Journal of Risk Research

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Fact-checking as risk communication: the multi-

layered risk of misinformation in times of
COVID-19

Nicole M. Krause, Isabelle Freiling, Becca Beets & Dominique Brossard

To cite this article: Nicole M. Krause, Isabelle Freiling, Becca Beets & Dominique Brossard (2020)
Fact-checking as risk communication: the multi-layered risk of misinformation in times of COVID-19,
Journal of Risk Research, 23:7-8, 1052-1059, DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2020.1756385

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Published online: 22 Apr 2020.

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JOURNAL OF RISK RESEARCH
2020, VOL. 23, NOS. 7–8, 1052–1059
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1756385

Fact-checking as risk communication: the multi-layered risk

of misinformation in times of COVID-19
Nicole M. Krausea , Isabelle Freilinga,b , Becca Beetsa and Dominique
Brossarda,c
a
Department of Life Sciences Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA; bDFG-
Research Training Group, Trust and Communication in a Digitized World, University of Mu€nster, M€unster,
Germany; cMorgridge Institute for Research, Madison, WI, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The emergence of the 2019 novel coronavirus has led to more than a Received 10 April 2020
pandemic—indeed, COVID-19 is spawning myriad other concerns as it Accepted 13 April 2020
rapidly marches around the globe. One of these concerns is a surge of
KEYWORDS
misinformation, which we argue should be viewed as a risk in its own
Risk communication;
right, and to which insights from decades of risk communication misinformation; trust;
research must be applied. Further, when the subject of misinformation uncertainty; COVID-19
is itself a risk, as in the case of COVID-19, we argue for the utility of
viewing the problem as a multi-layered risk communication problem. In
such circumstances, misinformation functions as a meta-risk that inter-
acts with and complicates publics’ perceptions of the original risk.
Therefore, as the COVID-19 “misinfodemic” intensifies, risk communica-
tion research should inform the efforts of key risk communicators. To
this end, we discuss the implications of risk research for efforts to fact-
check COVID-19 misinformation and offer practical recommendations.

The information environment on COVID-19 is constantly evolving, with inconsistent and unclear
messages regarding risk levels and appropriate protective behaviors coming from the media,
employers, public health officials, and all levels of government, as well as friends and family. The
World Health Organization (WHO) has characterized the COVID-19 information landscape as an
“over-abundance of information,” ultimately declaring the existence of a “massive infodemic”
(World Health Organization 2020b). Unfortunately, woven into this rapidly-expanding tapestry of
messages is a plethora of misinformation (Frenkel, Alba, and Zhong 2020).
The “misinfodemic” surrounding COVID-19 is the focus of our discussion, and one key pur-
pose of this paper is to illustrate the importance and utility of viewing misinformation as a risk
in its own right, to which decades of insight from risk communication research must be applied.
Further, we argue that the COVID-19 misinformation risk interacts with the risks of the pandemic
itself, creating a multi-layered risk. Ultimately, we show that multi-layered risks involving misinfor-
mation pose unique communication challenges that fact-checking (the current mitigation strat-
egy of choice) will fail to sufficiently address. We conclude with recommendations to researchers
and risk communicators.

CONTACT Nicole M. Krause nmkrause@wisc.edu Department of Life Sciences Communication, University of

Wisconsin-Madison, Hiram Smith Hall, 1545 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA
ß 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 JOURNAL OF RISK RESEARCH 1053

A tale of two risks: the COVID-19 misinfodemic

At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that the risk of misinformation should not be taken lightly.
In the case of the COVID-19 misinfodemic—where the subject of misinformation is a health
risk—misinformation can literally be a matter of life and death. Consider, for example, that an
Arizona resident died after consuming chloroquine (that was intended for use in aquariums) after
hearing on the news that the substance might be a good treatment for COVID-19 (Waldrop,
Alsup, and McLaughlin 2020). Furthermore, misinformation about COVID-19 can encourage peo-
ple to shirk experts’ recommendations for protective behaviors such as social distancing, thus
accelerating the spread of the virus. Concerned about this possibility, a large collection
of journalism professors and journalists recently raised the alarm about COVID-19 misinformation
on Fox News, arguing that its misreporting “endangers” both their own viewers and others
(Gitlin 2020).
Clearly, experts are concerned about COVID-19 misinformation and see Fox News as one
source of the risk. However, recent poll data indicate that the supposedly at-risk public does not
view the misinfodemic the same way as the experts: 84% of Fox News viewers said they believed
the network covered the coronavirus outbreak somewhat to very well (Pew Research Center
2020). We are not suggesting with these data that Fox News viewers see no risk of COVID-19
misinformation whatsoever, but only that they do not see Fox News as the problem. Meanwhile,
many Americans are aware of misinformation about COVID-19, and many more have exhibited
concern about misinformation more broadly. In a nationally-representative survey conducted in
mid-March 2020, 47% of Americans said they had come across some to a lot of news on COVID-
19 that seemed completely made up (Pew Research Center 2020). Further, regarding misinforma-
tion in general, recent research shows that “more Americans view made-up news as a very big
problem for the country than identify terrorism, illegal immigration, racism and sexism that way”
(Pew Research Center 2019a).
The latter data reveal that, for many Americans, misinformation is indeed perceived as a risk,
or “the possibility that an undesirable state of reality … [may] occur as the result of natural
events or human activities” (Renn 1992, 56). However, the discrepancy between experts’ and
some lay publics’ concerns about Fox News as a source of misinformation is one of many exam-
ples that, in addition to the variation in risk perceptions that seasoned risk researchers expect
about COVID-19, we should expect similarly varied perspectives on the definitions and attributes of
misinformation risks. Before arguing this point, we will clarify some key concepts.
First, there are different ways to define “misinformation” (Southwell, Thorson, and Sheble
2018, Scheufele and Krause 2019). Our operating definition of misinformation does not differenti-
ate between (a) incorrect information that a communicator believes is true and (b) information
that a communicator knows is false but purveys as true (sometimes referred to as
“disinformation”). Instead, we define misinformation broadly as any messages that conflict with
the best-available evidence about COVID-19, and that would likely not be corrected if they were
challenged. To identify misinformation about COVID-19, it is noteworthy that we must consider
the “best available evidence,” because notions of “scientific consensus” or “established scientific
facts” are tenuous in this context. For example, there is not yet agreement on the biology of the
novel SARS-CoV-2 virus and the COVID-19 disease it produces—there is uncertainty about the
processes of disease transmission and treatment strategies (Service 2020).
Beyond our definition of “misinformation,” our understanding of “fact-checking” also requires
clarification. For our purposes, “fact-checking” refers to efforts to “investigate claims that are
already in the news” (Graves 2016, 7-8) or on social media. Examples of fact-checking include
work by Snopes.com, CheckYourFact.com, and FactCheck.org, as well as the efforts of fact-check-
ing departments within established journalistic outlets, and those working in partnership with
social media platforms (Graves 2016). Our definition of fact-checking also includes myth-busting
efforts by institutions and scientific agencies. For example, the WHO has set up a website
1054 N. M. KRAUSE ET AL.

dedicated to COVID-19 “myth busting” (World Health Organization 2020a), and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) now publishes a webpage titled “Stop the Spread of
Rumors,” which encourages people to “know the facts about COVID-19” (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2020). As COVID-19 spreads, fact-checking efforts are multiplying, with
the number of English-language fact-checks about COVID-19 increasing by more than 900% from
January to March 2020 (Brennan et al. 2020).

Misinformation and fact-checking, through the lens of risk

At first glance, fighting falsehoods with facts may seem like a straightforward strategy to miti-
gate misinformation. Unfortunately, while fact-checking can sometimes correct individuals’ mis-
perceptions, there is ample evidence from political communication and social psychology
showing that fact-checking can be of limited utility—or worse, it can backfire—in contexts where
audiences are motivated to defend their pre-existing beliefs (Scheufele and Krause 2019).
Complementing this work, we argue that risk communication research offers another useful
framework for understanding why fact-checking can sometimes be problematic.
Specifically, we argue for the necessity and utility of viewing fact-checking as a form of risk
communication in which the “risk” is misinformation. Through this lens, we draw on well-estab-
lished risk research to assess the complexity of the COVID-19 misinfodemic, and we argue that:
(a) misinformation risks are difficult to define, particularly when they are multi-layered and when
subgroups of the population define misinformation risks differently; (b) attempts to fact-check
misinformation will be complicated by varying levels of trust in the communicators behind such
efforts; and (c) risks are, by definition, related to “uncertainties,” which means that articulating
“the facts” about COVID-19 may be insufficient (or, in some cases, impossible).

Defining the misinfodemic risk: a multi-layered problem

Risk research has long asserted that risks are difficult to define, and that different publics—oper-
ating with different ideologies, value systems, and cultural backgrounds—tend to define them
very differently (Hansson 2010, Renn 1992, Rayner 1992). To illustrate this point, consider public
opinion in the United States pertaining broadly to the issue of misinformation. Two thirds of
Americans (67%) “are worried about what is real and fake on the internet” (Newman et al. 2019,
10). This suggests, as discussed earlier, that Americans broadly view misinformation as a “risk.”
Taking a closer look, however, it is clear that definitions and perceptions of the misinformation
risk are not the same for everyone.
For example, there are strong, partisan-based cleavages in the United States. Whereas nearly
two-thirds of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (62%) view “made-up news [a]s
a very big problem in the country today,” only two in five Democrats and Democratic-leaning
independents (40%) say the same (Pew Research Center 2019a). Further, “Republicans [are] about
three times as likely as Democrats to blame journalists” for the problem (Pew Research Center
2019a). Clearly, partisans in the United States have divergent perspectives on key constitutive
elements of the misinformation threat, including its magnitude and its source.
When it comes to perceived risks of COVID-19, these divergent understandings of the misin-
formation risk seem to be interacting with COVID-19 risk perceptions in ways that will surely
complicate risk communications about the pandemic. First, a nationally-representative survey in
the United States conducted in mid-March shows aggregate-level agreement about the risks
posed by the pandemic: Two-thirds of Americans (66%) considered COVID-19 a major threat to
the health of the population; about nine in ten saw it as a major threat to the US economy
(88%); and half of Americans (49%) saw it as a major threat to their personal financial situation
(Pew Research Center 2020). Further, nearly two thirds (63%) also said that the CDC has properly
 JOURNAL OF RISK RESEARCH 1055

Figure 1. A multi-layered problem of risk definition in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Note: This graphic does not
aim to be all-encompassing.).

communicated the risks of COVID-19 (Pew Research Center 2020). Despite these indicators of
broad agreement, partisan-based cleavages begin to emerge when publics are asked about who
seems to be exaggerating—i.e., misreporting—the risks of COVID-19: Three quarters of
Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (77%) say the media have exaggerated the
risks of the coronavirus outbreak at least slightly, whereas only half (49%) of Democrats and
Democratic-leaning independents say so (Pew Research Center 2020).
Clearly, when COVID-19 risks and misinformation risks are considered in combination, com-
plexities arise as individuals’ COVID-19 risks perceptions influence their misinformation risk per-
ceptions. With two different sets of risk perceptions layered on top of each other, individuals
who trust that the CDC will not exaggerate COVID-19 risks can still simultaneously trust media
sources or other actors who are accused of misrepresenting the CDC’s position and recommen-
dations on the pandemic. Thus, efforts to combat misinformation about COVID-19 will confront a
multi-layered problem of risk definition, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Recognizing the multi-layered nature of the misinfodemic risk is helpful for understanding
why ongoing efforts to fact-check misinformation about COVID-19 are unlikely to succeed in
their current form. Indeed, the psychometric paradigm of risk research has demonstrated that
what people think should be done about a given risk can depend largely on how they define
the characteristics of the hazard (e.g., its magnitude and source) (Slovic 1992).
For example, in the case of misinformation about COVID-19, the above data suggest that
Republicans who see journalists as the origin of misinformation will likely expect two things:
(a) That fact-checking organizations will scrutinize false COVID-19 claims made by traditional
news media, and (b) That risk communicators will tell them how traditional media will be
held accountable for COVID-19 misinformation. Comparatively, Democrats will be less likely
to have these expectations. If parts of the public feel that fact-checkers are disregarding or
simply misunderstand the nature of the misinformation risk, then fact-checkers’ credibility
will be harmed among those parts of the public in times of crisis (Covello et al. 2001).
This brings us to the issue of trust.
1056 N. M. KRAUSE ET AL.

The importance of trust

When it comes to explaining variation in risk perceptions, it is clear that the factual knowledge
someone has about a risk is often less relevant than what someone they trust tells them about it
(Siegrist 2000, Brossard and Nisbet 2007). In the midst of the misinfodemic, we must therefore
ask not only if individuals will trust the CDC on its social distancing guidelines, but also whether
people will trust the fact-checkers seeking to dispel rumors about COVID-19.
Unfortunately, fact-checkers are not uniformly trusted by Americans. In a recent nationally-
representative poll in the United States, only half of the respondents said that “fact-checking
efforts by news outlets and other organizations tend to deal fairly with all sides,” while the other
half (48%) said they “tend to favor one side” (Pew Research Center 2019b). Moreover, “[t]he
more political or controversial issues a fact-checking service covers, the more it needs to build a
reputation for usefulness and trustworthiness” (Brandtzaeg and Følstad 2017, 67).
Beyond these concerning figures, a low level of trust in the press in United States (Hanitzsch,
Van Dalen, and Steindl 2018) also raises an important question: can fact-checking initiatives
housed within traditional journalistic outlets credibly highlight the risks of misinformation? As
mentioned previously, given that Republicans tend to see traditional journalists as responsible
for misinformation—including misinformation about COVID-19—why would they trust fact-check-
ers that are affiliated with traditional media outlets?
Overall, the fact that almost half of Americans view fact-checkers as somehow biased should
give us serious pause as we devise communication strategies amidst the misinfodemic. Rather
than hastily ramping up existing fact-checking efforts, we would be better served to investigate
how we can shore up fact-checkers’ credibility or how existing fact-checking operations can part-
ner with highly-trusted organizations to deliver messages more effectively. Further, as risk
researchers, we should recognize that if we want to effectively address future crises that misin-
formation is sure to complicate, then we need to better understand how fact-checkers (and
“corrective” communications more generally) are perceived by various publics.

The problem of uncertainty

Another unique challenge that fact-checkers will face during this misinfodemic is uncertainty.
Fact-checking in the context of risks—which are, by definition, uncertainties—is not easy. New
information is continually emerging, and old information is often discovered to be inaccurate.
For example, given the novelty of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, there is ongoing uncertainty about its
origins and the nature of the disease it produces (Kuznia and Griffin 2020).
Another example of the uncertainties connected to COVID-19 are the predictive models of
infection and death rates. Models are just models, but they are often presented as “the truth” in
media representations (Tufekci 2020), even though it is often unclear to the public which
assumptions and data the models are based on. For instance, as individuals’ compliance with
protective behaviors evolves over time, the models evolve as well. Beyond this, uncertainty can
also stem from misinformation spread by non-experts. For example, a COVID-19 article published
on Medium garnered millions of views before it was taken down because the author’s “number-
crunching [was] riddled with inconsistencies and entry-level errors” (Requarth 2020).

The limits of knowledge

A problematic assumption often put forward is that people who believe misinformation have a
“knowledge” problem—i.e., they lack sufficient exposure to the facts, or they mistake falsehoods
for facts. Often, this is where fact-checking enters the picture. However, the notion of a single,
mass public struggling to understand “the facts” is known as the “knowledge deficit model,” and
it has been mostly debunked as an effective model for bringing individuals’ views in line with
 JOURNAL OF RISK RESEARCH 1057

expert consensus (Scheufele 2013). In part, this is because of the roles that psychological biases
and information processing tendencies play in shaping how people respond to uncertainty and
risk (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Trumbo 2002).
When processing scientific (mis)information, individuals often rely on “heuristics” that can
make complex information easier or more efficient to digest (Scheufele and Krause 2019). In the
context of risk communication, individuals sometimes form attitudes about complex risk-related
information by relying on their existing value systems (Ho, Scheufele, and Corley 2011, Kim et al.
2014). When new information contradicts individuals’ pre-existing values or beliefs—such as
when they are told a risk-related belief they hold is false, via a fact-checking effort—they are
likely to engage in “motivated reasoning” to defend their prior beliefs (Kunda 1990). Further,
even if the corrective message succeeds in correcting misperceptions, there is no guarantee that
updated beliefs will lead to a change in behavior.
Finally, risk and benefit perceptions are heavily influenced by message content that has little
to do with facts. Instead, emotions tend to matter more, with some risk scholars offering evi-
dence that hazards characterized by more “outrage factors” (e.g., the uncontrollability of the risk
or its involuntariness) tend to elicit emotive reactions that can heighten risk perceptions
(Sandman 1987). Put simply, “the greater the outrage, the higher the risk perception” (Ju et al.
2015, 880). Thus, as has happened with misinformation about vaccines, emotionally-flat “fact-
checks” about COVID-19 will struggle to win hearts and minds as they compete against misinfor-
mation that is replete with emotionally-stirring human interest stories (Kata 2012, Offit and
Coffin 2003).

Recommendations
Throughout this paper, we have argued for the utility and importance of viewing fact-checking
efforts as forms of risk communication, in that they implicitly attempt to define the risk of misin-
formation and to establish the fact-checkers as trustworthy risk mitigators. Further, we demon-
strated then when fact-checkers are communicating about a risk—such as COVID-19—they are
engaged in a multi-layered risk communication effort, in which two sets of risk perceptions are
at play.
Risk communication researchers have long demonstrated that different publics view risks dif-
ferently, and that varied risk perceptions can have consequences for how people respond to
communications, including how they take action to mitigate risks. Misinformation is no excep-
tion, and we must account for this fact during the COVID-19 misinfodemic, as well during future
moments of crisis in which risks are likely to be multi-layered. Thus, we have argued that it is
important and useful to think about misinformation from a risk communication perspective.
In making this argument, we have listed several challenges facing risk communicators in the
COVID-19 misinfodemic. Addressing each challenge, we offer the following recommendations:

Problems of trust
Fact-checkers should build trust instead of just saying or implying they are trustworthy. This
could be done by working with actors that are trusted among most of the public, such as the
CDC or WHO, in the case of COVID-19 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2020).

The limits of knowledge

Fact-checkers should not assume that objectivity will win against emotive and value-laden misin-
formation. They should make careful use of emotions, possibly by trying to connect corrective
1058 N. M. KRAUSE ET AL.

information to values many people hold, to concerns that audiences have, and to what they
deem important.

Fact-checking a state of uncertainty

When fact-checking likely-false information, make it very clear that definite answer may not be
known, if that’s the case. Highlighting uncertainties does not impact trust levels (Van Der Bles
et al. 2020).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID
Nicole M. Krause http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0550-9546
Isabelle Freiling http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6046-4005
Becca Beets http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3323-1281
Dominique Brossard http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9188-8388

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