i.e., failure to reunite with the mother) and as cause for the slippage of
prediction (i.e., the child’s focusing instead on the objet)—is the site of
both creativity and jouissance. One must create when facing the surplus
prediction error at the precipice of one’s predictions. It is the child’s cre-
ation of a game that allows him to overcome the negativity of das Ding
and instead enjoy the use of objet a.
One might go a step further and suggest a hooking of PANIC into
PLAY—the child PLAYs a game of fort-da. In this sense, PLAY is also
hooked into the logic of the drive, deviating from its “natural” social pre-
diction (i.e., cooperative give-and-take with others, mastery and submis-
sion). By engaging with the prediction error at the site of negativity (with
all the slippages of instinctual predictions it entails), the child invents a way
to enjoy his jouissance. Neuroscientific evidence is not foreign to this for-
mulation, for “PLAY celebrates the joy of surprise” via its neuro-functional
intersection with SEEKING circuitry (Kellman and Radwan 2019).

A T ime F or U nderstanding : J o u i s s a n c e
I s S urplus P rediction E rror

I have argued that surplus prediction error corresponds to jouissance, and

that predictions fall on the side of the symbolic. Specifically, I have

736
 Sex And Prediction Error, Part 2

focused on the surplus prediction errors signaled by affective conscious-

ness and the primordial binding of this arousal by nondeclarative predictions
(i.e., action plans) in the (prematurely) automatized unconscious. Jouissance
is an irremovable, nonrepresentational excess within the symbolic, just as
surplus prediction error is an irremovable excess within the brain’s pre-
dictive model. Surplus prediction error is what is left unexplained and
unpredicted, yet simultaneously motivates the entire predictive machin-
ery. As affective consciousness, surplus prediction error is the extimate,
foreign core of the subject—a fount of jouissance.
There are several ways to formulate the real within the brain. Based
on the link between jouissance and predictive coding, I have suggested a
novel formulation: the originally lost prediction. This formulation empha-
sizes the extimate nature of predictive failure (the real within the sym-
bolic), casting light on the capacity for predictions to slip, drift, and be
subjected to aberration. Crucially, the signifiers (i.e., predictions) that
mark the contours of the real (i.e., predictive failure) are those that are
jouissance-filled. In other words, the particular way we fail is our mode
of enjoyment.
This Lacanian neuropsychoanalytic model makes sex (i.e., the real,
jouissance) central to the neuropsychoanalytic model of the mind. In part 1
of this three-part series, I detailed the metapsychology of jouissance.
Here, in part 2, I have laid out my arguments for why jouissance is sur-
plus prediction error and, correspondingly, why there is an originally lost
prediction (i.e., a structural negativity within the brain). In part 3 I will
suggest how Lacanian clinical technique can shed light on what we are to
do with prediction error, if eliminating it is impossible.

ORCID iD

John Dall’Aglio https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4620-743X

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Duquesne University
Department of Psychology
211 Rockwell Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15282
Email: dallagliojohn@gmail.com

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