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Letters to Staff College Quetta and What is Wrong with

Pakistan

Army

Agha Humayun Amin

ISBN-13: 978-1499790535

ISBN-10: 1499790538

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What is wrong with Pakistan Army

This is an internal assessment of Pakistan Army‟s

promotion system , training system and general

environment.

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British Colonial

legacy

Any discussion or analysis of the performance of

Pakistani or Indian Armies based on the assumption that

these armies came into existence in August 1947 is

meaningless and incomplete.

The organisational tactical and social development of

both the armies had a 190 year old connection with

British rule in India and influenced their conduct in 1948

1965 1971 wars and even today in many aspects.We will

therefore first of all analyse the conduct of Pakistan Army

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in 1965 with particular reference to the influence of the

"British military Legacy".

An attempt was made by sycophants in the period

1958-69 to prove that the Pakistan Army was largely the

creation of Ayub Khan!There are two types of men in

history;ie those who follow the status quo and those who

are originators or executors of dynamic ideas which

change the course of history ! Both Indian and Pakistan

Armies were dominated by men of the former category.In

India primacy of civilian leadership did not allow the

growth of dynamism in the army while in Pakistan

concentration on improving personal fortunes and in

perpetuating military dictatorship ,kept the military

usurpers attention fixed on non military things!In other

words no major change or reform was undertaken in both

the armies as far as doctrine staff procedures and military

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organisation were concerned .The armies which fought the

1965 war were led by men who were the products of the

British Colonial heritage. We will examine the influence of

British military colonial legacy on Pakistan Army's conduct

in 1965 war in the following paragraphs.

British Indian Military Tradition:-Britains power was

never based on its army but on its naval power and

superior diplomacy which enabled it to defeat its various

European mainland rivals by coalition warfare.Thus after

Marlborough British Army's role in land warfare on

European mainland decreased and during the Napoleonic

wars Britain's main contribution consisted in naval warfare

or in providing finances for sustaining the various

coalitions against France than in actual war against

France.Thus Napoleon was destroyed in Russia and in the

campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in which the British Army had

no role.Even Waterloo was a coalition affair in which the

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Prussians played as major a role as the British.In short the

foundation of British supremacy or British power was not

military excellence but other factors like naval

power,super.ior diplomacy and an overall superior political

system.In this sense the British legacy which the

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Indo Pak armies inherited was certainly not the finest in

the world.But the difference did not end here.The British

Indian Army which was the father of the post 1947 Indo

Pak Armies was an even more outdated organisation than

the regular British Army.This was so because the regular

British Army was designed to fight Britain's European

enemies and thus got more attention in terms of finances

equipment and was more vigorously reformed by a

concerned parliament.The British Indian Army which was

primarily an internal security army was far more backward

than the regular British Army because it was not designed

to face any European foe till 1914 except the Russians

whose military potential or effectiveness was regarded as

far more inferior than Britains West European rivals like

Germany and France and which in any case performed very

poorly in the Crimean War of 1854-56 and was later

defeated by an Asiatic power in the Russo Japanese War.In

terms of equipment the Indian Army as we have already

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seen was deliberately kept one generation behind the

regular British Army whether it was infantry weapons or

artillery (which was taboo for Indians except few mountain

batteries in which Indians could serve as common

soldiers).The Indian Army was trained as late as 1900 to

fight primarily as battalions or brigades against frontier

tribesmen. We have already discussed that the First World

War forced the British to slightly modernise the Indian

Army and the massive Indian contribution to the British

war effort forced the British to grant the Indians the

privilege of Regular commission in the army.The Indians

selected for officer rank were from the most loyal classes

with proven record of loyalty to the British Empire.Even

Indianisation (introduction of Indian Army Officers) was

resisted by the British Indian Army officers and as late as

1939 twenty years after Indianisation had started there

were just 333 regular Indian officers in the Indian Army as

against 3,031 British officers6.We have already seen that

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after 1918 it was felt that the Indian Army would not be

required to fight in a European war and this led to massive

reduction in the size and resource allocation of the Indian

Army.Thus the Indian Army was so outdated in 1938 that

General Auchinleck observed in 1938 that in terms of

modernisation and equipment it was behind even the Iraqi

Egyptian and Afghan Armies '!There was another serious

misconception in many minds and has been carried

forward till today that the Indian Army was the finest army

in the world and played a major part in many British

victories.There is no doubt that the Indian Army played a

significant role in British Empires wars.However it must be

remembered,as we have just discussed, that Britains wars

right from the time of Marlborough were coalition wars and

British Army's role in these successively became lesser

and lesserin this context the Indian Army's share in the

relatively limited contribution made by the British Army in

both the world wars was even more limited.In any case
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the Indian Army was Indian only as far as the rank and

file was concerned and its principal strength was its British

officer cadre.Even beyond battalion level each Indian

Brigade was stiffened by one pure British battalion and the

Indian Army always functioned as part of a larger team

and mostly in circumstances where the British enjoyed a

comfortable numerical material and logistic superiority

over their adversaries.The Indian Army at its best was

used only as a defensive force in France in 1914.The British

final success in both world wars had a deeper connection

with US aid and Russian blood than with the Indian

Army.In any case the principal force multiplier of the

Indian Army was the British officer and the vast resources

of the British Empire rather than the Chakwal Jhelum men

who were merely cannonfodder.In this regard there was

absolutely no comparison between the quality of

performance of the pre 1947 Indian Army and the post

1947 Indo Pak armies.In Pakistan specially it was

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mistakenly assumed that the British Indian Army did well

because their soldiers i.e. the Punjabi Muslims were more

martial than the Hindus !These naïve commentators failed

to see the essential fact i.e. that it was the British officer

who was able to organise and lead Indians of all

nationalities and religions equally well in battle .The

cardinal factor in the whole equation was not the martial

race,as has been mistakenly asserted by many Pakistani

officers, but the white officer who inspired the espirit de

corps and the relatively superior organisation skill that

created the Indian Army.

Legacy of inter arm compartmentation and rivalry:-

One of the most negative legacies which inhibited the

performance of both the armies in 1965 and even in 1971

was a purely British inculcated and British inherited legacy

of inter arm and even inter regimental rivalry within the

same arm.While German successes in the WW II had a

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deep link with emphasis on fighting as a division with

intimate coopertion between all arms,many British

military failures had a deep link with inter arm rivalry

which severely retarded their ability to fight as combined

arms teams.Thus at Gazala in 1942 the 2nd Highland

Infantry was overrun by German tanks "whilst a superior

British tank force looked on"8

Lack of leadership tradition:--We have briefly

discussed the fact that the West European way of warfare

was imported by many Asian and East European countries

like Russia.There was a major difference between the other

countries who imported the European way of warfare and

the British Indian Army.While the entire officer corps in

the Ottoman ,Russian,Japanese,Egyptian and Chinese

Armies consisted of their

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own people,there was no leadership tradition in the

British Indian Army as far as Indians were concerned.The

English East India Company was very careful in not allowing

native Indians from becoming officers in their native

Presidency Armies and did not allow even Anglo-Indians to

become officers after 1805 barring few exceptions like

Colonel Skinner etc.The objective of the company was

simple i.e. not letting a leadership tradition grow in the

natives and also not to let the natives master the European

methods of warfare.The US War of Independence convinced

the British Government that it was dangerous to let any

colonial subjects from mastering the art of warfare by

getting the officers commission.This policy played rich

dividends when the native soldiers of the Bengal Army

failed to handle units larger than platoons and companies

and were easily defeated by the British despite their

relative numerical superiority at least in the initial stages of

the rebellion.The Sepoy Rebellion reinforced the British

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determination not to allow Indian to become commissioned

officers and till 1919 there were no Indian officers in the

Indian Army.This meant that there was no leadership

tradition in the Indians who became officers.The Indians

selected to become officers from 1917 onwards were

from classes with proven loyalty and men meant to

be groomed for lower level command ranks

only.After the formation of Indian Military Academy

a large proportion of cadets were from the ranks

which never attracted the best available young men

in India9.Many of these were sons of rankers or VCOs

who had spent their whole lives in serving the

juniormost British officers and had inherited from

their family a narrow approach of a life spent in

playing sycophant par excellence with the juniormost

British officer who was senior to the seniormost

Indian VCO in rank and authority.In future analysis this

will be referred to as the Ranker/VCO approach which was

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found in plenty in the 1965 Indo Pak Armies!Colmar Von der

Goltz spoke of the "aristocracy of education" which

constituted the corps of German officersIn India bulk of the

real aristocracy had been eliminated when the British

emerged victorious.The new aristocracy which they

created was an aristocracy of toadies The German

aristocracy which constituted the bulk of the German officer

corps was basically an impoverished aristocracy„butrich in

tradition of contributed many generations of officers to the

Prussian/German Army.In Indo Pak armies bulk of the men

who reached the officer rank were neither an aristocracy of

education nor possessed a long tradition of leadership by

virtue of having ancestors in the officer ranks!The

Germans on the contrary did not encourage NCO to

become officers and Von Seeckt the founder of the

Reichswehr which was the iron frame of the Wehrmacht

deliberately increased educational qualifications to

discourage ex NCOs from getting officer rank.Thus in 1928

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just 117 out of 4000 officers were ex NCOs In the Indian

and Pakistani Armies a much larger proportion of rankers

or rankers sons were in the officer rank. Contemporary

evidence suggests that the British preferred these over

directly commissioned Indian officers with good college or

university education since the ex rankers or rankers sons

who were educated at the military schools of Ajmer

Jullundhur and Serai Alamgir (schools for rankers sons

education) were more pliable and easier to handle material

It is not difficult to understand that the small

number of Indians who joined the army as

commissioned officers were viewed as a necessary

evil arising as a result of a civilian governments policy

to accept Indians in the commissioned ranks.These

men were not held in much high esteem by their

British superiors and viewed the army as just one

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career where they could improve their personal lot

and as an avenue of social advancement.What

leadership tradition could be expected from such

mercenaries.The real hero of the British Indian Army

was the British officer who was from the first thirty

cadets in the Sandhurst entrance examination, and

was fighting for his King Emperor!His Indian

counterpart was just a mercenary for whom serving

the British was just a job!

Conservative Military Doctrine:--The British Army being

an extremely snobbish and class conscious army was the

bastion of conservatism.There was no threat to Britain in

the period till 1933 and military reform or radical change

was never serious agenda in the British Army.Thus the

British Army that fought the WW Two was an out of

date machine which performed extremely poorly in

France and North Africa till overwhelming material

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superiority,thanks to US aid finally enabled it to turn

the tables at Alamein.Thus progressive and dynamic

military thinkers like Fuller were sidelined from the

British Army before the war in an atmosphere where

Polo and social contacts were more important than

strict professionalism.Thus the British approach

towards warfare was extremely conservative and

outdated .If this was the case in the regular British Army

which was supposed to defend Britain in a war against

European adversaries it is not difficult to imagine the

rudimentary and primitive approach that dominated the

British Indian Army which was designed to imperial

policing jobs in countries like Iraq and Persia after the end

of First World War.

Lack of Permanent General Staff-The British Army

lacked a permanent General Staff unlike the German

Army.This was a serious drawback and played a major role

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in relatively poor performance of the British Army in the

two world wars.Organisationally the British Army was not

as efficient in carrying out

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military operations as the German Army.Cardwell the

revolutionary British Secretary of State and the father of

reform in the British Army was in favour of having a

permanent General Staff like the German Army but was

frustrated in his attempts to do so by the conservative

elements in the British Army led by Duke of Cambridge"

.Just because the British did not have a permanent General

Staff,the post 1947 officers of both the Indian and Pakistani

Armies saw no need to have one.Thus Staff work and

procedures stayed as poor and rudimentary in both the

armies as in the pre 1947 Indian Army or the British

Army.There was an ocean of qualitative difference in

between the British and German Staff institutions of

instruction.The British Staff College at Cambrai in words of

Montgomery's biographer Nigel Hamilton was an institution

preoccupied with "hunting and socialising"12.The same was

the case with US institutions like Fort Leavenworth where

in words of General Bradley to rose to great heights in the

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US Army the system of education was

"predictable....unrealistic and did not encourage

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unconventional tactics" In addition while the German

General Staff course lasted for three years that at Staff

College Quetta lasted for two years and was later reduced

to six months from 1940.Most of the senior officers who

held important command and staff assignments in the

1965 war were graduates of this six months crash course

in which entry was by nomination.ln 1965 as we shall

discuss many opportunities were primarily lost because of

poor staff work.in words of a British Army officer ; "The

British Army lacked an institution which deliberately

cultivated and carefully fostered a self-conscious

intellectual existence like the German general Staff.For the

German Army this institution became the focus for

professional debate and a vehicle for operational

innovation.The officer corps to which it gave rise received

a thorough grounding in military history and an induction

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into the critical methods of historical study.These

formidable intellectual foundations conferred on the minds

of staff trained German officers a powerful and sensitive

analytic approach to the problems of managing

violence"I4General Von Mellenthin who served as a general

staff officer in North Africa noted a major different in the

quality of thinking of the British about their staff officers

and the measure of trust that was placed in British Army in

the staff officers; "The officers of the German General Staff

were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their commanders

(as was the case with British and their corrupted off shoot

i.e. the Sub Continental Indian and Pakistani Armies) ,but

were trained to accept responsibility for grave decisions

and were respected accordingly.In contrast the British

fighting commanders tend look down on the staff,and the

British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff

officers to operational commands15.

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Orders Oriented British Legacy:-Another legacy common

to both the Indo Pak armies was an orders oriented

approach.This was the opposite of the German approach

of Auftragtstaktik under which commanders at all levels

were trained to function without waiting for orders in case a

tactical or operational situation warranted it and valuable

tactical or operational opportunities were being lost in case

one waited for orders from higher headquarters.The famous

British staff officer Dorman Smith observed that ; "

Essentially in a professional army the commander is left to

carry out an order without wet nursing.In the British

system,on the contrary a subordinate will do nothing until

he will have the next above breathing down his neck.The

result is that everyone is doing the proper job of of the

next below instead of his own battle job.This is the main

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cause of stagnation in the British tactical mind" . The

Indo Pak armies suffered from another subtle drawback in

this case.On one hand the British were conservative in

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attitude towards orders and secondly Indians till the

second world war were mostly very junior officers barring

few exceptions who commanded companies or battalions or

one who commanded a brigade.The Indian was fighting the

White Man's war and took no interest in exercising his

initiative always pursuing a safe course of waiting for

orders.The same bunch of people who fought the second

world war constituted the Indian and Pakistani armies who

fought the 1965 war from Lieutenant Colonel onwards.These

men as subalterns and captains or majors were not trained to

take mission oriented decisions,nor were they motivated to

risk their career by exercising any initiative since they were

fighting the white man's warlA large number of them like

Musa Tikka etc were ex rankers who were even more

limited and conservative in their typical "ranker

approach".Thus when these men became brigadiers and

major generals they expected the same from their juniorsJt

was the case of a habit getting instilled and internalised

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as an essential part of ones personality.Thus many

opportunities were lost since all commanders from

squadron/company till divisional level preferred to wait for

orders rather than do anything on their own initiative.Gul

Hassan's memoirs is full of examples of approach of

senior Pakistani officers using the weight of their rank and

intimidating their juniors by use of court of inquiries and

warnings!Anyone who is keen to know about the

"Conspiracy against originality boldness and initiative"

should read Gut" memoirs which though otherwise not

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wholly accurate provide an excellent

image of the attitudes of senior officers of

that time as regards cultivation or rather

discouragement of initiative!

The British system of selection of

Indians as army officers did not

encourage initiative or mission oriented

decision making .The Indian was

grudgingly allowed commissioned rank

as Indian Army had played a crucial role

in First World War.

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But this Indian was not supposed to go

beyond a company or a squadron

commander.

Second World War hastened British

Empires demise and both Indian and

Pakistan Army were hastily created in

1947 with Indians as divisional and

army commanders.

Many of the Indian officers had actually

been good batmen of British officers.

So that leadership trait was missing.

I explored this sensitive theme in my

article Tejh Singh of Meerut at the

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height of Musharraf usurpers power and

did not please the military usurper .

Tejh Singh of Meerut

In 1807 one Khushaal Singh , son of a poor

Brahman shopkeeper of Gaur Class came

from Sardhana Pargana of district Meerut,

then a part of Honourable English East India

Company's territory to Lahore. Khushaal

enrolled as a soldier in Ranjit Singh's army

and ultimately rose to the rank of a

Jemadar. The Hindustani Brahman became

close to Ranjit Singh and also brought his

nephew Tejh Ram from Meerut to Lahore in

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1812. They both became Sikhs, soon, the

uncle in 1812 and the nephew in 1816. By

1830s Tejh Singh was one of the senior Sikh

Chiefs in the inner circle of Ranjit Singh

having served in many key posts at

Peshawar, Kashmir etc.

Like many leaders of past and present Ranjit

Singh feared a military coup and this made

him have Hindustani Hindus like Tejh Singh

in his army's highest ranks. It is an

interesting fact of history that one of the

greatest leaders of Punjab did not favour

having a Punjabi chief in his highest army

ranks for fear of a military coup.

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No surprise since it is another fact of history

that all four army chiefs of Pakistan Army

hailing from Punjab were selected by Sindhi

or Pathan heads or political heads of state

i.e. Tikka, Zia and Karamat by two Sindhi

prime ministers i.e. Z.A. Bhutto and Benazir,

while Asif Nawaz was selected by a Pathan

president.

Yet when war finally came in 1845-46 Tejh

Singh betrayed the Khalsa at the battles of

Feroz Shah and Moodke refusing to attack a

far weaker British force which also housed

the then Governor General of India . This if

done would have been a fatal blow to the

British. Mallesson the famous author of the

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book "Decisive Battles of India" has singled

out Feroz Shah and Moodke as a decisive

battle in which Tejhh Singh's treachery was

more fatal than that of Mir Jafar at Plassey.

Tejh Singh was well rewarded for his

services by the English East India Company

and his family's name was on the top in the

famous book Punjab Chiefs published in

1909.

The tradition of divide and rule, selecting

key persons from political or ethnic

minorities is ancient. The Mughals soon

discarded their key Uzbek and Turk nobles

soon after Humayun's demise in Akbar's

reign and imported the Persian nobles with

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the hope that being from the Fiqh-I-Jafariya

they would be a sectarian minority and thus

a political guarantee against a coup by a

Sunni Turani military commander. The folly

was proved once the Persian Zulfiqar Khan

allied with the Marathas against the Mughals

and in the Battle of Karnal once the Persian

Nawab of Oudh betrayed the Mughals

leading to the sack of Delhi.

Liaquat Ali Khan selected a junior and

military record-wise incompetent officer

Ayub Khan simply because Liaqat was

involved in a political battle and did not

want a Punjabi army chief. Pakistan payed

the price in 1958. Ayub selected Yahya with

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the premise that Yahya belonged to the

Qizilbash minority and Pakistan paid the

price in 1971. Bhutto selected Zia because

he thought that Zia was meek and docile

and Pakistan is paying the price till to date.

Nawaz selected Musharraf with the premise

that Musharraf being from a minority would

be less dangerous than the Pathan Ali Quli

and Pakistan paid the price in Kargil and

Nawaz on 12th October. There is a Mianwali

saying " Siana Kaaan , Gooo tay Digdaa" .

(meaning a clever crow in his

overconfidence noose dives into cow shits

heap and dies).

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Divide and rule is a dangerous policy. Back

in 1980s the military intelligence pundits

acted as the midwife of ethnic parties in

Sindh in the hope that it would counter the

PPP. Thus a Pandora's Box was opened and

the military intelligence Don Quixotes have

so far failed to control the genie they

unleashed in Sindh in 1985-86. These ethnic

parties may even outlast Pakistan the way

geopolitical events are moving.

The Afghan Mujahideen and their successors

Taliban again represent an interesting lesson

in the limitations of policy of divide and rule.

Just to preserve a military regime facing a

political challenge in 1980s and 1990s these

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groups specially the Taliban became an

embarrassment for Pakistan and Pakistan

paid the price of 10 Billion loss to economy

in 2001.

Presently the policy of dividing and

destroying two of this country's largest

parties the PPP and the PML is again

dangerous. Whatever is left to present the

military rulers any credible defiance is being

bull dozed just in the interest of one man

rule. Thus the PML Q and the PPP Patriots.

How long would this policy of divide and rule

go on. This is a phenomenal self-deception.

How long would we be again and again

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betrayed by Zulfiqar Khans or Tejh Singhs

whatever their ethnicity sect or religion.

Castration of rights joined by Pakistan

Army officers as inherited from British

Indian Army Act

An army officer till 1951 could not be retired

summarily.However after the so called Pindi

Conspiracy affair Pakistan Armys chief Ayub

Khan , Pakistani Secretary of Defence

Iskandar Mirza advised Pakistani premier to

amend rules of service regarding retirement

of an officer.

From now on an army officer could be

retired or dismissed by the government as

easily as a sweaper !

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This is the simple summing up of why a

Pakistan Army officer is programmed to be

docile.

Any officer of any rank could be retired

without any reason and this officer could not

go to a civil court while in uniform against

this decision.

An officer was as good or as bad as a

personal slave of the Pakistani state.Job

security being Nil !

Even the Pakistani politicians failed to give

the army personnel the basic constitutional

right to appeal enjoyed in India. Thus while

ZA Bhutto did allow this initially in

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constitution in 1973 , he immediately took it

back once the Attock Conspiracy took place.

In 1958 when martial law was

clamped,Pakistans military dictator Ayub

Khan also castrated Pakistans civil servants.

Arbitrary interference of an

overpowerful executive and no job

security.This is Pakistans issue of

governance !

Ayubian System and complete

destruction of talent in Pakistan Army

In the Ayubian system when officers with

ranker background or those who lacked

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independent judgements were preferred for

higher ranks! The class conscious British

who were extremely snobbish in selection of

regular officers for the British Army very

cleverly kept a 50% quota for Indian Army

rankers (24 on internal merit and 6 on

nomination) in each intake ( 30 out of 60

cadets) of the Indian Military Academy Dera

Dun. The ulterior motive was to ensure that

relatively more pliable , politically inert, and

orders oriented material entered the Indian

officer corps. In India the ranker breed did

not do as well as Pakistan because their first

Indian C-in-C Cariappa was from the 1919

commissioned Indian course. On theother

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hand in Pakistan the civilian leadership in its

zeal to have a non-Punjabi C-in-C at a time

when the Punjabi-Hindustani conflict was at

its peak selected Ayub who was a 1927

commissioned officer. This led to the exit of

many Sandhurst/Daly College commissioned

Muslim officers who were senior to Ayub.

The leftover of Sandhurst commissioned

officers were eliminated by Ayub through

forced retirement or by promotion of Musa

to C-in-C‟s appointment in 1958. Thus the

Pakistan Army lost the services of many

more experienced officers simply because

they were sidelined through political

supersession or were retired. The gap

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between the two Indo Pak armies in quality

of experience may be gauged from the fact

that the first Indian C-in-C was eight years

senior to Ayub in service and the course

mate of Musa, the second Muslim C-in-C of

the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became

the Indian C-in-C eleven years after Musa!

This may have worked positively for the

Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with

an independent outlook! Musa on the other

hand as Gul Hassan‟s memoirs revealed

lacked independent judgement dynamism or

talent! The Pakistan army during the period

1951-71 became a highly orders oriented

machine! Smart on the drill square,

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tactically sound but strategically barren and

lacking in operational vision! One whose first

Pakistani C-in-C was more interested in

political intrigue and industrial ventures than

in the basics of higher military organisation

or operational strategy!

Modern warfare on the other hand

demanded mission-oriented approach, which

was sadly lacking in both the Indo Pak

armies! This was thanks to the British

inherited orders oriented approach which in

words of General Mellenthin of the

Wehrmacht, reduced British officers to the

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status of clerks and mouthpieces of their

commanders! The British with all the

resources of the British Empire and thanks

to US aid in both world wars managed to

survive despite phenomenal military

incompetence.

Thus Alanbrooke the British Chief lamented

during WW Two once he said “It is

lamentable, how poor we are in army and

corps commanders; we ought to remove

several , but heaven knows where we shall

find anything much better...the flower of our

manhood was wiped out some twenty years

ago and it is just some of those that we lost

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then that we require now” (Refers-Page-

239- The Turn of the Tide-Arthur Bryant -

Collins Saint James Place-London-April

1957). But this incompetence was no longer

affordable in the resource starved Pakistan

Army of 1971! The Indian problem was less

serious since many of their drawbacks were

overcome by the fact that they were

numerically superior, and possessed larger

material resources. This was applicable

relatively less in 1965 and convincingly

more in 1971! Secondly the Indians had

lesser number of ranker officers in their

higher ranks and had benefited from the

experience of a larger number of service

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chiefs with more experience in terms of

length of service as well as war record than

Pakistan Army, whose first chief was famous

for tactical timidity in Burma, while the

second chief was a non entity, whose only

quality was humility, albeit, commensurate

with his actual potential (!) and political

reliability!

Some readers may find the approach biased.

Nevertheless it is based on lessons of

military history. Leadership is a situational

process. The finest leadership seen in an

institutionalised form was developed in the

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German Army. The German officer corps

was dominated by two classes of men. One,

scions from aristocratic families of Prussia or

the impoverished nobility weak in land

holding but bearers of a long tradition in

officer rank. Men with the title/prefix Von.

Second were men of learning who made

their way upwards in the officer corps

through sheer merit and on total intellectual

grounds. Like Moltke Gneisenau and

Scharnhorst (of humble origins but educated

under a noble‟s patronage who saw great

talent in him). Take Moltke the Elder, the

writer of a large number of military history

works and a profound thinker. He cannot be

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compared with Niazi Tikka or Musa, all of

whom entered the army on the ranker quota

and the last were not famous for any

qualities of higher military leadership apart

from eminence in conducting ruthless

counter insurgency operations in Baluchistan

or East Pakistan! Men who had not written

even a single article or composition on any

military subject, with any trace of depth of

intellect! When I was commissioned in the

army in March 1983 we had two officers in

11 Cavalry who specialised in narrating

anecdotes of General Tikka Khan‟s

utterances of Solomon‟s wisdom on various

occasions while he was the chief! Take Ayub

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Khan. Guilty of tactical timidity in Burma!

No comparison with Thimaya the only Indian

to command an infantry brigade in actual

action in WW Two or Rajendarsinhji the first

Indian to get a DSO! Those who did have

the talent of higher command or grasp of

strategy like Yaqub were sidelined! Those

who did have a record of accomplished

generalship as divisional commanders like

Abrar or Sarfaraz or brigade commanders

like Qayyum Sher were not promoted!

The reviewer‟s observation about gallantry

awards may be compared with Tajammul‟s

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observation about the round about manner

in which gallantry awards were awarded in

1965, e.g Aziz Bhatti‟s case who as per

Tajammul died on the home bank of BRB

(by fluke) but was awarded a Nishan e

Haidar on the basis of the citation (which

was rewritten three times) written by his

Commanding Officer Colonel Ibrahim

Qureshi (a man the readers may or may not

know of considerable literary merit).

(Refers-Page-74-The Story of My Struggle-

Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik-Jang

Publishers- Lahore -1991) . In any case Hilal

I Jurrat was awarded even to Niazi again

and to General Rahim (accused of fleeing in

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a unsoldierly manner later), Ansari, Sharif

(God knows why) during the period when

the army was engaged in minor operations

against the so-called Mukti Bahini

insurgents from March to December 1971

(Page -126-Ibid). Tajammul a Punjabi

Muslim from Chakwal forthrightly admitted

that these above-mentioned awards were

given to these gentlemen for killing their

own countrymen! (Ibid).

The problem of the Pakistan Army was not

lack of talent but of operating in an

environment, which I have always referred

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to in a self-coined phrase as “ conspiracy

against originality and boldness”, something

which I at least witnessed in my 13 years

service from 1981 to 1994. Why this

conspiracy against talent? We enter the

political realm once again!

The German Kaisers had nothing to fear

from a Moltke or Blucher but military or

civilian usurpers of Pakistan had a lot to fear

from a more talented general! Thus the

necessity for (another self-coined phrase)

“Goof Selection Syndrome”, a process

initiated by Liaquat the first prime minister

under able advice of Iskandar Mirza and

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perfected by Ayub and Bhutto. “Select a

man from an ethnic or sectarian minority or

at least a politically docile man or one who

is mediocre or at least perceived/assessed

as such”. Thus in the Ayubian era officers

with ranker background, were not preferred

on merit, but on the basis of lack of talent

and thus lack of ambition in being politically

docile, or being from ethnic and sectarian

minorities as was the case with Musa and

Yahya. The German Army which we were

discussing as late as 1930‟s the German

army was a “Von” dominated army. As a

matter of fact most of the German generals

who opposed Hitler‟s rule and many of his

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unsound strategic decisions were men like

Fritsch Manstein etc, all of them with an

aristocratic background. In India

unfortunately the British with an ulterior

motive had encouraged men from the ranks

to be officers with the thinking that these

would be more reliable. There never was

any 50 % quota for rankers in Sandhurst!

Why the British were so generous with the

despised Indians! Even the Punjabi

dominated army which was so much

criticised by the British press for atrocities in

East Pakistan was a British creation whose

origins dated back to the period 1883-1911!

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The army did have potential Moltke‟s

Mansteins and some Grey Wolf‟s but the

vast bulk of these, perhaps with the

exception of men like Eftikhar Khan were

sidelined! Even Eftikhar, thanks to his

unorthodox personal life, was a sidelined

man, once the war broke out, and it was

Pakistan Army‟s good luck that this great

leader of men, our finest commander

commanded the 23 Division! I remember a

session with General Attiq ur Rahman whenI

presented him with a book that I had

written on Clausewitz‟s military thoughts

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.The book was dedicated to Eftikhar Khan.

Attiq was horror struck and remembered

Eftikhar as a horrible man , as Attiq saw him

in the light of Attiq‟s strict standards of

morality as Eftikhar‟s Directing Staff in Staff

College Quetta. I dismissed General

Attique‟s objections since I viewed Eftikhar

as all the officers and men of my unit 11

Cavalry saw him in Chamb in 1971. Moving

towards the sound of guns, racing ahead of

the leading tank ! Goading cursing and

prodding with his stick irresolute lower

commanders ahead ! Our problem has been

failure to identify and groom talent! A

natural result in a country where the Prime

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Minister or the President wants to have the

most pathetic man in the highest ranks, just

because he feels safer with them!

The fact that Niazi became a three star

general proves that incompetent men can

reach relatively high ranks in an army. Who

can say that Niazi was different from the

bulk of other generals of the Pakistan Army

in 1971!

An army in which between 1955 and

November 1971, in about 17 years 40

Generals had been retired, of whom only

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four had reached their superannuating age.

(Refers- Page-258 & 259- Pakistan‟s Crisis

in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem

Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-

Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973).

An army in which in the words of a major

general who served in the same period,

anyone “in the higher ranks who showed

some independence of outlook were

invariably removed from service” or one in

which “Some officers were placed in

positions that they did not deserve or had

no training for”! (Ibid). An army where

“gradually the officer corps, intensely proud

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of its professionalism was eroded at its apex

into third class politicians and

administrators”. An army in which security

of commission and constitutional safeguards

against arbitrary dismissal thanks to laws

amended from early 1950s were so lacking

that “some left in sheer disgust in this

atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the

right of criticism, the two most important

privileges of an armed force officer”.

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A CONSPIRACY AGAINST

ORIGINALITY AND BOLDNESS-THE

ABOVE ANALYSIS APPLIED TO

ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING OF

MILITARY LEADERS

What was wrong with Assessment

of Officers and Military Training-

Pakistan Army and What continues

to be wrong till to date as research

indicates

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Selection and Assessment of

Commanders in Pakistan Army-

Pakistan Army Journal-Citadel-

Command and Staff College

These articles published in military

journals of Pakistan Army

endeavour to subject the highly

defective system of assessment of

officers to criticism despite strict

censorship.

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One must add that some discussion

became possible in the army only

after 1988 when General M.A Baig

took over .

In the Zia era , with intellectual

honesty buried and hypocrisy and

sycophancy being hallmark of the

army for 12 long years (1976-88)

this was impossible.

After 1998 once Brigadier Riaz took

over as DG ISPR the situation

improved.

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Three editors of Pakistan Army

Journal were outstanding , all in

succession , i.e Colonel I.D Hassan

(a chronic bachelor and very

cereberal and well read) ,

Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq

Naqvi (outstanding) and Lieutenant

Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad (soft

spoken but bold as far as publishing

articles and extremely

knowledgeable).

In the command and staff college

there was Lieutenant Colonel Ashraf

Saleem (later lieutenant general) ,

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Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Khan (now

lieutenant general) and Lieutenant

Colonel Ahsan Mahmood (now

major general) , all three were well

read and had a high intellectual

calibre particularly Tariq Khan.

After these three the pedants came

and pedants and the conformists off

course are in preponderance !

I would say the assessments that I

made in faulty and fallacious

assessment of military commanders

continue !

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If Tariq Khan became a three star it

was a triumph of destiny over a

thoroughly rotten system !

WHEN ORDERS SHOULD BE OBEYED

AND WHEN DISOBEYED OR

MODIFIED AS SEEN IN MILITARY

HISTORY-MARCH 1991

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/27648037/

Orders-and-Obedience

On the first page a question is raised " if

selection and assessment system in

an army is realistic" .

There was a big question mark in

1991 when I wrote this , it

remained when I retired in

December 1993 because the army

then was run on whims and likes

and dislikes and no one bothered

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how good an officer was in real

command and intellectual ability ! I

fear that the large gaps and

question marks remain to date ? The

very Kargil operation proves that an

overambitious man with myopic

strategic vision like Musharraf can

rise to the highest ranks

,shamelessly abandons bodies of

soldiers and then proclaim Kargil as

his greatest success ! One could see

an ambitious man in him in 1993 ,

who was obsessed with self

projection ! I had asked Lieuenant

Colonel Ashraf (then CO 46 Field

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and my platoon commander in PMA ,

also GSO 1 , 14 Division what he

thought of Musharraf his brother

gunner officer .Ashraf an

outstandingly honest and straight

man hailing from Kalar Saidan near

Pindi stated " what can you make of

a man who uses generator of his

locating unit for his house "

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No one in kargil had the courage to

point out that the operation was a

wild gamble ! Brigadier Simon

confided that that General Tauqir

Zia was against it but then Tauqir

Zia never gave his dissent ?

PROBLEM WITH MILITARY

TRAINING , MILITARY EXERCISES

AND ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS

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A real soldier in the peacteime

environment of jee hazoori and yes man

ship hardly has any chance of being

promoted ! True in 1992 when I wrote

this and true today ! Can Pakistan afford

this ?

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PROBABLY IN OUR SCENARIO A

QUALITY TERMED AS LOYALTY ,

WHICH IN REALITY IS DOCILITY

AND OVERCONFORMITY IS HIGHLY

VALUED !AND LOYALTY OF A

PERSONAL NATURE IS SHEER

INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY !

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WHY ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS

QUALITIES IS OF CARDINAL

IMPORTANCE

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Historical Proof of the argument

presented above

War Performance had nothing to do

with promotion to higher ranks in

Pakistan Army

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Altaf Gauhar Ayub‟s close confidant

inadvertently proves this fact once he

quite uncharitably, and for reasons,

other than dispassionate objective

historical considerations, described

Yahya as one " selected…in preference

to some other generals, because Yahya,

who had come to hit the bottle hard,

had no time for politics and was

considered a harmless and loyal

person".

Major General Abrar, who had proved

himself as the finest military

commander, at the divisional level, at

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least by sub continental standards, was

sidelined and ultimately retired in the

same rank!

Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry

who had saved Pakistan‟s territorial

integrity from being seriously

compromised at a strategic level at

Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965

was sidelined.

Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry

who had saved Pakistan‟s territorial

integrity from being seriously

compromised at a strategic level at

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Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965

was sidelined. This may be gauged from

the fact that at the time of outbreak of

the 1971 War Nisar although promoted

to brigadier rank, was only commanding

the Armoured corps recruit training

centre, a poor appointment for a man

who had distinguished himself as a tank

regiment commander in stopping the

main Indian attack. A man whose unit‟s

performance was described by the

enemy opposing him as one "which was

certainly creditable because it alone

stood between the 1st Indian Armoured

Division and its objective"23 was

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considered by the Pakistani General

Headquarters pedantic officers as fit

only to command a recruit training

centre while one who was instrumental

in failure of the main Pakistani

intelligence failure as DMI was promoted

to Major General rank and trusted later

with the command of Pakistan‟s 1 Corps

with disastorous results !

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Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had

distinguished himself as a brigade

commander in 10 Division area in

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Lahore was also not promoted! Qayyum

Sher was one of the few brigade

commanders of the army who had led

from the front.

Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely

praised anyone had the following to say

about Sher‟s conduct while leading the

Pakistan army‟s most important infantry

brigade counter attack on Lahore Front

as a result of which the Indian 15

Division despite considerable numerical

superiority was completely thrown off

balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier

Qayyum Sher, in his command jeep,

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moved from unit to unit and then

personally led the advance, star plate

and pennant visible. This was something

no troops worth their salt could ignore".

But the Army‟s Selection Boards ignored

Qayyum Sher once his turn for

promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well

in war and was awarded the Pakistani

D.S.O i.e. the HJ!

But war performance or even

performance in peacetime training

manoeuvres was, and still is, no criteria

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for promotion in the Pakistan Army!

Qayyum retired as a brigadier,

remembered by those who fought under

him as a brave and resolute

commander, who was not given an

opportunity to rise to a higher rank,

which Qayyum had deserved, more than

any brigadier of the Pakistan Army did.

Brigadier Nisar of 25 Cavalry who was

praised by Indian historians as

outstanding in delaying battle in

Shakargarh as commander of changez

Force was also sidelined because he was

not close to Tikka Khan and company

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and did not possess Zias mastery of art

of sycophancy and appeasement of

seniors !

It was typical of Pakistan Army that

Brigadier Rahimuddin who did not join

his brigade in Chamb on pretext of

martial law duty was promoted to

general rank while Nisar who fought

both the 1965 and 1971 wars

exceedingly well sidelined !

In 1965 Nisar by his singular action at

Gadgor had literally saved Pakistan ! But

promotion in Pakistan Army had nothing

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to do with war performance or real

soldiering ! Pathetic !

Interestingly Brigadier Irshaad heading

the military intelligence in 1965 and

guilty of Pakistan Armys greatest

intelligence failure of 1965 i.e

disregarding a genuine report that

Indian Armoured division was in kashmir

, dismissing it as a deception plan , was

promoted to two and three star after the

war .He played hell with Pakistans 1

Corps in 1971 War !

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Major General Sarfaraz whose conduct

as GOC was outstanding in 1965 War

was not promoted because his ability

was regarded as a threat by Ayub Khan

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Brigadier Tajammul Hussain Malik was

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praised as an outstanding commander

by a person no less than the Indian

opponent of his Major General lachman

Singh .

A special commission was appointed by

Indian Army to study Tajammuls

brigade actions !

The tragedy is that all starting from

Liaquat Ali Khan sidelined officers with

outstanding war performance ! The first

being the elevation of Ayub Khan to

army chief with a proven record of

tactical timidity in Burma !

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Ayub Khan ,Tikka Khan and Bhutto

sidelined the best officers of 1971 !

Tajammul was sidelined because he was

not a pathetic sycophant with no war

record like Zia ul Haq ! This is a man

whose war performance was so

outstanding that the Indians appointed a

high level commission to study his epic

brigade battle at Hilli where he literally

repelled a division plus! His direct Indian

opponent Major General Lachman Singh

praised him as an outstanding and very

brave man in his book Indian sword

penetrates East Pakistan ! But the

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Pakistani selection boards criterion for

promotion was certainly not war

performance !

Major General Abdul Ali Malik noted by

Major General Fazal i Muqeem for

launcjing the most ill planned and failed

counter attacks of 1971 War in

Shakargarh Bulge was promoted to

three star rank after the war !

General K.M Arif who had no war record

in 1971 and no command experience

beyond a brigade command for few

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months was promoted to two three and

four star rank !

Brigadier Ameer Hamza who conducted

a brilliant brigade offensive battle at

Sulaimanke was similarly sidelined as a

Lieutenant General whereas many

others who had no war record in 1971

war as brigade commanders became

corps commanders !

Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik

in an interview with this scribe in

September 2001 summed up these

promotions in the following words:--

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The peculiarity about these promotions

was that except for Jahanzeb Arbab,

who had been superseded earlier

because of having been found guilty of

embezzlement of huge amount of

money while in East Pakistan by a Court

of Inquiry, headed by Major General M H

Ansari but continued to remain in an

officiating Command of a Division with

the rank of a Brigadier for nearly two

years upto as late as February 1976

when he was promoted to the rank of a

Major General, all others were those

who were on staff in GHQ.

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Major General Iqbal was doing as Chief

of General Staff, Major General Sawar

Khan was Adjutant General, Major

General Chishti was Military Secretary

and Major General Ghulam Hassan was

Director General Military Training.

The Division Commanders that is to say

myself, Major General Akhtar Abdur

Rehman, Major General Fazal e Raziq,

Major General Mateen, Major General Ch

Abdur Rehman, Major General Jamal

Said Mian, Major General Amir Hamza

(DG Civil Armed Forces), Major General

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Wajahat Hussain (Commadant Staff

College) were all superseded.”

General Zia ul Haq had seen my conduct

during the Division Commanders

conferences expressing my view very

candidly. He, therefore, thought that he

would not be able to control me. He

selected a team of „yes men‟ who were

more docile and prepared to accept his

command without any hesitation.”

Even the normal and highly defective

ACR system in the army was

disregarded in promotions.

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Thus while Major General Tajammul had

been graded as “OUTSTANDING”, as a

Brigadier, in his last Annual Confidential

Report and again as a Division

Commander was graded “Above

Average” by the then Corps Commander

Lieutenant General Aftab Ahmad Khan,

his contemporaries Lieutenant General

Faiz Ali Chisti and Late General Akhtar

Abdur Rehman were adjudged on the

lower side of the “Average” grade were

promoted to three star rank .Chishti in

1976 and Akhtar Abdul Rahman in

1977-78.

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Tajammul Hussain thus well summed up

Pakistan Armys tradition of promotions

when he stated:--

“In our Army, Field Marshal Ayub Khan

since he became Commander-in-Chief in

1951, made sure that only those people

were promoted to higher ranks, who

proved their personal loyalty to him

rather than loyalty to the state.

He did so because he had the ambitions

of becoming the Head of State from the

very beginning. As I said before, he had

a contempt for the politicians and with

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the passage of time he went on getting

extension of his tenure till he finally took

over in Oct 1958.

From amongst the senior officers

anyone who expressed his opinion

against the Army indulging in politics

was immediately retired. Some of the

very capable generals who had passed

out from Sandhurst were superseded

when General Musa was appointed

Commander-in-Chief. Now that he is

dead, it is not proper for me to pass any

remarks against him but I have no

hesitation in saying that he was a typical

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Gorkha Soldier, who had learnt to obey

the command of their superiors whether

right or wrong. The junior officers

following examples of the seniors, had

also learnt that perhaps sycophancy,

rather than professional capabilities,

was the only criteria for attaining the

higher command.

Exceptions are always there, but as a

general practice many good officers who

would have become very good Generals

could not go beyond the rank of

Lieutenant Colonel because they were

intellectually and professionally far

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superior to their seniors and always

expressed their views without any

hesitation whenever and wherever

required.

Commanders who attain the higher

ranks through following the path of

sycophancy soon crumble in the face of

danger and cannot stand the test of

battle fatigue. That has been an

inherent weakness in our Army, which

perhaps continues till today.

I had not intimately known General Zia

before he became the Chief of the Army

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Staff but from his conduct during the

Divisional Commanders Conferences, he

appeared to me an incompetent and low

grade officer.

In one of the Division Commanders

promotion conferences, I even saw him

sleeping with his mouth open.

He surpassed all limits of sycophancy

when meeting the Prime Minister

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he

used to bow when shaking hands with

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

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I remember my old Brigade

Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with

whom I served as his Brigade Major,

once told me that he had written in

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Major Zia ul Haq‟s ACR when he served

under his command, “Not fit to go

beyond the rank of a Major”. It is an

irony of fate that a person of such a

calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long

period of eleven years till he was finally

killed in an air crash.”

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There is no second opinion possible

about how Pakistan Army suffered

because of military rule.Thus Major

General Fazal Muqeem Khan in an

officially sponsored book admitted this

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cardinal fact when he wrote :--

"We had been declining according to the

degree of our involvement in making

and unmaking of regimes. Gradually the

officer corps, intensely proud of its

professionalism was eroded at its apex

into third class politicians and

administrators. Due to the absence of a

properly constituted political

government, the selection and

promotion of officers to the higher rank

depended on one man’s will. Gradually,

the welfare of institutions was sacrificed

to the welfare of personalities. To take

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the example of the army, the higher

command had been slowly weakened by

retiring experienced officers at a

disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and

November 1971, in about 17 years 40

Generals had been retired, of whom only

four had reached their superannuating

age. Similar was the case with other

senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks

who showed some independence of

outlook were invariably removed from

service. Some left in sheer disgust in

this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of

the right of criticism, the two most

important privileges of an Armed Forces

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officer. The extraordinary wastage of

senior officers particularly of the army

denied the services, of the experience

and training vital to their efficiency and

welfare. Some officers were placed in

positions that they did not deserve or

had no training for"

The tradition continued till to

date.Lieutenant General Mahmood and

Usmani with all their drawbacks was far

superior to Generals Aziz Yusuf and

Ahsan Saleem Hayat promoted to four

star rank but sidelined because feared

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as more resolute and thus dangerous !

It would be actually comical to match

these two groups at all ! Usmani was so

upright that he risked his career twice

as a brigadier and major general when

he took a righteous stand with his direct

superiors Malik Saleem Khan

in Karachi and Mumtaz Gul

at Peshawar !

It is no secret that had Yusuf or Ahsan

Saleem Hayat been commander 10

Corps in place of Mahmud on 12 October

1999 , Musharrafs coup would have

failed ! Perhaps that was the key

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selection criterion for both ! Lack of

resolution ! But that‟s what Pakistan is

all about !

A Conspiracy against originality and

boldness ! An undoubted failure !

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Pakistan has no short of talent and

military genius but our military system

is a conspiracy against talent originality

and boldness.Below is an article of this

scribe published in Daily Nation

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summarising whats wrong with Pakistan

Army published :---

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