studeu? overnight ery WF-2q Eur $40 bo Beyond Absolutism and Relativism in Transpersonal Evolutionary Theory JORGE N. FERRER Calitomia Insttute of Integral Studies, 9 Peter Yorke Way, San Francisco, CA 94109 USA, Tol.: (510) 595-0408, Fax: (415) 674-5500x125; (415) 674-5555, E-mall: JorgeF @cils.edu (Received December 10, 1997; accepted January 6, 1998) This paper critically examines Ken Wilber's transpersonal evolutionary theory in the context of the philosophical discourse of postmodernity. The critique focuses on Wilber’s refutation of any non-absolutist and non- universalist approach to rationality, truth and morality—such as cultural relativism, pluralism, constructivism, or perspectivism—under the charges of being epistemologically self-refuting and morally pernicious. First, . suggested that Wilber offers a “faulty dichotomy” between his absolucist— universalist metanarrative and a self-contradictory and pernicious vulgar shown that Wilber's arguments for the self-refuting wre of other non-absolutist approaches are both fal- Finally, the problematic consequences of absolutist discourse for academic and cross-cultural dialogue are pinpointed. Taking Wilber's treaument of Nagarjuna's thinking as a paradigmatic example, itis suggested that absolutist thinking both usually leads to “bad” hermeneutics, and potentially hinders genuine dialogue among people and traditions holding different world views KEYWORDS: absolutism, relativism, evolution, transpersonal, dialogue, Wilber ‘The last two decades of Western philosophical debates have been increasingly dominated by an implacable assault on the principles of modernity, or the so-called “fundamental Enlightenment para- digm.” Although there is not a unified postmodern theory, virtually all postmodern thinkers have developed the following two inter- related lines of attack against the legacy of modernity (see, e.g., Best and Kellner, 1991; Docherty, 1993; Rosenau, 1992): (1) the rejection of any form of absolute and universal standards of rationality, ruth, 2 set ron bp cer "34 ~ 8? 9090 ome nines inn aor eee " der tC sd ech aber2 JORGE N. FERRER and value; and (2) the critique of any privileged picture, metanar- ‘ative or “Big Story” about human beings and their place in history and the cosmos." As Lyotard (1974) put it in his often quoted dictum, postmodernity can be characterized by an “incredulity toward metanarratives.” According to many contemporary thinkers, metanarratives have historically not only claimed universal status, but also functioned as legitimization devices of ethical and epistemic Judgments and practices. The absolutist character of metanarratives has been fiercely criticized for being totalizing, imperialistic, and logocentric. Postmodernism emerged as a reaction against these totalizing meta-frameworks, and due to the failure of the funda- mental Enlightenment project to find untouchable or absolute foundations for human knowledge and morality. This lack of uli- ‘mate foundations has been often portrayed as potentially leading to a situation of utter perplexity, enervating anxiety, meaningless rela- ‘ivism, and even banalized nihilism (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Crook, 1991; Carr, 1992).? If there are no transhistorical and transcultural foundations for our knowledge and morality, the enemies of post- modernism argue, then the only route open to us is one leading to both a selfrefuting epistemological relativism and a pernicious moral anarchy. This is, paraphrasing Habermas (1987, p. 300), the di- Jemma of the postmodern era: How to navigate between the Scylla of 2 totalitarian and unattainable absolutism and the Charybdis of a self-contradictory and morally repugnant relativism, Interestingly enough, this postmodern predicament finds strike ing parallels in the history of evolutionary philosophical thinking. Ever since the rise of Darwinism, many of the debates on biological and human evolution have orbited around the conflict between defenders of an uni-linear, universal, and frequently pre-given evolu tionary process (Hegel, Teilhard de Chardin, etc.) and proponents of multiple, undeterministic, and often purposeless evolutionary pathways (Spencer, Morgan, Bergson, Monod, etc.) (Bowler, 1989). In the.same vein, the perpenial quarrels between scientists and religious partisans of various sorts (creationists, finalists, etc,) about the nature and purpose of evolution usually derived from similar Points of divergence (e.g., Barlow, 1995). However, it was in the discipline of culeural anthropology where the dichotomy between absolutist and relativism in the context of evolutionary thinkingnp ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 3 emerged at its best. Since the critique of the dassic evolutionary standpoint by Franz Boas and his pupils, but especially after the publication of Peter Winch's seminal The Idea of a Social Science and ‘its Relation to Philosophy (1958), philosophers and anthropologists hhave arduously disputed both the universality and evolutionary superiority of the mode of rationality characteristic of the West (absohutist/universalist thesis), and the illegitimacy of making such transcultural comparative judgments due to the relativity and in- commesurability existing among multiple “rationalities” and “forms of life” (relativist/pluralist thesis) (see Wilson, 1970; Finnegan and Horton, 1973; Hollis and Lukes, 1982). In the eyes of their respective antagonists, of course, the universalists appeared “imperialistic” and “ethnocentric,” and the relativists look “irrational,” “nihilistic, and “amoral.” It soon became evident, however, that both extreme positions—radical universalism and radical relativism—enuailed unbearable implications for our modern bourgeois ideals of justice, democracy, and equality among human beings. On the one hand, the commitment to radical universalism traps us in the conceptual straitjacket of dogmatic superiority and intolerance towards other's values and ways of life, so painfully evident in the historical justification of colonialism and imperialism. On the other hand, the acceptance of radical relativism builds unbridgable gaps among ‘cultures that now, “live in different worlds,” not only positing a priori obstacles to cross-cultural communication, but also preventing the critique of any historically or culnurally accepted form of life (includ- ing organized slavery, systematic genocide, ritualistic cannibalism, oor instirutionalized torture). In the light of these difficulties, it should not be surprising that an increasing number of anthropo- logists, philosophers, and social scientists are today explicitly seek- ing a middle way between these excesses that honors their insights while avoiding their dangers (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Tambiah, 1990; Fay, 1996). As in contemporary philosophy, then, the agenda of ‘modern anthropology and evolutionary philosophical thinking is to transcend these pernicious dualisms and move beyond absolutism and relativism. It is in this context that T want to discuss here the most recent work in transpersonal evolutionary theory as proposed by Ken Wilber (1995a) in his massive Sex, Ecology, Spirituality. The Spirit of4 JORGE N. FERRER Evolution.? One manner to read Wilber’s (1995a) Sex, Ecology, Spirituality (SES thereafter) is as a response to the relativist threat seemingly inherent in the postmodern critique of modernity. In the introduction of SES, Wilber presents this work as the first part of a wilogy (The Kosmos Trilogy) aimed at the bold and colossal task of identifying and systematizing the general evolutionary pat- tems embedded in the various branches of human knowledge—zhe “patterns of existence” (p. $2)—with the Maimonidean purpose of Providing us with an “orienting map of the place of men and women in relation to Universe, Life, and Spirit” (p. ix). Specifically, Wilber (1995a) offers his trilogy as an example of how this type of integrative work can be done in our fragmented postmodern era. Pushing post-modern jargon to its limits, we could say that what Wilber is proposing is a meta-metanarrative: A privileged meta- framework able to adequately sinsate or correct the rest of metanar- ratives about human existence and its place in the cosmos—such as the Christian, Darwinian, Marxist, Buddhist, Jungian, etc.* Further. ‘more, as is the case with all metanarrative, this “Big Story” is not Presented as one more perspective of cosmic and human evolution, but as an all-embracing framework possessing privileged status over all local and rival stories. As Wilber pointed out, the problem with contemporary holistic paradigms is that they are not holistic ‘enough, and the purpose of his Trilogy is to show the bigger picture (in Schwartz, 1995, p. 41). ‘Two other intertwined objectives are pursued by Wilber in SES: ‘The first is to carry forward what he considers to be the true task of postmodemity, ic., the integration of the Big Three (We, I, and it; or the Good, the Beautiful, and the, True), whose differentiation defined the modern period, and whose present state of dissociation is, for Wilber, lurking behind most of the maladies besetting the twentieth-century, such as the ecological crisis, ethnocentric imperi- alism, or egocentric narcissism (see Wilber, 1995a, pp. 148-149; 390-394; 1996, p. 387). The second is to fight the “flatland,” Wilber's term for the currently prevalent Western world view char- acterized by its lack of qualitative distinctions, interiority, and spirituality. This world view must be challenged, Wilber (1996) writes, not only because “Only by rejecting flatland can the Good and the True and the Beautiful be integrated” (pp. 336-337),‘ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 5 but also in order to dispel the “aperspectival madness” (nothing is beer than anything else) which Wilber attributes to every non- absolutist and non-universalist account of rationality, truth, and value—such as cultural-relativism pluralism, perspectivism, multi- culturalism, constructivism, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, and contextualism. cis not my purpose in this paper to argue against or in favor of the specific vision of reality that Wilber presents in his book.* My purpose is merely to show that the arguments he offers for the rejection of non-absolutist approaches do not stand serious scrutiny, and that certain non-absolutist positions should therefore be re- garded as viable alternatives to his absolutist-universalist scheme in both transpersonal theory and evolutionary thinking.” In addi- tion, I want to suggest what I believe are certain problematic con- sequences of absolutist thinking for the practice of genuine and undistorted dialogue among different peoples and traditions. To this end. I will first elucidate the philosophical stance espoused by Ken Wilber in SES. Second, Iwill claim that the arguments he pres- cents against non-absolutist approaches have important and insur- mountable shortcomings. First, I will argue that Wilber offers a “faulty dichotomy” between his absolutist-universalist scheme and a selfcontradictory and pernicious vulgar relativism. Second, I will show that Wilber’s arguments for the self-refuuting and pernicious nanure of every non-absohutis' approach are both fallacious and distorting. In brief, I will give an account of how non-absolutist views ‘an be posited without falling in self-contradictory aporias or “aper- spectival madness.” Finally, I will explore the potentially hazardous consequences of absolutist positions for academic dialogue and cross- cultural understanding. Taking Wilber's treamment of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example, I will suggest that absolutist thinking frequently hinders genuine dialogue between people and traditions holding different world views, |. ABSOLUTISM IN AN AGE OF POSTMODERNISM ‘As mentioned above, the overall goal of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality (SES) is to offer an orienting map of the place of men and women6 JORGE N. FERRER in the universe. In this section, I want to show how this map is laid out from the absolutist position known as the perennial philosophy. Before proceeding further, however, it may be necessary to say some words here about my use of the term “absolutism”, instead of the more in vogue “objectivism”, to refer to Wilber's position throughout this paper. As is well known, absolutism has been a term in disuse in Western philosophy for the last decades. Recently, for example, Bernstein (1983) encouraged the substitution of objectivism for absolutism in the classic’dichotomy “absolutism relativism.” Bernstein (1983) argued that, since all human knowl- edge is today accepted to be fallible, conjectural, and approximate, absolutism is “no longer a live option” (p. 12). Therefore, he pro- posed to use “objectivism” to refer to all forms of foundationalist Philosophy standing in opposition to relativist, contextualist or skeptical views of reason, knowledge, and value. However, although both absolutism and objectivism have been applied in contrast to relativist doctrines, these owo terms should not be used as inter- changeable. In short, while objectivism claims that our knowledge of the world, even if imperfect and approximate, is warranted by the existence of a pre-given reality that exists “out there” independently of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity, absolutism maintains the existence of ultimate, transcendental or eternal truths and values ‘embedded in human nature, the universe, or both. ‘The reason I am emphasizing this distinction here is because I believe that, in the context of transpersonal theory, to use the term “objectivism” is profoundly confusing and misleading for at least the following two reasons: First, to accuse an absolutist wranspersonal theorist—such as Wilber—of being objectivist is inaccurate because he or she may be defending the identity beween human deepest subjectivity and the ultimate nature of objective reality. After all, this is the central claim of the perennial philosophy, according to which: “At the highest levels, world and self, outer reality and inner reality, coincide as the ‘ground’ of all that is" (Rothberg, 1986, p. 3). Or, in Wilber's (1993b) own words: “The core insight of the psychologia perennis is: that our ‘innermost’ consciousness is identical to the absolute and ultimate reality of the universe" (p. 22), Second, we should also remember that fone of the most basic tenets of transpersonal theory .is preciselymae ate ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 7 that selfidentity can expand to include other aspects of the “objective” universe (Grof, 1985, 1988; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993). But then, in transpersonal studies it is not clear how to coherently demarcate between what is “objective” and what is “subjective” because what once were “objects” of knowledge can become, tempo- rarily or permanently, part of an individual's subjectivity. As I see it, the transpersonal dismantlement of the subject-object organiza- tion of phenomena strongly suggests that Cartesian epistemic cat- egories such as “objectivism” or “subjectivism” have lost their explanatory and descriptive power to account for transpersonal events, ‘The critical issue in transpersonal epistemology, then, is not the “objectivity” of transpersonal knowledge claims, but their ontologi- cal and epistemic status in relation to rival proposals (e.g., does the archetypal-astrological paradigm have epistemic privilege over Wilber's evolutionary model? Can indigenous forms of spirituality be legitimately subordinated to the hierarchical framework of the perennial philosophy? Or are all these approaches different but equally valid ways to engage spirituality?). We will briefly return to these crucial questions at the end of this article; here I am merely pointing out that, since the nature of transpersonal phenomena renders “objectivism” meaningless, we need to recover the term “absolutism” to refer to any transpersonal theory claiming to be for the rest and/or claiming to depict “how things 1. The Perennial Philosophy ‘There is no doubt that the idea of a perennial philosophy (philosophia perennis) has been differently articulated throughout the history of Western philosophy. The search for.an universal, per- manent, and all-encompassing philosophy can be traced to the neo- Platonism of Philo of Alexandria or the Platonic-Christian synthesis of St. Augustine. However, it is not until the Renaissance that we find the term “perennial philosophy” explicitly used in philosophi- cal circles (Loemker, 1973). More precisely, it was Agostino Steuco (1497-1546), bishop of Kisamos and librarian of the Vatican, who8 JORGE N. FERRER coined this term to refer to the prita theologia or plilophia priscorun of Marsilio Ficino, a unifying philosophical system based on a synthesis of Platonic principles and Christian doctrines, Thus, the modem notion of a perennial philosophy should be regarded 35 a product of the ecumenical interest of the neo-Platonic redition in the Renaissance (Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Nicolas de Cusa, Agostino Steuco, et.) in finding unity and harmony amidst the multiplicity of world views (Schmit, 1966). Throughout the history of philosophy, the term “perennial phi- losophy” (piilasphia perennis) has also been used as a synonym for Scholasticism and Thomism; as the final goal of philosophy by Leibniz; as the regulative ideal of philosophical practice by Jaspers: and as a world philosophy, synthesis of East and West, by Radhakrishnan (Collins, 1962; Loemker, 1978). Commion to all these conceptions, however, is the idea that a philosophical current exists that has endured through centuries, and that is able to harmoniously integrate all traditions in terms of a single Truth which underlies the apparent plurality of world views. According to the defenders of the perennial philosophy, this unity in human knowl- edge stems from the existence of a single ultimate reality which can be directly accessed by the human mind under certain special conditions. As is well known, the idea of a perennial philosophy was popular~ ized in the twentieth century by Aldous Huxley (1945), who in his book by the same title defined it as “the metaphysics that recognizes a divine Reality substantial to the world of things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to, for even identical wich, divine Reality; the ethic that places man's final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent Ground of all being” (p. vii). What characterized Huxley's peren- nialism, as well as the one of the so called traditionalists such as René Guénon, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy or Frithjof Schuon (see Borella, 1995; Quinn, 1997), was the conviction that the single ‘Truth of the perennial philosophy can be found at the heart of the smystical teachings of the world contemplative traditions. Although with different emphases, all these authors claimed that while the exoteric beliefs of the religious traditions may be assorted and ‘occasionally even incompatible, their esoteric or mystical dimensionABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 9 reveals an essential unity that transcends all doctrinal pluralisms,? ‘And this is so, the traditionalists argued, because mystics of all ages and places are individuals who are able to transcend the different ‘conceptual schemes provided by their cultures, languages, and doc- tines, and consequently access to a direct or unmediated apprehen- sion of reality (gnosis)."° In sum, the traditionalists maintained not only the existence of a contemplative consensus about the ultimate nature of reality, but also the absolute truth of such a vision, ie., that it depicted “the way things really are” once divested from individual and cultural projec- tions. In its general form, then, the perennialist thesis includes two different knowledge claims: A descriptive claim, that affirms the homogeneity of the message of the contemplative traditions; and a normative or epistemological daim, that maintains the absolute truth of that message (cf, Griffiths, 1991). Although T cannot develop this point here, it is important to note that the evaluation of these two claims may require different testing procedures. The examination of the former claim, for example, may involve hermeneutic com- parative analyses ofthe different mystical texts, as well as interviews ‘with representatives of the living traditions. In contrast, the assess- ment of the latter may entail epistemological analyses about the cog- nitive value of mysticism, and, in my opinion, personal involvement in certain forms of spiritual inquiry (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1994), But, what is the single Truth about which all contemplative tradi- tions supposedly converge? According to the modern defenders of the mystical version of the perennial philosophy, such as Huston Smith (1976, 1987, 1989), Frithjof Schuon (1984), and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1989, 1993), the doctrinal core of the perennial phi- losophy is the belief that Spirit, Pure Consciousness or the Universal Mind is the fundamental essence of both human nature and the totality of reality. In the perennialist view, that is, Spirit is the ‘ontologically primary foundation of the cosmos. Briefly, the other major principles derived from this primor- dial Truth are involutionary cosmology, hierarchical ontology and axiology, and hierarchical epistemology (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1986; Smith, 1976, 1989; Nasr, 1989, 1993; Wilber, 1977, 1990, 1993a; Quinn, 1997): (1) Involutionary cosmology, or the postulate that the physical universe is the result of a process of emanation, restriction10 JORGE N. FERRER, or involution of Spirit. In other words, Spirit is prior to matter, and ‘matter has evolved from It. (2) Hierarchical ontology and axiology, or the vision of reality as composed by different layers or levels of being that are hierarchically organized (e.g., matter, mind and spirit)—the so-called Great Chain of Being. In this hierarchy, the higher levels are those closer to Spirit, and are regarded as more eal, more causally effective, and more valuable than the lower. ‘That is, Spirit is more real and better than mind and matter. And (8) hierarchical epistemology, or the theory of knowledge according to which knowledge of the higher realms of the hierarchical ontology is more essential, reveals more about reality, and is therefore authoritative upon knowledge of the lower ones. That is, knowledge of Spirit (contemplation, gnosis) is more true and valuable than knowledge of the mental and physical levels (rational and empirical knowledge, respectively). To sum up, the perennial vision maintains that reality is orig- inated by, and ontologically the same as, a simultaneously imma- nent and transcending Spirit—identical in essence to human innermost consciousness—that constitutes the ultimate referent for what can be regarded as real, true, and valuable, 2. Ken Wilber’s Evolutionary Perennialism Through his many works, Ken Wilber has identified himself as modern translator and defender of the perennial philosophy, championing untiringly the perennial doctrines in the transpersonal arena during the last two decades (1977, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1993a)."* His latest work is not an exception. As Wilber (1997) has recently stressed, however, there is a fundamental difference between his “neoperennialism” and the traditional versions of the perennial phi- losophy. In contrast to the merely involutionary accounts of most waditions, Wilber (1997) claims that 2 more adequate description of the perennial Truth today should necessarily incorporate the notion of evolution. As Walsh (1995) rightly pointed out, the aim of Wilber’s recent work *is to trace evolution—physical, biological, and human—and to set it within the context of the perennial phi- losophy* (p. 18). Following thinkers like Hegel, Aurobindo, ora ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM n Teilhard de Chardin, then, Wilber (1997) proposes an evolutionary perennialism that holds that: (G..) there is sill That One, or the timeless and absolute Spirit of Which the entire universe is but a manifestation, but that world of rmanifesation is not now devolving away from Spirit, it is evolving toward Spirit. God does not lie in our collective past, God lies in our collective furure: the Garden of Eden is tomorrow, not yesterday; the Golden Age lies down the road, not up to it. (p. 68) ‘What Wilber is claiming is that the involutionary cosmology of the traditional perennial philosophy should be complemented with a special type of teleological evolutionism. Teleological evolutionism is the view that cosmological, phylogenetic, and ontogenetic processes are ultimately directed towards a predetermined goal. In the classic evolutionary perennialist view, this pre-given goal is generallv equated with Spirit itself. For traditional evolutionary perennialists like Teilhard de Chardin or Aurobindo, that is, Spirit is not only the beginning, but also the end-point of evolution. Spirit is both the Alpha and the Omega of all cosmological and evolutionary pro- cesses. It is important to note here that, in contrast to these phi- losophers, Wilber (1995a, 1997) does not believe that this Omega point (Spirit) towards which the evolutionary process is directed will ever be reached’in the world of time and space and form. Since Spirit is timeless and formless, Wilber (1997) convincingly argues, It will never be reached at any point in time, but can only be realized “by stepping off the cycle of time and evolution altogether” (p. 280). Still, it should be noted here that Wilber (1995a) regards Spirit as the final cause, pull, and telos of the entire cosmic and human evolutionary process. It is certainly one of Wilber’s great accomplishments to have given the perennial vision greater contemporary finesse and explanatory ower than any other traditional or modern account. In my opinion, this is due not only to the incorporation of the notion of evolu- tion, but also to the adoption of two conceptual frameworks: One modern, structuralism, and the other postmodem, constructivism. ‘Against an evolutionary background, these two frameworks allow Wilber to accommodate, somewhat artificially I believe, both the12 JORGE N. FERRER plurality of human forms, and some modem epistemological insights within the universalist vision of the perennial philosophy. On the one hand, the adoption of structuralism permits him to house cultural differences within a universalist view of consciousness and reality. For example, defending a perennialist view of spiritual Wilber (1995a) proposes that the diversity of experiences, symbolic expressions, and cultural forms found in the various contemplative traditions stems from the existence of “surface structures”, culeurally and historically situated manifestations of an underlying universal Sequence of “deep structures” which ultimately constitute one path and one goal for human spiritual evolution: “Common deep struc- tures with culturally situated surface structures seem to me to steer @ course benween ‘no similarities at all’ and ‘mostly or only one common core” (1995a, p. 604, note. 16). Accordingly, Wilber (1995a) plots the transpersonal territory into four types of hierarchically laddered realms or “deep” structures The psychic (or nature mysticism: the realm of OBEs, vibrations, Kundalini, chakras, etc.); the subtle (or deity mysticism: the realm of luminosity and archetypal forms, of God, etc.); the causal (or formless mysticism: the realm of pure consciousness, emptiness, nothingness, the Void, etc.); and, finally, the nondual (nondual mysticism: beyond being and non-being, where “emptiness is form, and form is emptiness,” the world as expression of Spirit, etc.). According to Wilber (1995a), these four types of mysticism “can most definitely be found cross-culturally. Nobody is denying that a Buddhist will interpret the luminosity as the Sambhogakaya, the Christian will interpret is perhaps as an angel or Christ himself, ‘a Jungian will interpret it as an archetypal emergence, and so on” (p. 621, note. 58). In other words, although very specific arche- typal visions and deities (different “surface structures”) can be ob- served in different traditions, all of them belong to the same level of spiritual development (the same “deep structure”), ie., the subtle level, the realm of the archetypal manifestations. In sum, human spirituality is ultimately universal, as constiruted by an evolutionary hierarchy of “deep structures.” Contextual factors only shape and determine the situated manifestations and interpretation of these “deep structures” and the level of spiritual evolution attainable in each tradition,1 oe aN ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 13 On the other hand, Wilber (1995a) adds to the perennial vision several constructivist principles inspired in Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) enactive paradigm, such as the rejection of the representation paradigm, the emancipation from the constraints of a pre-given reality, or the idea of “enacted worldspaces” (intersub- _jectively shared worlds of referents that are disclosed in the process of the mutually codetermined evolution of consciousness and the ‘world). Wilber should certainly be credited for having extended the scope of the enactive paradigm from its original confinement in the monological sensoriomotor world to the dialogical mental and the translogical spiritual realms. I should point out here, however, that Wilber’s inclusion of these modern epistemological insights occurs under the shadow of an absolutistuniversalist scheme that, sabotages the enactive paradigm. According to Wilber (1995a), although the different “worldspaces” are not pre-given but enacted, their unfolding follows a still pre-given evolutionary pattern gov- ered by a spiritual telos: “The deep structures are given, but the surface are not.” (Wilber, 1996, p. 219). Of course, the unnecessary subordination of the enactive paradigm to a uni-linear sequence of pre-given evolutionary stages (or “deep structures”) betrays the very raison d'étve of this paradigm, which was not only devised to provide a “middle way or entre-deux berween the extremes of absolutism. and nihilism” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 288), but also developed in the context of a view of “evolution by natural drift" that is undeterministic and inimical to any pre-given evolu- tionary path. - In sum, Wilber should be credited for having ‘softei and actual- ized the perennial vision, allowing for much more diversity, variety, and creative novelty than any traditional account. However, by retaining an absolutist/universalist core in his notion of “deep structure,” Wilber still runs the risk of falling in the several dangers intrinsic to absolutist thinking. In the next two sections, we will examine in more detail the nature of these pitfalls. Here, what should be clear is that, for Wilber, underlying all apparent contex- tual diversity and undeterminism, there exists a pre-given and universal evolutionary process that determines the deep structure of world views, social structures, and human psychospirinual develoy ment. This evolutionary process is driven by a dynamic telos-Spii“4 JORGE N. FERRER that, although never reachable in the world of form, isthe ultimate origin, end, and ground of all that exists. U, FIGHTING THE FLATLAND In this section, I want to explore the arguments Wilber offers throughout the entire SES against all non-absolutist accounts of knowledge and value. In short, I will argue that Wilber’s strategy comprises the following two moves: (1) to create a faulty dichotomy between his absolutist-universalist vision and a vulgar relativism; and (2) to depict all the alternatives to his absolutist vision as both self-refuting, i.e, they cannot be stated without falling in contradic- tions; and pernicious, ie., they inevitably lead to a “flatland” in which no qualitative contrasts can consistently be made (a situation of “aperspectival madness"). This section discusses in detail the fallacious nanure of these two moves. 1, The Fallacy of the “faulty dichotomy” Wilber’ first move against non-absolutist approaches is to create ‘a “faulty dichotomy” between his absolutist scheme and a self- contradictory and pernicious relativism. Central to Wilber's argu- ‘ment is the conflation of all non-absolutist approaches into an artificially constructed “vulgar relativism,” so that the reader gets the impression that one has to choose between adopting absolute/ ‘universal standards or falling into the clutches of a self-refuting and nihilistic relativism in which no knowledge claims or qualitative distinctions can coherently be made. ‘The nature of this move is more evident than ever in his discussion of the types of constructivism. Wilber (1996) claims that, “Faced with this discovery of ‘not pregiven,’ a theorist can then take ‘one of tro routes through this new and confusing postmodern landscape, where nothing is foundational” (p. 61, his emphasis). ‘The first route is one leading to a self-contradictory extreme con- structivism, which holds that all world views are arbitrary, all uth relative, and no universal truths exist, while at once defending the universal validity of its own approach. Wilber pinpoints, rightly 1ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 18 believe, that this form of constructivism is just a form of nihilism rooted in egocentric narcissism. The second.route is a moderate constructivism, which Wilber (1996) identifies with his own approach, and that “simply imuestigates the actual history and unfolding of these ‘world views, not as a series of merely arbitrary flailings-around, but rather as an evolutionary or developmental pattern, governed in part by the currents of evolution itself” (p. 63, his emphasis). As we have seen, for Wilber, the deep structures of this evolutionary pattern are still pre-given, that is, they follow a pre-determined sequence that inversely recapnires the steps of involution. The crucial flaw in this argumentation is that a non self contradictory constructivism does not need to be subordinated to any pre-given evolutionary scheme—and this is, I believe, the crux of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) enactive paradigm. However, Wilber’s naked dichotomization renders possible o ‘wo options: Either pre-given evolutionary world views or totally arbitrary ones; either universalism or nihilistic “aperspectival mad- ness,” either absolutism or self-contradictory relativism. There is nothing new about this move. For example, in spite of the numer- ous studies clarifying the different varieties of relativism,"? abso- lutist philosophers—out of either ignorance or malice—have sys- tematically employed this argument to attack any non-absolutist account of truth and value. The purpose behind positing dichot- omies that do nét exhaust the possibilities is well known by phi- losophers and logicians. In their classic study on fallacies, for example, Feamside and Holther (1959) pointed out that: “The as- sumption that there is no middle ground is a favorite weapon of persons desiring to force others to take sides in black-white terms even though the problem is not simple and though its fair solution requires an evaluation of several possibilities” (p. 30). To conclude this section, it appears that Wilber suffers from, and helps to spread, the philosophical affliction that, Bernstein (1992) called the "Cartesian Anxiety,” that is, “the anxiety that unless we can specify a firm foundation for our knowledge claims, unless we can appeal to clear determinate ahistorical criteria for deciding what is true and false, correct and incorrect, then the only alterna- tive is to fall into the abyss of a self-refuting relativism where ‘anything goes™ (p. 309).16 JORGE N. FERRER 2. Refuting the Argument for Self-Refutation Once the artificial dichotomy between absolutism and vulgar relativism is artificially constructed, the second move logically fol- lows: A sustained attack of the “wrong” pole under the charges of self-refutation and “aperspectival madness.” In this section, I will consider the legitimacy of the charge of self-refutation with which Wilber (1995a, 1996) attempts to dismiss all non-absolutist ap- proaches, such as cultural relativism, constructivism, pluralism, and other contextualist accounts of truth and morality. The next section will deal with the second charge, that of “aperspectival madnes The core of Wilber’s attack against non-absolutist approaches rests in the argument for self-reflexivity or self-refutation. When considering cultural relativism, for example, Wilber (1995: that its adherents “maintain that all diverse cultural values are equally valid, and that no universal value judgments are possible. But that judgment is itself a universal judgment. It claims to be universally true that no judgments are universally true” (p. 29, his emphasis). Therefore, he continues, “this type of obscurantism (. is profoundly self-contradictory” (p. 29; see also pp. 526-598, note. 26). Wilber (1995a) applies the same line of argumentation cad nauseum to critique non-hierarchical approaches (p. 25), plural- ism (p. 28; p. 574, note. 26), perspectivism and post-structuralism (p. 188), multiculturalism (pp. 199-204), constructivism (pp. 599-601, note. 16), and deconstructivism (p. 721, note. 4). As is well known, the charge of self-refutation is the classic argument against relativism used by virtually all absolutist philoso- phers even since Plato's quarrels with the Sophists."? In its general form, the argument nuns as follows: Relativism (or constructivism, contextualism, etc.) is self-refuting because it cannot be stated con- sistently without becoming some form of absolutism (or objectiv- ism, universalism, etc.). That is, to say that all views are relative (or constructed, contextual, etc.) renders the relativist thesis either relative itself or claiming to be an exception to its own logic. If the relativist thesis does .not have absolute and universal value, the absolutist philosopher argues, then there is no reason to consider it more valid than any other view. Conversely, ifthe relativist thesis isABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM v7 claimed to have absolute value, it either contradicts itself or falls into what Mandelbaum (1982) called the “sel-excepting fallacy.” Before proceeding to show the fallacious nature of this argumen- tation, I should add an important point here to avoid serious misunderstandings of my position in this article. I rotally agree with Wilber, Taylor, and many others, in that a “vulgar” relativism mai taining that “everything is the same as everything else, and that no distinctions can be therefore made between what is good or bad, right or wrong, true or false” is both blatantly self-contradictory and morally repulsive. And it is probable that some of Wilber's targets are guilty of these charges and well deserve the harsh reprimand they receive at his hands.’ Furthermore, I also agree with these authors on the significance and inevitability of making qualitative distinctions in human life—and, in the next section, I will be giving a brief account of how qualitative contrasts can be made without falling into the extremes of absolutism and vulgar relativism. The problem with Wilber’s presentation, however, is that it forces the reader to mistakenly believe that one can only “take one of two routes.” Absolutism/universalism or a self-contradictory vulgar rela- tivism. In other words, Wilber consistently omits to mention that many alternatives to absolutism, such as certain types of pluralism, perspectivism, pragmatism, and moderated forms of relativism and constructivism, are not necessarily inconsistent.'* What all these approaches have in common is not to be self-refuting, but to challenge absolutist, universalist, and objectivist beliefs in the exis- tence of transcultural and transhistorical standards of rationality, truth, and morality. As Adorno (1979) already warned, to inter- pret this denial as a self-refuting positive theory is both fallacious and question-begging. In short, what I am suggesting here is that the selfrefuting nature of most non-absoluist approaches only emerges when they are either believed to have absolutst purposes or judged from standards (notions of absolute truth, rationality, etc.) only appropriate in an absolutist domain of discourse, In other words, these approaches are self-refuting only when they are supposed to have an absolutist agenda, i, to make absolutist claims."* ‘The imputation of purposes alien to non-absolutist approaches is ‘a common strategy employed, with more or less awareness, by most absolutist philosophers. The neo-pragmatist Rorty (1989), for18 JORGE N. FERRER example, after rejecting selfrefuting forms of vulgar relativism (every belief is as good as every other”), challenged the assump- tion that philosophy is a search for the Truth, and that human i guity activity is aimed at the discovery of “underlying structures,” “culmrally invariant factors,” or “biologically determined patterns.” (p. 86). And when the absolutist philosopher depicts his position as self-contradictory, he responded that this philosopher is “projecting his own habits of thought upon the pragmatist when he charges with (vulgar, self-refuting] relativism” (p. 44). Because, Rorty (1989) argued, the absolutist philosopher “thinks that the whole point of philosophical thought is to detach oneself from any particular com- unity and look down at it from a more universal standpoint. When he hears the pragmatist repudiating the desire for such a standpoint he cannot quite believe it. He thinks that everyone, deep down inside, must want such detachment” (p. 44, his emphasis) ‘The persuasiveness of the argument for the selfrefuting nature of non-adsolutist approaches, then, rests on the acceptance of an absoluist domain of discourse. However, human discourse can have different purposes apart from arguing for the absolute truth or falsehood of knowledge claims, viewpoints, or paradigms. For ex- ample, when Meiland (1980) considered the claim that if rela- tivism is only relatively true, then we have no reason for taking it seriously, he pointed out that this statement presumes that only that which is purely absolute or objective is worth expressing. By bringing evidence contra universals and absolutes, relativists may be attempting to rationally persuade the non-relativist of the rela- tivity of all conceprual frameworks, including the relativist one. This appears to be, for example, the path taken by Goodman (1978), who emphasized the local (versus universal) validity of relativist knowledge claims. Stated in this way, then, the relativist thesis, far from being selfrefuting, is rather “selfexemplifying” (Smith, 1998). Alternatively. Meiland (1980) continued, relativists may be merely presenting their position because they have a psychological need to express the way they see the world. Furthermore, I should add, they may be appealing to the reasonableness, appropriateness, and even ‘truthness’ of the relativist thesis without operating in the domain of a bivalent theory of truth—according to which a state- ‘ment is either true or false (not-true), instead of having differentABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 19 degrees of ‘truthness’ (Negoita, 1985). In all these cases, relativism is not self-refuting and worth expressing. Needless to say, analogous arguments can be made, mulatis mutandis, in defense of the rest of non-absolutist that Wilber attempts to dismiss under the charge of self-refutation approaches—such as pluralism, perspectivism, or constructivism. The idea of different domains of discourse has been further developed by Patel (1994). In his interesting attempt to solve the paradox of selfrefutation in Nagarjuna's thinking, Patel (1994) distinguished between two different universes of discourse: Argu- mentative/systematic and dialogical/conversational."” In the argu- mentative universe of discourse, the function of statements is to state Propositions that have a truth-falsehood value. In a dialogical uni- verse of discourse, in contrast, propositions are not advanced as true or false, but expressed with a different purpose, such as therapeutic, soteriological, showing a state of affairs, or simply continuing the philosophical conversation, According to Patel (1994), the problem of the contradictory nature of self-referential statements—such as ‘Nagarjuna’s famous claim that his Mulamadhsamakarikas contains no thesis—appears only when considered in an argumentative universe of discourse. Following Patel, one might argue that when relativists deny the existence of absolutes, they are primarily developing an alternative mode of dialogical discourse. However, absolutist phi- osophers have interpreted them as positing absolutist positive theories in an argumentative universe of discourse. In addition, discourse (both argumentative and dialogical) may not be necessarily the ultimate context for the discussion of knowledge claims—and especially transpersonal ones. In this vein, Rothberg (1994) pointed out that once the epistemological claims of the spiritual traditions are taken seriously into account, to assume “discourse as the universal horizon of knowledge” (p. 9, his em- phasis) could be deeply misleading. Furthermore, Rothberg (1994) continued, arguments, for self-contradiction such as Habermas’ “performative paradox” (to question discourse is self-refuting because it assumes discourse) are only legitimate if one presumes the impossibility of going beyond the structures of communicative rationality—and this assumption is precisely what most spiritual traditions challenge! Rothberg (1994) suggested that a possiblehak aE 20 JORGE N. FERRER * ness) are redeemed through the suspension of action, and engage- ment in linguistic elucidation and argumentation, Kremer cemed which not only rational argumentation, but also ritual, silesce, story-telling, humor, theater, dance and other ars are taken inte consideration in the search for consensus. According to Kremer (1994) "While itis true that we are always challenged to reflect our resolutions in language, this does not mean that language is the fole arbiter of truth” (p. 83). On the contrary, he added: "The Knowing of the body, the knowing of the heart, the knowing which SOmes from states of shifted awareness are all-valuable processes, Even though every consensus will have to withstand the challenges Posed in verbal, rational discourse, the words of resolution will have to withstand the challenges from all other human dimen- sions of experience—somatic, sexual, emotional, and spiritual” (1994, p. 33), Tn sum, there are two paradigms of human communication aimed at the resolution of validity claims: Discourse—argumentative and Gialogical—and concourse, Since the practice of dialogue incorpo- rates extrarlinguistic elements such as attention to the silences be- ‘ween words, to the language's rhythm, and to the timbre and tone of voice (Bohm, 1990), 1 suggest that the dialogical mode of dis. course should be considered a bridge between argumentative dis. course and “concourse.” In other words, I believe that the shift from an argumentative to a dialogical mode of discourse in contemporary Philosophy (Bernstein, 1983) is paving the way for the recognition of “concourse” as a necessary corrective for the limitations of linguistic modes of rationality and resolution-making, To conclude this section, although vulgar relativism is obviously selfcontradictory, the validity of this charge against most non- absolutist approaches assumes an absolutist universe of argumenta- tive discourse. However, both the existence of absolutist standards (of reason, truth, and value), and the exclusive or privileged‘ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 2 legitimacy of an argumentative universe of discourse, is pre- cisely what is denied or put into question by these approaches. Furthermore, the contradictory problems seemingly implicit in self-referential pro-positions do not necessarily emerge in either a dialogical universe of discourse or in a model of “concourse.” But then, the argument for self-refutation against relativism is onls well-founded if relativism, the view that it is trying to discredit is mistaken (that is, if there really exist absolute standards of reason, knowledge, and value). Once it is revealed that the hidden premises of the self-refutation charge against non-absolutist approaches pre- suppose its conclusion, this reasoning becomes what logicians call a syllogistic fallacy. This is why a non-absolutist philosopher such as Fuchs (1992) can tranquilly point out that “The methodological horror of relativism and its paradoxes scares and occupies only those who still search for safe epistemic foundations” (p. 30). Absolt m or “aperspectival madness”? ‘The second charge made by Wilber against the different varieties of non-absolutist approaches is that they lead to what he calls “aperspectival madness,” i.e., a situation in which no qualitative distinctions can consistently be made because no perspective can be regarded as liaving advantage over any other (e.g., see 1995a, pp. 721-722, note. 4; 1996, pp. 192-198). Wilber illustrates the potentially pernicious nature of non-absolutist stances by mention- ing, for example, that Paul de Man—an early American deconstruc- tionist—had been a Nazi sympathizer (1995a, p. 722, note. 4). ‘Again, I believe that what is lurking behind this reasoning is the belief that the rejection of absolute standards ineluctably leads to moral nihilism and anarchy. However, it cannot be repeated too often that the absence of absolute or universal standards does not mean that there are no standards at all, or that any value judgment is arbitrary. Non-absolutists philosophers are well aware of the dangers of falling in what Smith (1988) called the Egalitarian Falla ive. to assert “that, unless one judgment can be said or shown to be objectively, absolutely] more ‘Valid’ than another, then all judgments must be ‘equal’ or ‘equally valid” (p. 98). In the same line, modern2 JORGE N. FERRER ‘cultural anthropologists have warned us against this faulty reasoning. According to Robbins (1993), for example, the flight from ethno. centrism should not lead anthropologists into the “relativistic fallacy", the morally intolerable “idea that it is impossible to make moral Judgments about the beliefs and behaviors of others” (p.§). Actually, T do not know of any serious comtemporary philosopher who holds the view that any belief or practice should be regarded as good as any ther so I fail to discern who are the real targets of Wilber's critique of the view that “I's all relative, so there is no better and worse, and zo stance is better than another” (Wilber, 1996, p. 193). On occasions, Wilber (1995a) appears to accept the possibility of relative value judgments. For example, in discussing multiculnaral- ism, he states that: ~...sliding contexts do not in any way prevent some contexts from being still relatively eter than less encompassing contexts. Thus, that everything is relative does not mean nothing is better; it means some things are, indeed, relatively better than others, all the time” (pp. 202-203, his emphasis). However, it should be noted here that these statements are made in the context ‘of an absolutist-universalist framework in which what is more encom- passing and holistic is judged to be absolutely more valuable than what is more simple, That is, relatively better contexts are necessarily more encompassing contexts. In fact, Wilber (1995a) continues his discussion on multiculturalism: “By failing co see the definieness Of relative judgments—and thus being totally disoriented and lost in aperspectival space—they miss the integral part, the universal- integral part, of their own stance, and thus they all too often regress into a riot of idiosyncratic differences that destroys the integrity of their own position” (p. 203; his emphasis). Once again, Wilber's inability to envision non self-refuting alternatives to universalism is conspicuous: Contextual and relative value judgments are accepted, but only when subordinated to an absohutist-universalist scheme, Otherwise, there is no escape from self-contradictory-aporias and “aperspectival madness.” However, a world without moral absolutes or universals is not necessarily a “fladand” in which “nothing can be said to be deeper ‘or higher or better in any meaningful sense” (Wilber, 1995a, p. 94), This line of argumentation, apart from falling into the several fallacies mentioned above, blatantly ignores the possibility ofos ‘ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 23 historically embedded human values. For example, judgments about what is better or worse can be legitimately made either on ragmatic/contextual grounds such as local adequacy, applicabi etc. or resolved in a situation of “concourse” where we not only rationally consider abstract moral postulates, but also openly listen to the voice of our bodies, our emotions, and our spirits (Kremer, 1992b, 1994). For example, Rorty (1989) argued that qualitative distinctions can be justified, not from an absolute or transhistorical standpoint, but on the grounds of the practical advantages of a certain posi- tion or way of being. These qualitative preferences, Rorty (1989) stressed, are “not built into us by human nature. It is just the way we live now!” (p. 44, his emphasis). And contra cultural solipsisms, Bernstein (1991) pointed out that, although each tradition has its own standards of rationality, cross-cultural qualitative judgments are possible because we can examine both how a tradition fulfills its own standards of rationality, and how successful itis in meeting the chal- lenges of rival traditions. Therefore, “The rational superiority of a tadition can be vindicated without (falsely) presupposing that there are universally neutral, ahistorical standards of rationality. There is not ‘rationality as such” (p. 91). A similar point has been made by Hoy (1994) in his critique of Habermas’ universalism: “To criticize one community or set of social practices, we do not need to imagine some ideal standpoint that is independent of any contingent con- crete standpoint. More substantively, we may judge that community, not from outside our own standpoint (since there is no such out- side), but from the standpoint of other communities, or other seli- understandings, that we know to be, or to have been, viable” (p. 203), In other words, the rejection of universal standards does not necessarily snares us in either the idiotic endorsement of all forms of life (‘aperspectival madness") or the ethnocentric hubris and provinciality of thinking that our standards are to be preferred to all others. All of us are already participating in diverse planetary communities, and this participation allows us to criticize not only other's standards, but also our own. By stepping outside our own Particular community and looking at our context from other con- texts, we can practice self-criticism and open ourselves to learn and be transformed by other perspectives. In this way, ethnocentrism is24 JORGE N. FERRER avoided while conserving grounds for cross-cultural criticism. What is really ethnocentric, says Hoy (1994), “is the assumption that we have become less and less context-bound, and more and more universal. This Whiggish view entails that others will have to become more like us, and is thus ethnocentric” (p. 203). ‘The positions of these authors not only challenge Wilber’s univer- salist claims about a unique mode of rationality (based on Piaget's “formal operational cognition”) (e.g., see 1995a, p. 174), but also hhis conviction that the absence of absolute standards leads inevi- ‘ably to a situation of “aperspectival madness”. On the contrary, con- temporary philosophers argue, the lack of absolute foundations may lead to a pluralistic reconstruction of a philosophy embodied in everyday practices and grounded on an open-ended dialogical communication among human beings. Non-absolutist philosophers simply do not find it necessary to appeal to any form of abstract absolute or universal principles, and less to factual ones such as Wilber’s “holistic capacity,” in order to make such evaluations. The Enlightenment assumption that without absolute or universal stan- dards, rational criticism of others and ourselves is not possible is a myth that must be laid to rest. Furthermore, one might even contend that nihilism is parasitic, ot upon relativism, but upon absolutism. Nihilism results from the failure to find absoluce foundations. Although I cannot adequately defend this thesis here, I believe that the craving for absolute and universal standards is ultimately rooted in fears of moral anarchy, the fear that, as Dostoyevsky put it, “If God does not exist, then everything is permitted.” This tendency can be traced to Plato, whose doctrine of the eternal and transcendental Ideas was in Part a reaction against the individualism and vulgar relativism dominating Greek government and commerce after the rise of democracy. However, if one is not involved in the self-defeating enterprise of looking for absolutes, nihilism does not need to emerge. This is why, I believe, some contemplative traditions, such as Madhyamaka Buddhism, regarded the grasping for absolute foundations not only as an egoic tendency contributing to exis. tential alienation, but also as the major obstacle for spiritual it eration—more about Wilber and Madhyamaka thinking in the next section.peaatn ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 25 To conclude this section, it may be necessary to say some words regarding Wilber's claim (1995a) about the inevi of a hier- archical ontology and axiology grounded in the principle of “holis- tic capacity.” In brief, Wilber (1995a) insists that reality is not composed of things or processes, but of holons, that is, whole/parts, “wholes that are simultaneously parts of other wholes” (p. 35), which are thereby hierarchically organized. Wilber (1995a) offers two different arguments for the inevitability of hierarchies. The first is formal: The rejection of hierarchies is self-defeating because it involves an implicit hierarchical ranking of non-hierarchies upon hierarchies. To deny hierarchies, then, “is self-contradictory: it is a hierarchy that denies hierarchy” (p. 25). The second argument is descriptive or naturalistic: As in all domains of nature—the physio- sphere (matter), the biosphere (life) and the noosphere (mind)— wholes emerge with more and new qualitative properties than their parts, and as these wholes cannot, by definition, be at the same level as their parts (otherwise they will be merely another part), Wilber (1995a) maintains that hierarchies, or “ranking of events according to their holistic capacity” (p. 17, his emphasis), are embedded in reality. In this hierarchical world view, he proceeds, holons (whole’ parts) with more integrative and holistic capacity are higher, deeper, and more valuable, Aswe have seen, the first argument is plainly fallacious. Assuming an absolutist argumentative universe of discourse, it turns a nega- tion into a positive statement, and then accuses it of being self. contradictory. As for the second argument, I agree with Wilber that, there are different degrees of order, complexity and organization in the physical and biological world, and I believe that to speak about these differences in terms of “higher” and “lower” is a semantic option as valid as any other, However, the adequacy of hierarchical accounts in cognitive and moral development (the noosphere) is currently a highly controversial and debated issue— see, e.g., Alexander and Langer (1990) for several descriptions of non-hierarchical models of cognitive development; Flanagan (1991) for a critique of universal stage developmental theories of moral- and Burman (1994) for an account of some of the serious ideological problems inherent in Piaget's cognitive developmental model.SRRECR METRE sgh 28 JORGE N. FERRER Finally, about the validity of grounding qualitative distinctions in a hierarchical ontology, it must be said that itis highly problematic to leap without further explanation from a factual level of discourse (eg about what is more complex, organized and holistic) to an axiological one (about what is more valuable). This “jump” is what in the philosophy of ethics is known as the naturalistic fallacy, according to which no conclusions expressed in evaluative language (value judgments) can be legitimately drawn from premises ex- pressed in descriptive language (factual judgments), And even in the case that it were valid to say, as I believe it is, that “values and facts are no longer automatically divorced” (Wilber, 1995a, p. 81), Wilber offers no non-circular argumentation for the value judgment that more holistic organizations must be regarded as absolutely more valuable than simpler ones, lll, PRIVILEGED FRAMEWORKS, HERMENEUTICS, AND DIALOGUE One of the most critical issues in contemporary transpersonal theory is the existence of a privileged framework or paradigm able ‘o harmoniously unify the different competing theories that have risen in the field during the last decades. Of course, most transper- sonal thinkers believe that the frameworks they hold are either more encompassing or epistemically privileged upon the rest. Arguably, the condition of modern cranspersonal studies can be then character ized as a “battle for the ultimate framework,” ie., the search for an alltembracing metaframework able to bestow their advocates with a privileged symbolic interpretation that allows them to hierarchically subordinate the rest of transpersonal models and theories. ‘Whether a consensus about an ultimate framework for transper- sonal theory, or for human knowledge in general, will ever be reached is obviously unknown to me. For all I know, it is quite possible that the very idea of an single, complete, and privileged symbolic interpretation of reality is no more than mere fiction. In any event, what is most discouraging about this situation is the circularity of the arguments transpersonal authors generally employ to refute or discredit their opponents. I believe that transpersonalseen ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM a theorists would be wise in remembering at least two of the harshest lessons philosophers of science learned more than twenty years ago: First, that the persuasive power of an argument is in large part provided by the conceptual framework within which it is made. And second, that logically incompatible conceptual frameworks can fit the very same evidence. Or, put in philosophical jargon, that all ‘evidence is in large part “theory-laden” (Hanson, Kuhn), and that all theories are “underdetermined” by evidence (Quine). For example, Wilber's (1995a) support of the more advanced nature of Eastern and Western mysticism over shamanism (pp. 572-578, note. 26), his claim about the non-spiritual nature of most Jungian arche- types (pp. 247-249), and his portrayal of a plethora of thinkers— Berman, Roszak; Taras, Washburn, etc.—as retro-romantics (see pp. 670-691, note. 82; p. 684, pp. 751-761, note. 17), only make sense and are compelling if both the pre-trans fallacy, and his uni-linear and universal evolutionary scheme are accepted. How- ever, the pre-trans fallacy in its strong form and the very idea of unilinear evolution are precisely some of the notions questioned by many transpersonal thinkers (eg., Armstrong, 1984, 1985; Washburn, 1990, 1995, 1996; Hunt, 1995; Grof, 1996; Kremer, 1996a). Needless to say, when the very foundations of a frame- work are challenged, retorts assuming its validity are blatanily question-begging. Although T cazinot go farther into this discussion here, I would like to conclude this paper by briefly pointing out certain potential pitfalls of believing to have attained ultimate or absolute frame- works for academic and cross-cultural dialogue. In brief, the first danger is to ignore, dismiss as incoherent, or simply regard as false any conflicting evidence the absolutist philosopher encounters when confronted with other viewpoints, alien traditions or competing paradigms. The second is to regard this evidence as partial, or, what is even more distorting, to translate it in terms of the “master” code of the totalizing framework. As it should be obvious, both dangers build serious obstacles to the practice of authentic dialogue, which requires not only the willingness and ability to actively listen and understand others, but also the ‘openness to be challenged and transformed by their viewpoints, Of course, the problem with absolutist stances in this regard is that~ - oR ERT BE” 28 JORGE N. FERRER ‘once one believes to have a more or less accurate picuure of “how things really are,” dialogue with people maintaining conflicting viewpoints cannot but become an uninteresting and sterile mono- logue. At its worst, the conflicting viewpoints are regarded as less evolved, incoherent, or simply false. At its best, the challenges Presented are assimilated within the all-encompassing framework defended by the absolutist philosopher. In both cases the absolutist Philosopher appears to not even listen to. what other people are saying, because all new or conflicting information is screened, processed, oF assimilated in terms of his or her own framework. Therefore, 2 genuine or symmetrical encounter with the other in which opposing viewpoints are regarded as real options is rendered unlikely. Considering Wilber's work in this context, several authors have commented on the obstacles that his argumentative style of dis- course raise for academic and philosophical dialogue (Kremer, 1996b; Rothberg, 1996; Zimmerman, 1996; McDermott, 1997), and even pointed out that “his main adaptive strategy in relation to the challenges has been, in Piagetian terms, that of assimilation” (Kelly and Rothberg, 1996; their emphasis). Rather than repeating what others have already pointed out with eloquence, I will focus here on how some absolutist tendencies of Wilber's discourse may hinder cross-cultural dialogue and hermeneutic understanding. To this end, I will present Wilber's treatment of the celebrated Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example of the distor- ons commonly resulting from the process of assimilating other waditions to an absolutist metanarrative."* ‘The Absolutization of Emptiness (sunyata) In short, the interpretation that Wilber offers of Madhyamaka’s thinking relies exclusively on Murti's The Central Philosophy of Bud- dhism (1953). Wilber (1995a) justifies the selection of this source by saying that, “although not without its difficulties and occasional inaccuracies, is nonetheless a classic in the field” (p. 692, note. 1), and “is generally regarded as the finest treatment of Nagarjuna in English” (p. 680, note. 2). Then, he proceeds by equating emptiness (sunyata) with pure Consciousness (p. 539, note. 2); with Absolute