Philos Stud (2013) 163:177–196

DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9806-2

Is evil just very wrong?

Todd Calder

Published online: 1 September 2011

Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Is evil a distinct moral concept? Or are evil actions just very wrong
actions? Some philosophers have argued that evil is a distinct moral concept. These
philosophers argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing.
Other philosophers have suggested that evil is only quantitatively distinct from
ordinary wrongdoing. On this view, evil is just very wrong. In this paper I argue that
evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. The first part of the paper is
critical. I argue that Luke Russell’s attempt to show that evil is only quantitatively
distinct from ordinary wrongdoing fails. Russell’s argument fails because it is based
on an implausible criterion for determining whether two concepts are qualitatively
distinct. I offer a more plausible criterion and argue that based on this criterion evil
and wrongdoing are qualitatively distinct. To help make my case, I sketch a theory
of evil which makes a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrong-
doing. I argue that we cannot characterize evil as just very wrong on plausible
conceptions of evil and wrongdoing. I focus on act-consequentialist, Kantian, and
contractarian conceptions of wrongdoing.

Keywords Evil
Wrongdoing
Qualitative
Moral Theory

Some philosophers believe that evil is not a distinct moral concept; evil is just
very wrong.1 Others argue that evil is a distinct moral concept; evil is

1
I have found that, when asked, most philosophers and laymen say that evil is just very wrong or very
bad. But as far as I know, Luke Russell offers the only argument for this view (Russell 2007).

T. Calder (&)
Saint Mary’s University, 923 Robie Street, Halifax, NS B3H 3C3, Canada
e-mail: todd.calder@smu.ca

123
178 T. Calder

qualitatively, rather than merely quantitatively, distinct from ordinary wrongdo-

ing.2 Does it matter?
If evil is just very wrong we can do without the term ‘evil.’ We can say
everything we need to say using terms such as ‘very wrong’ or ‘very very wrong.’ In
addition, there may be good reasons to avoid using the term ‘evil.’ Some
philosophers believe the term ‘evil’ should not be used because it is ambiguous and/
or dangerous.3 One reason the term ‘evil’ is thought to be ambiguous is that it may
carry with it questionable metaphysical commitments to Satan, dark forces, or the
supernatural, which are not made explicit, or are concealed. To say that a particular
action is evil may imply that the agent who performs the act is possessed by a dark
force or is working for Satan. Sometimes, especially in religious or fictional
contexts, the term is meant to carry with it these questionable metaphysical
commitments, while at other times, especially in moral and political contexts, it is
not. However, even in moral and political contexts, it is not always clear whether
these questionable metaphysical commitments are implied.
Another reason the term ‘evil’ is thought to be confusing is that it may imply
questionable psychological, or philosophical, theses such as that some people are
inherently criminal, or that some people’s motives are incomprehensible. Often
when the term ‘evil’ is used it is not clear whether these questionable psychological,
or philosophical, theses are implied.
The term ‘evil’ is thought to be dangerous since, given possible implicit
references to the supernatural, inherent criminality, and/or incomprehensible
motives, calling agents ‘evildoers’ may suggest that these agents are inhuman or
inherently bad and thus not deserving of humane treatment. For instance, it may be
that by repeatedly calling terrorists ‘evildoers’ former US President George W.
Bush suggested that it is permissible to torture and mistreat captured terrorists. This
suggestion may have been partially responsible for the torture and mistreatment of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib and other military prisons. In this way attributions of
evildoing may lead to further wrongdoing.
Philosophers who believe we should abandon the term ‘evil’ have been called
evil skeptics. Philosophers who believe we should continue to use the term ‘evil’
have been labelled evil-revivalists (Russell 2006). Evil revivalists believe ‘evil’
refers to a distinct category of immorality which need not imply the existence of
Satan, dark forces, or the supernatural, or theses about inherent criminality or
incomprehensible motives. Evil revivalists hope that through careful analysis a
secular moral concept of evil can be illuminated and distinguished from religious or
fictitious conceptions. But first, the evil revivalist must argue that a secular moral
concept of evil, if illuminated, would be qualitatively distinct from ordinary
wrongdoing. For if evil is just very wrong, we can safely abandon the concept of
evil.
So this is what is at stake: if evil is not qualitatively distinct from ordinary
wrongdoing, we should abandon the moral concept of evil since ascriptions of evil

2
Many philosophers writing about evil contend that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary
wrongdoing. See, e.g. (Garrard 1998, 2002; Haybron 2002; Steiner 2002; de Wijze 2002).
3
See e.g. (Cole 2006; Clendinnen 1999; Held 2001).

123
Is evil just very wrong? 179

are ambiguous and dangerous. If evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary

wrongdoing, more philosophical work needs to be done on this distinct, and
arguably important, category of immorality?
In this paper I argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing.
I begin with a critique of Luke Russell’s argument that evil is not qualitatively
distinct from ordinary wrongdoing (Russell 2007). I argue that Russell’s argument is
based on an implausible criterion for determining whether two concepts are
qualitatively distinct. I offer a more plausible criterion and argue that based on this
criterion evil and wrongdoing are qualitatively distinct. To help make my case I
sketch a theory of evil which makes a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil
and ordinary wrongdoing.

1 Russell’s criterion of qualitative distinctness

Russell’s criterion for determining whether a theory of evil makes a genuinely

qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing is based on some claims made
by evil-revivalists to support their view that evil is qualitatively distinct from
ordinary wrongdoing. According to evil-revivalist Hillel Steiner ‘‘evil acts are
distinguished from ordinary wrongs through the presence of an extra quality that is
completely absent in the performance of ordinary wrongs’’ (Steiner 2002, p. 184).
The evil-revivalist Eve Garrard seems to agree with Steiner when she writes that
‘‘evil acts are not just very bad or wrongful acts, but rather ones possessing some
especially horrific quality’’ (Garrard 2002, p. 321).
Following Steiner and Garrard, Russell argues that a qualitative distinction
between evil and wrongdoing is made only if ‘‘evil actions differ from ordinary
wrongs in virtue of possessing some particular property or properties not possessed
to any degree by ordinary wrongs’’ (Russell 2007, p. 661). Thus, to be qualitatively
distinct from ordinary wrongdoing, evil acts must have a quality that could not be
found in any possible instance of mere wrongdoing to any degree. For instance, if it
is distinctive of evil acts that they are done from malicious motives, then there
cannot be an instance of ordinary wrongdoing that includes malice. All malicious
acts must be evil and not merely wrong.
Russell uses this criterion to show that the theories of evil of various evil-revivalists
are either implausible as theories of evil or else cannot make a genuinely qualitative
distinction between evil and wrongdoing. The upshot is supposed to be that we cannot
make a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing.
Consider, for example, Russell’s treatment of Steiner’s theory of evil. Steiner
claims that ‘‘evil acts are wrong acts that are pleasurable for their doers’’ (Steiner
2002, p. 189). On Russell’s charitable interpretation of Steiner’s theory ‘‘evil actions
are those wrong actions in which the agent takes some degree of pleasure in either
the wrongness or a wrong-making feature of the act’’ (Russell 2007, p. 669).4

4
This is a charitable interpretation of Steiner’s view because it wouldn’t be evil for an agent to take
pleasure in a feature of an act that was morally good or neutral rather than wrong. Thus, Steiner’s theory
of evil would be implausible if it characterized evil simply as wrongful acts that are pleasurable.

123
180 T. Calder

Russell argues that Steiner’s account focuses on a clear qualitative distinction

between two classes of actions, but that the distinction is not the distinction between
evil and wrongdoing. The main reason that Steiner’s account fails to distinguish
between evil and wrongdoing is that it implies that some relatively trivial wrongs
are evil. For instance, on Steiner’s account, it seems that taking pleasure in
shoplifting or in mildly insulting a bus driver would be evil since in these cases the
agent does something wrong and takes pleasure in the wrongness or a wrong-
making feature of the act. But surely these relatively trivial wrongs are not evils.
Thus, Steiner’s theory of evil is implausible (Russell 2007, pp. 669–670).
To avoid this objection Russell suggests that Steiner could revise his theory to
say ‘‘that evil actions are those extremely harmful wrong actions in which the agent
takes pleasure’’ (Russell 2007, p. 670). On this revised theory, trivial wrongs such as
taking pleasure in shoplifting would not turn out to be evil since these actions are
not extremely harmful. Thus, the revised theory seems to offer a more plausible
account of evil. However, Russell argues that ‘‘The problem with this move, from
Steiner’s point of view, is that it implies that there is no qualitatively distinct
psychological property possessed by all and only evil actions’’ (p. 670). In other
words, unlike Steiner’s original theory, the revised theory does not make a
genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing because it does not
pick out some property, or properties, which all evil acts have that all merely
wrongful acts lack. Thus, Russell argues, Steiner’s theory is either implausible
because it implies that taking pleasure in trivial wrongs is evil, or else (when
revised) it does not make a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and
wrongdoing.

2 The problem with Russell’s criterion and the way forward

I disagree with Russell’s assessment of Steiner’s theory, not because I agree with
Steiner’s original theory or with the revised view suggested by Russell, but because
I think that both versions of the theory make a genuinely qualitative distinction
between evil and wrongdoing. Russell’s contention that Steiner’s revised view does
not make a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing is based
on an implausible criterion for determining whether two concepts are qualitatively
distinct. Consider how Russell’s criterion would apply to the concepts of tables and
chairs. It seems that there is a genuinely qualitative distinction between tables
and chairs. But what is the difference between these two concepts? Both tables and
chairs can be made from different sorts of materials, have four legs, have hard flat
surfaces, be backless, etc.5 I contend that the essential distinguishing property of a
chair is that it is primarily used for sitting on, while the essential distinguishing
property of a table is that it is primarily used to set things on. However, if I am
correct, Russell would say that there isn’t a qualitative distinction between tables
and chairs. Here’s why. Although a table is primarily used to set things on, it can
also be used for sitting. And while a chair is primarily used for sitting, we can also

5
A backless chair is a stool.

123
Is evil just very wrong? 181

set things on chairs. Thus, according to Russell’s criterion for distinguishing

between concepts, there is no qualitative distinction between tables and chairs
because chairs do not possess some special quality, such as being used for sitting,
that no table ever has to any degree, and tables do not possess some special quality,
such as being used to set things on, that no chair ever has to any degree. But surely
there is a genuinely qualitative distinction between tables and chairs.
Here is what I think makes for a genuinely qualitative distinction between
concepts: one concept is qualitatively distinct from another provided that all of the
essential properties of the first concept are not all of the essential properties of
the second concept, but had to a greater or lesser degree. On this way of making the
distinction between concepts, tables and chairs are qualitatively distinct provided
that what makes a table a table is not what makes a chair a chair except that tables
have the property, or properties, to one degree while chairs have the property, or
properties, to another degree. On this view, tables and chairs are qualitatively
distinct even if the special quality that makes a chair a chair, i.e. that it is primarily
used for sitting, is had by some tables to a lesser degree, i.e. some tables are
occasionally used for sitting. Some tables can occasionally be used for sitting and
the concepts of tables and chairs are still distinct because tables have this property
only incidentally and not essentially. That is, their being used to be sat on, to any
degree, is not what makes them tables.
Similarly, for evil to be qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing it isn’t
necessary that evil acts have some quality that merely wrongful acts never have to
any degree. It is sufficient that evil acts have a quality that merely wrongful acts do
not have essentially to any degree.6 Evil is distinct from ordinary wrongdoing
provided evil and wrongdoing do not share all of their essential properties.
On Steiner’s revised theory of evil, the essential properties of evil are
wrongdoing, extreme harm, and pleasure in wrongdoing or in a wrong-making
feature of an act. Thus, evil is qualitatively distinct from wrongdoing on this theory
of evil provided these three properties are not also the essential properties of
wrongdoing when they occur to a lesser degree. So now the question becomes, are
wrongdoing, harm, and pleasure in wrongdoing or in a wrong-making feature of an
act essential properties of wrongdoing? We might say that wrongdoing is an
essential property of wrongdoing, but if we do we haven’t said much. The more
interesting claims are that wrongdoing essentially involves harm and pleasure in
doing wrong or in a wrong-making feature of an act. It is controversial whether
wrongdoing essentially involves harm.7 But few would argue that it is necessary for
wrongdoing that we take pleasure in doing wrong or in a wrong-making feature of
an action. For example, it seems that lying, stealing, murder, etc., are wrong whether

6
Haille Liberto has suggested an account of when two concepts are qualitatively distinct which is even
more permissive than the one I have suggested here. Liberto believes that two concepts might be distinct
even if they share all of their essential properties. Concepts A and B might share all their essential
properties and yet be distinct provided A puts more emphasis on some particular property, or properties,
than does B and vice versa. I will not pursue this more permissive view in this paper.
7
Consequentiailists will argue that wrongdoing essentially involves causing or allowing harm, while
deontologists will deny that wrongdoing need be harmful. See Sect. 4 for more about these theories of
wrongdoing.

123
182 T. Calder

or not we take pleasure in doing wrong or in a feature of these acts that makes them
wrong. Thus, it is not plausible to suggest that it is essential for wrongdoing that a
perpetrator takes pleasure in doing wrong or in a wrong-making feature of her
action. Hence, on Steiner’s revised theory of evil, evil and wrongdoing do not share
all of their essential properties. Since on Steiner revised theory of evil evil and
wrongdoing do not share all of their essential properties, evil and wrongdoing are
qualitatively distinct on this conception of evil.
However, Steiner’s revised theory of evil is implausible because it isn’t necessary
for evil that a perpetrator takes pleasure in doing wrong or in a wrong-making
feature of her action.8 For instance, as Daniel Haybron has suggested, it would be
evil for someone to watch passively, and without emotion, as a child drinks from a
bottle of Drano (Haybron 2002, p. 271). In fact, it seems that we must agree with
Kant that in some cases ‘‘the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not only far more
dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than we would have
taken him to be without it’’ (Kant 1997, p. 8). Steiner’s revised theory fails, as does
his original theory, because we can do evil without taking pleasure in doing wrong
or in a wrong-making feature of our action. So while Russell fails to show that
Steiner revised theory cannot make a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil
and wrongdoing, we have other reasons not to accept the revised view. In Sect. 4
I sketch a more plausible theory of evil. But first more needs to be said about the
nature of wrongdoing.

3 Evil and wrongdoing

What makes an act wrong? Different moral theories give different answers to this
question. In this section I consider whether evil and wrongdoing share all of their
essential properties on two popular moral theories: act-consequentialism and
Kantian ethics. I argue that they do not.
According act-consequentialism, an act is right if it maximizes the overall good
and wrong if it does not. Let us assume that according to act-consequentialism
wrongdoing not only fails to maximize the good but that it leads to harm under some
interpretation of harm.9 Let us assume further that according to act-consequential-
ism the more overall harm we cause, or allow, the greater is the wrong. For
example, a light pinch on the arm is not very wrong while a slap across the face is a
greater wrong. Given this theory of wrongdoing, and of degrees of wrongdoing, evil
would not be qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing if our theory of evil
was that evil consists in causing extreme overall harm. If evil consist in causing
extreme overall harm and wrongdoing consist in causing overall harm, the property
that makes evil acts evil is the same as the property that makes wrong acts wrong. It
is just that evil acts have this property to a greater degree than merely wrongful acts.
Thus, on a purely act-consequentialist theory of wrongdoing and evil, evil is just

8
Russell makes a similar criticism of Steiner’s view (Russell 2007, p. 670).
9
For instance, we might say that any act that does not maximize the good deprives some agent of some
good and that being deprived of some good is a harm. In this way, wrongful actions are harmful.

123
Is evil just very wrong? 183

very wrong. There is no genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and

wrongdoing.
However, a purely act-consequentialist theory of evil is implausible because it
isn’t sufficient for evil that we cause extreme overall harm.10 The harm must also be
intended.11 Consider the following case which I will call Snowball. In Snowball, A
hits B with a snowball causing B to slip and break his neck. A has caused B extreme
overall harm, but it is implausible to think that A has committed an evil act unless A
intended to break B’s neck by throwing the snowball. However, in Snowball A has
no such intention. She intends to cause her victim only the sort of harm normally
caused by being struck by a snowball. Thus in Snowball, A’s act is not plausibly evil
even though she causes extreme overall harm.
To avoid this sort of counterexample an act-consequentialist might move from
actual consequence act-consequentialism to what has been called expected,
probable, or foreseeable, consequence act-consequentialism.12According to
expected consequence act-consequentialism an act is right if it is expected to
maximize the good, and wrong if it is not. We might then contend that the greater
the expected overall harm, the greater is the wrong. And further, that an agent
performs an evil act if it is expected to bring about extreme overall harm.
According to expected consequence act-consequentialism, in Snowball A does
something wrong by throwing a snowball at B because her act is expected to cause
some overall harm. But she does not do something very wrong since the amount
of harm expected is the amount of harm normally associated with being struck
by a snowball, which is relatively minor. Thus, unlike actual consequence act-
consequentialism, expected consequence act-consequentialism does not give us an
intuitively implausible evaluation of the moral status of A’s action in Snowball. A
does wrong by throwing a snowball at B, but she does not do evil.
Since expected consequence act-consequentialism seems to give us the right
answer to Snowball, we might think that evil and wrongdoing share essential
properties to varying degrees on an expected consequence act-consequentialist
conception of wrongdoing; evil is just very wrong on this conception. However,
other counterexamples show that we cannot plausibly characterize evil as just very
wrong on expected consequence act-consequentialism either. Consider the case of
Malicious Hirer. In Malicious Hirer A has the power to hire a candidate for a
prestigious well-paying job: President of a charity organization called Good Deeds.
Two people have applied: B and C. B has worked hard to acquire the education and
experience for this specific job, and she is one of the two most qualified applicants
for the job. A is aware of B’s qualifications. A also knows that if B doesn’t get the
job she will be devastated and suffer a severe depression. A knows that C is equally

10
It may not be necessary for evil that we cause extreme overall harm either. Garrard argues that evil
need not involve harm at all (Garrard 1998, pp. 45–46). I disagree with Garrard about this, but I won’t
argue for this point here. Below I will argue that we need not cause, or allow, extreme overall harm to do
evil. Evil requires a victim’s suffering but it does not require overall harm.
11
As we will see later, there are other components of evil besides harm and intention. For now I focus
only on these two components.
12
For discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of this form of consequentialism see (Singer 1977;
Gruzalski 1981; Jackson 1991; Feldman 2006; Sinnott-Armstrong 2008).

123
184 T. Calder

well-qualified for the job but that C will not suffer a depression if she doesn’t get the
job. However, the situation is such that if C gets the job the lives of a lot of people
will be greatly improved. C is a celebrity. If C gets the job, Good Deeds will receive
a lot of publicity which will result in more donations. Let us say that it is obvious
that hiring C rather than B will maximize the good and prevent some people from
suffering more than B would suffer from the depression.13 A hires C reasonably
expecting that she will bring about these good effects, but she does not really care
about the overall good or about preventing suffering. She cares only about getting
pleasure from the suffering of others. The reason A hires C rather than B is to take
pleasure in the suffering this will cause B and not to maximize the overall good or to
prevent suffering. This makes her act evil.14 But since it is also expected that her
action will maximize the overall good her act is right according to expected
consequence act-consequentialism. If according to expected consequence act-
consequentialism an act can be both right (and thus, not wrong) and evil, we cannot
characterize evil as the very wrong according to this conception of wrongdoing.
Let us now consider whether we can characterize evil as the very wrong on a
Kantian conception of wrongdoing. For Kant an act is wrong if it is prohibited by
the supreme principle of morality, i.e. the categorical imperative, and permitted if it
is not. Kant offers several formulations of the categorical imperative. The two
formulations which are the most distinct and the most often used by contemporary
Kantians are his formulas of universal law and humanity. According to the formula
of universal law we must ‘‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which
[we] can at the same time will that it become a universal law’’ (Kant 1997, p. 31).
For example, it is wrong to gain some advantage through deception because if it
were a universal law that agents in our circumstances use deception to gain the
advantage we seek then our deception would fail because deception succeeds only
when others are not aware that they are being deceived, and everyone would be
aware of our attempted deception if agents always use deception in our
circumstances. Thus, we cannot consistently will to act on a maxim to use
deception to gain some advantage while at the same time willing that this maxim
become universal law. Our maxim could only be successful if it was not a universal
law, and so it is wrong to act on this maxim.15
According to the formula of humanity, we are required to ‘‘So act that [we] use
humanity, whether in [our] own person or in the person of any other, always at the
same time as an end, [and] never merely as a means’’ (Kant 1997, p. 38).
By ‘humanity’ Kant means our rational choice-making capacity (Kant 1996,

13
If B doesn’t get the job she will suffer greatly, but not as much as potential beneficiaries of aid from
Good Deeds will suffer from lack of food, shelter, clean water, medicine, etc. if C doesn’t get the job.
14
In Sect. 4 I will say more about what makes an act evil. For now I will rely on the intuition that
intentionally causing significant suffering for the purpose of obtaining pleasure from this suffering is evil.
15
This is, of course, an extremely truncated discussion of the formula of universal law, focusing only on
how we can derive a duty not to deceive from this formulation. For brevity sake I have left out a
discussion of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties along with the correlative distinction
between contradictions in conception and contradictions in the will. However, I think there is enough here
for my purposes. My interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law has been influenced by Korsgaard
(2003, Korsgaard 1986).

123
Is evil just very wrong? 185

p. 154).16 Kant explains that to treat the humanity in another person as an end in
itself, and not merely as a means, it is necessary that she be able ‘‘to contain
within [herself] the end of the very same action’’ (Kant 1997, p. 38). In other
words, to treat the humanity in a person as an end in itself and not merely as a
means, we must allow her to choose for herself whether she will be used in the
manner in which she is used. According to the formula of humanity, deception is
wrong because when we deceive another person we do not allow her to choose for
herself how she will be used. When we deceive another person it may seem to her
that she is able to choose, but she cannot really choose since we have not allowed
her to know the true nature of the choices available to her.
So one way to treat the humanity of another person as an end in itself, and not
merely as a means, is to allow her to choose for herself how she will act or be used.
However, to treat humanity as an end in itself, it isn’t sufficient to allow others to
choose for themselves how they will act or be used. To treat humanity as an end in
itself it is necessary to recognize the unconditional and incomparable value of
humanity (Kant 1997, pp. 36–45). Sometimes people do not recognize the
unconditional and incomparable value of their own humanity. For instance, some
people are willing to commit suicide out of a desire to escape a life of suffering.
According to Kant, the problem with suicide is that someone who commits suicide
values the cessation of suffering over her rational choice-making capacity when her
rational choice-making capacity has incomparably more value. We must try as best
we can to preserve this rational choice-making capacity. If we are willing to trade
our humanity for something that has less value, we do not recognize its
unconditional and incomparable value as we should.
Kant extends this idea even further by saying that our actions must not only be
‘‘consistent with the preservation of humanity as an end in itself’’ they must also be
consistent with ‘‘the furtherance of this end’’ (Kant 1997, p. 39). It is not sufficient
to resist inclinations to harm the humanity in ourselves and in other people. We
must, as far as possible, try to enhance the humanity in ourselves and in other
people. It is for this reason that Kant argues that it is wrong to neglect our talents.
We must not only preserve our rational choice-making capacity, we must try to
enhance this capacity.
Now that we have discussed the Kantian conception of wrongdoing, we are in a
position to consider how to make sense of degrees of wrongdoing on this
conception.17 It is hard to see how to make sense of degrees of wrongdoing using
the formula of universal law. How can we more or less consistently will that our
maxim become universal law? It seems that we can either consistently will that our
maxim become universal law, or we cannot.
To make sense of degrees of wrongdoing on Kant’s moral theory we are better-
off with the formula of humanity. On the formula of humanity, degrees of
wrongdoing consist in degrees of failing to treat humanity as an end in itself. The
16
There are different interpretations of what Kant means by ‘humanity’ (Calder 2005, pp. 238–243;
Korsgaard 1986, pp. 106–132; Wood 1995, pp. 301–319). I won’t argue for a particular interpretation
here. For my purposes here it will be sufficient to take Kant’s definition of humanity in the Metaphysics of
Morals at face value (p. 154).
17
I discuss this question more fully in my paper ‘‘Kant and Degrees of Wrongness,’’ 2005.

123
186 T. Calder

more we fail to treat humanity as an end in itself the greater is our wrong. Recall
that there are two ways to fail to treat humanity as an end in itself. The first way
is to not allow an agent to contain within herself the end for the very same action
for which she is used. In other words, we treat someone merely as a means when
we do not allow her to choose for herself how she is to act or be used. Building
on this idea, we might say that the more we use someone in a way that hinders the
attainment of her own permissible choices or ends, the more we use her merely as
a means. We could say that there are two ways in which a person’s humanity may
be used in a way that hinders the attainment of her own permissible choices or
ends to a greater degree. First, a person’s humanity is used in a way that hinders
the attainment of her own permissible choices or ends to a greater degree the
more the way she is used makes the attainment of her ends less likely. Second, a
person’s humanity is used in a way that hinders the attainment of her own
permissible choices or ends to a greater degree the more important are the ends
which have been made less likely. For instance, if Mary wants to buy a bicycle
costing four hundred dollars it would be more of a hindrance to the attainment of
her permissible ends to steal two hundred dollars from her than it would be to
steal fifty dollars from her. It is more of a hindrance to the attainment of her
permissible ends to steal two hundred dollars from her because it makes her goal
of buying a four hundred dollar bicycle less likely than does stealing fifty dollars
from her. Thus, it is a greater wrong to steal two hundred dollars from Mary than
it is to steal fifty dollars from her. However, if it is more important to Mary that
she has a good relationship with her mother than it is that she buys a bicycle, she
would be used more merely as a means if she were deceived in a way that
damaged her relationship with her mother than she would be if she were deceived
in a way that hindered the purchase of a bicycle.18 She would be used more
merely as a means by being deceived in a way that damaged her relationship with
her mother because her relationship with her mother is more important to her than
the bicycle. Thus, it is a greater wrong to deceive Mary in a way that damages her
relationship with her mother than it is to deceive her in a way that hinders her
ability to buy a bicycle.
The second way to fail to treat humanity as an end in itself discussed above is to
fail to preserve or promote a person’s rational choice-making capacity. For instance,
if we encourage someone to neglect his rational choice-making capacities by
spending his time on mindless activities we fail to treat his humanity as an end in
itself. We also fail to treat the humanity of another person as an end in itself if we
damage his rational choice-making capacities, for example by cracking his skull and
causing him brain damage. It seems plausible to say that the more we cause, or
allow, a person’s rational choice-making capacities to diminish, the greater is our
wrong. On this way of characterizing degrees of wrongdoing, murder constitutes the
worst sort of wrong since it consists in stomping out someone’s rational choice-
making capacities altogether.

18
Depending, of course, on the degree to which her relationship has been damaged and how likely it is
that she will be able to purchase the bicycle in the future without this money.

123
Is evil just very wrong? 187

Thus, it seems that we can make sense of degrees of wrongdoing on a Kantian

conception of wrongdoing by extending the formula of humanity in the intuitively
plausible ways discussed above. There are two factors that make for a greater
wrong. First, the more our use of someone else’s humanity as a mere means is a
hindrance to the attainment of her own permissible ends, the greater is our wrong.
Second, the more our action, or inaction, diminishes a person’s rational choice-
making capacities, the greater is our wrong.
But can we characterize evil as the very wrong using this conception of degrees
of wrongdoing? It seems that we cannot, for on this conception of degrees of
wrongdoing killing an innocent person will always be the greatest sort of wrong.
Killing an innocent person is always a great wrong on this conception of degrees
of wrongdoing because it makes impossible most permissible ends that a person
might have, and would be, if she valued her humanity appropriately, very much
against her wishes. Further, killing an innocent person is a great wrong on this
conception of degrees of wrongdoing because it consists in diminishing another
person’s rational choice-making capacities to the maximum degree. But killing an
innocent person is not always evil; even if it is always wrong. Consider Bernard
Williams’s case of Jim and the villagers (Williams 1973, pp. 98–99). Jim stumbles
upon twenty innocent villagers who have been lined-up against a wall and are
about to be shot by soldiers of a tyrannical government. Jim is given the privilege
of killing one of the villagers. If he kills one of the villagers the other nineteen
will be set free. If he does not kill one of the villagers, all twenty will be killed by
the soldiers. Since killing an innocent person is very wrong according to the
Kantian conception of degrees of wrongdoing, it would be very wrong for Jim to
kill a villager. But Jim does not do something plausibly evil by killing a villager
in this situation if his reason for doing so is to save nineteen from a similar fate.
To do evil, Jim would need to have the right sort of motivation. He would need to
kill for a bad reason, e.g. to gain wealth, for entertainment value, for career
advancement, etc. Thus, we cannot equate evil with the very wrong on a Kantian
conception of degrees of wrongdoing.
In this section I have argued that we cannot characterize evil as just very wrong
on actual consequences act-consequentialist, expected consequences act-conse-
quentialist, and Kantian theories of wrongdoing. On these conceptions of
wrongdoing, evil and wrongdoing do not share all of their essential properties to
varying degrees. In Sect. 5 I give reason to believe that evil and wrongdoing do not
share essential properties on plausible theories of evil and wrongdoing more
generally. I also consider whether evil and wrongdoing share essential properties on
another popular conception of wrongdoing. But first, more needs to be said about
the nature of evil.

4 A theory of evil

While arguing that we cannot equate evil with the very wrong in the previous
section, I have hinted at some of the essential properties of evil. It is time now to say

123
188 T. Calder

more about the nature of evil as a distinct category of immorality. However, I

should stress that the purpose of this paper is not to develop and defend a theory of
evil.19 I need only sketch a plausible theory of evil that makes a genuinely
qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing. In my view, evil acts have at
least two essential components20:
(1) Significant harm, and
(2) What I call an e-motivation. By an e-motivation I mean an inexcusable
intention to bring about, allow, or witness, the significant harm of (1) for an
unworthy goal.
It is difficult to say precisely what constitutes significant harm, but it is easy
enough to get the general idea: a light pinch on the arm is not a significant harm
while a severe head wound is. Evil-revivalists have characterized the harm of evil as
intolerable, excessive, irreparable, serious etc. (Card 2002, pp. 16–17; Card 2001,
p. 87; Kekes 1998, p. 217; Kekes 2005, p. 2). I think we come closest to capturing
the amount of harm required for evil if we think of the harm of evil as a harm that a
normal rational human being would take considerable pains to avoid. This is what I
mean by ‘significant harm.’
Harm is intended for an unworthy goal, as opposed to a worthy goal, if the
achievement of the goal and the harm together would make for a less valuable state
of affairs than if the goal was not achieved and the harm was avoided.
To get a rough idea of how the theory works, consider some examples. The
principal case I want to discuss is Adolf Hitler. It’s important for a theory of evil to
be able to make sense of Hitler’s evildoing since he is a paradigm evildoer. On this
theory, Hitler committed horrendous evils by intentionally planning and imple-
menting a policy of genocide against European Jews and other undesirables from
1941 to 1945. Hitler’s largely successful attempt to exterminate European Jews was
evil because it included an inexcusable intention to bring about significant harm to
European Jews for an unworthy goal. Hitler’s genocidal policies caused 5–6 million
Jews to suffer dreadfully inhumane treatment and a murderous death.21
It is important to note that there is good reason to believe that Hitler believed his
genocidal policies were for a worthy goal (Jones 1999, pp. 128–138). Hitler seems
to have believed that Germany, and civilization generally, could not flourish, or
even survive, without the extermination of European Jews. He believed that the
Jews were responsible for Germany’s humiliating defeat in World War I, high levels
of unemployment, and almost any other social ill that plagued Germany in the early
part of the Twentieth Century. He believed that Jews had a ‘‘biologically determined

19
For more fully developed accounts of evil see e.g. (Calder 2003, 2009; Card 2002, 2010; Garrard
1998; Kekes 2005; Morton 2004; Steiner 2002; Thomas 1993).
20
The theory of evil sketched here is similar to the theories of Claudia Card, John Kekes, and Laurence
Thomas in that our theories each have harm and motivation components. However, the theory sketched
here is also importantly different from these other theories in ways which I cannot discuss here. See (Card
2002; Kekes 2005; Thomas 1993).
21
My view about Hitler’s wrongful actions and motivation has been greatly influenced by Jones (1999,
pp. 121–142).

123
Is evil just very wrong? 189

criminal nature, and that they were bent on destroying ‘good German blood’’’ (Jones
1999, p. 130).
It goes without saying that Hitler was stupendously wrong about the Jewish
people and about the value of his genocidal policies. There was nothing to be gained
from exterminating the Jews and much to lose. Hitler’s goal was unworthy of the
harm he intentionally caused. But since he believed that the harm he caused was for
a worthy goal it might be argued that his actions were excusable. If his actions were
excusable, he did not do evil. Hitler’s actions were excusable if he was not to blame
for his ignorance about the worthiness of his goal. However, David Jones has argued
persuasively that Hitler was responsible for his ignorance about the worthiness of
his goal (Jones 1999, pp. 121–142). I agree with Jones’s assessment of Hitler’s
responsibility for his ignorance.
Jones argues that Hitler’s ignorance did not result from a mental disorder or from
‘‘early, intense, and continuous socialization into Austrian anti-Semitism and
authoritarianism that might excuse his ignorance’’ (Jones 1999, pp. 130–131).
Instead, Hitler’s ignorance resulted from a lack of moral virtue, the presence of
several serious moral vices, and a lengthy project of self-deception that began in his
teenage years. Hitler was narcissistic and seemed to lack the capacity for self-
criticism. He used self-deception to construct an image of himself as a great artist
and political leader with a divine mission to save his nation. In his teenage years,
Hitler became convinced that he was a great artist. This conviction persisted even
though his application to the art academy in Vienna was rejected twice. After
learning of each of his rejections, Hitler did not take steps to acquire the skills and
education required to gain acceptance to the art academy or to become successful as
an artist in some other way. Instead, he continued to fantasize that he was a great
artist already. Lacking a career, Hitler enthusiastically enlisted in the German army
at the beginning of World War I. At this stage in his life his conception of himself
was closely tied to the Germany army. German victories were his victories. German
failures were his failures. When Germany was defeated in 1918, he could not accept
that Germany lost because she was weaker than her foes. Instead he seized upon the
idea of a ‘‘Jewish conspiracy.’’ He evaded acknowledging that Germany was
responsible for many of its own problems, just as he evaded acknowledging that he
was a failure as an artist. The Jews became a scapegoat for all of Germany’s
problems. A realistic and unbiased assessment of available evidence would have
revealed to Hitler that the Jews were not the root cause of all of Germany’s
problems, that the Jewish people were just like Germans in morally important
respects, and not inherently and irredeemably evil. But Hitler was not interested in a
realistic and unbiased assessment of available evidence. He took it as given that
Germany was a great nation. To maintain this belief in the face of contrary evidence
he rationalized that some outside agency, the Jews, were responsible for the failures
of his nation. In this way Hitler deceived himself about the value of his genocidal
goals. Since Hitler’s ignorance about the value of exterminating the Jews resulted
from character flaws and rationalization, he was to blame for his ignorance. Since he
was to blame for his ignorance, his intention to cause significant harm to European
Jews for an unworthy goal was inexcusable. Thus, on the theory of evil sketched
above, Hitler was an evildoer.

123
190 T. Calder

Other examples of evil on the theory sketched above include the actions of serial
killers, murderers, rapists, and thugs when they intentionally cause significant harm
to their victims for unworthy goals such as wealth, pleasure, or power.

5 Evil and wrongdoing, again

Evil, on the account sketched above, is qualitatively distinct from ordinary

wrongdoing because no plausible theory of wrongdoing would have as essential
properties the two components of evil but to a lesser degree. Many theories of
wrongdoing do not have harm as an essential component. For instance,
deontological theories such as Kantian ethics do not have harm as an essential
component.
But even theories of wrongdoing that have harm as an essential component, such
as most consequentialist theories of wrongdoing, could not plausibly have an
inexcusable intention to bring about, allow, or witness, harm for an unworthy goal
as an essential component. This is because many wrongful acts do not consist in
intentionally causing, allowing, or witnessing harm. For instance, reckless
behaviour is wrong, even though most instances of recklessness do not involve
an intention to bring about, allow, or witness harm. Lying, cheating, and adultery
are also wrong even if by performing these actions we do not intend to bring about,
allow, or witness harm. Since any plausible theory of wrongdoing will be able to
account for the wrongness of these sorts of actions, any plausible theory of
wrongdoing will not make an inexcusable intention to bring about, allow, or witness
harm an essential component of wrongdoing. Since an inexcusable intention to bring
about, allow, or witness harm is not an essential component of wrongdoing and it is
an essential component of evil, evil and wrongdoing do not share all of their
essential properties, and thus, based on the criterion for determining whether two
concepts are qualitatively distinct argued for above, evil and wrongdoing are
qualitatively distinct.
However, there is still room for an evil-skeptic to argue that evil is not
qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. She might argue that while an
inexcusable intention to bring about, allow, or witness harm is not an essential
component of wrongdoing, it isn’t an essential component of evil either; the theory
of evil sketched above is flawed. According to this critic, while evil acts involve a
victim’s significant harm and a perpetrator’s e-motivation, this is not because these
are essential properties of evil but because these properties result from having a high
degree of some more basic essential property, or properties, which is also the
essential property, or properties, of wrongdoing; merely wrongful acts have this
essential property to a lesser degree.
Is there some property, or properties, that is essential to both wrongdoing and evil
which explains why evil actions involve a victim’s significant harm and a
perpetrator’s e-motivation? We have shown that the sole essential property of
wrongdoing according to act-consequentialist and Kantian conceptions of wrong-
doing are not plausibly also the sole essential property of evil. That is, we cannot
characterize evil as causing, or allowing, extreme overall harm; causing, or

123
Is evil just very wrong? 191

allowing, extreme expected overall harm; or failing to treat humanity as an end in

itself to a great degree. I will now make a final attempt to see if there is a common
essential property shared by evil and wrongdoing by looking to another popular
moral theory: contractarianism.
According to contractarianism we are morally required to follow rules rationally
self-interested individuals would accept for their mutual benefit.22 For example, it is
rational for self-interested individuals who are able to steal from one another to
forgo the benefits of stealing if others do the same. It is rational to forgo the benefits
of stealing if others do the same since we gain more from not needing to fend-off the
constant threat of theft than we do from having the option to steal from others. If it
were necessary to constantly fend-off the threat of theft, not only would we have
little time for pleasurable activities, we would have little time to take part in
mutually advantageous cooperative ventures with others. And yet most of the
comforts of modern life are made possible by these cooperative ventures, e.g. the
houses we live in, the clothes we wear, the luxury food we eat. Further, if it were
necessary to constantly fend-off the treat of theft, we wouldn’t be motivated to work
to acquire property to make our lives better since it would be difficult to keep this
property. So it is mutually advantageous for us to follow a rule against stealing if
others do the same. Hence, for the contractarian, stealing is wrong. Similarly, it is
rational to have a rule against lying since, in the long-run, we gain much more from
being able to trust what others say than we do from being able to lie. We gain more
from being able to trust what others say because most cooperative ventures require
that we can trust what others say. Since we gain more from being able to trust what
others say than we do from being able to lie, it is rational to follow a rule against
lying if others do the same. Thus, for the contractarian, lying is wrong.
According to contractarianism, the essential property of wrongdoing is failing to
follow a rule which rationally self-interested individuals would accept for their
mutual benefit. Is this also the essential property of evil actions? Do evil actions
merely have this essential characteristic to a greater degree than wrongful actions? To
answer these questions we must first consider what it would be to fail to follow rules
which rationally self-interested individuals would accept for their mutual benefit to a
greater or lesser degree? We might begin by supposing that failing to follow some
moral rules makes a bigger difference to mutually advantageous outcomes than
failing to follow others. Building on this idea, we could say that we fail to follow rules
which rationally self-interested individuals would accept for their mutual benefit to a
greater degree the more the absence of this rule would reduce, or inhibit, mutually
advantageous outcomes. For instance, it is plausible that we would be worse-off
without a rule against murder than we would be without a rule against stealing since
we lose more when we lose our lives than we do when we lose our property. Thus,
murder consists in a greater failure to follow rules which rationally self-interested
individuals would accept for their mutual benefit than does stealing. Hence, murder is
a greater wrong than stealing on this conception of degrees of wrongdoing.
22
I do not have the space here to discuss the details of various contractarian moral theories. It is
sufficient for my purposes to give the basic structure of contractarianism. The most fully developed
expression of contractarianism is found in Gauthier (1987). See also Gauthier (1991). A helpful
discussion of Gauthier’s theory can be found in Morris (1991).

123
192 T. Calder

A potential problem with this approach is that it seems to imply that all instances
of breaking a particular rule are equally wrong. But it isn’t plausible that all
instances of breaking a particular rule are equally wrong. For instance, surely it is a
greater wrong to steal a large sum of money than it is to steal a small sum of money.
Yet these acts seem to consist in breaking the same rule which rationally self-
interested individuals would accept for their mutual advantage, i.e. a rule against
stealing, and thus, are equally wrong according to the contractarian conception of
degrees of wrongdoing suggested above. To solve this problem we would need to
narrow our description of the rules in such a way that stealing a large sum breaks a
different rule than does stealing a small sum. It might suffice to say that there is a
rule against stealing a large sum and a different rule against stealing a small sum and
that without a rule against stealing a large sum we would lose more than we would
without a rule against stealing a small sum.23 If so, it is a greater wrong to steal a
large sum than it is to steal a small sum on this conception of degrees of
wrongdoing. This result fits with our intuitions about degrees of wrongdoing. We
could make similar distinctions between rules against different forms of lying,
promise breaking, murder, etc.
So it seems that we can make sense of degrees of wrongdoing on a contractarian
conception of wrongdoing: the more the absence of a particular rule would inhibit
mutually beneficial outcomes, the more wrongful it is to break this rule. But can we
characterize evil as the very wrong on this conception of degrees of wrongdoing? I
do not think we can for reasons similar to those that made it implausible to
characterize evil as the very wrong on an expected consequence act-consequentialist
conception of degrees of wrongdoing. Recall Malicious Hirer. In Malicious Hirer A
has the power to hire one of two equally well-qualified applicants for a job: B and C.
She knows that hiring C will maximize the good and prevent some people from
suffering more than B will suffer if she doesn’t get the job. A also knows that if B
doesn’t get the job she will suffer a severe depression. A hires C, not because she
cares about the good consequences that will result, but because she wants to take
pleasure in B’s suffering. This, I have suggested, makes her act evil.
The problem Malicious Hirer poses for our ability to characterize evil as the very
wrong on a contractarian conception of degrees of wrongdoing is that it is hard to
see how A does anything very wrong, or wrong at all, on this conception of degrees
of wrongdoing. Yet it seems that what A does is evil. Recall that for the
contractarian an act is wrong if it breaks a rule which rationally self-interested
individuals would accept for their mutual benefit. The more the absence of a
particular rule would inhibit mutually beneficial outcomes, the more wrongful it is
to break this rule. Thus, according to this conception of degrees of wrongdoing, A
does something very wrong in Malicious Hirer only if she breaks a rule the absence
of which would greatly inhibit mutually beneficial outcomes. But not only is it hard
to see how A breaks a rule the absence of which would greatly inhibit mutually
beneficial outcomes, it is hard to see how A breaks a rule that rationally

23
Of course, we could make even more fine-grained distinctions between rules against stealing. For
example, we might distinguish between rules against stealing very large sums, large sums, medium-sized
sums, small sums and very small sums.

123
Is evil just very wrong? 193

self-interested individuals would accept for their mutual benefit at all. It seems that
rationally self-interested individuals deciding on rules of conduct would not make a
rule against hiring one of two equally well-qualified applicants for a job when doing
so maximizes the good and prevents greater suffering than if the other applicant
were hired. If anything, rationally self-interested individuals would accept a rule
which enjoined us to act in this way since it seems that this rule would make for
mutually advantageous outcomes; we would all be better off if, when choosing
between equally well-qualified applicants, those people who have the power to do
the hiring were required to hire one of the two applicants if doing so would
maximize the good and prevent more suffering than if the other applicant were
hired. If so, according to contractarian moral theory, A does what is required of her
in Malicious Hirer. A contractarian might resist this conclusion and argue instead
that rationally self-interested individuals would not agree to a rule that gave
preference to one of two equally well-qualified applicants, no matter what the
expected consequences. If so, it would be morally permissible for A to hire either
applicant in Malicious Hirer. But whether A is required or permitted to hire C rather
than B, it follows that A doesn’t do anything wrong by hiring C, and thus, we cannot
say that what A does is evil if we characterize evil as the very wrong on this
conception of wrongdoing. Yet, as I have suggested, it does makes sense to say that
what A does in Malicious Hirer is evil since the reason she hires C rather than B is
to cause B significant harm from a desire to take pleasure in that harm.
It might be objected that while rationally self-interested individuals would not
agree to a rule against hiring one of two equally well-qualified applicants for a job
when doing so maximizes the good and prevents more suffering for altruistic or
self-interested reasons, they would agree to a rule against doing so for malicious
reasons. However, it is hard to see why rationally self-interested individuals would
agree to this rule since it is hard to see how it would be for their mutual advantage.
If it would not be mutually beneficial to have a rule against hiring one of two
equally well-qualified applicants for a job when doing so maximizes the good and
prevents more suffering than if the other applicant were hired for altruistic or self-
interested reasons, it is hard to see why it would be mutually beneficial to have a
rule against this hiring practice for malicious reasons. Rationally self-interested
individuals deciding on rules of conduct shouldn’t care why people comply with
mutually advantageous rules as long as they comply. There is no reason to make
special rules against doing the right thing for the wrong reasons.
Furthermore, even if we can make sense of the idea that what A does in
Malicious Hirer is wrong on a contractarian conception of wrongdoing, what A does
in Malicious Hirer surely isn’t very wrong on this conception of degrees of
wrongdoing. It would be very wrong to do what A does in Malicious Hirer
according to the contractarian conception of degrees of wrongdoing suggested
above if the absence of a rule against this hiring practice would greatly inhibit
mutually advantageous outcomes. But since it isn’t clear that the absence of a rule
against this hiring practice would inhibit mutually advantageous outcomes at all, it
seems pretty clear that the absence of a rule against this hiring practice wouldn’t
greatly inhibit mutually advantageous outcomes. If the absence of this rule wouldn’t
greatly inhibit mutually advantageous outcomes, what A does in Malicious Hirer is

123
194 T. Calder

not very wrong on a contractarian conception of degrees of wrongdoing. And yet,

what A does in Malicious Hirer is evil. Thus, we cannot characterize evil as the very
wrong on a contractarian conception of degrees of wrongdoing.
At this point an evil-skeptic might point out that even if we cannot characterize
evil as the very wrong on act-consequentialist, Kantian, or contractarian conceptions
of wrongdoing, it is still possible that evil is just very wrong on some conception of
wrongdoing or other. It is, of course, true that I have not attempted to characterize
evil as the very wrong on every prominent theory of wrongdoing.24 But I have tried
using some of the most popular and plausible theories of wrongdoing. I leave it as a
challenge for others to argue that evil is just very wrong on some plausible
conception of wrongdoing not addressed in this paper. I contend that any such
attempt will fail for one of two reasons: either the theory of wrongdoing will be
inadequate as a theory of wrongdoing, or else we will not be able to characterize
evil as the very wrong on this conception of wrongdoing for reasons similar to the
reasons that we were not able to characterize evil as the very wrong on the
conceptions of wrongdoing discussed in this paper.

6 Conclusion

The distinction between evil and wrongdoing is not merely quantitative. There is a
qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing. Luke Russell’s attempt to
argue that evil is just very wrong fails because it is based on an implausible criterion
for determining whether two concepts are qualitatively distinct. For Russell two
concepts are qualitatively distinct only if members that fall under one concept have
a property that no member that falls under the other concept has to any degree.
I have argued that this requirement is too restrictive. In my view two concepts are
qualitatively distinct provided they do not share all of their essential properties to
differing degrees. I have argued that evil and wrongdoing do not share all of their
essential properties to differing degrees. The essential properties of evil actions
include a victim’s significant harm and a perpetrators e-motivation. An e-motivation
consists in an inexcusable intention to bring about, allow, or witness, significant
harm for an unworthy goal. The essential properties of evil are not plausibly the
essential properties of wrongdoing since many wrongful actions do not involve an
intention to bring about, allow, or witness harm, e.g. lying and cheating are wrong
even if these actions are performed without an intention to bring about, allow, or
witness harm.
Furthermore, there isn’t a more basic essential property which evil actions share
with merely wrongful actions which explains why evil actions involve a victim’s
significant harm and a perpetrator’s e-motivation. In particular, evil cannot plausibly
be characterized as causing, or allowing, extreme overall harm; causing, or
allowing, what is expected to be extreme overall harm; failing to treat the humanity
of a person as an end in itself to a great degree, or failing to follow rules which

24
Notable theories of wrongdoing not discussed in this paper include contractualism, the ethics of care,
and virtue ethics.

123
Is evil just very wrong? 195

rational self-interested individuals would accept for their mutual benefit to a great
degree. Since it seems that on plausible theories of wrongdoing and evil evil and
wrongdoing do not share all of their essential properties, it is reasonable to conclude
that evil and wrongdoing are qualitatively distinct; evil is not just very wrong.25
This, I think, is a point for evil revivalists. Since evil is a distinct moral concept
there is some reason to think that it has a place in our moral thinking and discourse.

References

Calder, T. (2003). The apparent banality of evil. Journal of Social Philosophy, 34(3), 364–376.
Calder, T. (2005). Kant and degrees of wrongness. Journal of Value Inquiry, 39, 229–244.
Calder, T. (2009). The prevalence of evil. In A. Veltman & K. Norlock (Eds.), Evil, political violence and
forgiveness (pp. 13–34). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, a division of Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers.
Card, C. (2001). Inequalities versus evils. In J. Sterba (Ed.), Controversies in feminism (pp. 83–98).
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Card, C. (2002). The atrocity paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Card, C. (2010). Confronting evils terrorism, torture, genocide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Clendinnen, I. (1999). Reading the holocaust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cole, P. (2006). The myth of evil: demonizing the enemy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
De Wijze, S. (2002). Defining evil: insights from the problem of ‘‘dirty hands’’. Monist, 85(2), 210–238.
Feldman, F. (2006). Actual utility, the objection from impracticality, and the move to expected utility.
Philosophical Studies, 129(1), 49–79.
Garrard, E. (1998). The nature of evil. Philosophical Explorations, 1(1), 43–60.
Garrard, E. (2002). Evil as an explanatory concept. Monist, 85(2), 320–336.
Gauthier, D. (1987). Morals by agreement. Oxford: Carendon Press.
Gauthier, D. (1991). Why contractarianism. In P. Vallentyne (Ed.), Contractarianism and rational
choice: essays on David Gauthier’s morals by agreement (pp. 15–30). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Gruzalski, B. (1981). Foreseeable consequence utilitarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59(2),
163–176.
Haybron, D. M. (2002). Moral monsters and saints. Monist, 85(2), 260–284.
Held, V. (2001). The language of evil. In J. Sterba (Ed.), Controversies in feminism (pp. 107–110).
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Jackson, F. (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics,
101(3), 461–482.
Jones, D. (1999). Moral responsibility in the holocaust: a study in the ethics of character. Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Kant, I. (1996). Metaphysics of morals (M. Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1997). The groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (M. Gregor, Trans.). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Kekes, J. (1998). The reflexivity of evil. Social Philosophy and Policy, 15(1), 216–232.
Kekes, J. (2005). The roots of evil. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Korsgaard, C. (1986). Kant’s formula of universal law. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66(1/2), 24–47.

25
Wrongdoing might not be a component of evil at all. It might be that all evil acts are also wrong acts,
but that evil acts are not evil because they are wrong. If so, evil and wrongdoing are like the concepts of
triangular and trilateral. All objects which are triangular are also trilaterals. But being triangular is not
part of the concept of being trilateral and vice versa. Triangular and trilateral are wholly distinct concepts
which just happen to be instantiated in the same objects. Another often cited example of two wholly
distinct concepts which denote the same objects are cordates (things with hearts) and renates (things with
kidneys).

123
196 T. Calder

Korsgaard, C. (2003). The right to lie: Kant on dealing with evil. In S. Darwall (Ed.), Deontology
(pp. 212–235). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Morris, C. W. (1991). Moral standing and rational-choice contractarianism. In P. Vallentyne (Ed.),
Contractarianism and rational choice: essays on David Gauthier’s morals by agreement
(pp. 76–95). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Morton, A. (2004). On evil. New York: Routledge.
Russell, L. (2006). Evil-revivalism versus evil-skepticism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 40(1), 89–105.
Russell, L. (2007). Is evil action qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing? Austalasian Journal of
Philosophy, 85(4), 659–677.
Singer, M. G. (1977). Actual consequence utilitarianism. Mind, 86(341), 69.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Consequentialism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of
philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/consequentialism.
Accessed 20 May 2011.
Steiner, H. (2002). Calibrating evil. Monist, 85(2), 183–193.
Thomas, L. (1993). Vessels of evil: American slavery and the holocaust. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.
Williams, B. (1973). A critique of utilitarianism. In J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams (Eds.), Utilitarianism:
for and against (pp. 77–118). London: Cambridge University Press.
Wood, A. (1995). Humanity as end in itself. In H. Robinson (Ed.), The Proceedings of the eighth
international Kant congress (Vol. I, Part 1, pp. 301–319). Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

123