Collective Memory

FOUNDATIONS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 1
Neural, psychological, and social foundations of collective memory: Implications for
common mnemonic processes, agency, and identity
Vanesa Fischer and Shane M. O’Mara
School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience
Trinity College Dublin – The University of Dublin
Author Note
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to Shane O’Mara, Trinity
College Dublin, D02 PN40, Ireland. Email: smomara@tcd.ie

Abstract
Recent advances in memory research within psychology and neuroscience have
contributed to a shift from examining memory through an individualistic lens towards a growing
recognition of potential social and collective influences on mnemonic processes. This shift is
prominently illustrated by continuing research on collective memory. Through a scoping
literature review, we identify three crucial components defining collective memory: memories
held in common across individuals within a social group, which are centrally important to group
identity, and which impact significantly on perceived group agency. This review attempts to
distil and organise empirical evidence into (i) neural, (ii) psychological, and (iii) social
foundations of collective memory, while considering the reflexive relationship between common
memory, identity, and agency (‘CIA’). We conceptualise collective memory as based on
neuropsychological substrates, influenced by social processes, and extended to societal,
historical, and political domains, driven by human sociality. To engage the complexity of, and
shed light on, numerous remaining questions surrounding collective memory, future research
should embrace a collaborative, interdisciplinary approach focused on issues of common
memory, identity, and identity.
Keywords: collective memory; collective identity; collective agency; foundations of
memory; social influences on memory; shared reality

Neural, psychological, and social foundations of collective memory
Ever since Ebbinghaus (1885/1913), empirical investigations of memory within
psychology and neuroscience have examined the recall of individuals at variable intervals after
initial exposure to test material (Clark, 2018; Radvansky, 2020; Stone & Jay, 2019). This
methodology has enabled substantial progress in understanding human memory (e.g., Hirst &
Echterhoff, 2012; Roediger & Abel, 2015), and has provided a secure basis for investigations of
the neural bases of memory in humans and non-human animals (Aggleton & O’Mara, 2022;
Reber, 2013; Rugg et al., 2002). Research investigating mnemonic processes within psychology
and neuroscience has mostly focused on the individual, paying less attention to potential social
and collective influences on memory (Danziger, 2009). More recently, however, research
examining memory through a social lens (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010; Weldon, 2000) has
promoted a shift to viewing rememberers and remembering as socially-situated (Roediger &
Abel, 2015) – invoking earlier tradition in psychology suggesting memory is, in part, socially-
moderated (Bartlett, 1932; Fraisse, 1957), and emphasised by other research traditions within
psychology (for example, on environmental (Gibson, 1966) and cultural affordances (Ramstead
et al. 2016), and grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2010)).
“Social frameworks” for memory
A different – and in some respects competing – approach to memory emerged in
disciplines such as sociology, history, and political science over the past century. Ideas regarding
‘collective memory’, drawing especially on the works of Durkheim (1971/1912) on ‘collective
consciousness’, and Halbwachs (1950/1926, 1992/1950) on ‘collective memory’ (Gensburger,
2016) animate this approach. Halbwachs, for example, suggested human memory was reliant on
frameworks provided by society, claiming “[…] our recollections depend on those of all our
fellows and on the great frameworks of the memory of society” (p. 42) – giving primacy to the
social circumstances of the rememberer. This way of thinking suggests collective memory acts as
a “schema” (Legrand et al., 2015; Wertsch, 2008; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008), or provides
“guiding narratives” (perhaps of a mythic or heroic past) widely shared among a population.
Rather than remembering fine details of events, individuals associate information with pre-
existing knowledge structures, easing recall of such information. Such ease facilitates telling and
retelling of narratives, shaping them into a simplified, easily-transmissible form through social
interactions.
Humans are innately social (Young, 2008), belonging to numerous social groups, ranging from
small (friend groups) to large (university members, or citizens of a country). Humans commonly
remember during social interactions, particularly in conversation with others (Hirst &
Echterhoff, 2012). We tell our co-workers about the traffic jam which caused us to be late in the
morning; we share what we learned on a podcast with our friends; we reminisce with our family
about our last shared holiday. Social interaction is a frequent setting for rehearsing and retrieving
memories (Kensinger et al., 2016). In a diary study where participants recorded events of their
daily lives, Pasupathi et al. (2009) found about two-thirds of events recorded were shared with
others by the evening of the day they occurred. Individuals belonging to the same social group
tend to share certain beliefs, attitudes, cultural norms and tools, which may impact their way of
remembering as a collective entity (Roediger & Abel, 2015; Wertsch, 2002, 2008). Wertsch
(2008) illustrated this claim with the example of civil unrest in the capital of Estonia in 2007.
Tallinn experienced two days of serious civil violence between two ethnic communities,
Russians and Estonians. The underlying reasons for the turmoil were different approaches to
remembering the history of World War II, sparked by a government decision to relocate a WWII
memorial (the “Bronze Soldier”). For ethnic Russians, the statue was a tribute to Soviet soldiers
who died during the liberation of Tallinn in 1944. For ethnic Estonians, by contrast, the statue
represented a reminder of their oppression. Wertsch (2008) concludes both communities had
been exposed to differing schematised narratives (e.g., through media and education), providing
them with unique “cultural tool kits” (Bruner, 1990) through which they perceive, reflect, and
remember their histories. These considerations offer an answer to the question of the importance
of collective memory: by collectively learning from past mistakes, we conclude which actions to
collectively avoid; by engaging in individual and collective MTT, we shape and make sense of
our lives in the present and future.
“History” and “culture wars”
The question of memory underpins much recent and current conflict – both hot (e.g., civil
strife), and cold (the ‘culture wars’ where disputes regarding history, identity, symbols, and
images loom large). How “collective memories” are guarded, revised, discarded, and altered by
new findings and interpretations are often flashpoints within contemporary societies; Fine,
2007), as the Estonian example illustrates. Understanding the dynamics of the “culture and
history wars” is of great relevance in many countries. The contextualising, preserving, or felling
of statues, for example, can be seen as an attempt to shape narratives around what should be
remembered, venerated, forgotten, or desacralized.
Memory studies and the collective memory research tradition
The ‘memory studies’ research tradition is concerned with diverse topics such as
commemorations of historical and political events (Gillis, 1994), international relations
(Langenbacher & Shain, 2010), collective memory and social media (Birkner & Donk, 2020),
war, genocide, and trauma (Paez & Liu, 2011; Stone, 2010), memory and identity politics (Liu &
Hilton, 2005), as well as how nations remember (Topcu & Hirst, 2020; Wertsch, 2021).
Moreover, ‘memory studies’ often subsumes ‘collective memory’ (Terdiman, 1993), focusing on
understanding memory as a ‘practice’ within society and the prevailing social order. Wertsch &
Roediger (2008) note collective memory does not fit “neatly within the confines of a single
academic discipline”. Olick (1999) suggests there are two cultures in respect of memory studies
– an individual one (identified with research traditions within psychology and neuroscience), and
a collective one (identified principally with research traditions in sociology, history, and political
science). Thus, the current intellectual state-of-the-art rests on uneasy and unreconciled tensions
between differing intellectual and empirical approaches to collective memory.
Defining collective memory
Collective memory has a complex definition within psychology and neuroscience,
embracing common memory, identity, and agency. Collective memories are currently defined as
memories held in common across individuals within a social group; they are centrally important
to the social identity of the group; and they loom large in the communal cognition, imagination,
and agency of the group (Barnier & Sutton, 2008; Gagnepain et al., 2020; Hirst & Coman, 2018;
Olick et al., 2011; O’Mara, 2023; Roediger & Abel, 2015; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). As a
shorthand, we describe these components (common memory, identity, and agency) as the ‘CIA’
of collective memory.
Distinguishing between communicative and cultural memory
Collective memory can be distinguished into ‘communicative memory’ and ‘cultural
memory’ (Assmann, 2008). Communicative memory describes collective memories shaped by
communication with others, while cultural memory encompasses collective memories shaped by
cultural artefacts. This distinction is not merely semantic or pragmatic: when comparing
mnemonic features of ‘cultural’ and ‘communicative’ memory in Argentina (the coup d’état in
1976 as a cultural memory versus the economic and social crisis in 2001 as a communicative
memory), Muller et al. (2018) found cultural memory was less personal, less emotional, and
more contextualised, while communicative memory emerged as more emotional and more
personal.
Scope and purpose of this review
Here, we review empirical investigations within psychology and neuroscience regarding
collective memory, emphasising investigations embracing the ‘CIA’ components of collective
memory: common memory, identity, and agency. The definition of collective memory as
embracing all three components is relatively recent: many studies we discuss are often germane
to just a single element of this definition.
Psychology, Neuroscience, and Collective Memory
A reference search shows the phrase ‘collective memory’ is, comparatively speaking,
used or cited rarely within mainstream journals in psychology (see Table 1). It is reasonable to
assert collective memory has been relatively neglected by theory and empirical investigation
within psychology and neuroscience until recently (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012; Roediger & Abel,
2015; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). Possibly the first to use of ‘collective memory’ in a
mainstream psychology journal was Brown (1915), who examined incidental memory in a group
context. As some incidents are more easily remembered than others, Brown investigated how
factors influencing ease or difficulty of recall for an incidental past observation impact on
collective memories of large-sized groups. Participants were asked to produce lists of items
which mentioned various advertisements (for a total of 215 advertisements). Afterwards, they
were asked to recall as many advertisements as possible. On average, participants recalled five
advertisements, and each advertisement was mentioned around four times. Brown concluded the
strength of appeal of an advertisement is related to how well it is remembered by most people.
Brown’s early work attracted few citations and little direct follow-up.
Table 1
Scopus search for “collective memory” (1991 to 2022; on 31.03.2022)
Social Sciences 1,337 results

Arts and Humanities 865 results
Psychology 309 results
Neural foundations of collective memory
Contemporary models of the neural bases of memory emphasise a tripartite,
anatomically-interconnected brain network supporting memory (e.g., Aggleton and O’Mara,
2022). These models envisage time-limited roles for the hippocampal formation and anterior
thalamic nuclei, with the cortex being the final repository of memory. Damage limited to each of
these areas results in differing, but related, types of amnesia.
Neural systems development and collective memories
The first explicitly-encoded, articulable memories tend to emerge at around three years of
age, in line with the development of the brain’s memory and language systems, with few explicit
memories encoded under two years of age (preverbal period) (Fivush & Haden, 1997; Fivush et
al., 2011). Akhtar et al. (2018) asked participants to recall their first memory and indicate the age
they believe the event took place at. Some 40% of their sample reported first memories at two
years or younger. The authors suggest such early recall is improbable, but fictional first
memories might emerge because of attributions of wrong dates/times, as well as the tendency to
construct a “life story”. Theory and data suggest the emergence of the developing self-concept
and individual agency during this early developmental period (Bullock & Lütkenhaus, 1988;
Demo, 1992; Stipek et al., 1990). Thus, there may be a lower bound of about three years of age
for the emergence of collective memories, and especially ones embracing identity and agency.
Mnemonic schemas and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
Schema memory (superordinate organising knowledge structures shaping subordinate
representations in memory) is supported by an anatomical network comprising the hippocampal
formation and cerebral cortex (specifically, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), angular
gyrus (AG), and unimodal association cortices; Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017; Spalding et al., 2015).
Several authors suggest collective memories are “schematised” – simplified and superordinate in
kind (Gagnepain et al., 2020; Legrand et al., 2015; Wertsch, 2008). One prediction is that
collective memories, as they are schematised, should engage ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), as vmPFC engagement supports mnemonic schemas. In a multicomponent
investigation combining archival analyses of French mass media coverage over a thirty-year
period on the Second World War, field studies of recall for elements present at a war memorial,
and functional brain imaging, Gagnepain et al. (2020) examined how collective memories of war
are schematised, abridged, and moulded. Participants toured the Caen Memorial Museum and
were asked to recall items and information displayed at the museum. During recall for elements
of the war memorial, fMRI was used to assess activity in vmPFC. Control models (contextual
and semantic memory) were used to predict the fMRI signal, and the collective memory schema.
The collective schema derived from mass media via archival analyses predicted the fMRI signal
more accurately than models derived from contextual and semantic memory. Thus, individual
memory may be organised through the schematisation, abridging, and simplification of historic
events in the mass media.
Conversation
Collective memories may derive in part from the social dispersion through conversation,
aligning memories in the conversation group. Schmälzle et al. (2013) examined possible neural
correlates of risk perception during real-life risk communication provided by mass media during
the H1N1 pandemic. Pre-study risk perceptions regarding H1N1 were assessed via questionnaire,
and participants were subsequently exposed to a television report on H1N1 while undergoing
fMRI. The similarity of participants’ neural responses was assessed via intersubject correlations
(ISC) of brain activity. ISCs among participants with high perceived risk (associated with
risk/threat appraisal) showed augmented anterior cingulate responses. There were no significant
differences reported for neural activity in perceptual-sensory brain regions between participants
with high versus low-risk perception. Thus, there was a correlation between individuals’ risk
perception and neural processing of information related to risk/threat (see also Hirsch et al.,
2021). More generally, information from mass media modulates individual risk perception via
activity in anterior cingulate brain regions typically associated with integrating information about
salience of threat and pain perception (Shackman, et al., 2011; Wiech et al., 2010).
Social networks and memory transmission
Transmission of memories within social networks facilitates memory dispersion between
individuals. Peer et al. (2021) examined participants’ real-life social networks and how they are
neurally-coded using fMRI. Social network distances were coded in the default mode network
(medial parietal and lateral parietal as well as medial prefrontal cortices). When controlling for
other potential influential factors (e.g., personality traits, subjectively-rated appearance), social
network distance was coded in retrosplenial cortex. Conversely, factors such as personality traits
were coded in medial parietal and prefrontal cortices, indicating a cortical division between
allocentric and egocentric representations of social distance and trait-related knowledge.
Amnesia and collective memory
A limiting case for collective memory is the amnestic syndrome: loss of individual
memory (e.g., through dementia or brain injury) surely impacts putative collective memory.
However, no systematic attempts to examine collective memory in amnestic populations have
been published to date. This is a striking omission, as variations in amnestic syndromes should
impair collective memory in differing ways. One prediction is that common memory, identity,
and agency (CIA) will be impaired in patients suffering from amnesia, but the CIA phenotype
will depend on the damage causing the mnemonic deficit. Impairments in episodic memory
should, for example, lead to decreased frequency and plausibility of collective episodic future
thoughts (Cole et al., 2016), whereas damage to brain regions supporting memory schema (in
particular, vmPFC; cf., Gagnepain et al., 2020) should impair collective memory schematization.
Psychological foundations of collective memory
Distinguishing collaborative remembering from collective memory
Remembering in collaboration with others happens daily for many people. A study group
in college may try to remember course content before an exam together. Friends may wish to
cook a certain dish and try recall the ingredients needed. Collective remembering is likely to be a
service for collective memory. What happens when people remember together? Do they
remember differently together than they would alone? Does joint effort lead to enhanced
performance? Remembering collaboratively may have benefits and costs. Collaborative

facilitation is a potential benefit of collective recall: group performance exceeds individual
performance in memory/recognition tasks (Clark et al., 2000; Weldon, 2000). While groups may
remember more than their members might on their own (collaborative facilitation), they also
might remember less than the pooled potential of all individuals combined (Hirst & Echterhoff,
2012). This cost of collaboration is called collaborative inhibition (Weldon & Bellinger, 1997;
Wright & Klumpp, 2004). Collaborative costs might arise from familiarity: as familiarity and
relational closeness increase, collaborative inhibition decreases. Thus, collaborative inhibition is
more likely to emerge between strangers than friends or romantic partners (Browning et al.,
2018). Collaborative recall performance might also depend on how cooperative efforts are
structured. Harris et al. (2012) instructed participants to recall collectively by taking turns or by
reaching a consensus; consensus groups demonstrated superior accuracy of recall compared to
turn-taking groups (potentially due to enhanced source-monitoring).
Collective autobiographical memory
Autobiographical memory encompasses memories of personally-experienced events
(Conway, 2001). A “collective autobiographical memory” refers to the notion that people can
experience the same events (disasters, celebrations, commemorations, sporting events, initiation
rites, etc.) both together and at the same time. Moreover, these events may come to have the
‘CIA’ characteristics of a collective memory – memories held in common with implications for
group identity and agency. Group members may discuss the event together and reach a
consensus regarding the significance and importance of the event being remembered. This
invokes selective recall of certain aspects of the “to-be-remembered” event, with the loss of other
aspects from memory. Collective memory necessarily requires memory conformity (or memory
alignment), which may happen as a result of group deliberation.

Children and adolescents regularly share selected experiences with friends and parents –
what happens to the unshared memories? Glynn et al. (2019) used the retrieval-induced
forgetting (RIF) paradigm with children (8-9 years old) and young adolescents (13-15 years old).
Selective discussion of certain memories led to an impairment in recalling memories similar to
those discussed, but not recalled. Specifically, not-talked-about memories were recalled less
frequently and with less detail than shared memories. Moreover, young children’s memories
were more malleable, and more likely to be forgotten when not talked about than adolescents.
Furthermore, memories were likely to be propagated onwards to others when discussed. This
social propagation of memories in turn facilitates the development of shared, aligned memories
held in common across individuals.
Memory conformity, collaborative inhibition, and collaborative facilitation
Collective memory requires memory conformity: we must remember approximately the
same things, and we need to align our memories with each other. Aligning individual memory
with the apparent overall memory of the group ensures memories can be synchronised across
members of the group. Group membership may inhibit recall, have no effect on recall, or
facilitate recall, depending on circumstances. Empirical approaches to memory conformity
typically expose individual participants to information other than the information provided to
other members of the group, and their recall is assessed explicitly or surreptitiously. Individual
participants are then informed of the group judgement, and the degree of memory conformity
between the individual and the group is measured. A variety of paradigms show individual
memory is moderated by the consensus the group forms regarding what has happened. Weldon
& Bellinger (1997), for example, compared individual and collaborative remembering.
Participants memorised pictures or words, subsequently recalling individually or collaboratively.

Collaborative groups remembered more than single individuals. However, there was also
evidence of collaborative inhibition, as collaborative groups also remembered less than their
pooled potential. A second recall block showed collaborative remembering was more consistent
over time than individual remembering. Additionally, some similarities between individual and
collaborative recall were found: hypermnesia (superiority of picture recall) and effects of cued
level of processing were present in both groups.
Allan et al. (2012) investigated if conforming to another person’s memory is based on a
strategic choice to balance memory accuracy of a personal account against someone else’s.
Participants were exposed to household scenes for varying durations of time (30s, 60s, 120s).
Half of participants were led to believe they would encode what they just watched for half the
time of their dyad partner, and the other half were told they would encode for double the amount
of time as their partner. Answers of partners were simulated (no response, accurate recall, errant
recall), and disclosed to participants before their own recall. Results showed that participants
were significantly more likely to conform to their virtual partners’ response for the short-
duration exposure (30s), compared to longer exposures (60 and 120s). Notably, this pattern of
conformity was only found for the group led to believe they had encoded for half the duration of
their partner. The authors conclude humans adjust their reliance on, and conformity to, other
people’s memories depending on the conditions under which they believe both parties have
obtained differing memories.
Memory conformity in dyads and groups has been widely observed across many different
paradigms. Andrews-Todd et al. (2021) examined if social pressure to perform impacts on
memory conformity. Participants memorised wordlists for later recall with a partner (who was
instructed to recall some words incorrectly). When participants were cued to act in a way that
communicates competence (individual-directed pressure), they were significantly more likely to
incorporate their partners’ errors into their own recall. When focusing on the accuracy of their
partner’s recall (goal-directed pressure), participants were significantly less likely to inaccurately
recall their partner’s inaccuracies. Thus, differing types of pressure in collaborative settings aid
or impede recall performance.
Relationships also matter: in a study by Roediger et al. (2001), participants viewed
household scenes and memorised present items for either 15 or 60s. During recall, participants
were assigned a stranger as partner. Both were instructed to recall items they had seen. On
occasion, the assigned partner falsely recalled items not actually present. Some of these items
were highly consistent with the scene, others were more unrelated. Subsequently, the participant
was asked to recall the items. Falsely-recalled items were more frequent in conditions where the
participant’s partner had falsely-recalled beforehand. In addition, false recall due to social
influence was more likely for shorter exposure (15s vs 60s), and when the intrusion was
consistent with the scene (e.g., a toaster in a kitchen setting). In a complementary investigation,
Browning et al. (2018) investigated prospective memory performance in dyads of strangers, and
intimate couples. For strangers, collaborative inhibition occurred, whereas for intimate couples
there was no evidence of collaborative inhibition (collaborative performances were similar to
those achieved apart). Altogether, the authors suggest collaboration may be costly for
prospective memory; however, intimate relationships may reduce or omit the usual collaborative
cost. In another example, Gates et al. (2017) examined large-scale collaborative recall:
collaborative inhibition was most visible in triads, but did not uniformly occur within larger
interactional groups.
Collaborative recall and subsequent memory performance
Collaborative remembering may have downstream effects on memory performance.
Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin (2007) examined collaboration effects on recognition performance in
individuals. Participants were asked to encode material and focus on either surface
characteristics or deeper meaning. Recognition memory performance was assessed after either
participating in a group discussion or not (collaboration vs. isolation). Individual recognition
memory performance was significantly increased for participants in the collaboration condition.
Further, although memory decreased over time, collaboration still impacted positively on
recognition memory. Thus, collaboration can boost recognition memory in individuals, and this
positive influence appears lasting (see also Hyman et al., 2014).
Collaborative Remembering in Older Adults
Collaborative memory has largely been investigated in younger populations. Henkel &
Rajaram (2011) asked younger and older adults to memorise a list of words for later recall.
Generally, older adults’ recall performance was poorer than young adults. However, the costs
and benefits of collaborative remembering appeared to be the same: collaborative remembering
reduced correct and errant recall, was linked to positive attitudes about its value, and generated
collective memories. Collaborative remembering within older adults may have implications for
providing additional support for recall in this population.
Bridging the past, present and future with collective memory
The content of memories is based in the past, but remembering itself is temporally
reversed, taking place in the present (Hall, 1998; Tulving, 1985). If how we collectively view the
past can shape who we feel we are in the present, could this be true for the future also?
Individually, the connection between remembering the past and imagining the future is well-
established (Merck et al., 2016). Episodic forethought is shaped by narratives regarding the past,
starting in early childhood (Shin et al., 2020). Conversely, deficits in remembering the past (as
seen in amnestic patients), frequently accompany difficulties in imagining the future (Hassabis et
al., 2007; Klein et al., 2002).
To test the possibility of past-future connections being present in collective memory, we
discuss the concept of agency. Agency can be defined as the subjective conviction of being able
to choose and control actions and outcomes (Potter & Mitchell, 2022). Subjective agency in the
past is connected to perceived agency in the future (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Merck et al.,
2016). As an example, consider Mary who successfully completed last year’s marathon because
she had trained consistently in the months beforehand. Consequently, Mary believes if she
decided to run another marathon in the future, she could achieve that goal. Although more
researched on an individual level, collectives might also express a sense of agency (Stollberg et
al., 2015; Topcu & Hirst, 2020). Notably, participants expected themselves and the nation as a
whole to have more control over the future than they believed they have had over the past. This
notion of increased agency in the future partially explains increased optimism for the future.
Although Topcu and Hirst’s (2020) study looked at nationhood as a collective, it is likely the
relation between past and future collective thinking also applies for other types of groups (Merck
et al., 2016).
Mental time travel
Mental time travel (MTT) allows us to revisit the past and imagine the future. Most
likely, MTT is facilitated by interactions between multiple cognitive mechanisms (Suddendorf et
al., 2009), including executive functioning, prospective and episodic memory, self-awareness,
temporal and spatial understanding, attention, imagination, and communicative language (Brocas
& Carrillo, 2018; Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007). MTT has
largely been investigated on an individual basis, but the notion of “collective MTT” has emerged
recently. To bridge the gap between individual and collective MTT, communication may be of
great importance: Corballis (2019) suggests our ability to communicate and share our mental
journeys is significantly more developed than is necessary for individual experience alone.
Communication via language may enhance MTT, evident in human storytelling, conversation,
and music production. If individual memory facilitates individual MTT, it seems reasonable to
surmise collective memory supports collective MTT, thereby allowing a group to collectively
revisit the past, and to (re-) imagine and envision possible and alternative collective futures
(Topcu & Hirst, 2020). A potential mechanism underlying collective MTT could be the
synchronisation of shared realities via communication, for instance, through conversational
remembering. While remembering in conversation may lead to a shared representation of the
past via concurrent retrieval and SS-RIF effects, imagining a future together may lead to
convergence of collective representations of the future (Michaelian & Sutton, 2017).
There have been few investigations of how collective memories might facilitate
collective mental time travel. How groups might collectively imagine the future together is more
than a matter of theoretical interest, for many problems we might face are future-located – they
might happen in the future, and require collective action in the present to forestall them.
Establishing people can recall significant events regarding their nation’s past is central to
showing that collective mental time travel is possible. Topcu and Hirst (2020) explore if
‘national mental time travel’ is possible in two experiments where they asked participants to
recall 15 significant national events from the past 50 years, and to imagine 15 significant national
events over the next 50 years. Participants rated each item’s sharpness, visual detail, sound
detail, vividness, detailedness, location clarity, time clarity, and comprehensibleness. They also
dated when the event happened, the emotional valence of the event for them, their agency (the
extent to which the self, others, or circumstances caused the events), and finally, the
“entitativity” of the group (the extent to which the group believes it has agency over the actions
of the group). Topcu and Hirst found participants believed agents affecting the past or future
most were impersonal institutions and organisations: institutions and organisations were regarded
as affecting the course of the past on about 60% of occasions, and on about 75% of occasions for
the future. Participants also displayed an ‘agency bias’ for their nation’s future, believing the
nation would be able to do more things in the future than in the past. The authors conclude there
is a strong relationship between how people remember their country’s past and how they imagine
their country’s future, because participants were more likely to “imagine specifically
phenomenally rich and positive future events if their memories of past national events had
corresponding levels of these attributes”.
Damage to the hippocampal region leads to significant impairments in remembering and
imagining the individual past and future (Hassabis et al. 2007; Buckner 2010), but does not
necessarily compromise the ability to recall and envision the collective past and future (Klein et
al. 2002; Szpunar et al. 2014). Understanding the neural substrates of future thinking will enrich
theories of collective memory. Collective MTT likely relies on the same mental systems and
structures as individual MTT (Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016). Investigations of patient populations
using functional brain imaging are of particular interest: Cole et al. (2016), for example,
examined episodic future thoughts in a patient (HCM) suffering from antero- and retrograde
amnesia. Compared to age-matched, neurologically-healthy controls, Patient HCM showed a

reduction in episodic future thinking, and a decline in the plausibility of reported episodic future
thoughts.
Social foundations of collective memory
Social contagion
Social contagion occurs when a memory spreads from one individual to one or multiple
others via social interaction (Roediger et al., 2001). This ‘mnemonic spread’ is not limited to
memories based on shared events, but may involve events and experiences only one party was
initially exposed to. Thus, individuals can be influenced by another person’s memory in a way
they come to believe is their own, leading to the creation of “false memories” (Meade &
Roediger, 2002). For instance, Hyman & Billings (1998) examined individual differences in
false childhood memories. Based on events recounted by parents on behalf of their children, the
children (now students) were asked about real childhood events, as well as one fictional event
(while being led to believe by their parents it was true). When participants failed to recall an
event (true or fictional), they were cued to use self-knowledge to imagine the event. Twenty-five
percent of the students developed false memories related to the fictional event presented; false
memories were more likely to be created by students who connected the fictional event to
relevant self-knowledge. Where memories are based on shared experiences, social contagion
may not lead to the creation of false memories, but to an alteration of the memory following the
social interaction (Roediger et al., 2001). Thus, individuals may not come to remember
something they never experienced themselves, but instead may remember what they experienced
differently.
Both false memories and altered memories resulting from social interactions may become
incorporated into a collectively-shared memory (e.g., between children and their parents). Social
contagion tends to be stronger in cases where (a) presented information is consistent with
expectations, stereotypes, and mental schemas (Kashima, 2000; Roediger et al., 2001), (b)
duration of exposure to and opportunity of encoding of stimuli is short rather than long (Allan et
al., 2012; Roediger et al., 2001), (c) information is conveyed by someone relationally-close (e.g.,
friends, partners) (Peker & Tekcan, 2009), (d) multiple individuals advocating for the same
information (Meade & Roediger, 2002), (e) information conveyed face-to-face (Meade &
Roediger, 2002), (f) the person sharing the information is perceived as more powerful
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2008) and dominant (Cuc et al., 2006) by the listener, (g) non-emotional
memories are concerned (Kensinger et al., 2016), and (h) the social influence between two
interaction partners is perceived as reciprocal (Mahmoodi et al., 2018).
Social reinforcement
Remembering in social settings can lead to reinforcement of memories. Reinforcement
takes place through repetition and practice effects when a memory is retrieved and re-affirmed
by an interactional partner (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2007; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997).
Consequently, reinforced memories are more easily accessed and recalled than non-reinforced
memories (Blumen & Rajaram, 2008).
Retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF)
Since human beings remember selectively, some memories are retrieved, mentioned, and
reinforced, and others are not. Unretrieved and unmentioned memories are more likely to be
forgotten (Coman & Hirst, 2012; Cuc et al., 2006): from early in life, children and young
adolescents tend to recall autobiographical events less when they do not share them with peers or
family (Glynn, 2019). Equally, when certain details of a memory are retrieved, retrieval of
related, but unmentioned, details becomes less likely (Cuc et al., 2006; Hirst, 2010). These
effects are not exclusive to individuals actively recounting themselves, but also when being
exposed to a speaker selectively remembering aspects of a shared experience (Coman & Hirst,
2012, 2015).
Reinforcement and RIF effects appear quite robust. For instance, Coman & Hirst (2012)
found that (with the exception of extremes) speakers may influence listeners’ memories
regardless of whether they share similar attitudes. Nonetheless, moderating factors have been
found for reinforcement and RIF: for topics perceived as self-relevant by listeners, congruence of
attitude in relation to the speaker may indeed play a role (Mao et al., 2021). Additionally, the
magnitude of reinforcement and RIF effects is amplified when listener and speaker belong to the
same social group (Coman & Hirst, 2015; Yamashiro & Hirst, 2019). However, reinforcement
and RIF do not automatically occur when a speaker is retrieving and sharing a memory. Rather,
both effects appear to hinge on the condition of concurrent retrieval of the memory by the
listener (Coman & Hirst, 2015; Mao et al., 2021).
Although some evidence suggests impacts of practice and RIF effects are stronger for
speakers than listeners (e.g., Cuc et al., 2006), both speaker and listener are influenced by
collective retrieval (Cuc et al. 2007; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). Consequently, both parties are
subject to mnemonic convergence – the development of a shared version of the discussed
memory (Coman & Hirst, 2015; Hyman et al., 2014).

Multiple social exchanges
Human memory is not independent of the social context in which it is developed,
retrieved, and potentially rehearsed at a later point in time. However, most research investigating
effects of social interactions on subsequent memory focuses on single instances of interactions
(Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). It seems unlikely such influences are limited to the initial exchange
(Bartlett, 1932). Coman and Hirst (2012) explored if and how mnemonic effects of social
interaction (particularly RIF and practice effects) spread across multiple social exchanges.
Conversational influence could propagate through social interactions, supporting the hypothesis
of the transitivity of mnemonic spread. Additionally, practice and retrieval-induced forgetting
traversed chains of interactions and accumulated across social exchanges (see also Yamashiro &
Hirst, 2019). Similarly, Yamashiro and Hirst (2014) studied mnemonic convergence in social
networks, and found memories converge within a social group depending on proximity of
individuals. An increase in relational proximity was associated with an increase in convergent
remembering for both directly- and indirectly-connected network members (but not unconnected
individuals).
Collective memory and shared realities
Social influences on human remembering may result in individuals developing a shared
rendering of the past (Hirst, 2010; Watts, 2003). Cooperation undergirds human sociality, which
is facilitated by the experience of a shared reality, an experience of “commonality of individuals’
inner states” (Echterhoff et al., 2009). Shared realities may encompass shared knowledge,
attitudes, attention, and/or memories. Echterhoff et al. (2009) propose two motives underpinning
the creation of shared realities: epistemic and relational. When driven by an epistemic motive,
we seek to develop an accurate understanding of the world around us (Higgins, 2012), whereas
relational intentions are fuelled by our need to connect and belong (Hirst, 2010). An example of
an epistemic motivation for shared reality (in this case, shared knowledge) is Wegner’s (1987;
Wegner et al., 1991) concept of transactive memory. Individual members of groups acquire
expertise in specific domains of knowledge, which represents an adaptive benefit, allowing the
group to “share the load” of knowledge and to know more collectively than they would
individually. Rossignac-Milon et al. (2021) examined shared reality in dyadic interactions,
finding an increase in shared reality was associated with an increase in subjective closeness
between interactional partners. When their shared reality was challenged experimentally,
relationally-close dyads (e.g., romantic partners) engaged in behaviours aimed at re-confirming
their sense of shared reality.
Social influences on memory may facilitate the creation of collective, shared memories,
allowing us to form social bonds, and thereby create collective identities (Hirst, 2010). By
definition, a shared memory becomes a collective memory only if it pertains to a collective’s
sense of identity and agency (Hirst & Manier, 2008). Much as autobiographical memory in
individuals is understood to be crucial in shaping a sense of personal identity (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), collective memory contributes to collective identity. In line with this
reasoning, Coman and Hirst (2015) concluded social mechanisms impacting our remembering
(e.g., SSRIF effects) may protect group affiliation and identity (see also Edy, 1999).
Collective memory in everyday life
Shared realities and memories may have practical implications such as facilitating
collective action (Langfield-Smith, 1992; Thomas et al., 2016; Willer, 2009). Thus, the social
malleability of memory is important (Brown et al., 2012; Hirst, 2010) for supporting and
fostering human sociality (Hirst, 2010; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012), offering a potential
explanation for why social contagion and RIF have persisted through evolution (Gazzaniga,
1985; Hirst, 2010).
Traditional cultural artefacts
Cultural memories can be shaped, transmitted, and maintained through presented or
found cultural artefacts. Any symbol accessible to the public may be a catalyst for the creation
and perpetuation of cultural memory (Olick, 1999), ranging from education (e.g., textbooks),
museums, monuments, and memorials, to architectural creations. Humans have long recognised
the potential of harnessing collectively-shared representations. The U.S. Government, for
instance, introduced compulsory schooling during mass migration in the 19th and early 20th
century – in part as a way of nation-building (Bandiera et al., 2019). With education as an
important channel of knowledge transmission, it was possible to broadly convey U.S. civic
values to people with migrational – and thus culturally diverse – backgrounds.
A recent illustration of the use of education as a tool to collectively shape political beliefs
and attitudes is considered by Cantoni et al. (2017) in the context of China. A new school
curriculum was introduced across Chinese provinces in a staggered fashion from 2004 to 2010.
The authors identified alterations made to textbooks, linking them to desired outcomes of the
reform on part of the government. By assessing attitudes before and after the introduction of the
new curriculum, they found students developed more positive perspectives on the government of
China, greater distrust regarding free markets, and increased scepticism towards democracy.
Considering the extensive collective rehearsal and retrieval of school material, it is not surprising
educational policies are potent tools for shaping and perpetuating collective memories (Abel et
al., 2018).
Monuments and memorials are an important channel through which cultural memory is
created and sustained. Historically, memorials were predominantly erected to commemorate
remarkable individuals and significant achievements on a national level. However, the last
century saw a rise in commemoration attempts of darker aspects of history (Stone, 2004).
Holocaust memorialisation has taken place mainly throughout Europe (Germany, in particular)
and in Israel (Huyssen, 2012). A prominent example in Berlin is the “Memorial to the Murdered
Jews of Europe”. Some praised the memorial for its remembrance of the formerly-thriving
Jewish community in Berlin, while others criticised the appropriateness of its design, or
suggested there was no additional need for a memorial, given the presence of memorialisation of
numerous concentration camps in Berlin (Neumärker, 2012; “Press cool on Berlin memorial”,
2005).
Other cultural artefacts with potential impacts on collective remembering are museums.
Although part-purposed to convey ‘objective’ accounts of the historical past to educate the
public, there is an increasing recognition of museums as “sites of cultural contestation and
negotiation” (Huyssen, 2012; Stone, 2004). As such, passive collective remembrance may
transition to a more active and dynamic practice of collective remembering. One important
component of actively remembering the past can be seen in attempts of symbolic reparation.
With respect to historical wrongdoings, commemoration in memorials or museums can provide
an invitation and space for healing and repair (Sodaro, 2018). While there is a gap in the
literature regarding how precisely cultural artefacts shape collective memory, or why some
artefacts elicit a stronger response than others (Stone & Jay, 2019), there is little doubt regarding
their powerful function in shaping collective narratives of the past (Olick, 1999).
Newer cultural artefacts: Mass and social media
Mass media play a crucial role in shaping shared realities for communities and societies
(Neiger, 2007; Sturken, 2008), and have become the dominant means through which most
individuals make sense of the past (Kitch, 2006). Compared to traditional broadcast methods
(e.g., radio and newspaper), more recent channels of news transmission (e.g., television, online
newspapers) afford more dynamic, animated presentations with an increasingly powerful impact
on the creation and maintenance of collective memories (Edy, 1999; Matei & Ball-Rokeach,
2005).
One characteristic of news media as agents of collective memory is an implied “reverse
temporal process” where the past is reconstructed in the present (Gibson & Jones, 2012).
Journalism invokes history in light of current interests and concerns, and illustrates the transitory
nature of collective memory by evidencing how our narratives of the past change as we evolve as
societies (Wertsch, 2002; Wang, 2008). The media also engage with collective prospective
memory (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013), encompassing things yet to happen. Although news
reports have traditionally focused largely on recounting past events, there is a significant increase
in the use of the future tense in journalism (Jaworski et al., 2003, 2004). As such, the media
suggest what may happen in the future by invoking what happened in the past. Mediated
prospective memory may bridge collective memory and current public and political agendas
(Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013). Indeed, numerous studies demonstrate a great influence of the
media agenda on the general public agenda (Coleman et al., 2009; Weaver et al., 2004). Wang
(2008) describes this as a ‘directive function’ of collective memory, by which communities
utilise information about the past to inform actions and decisions for the present and future.
Latterly, new social media may shape our collectively-held narratives of the present and past,
and consequently our sense of collective identity. As Wang (2008) put it, they are new
communication and memory channels, and “may introduce revolutionary changes to the
mnemonic processes and socialisation of our time”.
With the increasing digitalisation of many aspects of our lives, the concept of “memory
in a mediated world” (Hajek et al., 2016) is becoming more relevant. Our social networks are not
spatially-confined - we connect with “both dense and diffused social networks'' (Hoskins, 2011,
p. 271). We can interact with others regardless of physical location, nationality, socioeconomic
status, or ethnic group affiliation, in real time, allowing us to transcend physical and temporal
boundaries (Arthur, 2008). The Internet has progressively included voices of everyone with
online access to public discourse, allowing for sharing of information, ideas, and opinions which,
in turn, likely influences collective memory (Arthur, 2008).
Virtual space is a potential new realm for collectively-held memory narratives (Haskins,
2007; Hughes, 2012). Recent studies suggest the well-known online encyclopaedia “Wikipedia”
may be regarded as a global memory platform (Ferron & Massa, 2014; Pentzold, 2009).
Wikipedia allows entry editing but employs a rigorous fact-checking procedure in the editing
process (Keller, 2017). Consequently, Wikipedia is not a platform for unfounded claims or
propagation of individual opinions without evidential support. Twyman et al. (2017) investigated
collective memory in relation to social movements by tracking responses and edits to English
language Wikipedia following the recent “Black Lives Matter” movement. The authors identified
multiple processes taking place on the platform as events unfolded, one of which was a dynamic
re-appraisal of historic events. Readers actively sought out information and entries about past
events to develop an understanding of current events. A derived connection of present and past
events was also evident in editors' curation and synthesis of information in an attempt to provide
a coherent movement narrative. Dynamic re-appraisal may constitute an important online
memory-negotiating mechanism which affects collective memory.
Birkner and Donk (2020) examined the impact of social media by looking at a public
conflict centred around the renaming of a public square in Germany. The historical personality
Paul von Hindenburg (after whom the square was named) was involved in Adolf Hitler’s path to
becoming Chancellor; the square’s name was perceived to be somewhat inappropriate today.
Those opposed to renaming the square attempted to fight the change in part via the social media
platform, Facebook. The Facebook-located debate played an important role in shaping and
creating a new historical consciousness by drawing attention to the debate, providing an open
platform for all perspectives, and facilitating argumentative exchange. This inclusive opportunity
for participation in the “making of history” as it unfolds may influence our perceived individual
and collective agency: by actively engaging in negotiating narratives shaping our shared realities,
we may feel we have greater agency over our future paths. These possibilities, however, remain
to be investigated empirically.
Online platforms may shape collective memory, but in differing ways across nations and
cultures. Gustaffson (2019) investigated digital collective memory in China by examining online
encyclopaedia documentation and engagement relating to the Great Famine (1959 – 1961). The
results demonstrated that China relied more heavily on domestic alternatives such as “Weibo”,
than Wikipedia. Notably, Weibo’s influence in shaping collective memory in China was not
comparable to Wikipedia’s influence on English-speaking communities. In addition to general
cultural variance in practices of commemoration and online engagement, this finding can also be
understood in light of differing forms of government. It is likely different government
approaches lead to different mnemonic practices (Wertsch, 2021), and as such, authoritarian
states may attempt to shield themselves from memory narratives deviating from their desired
national image and political agenda.
The restrictiveness and fact-checking on Wikipedia is not common practice on other
platforms (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, etc.) whose aim is not to provide a reliable source of
information, but to offer a means of self-expression and social connection. This relative freedom
may allow for spread of misinformation, with wide-reaching implications of such misinformation
(for instance during the Covid-19 pandemic), with a detrimental and significant impact on
vaccination acceptance and intent (Islam et al., 2021; Loomba et al., 2021).
Collective silence and forgetting
Collective remembering and collective memory are associated with talk, narration,
chronicling, and other forms of commemoration (Vinitzky-Seroussi & Teeger, 2010). What
happens in the absence thereof – what influence do omissions and silences have on collective
memory? Does talk lead to remembrance, and silence facilitate forgetting?
Mnemonic silence is a complex and nuanced phenomenon (Abel & Bäuml, 2015; Vinitzy-
Seroussi & Teeger, 2010). Taxonomies developed to unravel its consequences on memory
typically distinguish three main dimensions: intentionality, covertness, and relatedness (Stone et
al., 2012). Silence can be intentional or unintentional - a person may intentionally refuse, or
unintentionally fail, to remember something. Intentional silence without covert remembering can
enhance memory (“ironic processes” paradigm), or facilitate forgetting (“think/no-think”
paradigm; Stone et al., 2012). Although there is no definitive explanation for this ambiguity
within the literature, Stone et al. (2012) suggest the success of a suppression attempt may be a
deciding factor for subsequent memory performance. Further, it is vital to consider whether
silence is accompanied by covert remembering or not. Someone can choose not to talk about
certain memories overtly, but nonetheless be retrieving these memories covertly: when a silenced
memory is accompanied by covert retrieval, its accessibility is enhanced rather than weakened
(Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). Roediger and Smith (2011) suggest covert retrieval may be
equally as impactful in strengthening a memory as overt retrieval. Lastly, relatedness matters:
silenced memories can be related or unrelated to what is being openly remembered. In accord
with findings for SS-RIF, the relationship between unmentioned and mentioned memories is
important. Collective forgetting is significantly more likely to occur when silenced aspects are
related to the overtly-remembered memories than when they are not (Stone et al., 2012; Stone &
Hirst, 2014).
The mnemonic consequences of silence and conversation are multifaceted and may
facilitate remembering or forgetting (Stone & Hirst, 2014). While some collective omissions and
silences are unintentional and benign, others are not. Instead, they can be attempts to mute
certain aspects of history, often in favour of those in power (Sturken, 1991, 1997). Depending on
context, silencing of memories can function as a trauma coping mechanism, an exercise of
power, or a denial of responsibility for involvement in unpleasant, widely condemned actions in
the past (Stone et al., 2012; Zerubavel, 2007).
Silence is commonly found in the realm of collective remembrance. Consider, for
instance, the pensive moment of silence reserved for the collective mourning of tragedies and
losses (Vinitzy-Seroussi & Teeger, 2010). This commemorative silence is accompanied by
collective remembering, not forgetting. Conversely, forgetting can be veiled in talk: phenomena
like SS-RIF demonstrate how talking can lead to selective forgetting of omitted, albeit related,
aspects of memories. Forgetting in the realm of collective memory does not necessarily mean
mnemonic erasure, but rather the inaccessibility of a certain memory at the time of remembering
(Habib & Nyberg, 2007; Singer & Conway, 2008). Cole (2001), for instance, investigated the
experience of the people of Madagascar in relation to a supposed failure to remember the
atrocities committed during French colonialism. Rather than having forgotten the conflict, people
merely did not access those memories spontaneously. Another example is the conflict over recall
of the ‘Young Turk’ movement’s attempted deportation of Armenians from the Turkish
population (Suny, 2015). Current Turkish legislation prohibits the use of the phrase “Armenian
genocide”, but Armenians residing in Turkey still recall these events (Akçam, 2006; Miller &
Miller, 1993).
Silence does not necessarily encourage forgetting, or it may do so in a complex, nuanced,
manner (Abel & Bäuml, 2015; Stone et al., 2012). Silence and talk are not exclusively confined
to remembering or forgetting (Vinitzy-Seroussi & Teeger, 2010). Collective memory
encompasses what is remembered and, paradoxically, what is not (overtly or covertly)
remembered. If collective identity is shaped by collective memory, what is not remembered or
silenced must also be important in the creation of a shared sense of identity within collectives
(Stone & Hirst, 2014). Equally, if collective remembrance can inform decisions, actions, and
attitudes on an individual and collective level, so can collective silence (Hirst et al., 2012) –
offering a conceptual and practical link between common memory, identity, and agency for
collectives.
General conclusions
A general, if unexceptional, conclusion is that although good progress has been made, the study
of collective memory is still in its infancy. There continues to be considerable variability in the
definition of ‘collective memory’, and few studies embrace the complexity of the ‘CIA’
components (common memory, identity, and agency) of collective memory – particularly as the
implications of CIA crosses interdisciplinary boundaries, especially in respect of the complexity
of the social and societal levels of analysis as they impact on memory, identity, and agency.
Another important implication of the CIA approach suggests thinking of memory as a discrete
psychological faculty is, paradoxically, holding back intellectual progress. The paradox arises
due to continuing research demonstrating the complexity and variety of individual human
memory – however, investigations founded on neuropsychological substrates but extended to
political and historical domains have only recently commenced. The intertwining of memory and
imagination also means there is a need to embrace the complexity of psychological processes –
especially in regard to how people imagine, collectively, their national futures. Since a single
discipline will only capture a part of the whole, a collaborative, interdisciplinary effort is needed
to account for the complexity of collective memory.
Further investigations of collective memory in psychology and neuroscience might profitably
embrace understanding the dispersion and consolidation of memories through conversational
networks. These processes necessarily engage memory and language systems, but may also reach
through to brain networks and psychological processes supporting identity formation. A
thorough understanding of how conversation and group identity intersect will assist in answering
important, yet unanswered, questions: does adapting a particular group identity facilitate the
common alignment of memories? Can a shift between adopting an “individual identity lens”
versus a “collective identity lens” explain how this might happen (Van Bavel and Packer, 2021)?
Is collective memory merely the alignment of individual memories through conversation and
group identification, synchronously expressed at the appropriate time? The underlying processes
are complex, and empirical investigations have not yet addressed them. In that respect, the digital
sphere may offer particular possibilities for investigating alignment of individual memory with
an apparent ‘collective memory’: the presence of online communities engaging in rituals with
online manifestations (e.g., ‘cosplaying’), as well as in negotiation and shaping of shared
memories on various online platforms (e.g., Wikipedia), may render collective memory
processes observable and traceable (Garcia-Gavilanes et al., 2017).

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FOUNDATIONS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 1

Neural, psychological, and social foundations of collective memory: Implications for

common mnemonic processes, agency, and identity

Vanesa Fischer and Shane M. O’Mara

School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience

Trinity College Dublin – The University of Dublin

Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to Shane O’Mara, Trinity

College Dublin, D02 PN40, Ireland. Email: smomara@tcd.ie

Recent advances in memory research within psychology and neuroscience have

prominently illustrated by continuing research on collective memory. Through a scoping

memory, identity, and agency (‘CIA’). We conceptualise collective memory as based on

neuropsychological substrates, influenced by social processes, and extended to societal,

should embrace a collaborative, interdisciplinary approach focused on issues of common

memory, identity, and identity.

Keywords: collective memory; collective identity; collective agency; foundations of

memory; social influences on memory; shared reality

Neural, psychological, and social foundations of collective memory

Ever since Ebbinghaus (1885/1913), empirical investigations of memory within

promoted a shift to viewing rememberers and remembering as socially-situated (Roediger &

et al. 2016), and grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2010)).

“Social frameworks” for memory

A different – and in some respects competing – approach to memory emerged in

‘collective memory’, drawing especially on the works of Durkheim (1971/1912) on ‘collective

consciousness’, and Halbwachs (1950/1926, 1992/1950) on ‘collective memory’ (Gensburger,

our lives in the present and future.

“History” and “culture wars”

remembered, venerated, forgotten, or desacralized.

Memory studies and the collective memory research tradition

commemorations of historical and political events (Gillis, 1994), international relations

between differing intellectual and empirical approaches to collective memory.

Defining collective memory

Collective memory has a complex definition within psychology and neuroscience,

Distinguishing between communicative and cultural memory

Collective memory can be distinguished into ‘communicative memory’ and ‘cultural

memory’ (Assmann, 2008). Communicative memory describes collective memories shaped by

Scope and purpose of this review

Here, we review empirical investigations within psychology and neuroscience regarding

collective memory, emphasising investigations embracing the ‘CIA’ components of collective

to just a single element of this definition.

Psychology, Neuroscience, and Collective Memory

strength of appeal of an advertisement is related to how well it is remembered by most people.

Scopus search for “collective memory” (1991 to 2022; on 31.03.2022)

Social Sciences 1,337 results

Neural foundations of collective memory

Contemporary models of the neural bases of memory emphasise a tripartite,

anatomically-interconnected brain network supporting memory (e.g., Aggleton and O’Mara,

these areas results in differing, but related, types of amnesia.

Neural systems development and collective memories

Mnemonic schemas and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)

Schema memory (superordinate organising knowledge structures shaping subordinate

representations in memory) is supported by an anatomical network comprising the hippocampal

(vmPFC), as vmPFC engagement supports mnemonic schemas. In a multicomponent

events in the mass media.

Social networks and memory transmission

Transmission of memories within social networks facilitates memory dispersion between

allocentric and egocentric representations of social distance and trait-related knowledge.

Amnesia and collective memory

However, no systematic attempts to examine collective memory in amnestic populations have

Psychological foundations of collective memory

Distinguishing collaborative remembering from collective memory

performance? Remembering collaboratively may have benefits and costs. Collaborative

facilitation is a potential benefit of collective recall: group performance exceeds individual

relational closeness increase, collaborative inhibition decreases. Thus, collaborative inhibition is

reaching a consensus; consensus groups demonstrated superior accuracy of recall compared to