METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITY

OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

James A. Marcum
Baylor University

This essay examines the metaphysical foundations of the natural sciences and Christian
theology in order to complement the epistemic claims from both disciplines. These
foundations include Robin Collingwood’s notion of presuppositions and Eman
McMullin 's epistemic and non-epistemic values. Specifically; the essay investigates the
presuppositions and values of science and theology used for guiding and constraining
the formation and evaluation of scientific theories and theological doctrines.
Practitioners in both disciplines need to keep these presuppositions and values in mind
when complementing epistemic claims to form a comprehensive world picture.
Complementing scientific and theological claims requires wisdom and restraint in
analyzing the presuppositions and values that make such claims possible. For, theology
without the input of science, and science without the input of theology, may lead to an
impoverished world picture.

SCIENCE-THEOLOGY INTERACTIONS

!! A n unprecedented challenge and opportunity for philosophy today,"

J writes Oskar Gruenwald, "is to mediate the emerging dialogue
between science and religion, and enhance the understanding of
the relationship between science, ethics, and faith" (1999: 157). Gruenwald
notes that philosophy in its "classic sense of sophia (love of wisdom) can,
indeed, facilitate science-religion dialogue by helping to clear up semantic
and conceptual confusion, as well as shed new light on complex inter­
connections and the interrelatedness of all phenomena" (1999: 160). The
aim of this essay is to meet both the challenge and the opportunity by
examining the metaphysical foundations of the natural sciences and religion,
particularly Christian theology, in terms of complementing epistemic claims
from both disciplines.
46 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

Robin Collingwood’s (1998) metaphysical analysis of presuppositions

and Ernan McMullin’s (1983) epistemic and non-epistemic values address the
metaphysical foundations of science and theology. Metaphysical pre­
suppositions and values are suitable not only for evaluating scientific and
theological claims, but also for tracing the origins of those claims as
important constraints that guide the formation and evaluation of scientific
theories and theological doctrines. Thus, examination of the metaphysical
foundations allows scientists and theologians to combine epistemic claims to
form a comprehensive world picture that captures the world’s complexity and
splendor but maintains the integrity of the individual disciplinary claims. As
Gruenwald suggests: "The times are ripe for genuine science-religion
dialogue seeking greater understanding and possible complementarity
between the findings of science with philosophical insights and religious
experience, without reductionist methodologies which can only compromise
distinct realms of inquiry” (1999: 165-66).

To complement scientific and theological epistemic claims, scientists and

theologians must respect each other’s metaphysical foundations and examine
each other’s claims in a charitable manner. In a postmodern, relativist age,
no one discipline can assert comprehensive truth about the world. Rather,
each discipline discovers some discrete aspect of it. Such a stance has had
an impact on the relationship of science and theology, as Gruenwald notes
in a call for a new episteme of charity: "Both enterprises presuppose a new
episteme-a more humane, scientific, and Christian understanding of God,
man, and the universe" (1990: 10). Central to this stance is restraint, for
scientists and theologians need to acknowledge that their approaches to the
world are limited. In brief, "all knowledge is imperfect and should be
treated with humility" (Gruenwald 1990: 7).

Although cooperation is the goal of complementing scientific and

theological claims, conflict is not necessarily avoided at all costs. Critical
assessment is required if a world picture, which combines complementary
scientific and theological claims, is to have any explanatory or theoretical
significance or utility. Indeed, analysis of the metaphysical foundations of
science and theology, including their presuppositions and values, permits an
examination of conflicts that arise between the two disciplines at a
fundamental level. Unexamined presuppositions and values, or their mis­
appropriation, are often an important source of conflict between scientists
and theologians. Kitty Ferguson points out that:
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 47

We tend to allow science to rely on its underlying assumptions and

insist only that all else follow logically from there. Very seldom do we
ask science to defend these assumptions. We do not, on the other
hand, tend to allow religion to rely even on its most basic principle-
that there is a God-and let all else follow logically from there.
Religion is repeatedly called back to defending that basic principle. Is
it any wonder that science and religion usually seem to be arguing past
one another? (1995: 269).

Two important assumptions undergird the current discussion over

complementarity of scientific and theological claims. First, there is a
comprehensive world picture, which may be constructed by combining or
coordinating—in a harmonizing manner—epistemic claims from scientific and
theological investigations. Second, there is a symmetrical relationship
between science and theology, especially concerning foundational criticism.
Both disciplines are capable of questioning critically each other’s epistemic
claims. Gruenwald concludes that "the times call for genuine science-religion
dialogue, understood as a dialogue among equals, without reductionism,
respecting the autonomy and necessity of diverse methodologies and
different levels of analysis, while seeking greater understanding of God’s
Creation" (1999: 170).

Various models have been proposed for science and theology

interaction, and several taxonomies to classify them. Any model for scien­
tific and theological relationships requires an analysis of the metaphysical
foundations underlying them. For these foundations of the natural sciences
and Christian theology, including presuppositions and epistemic and non-
epistemic values, ground scientific and theological claims. Grounding these
claims means that the foundations are not only important for evaluating the
claims, but also critical for understanding how they are originally formulated.
There is, then, an intimate connection between their discovery and
justification. And it is upon this analysis that the present defense of
complementarity rests. Importantly, the interaction between science and
theology according to the complementarity model does not result in the
integration of epistemic claims from each discipline at the expense of the
integrity of the individual disciplines. Rather, the combination or
coordination of these claims requires wisdom and insight, as well as restraint,
into the foundations that make possible scientific and theological claims.

In his 1989 Gifford lectures, Ian Barbour classified the interactions

between science and religion into four distinct models. In the first two
48 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

models, Barbour distinguished those interactions between the two institutions

that are either antagonistic or indifferent to each other. In the conflict
model, scientists and theologians reject each other’s epistemic claims (1997:
77-84). The basis for this mutual rejection, according to Barbour, is
science’s materialism and religion’s Biblical literalism. In the independence
model, both disciplines are regarded as completely unrelated, each with its
own methodology and articulation of epistemic claims (Barbour 1997: 84-89).
Moreover, in this model, there is no overlap between the two disciplines’
claims (Gould 1999: 49).

In the dialogue and integration models, the aim is rapprochement

between science and religion. In the dialogue model, the epistemic claims
of both disciplines overlap with one another due to common interests
(Barbour 1997: 90-98). There are three reasons, according to Barbour, that
justify dialogue between them. The first is the limit or boundary questions
that scientists raise, but cannot answer. The second is that the methods
employed in science and religion are not as distinct as once portrayed by the
logical empiricists; rather, there are "methodological parallels" between them.
The third is a "nature-centered spirituality," in which scientists and theo­
logians converse about shared spiritual experiences of the natural world.

In the integration model, scientific and religious claims are united into
a single statement (Barbour 1997: 98-105). Barbour identifies three types
of integration. The first is a natural theology, in which God’s existence is
derived or inferred from the design of nature, as discovered by scientists
through their investigations into the natural world. The next type is a
theology of nature, in which scientific claims are often used to modify
theological doctrines. Finally, there is "systematic synthesis," in which science
and religion are interwoven into what Barbour calls an "inclusive meta­
physics," especially in terms of process thought (1997: 103-5).

Barbour’s taxonomy has served as a basis for alternative taxonomies to

account for science-theology interactions. John Polkinghorne, for example,
proposed a classification scheme in which he reworks Barbour’s final two
models, dialogue and integration, in terms of consonance and assimilation.
Polkinghorne’s intention is to merge science and theology by either
harmonizing them or assimilating one into the other. In terms of con­
sonance, scientific and theological claims "must be capable of appropriate
reconciliation with each other in overlap regions," whereas in terms of
assimilation, the aim is "maximal possible conceptual merging of science and
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 49

theology" (Polkinghorne 1998: 22). John Haught also modified Barbour’s

classification of the models for science and religion interaction by intro­
ducing the four Cs: conflict, contrast, contact, and confirmation (1995: 9-26).
The last two, contact and confirmation, Haught considered the more
appropriate approaches to science and religion interaction, particularly
confirmation in which religion is taken to ground science. Other taxonomies
also include complementarity, based on Niels Bohr’s work.

THE COMPLEMENTARITY MODEL

Since Bohr’s introduction of the complementarity model in early

twentieth century to resolve certain paradoxes in physics, some adopted it
to science-theology interaction. Donald MacKay is probably one of the best
known advocates for the model. According to MacKay: "If we acquire
knowledge of a situation by different modes of interaction, the description
found valid in one mode may be inapplicable in another, and more than one
description may be required to do justice to the situation. This means in
practice that two disparate descriptions can be checked for compatibility only
after due allowance has been made for the standpoint from which each is
valid" (1974: 227). Illustrating complementarity with the question of
cosmological origins, MacKay continues: "It is only when we are considering
created history as a whole that we can strictly say that the scientific and
theistic answers to the question of origins have the same reference and are
complementary in the sense of describing different aspects of the situation
from mutually exclusive standpoints, though not in fact answering the same
question" (1974: 235).

For MacKay, complementarity is based upon a logical relationship

between scientific and theological claims: "Complementarity stands not for
a physical theory, still less for a metaphysical doctrine, but rather it stands
for a particular kind of logical relation, distinct from and additional to
traditional ones like contradiction, synonymy, or independence" (1974: 226).
Although MacKay’s complementarity has enjoyed a certain notoriety, criti­
cisms are leveled against it. For example, Hugo Bedau questions whether
the notion that science and theology are "different logical categories" is
warranted (1974: 205). Moreover, Clifton Orlebeke argues that: "There is
a sense in which complementarity insulates scientific thought from religious
thought-more so, perhaps, than the practicing Christian in science ought to
tolerate" (1977: 63). Critics of MacKay’s complementarity have a point,
especially when the model is defended from a strict logical perspective.
50 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

However, Helmut Reich defends complementarity by offering an

intriguing analysis of the various models for science-theology interaction,
using a logic-based typology. Reich concludes that complementarity "could
be one of the most fruitful approaches for relating science and theology”
(1996: 163). In response to Reich, David Grandy ponders "whether logic
can bear the full weight of any attempt to harmonize science and theology"
(1996: 169). Yet complementarity need not be defended strictly from a
logical perspective. Rather, the complementary relations of scientific and
theological statements may be defended using an analysis of their
metaphysical foundations, that is, what makes those statements possible. It
is the difference in foundations that allows different questions to be asked
about the same world, and yield seemingly paradoxical answers. Hence, it
is the analysis of those foundations that permits a complementary approach
to science and theology to form a comprehensive world picture, which
captures the world’s complexity and yet maintains the integrity of each
discipline’s epistemic claims.

An analysis of the metaphysical foundations of science and theology

also permits a comparison between complementarity and other models
proposed for science and theology interaction. For example, Barbour opts
for the integration model, particularly "systematic synthesis," since "a more
systematic integration can occur if both science and religion contribute to a
coherent world view elaborated in a comprehensive metaphysics" (1997: 103).
For Barbour, such metaphysics is concerned with categories, supplied
through process thought, in which experience can be mapped and inter­
preted. In the complementarity model, metaphysics looms large not
necessarily in supplying conceptual or logical categories or grids, but rather
in analyzing the presuppositions and values that make such categories or
grids possible.

Complementarity not only shares certain features with other models in

Barbour’s taxonomy, but also exhibits unique features. Given the differences
between science and theology with respect to foundations, complementarity,
like the independence model, preserves the integrity of both disciplines.
However, significant overlap between the two disciplines is acknowledged
in the complementarity model, such that conflict between the two disciplines
may be unavoidable at times. As for the dialogue model, complementarity
involves overlap between scientific and theological domains. However,
complementarity requires more than an overlap or shared experience
between the two disciplines to complement their epistemic claims.
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 51

Although complementarity shares certain features with Polkinghorne’s

models, it differs from his attempt to merge the two disciplines into one, by
respecting the goals and domains of each discipline. An important goal of
complementarity is to maintain the integrity of each disciplines’ epistemic
claims, even though reconciliation when a conflict prevails is not immediately
apparent. Moreover, Haught’s contact model is the closest to comple­
mentarity. The distinction, however, between the contact and comple­
mentarity models is that in the latter analysis of the foundations of the two
disciplines is important for combining or coordinating the two disciplines’
epistemic claims. Importantly, complementing epistemic claims is not
integrating them into a single statement in which the integrity of one or
both disciplines is compromised. Rather, it is a complementing, harmonizing,
combining, or coordinating of claims from both disciplines in which
disciplinary integrity is respected and maintained, in order to form a
comprehensive world picture that captures the world’s complexity.

Gruenwald argues that such complementing could lead to "a new lingua
franca, a new universal language, which could bridge the conceptual gap
between science and theology" (1994: 3). Such a lingua franca is certainly
possible and needed, as long as the integrity of each discipline is respected.
Again, efforts to complement the epistemic claims from both disciplines may
lead to conflict, until error and misunderstanding or simply ignorance in one
or both disciplines is recognized and corrected or overcome.

COLLINGWOOD’S METAPHYSICAL ANALYSIS

The role of metaphysics in the rise of the natural sciences has been the
subject of such studies as Edwin Burtt’s The Metaphysical Foundations of
Modem Physical Science (1932). In it, Burtt charts the development of
metaphysical presuppositions in the physical sciences from Copernicus and
Kepler to Newton. His thesis is that contemporary philosophical issues,
particularly those associated with the displacement of humans from the
physical and metaphysical center of the cosmos, reflect philosophers’
uncritical acceptance of the shift from a medieval to a Newtonian or modern
scientific worldview. That shift is particularly evident in the metaphysical
presuppositions and categories used to frame the modern perception of
cosmology. Specifically, the modern categories of space, time, and mass
replaced the medieval categories of substance, essence, and form. Moreover,
modern reality becomes atoms and their motions, efficient causality, and the
identification of mind with the brain. Burtt’s demonstration of the
52 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

importance of metaphysical categories and their associated presuppositions

in the development of scientific knowledge ran counter to the then
prevalent view of logical positivism that metaphysics is superfluous in the
natural sciences.

Burtt’s supporters have included Imre Lakatos, who praised Burtt for
his critique of positivism’s anti-metaphysical stance (1970: 183). But there
was also strong criticism of Burtt’s main thesis. Bertrand Russell, for
instance, interpreted Burtt’s thesis as the revival of "certain medieval
dogmas, such as belief in final causes" (1925: 255). Another important critic
was Edward Strong (1936), who argued that Burtt’s metaphysical categories
in the natural sciences are methodologically determined so that science is
driven by methods or procedures and not by metaphysics. Burtt (1943)
responded that certain metaphysical categories, such as "gravity," are
methodologically or operationally determined, while other categories, such
as the "ether," are conventionally defined. Burtt never felt a need to revise
his classic work in terms of the revolution in twentieth-century physics.
However, others picked up the gauntlet and advanced the role of
metaphysical presuppositions in contemporary science.

According to Collingwood, the metaphysician’s task is to untangle the

knot of presuppositions upon which natural science is founded. That task
is accomplished through what he calls "metaphysical analysis," which involves
the identification of the presuppositions required for raising questions about
the world (Collingwood 1998: 40). He wants to distinguish the metaphysical
analysis of presuppositions from traditional metaphysical ontology, which is
concerned with pure being or beings. It is the latter sense of metaphysics
that Isaac Newton banned from the natural sciences. Presuppositions, for
Collingwood, are not the conceptual context or even a mental act for
questioning the world. Rather, they are the assumptions or the supposing
that underlay such questioning, and as such are logically prior to any such
questioning. Collingwood gives the personal example of a rope strung
horizontally across a ship’s deck (1998: 21). He presupposes that it was
placed there for a purpose, and, only upon assuming a purpose, does the
question of its purpose arise.

Collingwood divides presuppositions into relative and absolute (1998:

29). Relative presuppositions act as both background assumptions for asking
a question under one set of conditions and for answering a different
question under another set of conditions, whereas absolute presuppositions
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 53

are always background assumptions for asking questions, never for answering
them. For example, Collingwood claims that Newton and his followers
absolutely presupposed that some events cause others. For relative pre­
suppositions, however-use of a measuring tape, for instance-presupposes
that a discrete numeric value can be determined with it (answer to a
question) and that the measurement is reliable (background assumption to
asking a question). Important for Collingwood, the logical efficacy of
absolute presuppositions, that is, their ability to engender questions about
the world, is independent of their truth-value. Rather, that efficacy depends
upon their being supposed.

The notion of absolute presuppositions permits analysis of the

foundations of the natural sciences that are crucial for framing questions
about the natural world. A number of important absolute presuppositions
form the foundations of the natural sciences, such as materialism,
reductionism, determinism, mechanism, and holism. To this list, Ferguson
adds "rationality, accessibility, contingency, objectivity, and unity" (1995: 9).
Although these presuppositions are important for generating scientific
knowledge, they are not unproblematic or universally accepted by all
scientists. For example, Scott Gilbert and Sahotra Sarkar propose that
twenty-first century biologists must shift presuppositions from the strident
reductionism predominant in twentieth-century biology to an open-ended
holism or organicism (2000: 7-8). Consequently, there is no single set of
presuppositions to which all scientists assent. Rather, based on the
discipline, they utilize a wide range of presuppositions and their
combinations to generate scientific knowledge.

There is, however, one presupposition that almost all practitioners in

the natural sciences agree upon, and that is naturalism. Although defining
naturalism is a daunting task, for present purposes the presupposition may
be taken to assert that natural phenomena are the products of natural
events and forces, and that human reason can comprehend these events and
forces. In brief, there is no need to posit forces outside the natural realm
to explain natural phenomena. "Naturalism," writes John Byl, "takes nature
to be a closed causal system open to no external (or supernatural)
influences" (2002: 77). Naturalism is commonly divided into two types:
methodological and metaphysical. Methodological naturalism presupposes
that scientists investigate only natural phenomena, and formulate physical
or mechanistic explanations for those phenomena. According to McMullin,
methodological naturalism "is simply a way of characterizing a particular
54 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

methodology, no more. In particular, it is not an ontological claim about

what sort of agency is or is not possible" (1991: 57). As such, this
presupposition limits scientific activity to the investigation of natural
phenomena, and thus serves as a guide for research in the natural sciences.
Since the naturalistic posture or attitude of scientists is confined only to
investigation of the natural world, this presupposition brackets questions
about phenomena that outstrip the physical world, such as religious
experience. Whether God intervenes in natural processes is an issue that
simply cannot be addressed directly by supposing methodological naturalism.

Metaphysical naturalism, on the other hand, is the presupposition that

physical or material phenomena are all there is. Willem Drees defines this
type of naturalism as follows: "The natural world is the whole of reality that
we know of and interact with; no supernatural or spiritual realm distinct
from the natural world shows up within our natural world, not even in the
mental life of humans" (1996: 12). As such, metaphysical naturalism denies
the existence of anything that is not physical or material. And it goes well
beyond the limit presupposed in terms of methodological naturalism, by
making metaphysical claims about nature that are often unwarranted
empirically.

As absolute presuppositions are important for analyzing how questions

are generated or framed within scientific inquiries, so they serve a similar
function in the analysis of theological inquiry. For traditional Christian
theologians, the prevailing presupposition is supernaturalism, although some
subscribe to naturalistic theology (McGrath 1998: 98-118). According to
supernaturalism, there are phenomena that transcend the natural world and
that human reason cannot comprehend, or even apprehend, without divine
aid. Stephen Barr defines supernaturalism in terms of "God who is outside
of Nature, and radically distinguished from the world He has made" (2003:
17). In God’s Creation, there is not only the natural order, but also the
supernatural order. For Christian theologians, divine revelation, particularly
in the Bible, serves as the main resource for formulating and framing
theological doctrines and dogmas. Appropriation of revelation for doctrinal
formation involves accurate and relevant Biblical interpretation.

Besides supernaturalism, there are other presuppositions used in

theological investigations, such as intervention of the divine into the created
order, intelligibility, purpose, and design. William Dembski (1999) and
others champion Intelligent Design, which questions metaphysical naturalism
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 55

not only as an explanation for the universe, but as a means for investigating
it. Stephen Meyer argues in defense of the God-hypothesis that Christian
theism is the best explanation for modern cosmology based on relativity
theoiy and Big-Bang singularity, compared to metaphysical naturalism,
pantheism, and deism (1999: 30-34). And William Marty (1993) recalls that
recent scientific and philosophical investigations into evolution reveal that
Darwin’s non-teleological argument for natural selection, combined with
chance mutation, fails to account sufficiently for the origin of life.
Importantly, God does not intrude intermittently in the created order, but
rather sustains that order, which includes the miraculous. Jesus put it best
when, after curing a person on the Sabbath, He answers critics claiming that
He is working just as His Father is (continually) working (John 5: 17).

Differences between science and theology with respect to the pre­

suppositions of naturalism and supernaturalism have been sources for past
disputes. Alas, some proponents of each discipline are too eager to discredit
the other’s presupposition about how to investigate the world. Some who
subscribe to supernaturalism reject the inadequacies of the naturalistic
presupposition. Thus, Alvin Plantinga asserts that methodological naturalism
"has little to be said for it; when examined coolly in the light of day" (1997:
153). Of course, those who subscribe to naturalism reject supernaturalism
or any possible knowledge of the supernatural. Niles Eldredge, a self-
described "lapsed Baptist," espouses agnosticism: "We humans can directly
experience that material world only through our senses, and there is no way
we can directly experience the supernatural" (2000: 13). Complementing
scientific and theological claims requires a charitable stance towards the use
of presuppositions to frame questions about the world and answer them.

Walter Thorson defends methodological naturalism as "an assumption

which limits and distinguishes scientific discourse from a wider, essentially
theological context in which it is placed" (2002: 5). Thorson asserts that
detractors of methodological naturalism, like Plantinga and Phillip Johnson,
"are overlooking the theological principles which make science legitimate,
limiting its scope and meaning" (2002: 6). The foremost principle is God’s
transcendence of Creation, as declared in the first chapter of Genesis. The
second principle Thorson derives from the second chapter of Genesis, where
God calls humans to nurture and preserve the natural world. "Science,"
writes Thorson, "is an enterprise whose aim is to offer an understanding and
explanation of created things in the (limited) context of cultivating and
keeping them. It is a response to what the natural world is, as manifested
56 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

in certain kinds of mundane, controlled experience, which are subject to our

rational scrutiny” (2002: 9).

MCMULLIN’S EPISTEMIC AND NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES

For metaphysical foundations, epistemic and non-epistemic values—as

championed by McMullin (1983)-are important for evaluating epistemic
claims as well as their formulation. In his presidential address to the
Philosophy of Science Association on values in science, McMullin, in order
to capture the role and significance of values in the natural sciences, divides
them into two kinds: epistemic and non-epistemic. Epistemic values are
those that "promote the truth-like character of science" (McMullin 1983: 18).
"The sense of my claim that science is value-laden," writes McMullin, "is that
there are certain characteristic epistemic values which are integral to the
entire process of assessment in science" (1988: 4). According to McMullin,
these include values referred to by Thomas Kuhn, with slight modification:
predictive accuracy, internal coherence, external consistency, unifying power,
fertility, and simplicity. These values, and their role in theory assessment,
include "measurements for their accuracy, experiments for their role in
theory-testing, mathematical formalisms for their elegance, theories for their
consistency or the like" (McMullin 1988: 23). They are important for
assessing the "fit" between scientific theories and the natural world.

Non-epistemic values are those that can be used, when epistemic values
fail, to close the empirical "gap between underdetermined theory and the
evidence brought in its support" (McMullin 1983: 19). They do not enhance
the theory’s "epistemic status," but reflect specific cultural, social, political,
and religious beliefs. Although these values are influential in the short run
within a community of practitioners, they are eventually replaced by
epistemic considerations: "To the extent that non-epistemic values and other
non-epistemic factors have been instrumental in the original theory-decision
. . . they are gradually sifted by the continued application of the sort of
value-judgment we have been describing here" (McMullin 1983: 23). In a
study on the development of evolutionary science during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, Michael Ruse demonstrates a shift from non-epistemic
to epistemic values in its practice. He goes on to argue that non-epistemic
values can still operate through metaphors in even the most robust science.
For example, Ruse locates such values operative in Stephen Jay Gould’s
punctuated equilibrium theory of evolution (1999: 143).
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 57

Epistemic and non-epistemic values also play an important role in

theology, although the discussion of the evaluation or expression of
theological doctrines is not necessarily conducted in these terms. Epistemic
values utilized by theologians to express and appraise doctrines are not
necessarily the same ones used by scientists for articulating and assessing
theories. For example, predictive accuracy is generally not a critical value
for evaluating or expressing theological doctrines. Doctrines are not usually
deployed to predict future events, although some are concerned with such
events. Nevertheless, theologians share some epistemic values with
scientists. For example, internal consistency is important for assessing logical
coherence in theological doctrines. Also, external coherence with other
theological doctrines is an important factor for evaluating the robustness of
a specific doctrine. For example, Bruce Marshall avers that the Trinity is a
"primary" doctrine to which other doctrines must cohere (2000: 108).

Non-epistemic or cultural-including scientific-values are also important

for expressing and evaluating theological doctrines, for they can influence
doctrinal content. Western Christian theologians use different metaphors
and models to express and evaluate the meaning of the doctrine of the
atonement (McIntyre 1992: 26). These metaphors and models are based
upon a notion of justice, in which guilt is the predominant social value.
However, this value is of little consequence for expressing and evaluating the
doctrine in Japan, where shame is the predominant social value underlying
the notion of justice (Green & Baker 2000: 153-70). Scientific values can
also influence the expression and evaluation of theological doctrines. Thus,
Arthur Peacocke utilizes current evidence from biology and psychology to
evaluate the doctrine of human being, exploring the issue that genetic
imprinting raises for understanding original sin (1993: 245-48).

Gruenwald also discusses the importance of values in science: "One of

the truly amazing aspects of the current science-religion dialogue is the
opening of natural science to questions of value and meaning, which are
basically theological in nature" (1995: 162). He goes on to propose "a
fundamental reassessment (<Grundlagenforschung) of all the arts and sciences,
social sciences and humanities, in order to reconnect facts and values in
complementary ways across all disciplines" (Gruenwald 1995: 166). In
commenting on Gruenwald’s essay, Brigitte Cooper (1995) also stresses the
importance of metaphysics for science and theology interaction.
58 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

HUMAN ORIGINS

Both the natural sciences and Christian theology assert important

epistemic claims about human origins. For science, the goal is to investigate
the phylogenetic relationship of humans to other organisms. Thus, scientists
endeavor to reconstruct human evolution from the fossilized remains of
hominid progenitors (Stringer 2001), and from the analysis of molecular
genetic variations among human populations (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman
2003), assuming that there is a natural, material, mechanistic, and genetic
connection between modern humans and hominid ancestors. Theology, on
the other hand, investigates the divine origin of humans or the relationship
of humans to God. The goal here is to interpret appropriately and
accurately the divine-human relationship as revealed in the Bible, assuming
that there is a supernatural or spiritual relationship between God and
humans (Barth 1960; Weber 1981).

The complementarity model seeks unity in the scientific and theological

epistemic claims on human origins in order to capture their intricacy and
grandeur. The natural sciences complement the picture of divine human
origins with a theory of human evolution from hominid progenitors. Science
is chiefly concerned with the relationship of humans to other organisms and
the natural world. Humans are descendant from progenitor hominids,
according to the theory of evolution. Science, then, provides a mechanistic
"how" of Creation. Christian theology complements the picture of evolved
human origins with its doctrine of the divine creation of humans. Theology
is chiefly concerned with the relationship of humans to God. For humans
are descended from the divine as the imago Dei, according to the doctrine
of Creation. Theology, then, reveals the teleological "why" of evolution.
Both the theory of human evolution and the doctrine of human creation are
required to constitute a comprehensive picture of human origins. To ignore
or disparage one or the other is to distort what it means to be fully human
in terms of origins.

Yet serious problems and conflicts arise between science and theology
with respect to human origins. For example, the notion of the soul con­
stitutes a major stumbling block for any attempt at a comprehensive picture
of human origins based on scientific and theological claims. For scientists,
the soul is often reduced to the mind, which in turn is reduced to the
structure and function of the brain. In an effort to address this conflict, a
non-reductive physicalist model has been proposed to integrate contemporary
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 59

developments in the neurosciences with the orthodox Christian doctrine of

the soul. According to this model, the human person is envisioned ”as a
unitary physical entity without a separate nonphysical soul, but not reducible
to ‘nothing but’ the physiology of cells or the chemistry of molecules”
(Brown 1998: 215). Although proponents of this model strive to remain
true to the character of the orthodox doctrine of the soul, and raise
important and interesting issues concerning that doctrine versus the neuro­
sciences, serious problems arise such as the ontology of religious conversion.

Complementarity avoids such dilemmas by affirming the ontological

distinctiveness of the soul, especially in terms of the imago Dei (Clines 1998;
Weber 1981). Humanity as the image of God cannot be captured in
physicalist terms alone, reductive or not, since that image outstrips the
physical dimension, being by definition an image of the Divine Who is Spirit.
Hence, religious conversion cannot be portrayed simply in terms of altered
neural networks or brain states. Conversion is a moral miracle, to use the
terminology of Catholic theologians, which transcends human physical nature.
But problems such as the soul expose our ignorance and the need for
further investigation into human origins, both scientific and theological. For
science, more research is required concerning the hominid fossil record,
especially sequencing of the human genome and the genomes of other
primates. For theology, more appropriate and relevant interpretation of
Biblical texts is required.

CONCLUSION

The vision of complementing scientific and theological epistemic claims

relies on an analysis of the foundations of science and theology, which is
metaphysical rather than empirical. Since the logical efficacy of pre­
suppositions for raising questions about the world is in their being supposed,
Collingwood warns that they cannot be justified simply on an empirical basis.
To transcend the polemic fueling current discussion of the interplay between
science and theology, such as creationism and evolutionism, requires a re­
working of the relationship between the two disciplines away from empirical
justification to include an analysis of their metaphysical foundations. Only
then can the proper evaluation of the empirical evidence be made.

Such reworking of the interaction between science and theology must

be based on wisdom or sapientia rather than knowledge or scientia alone.
Pope John Paul II encourages scientists "to continue their efforts without
60 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

ever abandoning the horizon of wisdom within which scientific and tech­
nological achievements are wedded to the philosophical and ethical values
that are distinctive and indelible mark of the human person" (2002: 169).
Instead of forcing an integration of the epistemic claims at the expense of
the integrity of one or both disciplines, such claims must be combined or
complemented wisely to fashion a world picture that captures both its order
and elegance so that sound decisions and judgments may be made concern­
ing difficult choices. As Robert Bishop concludes, complementing scientific
and theological claims "does justice to the fullness and complexity of reality,
since science and theology are not limited by territorial boundaries, but by
emphasis and purpose of inquiry" (1993: 158).

Polkinghorne extends Bishop’s argument by including ethics: "Science

provides opportunities for action, but it does not itself tell us how these
opportunities should be used. It confers knowledge but not wisdom ....
Theology seeks to confer not only knowledge of the divine will but also the
wisdom to make the right choices and to live lives conformed to God’s good
and perfect will" (1998: 129). Thus, ethics or the wise guidance of human
action serves as the means to combine and complement theological and
scientific epistemic claims; for science is limited in terms of applying its
knowledge wisely to the human existential condition.

Gruenwald (1993) also recognizes the limits of science, and advocates

a "rainbow paradigm" to address such areas as values and morality. Accord­
ing to Gruenwald, humans must be "unbracketed" to address questions
concerning values and morality, since such "areas intertwine around the
central concept of man as an intelligent, self-conscious, and free being,
irreducible to physical components alone" (1994: 10). For Gruenwald, the
reductionism of the scientific worldview-though responsible for much of the
success of modern science-has eliminated humans from the larger discourse.
His agenda is to place humans in the center of science and theology inter­
actions as the "missing link" (Gruenwald 1994). There is, then, an
incarnational dimension to the metaphysical foundations of science and
theology, both at the individual and social levels. And, in this dimension,
wise action or ethics is an important part of the missing link, according to
Gruenwald, by securing humans to the world in which the Holy Spirit
intercedes to link them to God.

Moreover, science and theology have a historical connection to each

other. As Stanley Jaki relates, the natural sciences arose in the Western
COMPLEMENTARITY OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY 61

world due to Christianity’s view of God as a rational Creator. Nancy

Pearcey and Charles Thaxton expand upon Jaki’s thesis in an effort to
retrieve Christianity’s lost heritage. They discuss the Christian assumptions
that undergird the development of Western science. These include the
reality of nature, its value and goodness, contingency, reliability and
predictability, rational order and lawfulness, mathematical precision, and
intelligibility and discoverability. But in light of the secularization of science,
Pearcey and Thaxton ask: Tf science received much of its impetus from
Christian assumptions, what will happen now that those assumptions have
eroded-now that Christianity is no longer a public faith undergirding science
but merely a private belief held by individual scientists?" (1994: 41-42). Jaki
(1990) offers a provocative answer to that question: Christ must become
the Savior of science.

Given the historical connection between science and theology, both

disciplines call forth each other in terms of providing epistemic claims about
the world that disclose avenues of investigation for the other. For example,
humans are curious about their phylogenetic origins and struggle to under­
stand "how" they came to be. But answers to how questions raise questions
about the "why," and answers to why questions call forth further how
questions. As scientists discover the phylogenetic relationships between
humans and other organisms, these discoveries call forth concerns over their
meaning. And, as those meanings are formulated and promulgated, they, in
turn, call forth questions concerning the discoveries. Thus, both the how
questions of science and the why questions of theology reinforce each other
as they are answered by scientific and theological explorations into human
origins. The calling forth of each discipline by the other, then, is the
foundation of complementarity, and the metaphysical analysis of this
foundation in terms of presuppositions and values provides the possibility of
articulating such a model. The central issue concerning complementarity of
scientific and theological claims is one of meaning, which Thomas Platt
embeds in a notion of revelation as communication:

Unlike science, which approaches the world with a mechanistic

paradigm, religious explanations, or at least those within the Judeo-
Christian tradition, approach the world with what might be called a
‘communication paradigm’ . . . revelation is communication, and
communication has meaning. The religious analysis of the world of
human experience aims at understanding that world as communication,
a reality, which has meaning" (1990: 35).
62 JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

The purpose of complementarity is to enhance such meaning based on

a comprehensive world picture that includes the epistemic claims from
scientific and theological investigations into the world, for either discipline
on its own terms yields only an impoverished, or even distorted, picture of
the world. As John Paul concludes in a letter to the director of the Vatican
Observatory: "Science can purify religion from error and superstition;
religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes .... Only a
dynamic relationship between theology and science can reveal those limits
which support the integrity of either discipline, so that theology does not
profess a pseudo-science and science does not become an unconscious
theology" (1988: 5).

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James A. Marcum teaches philosophy at Baylor University, P.O. Box 97273,

Waco, TX 76798. First draft presented at ICSA VI. World Congress 2004.
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