REPORT

- Shaik Hassain Basha

How much influence has France lost in Western Africa?
Introduction

Direct European contact in West Africa dates back at least as far as the fifteenth century AD
when Portuguese traders made their first links with West African coastal peoples. Previously,
Europeans has been aware of and had participated to varying degrees with West African
peoples through the trans-Saharan trade. Throughout the latter part of the fifteenth century the
Spanish, Dutch, British and French all began to establish their presence in the West African
context. The timing of these early contacts is linked closely to the growth of maritime
capabilities, increasing interest in trade activity with Africa and the Far East, religious
expansion and the Age of Exploration. Africa, and West Africa in particular, came to
represent important possibilities for the expansionist policies of the European powers over the
next five centuries.

The early contacts made by Europeans, primarily the Portuguese, in the fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries were largely focused on the coastal areas of West Africa and were
primarily trade related although missionary work and exploration did also occur. The
Europeans traded in slaves, sugar, pepper, ivory, wax, and gold during this period. The trade
in gold was a major factor in the expansion of European interest in West Africa. Gold from
West Africa, Ghana in particular, represented 1/10th of the world's gold reserve in the early
part of the sixteenth century (Boahen, 1986). Europe's growing dependence on gold and the
associated growth of merchant capitalism reinforced Europe's links to West Africa.

The West African coastal peoples encountered by the early European traders represented only
a small part of the richness and complexity of the region in general. Previous to European
contact, the region had witnessed the emergence and solidification of a series of ancient
African polities, among them, the Ghana, Mali, Songhai and Hausa empires and states. These
pre-colonial states, Islamic expansion and a strong pre-colonial trade network all contributed
to a diverse and complex social environment into which European traders, explorers and
missionaries entered, perhaps naively.

The Expansion of French Interests

Beginning in the latter part of the sixteenth century and continuing up to the middle of the
nineteenth century the trans- Atlantic trade in slaves expanded tremendously in West Africa.
The European powers began to enhance their links with African slave traders and by the
eighteenth-century slaves were an important element in the trade conducted by Europeans in
West Africa. The slaves were destined primarily for emerging New World plantation
economies. Rivalry and warfare between pre-colonial states, the expansion of the Islamic
jihads (holy wars) in West Africa and the growing Atlantic/New World demand for labor all
contributed to an environment in which the capture, consolidation and transfer of African
peoples became a dominant economic activity for Europeans (the Portuguese were eventually
supplanted by the Dutch who were in turn supplanted by the British and French) and some
segments of the African population in West Africa who were involved in the capture and
transport of captives to the markets.
Although the French had established a trade port on the West African coast as early as 1659
at St. Louis (present day Senegal), their participation in West Africa did not increase
substantially until later in the nineteenth century. Their participation in the trans-Atlantic
slave trade was always less significant than their European counterparts, especially the
Portuguese, Dutch and British. The French came to focus on gum Arabic, groundnuts (or
peanuts) and other raw materials originating in the interior regions. The major slave ports,
most active during the period between the middle seventeenth and middle nineteenth
centuries, were located between modern-day Ghana and the Cameroons and were largely
controlled by the British, Dutch and the Portuguese.

French Conquest of the Interior

Although the French had contact in other areas of coastal West Africa their efforts were most
clearly focused on the Senegal River area and its hinterland. In St. Louis the French began
what would eventually become their colonial project. Assimilation lay at the base of France's
experience in West Africa. West Africa would become a part of France. The French
colonialists came to think of their sphere of influence "as mere provinces overseas" (Boahen,
1986: 123). By the early nineteenth century an original goal of French settlement in West
Africa had been dropped in light of the difficulties experienced by early French settlers. Then
by the middle of the century it looked as though the most promising hope for development
was with the eager French merchants and traders and the expansion of their interests into the
savanna regions of the interior. The French goal of increasing their stake in West Africa was
influenced by similar policies undertaken by their fellow Europeans in Africa culminating in
the late nineteenth century with a European "scramble for Africa." Industrialization and
economic conditions in Europe influenced the expansion of European interests in West Africa
from the nineteenth century on.

British and French imperialism in West Africa proceeded hand- in- hand. Throughout the
nineteenth century the British and French were at work making contacts and solidifying their
interests throughout the interior. The French began a major push eastward into the savanna
regions under the direction of General Louis Faidherbe. Faidherbe had been appointed
Governor of Senegal in 1854 and began his expansionist program soon thereafter. The actual
empire-builders in the French context were from the outset, military men. British expansion
was conducted primarily by commercialists and resulted in more solid economic potential
than the French endeavor (Crowder, 1990).

When Faidherbe and his successors proceeded with their conquest of the hinterlands they met
with strong and sustained resistance from a number of sources including the Moors, the
Toucouleur Empire of Segou under Al Hajj Umar and the powerful Almamy Samori of
Wasulu. These were far from weak opponents and the progress of French expansion suffered
as a result of their presence. There existed a great diversity of political, social, economic, and
ideological organization in West Africa at the time of French colonial expansion.

In February 1885, the main European powers who were actively vying for control of large
parts of Africa signed the Berlin Act which formalized the process for the partition of Africa.
France, Germany, Britain and Portugal all had interests in West Africa and the Act provided
the guidelines by which each then proceeded to define their territories. By 1890, the French
had signed treaties with several African leaders which ostensibly gave the French the
mandate to annex large tracts of the Western Sudan. They negotiated these treaties from a
powerful military position. Their expansion was clearly linked to superior firepower and their
campaigns towards the Niger Valley were founded on this superiority. The French conquest
of West Africa proceeded fort by fort with increasing territory coming under their control.
Large tracts of these areas were desert lands not entirely suited for economic activity. This
may be related to the military direction of the expansion.

During the consolidation phase the French were concerned chiefly with carving themselves a
niche which they hoped would result in economic benefits. They sought to bring more and
more land under their control. It was not until the early part of the twentieth century that their
efforts turned to increasing productivity in the colonized areas.

French West Africa

By the early years of the twentieth century the French held most of what would come to be
their colonial territory in West Africa (including present day Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso,
Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Niger). A governor-general of French West Africa was
appointed to administer the federation and was based in Senegal, the only place where
African people had even minimally been assimilated under the original French plan. Only in
St. Louis did even a small percentage of West Africans come to participate in French national
affairs. Outside of this area West Africans had become subjects (sujets), not citizens. This
dynamic was due most likely to the increasing awareness by the French of the unlikelihood
that the African peoples they were colonizing would be 'suitable` French citizens. When the
original federation of the French West African colonies was achieved there was no strong
statement of the program for assimilation. The French began to install a very centralized
federalist administration in their new territory, a system of direct rule.

The governor-general in Dakar was to report to, and take his orders from, the Minister of
Colonies and the government in Paris. In the interior of French West Africa, the territories
were headed by lieutenant-governors who received their orders and finances through the
governor-general. There was a slightly different structure in Senegal where early attempts at
assimilation has resulted in the establishment of four communes or municipalities which had
a conseil-general, where assimilated Africans could represent the four municipalities in
France. The constituent territories of French West Africa were divided into cercles or
administrative units which were administered by commandants de cercel or district
commissioners and then further, chefs de subdivision at the local level. The French did not
utilize traditional power holders in their administration of the colony to any great extent. The
French appeared to understand fully, even at this early stage, that assimilation of West
Africans under tier control was not in the offing. Both the cost of implementing such a
program and the tenacity of the indigenous populations prevented full-scale assimilation
(Crowder, 1990: 77). Instead, the French sought to control the West African populations. By
contrast, in the British colonies the approach was the opposite: they used local power holders
rather than installing a whole new administration. Each system aimed to benefit the
colonizers. The French were rather harsh in their administration and their attempts to increase
their economic footholds, utilizing such means as forced labor (courvee) and imprisonment
(indigenant) to maintain and expand their interests.

One of the most important aspects of the French colonization of West Africa was the
requirement placed on the colony to pay its oem way as a colony. The French administration
sought to increase productivity and extract valuable resources. They fostered production of
groundnuts and cotton where appropriate conditions were present and imposed taxation as a
means of inducing participation in the cash economy. Where crops could not be grown, they
encouraged migration to wage- earning areas. Although slavery had been abolished in Europe
and the New World during the middle part of the nineteenth century, some forms of servitude
continued on the West African landscape and the French in their pursuit of gain often looked
the other way in order to insure the success of their programs. The French colonial encounter
in West Africa was driven by commercial interests and, perhaps to a lesser degree, a
civilizing mission. The political administration and the economic interests were fairly
uniform throughout the colonial period. Little was done to improve the lives of West
Africans, although attempts were made to provide minimal health and educational services.
Whereas in the British areas of West Africa some portion of the economic gain accrued to an
African middle class, no such dynamic occurred in the French context.

Growing Nationalism and the Move Towards Independence in French West Africa

By the close of the Second World War the colonized peoples of French West Africa were
making their dissatisfaction with the colonial system heard. West Africans had participated in
both World Wars to varying degrees and their experiences in them, along with a growing
opposition to direct rule and its exploitative nature, resulted in a movement which would
ultimately lead to independence for the territories.

The Brazzaville Conference of 1944 and the new Constitution of the Fourth Republic in
France paid heed to growing calls for reform in Africa. Reforms which included African
representation in the French National Assembly and the increase of local councils in West
Africa where Africans could participate in local governance were proposed and slowly
accepted. The rise of political parties and nationalist programs in french West Africa grew
steadily. Parties such as Houphouet-Boigny's RDA (Ras emblement democracies African)
and Senghor's Convention africaine gained support. In 1956 the French passed the loi cadre,
or enabling law, which allowed local government for individual territories in French West
Africa. It is important to note that the colony itself did not receive this right, rather it was
applied to sub-sets of the colony. It has been suggested that this fragmentation was an attempt
by France to create a destabilized and fragmented West Africa, perhaps in hopes of gaining
an upper hand in the approaching post-colonial period (Crowder, 1990: 78). By 1960, the
territories of French West Africa had achieved independence. The new nations were faced
with a difficult future as autonomous states with little to draw upon in their move towards the
future. French interest in their former territory in west Africa continues to this day.

rance convenes Summit for a New Global Financial Pact in a desperate attempt to safeguard its
interests in Africa.
Despite the declarations by French President Emmanuel Macron that the era of his country’s
interference in Africa was “well over”, France – and the West in general – have been losing influence
on the continent year after year.
Meanwhile, Russia, China, Turkey and other players have been ascendant.
Next month France will host the Summit for a New Global Financial Pact, which aims to reset
relations between the Global North and the Global South. But is it too little, too late?
Host Steve Clemons speaks with France’s minister of development, Chrysoula Zacharopoulou, about
his country’s efforts to rethink its relationship with Africa.
'France-Africa, the breakdown' (1/3). West African people have gradually come to reject
French influence, to the point of blaming the former colonizer for all the region's ills.

It has become the popular phrase of the moment, even in Libreville, Gabon's rather
Francophile capital: "French, go home!" This slogan was shouted on Monday, September 4.
It was aimed at a few journalists by a handful of people gathered in front of the Palais du
Bord de Mer, the official residence of the country's president. At the same time, General
Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, the country's new strongman, was sworn in as chairman of the
Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions. Three days earlier, Nguema, the
Gabonese Republican Guard's commander, had deposed Ali Bongo Ondimba, the president
since the death of his father and predecessor, Omar Bongo Ondimba. In practice, the senior
officer thereby ended 56 years of family rule and, in the public imagination, almost as many
years of collusion with France.

In Libreville, no political party has (as of yet) exploited the anti-French sentiment that is
boiling over elsewhere in Africa. "But it's just below the surface," confided a French
diplomat, "so it's best to keep a low profile." Paris has been content to do the minimum:
Condemn the coup, without saying too much; and call for a return to constitutional order,
with no advice given on the duration or content of the transition. Above all, make no waves.
Here, disenchantment with France has been building gradually since the end of the "reign" of
patriarch and autocrat Omar Bongo, in 2009, without any eruption of hatred.

The Ongoing Relationship Between France

and its Former African Colonies
For almost a century and a half France maintained a substantial colonial empire in
Africa, stretching from the Maghreb through the Western and Central sub-Saharan
regions. Though direct rule ended in the early 1960’s, French influence over its former
possessions continued. Through political, security, economic and cultural connections,
France has attempted to maintain a hegemonic foothold in Francophone Africa, both
to serve its interests and maintain a last bastion of prestige associated with a legacy of
past mastery. However, do these relations retain an essentially colonialist character?
To determine this we shall first briefly analyse the main rationale behind France’s
imperial expansion; its ‘mission to civilise’. We shall then explore France’s more
recent and existing relationships with its former possessions, and conclude.

During the post-1830 colonial expansion we see the nurturing of the French rationale
for justifying the notion of empire while at the same time lauding Republicanism. As
Charbonneau points out, in many spheres of French thought ‘‘the history of
continental France is very often considered to be separate from that of imperial
France… The constructed distinction allowed the Republic to maintain claims of
universalism. It allowed a denial of the intrinsic contradictions of the Republic that
were often blatant in the (ex-) colonies’’ (2008, p.281). Civilising efforts included the
development of colonial infrastructure, especially in railway transportation and
healthcare provision. However, the cornerstone of Mission Civilisatrice was attempted
social engineering through efforts at improving the natives’ quality of life, politics and
education, but often in the promotion of French interests and ideological and
governmental traditions; a recurring trend.

Slavery was no longer legally recognised from 1905, however forced labour largely
remained, though the fact that it was regulated supposedly made it less exploitative,
and the imperative to continue infrastructure improvements and instil a productive
ethic into the ‘workshy native’ supposedly justified such compromises (Conklin 1998,
p.438). Contradictions could also be found in colonial justice. A 1903 decree, further
reformed in 1912, called for greater respect of the legal customs of different West
African groups, yet the general approach was always that customary law was to be
respected so long as it did not conflict with French standards of ‘civilisation’ nor
impeded the hoped-for progress towards that ideal (Conklin 1997, pp.119-120).
French Republican sentiment influenced how the local chiefs and their peoples were
viewed; tyrannical and in need of liberation respectively. However, it was still
necessary to maintain many chiefs to assist in tax collection and enforcement of
French regulations. Some chiefs took advantage of reduced French manpower during
the Great War to rebel, often leading their peoples who had as little regard for the
French ideal as the French did towards their old, ‘feudal’ system (Conklin 1998,
pp.427-428). France hoped to expand and entrench its cultural and linguistic agenda,
if not for full assimilation of non-Maghreb Africans, then at least in the hope that
some kind of moral osmosis would ensue (ibid. p.429). Given the failure to seriously
commit the required resources, such educational programming was another example
of ambition crashing against the rocks of, at best reality, at worst indifference, for
even by 1950 illiteracy rates in French colonial areas were between 95% – 99%
(Cumming 2006, p.158).

If there is a theme running through France’s colonial era it is one of trying to forge an
African character that adhered to native identity melded with a French ideal, with the
moral compromises necessary to realise this vision made more palatable by seasoning
them with claims to social progress. France was essentially a Republic that ruled over
the supposedly ideologically incompatible notion of ‘subjects’ rather than citizens.
French colonial mentality was a product of its time, as was the belief that the measures
enacted were unquestionably positive. This protective mentality formed a strong
connection, ensuring French intent to maintain future influence.

Within a twenty-year period France’s African colonies passed from its control, though
Charles de Gaulle still perceived ‘‘that French world power and French power in
Africa were inextricably linked and mutually confirming’’ (Charbonneau 2008,
p.281). Though De Gaulle’s Comminute Franco-Africaine tried to keep the system
intact – not least through threatening to sever French support, as a dissenting Guinea
discovered to its cost – the African colonies, already used to de facto if not de jure
sovereignty thanks to Defferre’s Framework Law (Shipway 2008, p.20-21), rapidly
declared independence. Though a dazed France largely accepted this, we see early
initiatives to maintain ties with former colonies through economic and security
agreements, and it could be argued that the breakup of the colonial federations into
their constituent states made them more reliant on France than they would have been
if unified. ‘‘Decolonisation did not mark an end, but rather a restructuring of the
imperial relationship’’ (Chafer cited in Charbonneau 2008, p.281), and we see this in
Françafrique; the political, security, economic and cultural relations that, though
diminished somewhat, remain today.

Recent geopolitical events have spurred realignment of French foreign policy from
being too African-centric, yet old habits die hard when French interests are involved,
which have often revolved around energy resources and raw materials. In the 2009
Gabon presidential election, France stood accused by an angry populace of allowing
Ali Ben Bongo to defraud the electorate, echoing the support it gave his oil-wealth
plundering, anti-democratic father Omar (Crumley 2009a). Such interference, real or
imagined, is true to form. As with the chiefs of colonial past, France has sought to
maintain its interests by influencing African internal affairs, whether it be helping the
likes of Cameroon, Gabon and Senegal to avoid coups thanks to security guarantees
(McGowan 2003, p.357), or when in 1993 France, via state owned oil company Elf-
Aquitaine, sought to influence the Congo parliamentary elections by denying essential
loans needed to pay civil servants (Martin 1995, p.15-16).

Despite open summitry between French and African leaders, personal ties and
political networks have counted for much. Given the secretive nature of Franco-
African relations at elite levels – especially the machinations of the African advisory
‘Cells’ in the French presidency (Marchal, p.357 and p.359), and lack of public
oversight in development and private/public corporate involvement (ibid, p.357) – it is
little wonder this environment is deemed ripe for entrenching mutually beneficial
relationships and influence. From the early ties between Felix Houphouët-
Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and French elites (ibid, p.361) to President Sarkozy’s recent
trips to former colonies with business entourages in tow (Crumley 2009b), such
relations have made reform of political Françafrique difficult, to the frustration of not
just Africans but also of French diplomats. Jean-Christophe Rufin, recently
ambassador to Senegal, believes that ‘‘the old, shadowy, compromising, cynical habits
of trading political and business favours has just gotten more manipulative and
opaquer’’ (Crumley 2010). Replacing direct rule for substantial influence may not be
‘colonial’ per se, but neither is it a decisive break from the past.

Just as France has supported new ‘chiefs’ to safeguard its interests, it has also
endeavoured to preserve the centralised, socialised, free-market-suspicious model of
government institutionalised in its former colonies, with much of its development
funding going to central governments instead of sub-state or non-state actors. In
continuity with the double standards exhibited during colonialism, in 1990 President
Mitterrand announced renewed enthusiasm for encouraging democratic transition via
French aid, but statistics actually demonstrated increases of aid to authoritarian
regimes, generally countries in which France had economic and security concerns
(Martin 1995, p.15). Such prioritising of central governments – and indeed the shoddy
levels of education, economic dynamism and political maturity initially bequeathed by
colonialism – has arguably perpetuated social and democratic underdevelopment in
many former colonies and encouraged reliance on France, though this itself is
gradually eroding due to security and economic developments as detailed below.

A significant piece of the post-colonial jigsaw was France’s substantial military

presence. This, in addition to a broad license to intervene through defence agreements
with nearly half of Africa’s states, all helped France become known as
the gendarme of Africa (Charbonneau 2008, p.282). With permanent military bases
originally found in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroon and the
Central African Republic, responsibility to ‘defend’ Africa from Communism during
the Cold War dovetailed with French interests in maintaining regional hegemony.

The post-Cold War need to professionalise the military, along with recognition that
some deployments were redundant, encouraged reforms that reduced troop numbers
and closed bases, though forces remained stationed in politically volatile countries.
Greater professionalism and force projection meant that interventionism was still
viable, especially via the La Force d’action rapide, a 44,500-man force established in
1993 (Martin 1995, p.13). Between 1997 and 2002 France launched thirty-three
operations in Africa, though ten of those had mandates or fell under United Nations
command, suggesting that broader humanitarian concerns have become increasingly
important to France, with acceptance of multilateral involvement and moves towards
using interventionism to promote security and development rather than prioritising
often morally dubious order and stability (Charbonneau 2008, p.283).

France has good cause to seek to improve its image. Numerous resentments have
built-up against it due to political interference and armed interventions, not least the
legacy of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. French forces facilitated the training and
expansion of the Forces Armées Rwandaises from 1990-1993, and provided huge
shipments of arms (McNulty 2000, pp. 109–110). Though stabilisation was the chief
motivation France effectively if unwittingly helped militarise Rwanda prior to a pre-
planned massacre. Shock at these events, and a growing chorus of humanitarian
advocacy in French civil-society, have seen recent governments reform the terms of
their African military cooperation and engagements, as noted above. France has been
amicable to certain withdrawals, such as the pullout of 1200 troops and transfer of
base sovereignty to Senegal in 2010 (Bamford 2010), yet still retains the will and
capacity to intervene, as demonstrated in Ivory Coast when French forces, long in-
theatre under Force Licorne, assisted in overthrowing Laurent Gbagbo, albeit with
UN endorsement (Howden 2011).

Ultimately France has successfully used its security presence since decolonisation to
exert influence in countries where it has interests, maintaining both regional
hegemony and its vision of order and stability. While that strength is still potent,
strategic rationales for maintaining substantial presences are weakening and, in
addition to wary French and African public opinion, recent initiatives by the African
Union also threaten to further weaken France’s interventionist reflex, such as the 2004
creation of the Peace and Security Council and its African Standby Force to –
supposedly – allow Africans to intervene in their own affairs (Williams 2009, p.614).

France’s economic ties in Africa have run as deep as political and security ones.
Twenty years after decolonisation France still imported significant percentages of raw
materials and its energy dependence on Africa had risen from 30% in 1950 to 80% for
1988-89, including 100% uranium imports from Gabon and Niger, key to a mainly
nuclear powered France, and 70% of oil company Elf-Aquitaine’s world-wide
extractions were from African deposits (Martin 1995, p.9-10). Recently however,
these links are becoming less significant. Africa accounted for less than 5% of
France’s foreign trade at the end of the last century, when at the same time the trade
balance between them was around the same level as between France and its EU
partners (Marchal 1998, p.360), which can have only increased with Economic and
Monetary Union. Nevertheless, Africa remains a significant export market and target
for French investment. As the chart below demonstrates for the 2000-2008 period,
trade levels between France and the African region as a whole (inclusive of Northern,
Sub-Saharan, Eastern and Southern, and CFA zones) have consistently been in the
billions of euro’s, experiencing a marked upturn after 2007, perhaps validating
Sarkozy’s trade missions.

A major break in economic ties between France and its former colonies occurred in
January 1994 with the 100% devaluation of the CFA (Colonies françaises d’Afrique)
franc, a currency region which had been pegged to the French franc for decades,
though separate but interchangeable Western and Central African CFA francs
continue. This measure itself preceded the July 1994 Abidjan doctrine, where France
followed the Bretton Woods institutions’ conditions for budgetary aid, meaning it
could no longer ‘pick up the bills’ of client states (Marchal 1998. p.358). Another
example of declining French economic influence in Africa in the face of encroaching
liberalism was the Cotonou Agreement on free-trade reached with the EU in 2000,
further revised in 2010, as the successor to the Lomé Conventions (European
Commission 2010). This reflects a recent trend of major powers attempting to stake
commercial claims in France’s ‘backyard’, not least China, which in 2003 lay second
behind France as the biggest exporter to the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), some 11% and growing (Tull 2006, p.464), creating the possibility
of a new Fashoda Syndrome directed at China instead of France’s traditional
competitors in Africa.

French bilateral aid has always been principally directed towards its former colonies,
at one stage reaching 85% of official development assistance (Martin 1995, p.11).
Though France remains a huge donor, given the increased channelling of aid through
the EU, IMF and World Bank, it has been encouraged to increase distribution outside
Africa, though France is still inclined towards its own grand gestures alongside these
partners, such as a recent pledge of near $540m to aid Ivory Coast’s recovery
(McClanahan 2011). Nevertheless, with aid itself a means to exert influence cuts due
to the recent financial crisis, as well as this multilateral-influenced redistribution, can
only erode French power. With direct-rule long past and France’s African security
presence diminishing, the stick no longer retains the impact it once did. However, with
French economic ties eroding, the carrot may also start to look meagre, with potential
consequences for preserving long-term French influence.

 The rise of nationalism: After World War II, there was a rise of nationalism in
Western Africa. Africans wanted to be independent of European rule, and France was
no exception. In 1958, Guinea became the first French colony in Africa to gain
independence. This was followed by a wave of independence movements across the
continent, and by 1960, all of France's colonies in West Africa had gained their
independence.
 The Cold War: The Cold War also played a role in France's decline in Western
Africa. The United States and the Soviet Union were both vying for influence in the
region, and France was caught in the middle. The United States was particularly
interested in supporting anti-communist regimes in Africa, and this often put it at odds
 with France, which had traditionally been more supportive of socialist and nationalist
movements.
 Economic factors: France's economy declined in the years after World War II, and
this made it difficult to maintain its presence in Africa. France was simply no longer
able to afford to provide the same level of financial assistance to its former colonies.
 Political factors: France's domestic politics also played a role in its decline in Western
Africa. In the early 1960s, France was experiencing a period of political instability.
This instability made it difficult for the French government to develop a coherent
policy towards Africa.
The combination of these factors led to a decline in France's influence in Western Africa.
France is still an important player in the region, but it is no longer the dominant power that it
once was.
In addition to the above, here are some other factors that contributed to France's loss of
influence in Western Africa:
 The failure of French development aid: France provided a significant amount of
development aid to its former colonies in Western Africa. However, this aid was often
ineffective and corrupt. As a result, it did not help to improve the lives of ordinary
Africans.
 The French military presence in Africa: France has a long history of military
intervention in Africa. This intervention has often been unpopular with Africans, who
see it as a form of neo-colonialism.
 The rise of China: China has become a major player in Western Africa in recent years.
China has invested heavily in the region and has provided significant amounts of
development aid. This has challenged France's traditional dominance in the region.
It is important to note that France still retains some influence in Western Africa. However, its
influence is no longer what it once was. France is now facing increasing competition from
other powers, such as the United States, China, and India.

Despite these concerns, France strives to maintain its cultural legacy, with a
significant portion of development funding going towards education, scholarships and
cultural institutes. Various inter-governmental organisations and conferences have
operated under the hub of the Agence de cooperation culturelle et technique in an
effort to institutionalise the linguistic, cultural and educational links between France
and francophone Africa, and even the dedicated Ministere de la francophonie was set
up in 1988 (Martin 1995, p.8). Promotion of the French language is a priority, not
only for encouraging conditions conductive to positive economic relations within la
francophonie, but also, as mentioned above regarding Mission Civilisatrice, because
of the strong French connection between their language and the values and culture of
the ‘Latin’ world, distinct from the English speaking Anglo-Saxon world and its less-
than-admired traits. As the originator, France plays a significant cultural role and
places great importance on maintaining that legacy in Africa, especially the resulting
identity-construction encouraged within la francophonie, though, as Martin points out,
‘‘to the extent that it implies the inclusion of people outside France in the culture of
France itself, francophonie is a truly neo-colonial concept’’ (ibid, p.5).

As France’s global influence wanes, the African ‘backyard’ has been its best
opportunity to maintain a strong influence and relative hegemony; a reasonable
assumption given that French involvement has directly contributed to socio-political
conditions in these former colonies. Admittedly there has been an erosion of French
influence, whether by choice, circumstance or African leaders’ gradual detachment.
That said, even if they are diminished, France retains numerous and important stakes
in the security, economic, cultural and associated political ties between it and Africa.
Consequently, it can be posited that, even if France no longer exercises the status and
power it once enjoyed, a neo-colonial relationship has developed since decolonisation.
However notable French influence though, it is nevertheless diminishing and even if
present relations may be deemed neo-colonial, this is likely a phase of finite duration.

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