Post-truth Politics
From Brexit to Donald Trump, 2016 has been the year of the populist.
Jane Suiter asks why populism is on the rise and what politics means
in a ‘post-truth’ world.
I
f there is a dominant theme across
western democracies in the years since
the Great Recession it is one of concern.
From the US to Europe there are signs
that the centre is hollowing out as populist
extremes of the right and left are flourishing.
In Foreign Policy, The New York Times and The
Economist authors anxiously declare that ‘the
forces of disintegration are on the march’ and
‘the foundations of the post-war world … are
trembling’. Even the usually cautious World
Economic Forum warned earlier this year that
the liberal world order ‘is being challenged by
a variety of forces — by powerful authoritarian
governments and anti-liberal fundamentalist
movements’.
Symptoms
The symptoms are well known. In the US,
Donald Trump challenged the conventional
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of expressive voters moved by dangerous
thinking on political campaigns by
reimagining the process as a new reality
TV show. In the UK, a centrist government
pandering to right wing populists accidentally
facilitated Brexit, while in France, Nicolas
Sarkozy moves ever closer to Marine Le Pen.
Poland, Hungary, and Israel are all heading
away from liberalism. And the list goes on.
So what is happening? The answer is
complex. Arguably, what we are witnessing
is a toxic combination of policy blunders on
austerity, war and globalisation coupled with
a new hybrid media and political system
dominated by reality TV, social media and
filter bubbles. Combined with what has been
dubbed ‘post-truth politics’: where appeals to
emotion are dominant and factual rebuttals
or fact checks are ignored on the basis that
they are mere assertions. This combination
arguably results in the emergence of swathes
rhetoric and nativism. The swirling impact of
these variables has helped undermine the
legitimacy of the liberal order, opening the
door to illiberal forces and increasing the
potency of populist and nationalist appeals.
Arguments about the accelerating pace
of globalisation and deregulation are well
rehearsed. The force of globalisation left
many losers in its wake; losers who were not
particularly well represented by their centrist
politicians in the first place. Many lacked the
educational opportunities needed to thrive in
a globalised world and live with less security
and lower wages than their parents’ generation.
These concerns were rarely centre stage
among the political elite. The serious impact
of deregulation is also notable from the tax
arrangements of multinational corporations
through the bailing out of deregulated banks
to the direct experience of austerity among
the people. As Branko Milanovic of New York’s
City University argues, the rising inequality so
apparent across much of the developed world,
can lead to upheaval and even war. This is what
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 happened when the first era of globalisation
ended in 1914. The danger, he argues, is that
history could repeat itself.
Diagnosis
One problem is economics, in particular, the
economic instability caused by global financial
deregulation of the 1980s. The resulting light
touch regulation and derivative based banking
had huge repercussions for individual and
the global economy. The political slogans
deployed by centrist candidates and parties
are simply not responsive to the resulting
anxieties of people and especially not to those
removed from the security of the middle-
classes. In other words, the non-university
educated white working class who occupy the
middle to lower end of the socio economic
spectrum. Indeed, the old party systems make
it difficult for politicians to be responsive
and the majoritarian voting system of the
US and the UK effectively maintain a two-
party system. Two party systems leave large
swathes of people disillusioned and feeling
their vote doesn't matter unless they live in
a key marginal or swing state. In addition,
these large parties are made up of competing
even if cooperating factions, which struggle
to adjust to the new realities. The GOP for
example is made up of those who believe in
conservatism; small government; low taxes;
social conservatives; big business and finance.
But this arbitration cannot encompass being
both pro and anti open borders and trade.
Trump, for example, speaks about closed
borders, protectionism, and trade unions in
a way few Republican business and finance
interests would agree with.
The result is a new ideological rupture,
leaving the liberal economic order, possibly
the most successful intellectual political
movement of the past 50 years, in disarray. In
this world, the old left-right cleavage, which
did so much to explain political competition
in most democracies, is no longer as powerful.
It is difficult for centrist politicians to get
voters to focus on the problems associated
with financial globalisation and deregulation.
Instead, populists can, and do, focus on what
people can see: immigrants. Thus, while
there are still arguments between those who
want to spend more and those who want
to cut taxes, and left wing populists such as
Jeremy Corbyn, Yanis Varoufakis and Bernie
Sanders have emerged from an anti-austerity
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mood, one of the bigger divisions is in fact
between open and closed, between what
The Economist has called ‘drawbridge up and
drawbridge down’.
Political scientists, Pippa Norris and Ron
Ingelhart argue that while voters might explain
their vote choices in terms of pocketbook
and economic reasoning, many simply look
around and no longer recognise where they
live. It could be the rise of women in authority
positions, new immigrant communities, or
the collapse of traditional social relations. This
kind of expressive reaction may explain why
increasing numbers vote for populists. They
may not even have lost out that much on the
economic front. Rather, they are nativists who
feel they have lost something socially.
One result is that voter volatility is increasing
as voters switch back and forth between
the mainstream parties. One such cohort
is the white working class whose social
mobility was foundational to the American
Dream. As John Steinbeck put it, they have
the mentality of ‘temporarily embarrassed
millionaires’. Politically, they became the so-
called Reagan Democrats. Once anchored to
the US Democrats or the British Labour Party,
their political mooring shifted as trade unions
collapsed and their influence waned. Reagan
Democrats voted Reagan in 1980 and 1984
and Clinton in 1992 and 1996 but since then
they have been tilting Republican. Currently,
what seems to matter most is not the truth of
any given interpretation on this history but the
ability of a nativist or populist leader to appeal
to the instincts and nostalgic emotions of this
group. ‘Let’s Make America Great Again.’
But this is not the whole story. The instability
created by the catastrophic invasion of Iraq
is also a factor as is the implosion of Syria,
which stands an appalling human tragedy for
the people of Aleppo and a glaring failure of
foreign policy. Indeed, the debacle that has
given rise to ISIS has also become an effective
recruiting tool for populists. Ukip’s controversial
Brexit campaign poster featuring a queue of
Syrian refugees aimed to promote fear and
loathing. Indeed, in voters’ Brexit calculations,
it is possible that their resentment towards
immigrants was perhaps not as much about
EU migrants as it was about refugees.
If we dig a little deeper here we can see
what the populists probably well understand:
expressive voters. These voters are those
who vote as part of their identity, who want
to support the team. Emotional appeals are
often key for these voters. They may justify
their position in relation to some instrumental
or policy related reason but this is not why
they actually vote. Voters who feel ignored, let
down and threatened by change can stand up
for themselves and express their discontent
by voting for Trump or Farage. The populist
politician can exploit the natural resentment
that comes with feeling left behind, the anger
that comes with the demise of a well-paid
blue-collar job, and the rising tendency to
blame immigrants for taking ‘our’ jobs. The fact
that the policies of a Trump or a Farage are
unlikely to benefit this group doesn’t seem
to matter. The very low chance that their
individual vote will actually make a difference
makes the support seem almost costless and
allows the voter to put one finger up to the
establishment.
How populism took hold
Of course, there have been occasions such
as this in the past and the centre held. Waves
of immigration into the UK from former
colonies were integrated into British society.
The recession and industrial strife of the 1980s
impacted many people’s standards of living.
But what is different now is how immigrants
are portrayed and how the stories are shared
in the media.
As political theorist Andrew Chadwick
has argued, we are now in the age of a new
hybrid media system. Under the older logic
politicians and journalists were co-dependent
for coverage and for content with journalists
playing a gatekeeping role. The new Web
2.0-hybrid model, which includes social media,
blogs, reality TV and so on, negates much of
this. Politicians can now communicate directly
with the electorate. At the same time trust
in the older institutions in both politics and
media is continuously declining. Scepticism of
the establishment is such that many believe
little the media says. Outsiders such as Trump,
who innately understand the power of new
media, use it to devastating effect. In this way
a demagogue or populist can utilise this new
media logic not only to engage directly, but
also to drive older mainstream coverage.
In addition, this new hybrid world allows lies
and rumours to spread almost instantaneously
across networks and borders. We know from
the work of Nobel prize winning psychologists
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky that
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 when faced with a truth which contradicts
a bias we hold, we as a species are likely to
ditch the truth. Kahneman has argued that
irritation and anger drove the Brexit vote,
for example, without regard for evidence or
long-term thinking. But the established norms
and practice and in particular false balance
among older media, are also partly to blame
for maintaining false oppositions and failing to
uphold facts.
This so-called ‘false balance’ in news
reporting where journalists simply allow both
sides to argue with one another without
asserting the facts means truth becomes a
matter of opinion or assertion not fact. This
was clear in the BBC’s coverage of Brexit
through the acceptance of assertions, from
both sides of the argument, without evidence.
At the same time, we know that using
emotional cues helps to get audiences’
attention and to prolong engagement. In
a world where journalism is now disrupted
by social media, getting people to share
and engage with content is vital. Emotional
connection is often critical to making this
happen. Talk radio and Fox News understand
this logic well, tapping into a market for anger
and unabashed partisanship that is amplified
by social media. Being fair and balanced does
not drive ratings. This is the bedrock of the In his own TV world, he is always the winner. reverberate. In Eastern Europe, increasingly
post-truth environment where truth is simply a Losing is for dummies. authoritarian regimes are becoming
matter of assertion. In some ways, sociologist Neil Postman progressively illiberal.
As author and blogger Chris Mooney has presaged much of this in the 1980s. In Centrist governments must face up
asked: How can we step outside of our point of Amusing Ourselves to Death, he warned that this danger. To understand it we need to
view and understand what a religious person the pace of incessant media risks dumbing disentangle a myriad of influences. That in
is thinking if not religious, or what the outlook down culture by leaving little time for thought itself is not an easy task. One thing that is
and values of a conservative are if oneself is or questions. It’s sobering to think that his clear is that the old rules do not apply. It is no
liberal? Social media arguably bolsters this concerns were formed in the days of television longer enough to rely on centrist economic
where many fierce Remainers claimed to know long before the relentless pace of our current arguments around tax and spending.
few Brexiteers or see their point of view on online media. Governments must also look to behavioural
Facebook and vice versa. economics, to emotional appeals and to
Reality TV operates under many of the Centre holds – for now increasingly participative institutions. The
same logics. As TV critic Hank Stuever has Yet despite all the anti-establishment rhetoric bigger task and burning question is how we
argued in The Washington Post, pundits and the dangerous moves the centre is still can rebuild. We need to understand that we
have been comparing presidential politics holding is the UK, France and most likely the require intensive efforts to rebuild faith in
to the unseemly rituals of reality TV for more US. Neither Farage, Le Pen, Trump nor Wilders democracy. What many of the populists have
than a decade. The base logic of reality TV is will likely be will be heads of government in common is a liking for authoritarianism. The
poisonous as it turns us against one another, any time soon. But the danger is not just in benefits of the alternative must be clear and
confirming one subliminal prejudice after the populists winning power they may also unequivocal for all.
another. Types are cast and recast to conform be undermining faith in democracy. The
to stereotype. Of course, Trump’s innate emergence of the alt-right in the US and in Jane Suiter is Director of the Institute of
understanding and exploitation of this new the UK, the rise in hate crimes and lack of trust Future Media and Journalism at Dublin
hybrid logic is driven by his familiarity with in institutions are all likely to progress apace. City University and is a contributor to a
the inauthenticity of reality TV. Here, he is the In the US the splits in the Republican Party recent Routledge book Populist Political
master of sure quick fire business decisions. and a belief in a possibly rigged election will Communication in Europe.

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