Game Theory 19.1 INTRODUCTION ‘Compton isthe watchword of moder if Weean sy hata compstitv sotion exis ito gg individuals make decisions in situation that involves conflicting interests, and in which the ‘controlled by the decision ofall the concerned parties. A competitive situation is called a game, _game represents 2 conflict bewen two or more partis. A situation is termed as, the folowing properties. Thete a oot a ( Toenumber ofcompetitrsis (1), Thereisa confit in interests between the patcipants, (ii) Each ofthe participants has a finite set of possible courees of action, (@») Therules governing these choioes are specified and known toll <2ch player chooses a single cours f action from the ist of courses available to hin (©) The outcome of the game is affected by the choices made by all the players (©) The outcome fr ll he specific set of choices, by all the players, is known in advance and i numerically defined. The outcome of game consists of particular sof care of ection undertaken bythe a Each outcome determines a sct of payments (posit m ee tive, negative o zero), one to each competitr, 19.1.1 Definition ‘The term ‘sratgy’ is defined as «complet set of plans of action speifhng precisely whe lans of action specifying precisely what the player will srr cay os are contigeny hat might acu during theplay ofthe pe, ae es yes the decision ule he uses for making choice, from hs list of courses of action, Strategy ea ble ete 8 st of Faction. Strategy canbe © Pure strategy Aseayitcalepfneaom anf oan epee ‘of the strategy the other players might choose. ci a The (i) Mixed strategy "By. Mixed strategy is denoted by the set, S= {X,,Xp-%) 2 f= Qaomand X, + Xy + nde is re Sraegyis special case ofmixedstatepy pach tay beable to choose oly n pure state, buts choose them. soa -_ players. The game begins when. quaTeon 192, PAYOFF te Fervamedt thle nde ee APY oar fintthetp ote ie. MPO, ca using the following tes, = oes Player Saf rd len on oy = ay onl ; St O42 dy =a) o Player d Om 2 19.3 TYPES OF GAMES (9 Two-persom games and m-person gomes in twopeon panes, the py may have inany posites pe othon fr ch play te peat ean eps ein ‘nly two Heng, ts alles ro-peraon game. Incas of mora wo pesens the gane is senealy called person game w Toren geal ‘A zero-sum game is one in which the sum ofthe payments to all the competitors zero, forever possible outcome ofthe ue ifthe sum ofthe pins wn, eq the sum ofthe pois st. (i) Tworperson zero-sum game Agios vith oplaes Hee pin nen els theo af teh sown a twp sm ame, Naa alee eine ‘ame bcause their ac inthe rectangular em. The chances(©) Oniywoplaye pict in hewn, (@) Each player has fnite number of statics 0 © Exhayesisinteyrenlsinapeyede | (@ Total pay-off the two playesat the end ofeach play 19.4 THE MAXIMIN-MINIMAX PRINCIPLE Thisprince ius the tion ft tgs er Cons ho ply ag Aisa player who wishes to maximize is gains, wl player B wishes tominimizeislosts, Sine 1k tomatic his minimum gi, we nin lye 4 the vale led avin vig gaa ‘aresponding strategy is calle the main sate Ont aterhand ne ple ides tnininieisos aa all he minis aig isthe miniman ofthemanimam ess is and Te coresponing otgyisclled the mininarsp ‘When testwo areal aii vale minimax ale), hconesponding staeaes areca stele athe games iohae asi pi, Thevaue ofthe games given byte sad The scleon of maximin and minimax satel by Aandi bse upon the socalled mange minimax principle, which guaran the best ofthe worst esl Sask hus sR soe SSO Sn acannon a = SE byy. hae ‘maximin value= minimax value= 0, ic, if 7 Opn cee pemr Example 19.1 Solve the game whose pay-off matrix is given by, Player am Aft 34 Ls re Tatras = Solution Player 3 BB, Rowniniom Aft saya Pa tao: 4,-3.1 <4 alts 1) -1 Colmmainn 1 $1 Om Y one Ren, oe” Solin Yoru be eet rete gnaye Pye BBB Rowninina : ADA 6 2)2 f : wi 4 2 “19, q Example 19.3 Dern whic ote flowing ops zo-am prm cl emmine sic Given he cptinan sey rect pin eof eacea 0 Rod sa aie Ae A Al-S 2 aft renee AL Al Peed ae I “Masini = J “Ma e579 Moana) = 7 =Min 5 2)=-§ Soon oO Player B 3B - Rowman Aes 2 Payer ie ae Column maxima $2 i Since y = 7 =~$ #0, the gameis strictly determinable’ we me Bh tale ofthe une. te tion fie ode pat ea Uy)42 o Pine 2 By Row inion Ped [1 1] 1 Alas} eras on Maxi (minimum) = y =Max(-3)=1 Mii maximum) = 7 =Min(4 1)= 1. Since 7 = ¥ =1#0,thegameinsrictly determinable Yaluofthe games 1. The optima 5.4.8). "i ve Example 19.4 Solve the game whose pay-off ma 20053 ‘sezaweraratei2’ 4302 6 shes: =4°82'-6. Solution Maxi (minimum) = 1 = Max(-2,1,~4,-6) Mini (maximum) = ¥ =Min 5,3, 1,5,6)= 1. 1, there exists 2 saddle point. Value of the game is 1. The position ofthe saddle point is the optimal strategy and is given by, [4 B) EXERCISES 1. For 8 game wih the falowing payoff mate, Prayer A faze row [32% deternine te best sree 2 wo sth aun of the gare fr payers A an Bs is one a, Srety sammie? Ane. Vi oa = 2. Game ot a, Bt sty aie 2. Daamine teeta minimax statis for each ae th owing game 5B By aps 20 7 alsea o al 402-3 (hos. 0 4 8) 8 otra sto bee, Pim aay (i+ 02)= (a 0,) "P17 Laat-p, 7 aa (uF en)= (og Fay ft" 1g, The value ofthe game () = 2a = Git en)= Gs tant Example 19.5 Solve the following pay-offmatrix. Also thegame. the optimal stage and value of 2 st 4] Solution 5 4; wh Let this be, 34 a ag areal Alou on af A) on -(% 5) wl aler(e 43) vere, Pi" Give alen tan Cr=UeD § 1 pant 2 peta4 Ore Ran Y ena 4-1 3 1" Geto =O +) 44043) 5 ‘value of game, i * Theoptimum mixed strategies, Valueof game =“. Example 19.6 Solve the following game and determine its value. B ra[ peice ‘Te optimum mixed strategies, 5, = ae Solution tiscear that tvepay-off marx doesnot possess any sade point. Theplayers will usemied am igi risoas one ae (8 Senet \ -(4 4) pene se-(4 4) mere ayn econ _ OF] Gite = (aay ee ieee 12 = 4-(-4) git t 7s San “iat TapenaGrraDl te4=4-9 ie pa 274 Meer ea Sees te! alge Prmt=p, > pn t-d=4 beRenteletrr 7 eee ae a= ee 1" Gy tan)=(@n 4a) 4444-4) 16-2 eetoan sere, -( Etsy = G4) | 6449-444) ©.“The optimum mixed strategy is given by, and the value of game is-1/8 By EXERCISES 1. For a game wath the flowing payctt mats. determine th optima taleny And fh lve ofthe gang, | 5, A o e ‘The player B Would like to ek * Py io cinta ey aa pane 50a mica by i$} vametoned] a wo 6 265 <) 5} seston] 2. Two players, A and @ mach cans. te cana match, then A wins tO Uns of value. If cls do no mt : thon © wes two ut of va, enacted boundary ofthese ines lower! il give hemaximnen ‘boundary ower elope) aswelann wabesweng einen | Sram wala of reba py [Now the two strategies of player 8 : i a he sar eh Hasta ps rg temainin pit t ‘Consider the following 2m games. ‘Strategy for player 4 ‘Let the mixed strategy for player A be given by, 4 4) 5,- Peer AuPL p20 (Ge Pete bP Ps“These expected pn.tTequations are then ploeas neen shows the pay-off ofeach cluran represented 3s PX stuion The given problem dos Mieed tae8Y i | ; FT equation are pk re plowed in as ‘Se Fi. 192 wih wo ates and veal at it ‘Asil ig. 1941 ‘Now sine player 4 wishes to maimiz his minimum expectod pay-of interaction H on the lower envelope of 4's expected pay-off equat through H define te relevant moves tat Band B, alone need to Do dgamerediosta 2 2 \ ate ah } als 2 } ‘The optimum strategy ford and Bis given by, sc(4 2) nent . Am | (BB Bs j A: aoe ofthe game,a0 “o ons stag | 2. The companies A ang 5 % oeoe rorea ae of 3] 2 TTS Value ofthe game, EXERCISES 1. Sve the folowing problems graphicly. Preyer 4 +4] rapa icant ae eet ee pag 2 ae 00 ome ows dorsiate th row, then the th row wil be deleted. ° ‘pay-off matrix, all he element in the ti cluma re rete tan oe tte 7 frst column, Therefore, luna thesis dominated rst columa, Delete y-off matrix i given by, Player BI OrmUEEREn, 4 gus TOY «a ln) The «2 game can now be sl \ yt see Since no row (o clus) dinates NO . ; ming, ; rope metng Sineplae Beto mii mo pa mt es anions ee tes sow rome 27 saiton, Soe deantagg, EEE 6 row het ovale { pesca ‘thitd rom than oe, hat dominated row. The od Tale Tecan fc rd ea ih sive ba ae eee Bi op Seiler, ee east See Player B ws as arusipnied ronal - tows psn inte ppertondary igen bythe ie 4 a8 Th sia ne Decors senescent sms nice s-(§ 44) “4 ae gt (By By Bs) “Taeoptimum stegy fr Aand Bis given by, se(h Aaa ae (4% 4) penn cn eens se(4 9 parm ae at Value ofthe game, aa ‘The optimal strategy is given by, Wlocofine games =Oro ’ au EXERCISES sh st te pf mat ohn Mi que Toe i DT (9 Toe-peron games an ny posible che = fo, Hence iti egg Consider a2 « negevensis eee Re rE = len ox ‘The optimum mixed strategies, “halal 1 pss laoet py PO Gi Fem Cagragy PORTA E Py ae (Gar Fea)= (aa Faq) ft 1¢ value of the game is, v = ——2u@m= 44 ‘The value of the game is, (@u+4n)- Ga +e)i ae Orn Rec » ‘Monte-Carlo simulation yields a solution very close to the opt ‘exact solution. The Monts-Carlo simulation procedure can be sum ‘Step 1 Clearly define the problem. (@) Identify the objectives ofthe problem. (©) entity the mai factors which have the greatest effect on the objectives of the problem ‘Step 2 Construct an appropriate model. (@) Specify the variables and pat oe iowngamayae (®) State the conditions under whic be performed. (©) Define the relationship between rameters, ‘Step 3 Prepare the mode! for experimentation. (2) Define the starting conditions (©) Specify the numberof runs of made. ‘Step 4 Using steps 1 103, experiment with the model. needs the generation of @ sequence of random numbers, which constute an lation model and also Random numbers may be found through a computer using random tables or manually. The most ‘common method to obtain random numbers is to generate them through a computer program. Example 20.1 A sample of 100 arrivals of a customer at a retail sales depot is following distribution, sy ofthe tie requzeg POCKABES, ves the gua YS Comers "8 Gstibation Y IOE Up the iy, ; : 0g perme Estimate the average percentage of ; for the casera wating time ty simulation for thenext Oana sed ere preatngeofde teeth ews, “The random numbers are generate and linked tothe appropiate evens The ist 0 randoms simulating arrival, the second 10, simulating servioetimes. Theresltsareincorprsedin Table22. Lene assumption that the system starts at0.00am. 45 48 -o45mines, ime per customers, > 190 cr = 27min. Average waiting time (ot) iletimeoftheserves = jq_ =07Example 20.2 tourist car operator ins that daring the past few months, the car's use hes varied sp ‘much that the exst of maintaining th car varied considerably During the past 200 daysthe demand er hear 4 5 1 5 2 > 1 3 ‘ Tam | ‘The simulated demand fr the car rhe net 0 wes pains ‘Total demand = 28 cars. Pee 10 weeks period ven inthe tble shoe, a. Bxample 203 Amanutacuing company kop ska = ee cp sc of pc pratt, Provo expand, ‘Simulate the demand forthe next 10 days. Also find the daily average demand rte producto the bas ofsralated dats. -020 1s are transported across the bay atthe end of each da a be shi it E ‘i E probably Pie"! 5. Suppose tha the sales of particular ite per day is Poisson 8 of sales by the Monte Carlomethed Se e probability forthe sales is given byPO The simulated sales forthe next 20 days is given inthe table below. Day Tas foie Dar of simulation SUMMaRy amber (ovine i 1 ° 1 Computer (tem) mae tin 2 Ps 2 fom variable: “Th t indo 3 ° 8 ‘i come of conga nee ln aa 4 5 yer: A numerical ote a spk ese sno s 2 1s value assigned to. « ou i random na, ° a » JEN si. 3 20 EXERCISES 1. Th flowing dla is comand ina tba song counter The aha sa one min neva [We of persons arriving | 0 ' 2s elie -gencrated random number with the itr identi instep 1 nd ead 2 18 10 Step 5 Si the results obtained instep 5 = Step 6 Eval results of he simulation, ° 2 2 25 . 22 25 40 ao0 3 as 8 ‘There is 9 clark atthe office. Siulate the process for 20 arvals and estimate the average percentage of vehicle wating time and average par cant ofthe ick Une avalaie tothe clarkv coon TEDRY | 4 Construct the rest or pte) utcome and ie ay a. 5 Sees ect ea ca ees Brace geen whee, entabe Pt MENT Chapter y12 PECISION-Maxtyg ENVIRON; ‘ade under tree Woes of Decision Theory lace fe rary about decisions. Only so i how we use our feodom oe Seo Meret ene nee cof options is the main f "EME mcsbinc mae erst tons of Risk Peal ten a devon ar ch ic ville gen temas ermine ey a esson envrnmet with ik They ae Py ofa iting the ara deinen de conditional rf cach decisin-evet embeeo sene ak ternative by multiplying the conditional profs by assigned protaiites ig conditional values. Select the alteraative that ils he highen ENV. ‘A newspaper boy as the following probabilities of ling magazine No efceplessalf| 10 a Pea eae Probability oro | ais | 020 | ons eee alata eee table resulting fom any possible nd eee eee cach day wills rein apo o20 pepe i ahaha are ar ofits 200 pis. : i * = ! reed Wi hs we fom be flowing os lt 5, 4, Pee aa220 20 240 260 220 240 260 13 4 2. Compute the expected value ofeach decision profit by the associated probability and adding table is shown below. oy multiplying the conditions, +. The expected path 1 2 B 02s 50 35 6 6s “ 030 o 6 n % Total exp. 200 2s | (az23] 220 profit (pase) '3. From the above table it is observed thatthe highest possi (i) Expected Opportunity Loss (EOL) Criterion: An loss (COL) by subtracting the corres CCaleulate the expected opportunity loss ‘opportunity losses by the assigned probak that yields the lowest EOL is selected. hme] © No. of days 20 Probability 02 Construct the conditional profit and the opport that should be bought each day. A cake costs € 2 and sells for ® 2.50. rg 3. Compute the ex the ity lo feck decison erative by ‘ associated protebilty and then sun mung conical own a bleh.) an aOra Ree, SPE day, which the EMY method, ty problemi of minimis expe wo teers aeajr fran (EVP. Th el vr xpd pe ith pret inn Mari Example 213 Cote xpd low pret information fr Example 2 Sotation rae Find the bet ete te Ssinaee oer Sotution Cont expan eee te snag ee, zo a shes, Anna reef shen dog ye "Ascii poe of eens ofthe dig yur rr, = 2000154300002 5 Stnx04 4004025 a <2390 : 400003 #250044 389002510004 z Rea UU i Rey Example 21.5: Bate tm erpacy oases som ene or ‘Mean and Variance oF ach Alterative TT aternative) (0 7 2 soon [amo [700 joo | 2000 | 4000 percent. Find the best alterativ, when theiterest a Solution ‘Compute the coefficient of variations (1 143) oftheannual evenues ofthe alternatives. Ta, oy cro 0 cr 28-00 oye 190 “Result Since the coefcea of variation of alternative 2 lesser than that of alternatives 1 and3, “alternative 2 shouldbe selected asthe best alternative is launched in the market. ‘Under conditions of uncertainty, there are five criteria availble for making a decision. () Maximin ain eriterion or Minimax los criterion (i) Maximax gain criterion or Minimin loss criterion (Go) Sevage minimax repre criterion (@) The Hurwiczeiterion 21.3.1 Maximin Criterion this criterion the decision-maker achieves the maximum possible pay-offor the minimum possible cs ‘The steps volved in this are, | Step 1 Determine the minimum outcome ofeach alternative ro, respective ofthe column, || Siep2_ Sethe ighest maxim outcomes ofthe decision alternatives i Note: ‘ftisa minimax los rerio, choose the maximum n each row and select the minimum aerate . ofthe maximum oss Bo. | pce Toon prample21.6 Abs 3 a aera, ; Ps Ga ae At ite clove cabana foosble evens, The cendenen,464 Oren Reseacy 1c highest ofthese maximum pay-off is 14, the corresponding alternatives 4, an, 2 maximax pt hand are Solution Laplace pr associated probabilities are given by the best level are: 1 BO = 5 (+2 | Result Since the expected pay-off for perfume Ca 30 ° ° c ° ° 8 5 21.3.4 Savage Minimax Regret Crit Result Since the miniraum of maximum loss is in allerative C= € 15, thisalierativesbodd be tive selected, the decision-makers view falls betwoen that of exeme simian sd eres iso ae erat is mad by ergnng weights with certain eres opinion ad = involved in this eriterion ae: {after selecting a wrong deci regret. The steps involved466 ‘Step 1 Find the largest and smallest pay-off foreach ‘Step 3 Compute the expected value of decision off, ‘Step 4 Choose the decision alternative with the highest expected value asthe optimal decision alternative Example 21.9 Consider the following pay-off profit) matrix. 4 30 Solve this using Hurwicz exiterion with a= 0.75, Solution 1. Find the largest and smallest pay-off foreach alternative and compute the expected value of the eee ed at 25, product ad the cost fi ‘The expected demand forthe produce ae ig Mit the recive ec — a 0 Probability | 03 a cS Ey a & to decide upon the best alteratve among the tre dohions, () Decision node represented by a sa 40) bya circle. Alternative courses of act ‘Atthe end of each main branch, th ature node ance events sat in the form of sub-branches. 5 ‘The corresponding pay-off and the associated probabilities with alternative courses as a ‘chance events are shown on these branches, At the end ofthe chance branches, the expected values ofthe ‘outcome are shown. 4a),y Example 21.11 Amanager bas two independent investments A and B available to ‘the capital to undertake both of them simultaneously. He can choose to is successfl oly then take B or vice versa. The probability of suoces for. and both return investments require an initial capital Successful completion of 4 il return & 3,000 and successful comp 1. Compute the various action-event combinations and a ‘The net EMV corresponding to various ev rent decision 7 Decision ehernarive 3 ‘Result Since the EMV is maxion successful, then accept 2. nimdeiion, _manager has to decide whether or aot to dill well nhs frm Tai tne wells drilled wee successfl at 200 fet of depth Same ofthe frmers whoi i | ; on Cmena Solution 1 Draw the dns re gram the given problem. wt 0 Hey ne OS (wy Novae vie set oe 189 we Lk rey % se ae ° Yn a wg 04 Tae ase rn : Rs toy De Dy 009 etka 2 Compute the associated cost ofeach outcome and enter these values onthe decision tee. EMV of nade B =0.2 «12500 +0.8 «30500 = 226,900, EMV of node? =Min 26900, 28000), £26,900. EMV of nade =0.4» 1000+ 0.626500 20,140. EMV of node 1 = Min 20140, 18000], =€18 000. Result Thus he optimal (Last cours of action forthe manager isnot to dil he well and pay 18,000, {for water to his neighbour for five years. Advantages and Limitations of Decisions Tree Approach Advantages 1 Itsructures the decision process and helps decision-making na systematic and sequential err 2 Ithelps the decision-maker to examine al the posible outcomes, whether desirable or no 3. Hteommunicats the decision-making prooes to othersinan easy andclear manner about the fire. 4 Ibis maialy useful i situations where the ital dectsion and Ms outcome afc the subsequet decisions ‘5, Itdsplays the logical relationship between the parts ofa complex decision and identifies the time sequence is which various action and subsequent evens would occu Limitations 1. Decision tree diagrams become more complicated as the numberof decision alternatives ond variables increase 2 1 becomes highly complicated when interdependent alternatives and dependent variables are present inthe problem, 4. Itanalyzes the expected values and gives an average solution only. 4. Ofen there is inconsistency in essigning probabilities for different events, apa @ The decisioy oan aC Thess, decionemake ae AY the scion. The preken (id Event Evens ae (is) Pay-off Table 4, (+) Opportunity loss tas theese cig ‘Types of Decision-making Situation, ne ae peat ( oeontana Laplace criterion As the dcsion mater ts vious events he makes simple asemptan a Harvie: alpha criterion Thsmcted sass Intismcthod thedecsonmalerdeges sponta7 Markov Processes ang Markov Chains pened, i) 12.1 MARKOV PROCESS Mato proc its mate mol tt kt fn nd nay ng cach cventasitfillows The process a random eaten oamemayls nsiog Ivara Rusia matenatcan Any Maco ARerhiscntton, hegecal cot eee {8c despa iy AN Katopor dV Fl My pases a Sean se upmost senor tae saddam pone rly Matovn cece el ih ara noms sear eg conc with eens chor oe * Maskov process distin the current sate sown fps) aint ‘one at time). be * Ae he died rns rs bl ncaa of states irrespective ofthe time period. % aa Formal Definition * Markov process sochastic process fsa 8), fo sis ese than P, Leth] =e) 36), ¥e5 =P.) =4.20 whether. is rent 2, eda ) Matty cin isa sequac insane vis, Pls, rit F byt.) fy thal maybe representa, os PH Noe ung B12 Chast oy toporanttnctrinisthgy. Pa Theta rosa * cocoon dea ton oa vasreacted oan eect ge ra cro boat agente te Be AE a, 2. The ther imperana take oa les andes reaches the steady su 2, We assume tat the, 4 Inasineatorres aei a state a prbsiles Te weana 1h ae 122 MARKOV CHalNs -AMlarko eins pti = iat tin ee hanger an silty ofthe random evens changne ita Sosen tir aaa ate Wewlexhin Marv ha et owe ‘Mat degen ee ma estar a ccnp wpe ines tat econ pana What makes the Markov aia model nt ‘hn mah eae Tecate ‘en pethidine canteen Mato hina mainly ceniaetin ‘Melk uttgan Exton Cabin tae @ Dinreine Female for continuous time FER 1 Formula for discrete time neZ*= (012, Tnboth hese formula, wesc thatthe ters, are dnt nee eres. ends er falumbes. Thereby, we an write (20 fora date pos ofNckon chan,“pe pebty 1 0 ip fag apna er nie ses i ec 2 2 nt ee BB ap Fora sag ep ens: pyaPrsi“Hl8o"9 oes eeu waar se ne Genthae 27 Fe a inemogeneos Markov da Phe Pru I14= 9 ayP,= ¥ ph, gc ft Mak can) ta indt. SOE. yee 5 Be 5 Fi 121, Conca tine Inf. 12.1, ne sca Markov clin incontinent 3, we ave taken Wo independ expt inc ers 7,~£Q)3047,~£ (17, the smaller one he, you gota Serratia ca you gos 2afe ine 7, Tus, we can simply lela time nin 3 exponential of prance 2+4=6and te coditional probability of Tran Tis2Q+4)=18, es “a it ole as eee -feuing tothe same estes (5 6) pct Foe ts meg ap cn Oe eineythat he floving wee dean cf edscetine dag {9 Sarting 80 te tassional probabil is 1, ¢n sare fe tee ti (0 ating form, 10 Wansiet 03 we ned ie ap seating : stepson a average, (ring fo |e pin nope logon 23% or cain ean be Best represented in ote of hai (e)Ateorbing chains icehains jebave explained both these types in detail, forthe We ee aplication othe understanding ofthese, The exlanton wll uesaton ofthe one-run Sem Ste chains ae often best understood trough spl pes of Mako cans. One sch specs Nery chain stay i 0 Aboting hn fein wrk hans wndestoed beat hang cain, when tne te wing ese a) A east oe sat inthe chain proces sbarbig. or {0 All nonsbocbing ates in the cain r= is comet communits with tt ne Seating sate: “atearbing Markov chains rao known a Mav cin wi Site sue pce. In the init state sponte drsion of roby fi aston can beset by ema opr newe ss stn mati “Tuscan test be explainedbyanexampleandsdagam Fig 12). Q ra 1 io = 3 = Fig. 125, les fina [Example 12.1 Atoddlerakeshis rst step an ee are our comers in theroom (se Fig 123) Ifthe fodder isin any ofthe corners 1,2, 0r3, then theres an ul protbility that he woud tak tothe efor taht Ihe toddler continues to wa withou suring until has reached comer (placed at thighs tsdescremecf heat), There salon leave rebate my simply ka small cca rndsit down atthe starting point 0. Wecan depict itn « Markov chain withthe etfs 1,2 3.and Here we sec tha stats and are absorbing ses, The taston matrix ofa toes rt walk wil lek ike tis ‘