War Communism Alec Nove describes War Communism as the name commonly given to extreme communism which began in the middle of 1918. As Lenin proclaimed, it was a system forced on by “extreme want, ruin, and war”. Maurice Dobb argued that Lenin had no intention at first to launch into the extremes of war communism. The slide into war communism was stimulated by the food shortages and the failure of efforts to procure food, especially grain from peasants. Sheldon L Richman stated that War Communism was a ‘leap into socialism’ and that it was based on Lenin’s understanding that if the small number of the proletariat and a large number of the peasantry could not inaugurate socialism, then it had to be done by them Economist, Jack Hirshleifer in his work - “Disaster and Recovery: A Historical Review” defines War Communism as “the most extreme effort in modern times to do away with system of private property and voluntary exchange”. The biggest debate surrounding war communism is whether it began as a result of a war emergency or was consciously introduced as a leap into socialism. the answer to which largely remains ambivalent and on how one perceives the features and consequences of this economic policy. A. A Bogdanov in Socialist Academy debates (1922-24) states that two elements determined War communism, these were Catastrophe and communism. E.H Carr states that the context in which War Communism emerged was marked by both “Red and White terror” and was reflected in the disarray of the economy. The context in which this policy emerged was marked by a deep state of anarchy and elemental chaos with orders from the center being confusing and contradictory and the civil service machinery being smashed, The War and civil war-prone USSR had depleted supplies and paralyzed transport, It had also lost vital agricultural and industrial areas to various enemies. It was in this scenario that the Bolsheviks considered rationing and the banning of private trade in foodstuff’ essential. Characteristics of war communism as described by Alec Nove reflect An attempt to ban private manufacture, the nationalization of nearly all industry, the allocation of nearly all material stocks, and of what little output there was, by the state, especially for war purposes. There was a ban on private trade, never quite effective anywhere, but spasmodically enforced. There was an enforcement of the seizure of peasant surpluses known as prodrazverstka, Followed by, a partial elimination of money from the state's dealings with its organizations and the citizens. Free rations, when there was anything to ration. All these factors combined with terror and arbitrariness, expropriations, and requisitions. Efforts to establish discipline, with party control over trade unions. Thus, according to him, War Communism was a siege economy with a communist ideology. A partly organized chaos in a vain effort to replace the free market.Bolsheviks considered the market as the “most Bourgeoisie institution” and hereby it was declared illegal, All private enterprise hiring of labor and leasing of land were abolished. The property was confiscated and Businesses and factories were nationalized. In Industry, War communism may be said to have begun with a decree of June 28, 1918, nationalizing every category of industry. Several centers to manage industries were set up. Party members were assigned to top positions but lacked the experience to make them effective. The production in industries was increasingly dominated by the emergencies of the civil war and the demands of the Red Army were paramount, Small-scale enterprises employing only a handful of workers and the artisan's industry were immune from control but were hampered by a lack of material. The results were catastrophic, industrial production by 1920 was 20% of the pre-war volume, Gross agricultural output fell by 69 million tons in the period 1909-1913 to 31 million in 1921. There was a population decline in Moscow, and Petrograd, there was population decline of $8.2 % To bring about all these measures enlisted under the economic policy of war communism, on 15 December 1917, the Supreme Council of National Economics VESANKH was set up. It aimed to organize the national economy and state finance, It had the right of “confiscation, requisition, sequestration, compulsory syndication of the various branches of industry, trade and other measures in the areas of Production, distribution and state finance. As the process of ‘nationalization’ endorsed by the policy of war communism progressed, the various departments of VESANKH took command of the nationalized sector of the economy. Allround nationalization was the intent. Kritsinan in his article The Heroic Period of the Great Russian Revolution refers to the pre-June period as one of the “elemental-chaotic proletarian nationalization from below.” Venediktov and others claim that the party did have a plan for the nationalization of all major parts of the industry and Lenin in December 1917 spoke of declaring all limited companies to be the state property. Still, there were only 487 nationalized enterprises by June 1918. Alec Nove states that the leap to war communism must be dated from the end of June 1918 with the promulgation of the nationalization decree. It was in this context that work ha began to establish a ‘socialist society’ and in March 1918, railways were taken away from ‘workers’ control and displaced under ‘semi-military command’, it was opposed by Bukharin, and Obolensky among others. There was a naturalization of economic relations, money lost its effective function within the state sector of the economy. In 1919-20 workers’ wages were largely paid in kind and a meagre ration was free. Private trade was declared illegal and nationalisation of practically all industrial enterprise was undertaken. By 1919, according to Bukharin, 3,300 enterprises were employing 1.3 million persons under VESANKH. Peasants had already seized land and divided it among themselves but it had a disorganising effect on production. There was a struggle among the peasants as well, the small peasants rose against the Kulaks. There was growing hunger and peasants wanted to obtain better prices for their food and tended to evade the state monopoly of grain purchase. Thusencouraging the development of a flourishing black market. The winter of 1917-18 was a terrible one, the bread ration fell and factories closed because of a lack of labor. Between July 1918 and the end of 1919, much of Russia was affected by civil war. Attempts were made to organize sales of goods to peasants but had no effect. At last, Lenin restored to force with the main aim being - “the removal of surplus grain from Kulkas”. The result was Black market trade & illegal barter among peasants. The peasants saw little sense in producing surplus if it had to be taken from them. As a result, sowing was reduced, production fell and the majority supply of bread for people came out from official rations but the black market. There was a decline in the population of cities. The government tried to encourage various forms of rural cooperation, varying from the loosest associations to state farms but even at the peak of war communism, all these farms covered only a tiny, minority of households it was regarded politically important, and in Feb 1919, a decree was published for transition to collective farms. There were problems in distribution as well. Traders acquired the nickname of “Bagmen’, they exchanged commodities with peasants for foodstufis to be sold at exorbitant prices in towns. These Bagmen were denounced by authorities and schemes were hatched for barter of commodities between town and country. It has been argued that the overriding task of the economic policy was to keep the Red Army supplied and little attention was given to civilian needs. Therefore, it was the widespread request for surpluses of grain that led the peasants to rebel against the harshness of war communism. The effects of war communism climaxed resulting in the armed rebellion at the Kronstadt naval base in March 1921, it was once a strong Bolshevik naval base. The sailors at Kronstadt sympathized with the rebellious civilians and called for soviet tyranny. On March 18, a force directed by Trotsky attacked the sailor's fortress and crushed the rebels, and some 15000 participants were killed without trial. 1g a program intended to undo the conditions that had set the peasants against the regime. The solution or ‘antidote’ to this as Carr states was NEP, whose essential feature was as he describes the ‘negation or reversal of policies of war communism’ the incident led to Lenin outli Leon Trotsky, the architect of war communism states that war communism failed because the govt aimed to develop these methods of regimentation directly into a system of planned economy in distribution & production. Richman substantiates Trostsky’s position by stating that “A planned economy cannot plan and it is paradoxical to assume that directed economy from the center is fit for organizing production.” Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises argues that “economic activity is based on calculation and since under socialism economic calculation is impossible, there can be no economic activity” Economic change involves operations those value of which could neither be predicted nor ascertained before they have taken place. Ralph Raico states that- “Trotsky and his comrades were a group of few literary philosophical intellectuals who seized power in a great country intending to overturn the whole economy without the slightest idea of how an economic system works”PRINCIPLES OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF WAR COMMUNISM. L. Szamuley states that Western communism had a ‘military’ character and economic activity was focused on distribution and not production. The principles of the economic system of war communism are First, maximum extension of state ownership and the direct authority of the state. In the autumn of 1917 and the spring of 1918, the soviet government emphasized controlling private capital by applying certain forms of state capitalism concerning both domestic and foreign capital. However, still, according to the Census, the workers of the state enterprises employed only 53.3 % of all industrial earners. Other wage earners (21.5%) and self-employed (25.2%) in the cooperative and industrial enterprises also produced under the instruction of the government in circumstances of war mobilization. In the agriculture sphere, the obligatory delivery of surplus to the state established the center’s control. Secondly, the forced allocation of labor. While disciplining of labor is a feature of almost all socialist revolutions what made it a special tenet of war communism was that the ‘manpower mobilizations’ starting at the end of 1918 or ‘the militarization of labor’ became a regular, evergrowing operative principle. At the beginning of 1920, the whole system of forced allocation of labor was regulated and the decree on the general obligation to work issued by the Council of People’s Commissars on January 29, 1920, listed that the indispensable skilled workers should be detached from the army and people employed in agriculture and small scale industry should be transferred to state-owned enterprises, institutions, and farms. The high commission which had official authority could meet out punishment to those striking the obligation to work. Third, War Communism had far-reaching central management of economic activity. The allocation of scarce material goods and operative management of production. The activity of production units was not enterprise-based but financed by the state budget and their expenses were covered by People’s Bank and the cost estimates of the enterprise. The final products were at the disposal of the central bodies. Productive enterprises were controlled by Industrial sectoral boards, the glavki and though being subordinate to the supreme council of National Economy, these boards were practically independent. This ran counter to the features of central ‘regulation’, ‘planning’, and ‘coordination’, it was because of the heterogenous and ‘mass scale of production. Thus, bridging organizational fragmentation, This lack of ‘centralization’ in production was achieved in distribution. The fourth tenet of war communism was the class and social principles of distribution. Due to the war and inflation, distribution became naturalized and the workers of the state sector and urban population were supplied through rationing and allocations in kind. The principle of egalitarianism largely prevailed but was sidelined when ‘special rations’ were introduced during the war, it was mostly awarded to workers in the enterprises. In the second half of 1919, additional rations were granted to families of Red Army Soldiers. The hierarchical character of distribution was strengthened by the fact that one person could claim several rations under different titles.The last tenet was the Naturalisation of economic life and the abolition of commodity and money relations. This pro towns and the countryside. Collection and distribution were taken over by the people’s commi consumption. Private tarde was liquidated and private shops were municipalized and every citizen had to avail their ration from cooperative shops. ss was started by discontinuing commodity exchange between the iat for food, it collected all the products necessary for people’s Bukharin sums up the ideology of war communism by stating that; concentrated violence is the political weapon of proletariats and it can both accelerate or break the growth of the economic system. In the consciousness of the ideologues of war communism, the frontier between the temporary character of coercive measures taken under the pressure of an emergency and the basic principles of a socialist economy became blurred,