Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita, G.R. No.

168056, September 1, 2005 (Valid

delegation)
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO
PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 168207

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON,

ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, AND SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, CESAR V. PURISIMA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 168461

ASSOCIATION OF PILIPINAS SHELL DEALERS, INC. represented by its President, ROSARIO ANTONIO;
PETRON DEALERS’ ASSOCIATION represented by its President, RUTH E. BARBIBI; ASSOCIATION OF CALTEX
DEALERS’ OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its President, MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA; ROSARIO ANTONIO
doing business under the name and style of "ANB NORTH SHELL SERVICE STATION"; LOURDES MARTINEZ
doing business under the name and style of "SHELL GATE – N. DOMINGO"; BETHZAIDA TAN doing business
under the name and style of "ADVANCE SHELL STATION"; REYNALDO P. MONTOYA doing business under the
name and style of "NEW LAMUAN SHELL SERVICE STATION"; EFREN SOTTO doing business under the name
and style of "RED FIELD SHELL SERVICE STATION"; DONICA CORPORATION represented by its President,
DESI TOMACRUZ; RUTH E. MARBIBI doing business under the name and style of "R&R PETRON STATION";
PETER M. UNGSON doing business under the name and style of "CLASSIC STAR GASOLINE SERVICE
STATION"; MARIAN SHEILA A. LEE doing business under the name and style of "NTE GASOLINE & SERVICE
STATION"; JULIAN CESAR P. POSADAS doing business under the name and style of "STARCARGA
ENTERPRISES"; ADORACION MAÑEBO doing business under the name and style of "CMA MOTORISTS
CENTER"; SUSAN M. ENTRATA doing business under the name and style of "LEONA’S GASOLINE STATION and
SERVICE CENTER"; CARMELITA BALDONADO doing business under the name and style of "FIRST CHOICE
SERVICE CENTER"; MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA doing business under the name and style of "LORPED SERVICE
CENTER"; RHEAMAR A. RAMOS doing business under the name and style of "RJRAM PTT GAS STATION"; MA.
ISABEL VIOLAGO doing business under the name and style of "VIOLAGO-PTT SERVICE CENTER"; MOTORISTS’
HEART CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA;
MOTORISTS’ HARVARD CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F.
FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS’ HERITAGE CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations,
JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; PHILIPPINE STANDARD OIL CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for
Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; ROMEO MANUEL doing business under the name and style of
"ROMMAN GASOLINE STATION"; ANTHONY ALBERT CRUZ III doing business under the name and style of
"TRUE SERVICE STATION", Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance and GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 168463

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO G.

PLAZA, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, OSCAR G. MALAPITAN, BENJAMIN C. AGARAO, JR. JUAN
EDGARDO M. ANGARA, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, RENATO
B. MAGTUBO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, RODOLFO Q.
AGBAYANI and TEODORO A. CASIÑO, Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity
as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, Respondent.

x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 168730

BATAAN GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary; HON. MARGARITO TEVES, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; HON. JOSE MARIO BUNAG, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue; and HON. ALEXANDER AREVALO, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by everyone, and the more
man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold himself honored in contributing to those expenses.

-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781)

French statesman and economist

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased emoluments for
health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits … these are the reasons why Republic Act No.
9337 (R.A. No. 9337)1 was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional
power of review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law,
but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its passage.

Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments notwithstanding, petitioners failed
to justify their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A. No. 9337 is not unconstitutional.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill
No. 1950.

House Bill No. 35552 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House Committee on Ways and
Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468, which Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson
introduced on August 8, 2004. The President certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On
January 27, 2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading.

House Bill No. 37053 on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina,
and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its "mother bill" is House Bill No. 3555. The House
Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent on
February 8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading on February 28,
2005.

Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 19504 on March 7, 2005, "in
substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705."
Senator Ralph G. Recto sponsored Senate Bill No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both
sponsored by Sens. Franklin M. Drilon, Juan M. Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan. The President certified the bill on
March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate on second and third reading on April 13, 2005.

On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a
committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills.

Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705,
and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in full free and conference," recommended the approval
of its report, which the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing thereto the
next day, May 11, 2005.

On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was transmitted to the
President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337.

July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337.5 When said date came, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining respondents from enforcing and
implementing the law.

Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for its issuance of the temporary restraining order on July 1, 2005, to
wit:
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just tell you a little background.
You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon. But
before that, there was a lot of complaints aired on television and on radio. Some people in a gas station were
complaining that the gas prices went up by 10%. Some people were complaining that their electric bill will go up by
10%. Other times people riding in domestic air carrier were complaining that the prices that they’ll have to pay would
have to go up by 10%. While all that was being aired, per your presentation and per our own understanding of the
law, that’s not true. It’s not true that the e-vat law necessarily increased prices by 10% uniformly isn’t it?

ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?

ATTY. BANIQUED : It’s not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that granted the Petroleum
companies some subsidy . . . interrupted

J. PANGANIBAN : That’s correct . . .

ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . . interrupted

J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .

ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the elimination of the Excise Tax
and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say that the VAT as to petroleum dealers increased prices by
10%.

ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price by 10% to cover the E-Vat
tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import duties, the Net Tax would probably be in the neighborhood of 7%?
We are not going into exact figures I am just trying to deliver a point that different industries, different products,
different services are hit differently. So it’s not correct to say that all prices must go up by 10%.

ATTY. BANIQUED : You’re right, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are at present imposed a Sales
Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax was also removed as a mitigating measure. So, therefore,
there is no justification to increase the fares by 10% at best 7%, correct?

ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.

J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that first day, were being
increased arbitrarily by 10%. And that’s one reason among many others this Court had to issue TRO because of the
confusion in the implementation. That’s why we added as an issue in this case, even if it’s tangentially taken up by
the pleadings of the parties, the confusion in the implementation of the E-vat. Our people were subjected to the
mercy of that confusion of an across the board increase of 10%, which you yourself now admit and I think even the
Government will admit is incorrect. In some cases, it should be 3% only, in some cases it should be 6% depending
on these mitigating measures and the location and situation of each product, of each service, of each company, isn’t
it?

ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So that’s one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending the clarification of all these and
we wish the government will take time to clarify all these by means of a more detailed implementing rules, in case
the law is upheld by this Court. . . .6

The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.

G.R. No. 168056

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on
May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106,
107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT
on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate
to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½
%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

G.R. No. 168207

On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise assailing the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.

Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate to 12%, on the
ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power, petitioners also contend that the increase in the
VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the due process clause embodied
in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people, in that:
(1) the 12% increase is ambiguous because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the
conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable
VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase in the VAT rate, which is supposed to be an incentive to the
President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should only be based on fiscal
adequacy.

Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral
Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment rule" upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI,
Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 168461

Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers,
Inc., et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No. 9337:

1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods shall be
amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos
(₱1, 000,000.00);

2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited
against the output tax; and

3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its political subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross payments of goods
and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of
services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC.

Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and
confiscatory.

Petitioners’ argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to petitioners, the contested sections
impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax partakes
the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law. Petitioners
further contend that like any other property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of,
and that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-
added.

Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law under
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of
input tax; or (2) invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on
real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the
Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with higher input tax to output tax ratio that will suffer the
consequences thereof for it wipes out whatever meager margins the petitioners make.

G.R. No. 168463

Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed this petition
for certiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the following grounds:
1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI,
Section 28(2) of the Constitution;

2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on provisions present in
Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and

3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121, 125, 7 148, 151,
236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution,
which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives

G.R. No. 168730

On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 20, 2005,
alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows
VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the principle that tax
collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public purposes and expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further
claims that allowing these establishments to pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article
VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution.

RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents. Preliminarily, respondents
contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its
validity.

Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA

630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e., legality of the bicameral
proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate concomitant thereto, have
already been settled. With regard to the issue of undue delegation of legislative power to the President, respondents
contend that the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once any
of the two conditions provided therein arise.

Respondents also refute petitioners’ argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the
creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding
₱1,000,000.00, and the 5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory,
and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others.

Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the government’s fiscal reform agenda. A reform in
the value-added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the balance towards a sustainable
macroeconomic environment necessary for economic growth.

ISSUES

The Court defined the issues, as follows:

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 24, and

b. Article VI, Section 26(2)

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the
following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article VI, Section 28(2)

2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article III, Section 1

 RULING OF THE COURT

As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-added tax (VAT), as the
confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of its nature.

The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or
properties and services.8 Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or services may pass on the
amount of tax paid to the buyer,9 with the seller acting merely as a tax collector.10 The burden of VAT is intended to
fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers.

In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business it engages in,
without transferring the burden to someone else.11 Examples are individual and corporate income taxes, transfer
taxes, and residence taxes.12

In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in a different mode.
Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost deduction method" and was payable only
by the original sellers. The single-stage system was subsequently modified, and a mixture of the "cost deduction
method" and "tax credit method" was used to determine the value-added tax payable. 13 Under the "tax credit
method," an entity can credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its
purchases, inputs and imports.14

It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the VAT system was
rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using the "tax credit method." 15

E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law, 16 R.A. No. 8241 or the Improved VAT
Law,17 R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997,18 and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also
referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act.

The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

I.

Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 24, and

b. Article VI, Section 26(2)

A. The Bicameral Conference Committee

Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded its
authority by:

1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337;

2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;

3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and

4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of taxes in addition to
the value-added tax.

Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.

It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any legislative body for,
as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to
transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order."19 Thus,
Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings."
Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the
respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.

Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as follows:

Sec. 88. Conference Committee. – In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendment
to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference committees of both chambers.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere to and support the
House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they materially impair the House Bill, the panel
shall report such fact to the House for the latter’s appropriate action.

Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. – . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

...

The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report prior to the voting
thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the same manner and procedure as it votes
on a bill on third and final reading.

Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:

Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill
or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet
within ten (10) days after their composition. The President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in the
conference committee with the approval of the Senate.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in, or
amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the members of each House panel, voting
separately.

A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled version thereof with the
explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to the report.

...

The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed by any
constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over changes or
amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most basic powers of the
legislative branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the
Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of
passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses
creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference
committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by Congress.

In the recent case of Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary,20 the Court En Banc, unanimously reiterated and
emphasized its adherence to the "enrolled bill doctrine," thus, declining therein petitioners’ plea for the Court to go
behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case was Congress’s creation of two sets of bicameral
conference committees, the lack of records of said committees’ proceedings, the alleged violation of said
committees of the rules of both houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the
compromise bill submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the
passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.

Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:

Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A
review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from
the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal
rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court
is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever
doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court
reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in
the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And
it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure."21 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege irregularities committed
by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to
the Fariñas case,22 the present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference
committee on matters regarding Congress’ compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most
basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its
members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most
orderly manner. It is also the sole

concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee if it believes that said
members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to
questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the internal
proceedings of a co-equal branch of government.

Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,23 the
Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral
Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house." 24 To date, Congress has not seen it fit to
make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral
conference committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.

Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of the bicameral
conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The Court observes that there was a
necessity for a conference committee because a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on
one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements. As pointed out in
the petitions, said disagreements were as follows:

House Bill No. 3555
With regard to "Stand-By Authority" in favor of President
Provides for 12% VAT on every
sale of goods or properties
(amending Sec. 106 of NIRC);
12% VAT on importation of
goods (amending Sec. 107 of
NIRC); and 12% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of
properties (amending Sec. 108
of NIRC)
With regard to the "no pass-on" provision
No similar provision
House Bill No.3705
Provides for 12% VAT in general on
sales of goods or properties and
reduced rates for sale of certain
locally manufactured goods and
petroleum products and raw materials
to be used in the manufacture thereof
(amending Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12%
VAT on importation of goods and
reduced rates for certain imported
products including petroleum
products (amending Sec. 107 of
NIRC); and 12% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of
properties and a reduced rate for
certain services including power
generation (amending Sec. 108 of
NIRC)
Provides that the VAT imposed on
power generation and on the sale of
petroleum products shall be absorbed
by generation companies or sellers,
respectively, and shall not be passed
on to consumers
Senate Bill No. 1950
Provides for a single rate of 10%
VAT on sale of goods or
properties (amending Sec. 106 of
NIRC), 10% VAT on sale of
services including sale of
electricity by generation
companies, transmission and
distribution companies, and use or
lease of properties (amending
Sec. 108 of NIRC)
Provides that the VAT imposed on
sales of electricity by generation
companies and services of
transmission companies and
distribution companies, as well as
those of franchise grantees of
electric utilities shall not apply to
residential

end-users. VAT shall be absorbed

by generation, transmission, and
distribution companies.
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
Provides that the input tax credit No similar provision Provides that the input tax credit
for capital goods on which a VAT for capital goods on which a VAT
has been paid shall be equally has been paid shall be equally
distributed over 5 years or the distributed over 5 years or the
depreciable life of such capital depreciable life of such capital
goods; the input tax credit for goods; the input tax credit for
goods and services other than goods and services other than
capital goods shall not exceed capital goods shall not exceed
5% of the total amount of such 90% of the output VAT.
goods and services; and for
persons engaged in retail trading
of goods, the allowable input tax
credit shall not exceed 11% of
the total amount of goods
purchased.
With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding
 income and excise taxes
No similar provision No similar provision
Provided for
amendments to several
NIRC provisions
regarding corporate
income, percentage,
franchise and excise
taxes

The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were with regard to (1) what rate of
VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution
companies should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT imposed on
electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products
should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should
be limited; (4) and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise and excise taxes
should be amended.

There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and Senate bills, the
Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses of Congress to act on the same by
settling said differences and/or disagreements. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing
provisions by making the following changes:

1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the Conference
Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap in the difference between the
10% VAT rate proposed by the Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the
House, by striking a compromise whereby the present 10% VAT rate would be retained until certain conditions
arise, i.e., the value-added tax collection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds 2 4/5%, or National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1½%, when
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall raise the rate of VAT to 12% effective
January 1, 2006.

2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and
distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers or whether both the VAT imposed on electricity
generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products may be
passed on to consumers, the Bicameral Conference Committee chose to settle such disagreement by altogether
deleting from its Report any no pass-on provision.

3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the Bicameral Conference
Committee decided to adopt the position of the House by putting a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be
credited against the output tax, although it crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on input tax
credits and the manner of computing the same by providing thus:

(A) Creditable Input Tax. – . . .

...

Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business for which
deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the
fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component
thereof, exceeds one million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however, that if the estimated useful life of the
capital good is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over
such shorter period: . . .

(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. – If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax, the
excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be
carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters: PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over
from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output
VAT: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may
at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, . . .

4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax, franchise, percentage
and excise taxes, the conference committee decided to include such amendments and basically adopted the
provisions found in Senate Bill No. 1950, with some changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed.

Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral
Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill
and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile" and "harmonize." 25 To reconcile or harmonize
disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either
the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill
would

be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions.
In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions
were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is
wholly foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.

The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT wanted by the Senate is
retained until such time that certain conditions arise when the 12% VAT wanted by the House shall be imposed,
appears to be a compromise to try to bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed by the two houses of
Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still totally within the subject of what rate of VAT should be imposed
on taxpayers.

The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto, Chairman of the Senate Panel, explained the reason for
deleting the no pass-on provision in this wise:

. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were thinking that no sector should be
a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any sector be discriminated on. The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a
pass on-tax. And let’s keep it plain and simple. Let’s not confuse the bill and put a no pass-on provision. Two-thirds
of the world have a VAT system and in this two-thirds of the globe, I have yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though
provision. So, the thinking of the Senate is basically simple, let’s keep the VAT simple. 26 (Emphasis supplied)

Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision "never really enjoyed the support
of either House."27

With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral Conference Committee came
to a compromise on the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on such input tax credit, but again, the change
introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee was totally within the intent of both houses to put a cap on input
tax that may be

credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the House of Representatives, one
of the major objectives was to "plug a glaring loophole in the tax policy and administration by creating vital
restrictions on the claiming of input VAT tax credits . . ." and "[b]y introducing limitations on the claiming of tax credit,
we are capping a major leakage that has placed our collection efforts at an apparent disadvantage." 28

As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in Senate Bill No.
1950, since said provisions were among those referred to it, the conference committee had to act on the same and
it basically adopted the version of the Senate.

Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects of
the provisions referred

to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine
Judges Association vs. Prado29 and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,30 the Court recognized the long-standing
legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that:

. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found
either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment
in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as
an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis.31 (Emphasis supplied)

B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "No-Amendment Rule"

Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Petitioners’ argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add or delete
provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of
the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its
ruling in the Tolentino case that:

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report in these cases must have undergone three
readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may
seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .
Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. 32 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each
house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is
transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as
to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean
that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral
Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted
upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.

C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive Origination of Revenue
Bills

Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on corporate income
taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following provisions, to wit:

Section 27 Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation

28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage
119 Tax on franchises
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
151 Excise Tax on mineral products
236 Registration requirements
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue

Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the House. They
aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the
NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the
NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in the
House bills are not intended to be amended by the House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the
proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24
of the Constitution.

The argument does not hold water.

Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.

In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for
amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to
the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on
the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the
Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in
the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?

The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus:

. . . To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At
this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist
that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law – must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s
power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

…
…Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

...

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing
an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
was acting within its

constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced
by the Senate to the House revenue bill.

Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not been touched in the
House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the subject revenue bills. The Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 1468, the very first House bill introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by House
Bill No. 3555, stated:

One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of solving the country’s
serious financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be strictly monitored and controlled and
revenues must be significantly increased. This may be easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities are still
optimistic the government will be operating on a balanced budget by the year 2009. In fact, several measures that
will result to significant expenditure savings have been identified by the administration. It is supported with a
credible package of revenue measures that include measures to improve tax administration and control the
leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax (VAT). (Emphasis supplied)

Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that:

In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all acknowledged that on top of our
agenda must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal system.

In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a balanced budget by
the year 2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might seem poignant in the beginning, but
in the long run prove effective and beneficial to the overall status of our economy. One such opportunity is
a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the relevance given our present conditions.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in sizeable
revenues for the government

to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and control of the leakages
in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills were transmitted to the Senate, the
latter, approaching the measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce amendments within the
purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the
consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the
consumers. The sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the provisions on income tax on corporation were
included is worth quoting:

All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise ₱64.3 billion in additional revenues
annually even while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum products.

However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only ₱48.7 billion amount is from the VAT on twelve goods
and services. The rest of the tab – ₱10.5 billion- will be picked by corporations.

What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the consumer. Why should the
latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on the burden of the consumer?

The corporate world’s equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to 35 percent, but up to
2008 only. This will raise ₱10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will slide back, not to its old rate of 32 percent, but
two notches lower, to 30 percent.

Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency provision that will be
in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal medicine will have an expiry date.
For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of their sacrifice brief. We
would like to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the tunnel, this government will keep on
making the tunnel long.

The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business will be there to share
the burden.35

As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on provisions in the
tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is to raise revenues for the
government.

Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to the reforms to the
VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that certain goods and
services which were subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would
be burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend
these sections to soften the impact of VAT. Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:

However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on bunker fuel, to lessen the
effect of a VAT on this product.

For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT.

And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy the VAT chain, we will
however bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such as diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene.

...

What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what was taken from the
right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of VAT, so that the people can cushion the
blow of higher prices they will have to pay as a result of VAT.36

The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are necessary for the
implementation of the changes in the VAT system.

To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes of the house
bills, which is to supplement our country’s fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its power to
propose those amendments.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

I.

Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the
following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article VI, Section 28(2)

A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend in common that
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the
President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes
undue delegation of the legislative power to tax.

The assailed provisions read as follows:

SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. –

(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of
goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of the goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or
transferor: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%).

SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods. –

(A) In General. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a value-added tax
equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and
customs duties, plus customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and other charges, such tax to be paid by the importer
prior to the release of such goods from customs custody: Provided, That where the customs duties are determined
on the basis of the quantity or volume of the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus
excise taxes, if any: provided, further, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%) after any
of the following conditions has been satisfied.

(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%).

SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties –

(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services: provided, that the President, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.

(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%). (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual
abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the government.

They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well
as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the
exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to
the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported.

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President the legislative power
to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the
actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that
the law also effectively nullified the President’s power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify
the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.

Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by the law to bring about either or both the conditions precedent.

On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation that the imposition of the 12%
rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of Finance, an unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of
no taxation without representation. They submit that the Secretary of Finance is not mandated to give a favorable
recommendation and he may not even give his recommendation. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards
are provided in the law on what basis and as to how he will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless,
that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former
is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the
increased tax rate or not.

A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere. 37

A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed
in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated."38 This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.39

With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "the Legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." The
powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a
complete law – complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable – and
to determine the expediency of its enactment.40 Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be justified in
holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is
purely legislative in nature – that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the
power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation.

Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions: (Permissible delegations)

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.

TEST OF DELEGATION

It is valid only if the law

(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate;41 and

(b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.42 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.43 Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.44

In People vs. Vera,45 the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on the concept and extent of
delegation of power in this wise:

COMPLETENESS TEST

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether
the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was
left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

...

‘The true distinction’, says Judge Ranney, ‘is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.’

...

It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the
legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive
or the adoption by the people of a particular community. In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The
power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a
mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however,
to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and
economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on
Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in
the following language — speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: The principle
which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the
circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this
authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by
the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given
circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is
not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the
facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed. The
efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the
ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it
may designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the happening of future
specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified
contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).46

In Edu vs. Ericta,47 the Court reiterated:

What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test
is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope
and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that
may be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is
thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. (Emphasis
supplied).48

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or
conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend,
but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. 49 While the power to
tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of
such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.50

The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of
itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making
recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its members, or which
it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is
impossible in the absence of accurate information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of
securing such information is proper.51 The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not
require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts
and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.52

In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which
reads as follows:

That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the
rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½
%).
COURT’S RULING:
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the
control of the executive.

Completeness test

No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.53 Where the law is clear
and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that
the mandate is obeyed.54

Sufficient Standard test

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of
the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the
law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a
clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into
effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the
ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself.

The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law effectively
nullified the President’s power of control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position of
petitioners

Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase "upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance." Neither does the Court find persuasive the submission of petitioners
Escudero, et al. that any recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President
since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter.

When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means that as head of the
Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory
capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing, is "subject to the direction of the President." 55

In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions,
the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he
is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. 56 The Secretary of
Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate
them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of
Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or
nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter.

Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely, whether
by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the
Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT
rate must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.57 Congress
does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it,
and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.58

As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the President the legislative
power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not
delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to
12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress
chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the
law.59

The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions to bring about either or both the conditions precedent does not deserve any merit as this argument is
highly speculative. The Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist
at all. The Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When the Court acts on appearances
instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived.

B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary Additional Tax Burden

Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an unfair and additional tax burden
on the people. Petitioners also argue that the 12% increase, dependent on any of the 2 conditions set forth in the
contested provisions, is ambiguous because it does not state if the VAT rate would be returned to the original 10% if
the rates are no longer satisfied. Petitioners also argue that such rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are
unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year.

Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two conditions set forth therein
are satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to 12%. The provisions of the law are clear. It does not
provide for a return to the 10% rate nor does it empower the President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to
12%, the VAT collection goes below the 24/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that the national government deficit
as a percentage of GDP of the previous year does not exceed 1½%.

Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or limitations be introduced
where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that only Congress may tread upon. 60

Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in this case the Court finds none,
petitioners’ argument is, at best, purely speculative. There is no basis for petitioners’ fear of a fluctuating VAT rate
because the law itself does not provide that the rate should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in Sections 4,
5 and 6 are no longer present. The rule is that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that
there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial
addition or subtraction.61

Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an incentive to the President to raise
the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should be based on fiscal adequacy.

Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not the only condition. There is another
condition, i.e., the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%).

Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions:

1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%

The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If VAT/GDP is less than 2.8%, it
means that government has weak or no capability of implementing the VAT or that VAT is not effective in the
function of the tax collection. Therefore, there is no value to increase it to 12% because such action will also be
ineffectual.

2. Nat’l Gov’t Deficit/GDP >1.5%

The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the fiscal condition of government has
reached a relatively sound position or is towards the direction of a balanced budget position. Therefore, there is no
need to increase the VAT rate since the fiscal house is in a relatively healthy position. Otherwise stated, if the ratio
is more than 1.5%, there is indeed a need to increase the VAT rate. 62

That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT collection does not render it
unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for which the law was passed, which in this case, is mainly to
raise revenue. In fact, fiscal adequacy dictated the need for a raise in revenue.

The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was originally stated by Adam Smith in
his Canons of Taxation (1776), as:

IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as
possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. 63

It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures and their variations. 64
The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial woe. During the Bicameral
Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary Purisima bluntly depicted the country’s gloomy state of
economic affairs, thus:

First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in a position where 90 percent of
our revenue is used for debt service. So, for every peso of revenue that we currently raise, 90 goes to debt service.
That’s interest plus amortization of our debt. So clearly, this is not a sustainable situation. That’s the first fact.

The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other peer countries that borrow money
from that international financial markets. Our debt to GDP is approximately equal to our GDP. Again, that shows you
that this is not a sustainable situation.

The third thing that I’d like to point out is the environment that we are presently operating in is not as benign as what
it used to be the past five years.

What do I mean by that?

In the past five years, we’ve been lucky because we were operating in a period of basically global growth and low
interest rates. The past few months, we have seen an inching up, in fact, a rapid increase in the interest rates in the
leading economies of the world. And, therefore, our ability to borrow at reasonable prices is going to be challenged.
In fact, ultimately, the question is our ability to access the financial markets.

When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as bad as it is now, at least based
on the forecast of most financial institutions. So, we were assuming that raising 80 billion would put us in a position
where we can then convince them to improve our ability to borrow at lower rates. But conditions have changed on
us because the interest rates have gone up. In fact, just within this room, we tried to access the market for a billion
dollars because for this year alone, the Philippines will have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount, we have
borrowed 1.5 billion. We issued last January a 25-year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We were trying to access last week
and the market was not as favorable and up to now we have not accessed and we might pull back because the
conditions are not very good.

So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to front-end our deficit
reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of the debt and we are in what we call a debt spiral. The
more debt you have, the more deficit you have because interest and debt service eats and eats more of your
revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral. And the only way, I think, we can get out of this debt spiral is really
have a front-end adjustment in our revenue base.65

The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an inevitable catastrophe. Whether
the law is indeed sufficient to answer the state’s economic dilemma is not for the Court to judge. In
the Fariñas case, the Court refused to consider the various arguments raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), pronouncing that:

. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. 66

In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the executive policy, given
that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 67

II.

Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A.
No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article III, Section 1

A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary,
oppressive, excessive and confiscatory. Their argument is premised on the constitutional right against deprivation of
life, liberty of property without due process of law, as embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law.
The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not
fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such
a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.68

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the amount of input tax
that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: "[P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive of the input VAT
carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%)
of the output VAT: …"

Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax due from or paid by a
VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or local purchase of good and services, including lease or use of
property, in the course of trade or business, from a VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the value-added
tax due on the sale or lease of taxable goods or properties or services by any person registered or required to
register under the law.

Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. In
effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be credited against the output tax.

Petitioners’ argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and therefore,
the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that the input tax is less than 70% of the
output tax, then 100% of such input tax is still creditable.

More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a business’s books of accounts and remains creditable
in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B), which provides that "if the input tax exceeds
the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters." In addition, Section 112(B)
allows a VAT-registered person to apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for any unused input
taxes, to the extent that such input taxes have not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax
may be used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes.

The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as petitioners exaggeratedly
contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete and one-sided. It ends at the net effect that
there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that such
unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of
Section 110(B) or that it may later on be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B).

Therefore, petitioners’ argument must be rejected.

On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the operation of the 70% limitation on the
input tax. According to petitioner, the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered
establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, which violates the principle that tax collection and
revenue should be for public purposes and expenditures

As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the seller, when he buys goods.
Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when he sells goods. In computing the VAT payable, three
possible scenarios may arise:

First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal to the input taxes that he
paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is required;

Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for the excess, which has to be
paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);69 and

Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or
quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions, any excess over the
output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue taxes, at the
taxpayer’s option.70

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus, a person can credit his input
tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax. In layman’s term, the value-added taxes that a person/taxpayer
paid and passed on to him by a seller can only be credited up to 70% of the value-added taxes that is due to him on
a taxable transaction. There is no retention of any tax collection because the person/taxpayer has already
previously paid the input tax to a seller, and the seller will subsequently remit such input tax to the BIR. The party
directly liable for the payment of the tax is the seller.71 What only needs to be done is for the person/taxpayer to
apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts, against his output taxes.

Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a
property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law.

The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A VAT-
registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested
rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which were created by the law of the state,
although it may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights. 72

Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of distribution are not recoverable from
the taxes payable, although it becomes part of the cost, which is deductible from the gross revenue. When Pres.
Aquino issued E.O. No. 273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax on all sales, it was then that the crediting of the input
tax paid on purchase or importation of goods and services by VAT-registered persons against the output tax was
introduced.73 This was adopted by the Expanded VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716),74 and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A.
No. 8424).75 The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege created by law, a privilege that
also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.

Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Section 110(A) of the NIRC, which provides:

SEC. 110. Tax Credits. –

(A) Creditable Input Tax. – …

Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business for
which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition
and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT
component thereof, exceeds One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00): Provided, however, That if the estimated useful life
of the capital goods is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be
spread over such a shorter period: Provided, finally, That in the case of purchase of services, lease or use of
properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the purchaser, lessee or license upon payment of the compensation,
rental, royalty or fee.

The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the creditable input tax on purchase or
importation of capital goods with acquisition cost of ₱1 Million pesos, exclusive of the VAT component. Such spread
out only poses a delay in the crediting of the input tax. Petitioners’ argument is without basis because the taxpayer
is not permanently deprived of his privilege to credit the input tax.

It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable input tax in this case amounts to
a 4-year interest-free loan to the government.76 In the same breath, Congress also justified its move by saying that
the provision was designed to raise an annual revenue of 22.6 billion.77 The legislature also dispelled the fear that
the provision will fend off foreign investments, saying that foreign investors have other tax incentives provided by
law, and citing the case of China, where despite a 17.5% non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not
deterred.78 Again, for whatever is the purpose of the 60-month amortization, this involves executive economic policy
and legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.

With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the government for taxable
transactions, Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 114 of the NIRC, reads:

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –

(C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. – The Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on
account of each purchase of goods and services which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106
and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold a final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross
payment thereof: Provided, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners
shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For purposes of this Section, the payor
or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the withholding agent.

The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end of the
month the withholding was made.

Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents, a more simplified VAT
withholding system. The government in this case is constituted as a withholding agent with respect to their
payments for goods and services.

Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added taxes to be withheld -- 3% on
gross payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross payments for services supplied by contractors other than by
public works contractors; 8.5% on gross payments for services supplied by public work contractors; or 10% on
payment for the lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners. Under the present Section
114(C), these different rates, except for the 10% on lease or property rights payment to nonresidents, were deleted,
and a uniform rate of 5% is applied.

The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax usage, final, as opposed to creditable,
means full. Thus, it is provided in Section 114(C): "final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%)."
In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997), the concept of final
withholding tax on income was explained, to wit:

SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source

(A) Final Withholding Tax. – Under the final withholding tax system the amount of income tax withheld by the
withholding agent is constituted as full and final payment of the income tax due from the payee on the said
income. The liability for payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his
failure to withhold the tax or in case of underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected from the
payor/withholding agent. …

(B) Creditable Withholding Tax. – Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes withheld on certain income
payments are intended to equal or at least approximate the tax due of the payee on said income. … Taxes withheld
on income payments covered by the expanded withholding tax (referred to in Sec. 2.57.2 of these regulations) and
compensation income (referred to in Sec. 2.78 also of these regulations) are creditable in nature.

As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the government are subject to a 5% rate,
which constitutes as full payment of the tax payable on the transaction. This represents the net VAT payable of the
seller. The other 5% effectively accounts for the standard input VAT (deemed input VAT), in lieu of the actual input
VAT directly or attributable to the taxable transaction.79

The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that Congress intended to treat differently
taxable transactions with the government.80 This is supported by the fact that under the old provision, the 5% tax
withheld by the government remains creditable against the tax liability of the seller or contractor, to wit:

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –

(C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. – The Government or any of its political subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making
payment on account of each purchase of goods from sellers and services rendered by contractors which are subject
to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold the value-added tax due
at the rate of three percent (3%) of the gross payment for the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross
receipts for services rendered by contractors on every sale or installment payment which shall be creditable
against the value-added tax liability of the seller or contractor: Provided, however, That in the case of
government public works contractors, the withholding rate shall be eight and one-half percent (8.5%): Provided,
further, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to
ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For this purpose, the payor or person in control of the
payment shall be considered as the withholding agent.

The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end of the
month the withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied)

As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable exhibits Congress’s intention to treat
transactions with the government differently. Since it has not been shown that the class subject to the 5% final
withholding tax has been unreasonably narrowed, there is no reason to invalidate the provision. Petitioners, as
petroleum dealers, are not the only ones subjected to the 5% final withholding tax. It applies to all those who deal
with the government.

Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners believe. Revenue Regulations No. 14-
2005 or the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations 2005 issued by the BIR, provides that should the actual
input tax exceed 5% of gross payments, the excess may form part of the cost. Equally, should the actual input tax
be less than 5%, the difference is treated as income.81

Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the government gets to tax a profit or
value-added even if there is no profit or value-added.

Petitioners’ stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The Court will not engage in a legal
joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts, uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this
point will only be, as Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,82 "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."

What’s more, petitioners’ contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or value-added. It need not take
an astute businessman to know that it is a matter of exception that a business will sell goods or services without
profit or value-added. It cannot be overstressed that a business is created precisely for profit.

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances."83

The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts
to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of
validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.84

Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a high ratio of input tax, or invests
in capital equipment, or has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial
differences to meet a valid classification.

The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any classification in the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection. Petitioners’ alleged distinctions are based on variables that bear different consequences.
While the implementation of the law may yield varying end results depending on one’s profit margin and value-
added, the Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down and interfere with the affairs of business.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 85

Petitioners brought to the Court’s attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by Sens. S.R. Osmeña III and
Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. – Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and House Bill No. 4493 by Rep. Eric D. Singson. The
proposed legislation seeks to amend the 70% limitation by increasing the same to 90%. This, according to
petitioners, supports their stance that the 70% limitation is arbitrary and confiscatory. On this score, suffice it to say
that these are still proposed legislations. Until Congress amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its
unconstitutionality, the 70% limitation stays.

B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation

Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:

The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class
everywhere with all people at all times.86

In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services.
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a
rate of 10% (or 12%) on sale of goods and properties, importation of goods, and sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These same sections also provide for a 0% rate on certain sales and transaction.

Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70% limitation on the
creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final withholding
tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power
to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class. 87

R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%)
does not apply to sales of goods or services with gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding
₱1,500,000.00.88 Also, basic marine and agricultural food products in their original state are still not subject to the
tax,89 thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will remain accessible. As was stated in Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan:90

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engaged in
business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding ₱200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are
consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, so
that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to
be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.

It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit margins, and unduly favors those with
high profit margins. Congress was not oblivious to this. Thus, to equalize the weighty burden the law entails, the law,
under Section 116, imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under Section 109(v), i.e., transactions
with gross annual sales and/or receipts not exceeding ₱1.5 Million. This acts as a equalizer because in effect,
bigger businesses that qualify for VAT coverage and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equal-footing.

Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the imposition of the tax on those
previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum products91 and natural gas92 were reduced. Percentage tax on
domestic carriers was removed.93 Power producers are now exempt from paying franchise tax.94

Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in order to distribute the burden of
taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident corporations are now subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a
previous 32%.95 Intercorporate dividends of non-resident foreign corporations are still subject to 15% final
withholding tax but the tax credit allowed on the corporation’s domicile was increased to 20%. 96 The Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore. 97 Even the sale by an
artist of his works or services performed for the production of such works was not spared.

All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which would otherwise rest largely
on the consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that R.A. No. 9337 is equitable.

C. Progressivity of Taxation

Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive. It is the smaller
business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences.

Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayer’s ability to pay. This principle was also lifted from Adam
Smith’s Canons of Taxation, and it states:

I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in
proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the
protection of the state.

Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected. 98

The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive
taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every
goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In

other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The disparity lies in the income
earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the income or profit margin, the
smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit margin,
the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses
with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit.

Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it simply
provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The Court stated in the Tolentino case,
thus:

The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it
simply provides is that Congress shall ‘evolve a progressive system of taxation.’ The constitutional provision has
been interpreted to mean simply that ‘direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes
should be minimized.’ (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977))
Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales
taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art.
VIII, §17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, §28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also
regressive.

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid
them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes
the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §3,
amending §102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, §4 amending
§103 of the NIRC)99

CONCLUSION

It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a first-aid measure
to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on the plight of the
masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court
cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.

Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the judiciary should
stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct, for instance, those
involving political questions. . . .

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies for all political or
social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated the powers of government to three
distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the
independence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the
guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by impeachment,
trial or by the ballot box.100

The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino101 holds true then, as it still holds true now. All things considered, there is
no raison d'être for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.
WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207,
168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.

There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No. 9337, the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision.

SO ORDERED.

US vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (Permissible but Invalid delegation)

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

Williams & Ferrier for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

JOHNS, J.:

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to
issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material
provisions of which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting
in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the
Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.

(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to
or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.

(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire,
and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.

(d) . . .

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the production or milling
of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as
defined in section three of this Act; . . .

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act,
but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.

SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees
promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or
by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the
case of companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.

SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall consider that
the public interest requires the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation,
and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.

Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all
laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not
prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any
proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's proclamation.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price as follows:
 The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of
the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No.
2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho,
voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos
(P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,
from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919,
to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the
Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the
13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.

ISSUE

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-
General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General,
with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act.
By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what
reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and
leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not
specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act
also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and
promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify
or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not
in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the
Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the
price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the
Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum
price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal.
There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been
an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is
sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the
law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.
Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the
Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the
Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and,
if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to
the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power
conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The
Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself,
and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into
effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand,
if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it
a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94),
first laid down the rule:

Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and, under the
decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless
protected by their charters.

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the
transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as being
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility, the
State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State of
Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine
what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:

Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. — Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8,
the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and
rates for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings
by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue
can be raised or inquiry had on that question.

Same — constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The authority thus given to the commission
to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a
delegation of legislative power.

It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides —

That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be equal and
reasonable.

With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to hear
and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of the order of the
commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held —

That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to require either
argument or citation of authority.

The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and
regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is
apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.

The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and reasonable. It had the
undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.

They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be, — which
would not be allowable, — but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in
the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself
has passed upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no
authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single provision of law. It is
merely charged with the administration of the law, and with no other power.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co.
(92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so
that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire
insurance policies were required to be issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but
which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55
L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on
government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of
Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such
reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from
destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."

The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:

 In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or in stated ways,
the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the United States over land
which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of
administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow
person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different
from governmental authority.

The opinion says:

From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers
power to make rules and regulations, — not for the government of their departments, but for administering
the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had
legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to
act under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of administrative rules
and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by
penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.

That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and grazed their
sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the
government's property. In doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by
Congress.

The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is
required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate
the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the
use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."

The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted
that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a
public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates
for freight and passengers.

The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the
power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting
the commission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.

The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the court
held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it
could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated."

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.

These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly
defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the
government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it
shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be
suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to
depend.

The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:

All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on
the following morning, unless by special permission of the president.

Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:
 We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer arbitrary power upon
an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless
discriminations among persons similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-
making power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to
a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into
effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an
administrative officer or board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to
decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to
vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained.

The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated
by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not
commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a
crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must
follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale
of it at any price was to a crime.

The Executive order2 provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as follows:

In Manila —

Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.

Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.

In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila price less the cost of
transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be
determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.

In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the maximum price shall be
the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation
cost, from the place of supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined
by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.

(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different
provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General,
and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to
communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most
effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the
proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a
sub delegation of that power.

Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one price
of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine
Islands under a law, which is General and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of
rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and
another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there
are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range in the price,
which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the
rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila
"at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing
about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of
the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products. Any law
which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is
a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized
by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the
Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would
be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is
nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a
floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the
crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the
sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and
what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined
conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be
enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause,"
or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions
upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with
the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-
General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe
hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question here presented is the
constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its
constitutionality.

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and property rights
of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition.
The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live
under a republican form of government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under
republican form of government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law
delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated
under a republican form of government.

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government
property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law
should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the
Governor-General to fix the price of every product or commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make
it a crime to sell any product at any other or different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution should be
suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that
while that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended
even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix
the price at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had
declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in
doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took
possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour,
and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of
the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought and did not claim to own the
rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the
defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this court have taken
on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds
or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of government ever enacted
a law authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his
own rice, and make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found
which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in question. By the terms of the
Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in
the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here
involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold
in the manner power in violation of the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-General, upon
the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and
which holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality
of any of the remaining portions of the Act.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the first place, as to the facts, — one
cannot be convicted ex post facto of a violation of a law and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law, when
the alleged violation thereof occurred on August 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in question was not
published until August 13, 1919, and the order was not published until August 20, 1919. In the second place, as to
the law, — one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the
law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company [1921], 255
U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as amended, invalid.)

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would respectfully invite attention to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389),
concerning the legislative regulation of the prices charged by business affected with a public interest, and to another
decision of the United States Supreme Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S., 649), which
adopts as its own the principles laid down in the case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491), namely; "The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be
to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend
which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls of legislation."

Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 (Valid
delegation)
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.

Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.

CRUZ, J.:

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground
that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan,
March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of
the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by
the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless
assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The
award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the
theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This
case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially
questions of law. Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this
1

Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on
May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced
the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the
said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas
Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such
employment. 2

The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable.
What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's
claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission.

We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the
petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment
of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by
a valid contract. A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid
3

employment contract and shall include seamen" or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by
4

another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract
and shall include seamen." These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while
5

under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris,
while berthed in a foreign country. 6

It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the
nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the
POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment
under Executive Order NO. 797. The second is its payment of the contributions mandated by law and regulations
7 8

to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social
and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's signature,
described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." While this receipt is
9

certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the
Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines
who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the
petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers.
Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be
considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant
to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for
overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been
sustained in a number of cases by this Court. The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract
10

with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required
by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any
ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist
from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done
so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of
the police power of the State. 11

ISSUE

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as
follows:

... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself
prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate
Court which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
12

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.)
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers
must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they
be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving
commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

TESTS OF VALID DELEGATION

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
13

the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is
especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts
in the particular fields assigned to them.

Power of subordinate legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been
applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before
it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself
which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas
Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v.
Rosenthal "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v.
15 16
Williams and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few cases.
17 18

In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.
19 20

It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since
March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as
already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers.
These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is
specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1984, that—

Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—

1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the amount of:

a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician

c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from,
and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...

3. ...

c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the
beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial
expenses.

The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen
Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:

Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.—

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Employees
Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits,
gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the
employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law
and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance
with such laws.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with the
social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the
promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied due
process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an
uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the
quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations,
and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal
Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and
Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory
Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on
their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern
governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice
Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations are observed.
21

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the private
respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should
have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence
of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged
worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere
employee of capital but its active and equal partner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated
December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L.
CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and
RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an
appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An
act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review,
aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of
judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as
protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by
a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the
Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and
judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the
very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no
valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in
the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise
filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon
of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and
thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was
deemed submitted for decision.

COURT’S RULING:

The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the
case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by
memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional.

1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is
concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as
members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on
the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then
there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not
protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties
intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of
private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the
totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing
to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary
of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we
act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest
which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and
assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United
States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate
lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing
themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On
August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later
amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1.
The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70)
days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which
shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts,
and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the
honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study
ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system.
There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a
phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that
the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the
disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest
— can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the
courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected
by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted
could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which
since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has
proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does
not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the
first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt
that the last two decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy.
New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically
underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially
has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of
justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national
leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and
satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is
on development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike
in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of
sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes
further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and
economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and
change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the
gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social
justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then
"that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity.
Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could
be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final
disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not
conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of
clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts
exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend
towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development,
the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to
resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang
Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did
not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing
and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to
take place, would be the most thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations
. enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of
course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges,
who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact
business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of independence of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior
courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the
Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a
Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first
was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year
a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other
such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having
the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
was introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the
President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with
particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases,
a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In
consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that
some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than
diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated
into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored
by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter,
Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval
with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial
Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these
guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus
of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill
held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar
who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill
would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality
of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly,
the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully,
of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the
Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time
and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a
background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the
vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its
inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if
done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated
such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners
from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts
to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ...
And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary
question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases
enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is
with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto
proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of
the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of
First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim
appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on
Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule
squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of
Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any
doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the
opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial
District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and
constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is
DEadmitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The
principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A
mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner
vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the
National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security
of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or
the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle
is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do
say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security
of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional
and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until
then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered
a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to
affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power
of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization
consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by
the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for
the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was
made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization
of all branches of the government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance
were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the
fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first
instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district
of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even
less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for
solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the
Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v.
Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido
abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario
correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o
se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining,
the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso
de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del
gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged
statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly
a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept
independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of
Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of
the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance
with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until
the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all
the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security
of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of
words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that
antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President
Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of
providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know
how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other
departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by
Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle
of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not
through express provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he
possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President as the
"symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising
the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the
light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The
adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the
members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an
Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least
half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of
government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative
departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation
may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable
then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary,
especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of
tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar
provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise
administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member
of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any
intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of
the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that
in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would
be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree could
have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is
given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from
the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers
vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for
approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into
Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83

9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional
provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and
in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants,
as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a
power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under
the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation.
As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic
utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of
the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a
relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of
the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon,
likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the
same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances,
and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of
power against power. That we should avoid.

PRINCIPLE

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The
questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial
Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation
and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No.
93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a
standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body
which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the
statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of
the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If
the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind
the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as
their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this
observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to
administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of
delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a
deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-
delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another
objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally
bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President,
within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this
Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners
cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of
the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by
incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the
ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the
event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even
acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as
earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw

11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this
opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was
the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion
was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the
framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The
challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth
in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies.
That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had
administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this
opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate
to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the
United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for the
development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to
facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the
federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to
secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The
Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a
moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to
perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure
provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely
to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence
of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending
that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to
the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so
firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and
action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v.
Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of
those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are
of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant
after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are
confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but
as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a
judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v.
Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of
law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by
outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow
that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and
the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or
one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of
the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something
to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers
assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and
aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as
validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision
promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate
underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.

Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its parts.

The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of the Act which reads as
follows:

SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. — The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts
of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts
of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall e transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment,. property and the
necessary personnel.

The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from the funds for organizational
changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon the declaration
upon the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been completed), the said courts (meaning
the Court of Appeals and all other lower courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be
deemed abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office" trenches on all the constitutional
safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members
(Section 7, Article X of the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to
administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power of the
Supreme Court "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal.
" (Section 7, Id.)

On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44. the Batasan did nothing more than
to exercise the authority conferred upon it be Section I of the same Article of the Constitution which provides that
The Judicial power shall be rested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by
law." In other words, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of the law (of the
legislature it follows that it is within the legislature's power to abolish or reorganize them even if in so doing, it might
result in the cessation from office of the incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective constitutionally
fixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect is broad and indeed plenary.

Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is either (1) to reconcile,
on the one hand, the parliament's power of abolition and reorganization with, on the other, the security of tenure of
members of the judiciary and the Supreme Court's authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that
either the power of the Supreme Court or of the Batasan is more paramount than that of the other. I believe.
however, that such a manner of looking at the issue that confronts Us only confuses and compounds the task We
are called upon to perform. For how can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a
judge to continue as such, when the position occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do, that the
solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he should in some way be allowed to
continue to function as judge until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, if only because we would
then have the absurd spectacle of a judiciary with old and new courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such as a
district court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional judges or of judges exercising
powers not purely judicial which is offensive to the Constitution. The other suggestion that the incumbent of the
abolished court should be deemed appointed to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive
the appointing authority, the president, of the power to make his own choices and would, furthermore, amount to an
appointment by legislation which is a Constitutional anachronism. more on this point later .

Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact and in law, the structure of
judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially different from that under the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, hence the courts now existing are actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any
reconciliation or feel bound to determine whose power, that of the Batasang Pambansa or that of this Court, should
be considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with it the power to
abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality that the tenure of the holder of an office must of
necessity end when his office no longer exists, as I see it, be have no alternative than to hold that petitioners'
invocation of the independence of the judiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. It is as
simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just
a renaming and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the present judicial structure or system
assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly and
unequivocally provided in the section in question that said courts are deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it
most unmistakably emphatic, that "the incumbents thereat shall cease to hold office." Dura les, sed les. As a matter
of fact, I cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying the determined legislative intent
about it.

Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on championing the cause of the
independence of the judiciary by maintaining that the constitutional safeguards thereof I have already enumerated
earlier must be respected in any reorganization ordained by the parliament My answer is simple. Practically all the
Members of the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general reorganization but abolition — in other
words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure but a total demolition thereof to be followed by
the building of a new and different one. I am practically alone in contemplating a different view. True, even if I should
appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would still make myself a hero in the eyes of man justices and judges,
members of the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers of the judicial independence, but understandably, I
should not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the expense not only of my distinguished
colleagues but of the Batasang Pambansa that framed the law and, most of all, the President who signed and,
therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless I am absolutely sure that my position is formidable, unassailable and
beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain of, as I shall demonstrate anon.

To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us cannot be said to be
clear and consistent, much less unshakeable and indubitably definite either way. None of the local cases 1 relied
upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members of the Court during the deliberations, such as
Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3 Zandueta, 4 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to
certainty of correctness.

Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and beyond diminution.
Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa 129 explaining academically its apparent
tendency to invade the areas of authority of the Supreme Court, not to speak of its dangerously impairing the
independence of the judiciary, must have, I imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the law
unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations of the Court, the combined wisdom of my learned colleagues was
something I could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant factors, I have
come to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are justifiable grounds to uphold the Act, if only to try
how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and the Batasan in taking
what appear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people from a fast spreading cancer in the judiciary of our
country.

Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy The improved national discipline so
evident during the earlier days of martial law, has declined at a quite discernible degree. Different sectors of society
are demanding urgent reforms in their respective field And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear,
among their gripes, which as a matter of fact is common to all of them is that about the deterioration in the quality of
performance of the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace of pending judicial proceedings.
Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be related to lack of independence of the
judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or corruption among and corruptibility of the men sitting in the
courts in some parts of the country And what is worse, while in the communities concerned the malady is known to
factually exist and is actually graver and widespread, very few, if any individuals or even associations and organized
groups, truly incensed and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal evidence to
come out and file the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court, And I am not vet referring to similar situations
that are not quite openly known but nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand, if all these intolerable
instances should actually be formally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible for the Court to
dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands of other cases it has to attend to and the rather
cumbersome strict requirements of procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such administrative
case all of which are time consulting. Verily, under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is
justification for the patience of the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in our
judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.

Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not alone because of
structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging
procedural rules in force, but also when it becomes evident that a good number of those occupying positions in the
judiciary, make a mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as already
explained, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my
personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-
pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot
satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character,
competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay,
impregnability to an temptations of graft and corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit
improper pressures of the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa 129
encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the foundation of the principle of
independence of the judiciary.

The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint of the unusual situation in
which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of us, the Members of the Court, the
constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and removal only by the Supreme Court, among others, against
impairment of the independence of the judiciary, which is one of the bedrock's and, therefore, of the essence in any
"democracy under a regime of justice, peace, liberty and equality (Preamble of the 1973 Constitution), are priceless
and should be defended, most of all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually
endowed to each of Us. Withal, we are all conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never been intended to
place the person of the judge in a singular position of privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are
essentially part and parcel of what is required of an independent judiciary where judges can decide cases and do
justice to everyone before them ruat caelum. However, We find Ourselves face to face with a situation, in our
judiciary which is of emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be enforced
under such a circumstance seem to be difficult, aside from being controversial. And so, in a real sense, We have to
make a choice between adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the
broader and more practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least of the Constitution.

My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling purely Idealism and
nobility in the recognition of human dignity, protection of individual liberties and providing security and promotion of
the general welfare under a government of laws. With all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law
of the land is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances. It is
written for all seasons, except for very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated
by its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in
peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions.
Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios ", such in ordinary problems justify
exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and emergencies, the most
constitutionally Idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure of pragmatic considerations,
adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the extent
of creating impressions, of course erroneous, that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity
and imperiousness remained undiminished and unimpaired.

The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach. When martial law was
proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociferously shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily
and without the - required factual bases contemplated in the Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution,
but more, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recognized intent of said clause by utilizing his
martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and defend the integrity and security of
the state but to establish a New Society The critics contended that martial law is only for national security, not for the
imposition of national discipline under a New Society.

Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that in this jurisdiction, this
concept of martial law has already been upheld several times by this Court. 1, for one, accepted such a construction
because I firmly believe that to impose martial law for the sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion
without coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter folly, for
the country would still continue to lay open to its recurrence.

I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the fight of this Court's doctrines about the imposition
of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this concurrence. To put it differently, if indeed there could be
some doubt as to the correctness of this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional,
particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today calls for solutions that may
not in the eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and
intent. As 1 have earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction of words to whose literal iron-clad meanings
we must feel hidebound without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature of adjustability and
adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental intent and objectives of the framers may
remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the
transcendental objectives it seeks to pursue While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices
and judges before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the
desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.

Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside from what has been
discussed about its effect on the guarantees of judicial independence, also preempts, in some of its provisions, the
primary rule-making power of the Supreme Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of
my colleagues, I would just like to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. After all, the
legislature is expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of the Constitution of 1973) so
much so, that I doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or modify any rule the Batasang Pambansa enunciates.
Truth to tell, as Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, for one reason or another,
principally the lack of a clear consensus as to what some of my colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced
by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated long enough in making our procedural rules more
practical and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with substantial
justice.

So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers of the Constitution in our
ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring and misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse
Ourselves with the explanation that not only are We overloaded with work beyond human capability of its being
performed expeditiously, but that the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have precluded Us
from being more expeditious and speedy.

I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not combined to create a very
critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose its faith and confidence in the administration of justice
by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look with more sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all the
sundry to know, however, that notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is
far from being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes
to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible for those in
authority to answer the clamor of the people for an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more
apparent than real.

To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be dimming with tears of
disappointment and disenchantment because of the stand I have chosen to adopt in these cases, may I try to
assuage them by joining their fervent prayers that some other day, hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence
may dictate to another constitutional convention to write the guarantees of judicial independence with ink of deeper
hue and words that are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line of demarcation between
the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His Infinite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial
justice for our people, free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles
of interference and insiduous influence of the political powers that be. Presently, I am constrained from going along
with any other view than that the Constitution allows abolition of existing courts even if the effect has to be the
elimination of any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office.

I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters about the choice that will
ultimately be made of those who will be eased out of the judiciary in the course of the implementation of Batas
Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded
generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more specifically to the President, its own constitutionally conferred
power of removal of judges. Section 44 of the Batasan's Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have
ceased to hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see fit to occupy the new courts.
Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their respective offices", or, as others
would say they would be in fact removed. How the President will make his choices is beyond Our power to control.
But even if some may be eased out even without being duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given
the opportunity to be heard the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest shouted serve
as sufficient assurance that when lie ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath "to do justice to
every man hence, lie will equip himself first with the fullest reliable information before acts. This is not only my
individual faith founded on my personal acquaintance with the character and sterling qualities of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say this is the faith of the nation in a man who has led it successfully through crises and
emergencies, with justice to all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President will deal with each and every
individual to be affected by this reorganization with the best light that God will give him every moment he acts in
each individual case as it comes for his decision

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition "to declare the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) unconstitutional".
The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief
and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law. the petition is premature. No
jurisdictional question is involved.

There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the said law is in issue. It is presumed to be
constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked into the constitutional angle.

Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the constitutionality of the
said law even as taxpayers.

The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for declaratory relief
assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a referendum. De la Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525),
has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being removed from his position.

The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an unconstitutional and evil
purpose As ably expounded by the Chief Justice, in enacting the said law, the lawmaking body acted within the
scope of its constitutional powers and prerogatives.

GUERRERO, J., concurring:

I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my personal convictions and observations
on this case, a veritable landmark case, for whatever they may be worth.

The legal basis of the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed Chief Justice having been exhaustively discussed
and decisively justified by him, a highly-respected expert and authority on constitutional law, it would be an exercise
in duplication to reiterate the same cases and precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite
differently, not through the classic methods of philosophy, history and tradition, but following what the well-known
jurist, Dean Pound, said that "the most significant advance in the modern science of law is the change from the
analytical to the functional attitude." 1 And in pursuing this direct

ion, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling that "another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil
which it is designed to remedy, and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it
existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." 2

I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are clearly conducive to
the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the legislation namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the
creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (I 3) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts: (b) A reappointment of jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency:
(c) A simplification of procedures and (d) The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and
other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of
justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory
Note, which is "to embody reforms in the structure, organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of
improving the administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the more complex problems on
the present and forseeable future cannot but "promote the welfare of society, since that is the final cause of law. 4

Hence, from the standpoint of The general utility and functional value of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, there should be
no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is
undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets as too well-known to be ignored as are the causes
which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and measures that are more practical,
workable and economical. 5

From the figures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404, 686 in 1978; 426, 911 in 1979; 441,
332 in 1980; and 450, 063 as of February 3, 1982) 6 the congested character of court dockets rising year after year is
staggering and enormous, looming like a legal monster.

But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to have Justices and Judges
who are fair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent and efficient. The general clamor that the prestige of
the Judiciary today has deteriorated and degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual
basis. Records in the Supreme Court attest to the unfitness and incompetence, corruption and immorality of many
dispensers of justice. According to the compiled data, the total number of Justices and Judges against whom
administrative charges have been filed for various offenses, misconduct, venalities and other irregularities
reaches 322. Of this total, 8 are Justices of the Court of Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Judges, 8 CAR
Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146 Municipal Judges.

The Supreme Court has found 102 of them guilty and punished them with either suspension, admonition, reprimand
or fine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City
Judges and 53 Municipal Judges.
Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the service. And these
are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.

Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period from the filing of the charge to
the dismissal of the respondent. In one case, the proceedings were terminated after seven years. How long the
pending administrative cases will be disposed of, only time will tell as an increasing number of administrative cases
are being filed by victims of judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.

Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed from the service, there are many who have been
castigated and censured in final judgments of the Supreme Court upon appeal or review of the decisions, orders
and other acts of the respondent courts, Justices and Judges. To cite a few cases, Our decisions have categorically
pronounced respondents' actuations, thus: "deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7; applicable rules. The whole
proceedings looked no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the Judge to flaunt the law and
every norm of propriety and procedure" 8; "there was a deliberate failure of respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly
provided in the Rules of Court" 9; "It is unfortunate that respondent Judge failed to acquaint himself with, 01'
misinterpreted, those controlling provisions and doctrines" 10; "The failure of the respondent Municipal Judge to yield
obedience to authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and of respondent Court of First Instance Judge and his
deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25, 1981. For peremptorily dismissing
the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss was 'well-taken' and respondent Judge did not
elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his tribe vanish." 11 In one case, We noted "There is here so something unusual, but
far from palliating the gravity of the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. ... it did render the due process requirement
nugatory, for instead of a fair and impartial trial, there was an Idle form, a useless ceremony." 12

It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebuked but to allow these Judges and their ilk to remain and
continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the Judiciary. It is to be deplored that the Supreme Court has not
found time to exercise its power and authority in the premises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted against
them. We have a list of these crooked Judges whose actuations have been found to be patiently wrong and manifestly in-
defeasible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted
out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.

Candidly, one reason for writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses and wrongs which
are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of the people in the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Some
members of the Court felt that these revelations would be like washing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of
public and official record nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.

In the light of these known evils and infirmities of the judiciary system, it would be absurd and unreasonable to claim
that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It is
presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 13 The presumption of regularity is not confined to the acts of
the individual officers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts of
legislative bodies. 14 Good faith is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none in
the case at bar. It could not be otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep
sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high office as the duly-elected representatives of the people.

It is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant with good faith. 15 The question of good faith then is the
crux of the conflict at bar. Good faith in the enactment of the law does not refer to the wisdom of the measure, the
propriety of the Act, or to its expediency. The questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, viz: Why
abolish all the courts Why legislate out the judges Why not amend the Rules of Court only Is abolition of all courts the
proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misfits in our Judiciary? — may not be inquired into by Us. "It is not the province of
the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern." 16 The Courts "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into
the wisdom of the law." 17 Chief Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is
"useful to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.'" 19 In any case, petitioners have not shown an iota of proof of
bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship
speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more efficient vehicle of
"eliminating incompetent and unfit Judges as indicative of impermissible legislative motive. 20

It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by the legislation will eradicate hopefully or at least minimize
the evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial body, it will result in the actual removal of the Justices of the Court of
Appeals and Judges of the lower courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition of office or removal from office,
the end-result is the same — termination of the services of these incumbents. Indeed, the law may be harsh, but that is
the law. Dura lex sed lex.

The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are expected to know the
nature and concept of a public office. It is created for the purpose of effecting the ends for which government has
been instituted, which are for the common good, and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family
or class of men. In our form of government, it is fundamental that public offices are public trust, and that the person
to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. 21 In the last analysis, a public office is a
privilege in the gift of the State. 22

There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said
to have any vested right in an office or its salary. When an office is created by the Constitution, it cannot be
abolished by the legislature, but when created by the State under the authority of the Constitution, it may be
abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a judicial appointment must be deemed
as adherence to the rule that "when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of such a
court takes office with that encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his full term and his full salary are not
dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legislature may for the public good, in
ordaining and establishing the courts, from time to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it." 25

The removal from office of the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act of abolition of the office as demanded
by the superior and paramount interest of the people. The bad and the crooked Judges must be removed. The good and
the straight, sober Judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative of the President who, I am
certain, will act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance with his solemn oath of office "to preserve
and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone ... " There and then the proper balance between the
desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum of promoting the public good shall have been struck. 26

The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. It may be the last bulwark of constitutional
government. 27 It Must, however, be remembered "that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as courts." 28 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts
alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute" for which reason it will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution "except in a clear case." 29

Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conflict of opinions — on judicial independence, whether impaired or
strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the courts, whether abolition of office or removal therefrom, and on
delegation of legislative power, whether authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force and
brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the social justification and the
functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light of contemporaneous events from which the New
Republic emerged and evolved new Ideals of national growth and development, particularly in law and government, a kind
or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is necessary to justify as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.

This is the time and the moment to perform a constitutional duty to affix my imprimatur and affirmance to the law,
hopefully an act of proper judicial statesmanship.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. Unlike
Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by embellishing my concurrence lest I be accrued of bringing coal to
Newcastle. Accordingly, I will simply vote to dismiss the petition

However, I cannot agree with the Chief Justice when he says:

... In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore it should be in accordance with
accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. There
would be no plausibility then to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged
Act. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice
of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the
former is to be preferred.

It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity because the abolition of
certain judicial offices was done in good faith. This being the case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise
its constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and
to accord its views the fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an invasion of executive territory
which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional
implementation of the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.

DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.

May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my brethren in the judiciary as
not feeling for them as much concern as I should for their security of tenure which is raised as the main argument
against the constitutionality of the law, than by way of giving added force or support to the main opinion so well-
written by Our learned Chief Justice in his usual scholarly fashion. I, therefore, limit myself to a discussion that the
assailed statue is not unconstitutional without having to suggest how it may be implemented in order that it could
stand the most rigid test of constitutionality, for in that area, what is involved is purely an executive act of the
President in whose wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We should trust in how he would fulfill his sworn duties
to see that the laws are faithfully executed and to do justice to every man.
Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal of the petition, I do so on the additional ground that petitioners have
not fulfilled all the requisites for the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial inquiry — the power to declare a
law unconstitutional.

The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to reorganize said courts, and in the
process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a
basic doctrine of constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1

The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which would thereafter arise the
security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions of said courts. in the natural order of things, therefore, since
the occasion to speak of security of tenure of judges arises only after the courts have first been brought into being, the
right to security of tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power of creating the courts to provide for a
fair and strong judicial system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide for a
new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts would conduce more to its objective of improving
the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is one of policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the
Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interfere with. By this secondary position it has to the primary power of the
legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to the incumbents should not be a legal impediment to the
exercise of that basic power of creating the statutory courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish
them in order to create new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security of
tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion of that power. Unquestionably, the
legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power can never be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a
fundamental precept of constitutional and representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.

If the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a matter of legislative intent. it involves
the exercise of legislative power, an act of legislation which generally concerns policy in the formation of which the
courts have no say Initially, when the legislature creates the courts, it suffers from no limitation arising from the
necessity or respecting the security of tenure of judges who are not yea there. This inherent character of fullness
and plenitude of the power to create and abolish courts does not change when that same power is once more
exercised thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. Which only goes to show that when done in good faith and
motivated solely by the good and the well-being of the people, the exercise of the power is not meant to be
restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted by the so-called judicial security of tenure.

The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of the power vested by the
Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described above. That power carries with it the duty and
responsibility of providing the people with the most effective and efficient system of administration of justice. This is
by far of more imperative and transcedental importance than the security of tenure of judges which, admittedly, is
one of the factors that would conduce to independence of the judiciary — but first of all, a good, efficient and
effective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only
for a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welfare of the people which is the most primordial and paramount
consideration, not a judiciary in which the people's faith has been eroded, a condition which the security of tenure, in
some instances, may even be contributory.

In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the legislature is presumed to have been motivated by no
other objective than to provide the people the kind of judicial machinery that would best serve their interest and
welfare, in its belief that the present machinery is falling short of that measure of public service. It should, likewise,
be presumed that it has been led to this low estimate of the utility and effectiveness of the present set-up of the
judiciary after informing itself, with the facilities at its command, such as the power of legislative investigation, of the
actual condition of the courts, particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, faith and confidence of the
public, and what the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is the keenly perceptible feeling of the
people in general. Responsibility for this more or less extensive slowdown of the delivery of judicial service can be
laid on no other than either of the two components of a court — the procedural laws or rules that govern the
workings of the courts, or the persons executing or applying them — or both.

When two interests conflict as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty of the legislature to provide
society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and the right of judges to security of tenure,
on the other, the latter must of necessity yield to the former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly
and on a greater magnitude than the right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more
of a personal benefit to just a few, as indeed only the judge affected could seek judicial redress of what he
conceives to be its violation.

Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police power" of the State, if this concept which underlies even the
Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justification of the passage of the Act in question. That is, if a
conflict between the primary power of the legislature to create courts, and mere consequential benefit accorded to
judges and justices after the creation of the courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer fails to see, or, at least,
would disappear upon a reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting interests which, from the above disquisition is
not hard to find. It is, without doubt, in the essence of the exercise of police power that a right assertable by
individuals may be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general welfare. This is demonstrated in
how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights enjoyable by The entire people, not just by a handful in
comparison, are made subject to the lawful exercise of the police power of the State.
Viewed, therefore, from the above-mentioned perspective, the general revamp of the judiciary involving both its
components — the court as an office or institution, and the judges and justices that man them — should not find any
legal obstacle in the security of tenure of judges. This security, after all, is no more than as provided for all other
officials and employees in the civil service of the government in Section 3, Article XII-B of the Constitution which
provides:

No officer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law.

The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the Constitution gives to judicial officials no more than a guarantee that
their retirement age as fixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent
provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted for the first time because the retirement age before then was
provided merely by statute not by the Constitution. If it comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them
constitutional protection is the aforequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition of office when done in
good faith, for removal implies the existence of the office, not when it is abolished. Admittedly, as has been held,
abolition of office for no reason related to public welfare or for the good of the service, let alone when done in bad
faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. 2 The abolition of the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorganization
of the judiciary, as the Title of the law curtly but announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded. And
whether by said reorganization, the present would be deemed abolished, as the law expresses such an unmistakable
intent, the matter is one for the sole and exclusive determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion
whether by the nature and extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them abolished. To
give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of the changes as to their structure, distribution and
jurisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish them, or to declare them so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow
undue interference in the function of legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty of courts precisely to give
effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as my be discovered therefrom.

From the above observation, it would be futile to insist that the present courts would not effectively be abolished by
the Act in question. it might be to arrogate power for Us to say that the changes the law brings to the present judicial
system, do not suffice for this Court to give effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. Where would the
agrarian courts, the circuit criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by the law? Are they
not abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such merger, and by the other changes introduced
by the law, would make said courts different from the present Courts of First Instance which, as a consequence,
may then be considered abolished Integrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in the
judicial machinery would necessarily affect the entire system.

The fact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as the special courts just mentioned, does
not mean that the changes wrought are only superficial or "cosmetic" as this term has been used so often in the oral
argument. Without the new law, these courts will remain fixed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the
course of time, the need for their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed conditions, where they
are needed at present at a certain place, the need for them may be somewhere else in later years, if maximum
benefit at the least expense is to be achieved, as always should be a most desirable goal and objective of
government.

Demonstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is proper,
except perhaps if they intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional repugnancy, which is not so in the instant
case. We have, therefore, no occasion, as earlier intimated, to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization
of the judiciary would result in the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax
Appeals. Hence, the provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote of
eight justices does not come into the vortex of the instant controversy. Its possible violation by the assailed statute
cannot happen, and may, therefore, not constitute an argument against the constitutionality of the law.

Former Justice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly indorsed the judicial revamp
when he enumerated the qualities of a good judge that the appointing power should consider in making new appointments
to the judiciary upon its reorganization pursuant to the questioned Act. The words of the eminent jurist may well reflect the
favorable reaction of the public in general to what the Act aim to achieve in the name of good and clean government. The
present judicial incumbents, who have not in any way, by their acts and behavior while in office, tarnished the good image
that the judiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for apprehension that what they are entitled to under the
Constitution by way of security of tenure wig be denied them, considering the publicly known aim and purpose of the
massive judicial revamp, specially as cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when he
created the Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate judicial reforms.

If the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the law is its possible effect of impairing the security of
tenure of the incumbents, We may have the following facts to consider:

1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in office until replaced or
reappointed by the President. As to those judicial officials, no security of tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches
to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a holdover tenure. How the President has exercised this immense
power with admirable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness will be his sole
guide in implementing the law.

2. As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present President, and he should feel concerned
more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may rightfully claim to maintain their official standing and
integrity. They need have no fear of being ignored for no reason at all, much less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or
lack of nobility of heart.

From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation of the law may there possibly be a
taint of constitutional repugnancy as when a judge of acknowledged honesty, industry and competence is
separated, because an act of arbitrariness would thereby be committed, but the abolition of the courts as decreed
by the law is not by itself or per se unconstitutional.

Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly competent committee, deserves to be
given a chance to prove its worth in the way of improving the judiciary. If in its implementation, any one, if at all,
feels aggrieved, he can always seek judicial redress, if he can make out a case of violation of his right of security of
tenure with uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances of his
case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable.

This petition should also be dismissed for being premature, as is the stand of Justice Aquino. The petition asks this
Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law unconstitutional when it conflicts with the
fundamental law (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This power has well-defined limits, for it can be exercised only when
the following requisites are present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest opportunity, and (4) The
determination of the constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case.

I am of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it filed by the proper parties.

The main ground for which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is assailed is that it is
violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The only persons who could raise the question of
constitutionality of the law are, therefore, the actual incumbents of the courts who would be separated from the
service upon the abolition of the courts affected by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their
judicial security of tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the petitioners,
has not been separated from the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, for he may be appointed to the
court equivalent to his present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that his
tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that has become actual, not
merely probable or hypothetical.

The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action to raise the question
of constitutionality of a statute only when no one else can more appropriately bring the suit to defend a right
exclusively belonging to him, and. therefore, would localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a
"proper party" to invoke the power of judicial inquiry, as one of the requisites in the exercise of such power, does not
mean one having no better right, one more personalized, than what he has as a member of the public in general.
With the incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who would suffer direct and actual
injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suffer as "direct" and "actual" an injury as the
judges and justices by the enforcement of the assailed statute, from the right to bring the suit.

The validity of the foregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that only after the fate of the
present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually separated or not, would the present courts be
declared abolished. For the law clearly continues their existence until all the new courts have been filled up with new
appointments, or at least such number as would be equal to the number of actual incumbents, and they are the very
courts to which they may lay claim to the right to continue therein, so that the status of each and everyone of them
has thereby been made certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition of the courts, may there possibly be a violation
of the security of tenure, as contented, that would give rise to an "actual controversy" in which the 6 improper party"
can be no other than the judges who feel aggrieved by their non- appointment to the new courts.

It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, before it has even been given a chance to
prove its worth, as the legislature itself and an those who helped by their exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be
an urgent necessity, and before any of the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for a fact,
certain and actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly
contend to be an unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itself.

I am, therefore, for giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular expectations
for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had reputation for probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since
only when the law is fully implemented will all the courts affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an
interregnum when the country is without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of Tax Appeals and the
Sandigan. Only then will it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any of the incumbents
have been left out in the restructured judiciary.

There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the law, conformably to the conditions
requisite for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry which by their stringent character, together with the
constitutional prescription of a comparatively higher vote to declare a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle
of government that a law should, by all reasonable intendment and feasible means, be saved from the doom of
unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that if a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which
would make it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.
It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the implementation of the
law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or
desirable at the moment, the law itself is definitely not unconstitutional. 4 Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured
after the law shall have been implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be proper. But surely, the
benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic duties of government to the people — the
administration of justice — should not be sacrificed, as it would be, if the law is, as sought in the present petition, declared
void right now, on the claim of a few of being allegedly denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the claim would
seem to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public office.

Just one more point. The law in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its effectivity, certain judges
and justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is what distinguishes the Act in question from R.A. No.
1186 involved in the Ocampo case, 5 which by its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the judges
whose positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question, therefore, is not as exposed to the
same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation of the Constitution with its wise
provision on how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test for it to be enforced to the fullness
of its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, Identified with public interest and general welfare, through a
more efficient and effective judicial system as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.

Hence, the constitutionality of the law should not be assailed, and the law itself, striken down, on the ground that
some judges or justices may be removed or separated in violation of their security of tenure. The law does not
directly operate with Chat effect. It is in how the law would be implemented that this feared eventuality may or may
not occur. We would then be killing the law on a mere speculation if We do so at this stage. This would be an
injudicious act done in reckless disregard of the safeguards built around a law to defend it when its constitutionality
is attacked; first the presumption that a law is constitutional; second when a law is susceptible to two interpretations
one that would make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the former should be adopted; and third, the
Constitution itself which ordains that a law may not be declared unconstitutional except on the vote of at least ten
(10) members of the Supreme Court, more than what is required for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This
is not to mention the stringent requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all
designed to save the law from the dire fate of unconstitutionality.

To the writer, the question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between protecting some judges from
possible separation, as the implementation of the law to achieve its primary purpose of improving the judiciary may
have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire society through an honest, efficient and effective judiciary. For,
it is unthinkable that what is for the good of the people as a whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be
sacrificed for the sake of only the few. The greatest good for the greatest number is an unwritten rule, more firm and
enduring than any of the postulates spread in our written Constitution. This, I might say, is the main theme of this
separate opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known and time-honored maxim "Salus populi establish suprema
lex."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

There is unqualified adherence on my part to the dismissal of the Petition filed in this case. If I am writing this
separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in regards to the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, of the Organic law provides
that the legislative has the power to establish inferior Courts by law. Section 7 of the same Article reads:

SEC, 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight Members order their dismissal.

There should be no conflict Between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.

1. a) It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily includes the power to
organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish Courts is generally coextensive with the power to
create them. The power to abolish was not intended to be qualified by the permanence of tenure (Opinion of Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW
134; Halsey vs. Gaines 2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive Congress of its power
to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta vs. de la
Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. Officer, 904-5). Judges of those Courts take office with that encumbrance and
knowledge.

The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it. When the court is
abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge of such court takes office with that
encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698; State, ex rel. Thomas
v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So 283, et al."
The importance and the imperative of maintaining the independence of the Judiciary is undisputed. At the same
time, the power of Congress under the Constitution cannot be abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security
of tenure per se that is the only safeguard to the independence of the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle of
the Judges who sit on the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public and that there are those who
have abused the prerogatives of their judicial position knowing that they are untouchables by virtue of the
permanence of their tenure

b) A distinction should be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts. Section 1 heretofore mentioned
refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of Government. Section 7 quoted above refers to the tenure of
office of "individual" Judges (inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts that is to say, tenure of office is a matter
concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of Section 7 is supported by the clause that the
Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges of inferior Courts.

A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact, the entire judicial
system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to the wheels of progress and the
imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To hold that tenure of Judges is superior to the legislative
power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise of that power.

It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, from which they cannot be
separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not
entailed to their Judges, because the power of the legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to
abolish those Courts. If an inferior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his
position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.

c) The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as those Courts exist,
the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the extent of the constitutional provision relative to security
of tenure of Judges. Upon declaration of the completion of the reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization
Act, the affected Courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished There being no Courts, there are no offices for
which tenure of Judges may be claimed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to them are necessarily
extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]).

2. I am satisfied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an urgent and
pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of tenure of all Judges or legislating
them out to the detriment of judicial independence. It should riot be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of
abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of
Judges. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition of
public office, as clearly explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good faith in its actuations
must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch of government, supreme within the limits of its own sphere, until
that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing that the Reorganization Act was motivated for personal
or political reasons as to justify the interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127
A.S.R. 468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599
[1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must be balanced with tenure of Judges,
which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and Section 7, supra, the former is the weightier, because the
"Judiciary" is of more importance to the welfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual Judge. If a
Judge is removed without cause there can be damage to the public welfare to some extent, but maintenance of a
Court that does not meet the requirements of progressive Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the
people.

3. Nor does a conflict exist with the power of discipline vested in the Supreme Court by the present Constitution
reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline Judges of inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8
members, order their dismissal Absent the Court, it would be futile to speak of the Supreme Court's power to
discipline. Thus, where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot pose
an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal from an existing
judicial office but not when that it office is abolished. The reorganization of the judicial system with the abolition of
certain Courts is not an exercise of the power to discipline the Judges of the abolished Courts.

It is of significance to note that the power to dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the 1973 Constitution is
delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and the power to dismiss does not exist. Being
circumscribed in scope, it may well be asked: does the grant of the power of discipline and dismissal in the Supreme
Court deprive the executive of the power of removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation of powers in our
government to state that the Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss with the executive power of removal? For is
not the power of removal basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power of appointment, which is the
prerogative of the Chief Executive alone As in the case of appointments, Section 5 (6), Article X of the Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court shall appoint its officials and employees. However, is not this power shared with
the power of appointment of the executive who appoints some of the Court officials These questions could lend
themselves to an in-depth study in the proper case.

4. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public office cannot be regarded as the
"property " of the incumbent. A public office is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925]). A public office
is a public trust (Section 1, Article XIII. 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs. Russell,
166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA, 253 cited also in Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p.
537). The officers are the servants of the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin,
Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that
there is no removal from office but abolition of the office itself.

5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reforms in other departments of government. "The thrust is on
development." It is "the first major reorganization after four generations." It does not provide for a piecemeal change,
which could be ineffective. It goes to the roots and does not just scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main
objectives are an improved administration of justice, the "attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out of justice." These
aims are policy matters of necessity in the pursuit of developmental goals within the Judiciary.

6. The Reorganization Act reorganizing the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme Court, which is the only
constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages institutional reforms in the Philippine judiciary. It does not
simply change the names of the Courts. The facts herein are dissimilar from those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732
[1954]) where the position of Justice of the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely changed to Municipal
Judge after the municipality of Tacloban was converted into a city with its own charter.

Significant among the institutional changes and procedural reforms are:

The Intermediate Appellate Court

This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead of fifteen (15), five members composing each division,
and a majority vote of three members being needed for a decision. This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in
case of dissent, of assigning two other members to compose a "division of five". It also allows flexibility in that any
three members of a division, arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision. Now provided for is specialization into
four (4) Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal Cases Divisions and four (4) Special Cases Divisions. The
specialization is expected to contribute to the expeditious disposal of cases. The Court has been given original
jurisdiction to issue Writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or
processes whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden of the Supreme
Court where numerous such cases are filed daily.

It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution.

The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings (Sec. 9). This does
away with the delays attendant to the remand of cases to the lower trial Courts.

Regional Trial Courts

There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and Batasang Pambansa
Regions, instead of sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.

A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his official station. This ensures mobility since a Judge may be assigned
anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional limitation of six months. Additionally, -it can remedy
temporary inequalities of caseloads in trial Courts.

Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts would try all cases
within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in which case, they remain as Branches of Regional
Trial Courts. Special procedures and technical rules governing special Courts will continue to remain applicable in
Branches assigned those special cases.

Metropolitan Trial Courts

There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches for large urban areas. The appointment of Judges
would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch of
the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded by the exigencies of the service.

The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches of said Courts to exercise special jurisdiction over certain
cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies only to cases of traffic violations.

Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special jurisdiction over certain
cases, thereby resulting in overall flexibility. They can also be circuitized with those in cities not forming part of
metropolitan areas.

One notable change between the old and the new set up is that Judges of these Courts will now be Presidential
appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely designated by the Supreme Court in an
Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.
7. There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves:

a) The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been entirely eliminated.

b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.

A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now to be transmitted.

c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and conclusions of law as
set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from, is also provided for. This will expedite the rendition of
decisions in appealed cases.

d) Section 42 provides for "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for Justices and

Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in
the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity
pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank." Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach
the top, where unfortunately there is not enough room for all, may have the satisfaction of at least approximating the
salary scale of those above him depending on his length of service,

8. But while the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be administered should not be
tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of Commrs., 239 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To
obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional exercise of power the following safeguards are recommended and/or
expected to be undertaken:

a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time frame for the completion of the reorganization
provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding implementing Order.

b) Appointments and their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the declaration by the
President of the completion of the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid any detriment to the smooth and
continuous functioning of the judicial machinery.

c) The services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by the Committee on
Judicial Reorganization (Article XI of its Report).

9. For the speedy implementation of the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to submit to the President within
thirty (30) days from the date of finality of its Decision the staffing pattern for all Courts required by Section 43.

I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing pattern be made to
include the names of Judges. The staffing pattern for Judges is already clearly and explicitly provided in the law
itself which enumerates the various Judges and Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the
superior positions of Judges would depart from the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, which refers more to
personnel organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It is also constitutionally objectionable in
that it would interfere with the prerogative of appointment intrinsically executive in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16
SCRA 379 [1966]; Government of the Philippines vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be
deprived of, nor be limited in, the full use of his discretion in the appointment of persons to any public office. Nothing
should so trench upon executive choice as to be, in effect, judicial designation.

10. A word of explanation. If I had resolved not to inhibit myself in this case upon motion filed by petitioners, it was
because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, of which I was privileged to be a member, confined its work to
the recommendation of options and guidelines in the task of reorganization. The Committee had no part whatsoever
in the drafting of the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. In fact, some of its recommendations like the
circuitization or regionalization of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the appellation of members of the Judiciary, the
confinement of the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate jurisdiction, the adoption of
the system found in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries of having a Court of general jurisdiction
with trial and appellate divisions, were not availed of in the final Act.

11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the good faith of the
President that all the deserving, upon considerations of "efficiency, integrity, length of service and other relevant
factors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized judicial system in the interest of public service; that
appointments will not be unduly delayed; and that appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and
impartiality in the men and women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.

ERICTA, J., concurring:

I concur in the view that the Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not violate the principle of
security of tenure of judges.
The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court (Article
X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created by law. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office
includes the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)

Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a public officer or employee but an abolition of his
office. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. Office of the President,
78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made between removal from office and abolition of an office. Removal
implies that the office subsists after ouster, while, in abolition, the office no longer exists thereby terminating the right
of the incumbent to exercise the rights and duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)

The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court has long been
established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147). What is only needed is that the abolition passes the
test of good faith. it need only be shown that said abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona fide
reorganization. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña supra.)

It is unthinkable to impute bad faith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization composed of four (4)
distinguished members of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Justice, and to the
members of the Batasang Pambansa whose combined efforts after a careful study and deliberation resulted to the
enactment of a bill now signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In his sponsorship speech, Justice
Ricardo C. Puno declared the objectives of the Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the following: (1) the attainment
of more efficiency in the disposal of cases; (2) the improvement in the quality of decisions by the courts that will
result from the easing of court dockets; and (3) structural changes to meet the exigencies of present day Philippine
Society and of the foreseeable future.

Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely affected. But in a conflict
between public interest and the individual interest of some Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The
welfare of the people is the supreme law.

The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of appointment is the exclusive
prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law should be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and
statesmanship of the President.

PLANA, J., concurring:

As the lawmaking body has the power to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and apportion their jurisdiction,
so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts as long as the act is done in good faith and not for
the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end. Good faith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.

Upon an examination of the legislative history of Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done in the main opinion, it is
manifest that actual, not merely presumed good faith attended its enactment. On this basis, I concur in the opinion
penned by the learned Chief Justice, qualified only by the following observations:

1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. — I believe the President is under no obligation to consult with
the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President. Indeed,
as the Supreme Court itself has said, it cannot give advisory opinions (Bacolod Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs.
Bacolod — Murcia milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the
President.

In the drafting of the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court with the function of giving
advisory opinions. The framers of the Constitution, however, did not see fit to adopt the proposal.

If the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129 and the Supreme
Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question of procedure), I believe the President would be free to follow
or disregard the advice; but, in either case, there would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be
upheld in one case or stricken down in the other.

2. Undue delegation of legislative powers. —

The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 on the ground that a provision
thereof (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances for members of the Judiciary) constitutes an undue
delegation unto the President of legislative power.

As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines for the
implementation of the delegated power, which makes the delegation inoffensive. I would like to add however some
observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.

Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and executive powers, there was
good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. Otherwise, the principle of separation of
governmental powers could be negated via unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has
however radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or fusion of executive and
legislative powers in the hands of the same group of officials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the legislative
process, and members of the Batasan actively discharge executive functions. The Prime Minister indeed must come
from its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly upholding the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present
Constitution has significantly eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power, although it has
retained some provisions of the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this time
perhaps not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence of "undue"
delegation of legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereof.

In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the
President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)

The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within specified this and subject
to such stations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. [Ibid, Sec. 17(2).]

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such magnitude has confronted the Philippine judiciary
than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by its title would reorganize all existing
courts (except the nine-member Sandiganbayan 1 and the three- member Court of Tax Appeals) and upon declaration
by the President of the completion of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said courts "automatically
abolished en masse and "the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 2 The total abolition involves a total of 1,663
judicial positions with 1,180 incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as of January 26, 1982 and the Act would effect an
increase of 230 judicial positions raising the total of judicial positions to be filled by new appointments to 1,893.
Notwithstanding the great deference due to enactments of the Batasan, I regretably find myself unable to join the ranks of
my esteemed colleagues in the majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dismiss the petition,
for the following main considerations and reasons:

1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo,
Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955 case of Ocampo 3 who fell short by one vote
to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out of an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare
unconstitutional and invalid section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral
judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent judges from office as against the contrary vote of a minority of 4
Justices (namely, then Chief Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical situation that
the last three named Justices voted for the validity of the Act as a remedial measure that abolished said positions without
permanent station which subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent of the Supreme Court, which they
considered as "repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative of an express prohibitory provision of the 1935
Constitution ê while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that otherwise he would go with the majority that "Congress may not, as
a general rule, abolish a judicial post without allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."

2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion — "(T)he [adverse]
outcome of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the ten petitioners who were presiding different Courts
of First Instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A.
1186 abolishing the positions of judges-at large and cadastral judges] is apt to revive the speculation whether
wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has further weakened the usually weak judicial department because of its
'innovative' requirement of a 2/3 majority vote of the Supreme Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never
in our history has such a number of judges of first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted through judicial
reorganization.

His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges "during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office" 4 must prevail over the
implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears
repeating thus:

A careful analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke an express guaranty
or positive definition of their term of office, the respondents rely on implied authority to abolish courts
and the positions of the respective judges. Accurately stated, respondents' defense rests on
a second inference deduced from such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress
has express power to establish courts; therefore it has implicit power to abolish courts and the
positions of judges of such abolished courts (first inference); and therefore (second inference)
Congress likewise has power to eject the judges holding such positions.

Resulting juridical situation. The implied authority invoked by respondents collides with
the express guaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. Which shall prevail Obviously the express
guaranty must override the implied authority. "Implications can never be permitted to contradict the
expressed intent or to defeat its purpose."
 xxx xxx xxx

But the collision may he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, if one be considered a
proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the Constitution the Congress may abolish
existing courts, provided it does not thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take
effect upon termination of their incumbent The fundamental provisions on the matter are thereby
coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his concurring opinion in Zandueta v.
De la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is the great work of jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal
Science, p. 6) 5

3. This reasoning that the express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during good behavior unless removed
from office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy years must override
the implied authority of removing by legislation the judges has been further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the
new provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel
from the Chief Executive through the then Secretary of Justice to the Supreme Court 6 and vested in the Supreme Court
exclusively "the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal," 7 Which power was formerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the Chief Executive.

As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934 Constitutional Convention "frowned
on removal of judges of first instance through abolition of their offices or reorganization," citing Professor Jose
Aruego's observation that the security of judges' tenure provision was intended to "help secure the independence of
the judiciary" in that "during good behavior, they may not be legislated out of office by the law-making body nor
removed by the Chief Executive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense whatsoever; they may stay in
office until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
(Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. 11, pp. 718-719)" He further cited Aruego's report that a
proposed amendment to the effect that the prohibition against transfers of judges to another district without the
approval of the Supreme Court 8 "should not be applicable to a reorganization of tribunals of justice or of districts, but the
amendment was defeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow, there . before, having vetoed the
transfer of judges thru a re-organization, the Convention evidently could not have permitted the removal of judges thru re-
organization.

Now, if the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least in the light of the 7
to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal of incumbent judges through legislative action by abolition of their
courts, then they would have so clearly provided for such form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the
contrary as already stated they ruled out such removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by vesting
exclusively in the Supreme Court the power of discipline and removal of judges of all inferior courts.

4. This being so, the fundamental point emphasized by former Chief Justice Bengzon that abolition of the 33 judicial
positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect manner of removing the petitioners-judges" while the
"positions [that] were eliminated . . . were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of judges" applies with
greater force in the case at bar which involves an unprecedented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it reorganization, or
legislation or removal or abolition, this law disregards the constitutional assurance that these judges, once
appointed, shall hold office during good behavior ... [unless incapacitated and until retirement].

The abolition of their offices was merely an indirect manner of removing these petitioners. Remember that on June
19, 1954, there were 107 judges of first instance, district judges, judges at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act
296). After the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there were 114 positions of judges of first instance. There was no
reduction there was increase — in the number of judges, nor in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-
Large and Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of
judges; or if you please, there was a mere change of designation from 'Cadastral Judge or Judge at large to district
judge Hence it should be ruled that as their positions had not been 'abolished' de facto, but actually retained with
another name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March 30,
1954.) For it is not permissible to effect the removal of one judge thru the expediency of abolishing his office even
as the office with same power is created with another name. (Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. Williams, 118 tenn. 391,
Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R. p. 211). In this view of the picture, we believe, Congress could have, and should haveas
suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the hearings in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the
present judges-at-large and cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be fixed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments or by the Secretary of Justice, as originally
proposed by Senator Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar was done before, and it would not
be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's prerogative of appointment, because such judges had
already been appointed to the judiciary before the passage of the act, and the provision may be construed in the
light of mere change of official designation plus increase in salary."

5. Concededly, the questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms with more specific delineation of
jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority opinion, but they do not change the basic structure of the
existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and
redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the
challenged Act. The Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and
Courts of Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name of Regional
Trial Courts with provision for certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases . . . . and/or such other special cases as the Supreme
Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice" 10 and the Court of Appeals is
restructured and redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number of Appellate Justices
from the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction of the number of divisions from 15 (composed of 3 Justices each) to 10
(composed of 5 members each) such that it is feared that there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the
important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers of facts.

In my view, the "candid admission" by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court "that he entertained doubts as to
whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other above
mentioned courts provided for in the challenged Act as "new courts". And the best proof of this is the plain and simple
transitory provision in section 44 thereof that upon the President's declaration of completion of the reorganization
(whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office
"(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act,
together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel together with the
"applicable appropriations." This could not have been possible without a specification and enumeration of what specific
cases of the "old courts" would be transferred to the particular "new courts," had these "new courts" not been manifestly
and substantially the "old courts" with a change of name — or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his first view,
now discarded, in his separate opinion: "just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the
present judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or remodeling of the old structure." 11

6. I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and consequent ouster of the
incumbent judges from office as expounded by the late eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring
opinion in the pre-war case of Zandueta 12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the ground of
petitioner Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment of office. 13 Realistically viewed from the basis of the established legal
presumptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes (unless set aside by a 2/3 majority of 10 members of the Supreme
Court) and of good faith in their enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate on the good
or bad motives behind the enactment of the Act without appearing to be imprudent and improper and declare that "the
legislative power of reorganization (is) sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose." The good faith in the
enactment of the challenged Act must needs be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish
courts as implied from the power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of tenure of the judges which
is essential for a free and independent judiciary. Adherents of the Rule of Law are agreed that indispensable for the
maintenance of the Rule of Law is a free and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and enforce. it without fear or favor
— "free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and
insiduous influence of the political powers that be to quote again from Justice Barredo's separate concurring
opinion. 14 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice Bengzon in
the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law Professors headed by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization should at least snow the incumbents of the existing courts to remain in office
[the appropriate counterpart 'new courts'] unless they are removed for cause."

7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants" as stressed by former Chief
Justice Bengzon in Ms majority opinion in Ocampo is based on the judiciary's status as a coequal and coordinate
branch of government, whereas the long line of Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish offices
refers to officers or employees in the executive branch of government and "the underlying consideration must be
borne in mind that Manalang [the aggrieved petitioner] belonged to the Executive Department and because the
President approved the law no question or encroachment by one branch on the other could be apprehended or
alleged. 15 This is not a matter of personal privilege for the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by former U.P. Law Dean
Irene Cortez in her memorandum as amicus curiae, "for the judiciary whose independence is not only eroded but is in
grave danger of being completely destroyed." Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial independence is not a guarantee
intended for the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and is even more vital to the courts at the
lowest levels because there are more of them and they operate closest to the people," and "(P)articularly under the
present form of modified parliamentary government with legislative and executive functions overlapping and in certain
areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the checking function in the performance of which its independence
assumes an even more vital importance. "

The extensive memoranda filed by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae such as former Senator Jose W. Diokno
who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent further destruction of judicial independence," former
Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president of the Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the Court's
adoption of the B Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the
interpretation of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution" and that the judges' security
of tenure guaranty should not be rendered meaningless and inoperative" former Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
president of the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submits that the total abolition of all courts below the Supreme
Court (except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) and the removal of the incumbent Justices and
Judges "violates the independence of the judiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed
them by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of the Philippines
who invokes the Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1959, that "The principles of unremovability of the
Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until death or until a retiring age fixed by statute is reached, is an important
safeguard of the Rule of Law" have greatly helped in fortifying my views.

8. I had submitted in my memo of September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization that
"(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may recommend to meet the worldwide problem of congested court
dockets, and to improve judicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in mind that the members of the
judiciary as the weakest branch of government, yet called upon to safeguard the people's rights and protect them
oppression, official and otherwise, are entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though
the lower courts may be reshuffled or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit of the Constitution
guaranteeing their security of tenure and maintaining the independence of the judiciary should be respected, and
they should be retained in the new courts."
In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned of the dire consequences of giving the questioned provisions of the Act the
"absolutist sense which they appear to have at first blush" thus: "(T)o accept legislative power to abolish courts
asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the
door to future court abolitions in the guise of reorganization. At this stage of our political development, the process
of embarking upon a modified parliamentary system may well usher in a situation where despite guarantees of
judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can command a majority vote may periodically
undertake complete reorganization and remove judges, thus making of the judiciary a veritable straw in the political
wind and "(F)urthermore, what can result in the modified parliamentary system from the close working relationship
between executive and legislature is made manifest in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. If the sweeping revamp provided
were to be carried out the President would appoint all of the justices and judges of the courts affected and the whole
membership in the judiciary from the highest to the lowest courts would be his appointees. It is relevant to point out
that it is precisely a situation like this that the Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms for the
chairman and members of the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed independence."

9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution which
granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and replace all judges and officials 16 (as against the
limited one-year period for the exercise of such power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth Upon the declaration of martial law in September, 1972, justices and
judges of all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total of
53 judges who were replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during the period from September,
1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed after the effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973
Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the President in the pending case of Tapucar vs. Famador 17 notwithstanding the
generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the
cited Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his constitutional security of tenure and questioned the
appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him, although he had not been removed or
otherwise dismissed from his position nor had be resigned therefrom. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered
both to refrain from discharging the functions of the questioned office And now comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial
positions (and thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen
the judiciary with the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is essential for a free and independent judiciary
as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already feeble judiciary, possessed neither of the power
of the sword nor the purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion:

Shall we have judges of the type of Lord Coke Or judges, who, in his place, would have answered
'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, afraid of ouster thru a judiciary reshuffle, would rather
serve the interests of the party in power or of the political boss, than the interests of justice?

As it is, the Judicial Department is feeble enough. Shall we render it feebler with judges precariously
occupying their official seats Judges performing their duties under the sword of Damocles of future
judicial reorganizations

10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally apparent is that the
strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa
retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually
formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it as stressed that
with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need
'to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intends and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches,'" 19 with the further observation that "many are the
ways by which such independence could be eroded." In the cited case of Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the Chief
Justice for the Court), the Court issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the dismissal of the criminal complaint
filed with respondent fiscal Labang by "disgruntled members of the bar with a record of losing cases" in the judge's court
and imposed the penalty of censure on each and everyone of the private respondents-lawyers for the "unseemly haste"
with which they filed the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or oppressive exercise of
state authority." The Court marked the "violation of the cardinal principles of fairness and due process that underlie the
Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was not heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation.
There was, on the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the Integrated Bar stressing that
precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,' "
and that such subjection of a judge to public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish public confidence in the
courts."

11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the course of committee hearings
of Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of
incompetent and corrupt judges and to restore confidence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the
constant subject of headlines and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council reportedly screening and
conducting "integrity tests as to new applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking "confidential information on
corrupt and incompetent judges to help the government purge the judiciary." 21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was quoted as
saying that "there will be a purge of the corrupt and the misfits' when the Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law
by President Marcos and implemented in coordination with the Supreme Court." 22 The public respondents' answer
sidesteps the issue of such purge contravening the rudiments of a fair hearing and due process and submits that "no term
of office is sacrosanct when demanded before the altar of the public good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety
gripping the judiciary as the Ministry of Justice has reportedly been asked to collate information 'on the performance of the
judges and on the qualifications of those slated to take over the positions of the incompetent, the inefficient or those
involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 'Somehow, the uncertainty that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly
subjected the judges to mental torture since they do not know when or whether the axe will fall on them. Worse, the sword
of Damocles hanging over their heads could provoke them into seeking the help of people claiming to have influence with
the powers that be." 23

But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is there hard evidence on
this. The only figures given in the course of the committee hearings were to the effect that out of some 1,700
members of the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were of the undesirable category, i.e. misfit, incompetent or corrupts.
(Barredo, J., before the Committee on Justice, human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980)," and that
"(I)f this be the case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition of judicial offices becomes an arbitrary
act, the effect of which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or innocent without due process of
law." Now would it be of any avail to beg the question and assert that due process is not available in mass abolitions
of courts.

Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate concurrence to twin objectives of
getting rid of " structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and
dragging procedural rules in force and of "a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary (who') make a
mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for personal ends He adds that "it is my personal assessment
of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, as I have just
indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the
interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense of
loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of
graft and corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that
be," 24 and invokes the adage of "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity of the Act.

Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills demand drastic cures" thus:
"Drastic, yes — but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve courts by abolishing them, any more than
a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence;
they will not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course would only breed more
perversity in the administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule have bred more subversion."

12. Finally, as stated by the 19-i 5 integrated Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of Delegates, "It would, indeed, be
most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count it on themselves. Observance of
procedural due process in the separation of misfits from (he Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective. '

As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal principles of fairness and due
process and the opportunity to be heard and defend themselves against the accusations made against their and not
to be subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise of legal
authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what is at stake is their constitutionally
guaranteed security of tenure and non-impairment of the independence of the judiciary and the proper exercise of
the constitutional power exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges after fair hearing.

In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization that —

Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and branded for life in such reorganization on the basis
of confidential adverse reports as to their performance, competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily
resign from office upon being confronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports,
without due process or hearing, has been proven from our past experience where a number of honest and
competent judges were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to be basket cases have
remained in the service; and

The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals down, has been
vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be left to
clean its own house upon complaint and with the cooperation of the as grieved parties and after due process and
hearing.

The constitutional confrontation and conflict may wen be avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions
of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and functions of the "new courts" therein provided as
compared to the "abolished old courts" but provide for procedural changes, fixed delineation of jurisdiction and
increases in the number of courts for a more effective and efficient disposition of court cases, -the incumbent judges
guaranteed security of tenure require that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."

Fernandez, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its parts.

The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of the Act which reads as
follows:

SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. — The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts
of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts
of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall e transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment,. property and the
necessary personnel.

The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from the funds for organizational
changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon the declaration
upon the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been completed), the said courts (meaning
the Court of Appeals and all other lower courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be
deemed abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office" trenches on all the constitutional
safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members
(Section 7, Article X of the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to
administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power of the
Supreme Court "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal.
" (Section 7, Id.)

On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44. the Batasan did nothing more than
to exercise the authority conferred upon it be Section I of the same Article of the Constitution which provides that
The Judicial power shall be rested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by
law." In other words, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of the law (of the
legislature it follows that it is within the legislature's power to abolish or reorganize them even if in so doing, it might
result in the cessation from office of the incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective constitutionally
fixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect is broad and indeed plenary.

Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is either (1) to reconcile,
on the one hand, the parliament's power of abolition and reorganization with, on the other, the security of tenure of
members of the judiciary and the Supreme Court's authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that
either the power of the Supreme Court or of the Batasan is more paramount than that of the other. I believe.
however, that such a manner of looking at the issue that confronts Us only confuses and compounds the task We
are called upon to perform. For how can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a
judge to continue as such, when the position occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do, that the
solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he should in some way be allowed to
continue to function as judge until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, if only because we would
then have the absurd spectacle of a judiciary with old and new courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such as a
district court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional judges or of judges exercising
powers not purely judicial which is offensive to the Constitution. The other suggestion that the incumbent of the
abolished court should be deemed appointed to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive
the appointing authority, the president, of the power to make his own choices and would, furthermore, amount to an
appointment by legislation which is a Constitutional anachronism. more on this point later .

Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact and in law, the structure of
judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially different from that under the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, hence the courts now existing are actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any
reconciliation or feel bound to determine whose power, that of the Batasang Pambansa or that of this Court, should
be considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with it the power to
abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality that the tenure of the holder of an office must of
necessity end when his office no longer exists, as I see it, be have no alternative than to hold that petitioners'
invocation of the independence of the judiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. It is as
simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just
a renaming and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the present judicial structure or system
assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly and
unequivocally provided in the section in question that said courts are deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it
most unmistakably emphatic, that "the incumbents thereat shall cease to hold office." Dura les, sed les. As a matter
of fact, I cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying the determined legislative intent
about it.
Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on championing the cause of the
independence of the judiciary by maintaining that the constitutional safeguards thereof I have already enumerated
earlier must be respected in any reorganization ordained by the parliament My answer is simple. Practically all the
Members of the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general reorganization but abolition — in other
words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure but a total demolition thereof to be followed by
the building of a new and different one. I am practically alone in contemplating a different view. True, even if I should
appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would still make myself a hero in the eyes of man justices and judges,
members of the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers of the judicial independence, but understandably, I
should not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the expense not only of my distinguished
colleagues but of the Batasang Pambansa that framed the law and, most of all, the President who signed and,
therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless I am absolutely sure that my position is formidable, unassailable and
beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain of, as I shall demonstrate anon.

To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us cannot be said to be
clear and consistent, much less unshakeable and indubitably definite either way. None of the local cases 1 relied
upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members of the Court during the deliberations, such as
Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3 Zandueta, 4 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to
certainty of correctness.

Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and beyond diminution.
Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa 129 explaining academically its apparent
tendency to invade the areas of authority of the Supreme Court, not to speak of its dangerously impairing the
independence of the judiciary, must have, I imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the law
unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations of the Court, the combined wisdom of my learned colleagues was
something I could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant factors, I have
come to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are justifiable grounds to uphold the Act, if only to try
how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and the Batasan in taking
what appear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people from a fast spreading cancer in the judiciary of our
country.

Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy The improved national discipline so
evident during the earlier days of martial law, has declined at a quite discernible degree. Different sectors of society
are demanding urgent reforms in their respective field And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear,
among their gripes, which as a matter of fact is common to all of them is that about the deterioration in the quality of
performance of the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace of pending judicial proceedings.
Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be related to lack of independence of the
judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or corruption among and corruptibility of the men sitting in the
courts in some parts of the country And what is worse, while in the communities concerned the malady is known to
factually exist and is actually graver and widespread, very few, if any individuals or even associations and organized
groups, truly incensed and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal evidence to
come out and file the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court, And I am not vet referring to similar situations
that are not quite openly known but nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand, if all these intolerable
instances should actually be formally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible for the Court to
dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands of other cases it has to attend to and the rather
cumbersome strict requirements of procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such administrative
case all of which are time consulting. Verily, under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is
justification for the patience of the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in our
judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.

Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not alone because of
structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging
procedural rules in force, but also when it becomes evident that a good number of those occupying positions in the
judiciary, make a mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as already
explained, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my
personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-
pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot
satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character,
competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay,
impregnability to an temptations of graft and corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit
improper pressures of the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa 129
encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the foundation of the principle of
independence of the judiciary.

The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint of the unusual situation in
which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of us, the Members of the Court, the
constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and removal only by the Supreme Court, among others, against
impairment of the independence of the judiciary, which is one of the bedrock's and, therefore, of the essence in any
"democracy under a regime of justice, peace, liberty and equality (Preamble of the 1973 Constitution), are priceless
and should be defended, most of all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually
endowed to each of Us. Withal, we are all conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never been intended to
place the person of the judge in a singular position of privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are
essentially part and parcel of what is required of an independent judiciary where judges can decide cases and do
justice to everyone before them ruat caelum. However, We find Ourselves face to face with a situation, in our
judiciary which is of emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be enforced
under such a circumstance seem to be difficult, aside from being controversial. And so, in a real sense, We have to
make a choice between adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the
broader and more practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least of the Constitution.

My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling purely Idealism and
nobility in the recognition of human dignity, protection of individual liberties and providing security and promotion of
the general welfare under a government of laws. With all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law
of the land is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances. It is
written for all seasons, except for very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated
by its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in
peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions.
Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios ", such in ordinary problems justify
exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and emergencies, the most
constitutionally Idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure of pragmatic considerations,
adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the extent
of creating impressions, of course erroneous, that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity
and imperiousness remained undiminished and unimpaired.

The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach. When martial law was
proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociferously shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily
and without the - required factual bases contemplated in the Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution,
but more, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recognized intent of said clause by utilizing his
martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and defend the integrity and security of
the state but to establish a New Society The critics contended that martial law is only for national security, not for the
imposition of national discipline under a New Society.

Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that in this jurisdiction, this
concept of martial law has already been upheld several times by this Court. 1, for one, accepted such a construction
because I firmly believe that to impose martial law for the sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion
without coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter folly, for
the country would still continue to lay open to its recurrence.

I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the fight of this Court's doctrines about the imposition
of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this concurrence. To put it differently, if indeed there could be
some doubt as to the correctness of this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional,
particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today calls for solutions that may
not in the eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and
intent. As 1 have earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction of words to whose literal iron-clad meanings
we must feel hidebound without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature of adjustability and
adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental intent and objectives of the framers may
remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the
transcendental objectives it seeks to pursue While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices
and judges before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the
desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.

Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside from what has been
discussed about its effect on the guarantees of judicial independence, also preempts, in some of its provisions, the
primary rule-making power of the Supreme Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of
my colleagues, I would just like to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. After all, the
legislature is expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of the Constitution of 1973) so
much so, that I doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or modify any rule the Batasang Pambansa enunciates.
Truth to tell, as Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, for one reason or another,
principally the lack of a clear consensus as to what some of my colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced
by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated long enough in making our procedural rules more
practical and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with substantial
justice.

So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers of the Constitution in our
ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring and misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse
Ourselves with the explanation that not only are We overloaded with work beyond human capability of its being
performed expeditiously, but that the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have precluded Us
from being more expeditious and speedy.

I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not combined to create a very
critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose its faith and confidence in the administration of justice
by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look with more sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all the
sundry to know, however, that notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is
far from being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes
to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible for those in
authority to answer the clamor of the people for an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more
apparent than real.
To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be dimming with tears of
disappointment and disenchantment because of the stand I have chosen to adopt in these cases, may I try to
assuage them by joining their fervent prayers that some other day, hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence
may dictate to another constitutional convention to write the guarantees of judicial independence with ink of deeper
hue and words that are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line of demarcation between
the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His Infinite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial
justice for our people, free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles
of interference and insiduous influence of the political powers that be. Presently, I am constrained from going along
with any other view than that the Constitution allows abolition of existing courts even if the effect has to be the
elimination of any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office.

I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters about the choice that will
ultimately be made of those who will be eased out of the judiciary in the course of the implementation of Batas
Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded
generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more specifically to the President, its own constitutionally conferred
power of removal of judges. Section 44 of the Batasan's Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have
ceased to hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see fit to occupy the new courts.
Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their respective offices", or, as others
would say they would be in fact removed. How the President will make his choices is beyond Our power to control.
But even if some may be eased out even without being duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given
the opportunity to be heard the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest shouted serve
as sufficient assurance that when lie ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath "to do justice to
every man hence, lie will equip himself first with the fullest reliable information before acts. This is not only my
individual faith founded on my personal acquaintance with the character and sterling qualities of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say this is the faith of the nation in a man who has led it successfully through crises and
emergencies, with justice to all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President will deal with each and every
individual to be affected by this reorganization with the best light that God will give him every moment he acts in
each individual case as it comes for his decision

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition "to declare the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) unconstitutional".

The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief
and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law. the petition is premature. No
jurisdictional question is involved.

There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the said law is in issue. It is presumed to be
constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked into the constitutional angle.

Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the constitutionality of the
said law even as taxpayers.

The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for declaratory relief
assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a referendum. De la Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525),
has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being removed from his position.

The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an unconstitutional and evil
purpose As ably expounded by the Chief Justice, in enacting the said law, the lawmaking body acted within the
scope of its constitutional powers and prerogatives.

GUERRERO, J., concurring:

I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my personal convictions and observations
on this case, a veritable landmark case, for whatever they may be worth.

The legal basis of the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed Chief Justice having been exhaustively discussed
and decisively justified by him, a highly-respected expert and authority on constitutional law, it would be an exercise
in duplication to reiterate the same cases and precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite
differently, not through the classic methods of philosophy, history and tradition, but following what the well-known
jurist, Dean Pound, said that "the most significant advance in the modern science of law is the change from the
analytical to the functional attitude." 1 And in pursuing this direct

ion, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling that "another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil
which it is designed to remedy, and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it
existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." 2
I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are clearly conducive to
the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the legislation namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the
creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (I 3) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts: (b) A reappointment of jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency:
(c) A simplification of procedures and (d) The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and
other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of
justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory
Note, which is "to embody reforms in the structure, organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of
improving the administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the more complex problems on
the present and forseeable future cannot but "promote the welfare of society, since that is the final cause of law. 4

Hence, from the standpoint of The general utility and functional value of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, there
should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the
judicial system is undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets as too well-known to be
ignored as are the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and
measures that are more practical, workable and economical. 5

From the figures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404, 686 in 1978; 426, 911 in 1979; 441,
332 in 1980; and 450, 063 as of February 3, 1982) 6 the congested character of court dockets rising year after year is
staggering and enormous, looming like a legal monster.

But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to have Justices and Judges
who are fair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent and efficient. The general clamor that the prestige of
the Judiciary today has deteriorated and degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual
basis. Records in the Supreme Court attest to the unfitness and incompetence, corruption and immorality of many
dispensers of justice. According to the compiled data, the total number of Justices and Judges against whom
administrative charges have been filed for various offenses, misconduct, venalities and other irregularities
reaches 322. Of this total, 8 are Justices of the Court of Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Judges, 8 CAR
Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146 Municipal Judges.

The Supreme Court has found 102 of them guilty and punished them with either suspension, admonition, reprimand
or fine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City
Judges and 53 Municipal Judges.

Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the service. And these
are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.

Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period from the filing of the charge to
the dismissal of the respondent. In one case, the proceedings were terminated after seven years. How long the
pending administrative cases will be disposed of, only time will tell as an increasing number of administrative cases
are being filed by victims of judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.

Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed from the service, there are many who have been
castigated and censured in final judgments of the Supreme Court upon appeal or review of the decisions, orders
and other acts of the respondent courts, Justices and Judges. To cite a few cases, Our decisions have categorically
pronounced respondents' actuations, thus: "deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7; applicable rules. The whole
proceedings looked no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the Judge to flaunt the law and
every norm of propriety and procedure" 8; "there was a deliberate failure of respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly
provided in the Rules of Court" 9; "It is unfortunate that respondent Judge failed to acquaint himself with, 01'
misinterpreted, those controlling provisions and doctrines" 10; "The failure of the respondent Municipal Judge to yield
obedience to authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and of respondent Court of First Instance Judge and his
deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25, 1981. For peremptorily dismissing
the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss was 'well-taken' and respondent Judge did not
elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his tribe vanish." 11 In one case, We noted "There is here so something unusual, but
far from palliating the gravity of the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. ... it did render the due process requirement
nugatory, for instead of a fair and impartial trial, there was an Idle form, a useless ceremony." 12

It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebuked but to allow these Judges and their ilk to remain and
continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the Judiciary. It is to be deplored that the Supreme Court has
not found time to exercise its power and authority in the premises, for no charges or proceedings have been
instituted against them. We have a list of these crooked Judges whose actuations have been found to be patiently
wrong and manifestly in-defeasible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out from the
service. If they are not booted out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.

Candidly, one reason for writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses and wrongs which
are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of the people in the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Some
members of the Court felt that these revelations would be like washing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of
public and official record nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.

In the light of these known evils and infirmities of the judiciary system, it would be absurd and unreasonable to claim
that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It is
presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 13 The presumption of regularity is not confined to the acts of
the individual officers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts of
legislative bodies. 14 Good faith is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none in
the case at bar. It could not be otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep
sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high office as the duly-elected representatives of the people.

It is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant with good faith. 15 The question of good faith then is the
crux of the conflict at bar. Good faith in the enactment of the law does not refer to the wisdom of the measure, the
propriety of the Act, or to its expediency. The questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, viz: Why
abolish all the courts Why legislate out the judges Why not amend the Rules of Court only Is abolition of all courts the
proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misfits in our Judiciary? — may not be inquired into by Us. "It is not the province of
the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern." 16 The Courts "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into
the wisdom of the law." 17 Chief Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is
"useful to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.'" 19 In any case, petitioners have not shown an iota of proof of
bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship
speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more efficient vehicle of
"eliminating incompetent and unfit Judges as indicative of impermissible legislative motive. 20

It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by the legislation will eradicate hopefully or at least
minimize the evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial body, it will result in the actual removal of the Justices of
the Court of Appeals and Judges of the lower courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition of office or
removal from office, the end-result is the same — termination of the services of these incumbents. Indeed, the law
may be harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.

The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are expected to know the
nature and concept of a public office. It is created for the purpose of effecting the ends for which government has
been instituted, which are for the common good, and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family
or class of men. In our form of government, it is fundamental that public offices are public trust, and that the person
to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. 21 In the last analysis, a public office is a
privilege in the gift of the State. 22

There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said
to have any vested right in an office or its salary. When an office is created by the Constitution, it cannot be
abolished by the legislature, but when created by the State under the authority of the Constitution, it may be
abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a judicial appointment must be deemed
as adherence to the rule that "when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of such a
court takes office with that encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his full term and his full salary are not
dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legislature may for the public good, in
ordaining and establishing the courts, from time to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it." 25

The removal from office of the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act of abolition of the office as
demanded by the superior and paramount interest of the people. The bad and the crooked Judges must be
removed. The good and the straight, sober Judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative
of the President who, I am certain, will act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance with his
solemn oath of office "to preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone ... " There
and then the proper balance between the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum of promoting the
public good shall have been struck. 26

The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. It may be the last bulwark of constitutional
government. 27 It Must, however, be remembered "that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as courts." 28 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts
alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute" for which reason it will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution "except in a clear case." 29

Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conflict of opinions — on judicial independence, whether
impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the courts, whether abolition of office or removal
therefrom, and on delegation of legislative power, whether authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting from the
merits, the force and brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the
social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light of contemporaneous
events from which the New Republic emerged and evolved new Ideals of national growth and development,
particularly in law and government, a kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is necessary to justify as
the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.

This is the time and the moment to perform a constitutional duty to affix my imprimatur and affirmance to the law,
hopefully an act of proper judicial statesmanship.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. Unlike
Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by embellishing my concurrence lest I be accrued of bringing coal to
Newcastle. Accordingly, I will simply vote to dismiss the petition

However, I cannot agree with the Chief Justice when he says:

... In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore it should be in accordance with
accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. There
would be no plausibility then to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged
Act. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice
of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the
former is to be preferred.

It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity because the abolition of
certain judicial offices was done in good faith. This being the case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise
its constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and
to accord its views the fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an invasion of executive territory
which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional
implementation of the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.

DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.

May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my brethren in the judiciary as
not feeling for them as much concern as I should for their security of tenure which is raised as the main argument
against the constitutionality of the law, than by way of giving added force or support to the main opinion so well-
written by Our learned Chief Justice in his usual scholarly fashion. I, therefore, limit myself to a discussion that the
assailed statue is not unconstitutional without having to suggest how it may be implemented in order that it could
stand the most rigid test of constitutionality, for in that area, what is involved is purely an executive act of the
President in whose wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We should trust in how he would fulfill his sworn duties
to see that the laws are faithfully executed and to do justice to every man.

Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal of the petition, I do so on the additional ground that petitioners have
not fulfilled all the requisites for the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial inquiry — the power to declare a
law unconstitutional.

The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to reorganize said courts, and in the
process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a
basic doctrine of constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1

The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which would thereafter arise
the security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions of said courts. in the natural order of things,
therefore, since the occasion to speak of security of tenure of judges arises only after the courts have first been
brought into being, the right to security of tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power of
creating the courts to provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its authority,
deems it wise and urgent to provide for a new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts
would conduce more to its objective of improving the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is one of
policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interfere with. By
this secondary position it has to the primary power of the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to
the incumbents should not be a legal impediment to the exercise of that basic power of creating the statutory courts
which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to create new ones. This primary
legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security of tenure of those appointed to said courts
could not bring about the exhaustion of that power. Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that
power can never be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental precept of constitutional and
representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.

If the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a matter of legislative intent. it involves
the exercise of legislative power, an act of legislation which generally concerns policy in the formation of which the
courts have no say Initially, when the legislature creates the courts, it suffers from no limitation arising from the
necessity or respecting the security of tenure of judges who are not yea there. This inherent character of fullness
and plenitude of the power to create and abolish courts does not change when that same power is once more
exercised thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. Which only goes to show that when done in good faith and
motivated solely by the good and the well-being of the people, the exercise of the power is not meant to be
restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted by the so-called judicial security of tenure.
The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of the power vested by the
Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described above. That power carries with it the duty and
responsibility of providing the people with the most effective and efficient system of administration of justice. This is
by far of more imperative and transcedental importance than the security of tenure of judges which, admittedly, is
one of the factors that would conduce to independence of the judiciary — but first of all, a good, efficient and
effective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only
for a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welfare of the people which is the most primordial and paramount
consideration, not a judiciary in which the people's faith has been eroded, a condition which the security of tenure, in
some instances, may even be contributory.

In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the legislature is presumed to have been motivated by no
other objective than to provide the people the kind of judicial machinery that would best serve their interest and
welfare, in its belief that the present machinery is falling short of that measure of public service. It should, likewise,
be presumed that it has been led to this low estimate of the utility and effectiveness of the present set-up of the
judiciary after informing itself, with the facilities at its command, such as the power of legislative investigation, of the
actual condition of the courts, particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, faith and confidence of the
public, and what the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is the keenly perceptible feeling of the
people in general. Responsibility for this more or less extensive slowdown of the delivery of judicial service can be
laid on no other than either of the two components of a court — the procedural laws or rules that govern the
workings of the courts, or the persons executing or applying them — or both.

When two interests conflict as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty of the legislature to provide
society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and the right of judges to security of tenure,
on the other, the latter must of necessity yield to the former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly
and on a greater magnitude than the right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more
of a personal benefit to just a few, as indeed only the judge affected could seek judicial redress of what he
conceives to be its violation.

Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police power" of the State, if this concept which underlies even the
Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justification of the passage of the Act in question. That is, if a
conflict between the primary power of the legislature to create courts, and mere consequential benefit accorded to
judges and justices after the creation of the courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer fails to see, or, at least,
would disappear upon a reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting interests which, from the above disquisition is
not hard to find. It is, without doubt, in the essence of the exercise of police power that a right assertable by
individuals may be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general welfare. This is demonstrated in
how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights enjoyable by The entire people, not just by a handful in
comparison, are made subject to the lawful exercise of the police power of the State.

Viewed, therefore, from the above-mentioned perspective, the general revamp of the judiciary involving both its
components — the court as an office or institution, and the judges and justices that man them — should not find any
legal obstacle in the security of tenure of judges. This security, after all, is no more than as provided for all other
officials and employees in the civil service of the government in Section 3, Article XII-B of the Constitution which
provides:

No officer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law.

The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the Constitution gives to judicial officials no more than a guarantee that
their retirement age as fixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent
provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted for the first time because the retirement age before then was
provided merely by statute not by the Constitution. If it comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them
constitutional protection is the aforequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition of office when done in
good faith, for removal implies the existence of the office, not when it is abolished. Admittedly, as has been held,
abolition of office for no reason related to public welfare or for the good of the service, let alone when done in bad
faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. 2 The abolition of the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorganization
of the judiciary, as the Title of the law curtly but announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded. And
whether by said reorganization, the present would be deemed abolished, as the law expresses such an unmistakable
intent, the matter is one for the sole and exclusive determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion
whether by the nature and extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them abolished. To
give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of the changes as to their structure, distribution and
jurisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish them, or to declare them so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow
undue interference in the function of legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty of courts precisely to give
effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as my be discovered therefrom.

From the above observation, it would be futile to insist that the present courts would not effectively be abolished by
the Act in question. it might be to arrogate power for Us to say that the changes the law brings to the present judicial
system, do not suffice for this Court to give effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. Where would the
agrarian courts, the circuit criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by the law? Are they
not abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such merger, and by the other changes introduced
by the law, would make said courts different from the present Courts of First Instance which, as a consequence,
may then be considered abolished Integrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in the
judicial machinery would necessarily affect the entire system.
The fact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as the special courts just mentioned, does
not mean that the changes wrought are only superficial or "cosmetic" as this term has been used so often in the oral
argument. Without the new law, these courts will remain fixed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the
course of time, the need for their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed conditions, where they
are needed at present at a certain place, the need for them may be somewhere else in later years, if maximum
benefit at the least expense is to be achieved, as always should be a most desirable goal and objective of
government.

Demonstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is proper,
except perhaps if they intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional repugnancy, which is not so in the instant
case. We have, therefore, no occasion, as earlier intimated, to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization
of the judiciary would result in the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax
Appeals. Hence, the provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote of
eight justices does not come into the vortex of the instant controversy. Its possible violation by the assailed statute
cannot happen, and may, therefore, not constitute an argument against the constitutionality of the law.

Former Justice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly indorsed the judicial revamp
when he enumerated the qualities of a good judge that the appointing power should consider in making new appointments
to the judiciary upon its reorganization pursuant to the questioned Act. The words of the eminent jurist may well reflect the
favorable reaction of the public in general to what the Act aim to achieve in the name of good and clean government. The
present judicial incumbents, who have not in any way, by their acts and behavior while in office, tarnished the good image
that the judiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for apprehension that what they are entitled to under the
Constitution by way of security of tenure wig be denied them, considering the publicly known aim and purpose of the
massive judicial revamp, specially as cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when he
created the Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate judicial reforms.

If the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the law is its possible effect of impairing the security of
tenure of the incumbents, We may have the following facts to consider:

1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in office until replaced or
reappointed by the President. As to those judicial officials, no security of tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches
to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a holdover tenure. How the President has exercised this immense
power with admirable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness will be his sole
guide in implementing the law.

2. As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present President, and he should feel concerned
more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may rightfully claim to maintain their official standing and
integrity. They need have no fear of being ignored for no reason at all, much less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or
lack of nobility of heart.

From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation of the law may there possibly be a
taint of constitutional repugnancy as when a judge of acknowledged honesty, industry and competence is
separated, because an act of arbitrariness would thereby be committed, but the abolition of the courts as decreed
by the law is not by itself or per se unconstitutional.

Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly competent committee, deserves to be
given a chance to prove its worth in the way of improving the judiciary. If in its implementation, any one, if at all,
feels aggrieved, he can always seek judicial redress, if he can make out a case of violation of his right of security of
tenure with uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances of his
case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable.

This petition should also be dismissed for being premature, as is the stand of Justice Aquino. The petition asks this
Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law unconstitutional when it conflicts with the
fundamental law (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This power has well-defined limits, for it can be exercised only when
the following requisites are present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest opportunity, and (4) The
determination of the constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case.

I am of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it filed by the proper parties.

The main ground for which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is assailed is that it is
violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The only persons who could raise the question of
constitutionality of the law are, therefore, the actual incumbents of the courts who would be separated from the
service upon the abolition of the courts affected by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their
judicial security of tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the petitioners,
has not been separated from the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, for he may be appointed to the
court equivalent to his present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that his
tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that has become actual, not
merely probable or hypothetical.

The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action to raise the question
of constitutionality of a statute only when no one else can more appropriately bring the suit to defend a right
exclusively belonging to him, and. therefore, would localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a
"proper party" to invoke the power of judicial inquiry, as one of the requisites in the exercise of such power, does not
mean one having no better right, one more personalized, than what he has as a member of the public in general.
With the incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who would suffer direct and actual
injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suffer as "direct" and "actual" an injury as the
judges and justices by the enforcement of the assailed statute, from the right to bring the suit.

The validity of the foregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that only after the fate of the
present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually separated or not, would the present courts be
declared abolished. For the law clearly continues their existence until all the new courts have been filled up with new
appointments, or at least such number as would be equal to the number of actual incumbents, and they are the very
courts to which they may lay claim to the right to continue therein, so that the status of each and everyone of them
has thereby been made certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition of the courts, may there possibly be a violation
of the security of tenure, as contented, that would give rise to an "actual controversy" in which the 6 improper party"
can be no other than the judges who feel aggrieved by their non- appointment to the new courts.

It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, before it has even been given a chance to
prove its worth, as the legislature itself and an those who helped by their exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be
an urgent necessity, and before any of the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for a fact,
certain and actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly
contend to be an unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itself.

I am, therefore, for giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular expectations
for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had reputation for probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since
only when the law is fully implemented will all the courts affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an
interregnum when the country is without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of Tax Appeals and the
Sandigan. Only then will it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any of the incumbents
have been left out in the restructured judiciary.

There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the law, conformably to the conditions
requisite for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry which by their stringent character, together with the
constitutional prescription of a comparatively higher vote to declare a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle
of government that a law should, by all reasonable intendment and feasible means, be saved from the doom of
unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that if a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which
would make it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.

It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the implementation of the
law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or
desirable at the moment, the law itself is definitely not unconstitutional. 4 Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured
after the law shall have been implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be proper. But surely, the
benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic duties of government to the people — the
administration of justice — should not be sacrificed, as it would be, if the law is, as sought in the present petition, declared
void right now, on the claim of a few of being allegedly denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the claim would
seem to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public office.

Just one more point. The law in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its effectivity, certain judges
and justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is what distinguishes the Act in question from R.A. No.
1186 involved in the Ocampo case, 5 which by its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the judges
whose positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question, therefore, is not as exposed to the
same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation of the Constitution with its wise
provision on how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test for it to be enforced to the fullness
of its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, Identified with public interest and general welfare, through a
more efficient and effective judicial system as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.

Hence, the constitutionality of the law should not be assailed, and the law itself, striken down, on the ground that
some judges or justices may be removed or separated in violation of their security of tenure. The law does not
directly operate with Chat effect. It is in how the law would be implemented that this feared eventuality may or may
not occur. We would then be killing the law on a mere speculation if We do so at this stage. This would be an
injudicious act done in reckless disregard of the safeguards built around a law to defend it when its constitutionality
is attacked; first the presumption that a law is constitutional; second when a law is susceptible to two interpretations
one that would make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the former should be adopted; and third, the
Constitution itself which ordains that a law may not be declared unconstitutional except on the vote of at least ten
(10) members of the Supreme Court, more than what is required for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This
is not to mention the stringent requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all
designed to save the law from the dire fate of unconstitutionality.

To the writer, the question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between protecting some judges from
possible separation, as the implementation of the law to achieve its primary purpose of improving the judiciary may
have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire society through an honest, efficient and effective judiciary. For,
it is unthinkable that what is for the good of the people as a whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be
sacrificed for the sake of only the few. The greatest good for the greatest number is an unwritten rule, more firm and
enduring than any of the postulates spread in our written Constitution. This, I might say, is the main theme of this
separate opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known and time-honored maxim "Salus populi establish suprema
lex."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

There is unqualified adherence on my part to the dismissal of the Petition filed in this case. If I am writing this
separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in regards to the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, of the Organic law provides
that the legislative has the power to establish inferior Courts by law. Section 7 of the same Article reads:

SEC, 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight Members order their dismissal.

There should be no conflict Between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.

1. a) It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily includes the power to
organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish Courts is generally coextensive with the power to
create them. The power to abolish was not intended to be qualified by the permanence of tenure (Opinion of Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW
134; Halsey vs. Gaines 2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive Congress of its power
to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta vs. de la
Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. Officer, 904-5). Judges of those Courts take office with that encumbrance and
knowledge.

The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it. When the court is
abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge of such court takes office with that
encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698; State, ex rel. Thomas
v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So 283, et al."

The importance and the imperative of maintaining the independence of the Judiciary is undisputed. At the same
time, the power of Congress under the Constitution cannot be abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security
of tenure per se that is the only safeguard to the independence of the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle of
the Judges who sit on the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public and that there are those who
have abused the prerogatives of their judicial position knowing that they are untouchables by virtue of the
permanence of their tenure

b) A distinction should be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts. Section 1 heretofore mentioned
refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of Government. Section 7 quoted above refers to the tenure of
office of "individual" Judges (inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts that is to say, tenure of office is a matter
concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of Section 7 is supported by the clause that the
Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges of inferior Courts.

A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact, the entire judicial
system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to the wheels of progress and the
imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To hold that tenure of Judges is superior to the legislative
power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise of that power.

It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, from which they cannot be
separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not
entailed to their Judges, because the power of the legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to
abolish those Courts. If an inferior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his
position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.

c) The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as those Courts exist,
the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the extent of the constitutional provision relative to security
of tenure of Judges. Upon declaration of the completion of the reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization
Act, the affected Courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished There being no Courts, there are no offices for
which tenure of Judges may be claimed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to them are necessarily
extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]).

2. I am satisfied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an urgent and
pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of tenure of all Judges or legislating
them out to the detriment of judicial independence. It should riot be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of
abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of
Judges. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition of
public office, as clearly explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good faith in its actuations
must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch of government, supreme within the limits of its own sphere, until
that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing that the Reorganization Act was motivated for personal
or political reasons as to justify the interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127
A.S.R. 468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599
[1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must be balanced with tenure of Judges,
which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and Section 7, supra, the former is the weightier, because the
"Judiciary" is of more importance to the welfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual Judge. If a
Judge is removed without cause there can be damage to the public welfare to some extent, but maintenance of a
Court that does not meet the requirements of progressive Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the
people.

3. Nor does a conflict exist with the power of discipline vested in the Supreme Court by the present Constitution
reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline Judges of inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8
members, order their dismissal Absent the Court, it would be futile to speak of the Supreme Court's power to
discipline. Thus, where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot pose
an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal from an existing
judicial office but not when that it office is abolished. The reorganization of the judicial system with the abolition of
certain Courts is not an exercise of the power to discipline the Judges of the abolished Courts.

It is of significance to note that the power to dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the 1973 Constitution is
delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and the power to dismiss does not exist. Being
circumscribed in scope, it may well be asked: does the grant of the power of discipline and dismissal in the Supreme
Court deprive the executive of the power of removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation of powers in our
government to state that the Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss with the executive power of removal? For is
not the power of removal basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power of appointment, which is the
prerogative of the Chief Executive alone As in the case of appointments, Section 5 (6), Article X of the Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court shall appoint its officials and employees. However, is not this power shared with
the power of appointment of the executive who appoints some of the Court officials These questions could lend
themselves to an in-depth study in the proper case.

4. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public office cannot be regarded as the
"property " of the incumbent. A public office is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925]). A public office
is a public trust (Section 1, Article XIII. 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs. Russell,
166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA, 253 cited also in Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p.
537). The officers are the servants of the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin,
Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that
there is no removal from office but abolition of the office itself.

5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reforms in other departments of government. "The thrust is on
development." It is "the first major reorganization after four generations." It does not provide for a piecemeal change,
which could be ineffective. It goes to the roots and does not just scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main
objectives are an improved administration of justice, the "attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out of justice." These
aims are policy matters of necessity in the pursuit of developmental goals within the Judiciary.

6. The Reorganization Act reorganizing the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme Court, which is the only
constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages institutional reforms in the Philippine judiciary. It does not
simply change the names of the Courts. The facts herein are dissimilar from those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732
[1954]) where the position of Justice of the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely changed to Municipal
Judge after the municipality of Tacloban was converted into a city with its own charter.

Significant among the institutional changes and procedural reforms are:

The Intermediate Appellate Court

This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead of fifteen (15), five members composing each division,
and a majority vote of three members being needed for a decision. This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in
case of dissent, of assigning two other members to compose a "division of five". It also allows flexibility in that any
three members of a division, arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision. Now provided for is specialization into
four (4) Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal Cases Divisions and four (4) Special Cases Divisions. The
specialization is expected to contribute to the expeditious disposal of cases. The Court has been given original
jurisdiction to issue Writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or
processes whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden of the Supreme
Court where numerous such cases are filed daily.

It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution.

The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings (Sec. 9). This does
away with the delays attendant to the remand of cases to the lower trial Courts.
Regional Trial Courts

There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and Batasang Pambansa
Regions, instead of sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.

A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his official station. This ensures mobility since a Judge may be assigned
anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional limitation of six months. Additionally, -it can remedy
temporary inequalities of caseloads in trial Courts.

Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts would try all cases
within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in which case, they remain as Branches of Regional
Trial Courts. Special procedures and technical rules governing special Courts will continue to remain applicable in
Branches assigned those special cases.

Metropolitan Trial Courts

There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches for large urban areas. The appointment of Judges
would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch of
the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded by the exigencies of the service.

The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches of said Courts to exercise special jurisdiction over certain
cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies only to cases of traffic violations.

Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special jurisdiction over certain
cases, thereby resulting in overall flexibility. They can also be circuitized with those in cities not forming part of
metropolitan areas.

One notable change between the old and the new set up is that Judges of these Courts will now be Presidential
appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely designated by the Supreme Court in an
Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.

7. There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves:

a) The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been entirely eliminated.

b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.

A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now to be transmitted.

c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and conclusions of law as
set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from, is also provided for. This will expedite the rendition of
decisions in appealed cases.

d) Section 42 provides for "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for Justices and

Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in
the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity
pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank." Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach
the top, where unfortunately there is not enough room for all, may have the satisfaction of at least approximating the
salary scale of those above him depending on his length of service,

8. But while the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be administered should not be
tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of Commrs., 239 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To
obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional exercise of power the following safeguards are recommended and/or
expected to be undertaken:

a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time frame for the completion of the reorganization
provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding implementing Order.

b) Appointments and their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the declaration by the
President of the completion of the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid any detriment to the smooth and
continuous functioning of the judicial machinery.

c) The services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by the Committee on
Judicial Reorganization (Article XI of its Report).

9. For the speedy implementation of the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to submit to the President within
thirty (30) days from the date of finality of its Decision the staffing pattern for all Courts required by Section 43.
I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing pattern be made to
include the names of Judges. The staffing pattern for Judges is already clearly and explicitly provided in the law
itself which enumerates the various Judges and Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the
superior positions of Judges would depart from the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, which refers more to
personnel organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It is also constitutionally objectionable in
that it would interfere with the prerogative of appointment intrinsically executive in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16
SCRA 379 [1966]; Government of the Philippines vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be
deprived of, nor be limited in, the full use of his discretion in the appointment of persons to any public office. Nothing
should so trench upon executive choice as to be, in effect, judicial designation.

10. A word of explanation. If I had resolved not to inhibit myself in this case upon motion filed by petitioners, it was
because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, of which I was privileged to be a member, confined its work to
the recommendation of options and guidelines in the task of reorganization. The Committee had no part whatsoever
in the drafting of the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. In fact, some of its recommendations like the
circuitization or regionalization of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the appellation of members of the Judiciary, the
confinement of the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate jurisdiction, the adoption of
the system found in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries of having a Court of general jurisdiction
with trial and appellate divisions, were not availed of in the final Act.

11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the good faith of the
President that all the deserving, upon considerations of "efficiency, integrity, length of service and other relevant
factors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized judicial system in the interest of public service; that
appointments will not be unduly delayed; and that appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and
impartiality in the men and women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.

ERICTA, J., concurring:

I concur in the view that the Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not violate the principle of
security of tenure of judges.

The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court (Article
X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created by law. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office
includes the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)

Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a public officer or employee but an abolition of his
office. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. Office of the President,
78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made between removal from office and abolition of an office. Removal
implies that the office subsists after ouster, while, in abolition, the office no longer exists thereby terminating the right
of the incumbent to exercise the rights and duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)

The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court has long been
established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147). What is only needed is that the abolition passes the
test of good faith. it need only be shown that said abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona fide
reorganization. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña supra.)

It is unthinkable to impute bad faith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization composed of four (4)
distinguished members of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Justice, and to the
members of the Batasang Pambansa whose combined efforts after a careful study and deliberation resulted to the
enactment of a bill now signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In his sponsorship speech, Justice
Ricardo C. Puno declared the objectives of the Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the following: (1) the attainment
of more efficiency in the disposal of cases; (2) the improvement in the quality of decisions by the courts that will
result from the easing of court dockets; and (3) structural changes to meet the exigencies of present day Philippine
Society and of the foreseeable future.

Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely affected. But in a conflict
between public interest and the individual interest of some Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The
welfare of the people is the supreme law.

The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of appointment is the exclusive
prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law should be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and
statesmanship of the President.

PLANA, J., concurring:

As the lawmaking body has the power to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and apportion their jurisdiction,
so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts as long as the act is done in good faith and not for
the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end. Good faith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.
Upon an examination of the legislative history of Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done in the main opinion, it is
manifest that actual, not merely presumed good faith attended its enactment. On this basis, I concur in the opinion
penned by the learned Chief Justice, qualified only by the following observations:

1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. — I believe the President is under no obligation to consult with
the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President. Indeed,
as the Supreme Court itself has said, it cannot give advisory opinions (Bacolod Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs.
Bacolod — Murcia milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the
President.

In the drafting of the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court with the function of giving
advisory opinions. The framers of the Constitution, however, did not see fit to adopt the proposal.

If the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129 and the Supreme
Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question of procedure), I believe the President would be free to follow
or disregard the advice; but, in either case, there would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be
upheld in one case or stricken down in the other.

2. Undue delegation of legislative powers. —

The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 on the ground that a provision
thereof (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances for members of the Judiciary) constitutes an undue
delegation unto the President of legislative power.

As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines for the
implementation of the delegated power, which makes the delegation inoffensive. I would like to add however some
observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.

Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and executive powers, there was
good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. Otherwise, the principle of separation of
governmental powers could be negated via unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has
however radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or fusion of executive and
legislative powers in the hands of the same group of officials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the legislative
process, and members of the Batasan actively discharge executive functions. The Prime Minister indeed must come
from its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly upholding the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present
Constitution has significantly eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power, although it has
retained some provisions of the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this time
perhaps not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence of "undue"
delegation of legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereof.

In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the
President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)

The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within specified this and subject
to such stations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. [Ibid, Sec. 17(2).]

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such magnitude has confronted the Philippine judiciary
than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by its title would reorganize all existing
courts (except the nine-member Sandiganbayan 1 and the three- member Court of Tax Appeals) and upon declaration
by the President of the completion of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said courts "automatically
abolished en masse and "the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 2 The total abolition involves a total of 1,663
judicial positions with 1,180 incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as of January 26, 1982 and the Act would effect an
increase of 230 judicial positions raising the total of judicial positions to be filled by new appointments to 1,893.
Notwithstanding the great deference due to enactments of the Batasan, I regretably find myself unable to join the ranks of
my esteemed colleagues in the majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dismiss the petition,
for the following main considerations and reasons:

1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo,
Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955 case of Ocampo 3 who fell short by one vote
to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out of an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare
unconstitutional and invalid section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral
judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent judges from office as against the contrary vote of a minority of 4
Justices (namely, then Chief Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical situation that
the last three named Justices voted for the validity of the Act as a remedial measure that abolished said positions without
permanent station which subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent of the Supreme Court, which they
considered as "repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative of an express prohibitory provision of the 1935
Constitution ê while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that otherwise he would go with the majority that "Congress may not, as
a general rule, abolish a judicial post without allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."

2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion — "(T)he [adverse]
outcome of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the ten petitioners who were presiding different Courts
of First Instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A.
1186 abolishing the positions of judges-at large and cadastral judges] is apt to revive the speculation whether
wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has further weakened the usually weak judicial department because of its
'innovative' requirement of a 2/3 majority vote of the Supreme Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never
in our history has such a number of judges of first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted through judicial
reorganization.

His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges "during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office" 4 must prevail over the
implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears
repeating thus:

A careful analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke an express guaranty
or positive definition of their term of office, the respondents rely on implied authority to abolish courts
and the positions of the respective judges. Accurately stated, respondents' defense rests on
a second inference deduced from such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress
has express power to establish courts; therefore it has implicit power to abolish courts and the
positions of judges of such abolished courts (first inference); and therefore (second inference)
Congress likewise has power to eject the judges holding such positions.

Resulting juridical situation. The implied authority invoked by respondents collides with
the express guaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. Which shall prevail Obviously the express
guaranty must override the implied authority. "Implications can never be permitted to contradict the
expressed intent or to defeat its purpose."

xxx xxx xxx

But the collision may he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, if one be considered a
proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the Constitution the Congress may abolish
existing courts, provided it does not thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take
effect upon termination of their incumbent The fundamental provisions on the matter are thereby
coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his concurring opinion in Zandueta v.
De la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is the great work of jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal
Science, p. 6) 5

3. This reasoning that the express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during good behavior unless
removed from office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy
years must override the implied authority of removing by legislation the judges has been further strengthened and
placed beyond doubt by the new provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the administrative supervision
over all courts and their personnel from the Chief Executive through the then Secretary of Justice to the Supreme
Court 6 and vested in the Supreme Court exclusively "the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissal," 7 Which power was formerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the Chief
Executive.

As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934 Constitutional Convention "frowned
on removal of judges of first instance through abolition of their offices or reorganization," citing Professor Jose
Aruego's observation that the security of judges' tenure provision was intended to "help secure the independence of
the judiciary" in that "during good behavior, they may not be legislated out of office by the law-making body nor
removed by the Chief Executive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense whatsoever; they may stay in
office until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
(Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. 11, pp. 718-719)" He further cited Aruego's report that a
proposed amendment to the effect that the prohibition against transfers of judges to another district without the
approval of the Supreme Court 8 "should not be applicable to a reorganization of tribunals of justice or of districts, but the
amendment was defeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow, there . before, having vetoed the
transfer of judges thru a re-organization, the Convention evidently could not have permitted the removal of judges thru re-
organization.

Now, if the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least in the light of the 7
to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal of incumbent judges through legislative action by abolition of their
courts, then they would have so clearly provided for such form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the
contrary as already stated they ruled out such removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by vesting
exclusively in the Supreme Court the power of discipline and removal of judges of all inferior courts.

4. This being so, the fundamental point emphasized by former Chief Justice Bengzon that abolition of the 33 judicial
positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect manner of removing the petitioners-judges" while the
"positions [that] were eliminated . . . were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of judges" applies with
greater force in the case at bar which involves an unprecedented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it reorganization, or
legislation or removal or abolition, this law disregards the constitutional assurance that these judges, once
appointed, shall hold office during good behavior ... [unless incapacitated and until retirement].

The abolition of their offices was merely an indirect manner of removing these petitioners. Remember that on June
19, 1954, there were 107 judges of first instance, district judges, judges at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act
296). After the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there were 114 positions of judges of first instance. There was no
reduction there was increase — in the number of judges, nor in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-
Large and Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of
judges; or if you please, there was a mere change of designation from 'Cadastral Judge or Judge at large to district
judge Hence it should be ruled that as their positions had not been 'abolished' de facto, but actually retained with
another name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March 30,
1954.) For it is not permissible to effect the removal of one judge thru the expediency of abolishing his office even
as the office with same power is created with another name. (Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. Williams, 118 tenn. 391,
Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R. p. 211). In this view of the picture, we believe, Congress could have, and should haveas
suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the hearings in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the
present judges-at-large and cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be fixed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments or by the Secretary of Justice, as originally
proposed by Senator Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar was done before, and it would not
be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's prerogative of appointment, because such judges had
already been appointed to the judiciary before the passage of the act, and the provision may be construed in the
light of mere change of official designation plus increase in salary."

5. Concededly, the questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms with more specific delineation of
jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority opinion, but they do not change the basic structure of the
existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and
redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the
challenged Act. The Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and
Courts of Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name of Regional
Trial Courts with provision for certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases . . . . and/or such other special cases as the Supreme
Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice" 10 and the Court of Appeals is
restructured and redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number of Appellate Justices
from the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction of the number of divisions from 15 (composed of 3 Justices each) to 10
(composed of 5 members each) such that it is feared that there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the
important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers of facts.

In my view, the "candid admission" by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court "that he entertained doubts as to
whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other above
mentioned courts provided for in the challenged Act as "new courts". And the best proof of this is the plain and simple
transitory provision in section 44 thereof that upon the President's declaration of completion of the reorganization
(whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office
"(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act,
together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel together with the
"applicable appropriations." This could not have been possible without a specification and enumeration of what specific
cases of the "old courts" would be transferred to the particular "new courts," had these "new courts" not been manifestly
and substantially the "old courts" with a change of name — or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his first view,
now discarded, in his separate opinion: "just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the
present judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or remodeling of the old structure." 11

6. I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and consequent ouster of the
incumbent judges from office as expounded by the late eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring
opinion in the pre-war case of Zandueta 12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the ground of
petitioner Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment of office. 13 Realistically viewed from the basis of the established legal
presumptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes (unless set aside by a 2/3 majority of 10 members of the Supreme
Court) and of good faith in their enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate on the good
or bad motives behind the enactment of the Act without appearing to be imprudent and improper and declare that "the
legislative power of reorganization (is) sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose." The good faith in the
enactment of the challenged Act must needs be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish
courts as implied from the power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of tenure of the judges which
is essential for a free and independent judiciary. Adherents of the Rule of Law are agreed that indispensable for the
maintenance of the Rule of Law is a free and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and enforce. it without fear or favor
— "free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and
insiduous influence of the political powers that be to quote again from Justice Barredo's separate concurring
opinion. 14 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice Bengzon in
the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law Professors headed by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization should at least snow the incumbents of the existing courts to remain in office
[the appropriate counterpart 'new courts'] unless they are removed for cause."

7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants" as stressed by former Chief
Justice Bengzon in Ms majority opinion in Ocampo is based on the judiciary's status as a coequal and coordinate
branch of government, whereas the long line of Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish offices
refers to officers or employees in the executive branch of government and "the underlying consideration must be
borne in mind that Manalang [the aggrieved petitioner] belonged to the Executive Department and because the
President approved the law no question or encroachment by one branch on the other could be apprehended or
alleged. 15 This is not a matter of personal privilege for the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by former U.P. Law Dean
Irene Cortez in her memorandum as amicus curiae, "for the judiciary whose independence is not only eroded but is in
grave danger of being completely destroyed." Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial independence is not a guarantee
intended for the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and is even more vital to the courts at the
lowest levels because there are more of them and they operate closest to the people," and "(P)articularly under the
present form of modified parliamentary government with legislative and executive functions overlapping and in certain
areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the checking function in the performance of which its independence
assumes an even more vital importance. "

The extensive memoranda filed by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae such as former Senator Jose W. Diokno
who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent further destruction of judicial independence," former
Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president of the Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the Court's
adoption of the B Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the
interpretation of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution" and that the judges' security
of tenure guaranty should not be rendered meaningless and inoperative" former Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
president of the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submits that the total abolition of all courts below the Supreme
Court (except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) and the removal of the incumbent Justices and
Judges "violates the independence of the judiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed
them by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of the Philippines
who invokes the Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1959, that "The principles of unremovability of the
Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until death or until a retiring age fixed by statute is reached, is an important
safeguard of the Rule of Law" have greatly helped in fortifying my views.

8. I had submitted in my memo of September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization that
"(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may recommend to meet the worldwide problem of congested court
dockets, and to improve judicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in mind that the members of the
judiciary as the weakest branch of government, yet called upon to safeguard the people's rights and protect them
oppression, official and otherwise, are entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though
the lower courts may be reshuffled or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit of the Constitution
guaranteeing their security of tenure and maintaining the independence of the judiciary should be respected, and
they should be retained in the new courts."

In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned of the dire consequences of giving the questioned provisions of the Act the
"absolutist sense which they appear to have at first blush" thus: "(T)o accept legislative power to abolish courts
asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the
door to future court abolitions in the guise of reorganization. At this stage of our political development, the process
of embarking upon a modified parliamentary system may well usher in a situation where despite guarantees of
judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can command a majority vote may periodically
undertake complete reorganization and remove judges, thus making of the judiciary a veritable straw in the political
wind and "(F)urthermore, what can result in the modified parliamentary system from the close working relationship
between executive and legislature is made manifest in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. If the sweeping revamp provided
were to be carried out the President would appoint all of the justices and judges of the courts affected and the whole
membership in the judiciary from the highest to the lowest courts would be his appointees. It is relevant to point out
that it is precisely a situation like this that the Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms for the
chairman and members of the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed independence."

9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution which
granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and replace all judges and officials 16 (as against the
limited one-year period for the exercise of such power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth Upon the declaration of martial law in September, 1972, justices and
judges of all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total of
53 judges who were replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during the period from September,
1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed after the effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973
Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the President in the pending case of Tapucar vs. Famador 17 notwithstanding the
generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the
cited Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his constitutional security of tenure and questioned the
appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him, although he had not been removed or
otherwise dismissed from his position nor had be resigned therefrom. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered
both to refrain from discharging the functions of the questioned office And now comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial
positions (and thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen
the judiciary with the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is essential for a free and independent judiciary
as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already feeble judiciary, possessed neither of the power
of the sword nor the purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion:

Shall we have judges of the type of Lord Coke Or judges, who, in his place, would have answered
'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, afraid of ouster thru a judiciary reshuffle, would rather
serve the interests of the party in power or of the political boss, than the interests of justice?

As it is, the Judicial Department is feeble enough. Shall we render it feebler with judges precariously
occupying their official seats Judges performing their duties under the sword of Damocles of future
judicial reorganizations

10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally apparent is that the
strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa
retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually
formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it as stressed that
with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need
'to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intends and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches,'" 19 with the further observation that "many are the
ways by which such independence could be eroded." In the cited case of Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the Chief
Justice for the Court), the Court issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the dismissal of the criminal complaint
filed with respondent fiscal Labang by "disgruntled members of the bar with a record of losing cases" in the judge's court
and imposed the penalty of censure on each and everyone of the private respondents-lawyers for the "unseemly haste"
with which they filed the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or oppressive exercise of
state authority." The Court marked the "violation of the cardinal principles of fairness and due process that underlie the
Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was not heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation.
There was, on the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the Integrated Bar stressing that
precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,' "
and that such subjection of a judge to public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish public confidence in the
courts."

11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the course of committee hearings
of Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of
incompetent and corrupt judges and to restore confidence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the
constant subject of headlines and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council reportedly screening and
conducting "integrity tests as to new applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking "confidential information on
corrupt and incompetent judges to help the government purge the judiciary." 21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was quoted as
saying that "there will be a purge of the corrupt and the misfits' when the Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law
by President Marcos and implemented in coordination with the Supreme Court." 22 The public respondents' answer
sidesteps the issue of such purge contravening the rudiments of a fair hearing and due process and submits that "no term
of office is sacrosanct when demanded before the altar of the public good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety
gripping the judiciary as the Ministry of Justice has reportedly been asked to collate information 'on the performance of the
judges and on the qualifications of those slated to take over the positions of the incompetent, the inefficient or those
involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 'Somehow, the uncertainty that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly
subjected the judges to mental torture since they do not know when or whether the axe will fall on them. Worse, the sword
of Damocles hanging over their heads could provoke them into seeking the help of people claiming to have influence with
the powers that be." 23

But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is there hard evidence on
this. The only figures given in the course of the committee hearings were to the effect that out of some 1,700
members of the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were of the undesirable category, i.e. misfit, incompetent or corrupts.
(Barredo, J., before the Committee on Justice, human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980)," and that
"(I)f this be the case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition of judicial offices becomes an arbitrary
act, the effect of which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or innocent without due process of
law." Now would it be of any avail to beg the question and assert that due process is not available in mass abolitions
of courts.

Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate concurrence to twin objectives of
getting rid of " structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and
dragging procedural rules in force and of "a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary (who') make a
mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for personal ends He adds that "it is my personal assessment
of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, as I have just
indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the
interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense of
loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of
graft and corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that
be," 24 and invokes the adage of "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity of the Act.

Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills demand drastic cures" thus:
"Drastic, yes — but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve courts by abolishing them, any more than
a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence;
they will not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course would only breed more
perversity in the administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule have bred more subversion."

12. Finally, as stated by the 19-i 5 integrated Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of Delegates, "It would, indeed, be
most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count it on themselves. Observance of
procedural due process in the separation of misfits from (he Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective. '

As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal principles of fairness and due
process and the opportunity to be heard and defend themselves against the accusations made against their and not
to be subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise of legal
authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what is at stake is their constitutionally
guaranteed security of tenure and non-impairment of the independence of the judiciary and the proper exercise of
the constitutional power exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges after fair hearing.

In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization that —
Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and branded for life in such reorganization on the basis
of confidential adverse reports as to their performance, competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily
resign from office upon being confronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports,
without due process or hearing, has been proven from our past experience where a number of honest and
competent judges were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to be basket cases have
remained in the service; and

The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals down, has been
vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be left to
clean its own house upon complaint and with the cooperation of the as grieved parties and after due process and
hearing.

The constitutional confrontation and conflict may wen be avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions
of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and functions of the "new courts" therein provided as
compared to the "abolished old courts" but provide for procedural changes, fixed delineation of jurisdiction and
increases in the number of courts for a more effective and efficient disposition of court cases, the incumbent judges
guaranteed security of tenure require that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."

Fernandez, J., concur.

Footnotes

Springer vs. PI, 277 US 189

U.S. Supreme Court

Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928)

Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands

Nos. 564 and 573

Argued April 10, 1928

Decided May 14, 1928

277 U.S. 189

Syllabus

1. Acts of the Philippine Legislature creating a coal company and a bank, the stock of which is largely
owned by the Philippine government, provide that the power to vote the stock shall be vested in a
"Committee," in the one case, and in a "Board of Control," in the other, each consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. Held, that the voting of the stock in the election of directors and managing agents
of the corporations is an executive function, and that the attempt to repose it in the legislative
officers named violates the Philippine Organic Act. P. 277 U. S. 199.

2. In the Philippine Organic Act, which divides the government into three departments -- legislative,
executive, and judicial -- the principle is implicit, as it is in state and federal constitutions, that these
three powers shall be forever separate and distinct from each other. P. 201..

3. This separation, and the consequent exclusive character of the powers conferred upon each of the
three departments of the government, is basic and vital -- not merely a matter of governmental
mechanism. Id.

4. It may be stated as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system that, unless
otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise
either executive or judicial power, the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power,
and the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power. Id. chanrobles.com-red

Page 277 U. S. 190

5. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to
enforce them or to appoint the agents charged with the duty of enforcing them. The latter are
executive functions. P. 277 U. S. 202.
6. Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the
legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the
power of appointment by indirection. Id.

7. The appointment of managers (in this instance, corporate directors) of property or a business in
which the government is interested is essentially an executive act which the legislature is without
capacity to perform, directly or through its members. P. 277 U. S. 203.

8. Whether or not the members of the "board" or "committee" are public officers in the strict sense,
they are at least public agents charged with executive functions, and therefore beyond the appointing
power of the legislature. Id.

9. The instances in which Congress has devolved on persons not executive officers the power to vote
in nonstock corporations created for governmental purposes lend no support to a construction of the
Constitution which would justify Congressional legislation like that here involved, considering the
limited number of such instances, the peculiar character of the institutions there dealt with, and the
contrary attitude of Congress towards governmentally owned or controlled stock corporations. P. 277
U. S. 204.

10. The powers here asserted by the Philippine Legislature are vested in the Governor-General by the
Organic Act -- viz., by the provision vesting in him the supreme executive power, with general
supervision and control over all the departments and bureaus of the government; the provision
placing on him the responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws, and the provision that all
executive functions of the government must be directly under him or within one of the executive
departments under his supervision and control. P. 277 U. S. 205.

11. Where a statute contains a grant of power enumerating certain things which may be done, and
also a general grant of power which, standing alone, would include those things and more, the
general grant may be given full effect if the context shows that the enumeration was not intended to
be exclusive. P. 277 U. S. 206.

12. In § 22 of the Organic Act, the clause in the form of a proviso placing all the executive functions
directly under the Governor-General or in one of the executive departments under his direction chanrobles.com-red

Page 277 U. S. 191

and control, and the proviso preceding it which grant certain powers to the legislature, are both to be
construed as independent and substantive provisions. P. 277 U. S. 207.

13. An inference that Congress has approved an Act of the Philippine Legislature reported to it under
§ 10 of the Organic Act cannot be drawn from the failure of Congress to exercise its power to annul,
reserved in that section, where the Act reported contravenes the Organic Act, and is therefore clearly
void. P. 277 U. S. 208.

Affirmed.

Certiorari, 275 U.S. 519, to two judgments of ouster rendered by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands in proceedings in the nature of quo warranto, which were brought in that court by the
Philippine government against the present petitioners to test their right to be directors in certain
corporations described in the opinion.chanrobles.com-red

Page 277 U. S. 197

Ocampo vs. Sec., GR L-7918, 1/18/55