University of Santo Tomas

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW (1734)

CRIMINAL LAW
Questions Asked More Than Once

QuAMTO 2023
 The UST GOLDEN NOTES is the annual student-edited bar review material of
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 Faculty of Civil Law (1734)

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2023

ANGELA BEATRICE S. PEÑA KATHERINE S. POLICARPIO

SECRETARIES-GENERAL

RON-SOPHIA NICOLE C. ANTONIO CRIMINAL LAW

HERLENE MAE D. CALILUNG LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

POLITICAL LAW AND

PATRISHA LOUISE E. DUMANIL
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS WITH

ALEXANDRA MAUREEN B. GARCIA
PRACTICAL EXERCISES

HANNAH JOY C. IBARRA COMMERCIAL LAW

JEDIDIAH R. PADUA CIVIL LAW

PAULINNE STEPHANY G. SANTIAGO TAXATION LAW

DIANNE MICAH ANGELA D. YUMANG REMEDIAL LAW

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

PAULA ANDREA F. PEÑAFLOR COVER DESIGN ARTIST

 Faculty of Civil Law (1734)

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE 2023

ARIST SARIELL S. DELMONTE

CRIMINAL LAW SUBJECT HEAD

MEMBERS
PATRICIA CLARISSE H. BERNABE
KAREN DARYL L. BRITO
CLAIRE ANGELA B. CABALLES
MARY GENELLE S. CLEOFAS
NICOLE ALEXANDREA Q. FRANCISCO
JOSE MARI M. LEE
CHYNA PATRICIA S. MANANQUIL
RANJILL JAMBEE U. SY

ADVISERS
ATTY. VINS PLATON
ATTY. EDREA JEAN V. RAMIREZ
 Faculty of Civil Law (1734)

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

ACADEMIC OFFICIALS
ATTY. NILO T. DIVINA REV. FR. ISIDRO C. ABAÑO, O.P.
DEAN REGENT

ATTY. ARTHUR B. CAPILI

FACULTY SECRETARY

ATTY. ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ

LEGAL COUNSEL
UST CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTO CONCEPCION LEGAL AID CLINIC

JUDGE PHILIP A. AGUINALDO

SWDB COORDINATOR

LENY G. GADIANA, R.G.C.

GUIDANCE COUNSELOR
 Faculty of Civil Law (1734)

OUR DEEPEST APPRECIATION TO OUR

MENTORS AND INSPIRATION

Chief Justice Diosdado M. Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-

Peralta Tang

Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo Judge Oscar B. Pimentel

Judge Christian Emmanuel G. Judge Jesusa R. Lapuz-

Pimentel Gaudiano

Judge Madonna C. Echiverri Judge Pedro T. Dabu, Jr.

Judge Rico Sebastian D.

Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia
Liwanag

Atty. Ronald C. Chua Atty. Gidget Rose V. Duque

Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra Atty. Lorenzo Luigi T. Gayya

Atty. Alwyn Faye B. Mendoza Atty. Jedrek C. Ng

For being our guideposts in understanding the intricate sphere of Criminal Law.
– Academics Committee 2023
 DISCLAIMER

THE RISK OF USE OF THIS BAR

REVIEW MATERIAL SHALL BE
BORNE BY THE USER
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
2. Territoriality – that the law is applicable to all crimes
I. BOOK I committed within the limits of Philippine territory,
which includes its atmosphere, interior water, and
maritime zone. (Art. 2, RPC)

3. Prospectivity – that the law does not have any

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES retroactive effect, except if it favors the offender unless
(2019, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2011, 2005, 2003, he is a habitual delinquent (Art. 22, RPC) or the law
2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1994, 1988 BAR) otherwise provides. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

a) GENERALITY
1. MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA (2016, 2014, BAR)
(2019, 2017, 2005, 2003, 2001, 1999, 1997, 1988 BAR)
Q: Charges d'affaires Volvik of Latvia suffers from a
psychotic disorder after he was almost assassinated in
Q: Distinguish between crimes mala in se and mala
his previous assignment. One day, while shopping in a
prohibita. (2019, 2017, 2005, 2003, 2001, 1999, 1997,
mall, he saw a group of shoppers whom he thought
1988 BAR)
were the assassins who were out to kill him. He asked
for the gun of his escort and shot ten (10) people and
A: Mala in se and mala prohibita are distinguished as
wounded five (5) others before he was subdued. The
follows: (1) Mala in se are inherently wrong or immoral,
wounded persons required more than 30 days of
while mala prohibita are only wrong because they are
medical treatment. What crime or crimes, if any, did he
prohibited by law; (2) In mala in se, good faith or lack of
commit? Explain. (2016 BAR)
criminal intent is a defense, while in mala prohibita, it is
not; (3) Modifying circumstances can be appreciated in
A: Volvik committed five (5) frustrated murders for the
mala in se, while in mala prohibita it cannot be appreciated
unwounded victims and five (5) frustrated murders for the
unless the special law adopts the technical nomenclature
wounded victims. Treachery is present since the sudden
of the penalties of the RPC; (4) Mala in se are punishable
attack rendered the victims defenseless. The nature of the
under the RPC; or special laws where the acts punishable
weapon used in attacking the victims and extent of the
therein are wrong by nature. Mala prohibita are
wounds sustained by the five victims showed intent to kill.
punishable under special laws. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
His psychotic condition is not an exempting circumstance
of insanity in the absence of showing that there is a
Q: May an act be malum in se and be, at the same time,
complete deprivation of intelligence in accordance with the
malum prohibitum? (1997 BAR)
cognition test. However, he is immune from criminal
prosecution. Since the position of Volvik as charges de
A: YES, an act may be malum in se and malum prohibitum at
affaires is diplomatic, he is vested with blanket diplomatic
the same time. In People v. Sunico, et. al., (G.R. No. 8796-R, 18
immunity from criminal suit. (Minucher v. Hon. CA, G.R. No.
June 1954) it was held that the omission or failure of
142396, 11 Feb. 2003) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
election inspectors and poll clerks to include a voter’s name
in the registry list of voters is wrong per se because it
Q: Pierce is a French diplomat stationed in the
disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In this regard, it
Philippines. While on EDSA and driving with an
is considered as malum in se. Since it is punished under a
expired license, he hit a pedestrian who was crossing
special law (Sec. 101 and 103, Revised Election Code), it is
illegally. The pedestrian died. Pierce was charged with
considered malum prohibitum. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his
defense, he claimed diplomatic immunity. Is Pierce
2. SCOPE AND CHARACTERISTICS correct? (2014 BAR)
(2019, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2011, 2000, 1998, 1994, 1988
BAR) A: YES, Pierce is correct. Pierce, being a French diplomat
stationed in the Philippines, would be exempt from the
Q: State the characteristics of criminal law and explain general application of our criminal laws, as provided for
each. (1998, 1988 BAR) under laws or treaties of preferential application, more
particularly under R.A. No. 75. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
A: The characteristics of criminal law are as follows:

1. Generality – that the law is binding upon all persons

who reside or sojourn in the Philippines, irrespective
of age, sex, color, creed, or personal circumstances.

1 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
b) TERRITORIALITY
(2019, 2015, 2011, 2000, 1994 BAR)
Q: When committed outside the Philippine Territory,
our courts DO NOT have jurisdiction over the crime
of? (2011 BAR)
a. treason.
b. piracy.
c. espionage.
d. rebellion.
A: (d) rebellion (Ibid)
Q: What court has jurisdiction when an Indonesian
crew murders the Filipino captain on board a vessel of
Russian registry while the vessel is anchored outside
the breakwaters of the Manila Bay? (2011 BAR)
a. The Indonesian court.
b. The Russian court.
c. The Philippine court.
d. Any court that first asserts jurisdiction over
the case.
A: C. The Philippine court. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Ms. M, a Malaysian visiting the Philippines, was
about to depart for Hong Kong via an Indonesian-
registered commercial vessel. While on board the
vessel, which was still docked at the port of Manila, she
saw her mortal enemy, Ms. A, an Australian citizen. Ms.
A was seated at the front portion of the cabin and was
busy using her laptop, with no idea whatsoever that Ms.
M was likewise onboard the ship.
Consumed by her anger towards Ms. A, Ms. M stealthily
approached the Australian from behind, and then
quickly stabbed her neck with a pocketknife, resulting
in Ms. A's immediate death. Operatives from the
Philippine National Police - Maritime Command
arrested Ms. M for the killing of Ms. A and thereafter,
intended to charge her under the RPC. Ms. M contended
that the provisions of the RPC cannot be applied and
enforced against her because both she and the victim
are not Filipino nationals, and besides, the alleged
crime was committed in an Indonesian-registered
vessel.
(a) Is Ms. M's contention against the application of the
RPC against her tenable? Explain. (2019, 2015 BAR)
A: NO, the RPC can be applied and enforced against Ms. M
although both the offender and the offended party are
foreign nationals, and the crime was committed onboard a
foreign vessel. Based on the territorial principle, the
English rule adopted in the Philippines, crimes
perpetrated aboard foreign vessels are generally triable in
the courts of the country within the territory in which
they were committed. (People v. Wong Chen, G.R. No. L-
18924, 19 Oct. 1992)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Moreover, under the Principle of Generality, the penal
laws of the Philippines apply to all who live or sojourn in
the country regardless of their citizenship. The fact that
the vessel was registered in Indonesia is likewise
irrelevant. Thus, the killing committed by Ms. M while
onboard an Indonesian-registered vessel that is docket at
the port of Manila is triable within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: After drinking one case of San Miguel Beer and
taking two plates of “pulutan”, Binoy, a Filipino
seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean
seaman, aboard M/V “Princess of the Pacific”, an
overseas vessel which was sailing in the South China
Sea. The vessel, although Panamanian registered, is
owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman. When
M/V “Princess of the Pacific” reached a Philippine Port
at Cebu City, the Captain of the vessel turned over the
assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities. An
Information for homicide was filed against Binoy in
the RTC of Cebu City. He moved to quash the
Information for lack of jurisdiction. If you were the
judge, will you grant the motion? Why? (2000 BAR)
A: YES. The motion to quash the information should be
granted. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the
crime committed since it was committed on the high seas
or outside of Philippine territory and on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines. (US v. Fowler, G.R.
No. L-496, 31 Dec. 1902)
It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner,
which makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being
registered in Panama, the laws of Panama shall govern
while it is in the high seas. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage
with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie
returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and
wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna. Can
Abe be prosecuted for bigamy? (1994 BAR)
A: NO. Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the
bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in
Singapore. Hence, such violation is not one of those where
the RPC, under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied
extraterritoriality. The general rule on territoriality of
criminal law governs the situation. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
c) PROSPECTIVITY
2
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
3. PRO REO PRINCIPLE
(2012, 2010 BAR)
DOCTRINE OF PRO REO
(2012, 2010 BAR)
Q: What is the doctrine of pro reo? How does it relate
to Art. 48 of the RPC? (2010 BAR)
A: The doctrine of pro reo advocates that penal laws and
laws penal in nature are to be construed and applied in a
way lenient or liberal to the offender, consonant to and
consistent with the constitutional guarantee that an
accused shall be presumed innocent until his guilt is
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Following the pro reo doctrine, under Art. 48 of the RPC,
crimes are complexed and punished with a single penalty
(i.e., that prescribed for the most serious crime and to be
imposed in its maximum period). The rationale being, that
the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal
impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the
crimes are committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions. (People v. Comadre, G.R. No. 153559,
08 June 2004) However, Art. 48 shall be applied only when
it would bring about the imposition of a penalty lesser
than the penalties imposable for all the component crimes
if prosecuted separately instead of being complexed. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: What is the fundamental principle in applying and
interpreting criminal laws x x x? (2012 BAR)
A: The fundamental principle in interpreting and applying
penal laws is the principle of pro reo. The phrase “in dubio
pro reo” means “when in doubt, for the accused.” (Intestate
Estate of Gonzales v. People, GR No. 181409, 11 Feb. 2010).
This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee
that the accused ought to be presumed innocent until and
unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt
(See People v. Temporada, GR No. 173473, 17 Dec. 2008)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
4. EX POST FACTO LAW
5. INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS
6. RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS
(2014 BAR)
Q: Congress passed a law reviving the Anti-Subversion
Law, making it a criminal offense again for a person to
join the Communist Party of the Philippines. Reporma,
a former high-ranking member of the Communist
Party, was charged under the new law for his
membership in the Communist Party when he was a
student in the 80’s. He now challenges the charge
against him. What objections may he raise? (2014
3 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
BAR)
A: Reporma may raise the limitations imposed by the
1987 Constitution on the power of Congress to enact
retroactive penal laws which are prejudicial to the
accused. Under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution such is
classified as an ex post facto law. It should be noted that
when Congress decriminalized the crime of subversion
under R.A. 7637, it obliterated the felony and its effects
upon Reporma. Consequently, charging him now under
the new law for his previous membership in the
Communist Party would be constitutionally
impermissible. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
B. FELONIES
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006,
2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998,
1997, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992 1991, 1990, 1989,
1988, 1987 BAR)
1. CRIMINAL LIABILITIES AND FELONIES
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2007, 2006, 2005,
2004, 2003, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1995,
1994, 1993, 1992 1991, 1989, 1988, 1987 BAR)
FELONIES
(2015, 2012, 2011 BAR)
Q: How are felonies committed? Explain each. (2015
BAR)
A: Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit
(dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit
when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Art. 4, RPC)
MOTIVE AND INTENT
(2006, 2004, 1999, 1996, 1988 BAR)
Q: May a crime be committed without criminal intent?
(1996, 1988 BAR)
A: YES, a crime may be committed without criminal intent
if such is a culpable felony, wherein intent is substituted
by negligence or imprudence, and also in a malum
prohibitum or if an act is punishable by special law. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly between intent and
motive in the commission of an offense. (2004, 1999,
1996 BAR)
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
A: Intent is the purpose for using a particular means to
achieve the desired result; while motive is the moving
power which impels a person to act for a definite result.
Intent is an ingredient of dolo or malice and thus an
element of deliberate felonies; while motive is not an
element of a crime but only considered when the identity
of the offender is in doubt. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: When is motive relevant to prove a case? When is it
not necessary to be established? Explain. (2006, 1999
BAR)
A: Motive is relevant to prove a case when there is doubt
as to the identity of the offender or when the act
committed gives rise to variant crimes and there is the
need to determine the proper crime to be imputed to the
offender.
It is not necessary to prove motive when the offender is
positively identified or the criminal act did not give rise to
variant crimes. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
a) CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES
(2019, 2012, 2011)
GRAVE, LESS GRAVE, AND LIGHT FELONIES
(2019, 2012, 2011 BAR)
Q: Define/Distinguish the following terms: (b) Grave,
less grave, and light felonies; x x x (2019 BAR)
A: Under Art. 9 of the RPC, grave felonies are those to
which the law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in
accordance with Art. 25 of the same Code. Less grave
felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties
which in their maximum period are correccional, also in
accordance with Art. 25. Light felonies are those
infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P40,000 or both is
provided. (as amended by R.A. No. 10951) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
b. ABERRATIO ICTUS, ERROR IN PERSONAE,
AND PRAETER INTENTIONEM
(2020-21, 2019, 2015, 2012, 2011, 1999, 1996,
1994, 1993, 1989 BAR)
Q: Define/Distinguish the following terms: x x x (b)
Aberratio ictus, error in personae, and praeter
intentionem x x x (2019, 1999, 1989 BAR)
A: In aberration ictus or mistake in the blow, a person
directed the blow at an intended victim, but because of
poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else. The
intended victim as well as the actual victim are both at the
scene of the crime. There is error in personae or mistake in
identity if the felony committed by the offender befalls a
different person. Finally, in praeter intentionem, the
injurious result is greater than that intended by the
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
offender.
The presence of these circumstances will alter the
criminal liability of the accused. Thus:
In aberration ictus, two offenses are committed by the
offender, that which he intended to commit and that
which he committed. But if these two offenses are both
either grave or less grave, since they are produced by one
single act, a complex crime will result.
In the case of error in personae, the offender shall be guilty
of the crime committed by him, but the penalty to be
imposed shall either be the penalty for the crime actually
committed or that for the crime intended to be committed,
whichever is lower, but the same will be imposed in its
maximum period.
In the case of praeter intentionem, the offender will incur
criminal liability for the felony actually committed by him,
but he will be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that
which he committed. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
Q: While attending to an Enhanced Community
Quarantine (ECQ) barangay checkpoint, a barangay
tanod confronted a resident for non-essential travel.
Infuriated by the barangay tanod’s tone, the resident
punched the tanod’s head. The barangay tanod fell,
sustained brain hemorrhage, and died as a result
Charged with Homicide, the resident denies liability,
arguing that there can be no conviction if there is no
intent to cause the barangay tanod’s death. Is the
resident’s defense tenable? Explain briefly. (2020-21
BAR)
A: NO, the resident’s defense is untenable. Criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. (Art. 4(1) of the RPC). When
the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed (praeter intentionem), the same is only
a mitigating circumstance.
The resident is liable for the death of the barangay tanod.
His contention that there was no intent to kill is not
meritorious since intent to kill is presumed when the
victim dies. His liability however may be mitigated when
the resulting injury went beyond than that intended. (Bar
Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
c) ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
4
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
d) IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
(2018, 2015, 2014, 2012, 2009, 2004, 2000, 1998,
1994, 1993 BAR)
Q: What is an impossible crime? (2000 BAR)
A: Impossible crime is an act which would be an offense
against person or property, were if not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (Art.
4(2), RPC) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Is an impossible crime really a crime? (2000 BAR)
A: NO, an impossible crime is not really a crime. It is only
so-called because the act gives rise to criminal liability, but
actually, no felony is committed. The accused is to be
punished for his criminal tendency or propensity although
no crime was committed. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the
tricycle driver paid by her parents to bring and fetch
her to and from school. Enrique wrote a ransom note
demanding P500,000 from Carla’s parents in
exchange for Carla’s freedom. Enrique sent the
ransom note by mail. However, before the ransom
note was received by Carla’s parents, Enrique’s
hideout was discovered by the police. Carla was
rescued while Enrique was arrested and incarcerated.
Considering that the ransom note was not received by
Carla’s parents, the investigating prosecutor merely
filed a case of “Impossible Crime to Commit
Kidnapping” against Enrique. Is the prosecutor
correct? (2014, 2000 BAR)
A: NO, the prosecutor is not correct in filing a case for
“impossible crime to commit kidnapping” against Enrique.
Impossible crimes are limited only to acts which when
performed would be a crime against persons or property.
As kidnapping is a crime against personal security and not
against persons or property, Enrique could not have
incurred an “impossible crime” to commit kidnapping.
There is thus no impossible crime of kidnapping. (UPLC
Suggested Answers, 2000 Bar)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO. The crime committed by
Enrique is kidnapping for ransom. Even before the ransom
note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention had already been committed. The act
cannot be considered an impossible crime because there
was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. The
delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim
did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Enrique deprived Carla of her liberty.
The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect
only of increasing the penalty to death under Art. 267(5)
(People v. Tan, G.R. No. 95322, 01 Mar. 1993). Furthermore,
kidnapping is a crime against liberty while in impossible
crime it is important that the accused committed an act
5 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
that would have been a crime against persons or property.
(UPLC Suggested Answers, 2014 Bar)
Q: Puti detested Pula, his roommate, because Pula was
courting Ganda, whom Puti fancied. One day, Puti
decided to teach Pula a lesson and went to a
veterinarian to ask for poison on the pretext that he
was going to kill a sick pet, when actually Puti was
intending to poison Pula, the vet instantly gave Puti a
non-toxic solution which, when mixed with Pula’s
food, did not kill Pula. (2014, 2009, 2004, 1998 BAR)
(a) What crime, if any, did Puti commit?
A: Puti committed an impossible crime of murder. Puti,
with intent to kill Pula, unknowingly employed ineffectual
means to accomplish the intended felony, that is, using a
non-toxic solution.
(b) Would your answer be the same if, as a result
of the mixture, Pula got an upset stomach and
had to be hospitalized for 10 days?
A: NO. If as a result of the mixture administered by Puti,
Pula suffered an upset stomach and had to be hospitalized
for 10 days, Puti shall be liable for less serious physical
injuries. The rule is, in impossible crime, the act
performed should not constitute a violation of another
provision of the RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded
to the house of X. Y, a neighbor of X, who happened to
be passing by, pointed to the four culprits the room
that X occupied. The four culprits peppered the room
with bullets. Unsatisfied, A even threw a hand grenade
that totally destroyed X’s room. However, unknown to
the four culprits, X was not inside the room and
nobody was hit or injured during the incident. Are A,
B, C and D liable for any crime? Explain. (2000 BAR)
A: YES, A, B, C and D are liable for destructive arson
because of the destruction of the room of X with the use of
an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an impossible
crime is to be imposed only if the act committed would not
constitute any other crime under the RPC. Although the
facts involved are parallel to the case of Intod v. CA (G.R.
No. 103110, 21 Oct. 1992), where it was ruled that the
liability of the offender was for an impossible crime, no
hand grenade was used in the said case, which constitutes
a more serious crime though different from what was
intended. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: JP, Aries, and Randal planned to kill Elsa, a resident
of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They asked the
assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the place.
On 03 Apr. 1992, at about 10:00 in the evening, JP,
Aries, and Randal, all armed with automatic weapons,
went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed
her companions to the room in the house of Elsa.
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired their guns at
her room. Fortunately, Elsa was not around as she
attended a prayer meeting that evening in another
barangay in Laurel. JP, et. al., were charged and
convicted of attempted murder by the RTC at
Tanauan, Batangas.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the accused
ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding
them guilty of attempted murder. If you were the
ponente, how will you decide the appeal? (1994 BAR)
A: If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment
convicting the accused of attempted murder and instead
find them guilty of impossible crime under Art. 4(2), RPC,
in relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible crime
arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but likewise
when it is factual or physical impossibility, as in the case
at bar.
Elsa’s absence from the house is a physical impossibility
which renders the crime intended inherently incapable of
accomplishment. To convict the accused of attempted
murder would make Art. 4(2), practically useless as all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an incident independent of the
actor’s will which is an element of attempted or frustrated
felony. (Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103110, 21 Oct. 1992) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
e) STAGES OF EXECUTION
(2022, 2019, 2017, 2015, 2005, 2000, 1998, 1996
BAR)
Q: Why is there no crime of frustrated serious physical
injuries? (2017 BAR)
A: The crime of physical injuries is a formal crime since a
single act consummates it as a matter of law; hence, it has
no attempted or frustrated stage. Once the injuries are
inflicted, the offense is consummated. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Taking into account the nature and elements of the
felonies of coup d’état and rape, may one be criminally
liable for frustrated coup d’état or frustrated rape?
Explain. (2005 BAR)
A: NO. A person may not be held liable for frustrated coup
d’état or for frustrated rape because in a frustrated felony,
it is required that all acts of execution that could produce
the felony as a consequence must have been performed by
the offender but the felony was not produced by reason of
causes independent of the will of the offender. In the said
felonies, one cannot perform all the acts of execution
without consummating the felony. The said felonies,
therefore, do not admit of the frustrated stage.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO. One cannot be criminally
liable for frustrated coup d’état or frustrated rape because
in coup d’état, the mere attack directed against the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines,
or any military camp or installation, communication
networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the
exercise and continued possession of power would
consummate the crime. The objective may not be to
overthrow the government but only to destabilize or
paralyze the government through the seizure of facilities
and utilities essential to the continued possession and
exercise of governmental powers.
On the other hand, in the crime of rape, there is no
frustrated rape; it is either attempted or consummated
rape. If the accused who placed himself on top of a woman,
raising her skirt and unbuttoning his pants, the endeavor
to have sex with her very apparent, is guilty of attempted
rape. On the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the
female organ by the penis, even without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina, consummates the crime
of rape. More so, it has long abandoned its “stray” decision
in People vs. Erina (50 Phil. 998) where the accused was
found guilty of frustrated rape. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Mr. A has a long-standing feud with Mr. B. As
payback for Mr. B's numerous transgressions against
him, Mr. A planned to burn down Mr. B's rest house.
One night, Mr. A went to the rest house and started
pouring gasoline on its walls. However, just as Mr. A
had lit the match for burning, he was discovered by
Mr. B's caretaker, Ms. C, and was consequently
prevented from setting the rest house on fire. Mr. A
was then charged with Frustrated Arson. Is the charge
of Frustrated Arson proper? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO, the proper charge is Attempted Arson. Under Art. 6
of the RPC, there is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Here,
Mr. A commenced the commission of arson by pouring
gasoline on the house and lighting a match. However, he
did not perform all the acts of execution which includes
setting the rest house on fire. Thus, Mr. A should only be
liable for Attempted Arson. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in
consideration of money, to kidnap a girl he is courting
so that he may succeed in raping her and eventually
making her accede to marry him. Vicente asked for
more money which Edgardo failed to put up. Angered
because Edgardo did not put up the money he
required, he reported Edgardo to the police. May
Edgardo be charged with attempted kidnapping?
(1996 BAR)
6
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
A: NO. Edgardo may not be charged with attempted
kidnapping inasmuch as no overt act to kidnap or restrain
the liberty of the girl had been commenced. At most, what
Edgardo has done in the premises was a proposal to
Vicente to kidnap the girl, which is only a preparatory act
and not an overt act. The attempt to commit a felony
commences with the commission of overt act, not
preparatory act. Proposal to commit kidnapping is not a
crime. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A police officer responded to a disturbance call at
around 1:30 P.M. in an apartment in Quezon City.
Upon his arrival, the police officer encountered Sisa
stabbing her 1-year-old child with a kitchen knife. The
police officer grabbed Sisa and the latter threw the
knife on the floor. Sisa was immediately taken into
custody. Despite suffering multiple stab wounds on
her back, the child survived. During the trial, Sisa
insisted that she can only be held liable for Attempted
Parricide because she voluntarily desisted when she
threw down the knife. Is Sisa’s contention tenable?
(2022 BAR)
A: NO, the contention of Sisa is untenable. When the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim
sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because
of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated
murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether any
of the qualifying circumstances under Art. 249 of the RPC
are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the
victim is not fatal, then the crime is only attempted
murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to
kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s were not
fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious, or
slight physical injuries. (Edenetino v. People, G.R. No.
206632, 07 Feb. 2018)
In this case, were it not for the arrival of the police officers
who were able to grab the knife from Sisa, the 1-year-old
child could have died, and the offender shall be liable for
infanticide, the victim being less than 3 days old. Since the
wounds sustained by the victim are fatal and there is no
showing that she ceased from stabbing her child because
of her own spontaneous desistance, intent to kill the
victim is shown and the fact that the victim survived, the
crime is already in the frustrated stage. (Bar Q&A by Judge
Alejandria, 2022)
f) CONTINUING CRIMES
(2009, 2005, 1996, 1994 BAR)
Q: Differentiate delito continuado from a continuing
offense. (1994 BAR)
A: Delito continuado, or continuous crime, is a term used
to denote as only one crime a series of felonious acts
arising from a single criminal resolution, not susceptible
of division, which are carried out in the same place and at
about the same time and violating one and the same penal
7 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
provision. The acts done must be impelled by one criminal
intent or purpose, such that each act merely constitutes a
partial execution of a particular crime, violating one and
the same penal provision. It involves a concurrence of
felonious acts violating a common right, a common penal
provision, and impelled by a single criminal impulse.
(People v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-41522, 29 Sept. 1976)
On the other hand, a continuing offense is one whose
essential ingredients took place in more than one
municipality or city, so much so that the criminal
prosecution may be instituted and the case tried in the
competent court of any one of such municipality or city.
The term "continued crime" or delito continuado mandates
that only one information should be filed against the
offender although a series of felonious acts were
performed; the term "continuing crime" is more
pertinently used with reference to the venue where the
criminal action may be instituted. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Angelo devised a Ponzi Scheme in which 500
persons were deceived into investing their money
upon a promise of a capital return of 25%, computed
monthly, and guaranteed by post-dated checks.
During the first two months following the investment,
the investors received their profits, but thereafter,
Angelo vanished.
Angelo was charged with 500 counts of estafa and
2,000 counts of violation of BP 22. In his motion to
quash, Angelo contends that he committed a
continued crime, or delito continuado, hence, he
committed only one count of estafa and one count of
violation of BP 22. (2009 BAR)
(a) What is delito continuado?
A: Delito continuado refers to a crime constituted by
several overt acts committed by the offender in one place,
at about the same time, and all such overt acts violate one
and the same provision of penal law, thus demonstrating
that all such acts are the product of a single indivisible
criminal resolution. Hence, all said acts are considered as
one crime only.
(b) Is Angelo's contention tenable? Explain.
A: NO. His contention is not tenable. He committed as
many counts of estafa against the 500 victims and 2000
counts of violation of BP 22, since each swindling is
achieved through distinct fraudulent machinations
contrived at different times or dates, and in different
amounts. Moreover, his drawing separate checks payable
to each payee is a separate criminal resolution, as they
must be of different amounts and of different dates. He
acted with separate fraudulent intent against each
swindling victim and had distinct criminal intent in
drawing and issuing each check. It cannot be maintained
that his acts are the product of one criminal resolution
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
only. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: YES. Angelo committed only
one count of estafa and one count of violation of BP 22
because his acts were propelled by one and the same
intent to defraud. (Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No.
109266, 02 Dec. 1993) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Five robbers robbed one after the other five houses
occupied by different families located inside a
compound enclosed by a six-foot high hollow block
fence. How many robberies did the five commit?
Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: The offenders committed only one robbery in the eyes
of the law because when they entered the compound, they
were impelled only by a single indivisible criminal
resolution to commit a robbery as they were not aware
that there were five families inside said compound,
considering that the same was enclosed by a six-foot high
hollow block fence. The series of robbery committed in the
same compound at about the same time constitutes one
continued crime, motivated by one criminal impulse.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
g) COMPLEX AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
(2022, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012,
2011, 2009, 2007, 2005 2004, 2003, 2000, 1999, 1996,
1995, 1994, 1991, 1989, 1987 BAR)
Q: Explain the concept of complex crimes under the
RPC. (2018 BAR)
A: There are two kinds of complex crimes under Art. 48 of
the RPC. The first one is a compound crime, when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.
The second one is a complex crime proper when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
COMPOUND CRIMES
(2019, 2012, 2011, 2004 BAR)
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly between compound
and complex crime as concepts in the Penal Code.
(2019, 2004 BAR)
A: Compound crimes result when the offender committed
only a single felonious act from which two or more crimes
resulted. This is provided for in modified form in the first
part of Art. 48, RPC, limiting the resulting crimes to only
grave and/or less grave felonies. Hence, light felonies are
excluded even though resulting from the same single act.
Complex crime results when the offender has to commit
an offense as a necessary means for committing another
offense. Only one Information shall be filed and if proven,
the penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Q: X, intending to kill Y, a store owner, fired at Y from
the street, but the shot killed not only Y but also Z who
was in the store. As a case of aberratio ictus, it is
punishable as a: (2011 BAR)
a. Complex crime proper.
b. Special complex crime.
c. Continuing crime.
d. Compound crime.
A: D. Compound crime. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
COMPLEX CRIMES
(2022, 2019, 2009, 2007, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2000,
1999, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1991, 1989, 1987 BAR)
Q: A, actuated by malice and with the use of a fully
automatic M-14 sub-machine gun, shot a group of
persons who were seated in a cockpit with one burst
of successive, continuous, automatic fire. Four (4)
persons were killed thereby, each having hit by
different bullets coming from the sub-machine gun of
A. Four (4) cases of murder were filed against A.
The trial court ruled that there was only one crime
committed by A for the reason that, since A performed
only one act, he having pressed the trigger of his gun
only once, the crime committed was murder.
Consequently, the trial judge sentenced A to just one
penalty of reclusion perpetua. (1999 BAR)
(a) Was the decision of the trial judge correct?
Explain.
A: NO. The decision of the trial judge is not correct. When
the offender made use of an automatic firearm, the acts
committed are determined by the number of bullets
discharged inasmuch as the firearm being automatic, the
offender need only press the trigger once and it would fire
continually. For each death caused by a distinct and
separate bullet, the accused incurs distinct criminal
liability. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger
which should be considered as producing the several
felonies, but the number of bullets which actually
produced them. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
(b) What constitutes a complex crime? How many
crimes may be involved in a complex crime?
What is the penalty therefor?
A: A complex crime is constituted when a single act caused
two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an
offense is committed as a necessary means to commit
another offense. (Art 48, RPC)
At least two crimes are involved in a complex crime; either
two or more grave or less grave felonies resulted from a
single act, or an offense is committed as a necessary
means for committing another.
8
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
The penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed
and in its maximum period. (Art. 48, RPC) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: On 15 May 2013 at around 3:00 a.m., Lucy, Mary,
and Raphael were on board a passenger jeepney, with
Raphael behind the wheel. They were traversing the
highway on the southbound lane.
Meanwhile, a Virgen Bus, driven by Kiko, was
traveling along the northbound lane. Kiko overtook
the vehicle in front of him, which caused him to
occupy the opposite lane where the jeepney was on.
With the Virgen Bus traveling at a high speed, Raphael
tried to avoid the collision but failed. The bus hit the
jeepney which resulted in Raphael’s death, serious
physical injuries to Lucy and Mary, and extensive
damage to the jeepney amounting to Php 500,000.00.
The public prosecutor filed two Informations charging
Kiko for two separate offenses: (i) Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries for
the injuries suffered by the passengers; and (ii)
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for Raphael’s death and the
damage to the jeepney. Is the public prosecutor
correct? (2022 BAR)
A: NO, the charges are not correct. Kiko should be charged
with a complex crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property under Art. 365 in relation to Art. 263 of the RPC.
Art. 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious offense, in this case
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be
imposed in the maximum period.
If a reckless imprudent or negligent act results in two or
more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. Applying Art. 48, it follows that if one offense
is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses
may be treated as a separate or the light felony may be
absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of
damage to property and slight physical injuries, both
resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not
constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one
Information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct
penalties. Where the single act of imprudence resulted in
double less serious physical injuries, damage to property
amounting to Php. 10,000 and slight physical injuries,
there is a separate complaint for the slight physical
injuries and another complaint for lesiones menor graves
and damage to property, (Reodica v. CA, G.R. No. 125066,
08 July 1998) (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2023)
9 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
Q: Harry, an overseas contract worker, arrived from
Saudi Arabia with considerable savings. Knowing him
to be “loaded”, his friends Jason, Manuel and Dave
invited him to poker session at a rented beach cottage.
When he was losing almost all his money which to him
was his savings of a lifetime, he discovered that he was
being cheated by his friends. Angered by the betrayal,
he decided to take revenge on the three cheats.
Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay Rhum and
gave them to his companions to drink, as they did,
until they all fell asleep. When Harry saw his
companions already sound asleep, he hacked them all
to death. Then he remembered his losses. He rifled
through the pockets of his victims and got back all the
money he lost. He then ran away but not before
burning the cottage to hide his misdeed. The following
day, police investigators found among the debris the
charred bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave, and the
caretaker of the resort.
After preliminary investigation, the Provincial
Prosecutor charged Harry with the complex crime of
arson with quadruple homicide and robbery. Was
Harry properly charged? Discuss fully. (1995 BAR)
A: NO. Harry was not properly charged. Harry should have
been charged with three (3) separate crimes, namely:
murder, theft, and arson.
Harry killed Jason, Manuel, and Dave with evident
premeditation, as there was considerable lapse of time
before he decided to commit the crime and the actual
commission of the crime. In addition, Harry employed
means which weakened the defense of Jason, Manuel, and
Dave. Harry gave them the liquor to drink until they were
drunk and fell asleep. This gave Harry the opportunity to
carry out his plan of murder with impunity.
The taking of the money was a mere afterthought of the
killings. Hence, Harry committed the separate crime of
theft and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Although theft was committed against dead persons, it is
still legally possible as the offended party are the estates
of the victims.
In burning the cottage, it is another separate crime of
arson. The act of burning was not necessary for the
consummation of the two previous offenses he committed.
The fact that the caretaker died from the blaze did not
qualify Harry’s crime into a complex crime of arson with
homicide for there is no such crime.
Hence, Harry was improperly charged with the complex
crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery.
Harry should have been charged with three separate
crimes: murder, theft, and arson. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: Rodolfo, a policeman, was cleaning his service
pistol inside his house when it fell from his hand and
fired. The bullet hit a neighbor on the stomach and a
second neighbor on the leg. The injuries sustained by
the two neighbors required thirty-five (35) days and
nine (9) days of medical attendance, respectively. The
investigating fiscal later filed an information for
frustrated homicide and slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Rodolfo. Is the
charge correct? Explain. (1989 BAR)
A: NO, the charge is not correct. One single act of
accidental shooting cannot give rise to two felonies - one
of which is intentional and the other negligent. Frustrated
homicide presupposes intent to kill. The facts do not show
any intent to kill on the part of Rodolfo. At most, he was
careless, and therefore only negligent.
Two separate crimes of serious physical injuries (against
the first neighbor whose injuries requires 35 days of
medical attendance), and slight physical injuries (against
the second neighbor), both through reckless imprudence,
were committed by Rodolfo. Although both of these
offenses were the result of one single act, a complex crime
is not committed. It is only when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies that a complex
crime may be committed under Art. 48 of the RPC. Slight
physical injuries are not a grave or less grave felony.
The information filed should be reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries and slight physical
injuries. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Jose purchased roofing materials worth P20,000
from PY & Sons Construction Company owned by
Pedro and paid the latter a check in the said amount.
The following day, Pedro deposited the check but it
was returned dishonored because it was drawn
against a closed account. Jose failed to make good the
said check despite written demands. Atty. Saavedra,
counsel for Pedro, filed two complaints against Jose
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, one for estafa
under Art. 315 of the RPC and another for violation of
BP Blg. 22.
Atty. San Pascual, counsel for Jose, claimed that if his
client was at all liable, he could only be liable for
violation of BP 22 and not for estafa under Art. 315 of
the RPC because one precludes the other and because
BP 22 is more favorable to the accused as it carries a
lighter penalty.
The investigating fiscal, on his resolution, stated that
only one crime was committed, namely, the complex
crime of estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC and another
under BP 22. Is the resolution of the investigating
fiscal correct? (1987 BAR)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
A: NO, the resolution of the investigating fiscal is
erroneous. There is no complex crime of estafa under Art.
315 of the RPC and the violation of BP 22. A complex
crime refers only to felonies which are punished in the
RPC. BP 22 which punishes the offense of issuing a
worthless check is a special law. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES OR COMPOSITE CRIMES
(2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2011, 2010,
2009, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 1999, 1998, 1997,
1996, 1995, 1993, 1992, 1989, 1988 BAR)
Q: Distinguish between an ordinary complex crime
and a special complex crime as to their concepts and
as to the imposition of penalties. (2005, 2003 BAR)
A: In concept – An ordinary complex crime is made up of
two or more crimes being punished in distinct provisions
of the RPC but alleged in one information either because
they were brought about by a single felonious act or
because one offense is a necessary means for committing
the other offense or offenses. They are alleged in one
information so that only one penalty shall be imposed. A
special complex crime, on the other hand, is made up of
two or more crimes which are considered only as
components of a single indivisible offense being punished
in one provision of the RPC.
As to penalties – In ordinary complex crime, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed and in its
maximum period. In special complex crime, only one
penalty is specifically prescribed for all the component
crimes which are regarded as one indivisible offense. The
component crimes are not regarded as distinct crimes and
so the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime is
not the penalty to be imposed nor in its maximum period.
It is the penalty specifically provided for the special
complex crime that shall be applied according to the rules
on imposition of the penalty. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Pedro, Pablito, Juan, and Julio, all armed with bolos,
robbed the house where Antonio, his wife, and three
(3) daughters were residing. While the four were
ransacking Antonio's house, Julio noticed that one of
Antonio's daughters was trying to escape. He chased
and caught up with her at a thicket somewhat distant
from the house, but before bringing her back, raped
her. (2016 BAR)
(a) What crime or crimes, if any, did Pedro,
Pablito, Juan, and Julio commit? Explain.
A: Julio is liable for special complex crime of robbery with
rape since he had carnal knowledge of Antonio’s daughter
on occasion or by reason of robbery. Even if the place of
robbery is different from that of rape, what is important is
the direct connection between the crimes (People v.
Canastre, G.R. No. L-2055, 24 Dec. 1948). Rape was not
separate by distance and time from the robbery.
10
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Pedro, Pablito, and Juan are liable for robbery by a band.
There is a band in this case since more than three armed
malefactors took part in the commission of robbery. Under
Art. 296 of RPC, any member of a band, who is present at
the commission of a robbery by a band, shall be punished
as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band,
unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.
The assault mentioned in Art. 296 includes rape. (People v.
Hamiana, G.R. Nos. L-39491-94, 30 May 1971)
They are not liable, however, for rape since they were not
present when the victim was raped and thus, they had no
opportunity to prevent the same. They are only liable for
robbery by band. (People v. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771,
08 June 2011)
(b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns
in raping the three daughters inside the
house, and, to prevent identification, killed
the whole family just before they left. What
crime or crimes, if any, did the four
malefactors commit?
A: They are liable for special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. In this special complex crime, it is
immaterial that several persons are killed. It is also
immaterial that aside from the homicides, rapes are
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
Since homicides are committed by or on the occasion of
the robbery, the multiple rapes shall be integrated into
one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
(People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, 03 Apr. 2013) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: While walking alone on her way home from a party,
Mildred was seized at gun point by Felipe and taken
on board a tricycle to a house some distance away.
Felipe was with Julio, Roldan, and Lucio, who drove
the tricycle.
At the house, Felipe, Julio, and Roldan succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Mildred against her
will and under the threat of Felipe’s gun. Lucio was not
around when the sexual assaults took place as he left
after bringing his colleagues and Mildred to their
destination, but he returned every day to bring food
arid the news in town about Mildred’s disappearance.
For five days, Felipe, Julio and Roldan kept Mildred in
the house and took turns in sexually assaulting her.
On the 6th day, Mildred managed to escape; she
proceeded immediately to the nearest police station
and narrated her ordeal.
What crime/s did Felipe, Julio, Roldan, and Lucio
commit and what was their degree of participation?
(2013 BAR)
11
A: Felipe, Julio, Roldan and Lucio are all liable for the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape. It was sufficiently proved that the
four accused kidnapped Mildred and held her in detention
for five days and carnally abused her. Notably, however,
no matter how many rapes had been committed in the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the
resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. The
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense
with only one penalty. The offense is not forcible
abduction with rape since it was obvious that the intent is
to detain the victim.
As to the degree of their participation, all of them are
principally liable because of implied conspiracy as they
acted toward a single criminal design or purpose. (People
v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, 27 July 2011) Albeit,
Lucio was not around when the sexual assault took place,
his complicity is evident as he was the one who drove the
tricycle and returned every day to bring food and news to
his cohorts. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Two young men, A and B, conspired to rob a
residential house of things of value. They succeeded in
the commission of their original plan to simply rob. A,
however, was sexually aroused when he saw the lady
owner of the house, and so raped her.
The lady victim testified that B did not in any way
participate in the rape but he watched the happening
from a window and did nothing to stop the rape. Is B
as criminally liable as A for robbery with rape?
Explain. (2004, 1999 BAR)
A: YES. B is as criminally liable for the composite crime of
robbery with rape under Art. 294 (1). Although the
conspiracy of A and B was only to rob, B was present
when the rape was being committed which gave rise to a
composite crime, a single indivisible offense of robbery
with rape. B would not have been liable had he
endeavored to prevent the commission of the rape. But
since he did not when he could have done so, he in effect
acquiesced with the rape as a component of the robbery
and so he is also liable for robbery with rape. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank and when
they were about to get out of the bank, policemen
came and ordered them to surrender but they fired on
the police officers who fired back and shot it out with
them. Suppose a bank employee was killed and the
bullet which killed him came from the firearm of the
police officers, with what crime shall you charge A, B,
C and D? (1998 BAR)
A: A, B, C and D should be charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide because the death of the bank
employee was brought about by the acts of said offenders
on the occasion of robbery. They shot it out with the
policeman, thereby causing such death by reason or on the
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
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 CRIMINAL LAW
occasion of robbery; Hence, the composite crime of
robbery with homicide. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: After raping the complainant in her house, the
accused struck a match to smoke a cigarette before
departing from the scene. The brief light from the
match allowed him to notice a watch in her wrist. He
demanded that she hand over the watch. When she
refused, he forcibly grabbed it from her. The accused
was charged with and convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with rape. Was the court correct?
(1997 BAR)
A: NO. The court erred in convicting the accused of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape. The accused
should instead be held liable for two (2) separate crimes
of robbery and rape, since the primary intent or objective
of the accused was only to rape the complainant, and his
commission of the robbery was merely an afterthought.
The robbery must precede the rape, in order to give rise to
the special complex crime for which the court convicted
the accused. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
2. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2005, 2004,
2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996,
1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, 1987
BAR)
a. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
ART. 11, RPC
(2022, 2019, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2012, 2011,
2010, 2009, 2008, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000,
1998, 1996, 1993, 1992, 1990, 1989, 1987 BAR)
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between justifying
and exempting circumstances in criminal law. (2004,
1998 BAR)
A: Justifying circumstance affects the act, not the actor;
while exempting circumstance affects the actor, not the
act. In justifying circumstance, no criminal and, generally,
no civil liability is incurred; while in exempting
circumstance, civil liability is generally incurred although
there is no criminal liability. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
SELF-DEFENSE; DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
Art. 11(1)
(2022, 2019, 2017, 2000, 1998, 1996 BAR)
Q: Police officer John ran after Randy who had just
killed Willy in John’s presence. John fired at Randy in
an attempt to stop him in his tracks. In response,
Randy fired back at John, hitting him. John was
seriously wounded but survived due to timely medical
assistance. Randy was then charged with Frustrated
Homicide. During the trial, Randy claimed self-
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
defense. Is Randy’s claim of self-defense tenable?
(2022 BAR)
A: NO, the claim of Self-defense is untenable. In Randy’s
claim of self-defense, he has to prove by clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the
following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.
Randy committed a crime in the presence of the police
officer who, consequently, can validly make a warrantless
arrest. Police Officer John’s act in the fulfillment of his
duty cannot be equated as unlawful aggression (People v.
Delima, GR. No. L-18660, 22 Dec. 1922). Without unlawful
aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has
no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated in favor of
Randy. The assault made by Randy was not an act of self-
defense but a determined aggression on his part. (Bar Q&A
by Judge Alejandria, 2023)
Q: In dire need of money, Mr. R decided to steal from
his next-door neighbor, Mrs. V. On the night of May 15,
2010, Mr. R proceeded with his plan entered Mrs. V's
bedroom by breaking one of the windows from the
outside. Finding Mrs. V sound asleep, he silently
foraged through her cabinet, and stashed all the
bundles of cash and jewelries he could find.
As Mr. R was about to leave, he heard Mrs. V shout,
"Stop or I will shoot you!", and when he turned
around, he saw Mrs. V cocking a rifle which has
pointed at him. Fearing for his life, Mr. R then lunged
at Mrs. V and was able to wrest the gun away from her.
Thereafter, Mr. R shot Mrs. V, which resulted in her
death. Mr. R's deeds were discovered on the very same
night as he was seen by law enforcement authorities
fleeing the crime scene. May Mr. R validly invoke the
justifying circumstances of self-defense? Explain.
(2019 BAR)
A: NO, Mr. R may not invoke the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. There was no unlawful aggression on the
part of Mrs. V, who was defending her property. As the
owner of the cash and jewelry, Mrs. V had the lawful right
to take back the goods stolen by Mr. R who was actually
the unlawful aggressor. (People v. Salamuddin, G.R. No.
29896, 24 Jan. 1929) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Porthos made a sudden turn on a dark street, and
his Rolls-Royce SUV bumped the rear of a parked
Cadillac Sedan inside which Aramis was then taking a
nap. Angered by the violent Impact, Aramis alighted
and confronted Porthos who had also alighted. Aramis
angrily and repeatedly shouted at Porthos: Putang
Ina mo! Porthos, displaying fearlessness, aggressively
shouted back at Aramis: Wag kang magtapang-
tapangan dyan, papatayin kita! Without saying
12
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
anything more, Aramis drew his gun from his waist
and shot Porthos in the leg. Porthos' wound was not
life threatening. (2017 BAR)
(a) What are the kinds of unlawful aggression,
and which kind was displayed in this case?
A: Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or
material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. (People v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, 29 June 2015)
There was neither material nor imminent unlawful
aggression here. On the part of Porthos, while Aramis
displayed fearlessness and aggressively shouted back at
him, there was no physical force or weapon that might
endanger his life. In other words, it was not life
threatening.
It was Aramis who was the aggressor here in view of his
act in actually shooting Porthos, although on his leg only.
Hence, we could conclude that there was no intent to kill.
(b) Standing trial for frustrated murder, Aramis
pleaded self-defense. The Prosecution's
contention was that the plea of self-defense
applied only to consummated killings. Rule,
with explanations, on the tenability of Aramis'
claim of self-defense, and on the Prosecution's
contention.
A: Aramis cannot plead that his act in shooting Porthos
was self-defense. There was no element of unlawful
aggression as a condition sine qua non on the part of
Porthos.
The accidental bumping of his car by Porthos cannot be
considered as enough provocation, neither was the verbal
tussle between them. No person can be killed or injured by
act of shouting fearlessly against each other. I cannot also
adhere to the prosecution’s contention that self-defense
applies only to consummated killings. Self-defense applies
even in frustrated murder as the law did not qualify its
application. (People v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, 29 June 2015;
People v. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, 23 Nov. 2011) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Osang, a married woman in her early twenties, was
sleeping on a banig on the floor of their nipa hut
beside the seashore when she was awakened by the
act of a man mounting her. Thinking that it was her
husband, Gardo, who had returned from fishing in the
sea, Osang continued her sleep but allowed the man,
who was actually their neighbor, Julio, to have sexual
intercourse with her. After Julio satisfied himself, he
said “Salamat Osang" as he turned to leave. Only then
did Osang realize that the man was not her husband.
Enraged, Osang grabbed a balisong from the wall and
stabbed Julio to death. When tried for homicide, Osang
claimed defense of honor. Should the claim be
sustained? Why? (2000, 1998 BAR)
13
A: NO. Osang's claim of defense of honor should not be
sustained because the aggression on her honor had ceased
when she stabbed the aggressor.
In defense of rights under Art. 11(1) of the RPC, it is
required inter alia that there be (1) unlawful aggression,
and (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it. The unlawful aggression must be
continuing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by
the person making a defense. Otherwise, the attack made
is a retaliation and not a defense. Hence, Osang's act of
stabbing Julio to death after the sexual intercourse was
finished, is not defense of honor but an immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against her,
which is only mitigating. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A security guard, upon seeing a man scale the wall
of a factory compound which he was guarding, shot
and killed the latter. Upon investigation by the police
who thereafter arrived at the scene of the shooting, it
was discovered that the victim was unarmed. When
prosecuted for homicide, the security guard claimed
that he merely acted in self-defense of property and in
the performance of his duty as a security guard. If you
were the judge, would you convict him of homicide?
Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: YES. I would convict the security guard for homicide if I
were the judge, because his claim of having acted in
defense of property and in performance of a duty cannot
fully be justified. Even assuming that the victim was
scaling the wall of the factory compound to commit a
crime inside the same, shooting him is never justifiable,
even admitting that such act is considered unlawful
aggression on property rights.
In People v. Narvaes (G.R. No. L-33466-67, 20 Apr. 1983), a
person is justified to defend his property rights, but all the
elements of self-defense under Art. 11, must be present. In
the instant case, just like in Narvaes, the second element
(reasonable necessity of the means employed) is absent.
Hence, he should be convicted of homicide but entitled to
Incomplete self-defense. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
Art. 11(2)
(2002, 2000, 1999 BAR)
Q: When A arrived home, he found B raping his
daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A took his gun
and shot B, killing him. Charged with homicide, A
claimed he acted in defense of his daughter's honor. Is
A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of any
mitigating circumstance or circumstances? (2002,
2000, 1999 BAR)
A: NO. A cannot validly invoke defense of his daughter's
honor in having killed B since the rape was already
consummated; moreover, B already ran away, hence, there
was no aggression to defend against and no defense to
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FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
speak of. Defense of honor as included in self-defense,
must have been done to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. There is no defense to speak of where the
unlawful aggression no longer exists.
A may, however, invoke the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of having acted in immediate vindication of
a grave offense to a descendant, his daughter, under Art.
13(5) of the RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Art. 11(3)
(2016, 2002 BAR)
Q: Pedro is married to Tessie. Juan is the first cousin of
Tessie. While in the market, Pedro saw a man stabbing
Juan. Seeing the attack on Juan, Pedro picked up a
spade nearby and hit the attacker on his head which
caused the latter’s death. Can Pedro be absolved of the
killing on the ground that it is in defense of a relative?
Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: NO. The relatives of the accused for purpose of defense
of relative under Art. 11(20) of the RPC are his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters or of his relatives by affinity in the
same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree. Relative by affinity within the same
degree includes ascendant, descendant, brother or sister
of the spouse of the accused.
In this case, Juan is not the ascendant, descendant, brother
or sister of Tessie, the spouse of Pedro. Relative by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree includes first
cousin. But in this case, Juan is the cousin of Pedro by
affinity but not by consanguinity. Juan, therefore, is not a
relative of Pedro for purpose of applying the provision on
defense of relative.
Pedro, however, can invoke defense of a stranger. Under
the RPC, a person who defends a person who is not his
relative may invoke the defense of a stranger provided
that all its elements exist, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the attack; and (c) the person defending
be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A chanced upon three men who were attacking B
with fist blows. C, one of the men, was about to stab B
with a knife. Not knowing that B was actually the
aggressor because he had earlier challenged the three
men to a fight, A shot C as the latter was about to stab
B. May A invoke the defense of a stranger as a
justifying circumstance in his favor? Why? (2002 BAR)
A: YES. A may invoke the justifying circumstance of
defense of stranger since he was not involved in the fight
and he shot C when the latter was about to stab B. There
being no indication that A was induced by revenge,
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
resentment or any other evil motive in shooting C, his act
is justified under Art. 11(3) of the RPC. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL OR INJURY
Art. 11(4)
(2004, 1990 BAR)
Q: BB and CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT.
The victim's son, ST, upon seeing the attack, drew his
gun but was prevented from shooting the attackers by
AA, who grappled with him for possession of the gun.
FT died from knife wounds. AA, BB and CC were
charged with murder. In his defense, AA invoked the
justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or
injury, contending that by preventing ST from
shooting BB and CC, he merely avoided a greater evil.
Will AA's defense prosper? Reason briefly. (2004 BAR)
A: NO, AA's defense will not prosper because obviously
there was a conspiracy among BB, CC and AA, such that
the principle that when there is a conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all, shall govern. The act of ST, the victim's
son, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence,
justified as a defense of his father against the unlawful
aggression by BB and CC. ST’s act to defend his father's life
and to stop BB and CC achieve their criminal objective
cannot be regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes
of the law, a lawful act.
What AA did was a lawful defense, not greater evil, to
allow BB and CC achieve their criminal objective of
stabbing FT. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q:
(a) In mercy killing, is the attending physician
criminally liable for deliberately turning off
the life support system consequently costing
the life of the patient? State reasons. (1990
BAR)
A: The attending physician is criminally liable. Euthanasia
is not a justifying circumstance in Philippine jurisdiction.
(b) How about in an instance when in saving the
life of the mother, the doctor sacrificed the life
of the unborn child? Explain your answer.
(1990 BAR)
A: There is no criminal liability on the part of the doctor
because his acts are justified under Art. 11(4) of the RPC
which provides that: "The following do not incur any
criminal liability: x x x 4) any person, who in order to
avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage
to another, provided that the following requisites are
present: First: That the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than that
done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical
and less harmful means of preventing it." (UPLC Suggested
14
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Answers)
FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
Art. 11(5)
(2000 BAR)
Q: Lucresia was robbed of her bracelet in her home.
The following day, Lucresia, while in her store, noticed
her bracelet wound around the right arm of Jun-Jun.
As soon as the latter left, Lucresia went to a nearby
police station and sought the help of Pat. Willie Reyes.
He went with Lucresia to the house of Jun-Jun to
confront the latter.
Pat. Reyes introduced himself as a policeman and
tried to get hold of Jun-Jun who resisted and ran away.
Pat. Reyes chased him and fired two warning shots in
the air but Jun-Jun continued to run. Pat. Reyes shot
him in the right leg. JunJun was hit and he fell down
but he crawled towards a fence, intending to pass
through an opening underneath. When Pat. Reyes was
about 5 meters away, he fired another shot at Jun-Jun
hitting him at the right lower hip. Pat. Reyes brought
Jun-Jun to the hospital, but because of profuse
bleeding, he eventually died. Pat. Reyes was
subsequently charged with homicide.
During the trial, Pat. Reyes raised the defense, by way
of exoneration, that he acted in the fulfillment of a
duty. Is the defense tenable? (2000 BAR)
A: NO. The defense of having acted in the fulfillment of a
duty requires as a condition, inter alia, that the injury or
offense committed be the unavoidable or necessary
consequence of the due performance of the duty. (People v.
Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, 27 July 1943). It is not enough that
the accused acted in fulfillment of a duty. After Jun-Jun
was shot in the right leg and was already crawling, there
was no need for Pat. Reyes to shoot him any further.
Clearly, he acted beyond the call of duty, which brought
about the cause of death of the victim. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
b. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
ART. 12, RPC
(2022, 2020-21, 2017, 2015, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2004,
2000, 1998, 1994, 1992, 1991, 1989 BAR)
Q: A person arrested for playing cara y crus was
charged with violation of P.D. No. 1602 or the Anti-
Gambling Law. The lawyer for the accused argues that
the case should be dismissed based on an exempting
circumstance, which is that the accused is poor. The
lawyer argues that unlike those who gamble in big
casinos with astronomical sums of money, cara y crus
is the accused’s only means of entertainment. In
addition, the lawyer explains that gamblers from
China, where gambling is illegal, are even welcomed in
the Philippines.
15
Is the lawyer’s argument legally tenable? Explain
briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
A: NO, the lawyer’s argument is untenable. First, extreme
poverty is not an exempting circumstance to exculpate the
offender of criminal liability. Moreover, violations of P.D.
1602 or a special law is mala prohibitum where intent is
immaterial and neither modifying circumstances are
appreciated. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
INSANITY OR IMBECILITY
Art. 12(1)
(2010 BAR)
Q: While his wife was on a 2-year scholarship abroad,
Romeo was having an affair with his maid Dulcinea.
Realizing that the affair was going nowhere, Dulcinea
told Romeo that she was going back to the province to
marry her childhood sweetheart. Clouded by anger
and jealousy, Romeo strangled Dulcinea to death
while she was sleeping in the maid’s quarters.
The following day, Romeo was found catatonic inside
the maid’s quarters. He was brought to the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) where he was
diagnosed to be mentally unstable. Charged with
murder, Romeo pleaded insanity as a defense. (2010
BAR)
(a) Will Romeo’s defense prosper? Explain.
A: NO. Romeo’s defense of insanity will not prosper
because, even assuming that Romeo was “insane” when
diagnosed after he committed the crime, insanity as a
defense to the commission of a crime must have existed
and proven to be so existing at the precise moment when
the crime was being committed. The facts of the case
indicate that Romeo committed the crime with
discernment.
(b) What is the effect of the diagnosis of the NCMH
on the case?
A: The effect of the diagnosis made by NCMH is possibly a
suspension of the proceeding against Romeo and his
commitment to appropriate institution for treatment until
he could already understand the proceedings. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
MINORITY
Art. 12(2) and (3)
(2015, 2000, 1998 BAR)
Q: Lito, a minor, was bullied by Brutus, his classmate.
Having had enough, Lito got the key to the safe where
his father kept his licensed pistol and took the
weapon. Knowing that Brutus usually hung out at a
nearby abandoned building after class, Lito went
ahead and hid while waiting for Brutus. When Lito
was convinced that Brutus was alone, he shot Brutus,
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 CRIMINAL LAW
who died on the spot. Lito then hid the gun in one of
the empty containers. At the time of the shooting, Lito
was fifteen years and one month old. What is Lito's
criminal liability? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: Lito is criminally liable for murder qualified by the
circumstance of treachery, or evident premeditation, as
well as illegal possession of firearms. Minority is not an
exempting circumstance under Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 9344
since his age is above fifteen years but below eighteen
years and he acted with discernment. Circumstance will
show that he discerned the consequences of his criminal
acts as shown from the fact he employed means to make a
surprise attack and he even hid the murder weapon in an
empty container. It was also clear that he planned the
killing. However, minority will be considered as a
privileged mitigating circumstance, which will require the
graduation of the penalty prescribed by law to one degree
lower. (Art. 68, RPC) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: While they were standing in line awaiting their
vaccination at the school clinic, Pomping repeatedly
pulled the ponytail of Katreena, his 11 years, 2 months
and 13 days old classmate in Grade 5 at the Sampaloc
Elementary School. Irritated, Katreena turned around
and swung at Pomping with a ball pen. The top of the
ball pen hit the right eye of Pomping which bled
profusely. Realizing what she had caused, Katreena
immediately helped Pomping. When investigated, she
freely admitted to the school principal that she was
responsible for the injury to Pomping's eye. After the
incident, she executed a statement admitting her
culpability. Due to the injury, Pomping lost his right
eye. (2000, 1998 BAR)
(a) Is Katreena criminally liable? Why?
A: NO. Katreena is not criminally liable although she is
civilly liable. Being a minor less than 15 years old although
over nine (9) years of age, she is generally exempt from
criminal liability. The exception is where the prosecution
proved that the act was committed with discernment. The
burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the accused
acted with discernment.
The presumption is that such minor acted without
discernment, and this is strengthened by the fact that
Katreena only reacted with a ballpen which she must be
using in class at the time, and only to stop Pomping’s
vexatious act of repeatedly pulling her ponytail. In other
words, the injury was accidental.
(b) Discuss the attendant circumstances and
effects thereof.
A: The attendant circumstances which may be considered
are:
1. Minority of the accused as an exempting circumstance
under Art. 12(3) of RPC, where she shall be exempt
from criminal liability, unless it was proved that she
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
acted with discernment. She is however civilly liable;
2. If found criminally liable, the minority of the accused
is a privileged mitigating circumstance. A
discretionary penalty lower by at least two (2)
degrees than that prescribed for the crime committed
shall be imposed in accordance with Art. 68(1) of RPC.
The sentence, however, should automatically be
suspended in accordance with Sec. 5(a) of R.A. No.
8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997);
NOTE: In view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9344
otherwise known as the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006”, the sentence should be automatically
suspended in accordance with Sec. 38 thereof.
3. Also if found criminally liable, the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of not intending to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed under Art. 13(3) of the RPC;
and
4. The ordinary mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
ACCIDENT
Art. 12(4)
(2022 BAR)
Q: Michael was driving along the highway when he
executed a prohibited U-turn. Dyords, a police officer,
accosted Michael for the traffic violation. A verbal
argument ensued between them. Dyords suddenly
drew his service firearm and pointed it at Michael.
Dyords ordered Michael to alight from his car, which
the latter obeyed. Dyords then handcuffed Michael
and pinned his head and body against the pavement
until he could no longer breathe. Michael died.
Charged with Homicide, Dyords interposed the
exempting circumstance of accident as a defense.
If you were the Judge, how would you resolve Dyords’
defense Explain briefly. (2022 BAR)
A: The defense of Dyords is not meritorious. Exemption
from criminal liability proceeds from finding that the
harm to the victim was not due to the fault or negligence
of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have
been foreseen or controlled. The elements of Accident are
as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a
lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was
caused by a mere accident; and 3) on the part of the
accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the
injury. (Pomoy vs. People, G.R. No. 150647, 29 Sept. 2004)
In this case, Dyords, although performing a lawful act,
acted without due care. There is no necessity to employ
force upon Michael who was shown to have been
submissive to the ordered of the police officer. He could
16
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
have avoided the resulting injury sustained by Michael
which caused the latter’s death. (Bar Q&A by Judge
Alejandria, 2023)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: If I were the judge, I would rule
against Dyords. The requisites of accident are the
following: lawful act, without dolo, and without culpa.
Arresting for traffic violation is not a lawful act. Thus,
Dyords should have confiscated the driver’s license
instead of arresting him. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29
Feb. 2012) Unlawful arresting the victim is arbitrary
detention. (Compendious Bar Reviewer on Criminal Law:
Based on Bar Exam Syllabus (2023) by Dean Nilo T. Divina)
LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE
Art. 12(7)
(2011, 1994 BAR)
Q: Insuperable cause is an exempting circumstance
which may be applied to? (2011 BAR)
a. Robbery.
b. Misprision of treason.
c. Homicide
d. Rebellion.
A: (d) Rebellion (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
Q: VC, JG, GG, and JG conspired to overthrow the
Philippine Government. VG was recognized as the
titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings were
held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his
conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that he, VG,
JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the
government.
Father Abraham did not report this information to the
proper authorities. Did Father Abraham commit a
crime? If so, what crime was committed? What is his
criminal liability? (1994 BAR)
A: NO, Father Abraham did not commit a crime because
the conspiracy involved is one to commit rebellion, not a
conspiracy to commit treason which makes a person
criminally liable under Art. 116 of the RPC. And even
assuming that it will fall as misprision of treason, Father
Abraham is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12,
par. 7, as his failure to report can be considered as due to
“insuperable cause", as this involves the sanctity and
inviolability of a confession. Conspiracy to commit
rebellion results in criminal liability to the co-
conspirators, but not to a person who learned of such and
did not report to the proper authorities. (US v. Vergara,
G.R. No. 1016, 16 Jan. 1903; People v. Atienza, G.R. No. 3578,
14 Dec. 1931) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
17
c) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ART. 13, RPC
(2019, 2018, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011,
2009, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1993, 1992,
1990, 1989, 1988 BAR)
Q: What is a privileged mitigating circumstance?
Distinguish a privileged mitigating circumstance from
an ordinary mitigating circumstance as to reduction of
penalty and offsetting against aggravating
circumstance/s. (2012 BAR)
A: Privileged mitigating circumstances are those that
mitigate the criminal liability of the accused by graduating
the imposable penalty for the crime being modified to one
or two degrees lower. These circumstances cannot be
offset by aggravating circumstance. The circumstance of
incomplete justification or exemption (when majority of
the conditions are present), and the circumstance of
minority (if the child above 15 years of age acted with
discernment) are privileged mitigating circumstance.
The distinctions between ordinary and privileged
mitigating circumstances are as follows:
a. Under the rules for application of divisible penalties
(Art. 64, RPC), the presence of a mitigating
circumstance, if not off-set by aggravating
circumstance, has the effect of applying the divisible
penalty in its minimum period. Under the rules on
graduation of penalty (Art. 68, 69, RPC), the presence
of privileged mitigating circumstance has the effect of
reducing the penalty one to two degrees lower;
b. Ordinary mitigating circumstances can be offset by
aggravating circumstances. Privileged mitigating
circumstances are not subject to the off-set rule.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING OR EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE
Art 13(1)
(1999, 1990 BAR)
Q: When is surrender by an accused considered
voluntary, and constitutive of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender? (1999 BAR)
A: A surrender by an offender is considered voluntary
when it is spontaneous, indicative of an intent to submit
unconditionally to the authorities. To be mitigating, the
surrender must be:
a. Spontaneous, i.e., indicative of acknowledgment of
guilt and not for convenience nor conditional;
b. Made before the government incurs expenses, time
and effort in tracking down the offender's
whereabouts; and
c. Made to a person in authority or the letter's agents.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: In the middle of the night, Enyong heard the
footsteps of an intruder inside their house. Enyong
picked up his rifle and saw a man, Gorio, with a pistol
ransacking Enyong’s personal effects in his study. He
shot and killed Gorio.
Suppose Enyong shot Gorio while he was running
away from Enyong’s house with his television set,
what is Enyong liable for? Explain your answer. (1990
BAR)
A: There is criminal liability this time with the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Under the case of
People v. Narvaez, (G.R. No. L-33466-67, 20 Apr. 1983)
defense of property can be availed of even when there is
no assault against a person. It is recognized as an unlawful
aggression. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
Art. 13(5)
(1988 BAR)
Q: The victim Dario went to the Civil Service
Commission at about 11:00 am to have some
documents signed, and because his efforts were
frustrated, he angrily remarked in the presence of the
accused Benito that the Civil Service Commission is a
hang-out of thieves.
The accused felt alluded to because he was then facing
criminal and administrative charges on several counts
involving his honesty and integrity, and pulling out a
gun from his desk, he shot Dario, inflicting a fatal
wound. Benito is now invoking the mitigating
circumstances of immediate vindication of grave
offense. Decide the case. (1988 BAR)
A: The mitigating circumstances of immediate vindication
of grave offense cannot be considered because to be
applicable, Art. 13(5) requires that: “Mitigating
circumstances.— xxxx 5. That the act was committed in
the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito) his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.”
Instead, the circumstances of passion or obfuscation
should be considered. Benito should be charged with
frustrated homicide with the mitigating circumstances of
passion. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION
Art. 13(6)
(2013 BAR)
Q: Passion or obfuscation may be appreciated
__________. (2013 BAR)
a) if it arises from jealousy in an amorous
relationship between a married man and a
single woman
b) if it arises from jealousy of a man who has
been living-in with the woman for the past 20
years
c) if it arises from jealousy with immoral, lustful
and vindictive sentiments of the offender
against the victim in none of the above
situations
d) in none of the above situations.
A: B. In U.S. v. dela Cruz (G.R. No. L-7094, 29 Mar. 1912), the
Supreme Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation wherein the accused, in the heat
of passion, killed the deceased, who had been his querida
(concubine or lover), upon discovering her in flagrante in
carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, AND VOLUNTARY
CONFESSION OF GUILT
Art. 13(7)
(2019, 1999 BAR)
Q: In order that the plea of guilty may be mitigating,
what requisites must be complied with? (1999 BAR)
A: For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the requisites are:
1. That the accused spontaneously pleaded guilty to the
crime charged;
2. That such plea was made before the court competent
to try the case and render judgment; and
3. That such plea was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Mr. X and Mr. Y engaged in a violent fistfight which
Mr. X instigated. This culminated in Mr. X repeatedly
smashing Mr. Y's head on the concrete pavement.
Thereafter, Mr. X left Mr. Y barely breathing and
almost dead. A few minutes after the incident, Mr. X
immediately went to the police station to confess what
he did and told the police where he left Mr. Y.
Fortunately, the police rescued Mr. Y and he survived
with the help of timely medical intervention. Mr. X
was then charged in court with Frustrated Homicide,
to which he openly confessed his guilt upon
arraignment.
Based on the above-stated facts, what is/are the
mitigating circumstance/s that may be appreciated in
favor of Mr. X. Explain. (2019 BAR)
18
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
A: The mitigating circumstances of Voluntary Surrender
and Voluntary Confession of Guilt can be appreciated in
Mr. X’s favor. Mr. X voluntarily and immediately went to
the police station after his altercation with Mr. Y. He
acknowledged his wrongdoing and saved the authorities’
time and investigative resources (People v. Gervacio, G.R.
No. 107328, 26 Sept. 1994). This satisfies the requirements
for Voluntary Surrender.
Mr. X likewise voluntarily pleaded “guilty” in open court
during his arraignment. This satisfies the requirements for
a Voluntary Confession of Guilt, (a) that the offender
spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession
of guilt was made in open court, or before the competent
court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of
guilt was made prior to the presentation for the
prosecution. (People v. Bueza, G.R. No. 79619, 20 Aug.
1990) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: After killing the victim, the accused absconded. He
succeeded in eluding the police until he surfaced and
surrendered to the authorities about two years later.
Charged with murder, he pleaded not guilty but, after
the prosecution had presented two witnesses
implicating him to the crime, he changed his plea to
that of guilty. Should the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty be considered
in favor of the accused? (1997 BAR)
A: NO. Voluntary surrender may not be appreciated in
favor of the accused. Two years is too long a time to
consider the surrender as spontaneous. (People v. Ablao,
G.R. No. 69184, 26 Mar. 1990)
For sure the government had already incurred
considerable efforts and expenses in looking for the
accused. Plea of guilty can no longer be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance because the prosecution had
already started with the presentation of its evidence. (Art.
13(7), RPC) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
d) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ART. 14, RPC
(2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010,
2009, 2005, 2003, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997,
1996, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1989, 1988 BAR)
Q: Name the four (4) kinds of aggravating
circumstances and state their effect on the penalty of
crimes and nature thereof. (1999 BAR)
A: The four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstances are:
1. Generic aggravating or those that can generally
apply to all crimes, and can be offset by mitigating
circumstances, but if not offset, would affect only the
maximum of the penalty prescribed by law;
2. Specific aggravating or those that apply only to
particular crimes and cannot be offset by mitigating
19
circumstances;
3. Qualifying circumstances or those that change the
nature of the crime to a graver one, or brings about a
penalty next higher in degree, and cannot be offset by
mitigating circumstances; and
4. Inherent aggravating or those that essentially
accompany the commission of the crime and do not
affect the penalty whatsoever.
Q: Distinguish generic aggravating circumstance from
qualifying aggravating circumstance. (1999 BAR)
A: The distinctions between generic aggravating
circumstances and qualifying aggravating circumstances
are as follows:
Generic aggravating circumstances:
a. affects the nature of the crime or brings about a
penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily
prescribed;
b. can be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances;
c. need not be alleged in the Information as long as
proven during the trial;
d. the same shall be considered in imposing the
sentence.
Qualifying circumstances:
a. affects the nature of the crime or brings about a
penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily
prescribed;
b. cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances;
c. must be alleged in the Information and proven
during trial. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: When would qualifying circumstances be deemed, if
at all, elements of a crime? (2003 BAR)
A: A qualifying circumstance would be deemed an element
of a crime when:
1. It changes the nature of the crime, bringing about a
more serious crime and heavier penalty;
2. It is essential to the crime involved, otherwise some
other crime is committed; and
3. It is specifically alleged in the information and proven
during trial. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Bernardo was enraged by his conviction for robbery
by Judge Samsonite despite insufficient evidence.
Pending his appeal, Bernardo escaped in order to get
even with Judge Samsonite. Bernardo learned that the
judge regularly slept in his mistress' house every
weekend. Thus, he waited for the judge to arrive on
Saturday evening at the house of his mistress. It was
about 8:00 p.m. when Bernardo entered the house of
the mistress. He found the judge and his mistress
having coffee in the kitchen and engaging in small
talk. Without warning, Bernardo stabbed the judge at
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
least 20 times. The judge instantly died.
Prosecuted and tried, Bernardo was convicted of
direct assault with murder. Rule with reasons whether
or not the conviction for direct assault with murder
was justified, and whether or not the trial court
should appreciate the following aggravating
circumstances against Bernardo, to wit: (1) disregard
of rank and age of the victim, who was 68 years old;
(2) dwelling; (3) nighttime; (4) cruelty; and (5) quasi-
recidivism. (2017 BAR)
A: The phrase “on occasion of such performance” used in
Art. 148 of the RPC means “by reason of the past
performance of official duty” because the purpose of the
law is to allow them to discharge their duties without fear
of being assaulted by reason thereof (People v. Renegado,
G.R. No. L-27031, 31 May 1974). Attacking Judge Samsonite
by reason of past performance of duty of convicting
Bernardo based on his assessment of the evidence
constitutes qualified direct assault (U.S. v. Garcia, G.R. No.
6820, 16 Oct. 1911). Since the single act of attacking Judge
Samsonite constitutes direct assault and murder qualified
by the circumstance of treachery, the two shall be merged
together to form a complex crime of direct assault with
murder. (People v. Dural, G.R. No. 84921, 08 June 1993;
People v. Rillorta, G.R. No. 57415, 15 Dec. 1989)
Disregard of rank, being inherent in direct assault, is
absorbed. Disregard of age shall not be considered for lack
of showing intent to offend or insult the age of Judge
Samsonite. (People v. Onabia, G.R. No. 128288, 20 Apr.
1999)
Dwelling and nighttime shall not be appreciated because
the presence of treachery in the instant case absorbs these
aggravating circumstances.
The crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the
judge sustained 10 stab wounds. For cruelty to be
considered as an aggravating circumstance, it must be
proven that in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim,
the perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and
suffering of the victim. The number of wounds on the
victim is not proof of cruelty (Simangan v. People, G.R. No.
157984, 08 July 2004). Unless there is proof that when the
2nd or subsequent stabs were made, the Judge was still
alive, there is no cruelty to speak of.
A quasi-recidivist is a person who shall commit a felony
after having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the
same (Art. 160, RPC). In this case, Bernardo committed the
crime while the judgment of conviction is on appeal. Thus,
quasi-recidivism cannot be considered since he did not
commit the crime after having been convicted by final
judgment. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: TRUE OR FALSE. Amado, convicted of rape but
granted an absolute pardon by the President, and one
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
year thereafter, convicted of homicide, is a recidivist.
(2009 BAR)
A: TRUE. Rape is a crime against persons and, like the
crime of homicide, is embraced in the same Title of the
Revised Penal Code under which Amado had been
previously convicted by final judgment. The absolute
pardon also did not erase the effect of the conviction.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Juan de Castro already had three (3) previous
convictions by final judgment for theft when he was
found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. In the last
case, the trial judge considered against the accused
both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The
accused appealed and contended that in his last
conviction, the trial court cannot consider against him
a finding of recidivism and, again, of habitual
delinquency. Is the appeal meritorious? Explain.
(2001 BAR)
A: NO, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and
habitual delinquency are correctly considered in this case
because the basis of recidivism is different from that of
habitual delinquency.
Juan is a recidivist because he had been previously
convicted by final judgment for theft and again found
guilty of Robbery with Homicide, which are both crimes
against property, embraced under the same Title (Title
Ten, Book Two) of the RPC. The implication is that he is
specializing in the commission of crimes against property,
hence aggravating in the conviction for Robbery with
Homicide.
Habitual delinquency, which brings about an additional
penalty when an offender is convicted a third time or
more for specified crimes, is correctly considered because
Juan had already three (3) previous convictions by final
judgment for theft and again convicted for Robbery with
Homicide. And the crimes specified as basis for habitual
delinquency includes, inter alia, theft and robbery. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: The accused and the victim occupied adjacent
apartments, each being a separate dwelling unit of
one big house. The accused suspected his wife of
having an illicit relation with the victim. One
afternoon, he saw the victim and his wife together on
board a vehicle. In the evening of that day, the accused
went to bed early and tried to sleep but being so
annoyed over the suspected relation between his wife
and the victim, he could not sleep. Later in the night,
he resolved to kill the victim. He rose from bed and
took hold of a knife. He entered the apartment of the
victim through an unlocked window. Inside, he saw
the victim soundly asleep. He thereupon stabbed the
victim, inflicting several wounds, which caused his
death within a few hours.
20
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Would you say that the killing was attended by the
qualifying or aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, nighttime and unlawful
entry? (1997 BAR)
A: Evident premeditation cannot be considered against
the accused because he resolved to kill the victim “later in
the night" and there was no sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution, to allow his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
Treachery may be present because the accused stabbed
the victim while the latter was sound asleep. Accordingly,
he employed means and methods which directly and
specially insured the execution of the act without risk
himself arising from the defense which the victim might
have made. (People v. Dequiña, G.R. No. 41040, 09 Aug.
1934; People v. Miranda, et al., G.R. No. L-3284, 28 Sept.
1951)
Nighttime cannot be appreciated because there is no
showing that the accused deliberately sought or availed of
nighttime to insure the success of his act. The Intention to
commit the crime was conceived shortly before its
commission (People v. Pardo. G.R. No. L-562, 19 Nov. 1947).
Moreover, nighttime is absorbed in treachery.
Unlawful entry may be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance, in as much as the accused entered the room
of the victim through the window, which is not the proper
place for entrance into the house. (Art. 14(18), RPC; People
v. Barruga. G.R. No. 42744, 27 Mar. 1935) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy
were walking along Padre Faura Street, Manila,
Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back.
Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby, Steve,
Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby
stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on
hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result, Dino
died.
Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged
with homicide. Can the court appreciate the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band?
(1994 BAR)
A: NO, nighttime cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance because there is no indication that the
offenders deliberately sought the cover of darkness to
facilitate the commission of the crime or that they took
advantage of nighttime (People v. De los Reyes, G.R. No.
85771, 19 Nov. 1991). Besides, judicial notice can be taken
of the fact that Padre Faura Street is well-lighted.
However, band should be considered as the crime was
committed by more than three armed malefactors; in a
recent Supreme Court decision, stones or rocks are
considered deadly weapons. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
21
Q: Ben, a widower, driven by bestial desire, poked a
gun on his daughter Zeny, forcibly undressed her and
tied her legs to the bed. He also burned her face with a
lighted cigarette. Like a madman, he laughed while
raping her. What aggravating circumstances are
present in this case? (1994 BAR)
A: Cruelty, for burning the victim’s face with a lighted
cigarette, thereby deliberately augmenting the victim’s
suffering by acts clearly unnecessary to the rape, while the
offender delighted and enjoyed seeing the victim suffer in
pain. (People v. Lucas, G.R. 80102, 22 Jan. 1990)
Relationship, because the offended party is a descendant
(daughter) of the offender and considering that the crime
is one against chastity. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: The robbers killed a mother and her baby, then
threw the body of the baby outside the window. Can
the aggravating circumstance of cruelty be considered
in this case? Reason. (1988 BAR)
A: NO. Cruelty cannot be considered in this case because
the aggravating circumstance of cruelty requires
deliberate prolongation of the suffering of the victim. In
this case, the baby was dead already so that there is no
more prolongation to speak of. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
e) ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
(2011, 2002 BAR)
RELATIONSHIP
(2011 BAR)
Q: The alternative circumstance of relationship shall
NOT be considered between: (2011 BAR)
A. Mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.
B. Adopted son and legitimate natural daughter.
C. Aunt and nephew.
D. Stepfather and stepson.
A: C. Aunt and nephew. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
INTOXICATION
(2002 BAR)
Q: A was invited to a drinking spree by friends. After
having had a drink too many, A and B had a heated
argument, during which A stabbed B. As a result, B
suffered serious physical injuries. May the
intoxication of A be considered aggravating or
mitigating? (2002 BAR)
A: The intoxication of A may be prima facie considered
mitigating since it was merely incidental to the
commission of the crime. It may not be considered
aggravating as there is no clear indication from the facts of
the case that it was habitual or intentional on the part of A.
Aggravating circumstances are not to be presumed; they
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
f. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
(2019, 2018, 2013, 2012, 2008, 2004, 2003, 2000,
1995, 1990, 1989 BAR)
PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
THEFT, SWINDLING AND MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
ART. 332
(2019, 2013, 1989 BAR)
Q: Ms. E was charged with the complex crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents before the
trial court. Prior to her arraignment, Ms. E moved for
the dismissal of the criminal case against her, pointing
out that the private offended party is her biological
father, and that such relationship is an absolutory
cause under Art. 332 of the RPC. Is Ms. E's contention
correct? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO, Ms. E’s contention is incorrect. While Art. 332 of the
RPC provides an absolutory cause for the crimes of theft,
swindling or estafa, and malicious mischief against
defendants, the exemption does not apply to complex
crimes. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: William is the son-in-law of Mercedes who owns
several pieces of real property. In 1994, William’s
wife, Anita, died. In 1996, William caused the
preparation of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
giving him the authority to sell two (2) parcels of land
registered in the name of Mercedes. The signature of
Mercedes in the SPA was forged and, through this
forged SPA and without the consent and knowledge of
Mercedes, William succeeded in selling the two (2)
parcels for Php2,000,000. He pocketed the proceeds of
the sale.
Mercedes eventually discovered William’s misdeeds
and filed a criminal complaint. William was
subsequently charged with estafa through falsification
of public document. Was the criminal charge proper?
(2013 BAR)
A: The criminal charge of estafa through falsification is
correct. William forged the signature of his mother-in-law
in the Special Power of Attorney, which is a public
document, as a necessary means to sell her properties to
third parties without delivering the proceeds thereof.
Although the relationship of affinity created between
William and his mother-in-law survived the death of
either party to the marriage, the coverage of the
absolutory cause under Art. 332(1) of the RPC cannot be
applied to him. It is strictly limited to the simple crimes of
theft, estafa and malicious mischief. It does not apply
where any of the crimes mentioned is. complexed with
another crime. This is because when estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, the matter
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond
the respective rights and liabilities of family members
among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts
to an act that breaches the public interest in the integrity
of public documents as a means to violate the property
rights of a family member, he is removed from the
protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Art. 332.
(Intestate Estate of Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong v. People,
G.R. No. 181409, 11 Feb. 2010) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A is married to the sister of B, and the three (3) live
together in a house located a Caloocan City. On several
occasions, B's dog would bark at A everytime he
arrives at past midnight. One time, after arriving in
the house at around 2 o'clock in the morning, B’s dog
barked continuously at A. In a fit of anger, A entered
the house, took a bolo and killed the dog. What crime
was committed and what is liability of A? Explain.
(1989 BAR)
A: The crime committed by A is malicious mischief. The
elements of this are: (1) the offender caused damages to
the property of other (2) the damage caused did not
constitute arson or any other crime involving destruction
and (3) the damage was caused by the offender (Caballes
v. DAR, G.R. No. 78214, 05 Dec. 1988). A's act of killing the
dog is characterized by malice, it being a product of anger
and resentment.
However, A is exempt from criminal liability for the crime
committed by him because he is the brother-in-law of the
offended party and they are both living together under the
same roof. Under Art. 332 of the RPC, no criminal, but only
civil, liability shall result from the commission of the crime
of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by, among others, brothers and sisters
and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
ACCESSORIES EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY
REASON OF RELATIONSHIP
Art. 20
(2004 BAR)
Q: DCB, the daughter of MCB, stole the earrings of XYZ,
a stranger. MCB pawned the earrings with TBI
Pawnshop as a pledge for P500 loan. During the trial,
MCB raised the defense that being the mother of DCB,
she cannot be held liable as an accessory. Will MCB's
defense prosper? Reason briefly. (2004 BAR)
A: NO. MCB's defense will not prosper because the
exemption from criminal liability of an accessory by virtue
of relationship with the principal does not cover
accessories who themselves profited from or assisted the
offender to profit by the effects or proceeds of the crime.
This non-exemption of an accessory, though related to the
principal of the crime, is expressly provided in Art. 20 of
the RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
22
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
3. PERSONS LIABLE AND
DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006,
2005, 2004, 2003, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1994,
1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, 1987 BAR)
a) PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES, AND ACCESSORIES
(2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010,
2009, 2008, 2007, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2000, 1998,
1995, 1994, 1990, 1989, 1987 BAR)
PRINCIPAL
(2019, 2018, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2008, 2004, 2003,
2002, 2000, 1995, 1994, 1990, 1989 BAR)
Roberto is principal by direct participation as he took a
direct part in the execution of the plan to kill Ricardo by
firing his gun at the room of the intended victim. Rafael is
principal by indispensable cooperation not only because
he lent his gun to Roberto fully knowing the unlawful
intent of the latter, but also drove him to the place of the
commission of crime and to a place where he could
escape.
Ruel being involved in the criminal plan to kill Ricardo
acted in conspiracy with the two (2) other perpetrators
staying in the place from the time they planned the crime
up to its finalization. They were together in the car driven
by Rafael going to the next town in escaping from the
scene of the crime. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Q: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies, Mr. White

Q: Roberto and Ricardo have had a long-standing
and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr. Green with his former
dispute regarding conflicting claims over the
girlfriend, Ms. Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red
ownership of a parcel of land. One night, Roberto was
declared in a loud voice that if he could not have Ms.
so enraged that he decided to kill Ricardo. Roberto
Yellow, no one can. He then proceeded to the men’s
asked his best friend, Rafael, to lend him a gun and
room but told Mr. White and Mr. Blue to take care of
drive him to Ricardo’s house. Rafael knew about
Mr. Green. Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr. Red what
Roberto’s plan to kill Ricardo, but agreed to lend him
he meant but Mr. Red simply said, "You already know
a gun nevertheless. Rafael also drove Roberto to the
what I want," and then left. Mr. Blue and Mr. White
street corner nearest the house of Ricardo. Rafael
proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt Ms. Yellow.
waited for him there, until the task had been
(2014 BAR)
accomplished, so that he could drive Roberto to the
next town to evade arrest. Roberto also asked another
(a) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of
friend, Ruel, to stand guard outside Ricardo’s house,
Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the death
for the purpose of warning him in case there was any
of Mr. Green?
danger or possible witnesses, and to keep other
persons away from the vicinity. All three – Roberto,
A: Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable for the death of Mr.
Rafael and Ruel – agreed to the plan and their
Green as principals by direct participation. They were the
respective roles.
ones who participated in the criminal resolution and who
carried out their plan and personally took part in its
On the agreed date, Rafael drove Roberto and Ruel to
execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.
the nearest corner near Ricardo’s house. Roberto and
Ruel walked about 50 meters where Ruel took his
Mr. Red cannot be held criminally liable as principal by
post as guard, and Roberto walked about five (5)
inducement because his statement that Mr. Blue and Mr.
meters more, aimed the gun at Ricardo’s bedroom,
White are to take care of Mr. Green was not made directly
and peppered it with bullets. When he thought that he
with the intention of procuring the commission of the
had accomplished his plan, Roberto ran away,
crime. There is no showing that the words uttered by him
followed by Ruel, and together they rode in Rafael’s
may be considered as so efficacious and powerful so as to
car where they drove to the next town to spend the
amount to physical or moral coercion (People v. Assad, G.R.
night there.
No. L-33673, 24 Feb. 1931). Neither is there evidence to
show that Mr. Red has an ascendancy or influence over
It turned out that Ricardo was out of town when the
Mr. White and Mr. Blue. (People v. Abarri, G.R. No. 90815,
incident happened, and no one was in his room at the
01 Mar. 1995)
time it was peppered with bullets. Thus, no one was
killed or injured during the incident. If a crime was
(b) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of
committed, what is the degree of participation of
Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the
Roberto, Rafael, and Ruel? (2018 BAR)
injuries of Ms. Yellow?

A: All the perpetrators (Roberto, Ricardo and Rafael) are

A: Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable as principals by direct
criminally liable as principals since the conspiracy among
participation for the crime of physical injuries for hurting
them was clearly established by their participation.
Ms. Yellow to the extent of the injuries inflicted. Having no
participation in the attack upon Ms. Yellow, Mr. Red would
have no criminal liability therefor. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)

23 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice done
to A by C. A promised B a reward. B was willing to kill
C, not so much because of the reward promised to him
but because he also had his own long-standing grudge
against C, who had wronged him in the past. If C killed
by B, would A be liable as a principal by inducement?
(2002 BAR)
A: NO. A would not be liable as principal by inducement
because the reward he promised B is not the sole
impelling reason which made B kill C. To bring about the
criminal liability of a co-principal, the inducement made
by the inducer must be the sole consideration which
caused the person induced to commit the crime and
without which the crime would not have been committed.
The facts of the case would indicate that B, the killer
supposedly induced by A had his own reason to kill C out
of a long standing grudge. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Tata owns a three-storey building. She wanted to
construct a new building but had no money to finance
the construction. So, she insured the building for
P3,000,000.00. She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for
monetary consideration, to burn her building so she
could collect the insurance proceeds. Yoboy and
Yongsi burned the said building resulting to its total
loss. What is their respective criminal liability? (1994
BAR)
A: Tata is a principal by inducement for the crime of
destructive arson because she directly induced Yoboy and
Yongsi, for a price or monetary consideration, to commit
arson which the latter would not have committed were it
not for such reason. Yoboy and Yongsi are principals by
direct participation. (Art. 17(1) and (2), RPC) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
ACCOMPLICE
(2012, 2011, 2009, 2008, 2007 BAR)
Q: Who is an accomplice? (2012 BAR)
A: Accomplices are those persons who, not being the
principal, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts. (Art. 18, RPC)
Q: Distinguish between an accomplice and
conspirator. (2012, 2007 BAR)
A: The distinction between an accomplice and a
conspirator are:
1. An accomplice incurs criminal liability by merely
cooperating in the execution of the crime without
participating as a principal, by prior or simultaneous
acts; whereas a conspirator participates in the
commission of a crime as a co-principal.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
2. An accomplice incurs criminal liability in an individual
capacity by his act alone of cooperating in the
execution of the crime; while a conspirator incurs
criminal liability not only for his individual acts in the
execution of the crime but also for the acts of the
other participants in the commission of the crime
collectively. The acts of the other participants in the
execution of the crime are considered also as acts of a
conspirator for purposes of collective criminal
responsibility.
3. An accomplice participates in the execution of a crime
when the criminal design or plan is already in place;
whereas a conspirator participates in the adoption or
making of the criminal design.
4. An accomplice is subjected to a penalty one degree
lower than that of a principal; whereas a conspirator
incurs the penalty of a principal. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Ponciano borrowed Ruben’s gun, saying that he
would use it to kill Freddie. Because Ruben also
resented Freddie, he readily lent his gun, but told
Ponciano: "O, pagkabaril mo kay Freddie, isauli mo
kaagad, ha." Later, Ponciano killed Freddie, but used a
knife because he did not want Freddie’s neighbors to
hear the gunshot. (2009 BAR)
(a) What, if any, is the liability of Ruben? Explain.
A: Ruben’s liability is that of an accomplice only because
he merely cooperated in Pociano’s determination to kill
Freddie. Such cooperation is not indispensable to the
killing, as in fact the killing was carried out without the
use of Ruben’s gun. Neither may Ruben be regarded as a
co-conspirator since he was not a participant in the
decision-making of Ponciano to kill Freddie; he merely
cooperated in carrying out the criminal plan which was
already in place. (Art. 18, RPC)
(b) Would your answer be the same if, instead of
Freddie, it was Manuel, a relative of Ruben,
who was killed by Ponciano using Ruben’s
gun? Explain.
a A: NO. The answer would not be the same because Ruben
lent his gun purposely for the killing of Freddie only, not
for any other killing. Ponciano’s using Ruben’s gun in
killing a person other than Freddie is beyond Ruben’s
criminal intent and willing involvement. Only Ponciano
will answer for the crime against Manuel. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
24
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
ACCESSORY
(2020-21, 2013, 2010, 2004, 1998, 1989, 1987 BAR)
Q: In an act of rage while playing golf, a high-ranking
public official hit a caddy with a golf club at hole
number 9 of a golf course. The caddy fell and died
immediately. The public official called a loyal security
guard who did not witness the incident. The security
guard was instructed to put the caddy’s lifeless body
in the golf cart and dump it in the nearby lake. The
public official wanted to make it appear that the caddy
died of drowning. The corpus delicti of the crime was
discovered. Both the high-ranking public official and
the security guard were charged as co-conspirators
for the crime of homicide.
Can the security guard be convicted as a principal to
the crime of Homicide? Explain briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
A: NO. The security guard cannot be considered as
principal of the crime of Homicide. The security guard did
not conspire with the high-ranking official in killing the
victim as his participation is merely an accessory of the
crime committed shown by his act of putting the caddy’s
lifeless body in the golf cart and dump it in the nearby
lake, which act was made subsequently to the commission
of the crime of Homicide.
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission such as when he conceals or
destroyed the corpus delicti or the body of the crime of the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery. (Art. 19, RPC) (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria,
2022)
Q: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake went to his
mother to seek refuge. His mother told him to hide in
the maid’s quarters until she finds a better place for
him to hide. After two days, Jake transferred to his
aunt’s house. A week later, Jake was apprehended by
the police. Can Jake’s mother and aunt be made
criminally liable as accessories to the crime of
murder? Explain. (2010, 1998 BAR)
A: Obviously, Jake’s mother was aware of her son’s having
committed a felony, such that her act of harboring and
concealing him renders her liable as an accessory. But
being an ascendant to Jake, she is exempt from criminal
liability by express provision of Art. 20 of the RPC.
On the other hand, the criminal liability of Jake’s aunt
depends on her knowledge of his commission of the
felony, her act of harboring and concealing Jake would
render her criminally liable as accessory to the crime of
murder; otherwise, without knowledge of Jake’s
commission of the felony, she would not be liable. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
25
b. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003,
1998, 1997, 1996, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990,
1988, 1987 BAR)
Q: Differentiate wheel conspiracy and chain
conspiracy. (2017, 2016 BAR)
A: There are two structures of multiple conspiracies,
namely: wheel or circle conspiracy and chain conspiracy.
A “wheel conspiracy” occurs when there is a single person
or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more
other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically
interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In
the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to
succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the
instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the
success of the other spokes, there are multiple
conspiracies.
A “chain conspiracy”, on the other hand, exists when
there is successive communication and cooperation in
much the same way as with legitimate business operations
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, 26 Feb. 2002) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: State the concept of “implied conspiracy” and give
its legal effects. (2003, 1998 BAR)
A: An implied conspiracy is one which is only inferred or
deduced from the manner of participants in the
commission of crime carried out its execution. Where the
offenders acted in concert in the commission of the crime,
meaning that their acts are coordinated or synchronized
in a way indicative that they are pursuing a common
criminal objective, they shall be deemed to be acting in
conspiracy and their criminal liability shall be collective,
not individual.
The legal effects of an implied conspiracy are:
(1) Not all those who are present at the scene of the crime
will be considered as co-conspirators;
(2) Only those who participated by criminal acts in the
commission of the crime will be considered as co-
conspirators; and
(3) Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission
of the crime, without any act of criminal participation,
shall not render one criminally liable as co-
conspirator. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Bernardo, a mayoralty candidate of Osram City,
wanted to eliminate Yori, his political opponent. Yori
announced his intention to run for mayor of the same
city. A month before the filing of candidacy, Bernardo
and Benjamin met at a hotel and discussed their plan
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
to kill Yori on the day when he would file his
certificate of candidacy. Based on their agreement,
Bernardo would provide the guns and the money,
while Benjamin would provide the personnel to
cordon off all roads leading to the COMELEC’s local
office.
On the day of the execution of the plan, however,
Benjamin flew to Manila to avoid being involved in the
planned killing of Yori. Bernardo, determined to kill
Yori, convened his own armed group and laid out a
new plan to kill Yori, and in accordance with it, his
armed group patrolled all the roads leading to the
COMELEC’s local office. Bernardo remained in his
house and monitored the execution of the plan from
there. As soon as Yori and his supporters passed by
the main road at around 2:00 p.m., Bernardo’s armed
group opened fire at them.
Yori was unharmed as he was inside a bullet proof
vehicle, but ten of his supporters were killed.
Bernardo, the members of his armed group, and
Benjamin were later charged with ten counts of
Murder for the death of Yori’s supporters and one
count of Attempted Murder of Yori.
Discuss the criminal liability for the crimes charged
against each of the following: (i) Bernardo, (ii) the
members of Bernardo’s armed group, and (iii)
Benjamin. Explain briefly. (2022 BAR)
A: Bernardo and the members of his armed group are all
liable in conspiracy for the death of Yori’s supporters and
the attempted murder against Yori.
The moment it is established that the malefactors
conspired and confederated in the commission of the
felony proved, collective liability of the accused
conspirators attached by reason of the conspiracy, and the
court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the
actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators
present at the scene of the crime.
Although Bernardo was remote from the situs of the
aggression, it could be drawn within the enveloping ambit
of the conspiracy that his moral ascendency over the rest
of the conspirators, the latter were moved or impelled to
carry out the conspiracy. (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 168539, 25
Mar. 2014)
As regards Benjamin, he incurs no criminal liability. In
conspiracy, as a mode of incurring criminal liability, if the
offender did not proceed in committing the crime, the act
of planning the commission of the crime is not punishable.
(Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2023)
Q: During one of their intense operational meetings,
the campaign manager of 2 presidential candidate
openly suggested, “Dapat ipapatay na lang natin ang
mga bumabatikos sa kandidato na un.” Later, the
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
campaign manager was charged with the crime of
Proposal to commit murder.
Can the campaign manager be convicted of offense
charged? Explain briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
A: NO. The campaign manager is not liable for the offense
charged. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the cases in which the law specially
provides a penalty therefor. There is proposal when the
person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its
execution to some other person or persons (Art. 8, RPC).
When the campaign manager proposed to commit murder,
he is not yet criminally liable unless they proceeded in the
execution of the crime. Proposal to commit murder is not a
crime itself under the RPC. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria,
2022)
Q: Mr. X has always been infatuated with Ms. Y.
Scorned by Mr. Y's disregard for his feelings towards
her, Mr. X came up with a plan to abduct Ms. Y in order
to have carnal knowledge of her with the help of his
buddies, A, B, and C.
On the day they decided to carry out the plan, and
while surreptitiously waiting for Ms. Y, C had a change
of heart and left. This notwithstanding, Mr. X, A, and B
continued with the plan and abducted Ms. Y by
forcefully taking her to a deserted house away from
the city. There, Mr. X restrained Ms. Y's arms, while A
held her legs apart. B stood as a lookout. Mr. X was
then able to have carnal knowledge of Ms. Y, who was
resisting throughout the entire ordeal.
Consequently, Mr. X was charged with the crime of
Forcible Abduction under the RPC. Assuming that A, B,
and C are also charged, may they be held criminally
liable together with Mr. X? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO. Only A and B may be held criminally liable together
with Mr. X. Under Art. 8, par. 1 of the RPC, a conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. With A holding Ms. Y’s legs apart and B standing
as a lookout, they actively participated in the commission
of the crime and are guilty as co-conspirators. (People v.
Tumalip, G.R. No. L-28451, 28 Oct. 1974)
C may not be held criminally liable. C dissociated himself
from the conspiracy when he had a change of heart and
left. His disavowal of the conspiracy was effective since he
decided not to perform his part in the conspiracy before
any material act of execution leading to the Rape was
committed. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of
the act without cooperation is not enough to constitute
one as a party to a conspiracy. (Taer v. CA, G.R. No. 85204,
18 Jun. 1990) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
26
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Q: Together XA, YB and ZC planned to rob Miss OD.
They entered her house by breaking one of the
windows in her house. After taking her personal
properties and as they were about to leave, XA
decided on impulse to rape OD. As XA was molesting
her, YB and ZC stood outside the door of her bedroom
and did nothing to prevent XA from raping OD.
What crime/s did XA, YB and ZC commit and what is
the criminal liability of each? Explain briefly. (2004
BAR)
A: The crime committed by XA, YB and ZC is the composite
crime of Robbery with Rape, a single, indivisible offense
under Art. 294 (1) of the RPC.
Although the conspiracy among the offenders was only to
commit robbery and only XA raped CD, the other robbers,
YB and ZC, were present and aware of the rape being
committed by their co-conspirator. Having done nothing
to stop XA from committing the rape, YB and ZC thereby
concurred in the commission of the rape by their co-
conspirator XA.
The criminal liability of all, XA, YZ, and ZC, shall be the
same, as principals in the special complex crime of
robbery with rape which is a single, indivisible offense
where the rape accompanying the robbery is just a
component. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting,
Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden, and Arthur.
He ran towards his house but the four chased and
caught him. Thereafter, they tied Joe’s hands at his
back and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a
shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a piece of wood.
After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a grave
to bury Joe’s lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left
together. Convicted for the killing of Joe, Arthur now
claims that his conviction is erroneous as it was not he
who conflicted the fatal blow. Would you sustain his
claim? (1993 BAR)
A: NO. Arthur’s claim is without merit. The offenders acted
in conspiracy in killing the victim and hence, liable
collectively. The act of one is the act of all.
The existence of a conspiracy among the offenders can be
clearly deduced or inferred from the manner they
committed the killing, demonstrating a common criminal
purpose and intent. There being a conspiracy, the
individual acts of each participant is not considered
because their liability is collective. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito engaged in a
drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special Police
Officer 3 (SPO3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached
them, aimed his revolver at Sergio whom he
recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot the
27
latter. Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito ganged
up on Yabang, Warlito, using his own pistol, shot and
wounded Yabang.
What are the criminal libailities of Yoyong, Zoilo and
Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was there
conspiracy and treachery? (1992 BAR)
A: If they have to be criminally liable at all, each will be
responsible for their individual acts as there appears to be
no conspiracy, as the acts of the three were spontaneous
and a reflex response to Yabang’s shooting of Sergio.
There was no concerted act that will lead to a common
purpose. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
c) MULTIPLE OFFENDERS
(DIFFERENCES, RULES, EFFECTS)
(2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2014, 2012, 1998, 1989 BAR)
NOTE: See also Q&As under Aggravating Circumstances –
page 16.
(1) RECIDIVISM
(2014, 1998 BAR)
Q: Distinguish between recidivism and quasi-
recidivism. (1998 BAR)
A: In recidivism –
a. The convictions of the offender are for crimes
embraced in the same Title of the RPC; and
b. This circumstance is generic aggravating and
therefore can be effect by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
Whereas in quasi-recidivism –
a. The convictions are not for crimes embraced in the
same Title of the RPC, provided that it is a felony
that was committed by the offender before serving
sentence by final judgment for another crime or
while serving sentence for another crime; and
b. This circumstance is a special aggravating
circumstance which cannot be offset by any
mitigating circumstance. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: During trial for theft in 2014, the prosecution
managed to show that accused AA has also been
convicted by final judgment for robbery in 2003, but
she eluded capture. A subsequent verification showed
that AA had several convictions, to wit:
1. In 1998, she was convicted of estafa;
2. In 2002, she was convicted of theft;
3. In 2004, she was convicted of frustrated homicide.
The judge trying the theft case in 2014 is about to
convict AA. What circumstances affecting the liability
or penalty may the judge appreciate against AA?
(2014 BAR)
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 CRIMINAL LAW
A: The judge may appreciate the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his
trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted
by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of the RPC. Robbery, theft and estafa are crimes
against property embraced in Title Ten of the RPC.
The judge may also appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of habituality or reiteracion, because there
have been two or more crimes committed for which she
has been punished, regardless of the degree of penalty.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
(2) HABITUALITY (REITERACION)
(1989 BAR)
Q: Andres was earlier convicted of adultery and
served an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term
of which did not exceed two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional. A month after
his release from prison, he was charge with the crime
of serious physical injuries. Later, Andres was again
charged with homicide punishable by reclusion
temporal. He entered a plea of guilty in the homicide
case. May the aggravating circumstance of habituality
(reiteracion) be appreciated against Andres? Explain.
(Question reframed) (1989 BAR)
A: The aggravating circumstance of habituality or
reiteracion cannot be taken against Andres because in
order for this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that:
1. The accused is on trial for an offense;
2. He previously served sentence for another offense to
which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty, or
for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter
penalty than that for the new offense; and
3. He is convicted of the new offense.
In the case at bar, Andres had previously served sentence
only for one offense, that of adultery, but the penalty for
adultery (prison correccional) is lighter than the penalty
for homicide (reclusion-temporal). Consequently, there is
no aggravating circumstance of habituality or reiteracion.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
(3) QUASI-RECIDIVISM
(2018 BAR)
Q: Robbie and Rannie are both inmates of the National
Penitentiary, serving the maximum penalty for
robbery which they committed some years before and
for which they have been sentenced by final judgment.
One day, Robbie tried to collect money owed by
Rannie. Rannie insisted that he did not owe Robbie
anything, and after a shouting episode, Rannie kicked
Robbie in the stomach. Robbie fell to the ground in
pain, and Rannie left him to go to the toilet to relieve
himself. As Rannie was opening the door to the toilet
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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
and with his back turned against Robbie, Robbie
stabbed him in the back with a bladed weapon that he
had concealed in his waist. Hurt, Rannie ran to the
nearest “kubol” where he fell. Robbie ran after him·
and, while Rannie was lying on the ground, Robbie
continued to stab him, inflicting a total of 15 stab
wounds. He died on the spot. (2018 BAR)
(a) Is Robbie a recidivist, or a quasi-recidivist?
A: Robbie is considered a quasi-recidivist pursuant to Art.
160 of the RPC. At the time he stabbed Rannie which
resulted in the latter’s death, he had been convicted by
final judgment and had been serving sentence at the
National Penitentiary.
In quasi-recidivism, the first and second offenses need not
be embraced in the same title of the RPC. A recidivist, on
the other hand, requires that the crimes committed must
be embraced in the same title of the RPC. Because the
killing of Rannie and the robbery, in which Robbie was
previously convicted by final judgment, were not under
the same title, Robbie cannot be considered a recidivist.
(b) Can the mitigating circumstances raised by
Robbie, if proven, lower the penalty for the
crime committed?
A: NO. If proven, the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of lack of sufficient provocation and
voluntary surrender would be of no consequence as quasi-
recidivism cannot be offset by any ordinary mitigating
circumstance. (People v. Macariola, G.R. No. L-40757, 24
Jan. 1983) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
(4) HABITUAL DELINQUENCY
(2020-21, 2019, 2012 BAR)
Q: Who is a habitual delinquent? (2012 BAR)
A: A habitual delinquent is one who is convicted of a crime
of falsification, estafa, robbery, serious physical injuries,
and theft. If the offender within ten years from his last
conviction or within ten years from his release from jail of
any of the offenses enumerated, shall have a conviction for
the third time of said offenses, he shall be considered a
habitual delinquent.
Q: Distinguish habitual delinquency from recidivism
as to the crimes committed, the period of time the
crimes are committed, the number of crimes
committed and their effects in relation to the penalty
to be imposed on a convict. (2012 BAR)
A: Difference of recidivism and habitual delinquency:
(a) Nature of crime – In recidivism, the first crime, and
the aggravated second crime are embraced in the
same Title of the RPC. In habitual delinquency, the
first, second and third crimes must be a habitual-
delinquency crime, and that is, serious or less serious
28
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
physical injuries, theft, robbery, estafa or falsification
of document.
(b) Time element – In recidivism, the accused was
convicted of the first crime by final judgment at the
time of trial of the second crime. In habitual
delinquency, the accused was convicted of first
habitual-delinquency crime; within 10° years after
conviction or release, he was found guilty of habitual-
delinquency crime for the second time; within 10
years after conviction or release he was found guilty
of habitual-delinquency crime for the third time or
oftener.
(c) Number of crimes – In recidivism, there must be at
least two crimes committed; while in habitual
delinquency, there must be at least three crimes
committed.
(d) Nature of the aggravating circumstance –
Recidivism is ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
presence of any of which will trigger the application of
the penalty for the second crime committed in its
maximum period unless it is offset by mitigating
circumstance. Habitual delinquency is an
extraordinary or special aggravating circumstance,
the presence of which will trigger the imposition of
additional penalty for the third or subsequent crime.
This is not subject to the offset rule. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Juan de Castro already had three (3) previous
convictions by final judgment for theft when he was
found guilty of Rob- bery with Homicide. In the last
case, the trial Judge consid- ered against the accused
both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The
accused appealed and contended that in his last
conviction, the trial court cannot consider against him
a finding of recidivism and, again, of habitual
delinquency. Is the appeal meritorious? (2020-21
BAR)
A: NO, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and
habitual delinquency are correctly considered in this case
because the basis of recidivism is different from that of
habitual delinquency. Juan is a recidivist. Habitual
delinquency, which brings about an additional penalty
when an offender is convicted a third time or more for
specified crimes, is correctly considered because Juan had
already three (3) previous convictions by final judgment
for theft and again convicted for Robbery with Homicide.
And the crimes specified as basis for habitual delinquency
includes, inter alia, theft and robbery. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: In Nov. 2018, Mr. N, a notorious criminal, was found
guilty of three (3) counts of Murder and was
consequently sentenced with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. A month after, he was
likewise found guilty of five (5) counts of Grave
29
Threats in a separate criminal proceeding, and hence,
meted with the penalty of prision mayor for each
count. Is Mr. N considered a habitual delinquent?
Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO. Mr. N is not a habitual delinquent. Under Art. 62 of
the RPC, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual
delinquent, if within the period of 10 years from the date
of his last release or last conviction of the crimes of
serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa,
or falsification, he is found guilty of any of the said crimes
a third time or oftener. Here, Mr. N did not commit the
specific crimes above mentioned. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
d) DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
P.D. No. 1829
C. PENALTIES
(2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012,
2011, 2010, 2009, 2007, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001
1999, 1998, 1997, 1995, 1994, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988
BAR)
1. IMPOSABLE PENALTIES
(2010, 2005, 2004, 1998, 1995, 1991, 1988 BAR)
Q:
(a) State the two classes of penalties under the RPC.
Define each. (1988 BAR)
A: The two classes of penalties under Art. 25 of the RPC
are as follows:
1. Principal – A principal penalty is defined as that
provided for a felony and which is imposed by court
expressly upon conviction.
2. Accessory – An accessory penalty is defined as that
deemed included in the imposition of the principal
penalty.
(b) May censure be included in a sentence of
acquittal? (1988 BAR)
A: Censure may not be included in a sentence of acquittal
because a censure is a penalty. Censure is repugnant and
is essentially inconsistent and contrary to an acquittal.
(People v. Abellera, GR No. L-23533, 01 Aug. 1925) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Imagine that you are a Judge trying a case, and
based on the evidence presented and the applicable
law, you have decided on the guilt of two (2) accused.
Indicate the five (5) steps you would follow to
determine the exact penalty to be imposed. Stated
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
differently, what are the factors you must consider to 3. DURATION AND EFFECTS
arrive at the correct penalty? (1991 BAR) (2005, 2001, 1994 BAR)

A:
Q: After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila RTC found
1. Determine the crime committed;
Benjamin Garcia guilty of Murder, the victim having
2. Stage of execution and degree of participation;
sustained several bullet wounds in his body so that he
3. Determine the penalty
died despite medical assistance given in the Ospital ng
4. Consider the modifying circumstances;
Manila. Because the weapon used by Benjamin was
5. Determine whether Indeterminate Sentence Law is
unlicensed and the qualifying circumstance of
applicable or not. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
treachery was found to be present. Judge Laya
rendered his decision convicting Benjamin and
ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH
sentencing him to "reclusion perpetua or life
PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES
imprisonment".
R.A. No. 9346
(2010, 2007, 2005, 2004, 2001, 1998, 1995, 1994,
Are "reclusion perpetua" and life imprisonment the
1988 BAR)
same and can be imposed interchangeably as in the
foregoing sentence? Or are they totally different? State
Q: Because of the barbarity and hideousness of the
your reasons. (2005, 2001, 1994 BAR)
acts committed by the suspects/respondents in
cutting off their victims’ appendages, stuffing their
A: The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the penalty of life
torsos, legs, body parts Into oil drums and bullet-
imprisonment are totally different from each other and
riddled vehicles and later on burying these oil drums,
therefore, should not be used interchangeably. Reclusion
vehicles with the use of backhoes and other earth-
perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the RPC, with a fixed
moving machinery, the Commission on Human Rights
duration of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40
(CHR) investigating team recommended to the panel
years and carries it with accessory penalties. Life
of public prosecutors that all respondents be charged
imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty prescribed
with violation of the “Heinous Crimes Law.” The
by special laws, with no fixed duration of imprisonment
Prosecution panel agreed with the CHR. As the Chief
and without any accessory penalty. (UPLC Suggested
Prosecutor tasked with approving the filing of the
Answers)
Information, how will you pass upon the
recommendation? Explain. (2010 BAR)
Q: Under Art. 27 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 years and 1
A: The CHR is correct in describing the crimes committed
day to 40 years. Does this mean that reclusion
as “heinous crimes”, as defined in the preamble of the
perpetua is now a divisible penalty? Explain. (2005
“Heinous Crimes Law” (R.A. No. 7659), despite the passage
BAR)
of R.A. No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty.
A: NO, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly called
the attention of the Bench and the Bar to the fact that the
However, the “Heinous Crimes Law” does not define
penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are
crimes; it is only an amendatory law increasing the
not synonymous and should be applied correctly and as
penalty for the crimes specified therein as heinous, to a
may be specified by the applicable law. Reclusion
maximum of death. Thus, the heinous crimes committed
perpetua has a specific duration of 20 years and 1 day to
shall be prosecuted under the penal law they are
40 years (Art. 27, RPC) and accessory penalties (Art. 41,
respectively defined and penalized, such as the RPC as the
RPC), while life imprisonment has no definite term or
case may be. The circumstances making the crimes
accessory penalties. Also, life imprisonment is imposable
heinous may be alleged as qualifying or generic
on crimes punished by special laws, and not on felonies in
aggravating, if proper. The crime shall be designated as
the Code. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
defined and punished under the penal law violated and
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua without the benefit
of parole or life imprisonment without the benefit of
parole, as the case may be in lieu of the death penalty.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)

2. CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES

U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S 30
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
4. APPLICATION A: NO, subsidiary imprisonment does not apply to civil
(2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012, liability but only for non-payment of fine. Here, there is no
2010, 2009, 2007, 2005, 2003, 2002, 1999, 1997, 1994, penalty of fine imposed by the trial court. (UPLC Suggested
1991, 1990, 1989, 1988 BAR) Answers)

b) INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

Q: What are the penalties that may be served
R.A. No. 4103, as amended
simultaneously? (2007 BAR)
(2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2013, 2012,
2010, 2009, 2007, 2005, 2003, 2002, 1999, 1997,
A: The penalties that may be served simultaneously are
1994, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988 BAR)
imprisonment/destierro and –

Q: Explain the application of the Indeterminate

1. Perpetual absolute disqualification;
Sentence Law. (2016, 1988 BAR)
2. Perpetual special disqualification;
3. Temporary absolute disqualification;
A: The court shall sentence the accused to an
4. Temporary special disqualification;
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
5. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
voted for and the right to follow a profession or
could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and
calling;
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
6. Fine; and
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
7. Any principal penalty with its accessory penalties.
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
(special law), the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
a) SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
(2019, 2013, 2005 BAR)
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. (Sec. 1, ISL, Act No. 4103 as
Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law that imposes a
amended by Act No. 4225)
penalty of fine or imprisonment or both fine and
imprisonment. The judge sentenced them to pay the
The court must, instead of a single fixed penalty, except
fine, jointly and severally, with subsidiary
where the imposable penalty is one (1) year or less,
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
determine two penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate
Sentence Law as the “maximum” and “minimum" terms.
(a) Is the penalty proper? Explain.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)

A: NO. The penalty should be imposed individually on

Q: Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
every person accused of the crime. Any of the convicted
applied in crimes punished by special laws (2017
accused who is insolvent and unable to pay the fine, shall
BAR)
serve the subsidiary imprisonment.

A: Under the second party of the ISLaw, in cases where the

(b) May the judge impose an alternative penalty of
offense is punishable under special law, the maximum
fine or imprisonment? Explain. (2005 BAR)
indeterminate penalty shall not exceed the maximum limit
of the prescribed penalty while the minimum penalty.
A: NO. Although the law may prescribe an alternative
shall not be less than the minimum limit thereof. However,
penalty for a crime, it does not mean that the court may
if the special law adopts the technical nomenclature of the
impose the alternative penalties at the same time. The
penalties under the RPC (People v. Macatanda, G.R. No.
sentence must be definite. Otherwise, the judgment cannot
51368, 06 Nov. 1981), the provision of the RPC will apply.
attain finality.

Consequently, there will be an application of Art. 64 of the

Q: Mr. Q was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
RPC. The maximum penalty shall be fixed within the range
the crime of Serious Physical Injuries, and
of the proper imposable period after taking into
accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
consideration the modifying circumstance; while the
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6)
minimum penalty shall be fixed within the range of the
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law.
years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
correccional, as maximum. He was also ordered to pay
the victim actual damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Was the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment proper? (2019 BAR)

31 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: When would the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISLaw) be inapplicable? (2003, 1999 BAR)
A: The ISLaw is not applicable to:
1. Those persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life-imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua;
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to
commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence;
7. Those who having been granted conditional pardon
by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed one year;
9. Those already sentenced by final judgment at the time
of the approval of this Act; and
10. Those whose sentence imposes penalties which do
not involve imprisonment, like destierro. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: How are the maximum and the minimum terms of
the indeterminate sentence for offenses punishable
under the RPC determined? (2002 BAR)
A: For crimes punished under the RPC, the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty
properly imposable under the same Code after
considering the attending mitigating and/or aggravating
circumstances according to Art. 64 of said Code. The
minimum term of the same sentence shall be fixed within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the crime under the said Code. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Under the law, what is the purpose for fixing the
maximum and the minimum terms of the
indeterminate sentence? (2002 BAR)
A: The purpose of the law in fixing the minimum term of
the sentence is to set the grace period at which the convict
may be released on parole from imprisonment, unless by
his conduct he is not deserving of parole and thus he shall
continue serving his prison term in jail but in no case to go
beyond the maximum term fixed in the sentence. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: A crime defined in the RPC is punishable by arresto
menor. Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime, should the judge apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law? Explain briefly. (2020-
21 BAR)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
A: NO. The judge must not apply the indeterminate
Sentence Law. Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable
only when the penalty is more than one (1) year. Since, the
accused was given a penalty of arresto menor which has a
duration from 1 day to 30 days, the accused is among the
disqualified offenders in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. (Bar Q&A by Judge
Alejandria, 2022)
Q: Randy was prosecuted for forcible abduction
attended by the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism. After trial, the court held that the
prosecutor was able to prove the charge. Nonetheless,
it appreciated in favor of Randy, on the basis of the
defense’s evidence, the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender, uncontrollable fear, and
provocation. Under Art. 342 of the RPC, the penalty for
forcible abduction is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what
penalty should be imposed on Randy? (2018 BAR)
A: Since he was found guilty of Forcible Abduction with
one aggravating circumstances of recidivism, this
aggravating circumstance is off-set by one of the three
mitigating circumstances; so the penalty to be imposed is
still reclusion temporal (Art. 342, RPC) but because there
are two (2) more mitigating circumstances left and the
penalty is divisible, in determining the maximum term, we
have to reduce to prision mayor and because there is no
more mitigating and aggravating circumstances to be
considered, the maximum term shall be prision mayor in
its medium period that is eight (8) years and one (1) day
to ten (10) years. The minimum, term shall be any range
within, that is from six (6) years and one (1) day to six (8)
years.
Thus, Randy will suffer as minimum term any penalty
ranging from six months and one (1) day, and the
maximum term will be, any range from eight (8) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for killing the
75-year-old owner of his rooming house. The
prosecution proved that Bruno stabbed the owner
causing his death; and that the killing happened at 10
in the evening in the house where the victim and
Bruno lived. Bruno, on the other hand, successfully
proved that he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities; that he pleaded guilty to the crime
charged; that it was the victim who first attacked and
did so without any provocation on his (Bruno's) part,
but he prevailed because he managed to draw his
knife with which he stabbed the victim. The penalty
for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assuming a
judgment of conviction and after considering the
attendant circumstances, what penalty should the
judge impose? (2013 BAR)
32
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
A: Bruno should be sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence penalty of arresto mayor in any of its period to
prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.
Bruno was entitled to two privileged mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the
presence of at least two ordinary mitigating circumstances
(voluntary surrender and plea of guilt) without any
aggravating circumstance under Art. 69 and 64(5) of the
RPC respectively, which lowers the prescribed penalty for
homicide which is reclusion temporal to prision
correccional.
There is incomplete self-defense because Bruno proved
that it was the victim who first attacked him and did so
without provocation on his part. There is, however, no
reasonable necessity of the means employed to defend
himself, after Bruno used a knife to stab the weaponless
victim. There are also no aggravating circumstances
present, because it was not shown that Bruno disregarded
the age of the victim or that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime; moreover, dwelling cannot be
appreciated because the crime happened in the house
where both Bruno and the victim lived. In contrast, there
are two mitigating circumstance present, namely,
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
term of the indeterminate penalty should be within the
range of prision correccional in its medium period and the
minimum term should be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree or arresto mayor in any of its period.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: While serving his sentence, Macky entered the
prohibited area and had a pot session with Ivy (Joy’s
sister). Is Macky entitled to an indeterminate sentence
in case he is found guilty of use of prohibited
substances? Explain your answer. (2007 BAR)
A: NO. Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103, as amended) for
having evaded the sentence which banished or placed him
on destierro. Sec. 2 of the said law expressly provides that
the law shall not apply to those who shall have “evaded
sentence”. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Itos was convicted of an offense penalized by a
special law. The penalty prescribed is not less than six
years but not more than twelve years. No modifying
circumstance attended the commission of the crime. If
you were the judge, will you apply the Indeterminate
Sentence Law? If so, how will you apply it? (1999,
1994 BAR)
A: If I were the judge, I will apply the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as the last sentence of Sec. 1
Act 4103, specifically provides the application thereof for
violations of special laws. Under the same provision, the
minimum must not be less than the minimum provided
therein (six years and one day) and the maximum shall
33
not be more than the maximum provided therein, i.e.
twelve years. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
5. GRADUATION OF PENALTIES
6. ACCESSORY PENALTIES
(2005 BAR)
Q: Distinguish pecuniary penalties from pecuniary
liabilities. (2005 BAR)
A: Pecuniary liabilities do not include restitution, but
include reparation of damages caused, the indemnification
for consequential damages, as well as fines and cost of the
proceedings. Pecuniary penalties include fines and cost of
the proceedings. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
D. EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF SENTENCE
(2019, 2017, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2010, 2009,
2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1997,
1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988 BAR)
1. THREE-FOLD RULE
(2019, 2013 BAR)
Q: In Nov. 2018, Mr. N, a notorious criminal, was found
guilty of three (3) counts of Murder and was
consequently sentenced with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. A month after, he was
likewise found guilty of five (5) counts of Grave
Threats in a separate criminal proceeding, and hence,
meted with the penalty of prision mayor for each
count. (2019 BAR)
(a) What are the respective durations of the
penalties of reclusion perpetua and prision
mayor?
A: Under Art. 27 of the RPC, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years;
while the duration of the penalty of prision mayor shall be
from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.
(b) How long will Mr. N serve all his penalties of
imprisonment? Explain.
A: Mr. N will serve all these penalties of imprisonment for
a total of 40 years. Under Art. 70 of the RPC, when the
culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve
then simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so
permit. However, the maximum duration of the convict’s
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be
liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those
imposed equals the same maximum period. Such
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
maximum period shall in no case exceed 40 years. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Roman and Wendy are neighbors. On Valentine's
Day, without prior notice, Roman visited Wendy at her
condo to invite her to dinner, but Wendy turned him
down and abruptly left, leaving her condo door
unlocked. Roman attempted to follow, but appeared to
have second thoughts; he simply went back to
Wendy's condo, let himself in, and waited for her
return. On Wendy's arrival later that evening, Roman
grabbed her from behind and, with a knife in hand,
forced her to undress. Wendy had no choice but to
comply. Roman then tied Wendy's hands to her bed
and sexually assaulted her five (5) times that night.
Roman was charged with, and was convicted of, five
(5) counts of rape, but the judge did not impose the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. Instead,
the judge sentenced Roman to 40 years of
imprisonment on the basis of the three-fold rule. Was
the judge correct? (2013 BAR)
A: NO. The three-fold rule is applicable only in connection
with the service of the sentence not in the imposition of
the proper penalties. The court must impose all penalties
for all the crimes for which the accused have been found
guilty. Thus, the court should not make a computation in it
decision and sentence the accused to not more than the
three-fold of the most severe of the penalties imposable.
The computation under the three-fold rule is for the
prison authorities to make. (Art. 70, RPC) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
2. PROBATION LAW
P.D. No. 968, as amended
(2019, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2010, 2009, 2005, 2004,
2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1997, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992,
1991, 1990, 1989, 1988 BAR)
Q: Who are the offenders disqualified from availing
themselves of the benefits of the probation law (P.D.
968, as amended)? (1988 BAR)
A: The following offenders are disqualified from availing
of the benefits of the Probation Law:
(a) Those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
(b) Those convicted of any crime against the national
security;
(c) Those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a
fine of more than one thousand pesos (Php 1,000.00);
(d) Those who have been once on probation under the
provisions of the Probation Law; and
(e) Those who are already serving sentence at the time
the substantive provisions of the Probation Law
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
became applicable pursuant to Sec. 33 thereof, as
amended.
NOTE: The foregoing enumeration is based on P.D. 968, as
amended by R.A. 10707.
Q: In June 2017, Mr. P was criminally charged with
Qualified Theft under the RPC. After due proceedings,
the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Thereafter, Mr. P
applied for probation. (2019 BAR)
(a) May Mr. P be extended the benefits of the
Probation Law? Explain.
A: NO, Mr. P may not be extended the benefits of
Probation Law because he is a disqualified offender. Under
Sec. 9 of PD 968, as amended by R.A. 10707, the benefits of
probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to
serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6
years.
(b) In what instance may an accused who appeals
a judgment of conviction still apply for
probation? Explain.
A: Under Sec. 4 of PD 968, as amended by R.A. 10707, no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction. However, when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or
reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the
imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall
be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified
decision before such decision becomes final. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Andres was convicted of frustrated homicide and
was sentenced to 6 years and 1 day as minimum, to 8
years of prision mayor as maximum. Andres appealed
his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which convicted
him of attempted homicide, and sentenced him to 6
months of arresto mayor as minimum, to 2 years of
prision correccional as maximum.
Instead of appealing his conviction, Andres filed an
application for probation with the RTC. Is Andres
qualified to avail of the benefits of the probation law?
(2013 BAR)
A: YES, because after his appeal, he qualified for probation
as the sentence imposed on him was less than 6 years. An
accused convicted by the lower court of a non-
probationable offense (frustrated homicide), but on
appeal was found guilty of a probationable offense
(attempted homicide), may apply for probation as
34
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
expressly provided for by Sec. 4 of PD No. 968, as
amended by R.A. No. 10707.
Q: On Feb. 3, 1986, Roberto was convicted of arson
through reckless imprudence and sentenced to pay a
fine of P15,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency by the RTC of Quezon City. On Feb.
10, 1986, he appealed to the CA. Several months later,
he filed a motion to withdraw the appeal on the
ground that he is applying for probation. On May 7,
1987, the CA granted the motion and considered the
appeal withdrawn.
On June 10, 1987, the records of the case were
remanded to the trial court. Roberto filed a “Motion
for Probation” praying that execution of his sentence
be suspended, and that a probation officer be ordered
to conduct an investigation and to submit a report on
his probation.
The judge denied the motion on the ground that
pursuant to PD No. 1990, which took effect on July 16,
1986, no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Is the
denial of Roberto’s motion correct? (1994 BAR)
A: YES, even if at the time of his conviction, Roberto was
qualified for probation but that at the time of his
application for probation, he is no longer qualified, he is
not entitled to probation. The qualification for probation
must be determined as of the time the application is filed
in Court. (Bernardo v. Judge Balagot, et. al., G.R. 86561, 10
Nov. 1992) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Boyet Mar was charged with consented abduction
by a 17-year-old complainant. The accused made
wedding arrangements with the girl, but her parents
insisted on the prosecution of the case. To avoid
further embarrassment of a court trial for him and the
girl, the accused entered a plea of guilty. He then filed
a petition for probation before serving sentence, but
the court denied the petition on the ground that “it
would be better for the accused to serve sentence so
that he would reform himself and avoid the scandal in
the community that would be caused by the grant of
the petition.”
The accused served sentence but he brought the
matter to the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari. Did the trial court act correctly in denying
the petition for probation? (1991 BAR)
A: NO. The trial court acted incorrectly. In Balleta v.
Leviste (GR No. L-49907, 21 Aug. 1979), the Judge precisely
denied the petition for probation on the same excuse
stated in the problem. The Supreme Court held that an
accused must fall within any one of the disqualifications
stated in Sec. 9 of PD 968 in order to be denied probation.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
35
Q: A was charged with theft and upon arraignment,
pleaded guilty to the charge. He was detained for
failure to post bail. After two (2) months, a decision
was rendered sentencing “A” to an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day as a
minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) month as
maximum, and to pay the offended party the amount
of P700.
On Jan. 16, 1985, the very day the sentence was read
to “A”, the Judge issued a Commitment Order
addressed to the Provincial Jail Warden. On 28 Jan.
1985, “A” applied for probation but his application
was denied on the ground that the sentence of
conviction became final and executory on 16 Jan.
1985, when “A” commenced to serve his sentence. Is
“A” eligible for probation? (1989 BAR)
A: YES. A is still eligible for probation since he filed his
application for probation within 15 days from the
promulgation of the judgment. Under the Probation Law,
the accused may apply for probation within the period for
perfecting an appeal which is 15 days from promulgation
or notice thereof.
The judge committed an error in issuing a Commitment
order on the same day of promulgation. A commitment
order for the convict to begin serving his sentence can be
validly issued only if the period for perfecting an appeal
has expired with no appeal being taken. The fact that in
compliance with such order, which is void, the accused
commenced to serve his sentence does not bar him from
availing himself of the benefits of the Probation Law.
While it is true under the Rules that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served or the accused has
applied for probation (Sec. 7, Rule 120), Sec. 9 of the same
Rule provides that “nothing in this Rule shall be construed
as affecting any existing provision in the law governing
suspension of sentence, probation or parole.”
The probation law does NOT speak of filing an application
for probation before judgment has become final. It only
speaks of filing the application WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR
PERFECTING AN APPEAL. There is nothing in the
Probation Law that bars an accused who has commenced
to serve his sentence from filing an application for
probation provided he does so within the period for
perfecting an appeal.
What the Probation Law provides is that no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected an appeal from the judgment or conviction.
It does not say that no application shall be entertained if
the judgment has become final because the convict has
already commenced to serve his sentence. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
3. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT A: YES. under Sec. 98, RA 9165, if the offender is a minor,
R.A. No. 9344, as amended the penalty of life imprisonment shall be considered as
(2017, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2009, 2006 BAR) reclusion perpetua. Even if reclusion perpetua is a single
indivisible penalty, the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority would still be considered to lower the
Q: What is now the age of doli incapax in the
imposable penalty. The rule in Art. 63, RPC that if the
Philippines? (2017 BAR)
penalty prescribed by law is a single indivisible penalty, it
shall be imposed regardless of mitigating and aggravating
A: If the accused is 15 years of age or below, minority is an
circumstance refers only to ordinary mitigating
exempting circumstance (Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9344). With or
circumstances.
without discernment, the accused of such age is exempt
from criminal liability. Lack of discernment is conclusively
(b) Is the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable
presumed. Hence, the age of doli incapax in the Philippines
considering that life imprisonment has no
is now 15 years of age or under. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
fixed duration and the Dangerous Drugs Law
is malum prohibitum?
Q: Dang was a beauty queen in a university. Job, a rich
classmate, was so enamored with her that he
A: YES. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable even
persistently wooed and pursued her. Dang, being in
to special penal laws. Since life imprisonment was
love with another man, rejected him. This angered Job,
converted into reclusion perpetua, which in turn was
Sometime in September 2003, while Dang and her
graduated to reclusion temporal because of the privileged
sister Lyn were on their way home, Job and his minor
mitigating circumstance of minority, the Indeterminate
friend Nonoy grabbed them and pushed them inside a
Sentence Law is applicable.
white van. They brought them to an abandoned
warehouse where they forced them to dance naked.
(c) If the penalty imposed is more than six (6)
Thereafter, they brought them to a hill in a nearby
years and a notice of appeal was filed by A and
barangay where they took turns raping them. After
given due course by the court, may A still file
satisfying their lust, Job ordered Nonoy to push Dang
an application for probation?
down a ravine, resulting in her death. Lyn ran away
but Job and Nonoy chased her and pushed her inside
A: YES. A may still file an application for probation even if
the van. Then the duo drove away. Lyn was never seen
he filed a notice of appeal. Sec. 42, RA 9344 allows a child
again. Will Nonoy's minority exculpate him? (2006
in conflict with the law to apply for probation with the
BAR)
court “any time.” This means that he may do so even
beyond the period for perfecting an appeal and even if the
A: Under RA. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Reform Act,
child has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
which retroacts to the date that the crime was committed,
conviction.
Nonoy will be exculpated if he was 15 years old or below.
However, if he was above 15 years old but below 18 years
(d) If probation is not allowed by the court, how
of age, he will be liable if he acted with discernment. As
will A serve his sentence?
the problem shows that Nonoy acted with discernment, he
will be entitled to a suspension of sentence. (UPLC
A: If probation is not allowed by the court, the minor
Suggested Answers)
offender shall serve his sentence in agricultural camp or
other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of RA
Q: A, a young boy aged 16 at the time of the
9344 as amended. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
commission of the crime, was convicted when he was
already 17 years of age for violation of Sec. 11 of R.A.
Q: Joe was 17 years old when he committed homicide
9165 or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs for
in 2005. The crime is punishable by reclusion
which the imposable penalty is life imprisonment and
temporal. After two years in hiding, he was arrested
a fine. Sec. 98 of the same law provides that if the
and appropriately charged in May 2007. Since R.A.
penalty imposed is life imprisonment to death on
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) was
minor offenders, the penalty shall be reclusion
already in effect, Joe moved to avail of the process of
perpetua to death. Under R.A. 9344, a minor offender
intervention or diversion. (2009 BAR)
is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
(2014 BAR)
(a) What is intervention or diversion? Is Joe entitled
to intervention or diversion? Explain.
(a) May the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority be appreciated considering that the
A: The two terms are different. “Intervention” refers to a
penalty imposed by law is life imprisonment
series of activities which are designed to address issues
and fine?
that caused the child to commit an offense. It may take the
form of an individualized treatment program which may
include counseling, skills training, education, and other

U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S 36
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
activities that will enhance his/her psychological,
emotional and psycho-social well-being. This is available E. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
to a child 15 years old or less at the time of the (2020-21, 2015, 2013, 2012, 2010, 2009, 2006, 2004,
commission of the crime or although over 15 but below 18 2001, 2000, 1997, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1990,
years old at the time of commission of the crime, the child 1988, 1987 BAR)
acted without discernment.

“Diversion” refers to an alternative, child-appropriate

process of determining the responsibility and treatment of 1. AN ACT AMENDING ARTS. 29, 94, 97-99 OF THE RPC
a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her R.A. No. 10592
social, cultural, economic, psychological or educational (2020-21, 2015, 2012, 2010, 2009, 2006, 2004, 2001,
background without resorting to formal court 2000, 1997, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1990, 1988, 1987
proceedings. This process governs when the child is over BAR)
15 years old but below 18 at the time of the commission of
the crime and he acted with discernment. Q:
(a) How is criminal liability totally extinguished?
YES. Joe is entitled to diversion. Being only 17 years old at (2004, 1992, 1990, 1988 BAR)
the time he committed the crime of homicide, he is treated
as a child in conflict with the law under R.A. 9344. A: Art. 89 of the RPC provides for the following causes of
total extinction of criminal liability:
(b) Suppose Joe’s motion for intervention or
diversion was denied, and he was convicted two 1. Death of the convict as to personal penalties, as to the
(2) years later when Joe was already 21 years pecuniary liabilities, liability therefore is extinguished
old, should the judge apply the suspension of only when death occurs before final judgment
sentence? Explain. 2. Service of sentence
3. Amnesty
A: NO. The judge should not suspend sentence anymore 4. Absolute pardon
because Joe was already 21 years old. Suspension of 5. Prescription of the crime
sentence is availing under R.A. 9344 only until a child 6. Prescription of the penalty
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (UPLC 7. Marriage of the offended woman as provided in Art.
Suggested Answers) 344.

4. AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE VALUE OF (b) How is criminal liability partially
THE PROPERTY AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A PENALTY extinguished? (1988 BAR)
IS BASED AND THE FINES IMPOSED UNDER THE RPC
R.A. No. 11362 A: Art. 94 of the RPC provides for the following causes of
the partial extinction of criminal liability:

5. COMMUNITY SERVICE ACT 1. Conditional pardon

R.A. No. 11362, A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC 2. Commutation of sentence
3. Good conduct allowance during confinement
4. Parole
5. Probation

NOTE: Art. 94 has been amended by R.A. No. 10592, which

now reads as follows:

"ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. –

Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

"1. By conditional pardon;

"2. By commutation of the sentence; and
"3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may
earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment
or serving his sentence."

(c) If an accused is acquitted, does it necessarily

follow that no civil liability arising from the
acts complained of may be awarded in the
same judgment? Explain briefly. (1988 BAR)

37 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
A: NO. If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily
follow that no civil liability arising from the acts
complained of may be awarded in the same judgment
except: If there is an express waiver of the liability; and if
there is a reservation to file a separate civil action. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: A prisoner who had been convicted, but whose
appeal was pending, died due to complications caused
by COVID-19. Should the prisoner’s pending appeal be
dismissed as a consequence? Explain briefly. (2020-21
BAR)
A: YES. The appeal shall be dismissed due to death of the
prisoner. Criminal liability is totally extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before the final
judgment. (Art. 89, RPC)
In this case, both the criminal and civil liability are
extinguished since the death of the prisoner occurred
before the final judgment or pending appeal. Civil liability
arising from the sources of obligation other than delict
may however proceed against the estate of the deceased
prisoner. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
Q: The RTC found Tiburcio guilty of frustrated
homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty of four years and one day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight years of prision
mayor as maximum, and ordered him to pay actual
damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Tiburcio
appealed to the CA which sustained his conviction as
well as the penalty imposed by the court a quo. After
sixty days, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment and
remanded the records of the case to the RTC. Three
days thereafter, Tiburcio died of heart attack.
Atty. Abdul, Tiburcio's counsel, filed before the RTC a
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss, informing the
court that Tiburcio died already, and claiming that his
criminal liability had been extinguished by his demise.
(2015 BAR)
(a) Should the RTC grant the Motion to Dismiss
the case? Explain.
A: NO. The RTC may not grant the motion to dismiss
because the Court of Appeals, having issued an Entry of
Judgment, the decision has become final and executory.
Moreover, the pecuniary penalty, such as the civil liability
arising from the crime consisting of actual damages of
P25,000 survives the death of Tiburcio.
(b) Assuming that Tiburcio' s death occurred
before the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, will you give a different answer?
Explain.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
A: YES. The RTC decision must be set aside and the case
against Tiburcio must consequently be dismissed. The
demise of Tiburcio which occurred before the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision causes his criminal liability,
as well as his civil liability ex delicto, to be totally
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused, the civil action is instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on criminal case. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: AX was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide. The trial court sentenced him to a prison
term as well as to pay P150,000 as civil indemnity and
damages. While his appeal was pending, AX met a fatal
accident. He left a young widow, 2 children, and a
million-peso estate. What is the effect, if any, of his
death on his criminal as well as civil liability? Explain
briefly. (2004 BAR)
A: The death of AX while his appeal from the judgment of
the trial court is pending, extinguishes his criminal
liability. The civil liability insofar as it arises from the
crime and recoverable under the RPC is also extinguished;
but indemnity and damages may be recovered in a civil
action if predicated on a source of obligation under Art.
1157, NCC, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts and
quasi-delicts, but not on the basis of delicts. (People v.
Bayotas, GR No. 102007, 02 Sept. 1994)
Civil indemnity and damages under the RPC are
recoverable only if the accused had been convicted with
finality before he died. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES
(2015, 2010, 2009, 2004, 2001, 2000, 1997, 1995,
1994, 1993, 1990, 1987 BAR)
Q: Taylor was convicted of a violation of the Election
Code, and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
one year as minimum, to three years as maximum.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed on appeal
and became final and executory. Taylor failed to
appear when summoned for execution of judgment,
prompting the judge to issue an order for his arrest.
Taylor was able to use the backdoor and left for the
United States.
Fifteen years later, Taylor returned to the Philippines
and filed a Motion to Quash the warrant of arrest
against him, on the ground that the penalty imposed
against him had already prescribed. (2015 BAR)
(a) If you were the judge, would you grant
Taylor's Motion to Quash? Explain.
38
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
A: NO. If I were the judge, I will deny the motion to quash.
Art. 93 of the RPC provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it
shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the
service of his sentence. Pursuant to Art. 157 of the same
Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed
only by those who have been convicted by final judgment
by escaping during the term of his sentence. Taylor never
served a single minute of his sentence, and thus,
prescription never started to run in his favor. Clearly, one
who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to
have escaped therefrom. (Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R.
No. 139033, 18 Dec. 2002)
(b) Assuming that instead of the United States,
Taylor was able to go to another country with
which the Philippines had no extradition
treaty, will your answer be the same? Explain.
(2015 BAR)
A: Even if Taylor was able to go to another country which
the Philippines had no extradition treaty, I will deny the
motion to quash. Going to a foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty to interrupt the
running of prescription is not applicable nor even material
because the period of prescription is not applicable nor
even material because the period of prescription had not
commenced to run in the first place; hence, there is
nothing to interrupt. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A killed his wife and buried her in their backyard.
He immediately went into hiding in the mountains.
Three years later, the bones of A’s wife were
discovered by X, the gardener. Since X had a standing
warrant of arrest, he hid the bones in an old clay jar
and kept quiet about it. After two years, Z, the
caretaker, found the bones and reported the matter to
the police.
After 15 years of hiding, A left the country but
returned three years later to take care of his ailing
sibling. Six years thereafter, he was charged with
parricide but raised the defense of prescription.
(2010, 2009, 2004, 2000 BAR)
(a) Under the RPC, when does the period of
prescription of a crime commence to run?
A: Generally, the period of prescription of a crime
commences to run for the date it was committed; but if the
crime was committed clandestinely, the period of
prescription of the crimes under the RPC commence to
run from the day on which the crime was discovered (the
discovery rule) by the offended party, the authorities or
their agents. (Art. 91, RPC)
(b) When is it interrupted?
39
A: The running of the prescriptive period of the crime is
interrupted when “any kind of investigative proceedings is
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately
lead to his prosecution.” (Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No.
167571, 25 Nov. 2008)
(c) Is A’s defense tenable? Explain.
A: NO, the defense of prescription of the crime is not
tenable. The crime committed is parricide which
prescribes in twenty (20) years (Art. 90, RPC). It was only
when the caretaker, Z, found the victim’s bones and
reported the matter to the police that the crime is deemed
legally discovered by the authorities or their agents and
thus the prescriptive period of the crime commenced to
run.
When A left the country and returned only after three (3)
years, the running of the prescriptive period of the crime
is interrupted and suspended because prescription shall
not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC).
Since A had been in hiding for 15 years after the
commission of the crime and the prescriptive period
started running only after 5 years from such commission
when the crime was discovered, only 10 years lapsed and
3 years thereof should be deducted when the prescriptive
period was interrupted and suspended. Hence, the 3 years
when A was out of the Philippines should be deducted
from the 10 years after the prescription starts running.
Adding the 7 years of prescription and the 6 years that
lapsed before the case was filed, only a total of thirteen
(13) years of the prescriptive period had lapsed. Hence,
the crime has not yet prescribed. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: On 01 Jun. 1988, a complaint for concubinage
committed in Feb. 1987 was filed against Roberto in
the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite for
purposes of preliminary investigation. For various
reasons, it was only on Jul. 3, 1998 when the judge of
said court decided the case by dismissing it for lack of
jurisdiction since the crime was committed in Manila.
The case was subsequently filed with the City Fiscal of
Manila but it was dismissed on the ground that the
crime had already prescribed. The law provides that
the crime of concubinage prescribes in ten (10) years.
Was the dismissal by the fiscal correct? Explain. (2001
BAR)
A: NO. The fiscal’s dismissal of the case on alleged
prescription is not correct. The filing of the complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court, although only for preliminary
investigation, interrupted and suspended the period of
prescription inasmuch as the jurisdiction of a court in a
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information, not by the result of proof.
(People v. Galano, GR No. L-42925, 31 Jan. 1977) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: On Jan. 1990, while 5-year-old Albert was urinating
at the back of their house, he heard a strange noise
coming from the kitchen of their neighbor and
playmate, Ara. When he peeped inside, he saw Mina,
Ara’s stepmother, very angry and strangling the 5-
year old Ara to death. Albert saw Mina carry the dead
body of Ara, place it inside the trunk of her car and
drive away. The dead body of Ara was never found.
Mina spread the news in the neighborhood that Ara
went to live with her grandparents in Ormoc. For fear
of his life, Albert did not tell anyone, even his parents
and relatives.
20 and ½ years after the incident, and right after his
graduation in Criminology, Albert reported the crime
to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes
in 20 years. Can the State still prosecute Mina for the
death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 and ½ years?
Explain. (2000 BAR)
A: YES. The State can still prosecute Mina for the death of
Ara despite the lapse of 20 & ½ years. Under Art. 91, RPC,
the period of prescription commences to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their agents.
In the case at bar, the commission of the crime was known
only to Albert, who was not the offended party nor an
authority or an agent of an authority. It was discovered by
the NBI Authorities only when Albert revealed to them the
commission of the crime. Hence, the period of prescription
of 20 years for homicide commenced to run only from the
time Albert revealed the same to the NBI Authorities.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered owner of a
lot, in a special power of attorney naming him (B) as
his attorney-in-fact of A. On 13 Feb. 1964, B mortgaged
the lot to a bank using the special power of attorney to
obtain a loan. On the same day, both the special power
of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly
registered in the Registry of Deeds. Because of B’s
failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage, and
the lot was sold to X in whose name a new title was
issued.
In March 1974, A discovered that the property was
already registered in the name of X because of an
ejectment case filed against him by X. If you were the
counsel of B, what would be your defense? Discuss.
(1993 BAR)
A: My defense will be prescription because the crime was
committed in 1964 and almost ten (10) years had already
elapsed since then. Even if we take Falsification and Estafa
individually, they have already prescribed.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
It is to be noted that when it comes to discovery, the fact
that the crime was discovered in 1974 will be of no
moment because the offended party is considered to have
constructive notice on the forgery after the Deed of Sale
where his signature had been falsified was registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds. (Cabral v. Puno, GR No.
L-54449, 20 Jul. 1984) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
PARDON AND AMNESTY
(2015, 2012, 2009, 2006, 2004, 1994, 1990 BAR)
Q: Enumerate the differences between pardon and
amnesty. (2006 BAR)
A:
(a) PARDON includes any crime and is exercised
individually by the President, while AMNESTY applies
to classes of persons or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses.
(b) PARDON is exercised when the person is already
convicted, while AMNESTY may be exercised even
before trial or investigation.
(c) PARDON looks forward and relieves the offender of
the penalty of the offense for which he has been
convicted; it does not work for the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights are expressly restored by means of
pardon, while AMNESTY looks backward and
abolishes the offense and its effects, as if the person
had committed no offense.
(d) PARDON does not alter the fact that the accused is
criminally liable as it produces only the extinction of
the penalty, while AMNESTY removes the criminal
liability of the offender because it obliterates every
vestige of the crime.
(e) PARDON being a private act by the President, must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, while
AMNESTY which is a Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Senator Adamos was convicted of plunder. About
one year after beginning to serve his sentence, the
President of the Philippines granted him absolute
pardon. The signed pardon states: "In view hereof,
and in pursuance of the authority vested upon me by
the Constitution, I hereby grant absolute pardon unto
Adamos, who was convicted of plunder in Criminal
Case No. XV32 and upon whom the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was imposed." He now comes to
you for advice. He wants to know if he could run for
senator in the next election. (2015 BAR)
(a) What advice will you give Adamos? Explain.
40
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
If I were the counsel of Senator Adamos, I will give him the Sept. 2000). Amnesty obliterates, not only the basis of
advice that he cannot run in the Senatorial race since the conviction, but also all the legal effects thereof. (UPLC
terms of the pardon has not expressly restored his right to Suggested Answers)
hold public office or remitted the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Under Art. 36 of the
RPC, a pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to F. CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
hold public office unless such right be expressly restored (2013, 2010, 2000, 1998, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1988,
by terms of the pardon. Under Art. 41, the penalty of 1987 BAR)
reclusion perpetua shall carry with it perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
Q: Name at least two exceptions to the general rule
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
that in case of acquittal of the accused in a criminal
(Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, 21 Jan. 2015)
case, his civil liability is likewise extinguished. (2000
BAR)
(b) Assuming that what Adamos committed was
heading a rebellion for which he was imposed
A: Exceptions to the rule that acquittal from a criminal
the same penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
case extinguishes civil liability, are:
what he received was amnesty from the
government, will your answer be the same?
1. When the civil action is based on obligations not
Explain.
arising from the act complained of as a felony;
2. When acquittal is based on reasonable doubt or
A: If he was given amnesty, he can run in the Senatorial
acquittal is on the ground that guilt has not been
race. Under Art. 89 of the RPC, criminal liability is totally
proven beyond reasonable doubt (Art. 29, New Civil
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes
Code);
the penalty and all its effects. Thus, the amnesty
3. Acquittal due to an exempting circumstance, like
extinguishes not only the principal penalty of reclusion
Insanity;
perpetua but also its effects such as the accessory penalty
4. Where the court states in its Judgment that the case
of perpetual absolute disqualification. Amnesty looks
merely involves a civil obligation;
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
5. Where there was a proper reservation for the filing of
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
a separate civil action;
which he is charged, so that the person released by
6. In cases of independent civil actions provided for in
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the NCC;
committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
7. When the judgment of acquittal includes a declaration
L-1278, 21 Jan. 1949) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist (Sapiera v. CA, G.R. No. 128927, 14 Sept.
Q: Antero Makabayan was convicted of the crime of
1999);
Rebellion. While serving sentence, he escaped from
8. Where the civil liability is not derived or based on the
jail. Captured, he was charged with; and convicted of
criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. (Ibid.)
Evasion of Service of Sentence. Thereafter, the
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
President of the Philippines issued an amnesty
proclamation for the offense of Rebellion. Antero
Q: On her way home, Eva Marie saw an injured chow
applied for and was grantee the benefit of the amnesty
chow puppy behind a bush. Since the puppy did not
proclamation.
have a collar, she brought it home so she could have it
as a pet. Her son in fact begged Eva Marie to keep the
Antero then filed a petition for habeas corpus, praying
puppy. The following day, Eva Marie brought a collar
for his immediate release from confinement. He
for the puppy and brought it to a veterinarian for
claims that the amnesty extends to the offense of
treatment. Did she incur civil liability? Explain. (2010
evasion of Service of Sentence. As judge, will you grant
BAR)
the petition? Discuss fully. (2009 BAR)

A: Eva Marie may incur civil liability if the owner of the

A: YES, I will grant the petition because the sentence that
puppy would incur a loss due to non-restitution or return
was evaded proceeded from the crime of Rebellion which
thereof to the owner. Finding any property of value,
has been obliterated by the grant of amnesty to the
legally regarded as lost property, would constitute theft if
offender. (Art. 89(3), RPC)
the finder failed to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner. (Art. 308, par. 1, RPC) Once Eva Marie is
Since the amnesty erased the criminal complexion of the
found guilty of theft, she will incur civil liability, which
act committed by the offender as a crime of rebellion and
consists of restitution or reparation for damage caused
rendered such act as though innocent, the sentence lost its
and indemnification for consequential damages. (Art. 100,
legal basis. The purported evasion thereof therefore
RPC) The general rule is: a person who is criminally liable
cannot subsist (People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, 29
is also civilly liable. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

41 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: A was a 17-year-old working student who was
earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. B was driving a
car along busy España Street at about 7:00 p.m. Beside
B was C. The car stopped at an intersection because of
the red signal of the traffic light. While waiting for the
green signal, C beckoned A to buy some cigarettes. A
approached the car and handed two sticks of
cigarettes to C.
Upon finality of the decision, a writ of execution was
served upon Guy, but was returned unsatisfied due to
his insolvency. Demy moved for a subsidiary writ of
execution against Max. The latter opposed the motion
on-the ground that the decision made no mention of
his subsidiary liability and that he was not impleaded
in the case. How will you resolve the motion? (1998
BAR)

While the transaction was taking place, the traffic
light changed to green and the car immediately sped
off. As the car continued to speed towards Quiapo, A
clung to the window of the car but lost his grip and fell
down on the pavement. The car did not stop. A
suffered serious injury which eventually caused his
death. C was charged with robbery with homicide.
In the end, the Court was not convinced with moral
certainty that the guilt of C has been established
beyond reasonable doubt and, thus, acquitted him on
the ground of reasonable doubt. Can the family of the
victim still recover civil damages in view of the
acquittal of C? Explain. (2000 BAR)
A: The motion is to be granted. Max as an employer of Guy
and engaged in an industry (transportation business)
where said employee is utilized, is subsidiarily civilly
liable under Art. 103 of the RPC. Even though the decision
made no mention of his subsidiary liability, the law
violated (RPC) itself mandates for such liability and Max is
deemed to know it because ignorance of the law is never
excused. And since his liability is not primary but only
subsidiary in case his employee cannot pay. he need not
be impleaded in the in the criminal case. It suffices that he
was duly notified of the motion for issuance of a
subsidiary writ of execution and thus given the
opportunity to be heard. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

A: YES, as against C, A's family can still recover civil

damages despite C's acquittal. When the accused in a
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. (Art. 29, NCC)

If A's family can prove the negligence of B by

preponderance of evidence, the civil action for damages
against B will prosper based on quasi-delict. Whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, about pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict (Art.
2176, NCC). This is entirely separate and distinct from civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
(Arts, 31, 2176, 2177, NCC) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY

(2013, 1998, 1988 BAR)

Q: Guy, while driving a passenger jeepney owned and

operated by Max, bumped Demy, a pedestrian
crossing the street. Demy sustained injuries which
required medical attendance for three months. Guy
was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
physical injuries. Convicted by the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Guy was sentenced to suffer a straight penalty
of three months of arresto mayor and ordered to
indemnify Demy in the sum of P5,000 and to pay
P1,000 as attorney's fees.

U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S 42
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
II. BOOK II AND RELATED SPECIAL LAWS
A. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAWS OF NATIONS
(2018, 2017, 2016, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2008, 2006
BAR)
TREASON
(2012 BAR)
Q: Which of the following circumstances may be
appreciated as aggravating in the crime of treason?
(2012 BAR)
a. cruelty and ignominy;
b. evident premeditation;
c. superior strength;
d. treachery.
A: A. Cruelty. Cruelty may be appreciated in treason by
deliberately augmenting the wrong by being unnecessarily
cruel. However, treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation are by their nature, inherent in the
offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the
penalty. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON
(2018, 2017, 2013, 2012 BAR)
Q: The brothers Roberto and Ricardo Ratute, both
Filipino citizens, led a group of armed men in seizing a
southern island in the Philippines, and declaring war
against the duly constituted government of the
country. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
led by its Chief of Staff, General Riturban, responded
and a full-scale war ensued between the AFP and the
armed men led by the brothers. The armed conflict
raged for months.
When the brothers-led armed men were running out
of supplies, Ricalde, also a Filipino, and a good friend
and supporter of the Ratute brothers, was tasked to
leave for abroad to solicit arms and funding for the
cash-strapped brothers. He was able to travel to
Rwanda, and there he met with Riboli, a citizen and
resident of Rwanda, who agreed to help the brothers
by raising funds internationally, and to send them to
the Ratute brothers in order to aid them in their
armed struggle against the Philippine government.
Before Ricalde and Riboli could complete their fund-
raising activities for the brothers, the AFP was able to
reclaim the island and defeat the Ratute-led uprising.
Ricalde and Riboli were charged with conspiracy to
commit treason. During the hearing of the two cases,
the government only presented as witness, General
43
Riturban, who testified on the activities of the Ratute
brothers, Ricalde, and Riboli. Can Ricalde and Riboli
be convicted of the crime of conspiracy to commit
treason? Explain. (2017 BAR)
A: NO. Ricalde and Riboli cannot be convicted of the crime
of conspiracy to commit treason because there was no war
existing when they committed the acts. Jurisprudence
considers treason as a crime committed in times only of an
international armed conflict. The same is true with the
felony of conspiracy to commit treason. Moreover, the
crimes were committed outside the jurisdiction of
Philippine Court. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
MISPRISION OF TREASON
(2012, 2011, 2010 BAR)
Q: Because peace negotiations on the Spratlys
situation had failed, the People’s Republic of China
declared war against the Philippines. Myra, a Filipina
who lives with her Italian expatriate boyfriend,
discovered e-mail correspondence between him and a
certain General Tung Kat Su of China.
On March 12, 2010, Myra discovered that on even
date, her boyfriend sent an e-mail to General Tung Kat
Su, in which he agreed to provide vital information on
the military defense of the Philippines to the Chinese
government in exchange for P1 million and his safe
return to Italy. Two weeks later, Myra decided to
report the matter to the proper authorities. Did Myra
commit a crime? Explain. (2010 BAR)
A: YES, Myra committed the crime of Misprision of
Treason because she failed to report as soon as possible to
the governor or provincial fiscal or to the mayor or fiscal
of the city where she resides, the conspiracy between her
Italian boyfriend and the Chinese General to commit
Treason against the Philippine Government.
Under Art. 116 of the RPC, every person who, owing
allegiance to the Government, without being a foreigner,
and having knowledge of any conspiracy against it,
conceals or does not disclose and make known the same,
as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the
province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he
resides, commits Misprision of Treason. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
PIRACY AND MUTINY
(2016, 2008, 2006 BAR)
Q: The Royal S.S. Maru, a vessel registered in Panama,
was 300 nautical miles from Aparri, Cagayan when its
engines malfunctioned. The Captain ordered his men
to drop anchor and repair the ship. While the officers
and crew were asleep, armed men boarded the vessel
and took away several crates containing valuable
items and loaded them in their own motorboat. Before
the band left, they planted an explosive which they
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
detonated from a safe distance. The explosion
damaged the hull of the ship, killed 10 crewmen, and
injured 15 others. What crime or crimes, if any, were
committed? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed is Qualified Piracy under Art. 123
of the RPC. The elements of Piracy being present, namely,
(1) the vessel is on the high seas; (2) that the offenders are
not members of its complement or passenger of the
vessel; and (3) that the offenders attack or seize the
vessel, or seize the whole or part of the cargo of said
vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers. The latter act is committed
when the offenders took away the several crates
containing valuable items and loaded them in their own
motorboat.
The crime of Piracy is qualified because: (1) the offenders
have seized the vessel by boarding; and (2) the crime of
Piracy was accompanied by Murder and Physical Injuries.
The facts show that the offenders planted an explosive in
the vessel which they detonated from a safe distance and
the explosion killed ten (10) crewmen and injured fifteen
(15) others.
The number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. The law considers Qualified Piracy as a
special complex crime regardless of the number of victims.
(People v. Siyoh, G.R. No. L-57292, 18 Feb. 1986) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: The inter-island vessel M/V Viva Lines I, while
cruising off Batanes, was forced to seek shelter at the
harbor of Kaoshiung, Taiwan because of a strong
typhoon. While anchored in said harbor, Max, Baldo
and Bogart arrived in a speedboat, fired a bazooka at
the bow of the vessel, boarded it and divested the
passengers of their money and jewelry.
A passenger of M/V Viva Lines I, Dodong took
advantage of the confusion to settle an old grudge
with another passenger and killed him. After their
apprehension, all four were charged with qualified
piracy before a Philippine court.
Was the charge of qualified piracy against the three
person (Max, Badong and Bogart) who boarded the
inter-island vessel correct? Explain. (2008 BAR)
A: YES, Max, Baldo and Bogart committed Qualified Piracy
when, not being members or passengers of the M/V Viva
Lines I, attacked said vessel in Philippines waters, and
seized the passengers’ personal belongings. Moreover, the
crime was qualified when Max, Baldo and Bogart boarded
the vessel and fired upon the ship, and divested the
passengers of their money and jewelry. (Art. 122 & 123 of
the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659 and P.D. 532) The crime
was further qualified when they fired upon the vessel and
boarded it. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Q: While SS Nagoya Maru was negotiating the sea
route from Hongkong towards Manila, and while still
300 miles from Aparri, Cagayan, its engine
malfunctioned. The Captain ordered the ship to stop
for emergency repairs lasting for almost 15 hours.
Due to exhaustion, the officers and crew fell asleep.
While the ship was anchored, a motorboat manned by
renegade Ybanags from Claveria, Cagayan, passed by
and took advantage of the situation. They cut the
ship’s engines and took away several heavy crates of
electrical equipment and loaded them in their
motorboat. Then they left hurriedly towards Aparri.
At daybreak, the crew found that a robbery took place.
They radioed the Aparri Port Authorities resulting in
the apprehension of the culprits. (2006 BAR)
(a) What crime was committed? Explain.
A: Piracy in the High Seas was committed by the renegade
Ybanags. The culprits, who are neither members of the
complement nor passengers of the ship, seized part of the
equipment of the vessel while it was three hundred (300)
miles away from Aparri, Cagayan. (Art. 122, RPC)
(b) Supposing that while the Robbery was taking
place, the culprits stabbed a member of the
crew while sleeping. What crime was
committed? Explain.
A: The crime committed is Qualified Piracy, because it was
accompanied by Physical Injuries or Homicide. The
culprits stabbed a member of the crew while sleeping.
(Art. 123, RPC) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
1. ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY
P.D. No. 532
(2012 BAR)
Q: A postal van containing mail matters, including
checks and treasury warrants, was hijacked along a
national highway by 10 men, two (2) of whom were
armed. They used force, violence, and intimidation
against three (3) postal employees who were
occupants of the van, resulting in the unlawful taking
and asportation of the entire van and its contents.
a. If you were the public prosecutor, would you
charge the 10 men who hijacked the postal
van with violation of PD No. 532, otherwise
known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974? Explain your answer.
A: YES, as a public prosecutor, I would charge the 10
men/hijackers with violation of P.D. 532. Highway
robbery under P.D. 532 is committed by any person, in
any Philippine highway, who takes away the property of
another by means of violence against or intimidation of
person or force upon things. In this case, there are 10 men
44
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
who hijacked the van, and two (2) were armed. Thus, they
may be charged with highway robbery under P.D. 532. B. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
(Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022) LAW OF THE STATE
(2017, 2012, 2008, 2006, 1992)
b. If you were the defense counsel, what are the
elements of the crime of highway robbery that
the prosecution should prove to sustain a
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND EXPULSION
conviction? (2012 BAR)
(2008, 2006, 1992 BAR)

A: The elements of Highway Robbery are:

Q:
a. Intent to gain;
(a) What are the three (3) ways of committing
b. Unlawful taking of property of another;
Arbitrary Detention? Explain each. (2006
c. Violence against or intimidation of any person;
BAR)
d. Commission on a Philippine highway; and
e. Indiscriminate victim.
A: The three (3) ways of committing Arbitrary Detention
are:
To obtain a conviction for Highway Robbery, the
prosecution must prove that the accused were organized
a. by detaining or locking up a person without any legal
for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately.
cause or ground therefore purposely to restrain his
(Compendious Bar Reviewer on Criminal Law: Based on Bar
liberty; (Art. 124, RPC)
Exam Syllabus (2023) by Dean Nilo T. Divina)
b. by delaying delivery to the proper judicial authority of
a person lawfully arrested without a warrant; (Art.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO, I would not charge the 10
125, RPC) and
men with the crime of highway robbery.
c. by delaying release of a prisoner whose release has
been ordered by competent authority. (Art. 126, RPC)
The mere fact that the offense was committed on a
highway would not be the determinant for the application
In all the above-stated ways, the principal offender should
of PD No. 532. If a motor vehicle, either stationary or
be a public officer acting under color of his authority.
moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the
accused, the location of the vehicle at the time of the
(b) What are the legal grounds for detention?
unlawful taking would not be necessarily put the offense
(2006 BAR)
within the ambit of PD No. 532.

A: The legal grounds for detention are:

In this case, there is no showing that the 10 men were a
band of outlaws organized for the purpose of depredation
1. Commission of a crime; and
upon the persons and properties of innocent and
2. Violent insanity or other ailment requiring
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
compulsory confinement in an institution established
another. Thus, the crime committed is the violation of the
for such purpose. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Q: Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-Bago

2. ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2020 community in a police car with SP03 Caloy Itliong
R.A. No. 11479 blew his whistle to stop a Nissan Sentra car which
wrongly entered a one-way street. After demanding
from Linda Lo Hua, the driver, her driver’s license,
Menor asked her to follow them to the police precinct.
Upon arriving there, he gave instructions to Itliong to
guard Lo Hua in one of the rooms and not to let her
out of sight until he returns; then got the car key from
Lo Hua. In the meantime, the latter was not allowed to
make any phone calls but was given food and access to
a bathroom.

When Menor showed up after two days, he brought Lo

Hua to a private house and told her that he would only
release her and return the car if she made
arrangements for the delivery of P500,000.00 in a
doctor’s bag at a certain place within the next twenty-
four hours. When Menor went to the designated spot
to pick up the bag of money, he suddenly found
himself surrounded by several armed civilians who

45 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
introduced themselves as NBI agents. What criminal
offense has Menor committed? Explain. (1992 BAR)
A: Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC (Arbitrary
Detention), he being a public officer who detained, a
person without legal grounds. Violation of a traffic
ordinance by entering a one-way street is not a valid
reason to arrest and detain the driver. Such only merits
the issuance of a traffic violation ticket. Hence, when Lo
Hua was ordered to follow the police officers to the
precinct (confiscating her license to compel her to do so),
and confining her in a room for two days and prohibiting
her to make phone calls, is a clear case of deprivation of
personal liberty. Giving her food and access to the
bathroom will not extinguish or mitigate the criminal
liability.
Menor is further liable for robbery, because money or
personal properly was taken, with intent to gain, and with
intimidation. The peculiar situation of Lo Hua practically
forced her to submit to the monetary demands of the
major. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
(2017)
Q: In his homily, Fr. Chris loudly denounced the many
extrajudicial killings committed by the men in
uniform. Policeman Stone, then attending the mass,
was peeved by the denunciations of Fr. Chris. He
immediately approached the priest during the homily,
openly displayed his firearm tucked in his waist, and
menacingly uttered at the priest: Father, may
kalalagyan kayo kung hindi kayo tumigil. His
brazenness terrified the priest, who cut short his
homily then and there. The celebration of the mass
was disrupted, and the congregation left the church in
disgust over the actuations of Policeman Stone, a co-
parishioner.
Policeman Stone was subsequently charged. The
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is now about to
resolve the case and is mulling on what to charge
Policeman Stone with. May Policeman Stone be
properly charged with either or both of the following
crimes, or, if not, with what proper crime? (2017 BAR)
(a) Interruption of religious worship as defined
and punished under Art. 132 of the RPC;
and/or
A: YES. Policeman Stone may be charged with
Interruption of Religious Worship. Under the RPC, a public
officer or employee who shall prevent or disturb the
ceremonies or manifestations of any religion shall be
liable for interruption of religious worship. Hence,
Policeman Stone, a public officer, approached the priest,
displayed his firearm, and threatened the priest, which
caused the disruption of the mass and the leaving of the
congregation. Policeman Stone, therefore, may be charged
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
of interruption of religious worship.
(b) Offending the religious feelings as defined and
punished under Art. 133 of the RPC. Explain
fully your answers.
A: NO. Policeman Stone may not be charged with the
crime of Offending Religious Feelings. The Supreme Court
has ruled that the acts must be directed against religious
practice, dogma, or ritual for the purpose of ridicule as
mocking or scoffing at or attempting to damage an object
of religious veneration. (People v. Baes, G.R. No. 46000, 25
May 1939)
Policeman Stone threatened the priest because the priest’s
statements during his homily and not to mock or ridicule
the ceremony; consequently, Policeman Stone may not be
charged with the crime of offending religious feelings.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
1. ANTI-TORTURE ACT OF 2009
R.A. No. 9745
(2012 BAR)
Q: AA was arrested for committing a bailable offense
and detained in solitary confinement. He was able to
post bail after two (2) weeks of defection. During the
period of detention, he was not given any food. Such
deprivation caused him physically discomfort. What
crime, if any, was committed in connection with the
solitary confinement and food deprivation of AA?
Explain your answer. (2012 BAR)
A: Food deprivation and confinement in solitary cell are
considered as physical and psychological torture under
Sec. 4(2) of R.A. No. 9745. Hence, the crime committed is
torture. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
C. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
(2022, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2015, 2013, 2012, 2011,
2009, 2007, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1998,
1995, 1994, 1993, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, 1987 BAR)
Q: Can there be a complex crime of coup d’état with
rebellion? (2003 BAR)
A: YES, if there was conspiracy between the offender/
offenders committing the coup d’état and the offenders
committing the rebellion. By conspiracy, the crime of one
would be the crime of the other and vice versa. This is
possible because the offender in coup d’état may be any
person or persons belonging to the military or the national
police or a public officer, whereas rebellion does not so
require. Moreover, the crime of coup d’état may be
committed singly, whereas rebellion requires a public
uprising and taking up arms to overthrow the duly
constituted government. Since the two crimes are
46
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
essentially different and punished with distinct penalties,
there is no legal impediment to the application of Art. 48
of the RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
REBELLION
(2019, 2018, 2012, 2011, 2004, 2003, 1998, 1994,
1991, 1990, 1988 BAR)
Q: A proposal to commit a felony is punishable only
when the law specifically provides a penalty for it as
in the case of proposal to commit? (2011 BAR)
a. rebellion.
b. sedition.
c. espionage.
d. highway robbery.
A: (a) rebellion. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
Q: What is the proper charge against public officers or
employees who, being in conspiracy with the rebels,
failed to resist a rebellion by all means in their
powers, or shall continue to discharge the duties of
their offices under the control of the rebels, or shall
accept appointment to office under them? (2012 BAR)
a. disloyalty of public officers or employees;
b. rebellion;
c. conspiracy to commit rebellion;
d. dereliction of duty.
A: (b) rebellion. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
Q: VC, JG, GG, and JG conspired to overthrow the
Philippine Government. VG was recognized as the
titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings were
held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his
conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that he, VG,
JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the
government. Father Abraham did not report this
information to the proper authorities. Did Father
Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was
committed? What is his criminal liability? (1994 BAR)
A: NO, Father Abraham did not commit a crime because
the conspiracy involved is one to commit rebellion, not a
conspiracy to commit treason which makes a person
criminally liable under Art 116, RPC. And even assuming
that it will fall as misprision of treason, Father Abraham is
exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12(7) [of the
RPC] as his failure to report can be considered as due to
"insuperable cause", as this involves the sanctity and
inviolability of a confession.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion results in criminal liability
to the co-conspirators, but not to a person who learned of
such and did not report to the proper authorities. (US v.
Vergara, G.R. No. 1543, 19 Mar. 1904; and People v. Atienza,
G.R. No. L-35748, 14 Dec. 1931) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
47
Q: In the early morning of 25 Oct. 1990, the troops of
the Logistics Command (LOGCOM) of the AFP at Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo headed by their Operations
Officer, Col. Rito Amparo, withdrew firearms and
bullets and, per prior agreement, attacked, in separate
teams, the offices of the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of
National Defense, the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
and other offices, held hostage the Chief of Staff of
LOGCOM and other officers, killed three (3) pro-
Government soldiers, inverted the Philippine flag,
barricaded all entrances and exits to the camp, and
announced complete control of the camp. Because of
the superiority of the pro-Government forces, Col.
Amparo and his troops surrendered at 7:00 in the
morning of that day.
Did Col. Amparo and his troops commit the crime of
coup d’état (Art. 134-A, RPC) or of rebellion? (1991
BAR)
A: Under the facts stated, the crime committed would be
coup d’état. (R.A. 6988, incorporating Art. 134-A). However,
since the law was not yet effective as of 25 Oct. 1990, as
the effectivity thereof (Sec. 8) is upon its approval (which
is 24 Oct. 1990) and publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation, the felony committed
would be rebellion. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
COUP D’ ETAT
(2013, 2012, 2004, 2003, 2002, 1998, 1991, 1990,
1988 BAR)
Q: During a military uprising aimed at ousting the duly
constituted authorities and taking over the
government, General Tejero and his men forcibly took
over the entire Rich Hotel which they used as their
base. They used the rooms and other facilities of the
hotel, ate all the available food they found, and
detained some hotel guests.
What crime did General Tejero and his men commit?
(2013 BAR)
a. Rebellion complexed with serious illegal
detention and estafa.
b. Rebellion.
c. Coup d'etat.
d. Terrorism.
e. None of the above.
A: (c) Coup d'etat. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between Rebellion
and coup d’état, based on their constitutive elements
as criminal offenses. (2004, 1991 BAR)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
A: Rebellion is committed when a multitude of persons
rise publicly in arms for the purpose of overthrowing the
duly constituted government, to be replaced by a
government of the rebels. It is carried out by force and
violence, but need not be participated in by any member
of the military, national police or any public officer.
Coup d'etat is committed when members of the military,
Philippine National Police, or public officer, acting as
principal offenders, launched a swift attack thru strategy,
stealth, threat, violence or intimidation against duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines,
military camp or installation, communication networks,
public facilities or utilities needed for the exercise and
continued possession of governmental powers, for the
purpose of seizing or diminishing state powers.
Unlike rebellion which requires a public uprising, coup
d'etat may be carried out singly or simultaneously and the
principal offenders must be members of the military,
national police, or public officer, with or without civilian
support. The criminal objective need not be to overthrow
the existing government but only to destabilize or
paralyze the existing government. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q:
(a) If a group of persons belonging to the armed
forces makes a swift attack, accompanied by
violence, intimidation, and threat against a
vital military installation for the purpose of
seizing power and taking over such
installation, what crime or crimes are they
guilty of? (2002, 1998 BAR)
A: The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the
Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of coup d'etat,
under Art. 134-A of the RPC, as amended, because their
attack was against vital military installations which are
essential to the continued possession and exercise of
governmental powers, and their purpose is to seize power
by taking over such installations.
(b) If the attack is quelled but the leader is
unknown, who shall be deemed the leader
thereof? (2002, 1998 BAR)
A: The leader being unknown, any person who in fact
directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and
other documents issued in their name, or performed
similar acts, on behalf of the group shall be deemed the
leader of said coup d'etat. (Art 135, RPC) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
SEDITION
(2013, 2012, 2007, 1987 BAR)
Q: What is the proper charge against a person who,
without taking arms or being in open hostility against
the Government, shall incite others to deprive
Congress of its legislative powers, by means of
speeches or writings? (2012 BAR)
(a) inciting to sedition;
(b) inciting to rebellion or insurrection;
(c) crime against legislative body;
(d) unlawful use of means of publication or
unlawful utterances.
A: (a) inciting to sedition. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria,
2022)
Q: What are the different acts of Inciting to Sedition?
(2007 BAR)
A: The different acts which constitute the crime of Inciting
to Sedition are:
1. Inciting others through speeches, writings, banners
and other media of representation to commit acts
which constitute sedition;
2. Uttering seditious words, speeches or circulating
scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities,
which tend to disturb or obstruct the performance of
official functions, or which tend to incite others to
cabal and meet for unlawful purposes;
3. Inciting through the same media of representation
rebellious conspiracies or riots;
4. Stirring people to go against lawful authorities, or
disturb the peace and public order of the community
or of the Government; or
5. Knowingly concealing any of the aforestated evil
practices. (Art. 142, RPC)
Q: A, B, C, D, and E were former soldiers who deserted
their command in Mindanao. Jose and Pedro, two big
landowners, called A, B, C, D, and E to a conference.
Jose and Pedro proposed to these former soldiers that
they recruit their comrades and organize a group of
100 for the purpose of challenging the government by
force of arms in order to prevent the enforcement or
implementation of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato
Province. Jose and Pedro promised to finance the
group and to buy firearms for the purpose. The former
soldiers agreed.
48
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
After Jose and Pedro left, A, the leader of the former
soldiers, said that in the meanwhile he needed money
to support his family. D suggested that they rob a bank
and agreed to carry put the plan on the 15th day of the
month. Unknown to all of them, as they were
conferring with Jose and Pedro and as they were
planning to rob the bank, Rosauro, a houseboy was
within hearing distance.
On the pretext of buying cigarettes, Rosauro instead
went directly to the Police and told them what
transpired. All the former soldiers, as well as Jose and
Pedro, were arrested. (1987 BAR)
(a) What crime, if any, did the former soldiers
commit?
A: The former soldiers committed the crime of conspiracy
to commit sedition. What Jose and Pedro proposed to the
soldiers that they recruit their comrades and organize a
group of 100 for the purpose of challenging the
government by force of arms in order to prevent the
implementation of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato
Province is to commit sedition.
Proposal to commit sedition is not punished. But since the
soldiers agreed, a conspiracy to commit sedition resulted
which is now punishable. Conspiracy arises on the very
moment the plotters agree. (People v. Peralta, G.R. No. L-
19069, 29 Oct. 1968)
(b) What about Jose and Pedro?
A: Jose and Pedro will also be liable for conspiracy to
commit sedition since they are members of the conspiracy
where the act of one is the act of all. If the soldiers did not
agree to their proposal, they would not incur any criminal
liability because there is no proposal to commit sedition.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
DIRECT ASSAULT
(2019, 2017, 2015, 2013, 2012, 2009, 2002, 2001,
2000, 1995, 1993, 1991, 1989, 1987 BAR)
Q: Ms. L, dean of a duly recognized private school,
caught K, one of her students, vandalizing one of the
school’s properties. Ms. L called K’s attention and
proceeded to scold him, causing a crowd to gather
around them. Embarrassed with the situation, K
attacked Ms. L by repeatedly punching her on the face.
Just as K was about to strike Ms. L again, J, another
student, intervened. K then turned his anger on J and
also hit him repeatedly, causing him physical injuries.
What crime/s did K commit under the RPC for his acts
against Ms. L and J? Explain. (2019 BAR)
49
A: K committed two counts of Direct Assault. The elements
of direct assault under Art. 148 of the RPC are:
1. That the offender makes an attack, employs force,
makes a serious intimidation or makes a serious
resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or
his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority
or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or that he is assaulted by reason of the
past performance of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting
is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of
his duties; and
5. That there is no public uprising. Art. 152 further
provides that teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges, and universities
in the actual performance of their professional duties
or on the occasion of such performance shall be
deemed persons in authority.
Here, all the elements of Direct Assault are present, where
K repeatedly punched Ms. L, a person in authority engaged
in the performance of her official duties.
K also committed Direct Assault against J. Art. 152 states
that any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in
authority. Here, while K was attacking Ms. L, K also hit J,
an agent of a person in authority who came to the aid of a
person in authority. (Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, 28
July 2010)
Q: Miss Reyes, a lady professor, caught Mariano, one of
her students, cheating during an examination. Aside
from calling Mariano’s attention, she confiscated his
examination booklet and sent him out of the room,
causing Mariano extreme embarrassment.
In class the following day, Mariano approached Miss
Reyes and without any warning, slapped her on the
face. Mariano would have inflicted grave injuries on
Miss Reyes had not Dencio, another student,
intervened. Mariano then turned his ire on Dencio and
punched him repeatedly, causing him injuries. What
crime or crimes, if any, did Mariano commit? (2013
BAR)
A: Mariano is liable for two counts of direct assault. First,
when he slapped Miss Reyes, who is a person in authority
expressly mentioned in Art. 152 of the RPC, who was in
the performance of her duties on the day of the
commission of the assault. Second, when he repeatedly
punched Dencio, who became an agent of the person in
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
authority when he came to the aid of a person in authority,
Miss Reyes. (Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: What is the proper charge against a group of four
persons who, without public uprising, employs force
to prevent the holding of any popular election? (2012
BAR)
A: Direct Assault. Any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining
the crimes of rebellion and sedition, is liable for the crime
of direct assaults. (Art. 148, RPC)
The first mode of direct assault is tantamount to rebellion
or sedition, without the element of public uprising. (People
v. Recto, G.R. No. 129069, 17 Oct. 2001) If the offender
prevented by force the holding of a popular election in
certain precincts, without public uprising, he may be held
liable for direct assault of the first form. (Clarin v. Justice of
Peace, G.R. No. L-7661, 30 Apr. 1955) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Bernardo was enraged by his conviction for robbery
by Judge Samsonite despite insufficient evidence.
Pending his appeal, Bernardo escaped in order to get
even with Judge Samsonite. Bernardo learned that the
judge regularly slept in his mistress' house every
weekend. Thus, he waited for the judge to arrive on
Saturday evening at the house of his mistress. It was
about 8:00 p.m. when Bernardo entered the house of
the mistress. He found the judge and his mistress
having coffee in the kitchen and engaging in small
talk. Without warning, Bernardo stabbed the judge at
least 20 times. The judge instantly died.
Prosecuted and tried, Bernardo was convicted
of direct assault with murder. Rule with reasons
whether or not the conviction for direct assault
with murder was justified. (2017 BAR)
A: Bernardo was correctly convicted of direct assault with
murder. Attacking Judge Samsonite by reason of past
performance of duty of convicting Bernardo based on his
assessment of the evidence constitutes qualified direct
assault. He likewise committed the crime of murder when
he committed the direct assault with the circumstance of
treachery. In a single act of attacking Judge Samsonite, he
committed two crimes, direct assault and murder. The two
crimes may be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having gotten mad
at X, one of his pupils, because of the latter’s throwing
paper clips at his classmates, twisted his right ear. X
went out of the classroom crying and proceeded home
located at the back of the school. He reported to his
parents, Y and Z, what A had done to him,
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Y and Z immediately proceeded to the school building
and because they were running and talking in loud
voices, they were seen by the barangay chairman, B,
who followed them as he suspected that an untoward
incident might happen. Upon seeing A inside the
classroom, X pointed him out to his father, Y, who
administered a fist blow on A, causing him to fall
down. When Y was about to kick A, B rushed towards
Y and pinned both of the latter’s arms. Seeing his
father being held by B, X went near and punched B on
the face, which caused him to lose his grip on Y.
Throughout this incident, Z shouted words of
encouragement at Y, her husband, and also threatened
to slap A.
Security guards of the school arrived, intervened and
surrounded X, Y and Z so that they could be
investigated in the principal’s office. Before leaving, Z
passed near A and threw a small flowerpot at him but
it was deflected by B. (2001 BAR)
(a) What, if any, are the respective criminal
liability of X, Y, and Z?
A: X is liable for Direct Assault only, assuming the physical
injuries inflicted on B, the Barangay Chairman, to be only
slight and hence, would be absorbed in the direct assault.
A Barangay Chairman is a person in authority (Art. 152,
RPC) and in this case, was performing his duty of
maintaining peace and order when attacked.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct Assault with
Less Serious Physical Injuries for the fist blow on A, the
teacher, which caused the latter to fall down. For purposes
of the crime in Arts. 148 and 151 of the RPC, a teacher is
considered a person in authority, and having been
attacked by Y by reason of his performance of official duty,
direct assault is committed with the resulting less serious
physical injuries complexed.
Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may only be liable as an
accomplice to the complex of crimes of direct assault with
less serious physical injuries committed by Y. Her
participation should not be considered as that of a co-
principal, since her reactions were only incited by her
relationship to X and Y, as the mother of X and the wife of
Y.
(b) Would your answer be the same if B were a
barangay tanod only?
A: If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of X of laying
hand on him, being an agent of a person in authority only,
would constitute the crime of Resistance and
Disobedience under Art. 151, RPC since X, a high school
pupil, could not be considered as having acted out of
contempt for authority but more of helping his father get
free from the grip of B. Laying hand on an agent of a
person in authority is not ipso facto Direct Assault, while it
would always be Direct Assault if done to a person in
50
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
authority in defiance to the latter’s exercise of authority.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE
(2002, 2001, 1990, 1989 BAR)
Q: Amy was apprehended and arrested by Patrolman
Bart for illegal parking. She was detained at the police
precinct, underwent investigation, and released only
after 48 hours. Supposed Amy resisted the arrested
and grappled with Patrolman Bart, is she criminally
liable thereby? (1990 BAR)
A: She is criminally liable for Slight Disobedience under
Art. 151 of the RPC – Resistance and disobedience to a
person in authority or the agents of such person. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
(2015, 2012, 2009, 1998, 1989 BAR)
Q: Dancio, a member of a drug syndicate, was a
detention prisoner in the provincial jail of X Province.
Brusco, another member of the syndicate, regularly
visited Dancio. Edri, the guard in charge who had been
receiving gifts from Brusco everytime he visited
Dancio, became friendly with him and became relaxed
in the inspection of his belongings during his jail
visits. In one of Brusco's visits, he was able to smuggle
in a pistol which Dancio used to disarm the guards and
destroy the padlock of the main gate of the jail,
enabling Dancio to escape. What crime(s) did Dancio,
Brusco and Edri commit? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: Dancio did not commit the crime of Evasion of Service
of Sentence under Art. 157 of the RPC because this crime
can only be committed by a convict who shall evade
service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment. Dancio is only
a detention prisoner and not a convict. He is not serving
sentence by reason of final judgment but merely
undergoing preventive imprisonment. By escaping while
undergoing preventive imprisonment, he is not evading
the service of his sentence.
However, Dancio committed the crime of Direct Assault
under Art. 148 for disarming the guards with the use of
pistol while they are engaged in the performance of their
duties. Using a pistol to disarm the guards manifests
criminal intention to defy the law and its representative at
all hazard.
NOTE: Illegal possession of firearms may also be
considered.
Edri committed Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner or
Evasion through Negligence under Art. 224. As the guard
in charge, Edri was negligent in relaxing the inspection of
the Brusco’s belongings during jail visits allowing him to
smuggle a pistol to Dencio, which he subsequently used to
51
escape. By accepting gifts from Brusco, who was part of
the syndicate to which Dancio belonged, he is also guilty of
Indirect Bribery under Art. 211.
Brusco committed Delivery of Prisoner from Jail under
Art. 156, qualified by his bribery of Edri. Helping a person
confined in jail to escape constitutes this crime. “Helping”
means furnishing the prisoner with the material means or
tools which greatly facilitate his escape; hence, providing a
pistol which helped Dencio to escape is Delivery of
Prisoner from Jail. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Manny killed his wife under exceptional
circumstances and was sentenced by the RTC of
Dagupan City to suffer the penalty of destierro during
which he was not to enter the city. While serving
sentence, Manny went to Dagupan City to visit his
mother. Later, he was arrested in Manila. (1998 BAR)
(a) Did Manny commit any crime?
A: YES. Manny committed the crime of evasion of service
of sentence when he went to Dagupan City, which he was
prohibited from entering under his sentence of destierro.
A sentence imposing the penalty of destierro is evaded
when the convict enters any of the place/places he is
prohibited from entering under the sentence or come
within the prohibited radius. Although destierro does not
involve imprisonment, it is nonetheless a deprivation of
liberty. (People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, 26 Nov. 1948)
(b) If so, where should he be prosecuted?
A: Manny may be prosecuted in Dagupan City or in Manila
where he was arrested. This is so because Evasion of
Service of Sentence is a continuing offense, as the convict
is a fugitive from justice in such case. (Parulan v. Dir. of
Prisons, G.R. No. L-28519, 17 Feb. 1968)
1. COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITION REGULATION ACT
R.A. No. 10591
(2022 BAR)
Q: Jesusa, a mayoralty candidate of the Municipality of
Jaen, Nueva Ecija during the 2019 local elections, was
ambushed and gunned down by Jhudas, a gun for hire.
Jhudas was arrested at a COMELEC checkpoint just
after the incident. The firearm he used, a baby
Armalite, was verified to be without any license.
During the interrogation, Jhudas admitted that Pontio,
the rival mayoralty candidate of Jesusa, paid him Php
1,000,000.00 to assassinate Jesusa. Due to Jhudas’
admission, coupled with the sworn statement of an
eyewitness, the prosecutor filed two Informations, one
for Murder and one for Illegal Possession of Firearm,
against both Jhudas and Pontio.
Do you agree with the prosecutor’s charges against
Jhudas and Pontio? Explain briefly. (2022 BAR)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
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 CRIMINAL LAW
A: YES, the charges against Jhudas for Murder and Illegal
Possession of Firearms are correct. When Jhudas gunned
down Jesusa upon Pontio’s inducement by paying him Php
1,000,000.00, the crime committed was murder. The use of
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime is an
aggravating circumstance. Where murder was committed,
the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer
imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance. (People v. Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, 27 July
2016)
unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime
but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating
circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer
imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance. The intent of Congress is to treat the offense
of illegal possession of firearm and the commission of
homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as
a single offense. (People v. Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, 27 Jul.
2016) (UPLC Suggested Answers).

Jhudas may likewise be liable for violation of R.A. 10951 as

he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of an D. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
unlicensed firearm when he was apprehended at the (2018, 2015, 2014, 2012, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2005,
checkpoint, which is a separate occasion/offense from the 2000, 1999, 1997, 1996, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1989
crime of Murder he committed. 1988, 1987 BAR)

Pontio, on the other hand, shall be liable for Murder

committed by Jhudas as principal by inducement. (People
FORGERY
v. Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, 27 Jul. 2016). (Bar Q&A by
(1999 BAR)
Judge Alejandria, 2023)

Q: How are "forging" and "falsification" committed?

Q: Wielding loose firearms, Rene and Roan held up a
(1999 BAR)
bank. After taking the bank's money, the robbers ran
towards their getaway car, pursued by the bank
A: Forging or Forgery is committed by giving to a treasury
security guards. As the security guards were closing in
or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to
on the robbers, the two fired their firearms at the
order the appearance of a true and genuine document; or
pursuing security guards. As a result, one of the
by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any
security guards was hit on the head causing his
means the figures, letters, words or signs contained
immediate death.
therein.
Falsification, on the other hand, is committed through –
For the taking of the bank's money and killing of the
security guard with the use of loose firearms, the
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature
robbers were charged in court in two separate
or rubric;
Information, one for robbery with homicide attended
by the aggravating circumstance of use of loose
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in
firearms, and the other for illegal possession of
any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
firearms.
participate;

Are the indictments correct? (2018 BAR)

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act
or proceeding statements other than those in fact
A: YES, the indictment for Robbery with homicide is
made by them;
correct. Robbery with homicide, a special complex crime, is
primarily a crime against property and not against
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery
with the latter being the main purpose of the criminal.
5. Altering true dates;

The indictment for illegal possession of firearm is wrong.

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
In the case of People v. Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, July 27,
document which changes its meaning;
2016, the Supreme Court clarified the issue, to wit:

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document

In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294
purporting to be a copy of an original document when
and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866, 14
no such original exists, or including in such copy a
separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of
genuine original; or
firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of murder. It is clear from the
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
foregoing that where murder results from the use of an
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official
unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal
book. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
possession but, murder. In such a case, the use of the

U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S 52
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
COUNTERFEITING COINS; FORGING TREASURY OR
BANK NOTES, OBLIGATIONS AND SECURITIES;
IMPORTING AND UTTERING FALSE OR FORGED
NOTES, OBLIGATIONS AND SECURITIES
(1999 BAR)
Q: Is mere possession of false money bills punishable
under Art. 168 of the RPC? (1999 BAR)
A: NO. Possession of false treasury or bank note alone
without an intent to use it, is not punishable. But the
circumstances of such possession may indicate intent to
utter, sufficient to consummate the crime of Illegal
Possession of False Notes. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
INTRODUCTION OF FALSE DOCUMENTS
(1987 BAR)
Q: M was forced by a policeman to sign a document
entitled “Sinumpaang Salaysay” in which M implicated
X as the brain behind the robbery of a bank where
P500,000.00 were lost. The document was prepared
by the policeman upon advice of B, the bank’s lawyer,
who was present when the policeman asked M to sign
the document. As M refused to sign it, the policeman
held him by the neck and forced him to sign, which he
did as he was afraid he might be bodily harmed.
During the hearing of the Robbery before the Fiscal’s
Office, B submitted the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” as
evidence, on the basis of which X was included in the
information filed by the Fiscal in court.
When M testified in court, he repudiated the
document and told the court there was no truth to its
contents as he was merely forced to sign it. Did lawyer
B commit any crime when he used the “Sinumpaang
Salaysay” as evidence? (1987 BAR)
A: The lawyer would be liable under Art. 172 of the RPC
for the offense of introducing a false document in a judicial
proceeding as he knew the same to be false. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT
(2018, 2015, 2014, 2012, 2009, 2008, 2000, 1999,
1993, 1992, 1988 BAR)
Q: A falsified official or public document was found in
the possession of the accused. No evidence was
introduced to show that the accused was the author of
the falsification. As a matter of fact, the trial court
convicted the accused of Falsification of Official or
Public Document mainly on the proposition that “the
only person who could have made the erasures and
the superimposition mentioned is the one who will be
benefited by the alterations thus made” and that “he
alone could have the motive for making such
alterations”.
53
Was the conviction of the accused proper although the
conviction was premised merely on the aforesaid
ratiocination? Explain your answer. (1999 BAR)
A: YES. The conviction is proper because there is a
presumption in law that the possessor and user of a
falsified document is the one who falsified the same.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered owner of a
lot, in special power of attorney naming him (B) as the
attorney-in-fact of A. On Feb. 13, 1964, B mortgaged
the lot to a bank using the special power of attorney to
obtain a loan of P8,500. On the same day, both the
special power of attorney and the mortgage contract
were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds.
Because of B’s failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the
mortgage and the lot was sold to X in whose name a
new title was issued. In March 1974, A discovered that
the property was already registered in the name of X
because an ejectment case filed against him by X. If
you were the lawyer of A, with what crime or crimes
would you charge B? Explain. (1993 BAR)
A: The crime to be charged against B is Estafa through
Falsification of a Public Document. When the offender
commits in a public document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a
necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex
crime under Art. 48 of the same Code. The falsification of a
public, official or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa because, before the falsified document
is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or
intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime
of falsification of a public, official or commercial
document. In other words, the crime of falsification was
committed prior to the consummation of the crime of
estafa.
Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. The damage to
another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. (Intestate Estate of Manolita
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, 11
Feb. 2010) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born in Macao,
having applied with a recruitment agency to work in
Kuwait, went to Quezon City Hall to procure a
Community Tax Certificate, formerly called Residence
Certificate.
He stated therein that his name is Leo Tiampuy, a
Filipino citizen born in Binan, Laguna. As he paid for
the Community Tax Certificate, Cecille Delicious, an
employee in the office recognized him and reported to
her boss that the information written in the
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 CRIMINAL LAW
Community Tax Certificate were all lies. Shortly
thereafter, an information was filed against Dee Kiam
alias Tiampuy. (1992 BAR)
(a) An information was filed against Dee Kiam.
What crime, if any, may he be indicted for?
Why?
A: Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony of Falsification
of a Public Document committed by a private individual
under Art. 172 of the RPC in relation to Art. 171 thereof. A
residence certificate is a public or official document within
the context of said provisions and jurisprudence. Since
Dee Kiam made an untruthful statement in a narration of
facts (Art. 171(4), RPC), and he, being a private individual,
is culpable thereunder.
(b) The accused move to quash the information on
the ground that it did not allege that he had
the obligation to disclose the truth in the
Community Tax Certificate; that the same is a
useless scrap of paper which one can buy even
in the Quiapo underpass and that he had no
intent of deceiving anybody. Would you grant
the motion to quash?
A: NO. Falsification of Public Documents under Arts. 171
and 172, RPC does not require that the document is
required by law. The sanctity of the public document, a
residence certificate, cannot be taken lightly as being a
“mere scrap of paper”. Intent to cause damage or actual
damage, is not an indispensable requisite for Falsification
of Public Document. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Andrea signed her husband’s name in endorsing his
treasury warrants which were delivered to her
directly by the district supervisor who knew that her
husband had already died, and she used the proceeds
to pay for the expenses of her husband’s last illness
and his burial. She knew that her husband had
accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value
of which exceeded that value of the three treasury
warrants, so that the government suffered no damage.
Andrea’s appeal is based on her claim of absence of
criminal intent and of good faith.
Should she be found guilty of falsification? Discuss
briefly. (1988 BAR)
A: Andrea should be held guilty of Falsification of Public
Documents. Her claim of absence of criminal intent and of
good faith cannot be considered because she is presumed
to know that her husband is dead. The element of damage
required in falsification does not refer to pecuniary
damage but damage to public interest.
NOTE: Executive clemency can, however, be sought for by
Andrea. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT
(2018, 2007, 1991, 1989 BAR)
Q: Fe is the manager of a rice mill in Bulacan. In order
to support a gambling debt, Fe made it appear that the
rice mill was earning less than it actually was by
writing in a “talaan” or ledger a figure lower than
what was collected and paid by their customers. Fe
then pocketed the difference. What crime/s did Fe
commit, if any? Explain your answer. (2007 BAR)
A: Fe committed the crimes of: (a) Estafa through Abuse of
Confidence or Unfaithfulness; and (b) Falsification of a
Private Document.
Damage or intent to cause damage, would sustain the case
for estafa independently of the falsification of the
commercial document. The crime of Falsification of a
Commercial Document has already been consummated
and the use of said of document to defraud another person
would constitute estafa, which constitutes the damage. In
this case, two (2) separate crimes are committed; namely,
Estafa and Falsification of the Commercial Document. The
falsification should not be complexed with the estafa since
it was not committed as a necessary means to commit the
estafa. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: In a civil case for recovery of a sum of money filed
against him by A, B interposed the defense of
payment. In support thereof, he identified and offered
in evidence a receipt which appears to be signed by A.
On rebuttal, A denied having been paid by B and
having signed the receipt. He presented a handwriting
expert who testified that the alleged signature of A on
the receipt is a forgery and that a comparison thereof
with the specimen signatures of B clearly shows that B
himself forged the signature of A. (1991 BAR)
(a) Is B liable for the crime of using a falsified
document in a judicial proceeding (last
paragraph of Art. 172 of the RPC)?
A: NO. B should not be liable for the crime of using a
falsified document, under the last paragraph of Art. 172,
RPC. He would be liable for forgery of a private document
under the second mode of falsification under Art. 172,
RPC.
Being the possessor and user of the falsified document, he
is presumed to be the forger or falsifier and the offense of
introducing falsified document is already absorbed in the
main offense of forgery or falsification.
(b) If he is not, what offense of offenses may he be
charged with?
A: If he testified on the genuineness of the document, he
should also be liable under Art. 182, which is False
Testimony in Civil Cases. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
FALSE TESTIMONY; PERJURY
(2012, 2008, 2005, 1997, 1996, 1994, 1993, 1991,
1987 BAR)
Q: AA knowingly and willfully induced BB to swear
falsely. BB testified as told in a formal hearing of an
administrative case under circumstances rendering
him guilty of perjury. Is AA criminally liable? (2012
BAR)
(a) AA is not criminally liable because his act
constitutes subornation of perjury which is
not expressly penalized in the Revised Penal
Code.
(b) AA is not criminally liable because he was not
the one who gave false testimony in the
administrative case.
(c) AA is not criminally liable because the witness
suborned testified in an administrative case
only.
(d) AA is criminally liable for perjury as principal
by inducement with BB as the principal by
direct participation.
A: (d) AA is criminally liable for perjury as principal by
inducement with BB as the principal by direct
participation. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
Q: Al Chua, a Chinese national, filed a petition under
oath for naturalization, with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. In his petition, he stated that he is married
to Leni Chua; that he is living with her in Sampaloc,
Manila; that he is of good moral character; and that he
has conducted himself in an irreproachable manner
during his stay in the Philippines. However, at the
time of the filing of the petition, Leni Chua was already
living in Cebu, while Al was living with Babes Toh in
Manila, with whom he has an amorous relationship.
After his direct testimony, Al Chua withdrew his
petition for naturalization. What crime or crimes, if
any, did Al Chua commit? Explain. (2005 BAR)
A: Al Chua committed perjury. His declaration under oath
for naturalization that he is of good moral character and
residing at Sampaloc, Manila is false. This information is
material to his petition for naturalization. He committed
perjury for this willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood which is contained in a verified petition made
for a legal purpose. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A, a government employee, was administratively
charged with immorality for having an affair with B, a
co-employee in the same office who believed him to be
single. To exculpate himself, A testified that he was
single and was willing to marry B, He induced C to
testify and C did testify that B was single. The truth,
however, was that A had earlier married D, now a
55
neighbor of C. Is A guilty of perjury? Are A and C guilty
of Subordination of Perjury? (1997 BAR)
A: NO. A is not guilty of perjury because the willful
falsehood asserted by him is not material to the charge of
immorality. Whether A is single or married, the charge of
immorality against him as a government employee could
proceed or prosper. In other words, A's civil status is not a
defense to the charge of immorality, hence, not a material
matter that could influence the charge.
There is no crime of subornation of perjury. The crime is
now treated as plain perjury with the one inducing
another as the principal inducement, and the latter, as
principal by direct participation. (People v. Podol, G.R. No.
45618, 18 Oct. 1938)
Since in this case, A cannot be held liable for perjury, the
matter that he testified to being immaterial, he cannot
therefore be held responsible as a principal by
inducement when he induced C to testify on his status.
Consequently, C is not liable as principal by direct
participation in perjury, having testified on matters not
material to an administrative case. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Sisenando purchased the share of the stockholders
of Estrella Corporation in two installments, making
him the majority stockholder thereof and eventually,
its president. Because the stockholders who sold their
stocks failed to comply with their warranties
attendant to the sale, Sisenando withheld payment of
the second installment due on the shares and
deposited the money in escrow instead, subject to
release once said stockholders comply with their
warranties. The stockholders concerned, in turn,
rescinded the sale in question and removed Sisenando
from the Presidency of the Estrella Corp., Sisenando
then filed a verified complaint for damages against
said stockholders in his capacity as president and
principal stockholder of Estrella Corp.
In retaliation, the stockholders concerned, after
petitioning the Securities and Exchange Commission
to declare the rescission valid, further filed a criminal
case for perjury against Sisenando, claiming that the
latter perjured himself when he stated under oath in
the verification of his complaint for damages that he is
the President of the Estrella Corporation when in fact
he had already been removed as such.
Under the facts of the case, could Sisenando be held
liable for perjury? Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: NO. Sisenando may not be held liable for perjury
because it cannot be reasonably maintained that he
wilfully and deliberately made an assertion of a falsehood
when he alleged in the complaint that he is the President
of the Corporation.
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Obviously, he made the allegation on the premise that his
removal from the presidency is not valid and that is
precisely the issue brought about by his complaint to the
SEC. It is a fact that Sisenando has been the President of
the corporation and it is from that position that the
stockholders concerned purportedly removed him,
whereupon he filed the complaint questioning his
removal. There is no willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood which is a requisite of perjury. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
E. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER
PROHIBITED DRUGS
(2022, 2019, 2018, 2016, 2015, 2009, 2007, 2006,
2005, 2004, 2003, 1998 BAR)
1. COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002
R.A No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640;
Sec. 21 of the IRR only
(2022, 2019, 2018, 2016, 2015, 2009, 2007, 2006,
2005, 2004, 2003, 1998 BAR)
Q: Distinguish fully between entrapment and
instigation in Criminal Law. Exemplify each. (2015,
2003, 1995, 1990 BAR)
A:
In entrapment –
1. The criminal design originates from and is already
in the mind of the lawbreaker even before
entrapment;
2. The law enforcers resort to ways and means for the
purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante
delicto; and
3. This circumstance is no bar to prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker.
In instigation –
1. The idea and design to bring about the commission
of the crime originated and developed in the mind
of the law enforcers;
2. The law enforcers induce, lure, or incite a person
who is not minded to commit a crime and would not
otherwise commit it, into committing the crime; and
3. This circumstance absolves the accused from
criminal liability. (People v. Dante Marcos, G.R. No.
83325, 08 May 1990)
Example of Entrapment: A, an anti-narcotic agent of the
Government acted as a poseur buyer of shabu and
negotiated with B, a suspected drug pusher who is
unaware that A is a police officer. A then issued marked
money to B who handed a sachet of shabu to B.
Thereupon, A signaled his anti-narcotic team to close-in
and arrest B. This is a case of entrapment because the
criminal mind is in B already when A transacted with him.
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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Example of Instigation: Because the members of an anti-
narcotic team are already known to drug pushers. A, the
team leader, approached and persuaded B to act as a
buyer of shabu and transact with C, the suspected drug
pusher. For the purpose, A gave B marked money to be
used in buying shabu from C. After C handed the sachet of
shabu to B and the latter handed the marked money to C,
the team closed-in and placed B and C under arrest. Under
the facts, B is not criminally liable for his participation in
the transaction because he was acting only under
instigation by the law enforcers. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Following his arrest after a valid buy-bust
operation, Tommy was convicted of violation of Sec. 5,
R.A. No. 9165. On appeal, Tommy questioned the
admissibility of the evidence because the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation failed
to observe the requisite "chain of custody" of the
evidence confiscated and/or seized from him.
(a) What is the "chain of custody" requirement in
drug offenses? What is its rationale? (2016,
2009 BAR)
A: “Chain of custody” requirement in drug offenses refers
to the duly recorded, authorized movement and custody of
seized dangerous drugs, controlled chemicals, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and laboratory equipment of
dangerous drugs from the time of confiscation/seizure
thereof from the offender, to its turn-over and receipt in
the forensic laboratory for examination, to its safekeeping
and eventual violation, and for destruction. (Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 Series of 2002)
Its rationale is to preserve the authenticity of the corpus
delicti or body of the crime by rendering it improbable
that the original item seized/ confiscated in the violation
has been exchanged or substituted with another or
tampered with or contaminated. It is a method of
authenticating the evidence as would support a finding
beyond reasonable doubt that the matter is what the
prosecution claims to be. (UPLC Suggested Answer)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: To establish the chain of
custody, the prosecution must show the movements of the
dangerous drugs from its confiscation up to its
presentation in court. The purpose of establishing the
chain of custody is to ensure the integrity of the corpus
delicti (People v. Magat, G.R. No. 179939, 29 Sept. 2008).
The following links that must be established in the chain
of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
56
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
from the forensic chemist to the court. (People v. Kamad,
G.R. No. 174198, 29 Jan. 2010)
To establish the first link in the chain of custody, and that
is the seizure of the drug from the accused, the
prosecution must comply with Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165,
which requires that the apprehending officer after the
confiscation of drug must immediately physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom such items were
confiscated, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof and within twenty-four (24) hours upon such
confiscation, the drug shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for examination. (UPLC Suggested
Answer, 2016 Bar)
(b) What is the effect of failure to observe the
requirement? (2009 BAR)
A: Failure to observe the “chain of custody” requirement
renders the evidence questionable, not trustworthy and
insufficient to prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, Tommy would be acquitted on reasonable
doubt. (UPLC Suggested Answer)
Q: After a successful entrapment operation by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Mr. D, a known
drug pusher, was arrested on 15 Jan. 2019 for having
been caught in flagrante delicto selling a pack of
shabu, a prohibited drug, to the poseur-buyer.
Consequently, Mr. D was frisked by the arresting
officer, and aluminum foils, plastic lighters, and
another plastic sachet of shabu were obtained from
him. The items were marked immediately upon
confiscation, and they were likewise inventoried and
photographed at the place of arrest. Throughout the
process, a media representative was able to witness
the conduct of the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items in the presence of Mr.
D.
Mr. D was then charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale
and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. In defense,
he lamented that the chain of custody procedure
under Sec. 21, Art. II of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, as amended, was not followed
because only a media representative was present. In
response, the prosecution maintained that the said
media representative was a very credible reporter
and as such, the presence of any other witness was
unnecessary. (2019, 2009 BAR)
57
(a) Was the chain of custody procedure validly
complied with in this case? If not, was the
deviation from such procedure justified?
Explain.
A: NO, the chain of custody was not validly complied with.
Under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No.
10640, the presence of at least two insulating witnesses is
required: (1) an elected public official, and (2) a
representative from the media, or a representative from
the National Prosecution Service. Here, only a media
representative was present to witness the conduct of
marking, inventory and photography.
Further, the credibility of the media reporter as the lone
witness in a buy-bust operation is neither a plausible
explanation nor an unacceptable justification for the
PDEA’s non-compliance with the chain of custody rule.
The Supreme Court listed the following acceptable
justifications in case of the absence of witnesses: (1) their
attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was
a remote area; (2) their safety was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused; and (3)
earnest efforts to secure the presence of the witnesses
within the period required under Art. 125 of the RPC
prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers.
(People v. Sipin, as cited in People v. Lim, G.R. 231989, 04
Sept. 2018)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO, the chain of custody was
not validly complied with because of the violation of the
three-witness rule. Under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended by R.A. No. 10640, the accused or his
representative or counsel, a barangay elected official and a
representative from the media or from the Department of
Justice (DOJ) must be present during the inventory.
The deviation from the procedure is not justified in the
absence of any justifiable reason for its non-compliance.
(Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
(b) What is the consequence of an unjustified
deviation from the chain of custody rule to the
criminal case against Mr. D? Explain.
A: The unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule
would lead to Mr. D’s acquittal. Well settled is the rule that
the procedure under Sec. 21 is a matter of substantive law
and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality. (People v. Año, G.R. No. 230070, 14 Mar. 2018)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
While the failure to observe Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended by R.A. No. 10640 will not automatically render
the evidence confiscated from the possession of the
accused inadmissible, in the absence of a justifiable reason
offered by the apprehending officers, the non-compliance
to Sec. 21 will amount to an acquittal as the integrity of the
corpus delicti was not duly preserved.
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Q: Robin and Rowell are best friends and have been
classmates since grade school. When the boys
graduated from high school, their parents gifted them
with a trip to Amsterdam, all expenses paid. At age 16,
this was their first European trip. Thrilled with a sense
of freedom, they decided to try what Amsterdam was
known for. One night, they scampered out of their
hotel room, went to the De Wallen, better known as
the Red-light District of Amsterdam. There, they went
to a "coffee shop" which sells only drinks and various
items made from opium poppy, cannabis, and
marijuana, all of which are legal in Amsterdam. They
represented themselves to be of age, and were served,
and took shots of, cannabis and marijuana products.
They indulged in these products the whole night, even
if it was their first time to try them.
Before returning to Manila, they bought a dozen
lollipops laced with cannabis, as souvenir and
"pasalubong" for their friends. They were accosted at
the Manila International Airport and were charged
with importation of dangerous drugs under the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. They
were also charged with use of dangerous drugs after
pictures of them in the "coffee shop" in Amsterdam
were posted on Facebook, showing them smoking and
taking shots of a whole menu of cannabis and
marijuana products. Their own captions on their
Facebook posts clearly admitted that they were using
the dangerous products. The pictures were posted by
them through Private Messenger (PM) only for their
close friends, but Roccino, the older brother of one of
their best friends, was able to get hold of his younger
brother's password, and without authority from his
brother, accessed his PM and shared Robin and
Rowell's Amsterdam photos on Facebook. (2018 BAR)
(a) Can Robin and Rowell be prosecuted for use of
dangerous drugs for their one-night use of
these products in Amsterdam?
A: NO. Robin and Rowell cannot be prosecuted by
Philippine courts because they did not use the dangerous
drug within Philippine territory, applying the principle of
territoriality. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
(b) Can they be prosecuted for importation of
dangerous drugs?
A: YES. They can be prosecuted for importation of
dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165, which provides:
“Sec. 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- that
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
import or bring into the Philippines any dangerous
drug, regardless of the quantity and purity involved,
including any and all species of opium poppy or any
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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
part thereof or substances derived therefrom even for
floral, decorative and culinary purposes”
(c) If found liable under either (a) or (b) above,
what is the penalty that may be imposed on
them?
A: If found guilty, they will be exempt from criminal
liability, because they are minors (16 years old), as
provided in Chapter 2, Sec. 6 of R.A. 9344 (Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006"), to wit: “A child above fifteen
(15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected
to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act”.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Maita was the object of Solito's avid sexual desires.
Solito had attempted many times to entice Maita to a
date in bed with him, but Maita had consistently
refused. Fed up with all her rejections, Solito abducted
Maita around 7 p.m. one night. With his cohorts, Solito
forced Maita into a Toyota lnnova and drove off with
her to a green-painted house situated in a desolate
part of the town. There, Solito succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of Maita against her will.
Meanwhile, the police authorities were tipped off that
at 11:30 p.m. on that same night Solito would be
selling marijuana outside the green-painted house.
Acting on the tip, the PNP station of the town formed a
buy-bust team with PO2 Masahol being designated the
poseur buyer. During the buy-bust operation, Solito
opened the trunk of the Toyota lnnova to retrieve the
bag of marijuana to be sold to PO2 Masahol. To cut the
laces that he had tied the bag with, Solito took out a
Swiss knife, but his doing so prompted PO2 Masahol to
effect his immediate arrest out of fear that he would
attack him with the knife. PO2 Masahol then
confiscated the bag of marijuana as well as the Toyota
lnnova. (2017 BAR)
(a) Two informations were filed against Solito in
the RTC – one for forcible abduction with rape,
raffled to Branch 8 of the RTC; the other for
illegal sale of drugs, assigned to Branch 29 of
the RTC. Was the charge of illegal sale of drugs
proper? (Question reframed)
A: NO. The charge of sale of dangerous drugs is improper,
since this crime is consummated only upon the delivery of
the dangerous drugs to the poseur buyer for a
consideration. Since in this case, Solito has not yet
delivered the marijuana to PO2 Masahol when the latter
apprehended the former, the crime committed is not a sale
of dangerous but attempted sale of dangerous drugs. In
People v. Figueroa (G.R. No. 186141, 11 Apr. 2012), where
the sale was aborted when the police officers immediately
placed accused under arrest, the crime committed is
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
attempted sale.
(b) While the Prosecution was presenting its
evidence in Branch 29, Branch 8 convicted
Solito. Immediately after the judgment of
conviction was promulgated, Solito filed in
both Branches a motion for the release of the
Toyota Innova. He argued and proved that he
had only borrowed the vehicle from his
brother, the registered owner. Branch 8
granted the motion but Branch 29 denied it.
Were the two courts correct in their rulings?
Explain your answer.
A: YES. The two courts were correct in their findings. The
applicable provisions of law are Art. 45 of the RPC and Sec.
20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Under Art. 45 of the RPC every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall include the forfeiture of the
instruments or tools with which the crime was committed,
unless they be the property of a third person not liable for
the offense. The Supreme Court ruled that the return of
the instrument or tools to its owner cannot be prevented
unless said owner is charged with the offense for which
said instrument or tool was used (PDEA v. Brodett, G.R. No.
196390, 28 Sept. 2011, citing People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-
28232, 06 Feb. 1971). The Supreme Court further held that
the forfeiture of said instrument or tools, if warranted,
would be part of the penalty prescribed (PDEA v. Brodett,
supra). Hence, the determination of whether it will be
forfeited could be made only when judgment is rendered.
In this case, the RTC Branch 8 already rendered a
judgment of conviction against Solito. Solito was able to
prove that the car belonged to his brother who was not
charged with forcible abduction with rape; hence, it was
correct for the RTC Branch 8 to order the release of the
Toyota Innova to his brother who is not liable for the
offense.
On the other hand, Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 9165 states in part,
“during the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial
Court, no property, or income derived from the unlawful
sale of any dangerous drug], which may be confiscated
and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred
and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall
be admitted for the release of the same.” The Supreme
Court ruled that it is premature to release the car used in
the sale of dangerous drugs while the trial is still ongoing
(PDEA v. Brodett, supra). The Supreme Court explained
that the status of the car for the duration of the trial in the
RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to
preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as
such. (PDEA v. Brodett, supra)
The RTC Branch 29, thus was correct in denying Solito’s
motion to release the Toyota Innova considering that the
trial for illegal sale of drugs is still ongoing. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
59
Q: Dimas was arrested after a valid buy-bust
operation. Macario, the policeman who acted as
poseur-buyer, inventoried and photographed ten (10)
sachets of shabu in the presence of a barangay tanod.
The inventory was signed by Macario and the tanod,
but Dimas refused to sign. As Macario was stricken
with flu the day after, he was able to surrender the
sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after four
(4) days. During pre-trial, the counsel de oficio of
Dimas stipulated that the substance contained in the
sachets examined by the forensic chemist is in fact
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Dimas
was convicted of violating Sec. 5 of RA 9165.
On appeal, Dimas questioned the admissibility of the
evidence because Macario failed to observe the
requisite "chain of custody" of the alleged "shabu"
seized from him. On behalf of the State, the Solicitor
General claimed that despite non-compliance with
some requirements, the prosecution was able to show
that the integrity of the substance was preserved.
Moreover, even with some deviations from the
requirements, the counsel of Dimas stipulated that the
substance seized from Dimas was shabu so that the
conviction should be affirmed. Rule on the contention
of the State. (2016 BAR)
A: The contention of the State is meritorious. Macario, the
policeman failed to comply with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
since the inventory and photograph of the drugs was only
made in the presence of the barangay tanod and the same
was not submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24
hours.
The rule is settled that failure to strictly comply with Sec.
21(1), Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render
an accused’s arrest illegal, or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible. The most important
factor is the preservation the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item. Moreover, the issue of
noncompliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Badilla, G.R.
No. 218578, 31 Aug. 2016) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
had intelligence reports about the drug pushing
activities of Rado, but could not arresthim for lack of
concrete evidence. SP03 Relio, a PDEA team leader,
approached Emilo and requested him to act as poseur-
buyer of shabu and transact with Rado. Emilo refused,
saying that he had completely been rehabilitated and
did not want to have anything to do with drugs
anymore. But he was prevailed upon to help when
SP03 Relio explained that only he could help capture
Rado because he used to be his customer. SP03 Relio
then gave Emilo the marked money to be used in
buying shabu from Rado. The operation proceeded.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
After Emilo handed the marked money to Rado in
exchange for the sachets of shabu weighing 50 grams,
and upon receiving the pre-arranged signal from
Ernilo, SP03 Relio and his team members barged in
and arrested Rado and Ernilo, who were both charged
with violation of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. (2015
BAR)
(a) What defense, if any, may Emilo invoke to free
himself from criminal liability? Explain.
A: Ernilo may invoke Sec. 33, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 or the
“Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002”. He may have violated
Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 9165 for possession of shabu but he is
immune from prosecution and punishment because of his
role as the poseur-buyer in the entrapment operation.
There was virtually instigation. He is exempted from
prosecution or punishment because the information
obtained from him by the PDEA agents, who had no direct
and concrete evidence of Rado’s drug-pushing activities,
led to the whereabouts, identity and arrest of Rado. So
long as the information and testimony given are pleaded
and proven, Ernilo cannot be prosecuted for violation of
R.A. No. 9165.
(b) May Rado adopt as his own Emilo's defense?
Explain.
A: NO. First, an entrapment operation is a valid means of
arresting violators of RA 9165. It is an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or
prodding him to commit the offense. Second, the immunity
does not extend to violators of Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165 or
the sale of shabu (Sec. 33, R.A. No. 9165). Lastly, he was the
offender of the crime and apparently the most guilty of the
offense. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Tiburcio asked Anastacio to join their group for a
“session”. Thinking that it was for a mahjong session,
Anastacio agreed. Upon reaching Tiburcio’s house,
Anastacio discovered that it was actually a shabu
session. At that precise time, the place was raided by
the police, and Anastacio was among those arrested.
What crime can Anastacio be charged with, if any?
Explain. (2007 BAR)
A: Anastacio may not be charged of any crime. Sec. 7 of
R.A. No. 9165 on the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of
2002 punishes employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort where dangerous drugs are used in any form.
However, to be convicted under said provision, the visitor
must be aware of the nature of the place as such and shall
knowingly visit the same. In this case, Anastacio may not
be charged because he is not aware of the nature of the
place.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
NOTE: This is an offense that is malum prohibitum. Good
faith is not a defense. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: After receiving a reliable information that Dante
Ong, a notorious drug smuggler, was arriving on PAL
Flight No. PR181, PNP Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa
formed a group of anti-drug agents. When Ong arrived
at the airport, the group arrested him and seized his
attaché case. Upon inspection the Immigration
holding area, the attaché case yielded 5 plastic bags of
heroin weighing 500 grams. Chief Inspector Gamboa
took the attaché case and boarded him in an
unmarked car driven by PO3 Pepito Lorbes.
On the way to Camp Crame and upon nearing White
Plains corner Edsa, Chief Inspector Gamboa ordered
PO3 Lorbes to stop the car. They brought out the
drugs from the case in the trunk to and got 3 plastic
sacks of heroin. They then told Ong to alight from the
car. Ong left with the 2 remaining plastic sacks of
heroin. Chief Inspector Gamboa advised him to keep
silent and go home which the latter did.
Unknown to them, an NBI team of agents had been
following them and witnessed the transaction. They
arrested Chief Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Lorbes.
Meanwhile, another NBI team followed Ong and
likewise arrested him. All of them were later charged.
What are their respective criminal liabilities? (2006
BAR)
A: Chief Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Pepito Lorbes who
conspired in taking the attache case are liable for the
following crimes defined under R.A. 9165:
a. Sec. 27 for misappropriation or failure to account for
the confiscated or seized dangerous drugs.
b. Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 3(ee) for their acts as
protector/coddler of Dante Ong who imported drugs.
In addition, by allowing Ong to escape prosecution for
illegal importation or illegal transportation of dangerous
drugs, where the penalty is life imprisonment to death,
they are also liable for qualified bribery under Art. 211-A
of the RPC.
With respect to Dante Ong, he is guilty of illegal
importation of dangerous drugs under Sec. 4, R.A. 9165, if
PR 181 is an international flight. If PR 181 is a domestic
flight, he is liable for violation of Sec. 5, RA. 9165 for illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa
and PO3 Pepito Lorbes incur criminal liability under Art.
11, Sec. 4 last par., R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. They
acted as “protector/coddler” to the unlawful bringing into
the Philippines of the dangerous drugs. A
60
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
“protector/coddler” refers to any person who uses his
power or position in, inter alia, facilitating the escape of F. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
any person whom he knows or believes, has violated the (1996, 1993 BAR)
Dangerous Drugs Law, in order to prevent the arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the violator.

GRAVE SCANDAL
The two police officers are criminally liable for violation of
(1996 BAR)
Sec. 27. R.A. No. 9165 of the same law for
misappropriation and failure to account for the
Q: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush
confiscated or seized dangerous drugs.
condominium in Makati City sunbathed naked at its
penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware
On the other hand, Dante Ong is criminally liable for the
that the business executives holding office at the
illegal importation or bringing into the Philippines of the
adjoining tall buildings reported to office every
dangerous drugs. (Art. 11, Sec. 4, R.A. No. 9165)
Sunday morning and, with the use of powerful
binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed.
Q: Obie Juan is suspected to have in his possession an
Eventually, her sunbathing became the talk of the
unspecified amount of methamphetamine
town. (1996 BAR)
hydrochloride or “shabu”. An entrapment operation
was conducted by police officers, resulting in his
(a) What crime, if any, did Pia commit? Explain.
arrest following the discovery of 100 grams of the said
dangerous drug in his possession. He was
A: Pia did not commit a crime, the felony closest to making
subsequently charged with two crimes: Violation of
Pia criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then such act is
Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 for the possession of “shabu”
not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive
and violation of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 for the use
against decency and good customs. In the first place, it was
of marijuana. (2005, 2004, 1998 BAR)
not done in a public place and within public knowledge or
view. As a matter of fact, it was discovered by the
(a) Are the charges proper? Explain.
executives accidentally and they have to use binoculars to
have public and full view of Pia sunbathing in the nude.
A: The charge of possession of shabu is proper as the mere
possession of such drug is punishable, but the charge of
(b) What crime, if any, did the business executives
use of marijuana is not proper as Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9165
commit? Explain.
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) expressly
excludes penalties for “use” of dangerous drugs when the
A: The business executives did not commit any crime.
person tested “is also found to have in possession such
Their acts could not be acts of lasciviousness (as there was
quantity of any dangerous drug” provided for in Sec. 11 of
no overt lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk of the
such Act.
town, resulting from her sunbathing, is not directly
imputed to the business executives, and besides such topic
is not intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule. (UPLC
(b) So as not to be sentenced to death, Obie Juan
Suggested Answers)
offers to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Can
he do so? Why?
IMMORAL DOCTRINES AND OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS
(1993 BAR)
A: YES. Sec. 23 of R.A. No 9165 which expressly provides
that “Any person charged under any provision of this Act
Q: Juan and Petra are officemates. Later, intimacy
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to
developed between them. One day, Juan sent to Petra
avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.” has already
a booklet contained in a pay envelope which was
been struck down by the Supreme Court as
securely sealed. The booklet is unquestionably
unconstitutional for it encroaches on the rule-making
indecent and highly offensive to morals. Juan was
power of the Supreme Court. (Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo G.R.
thereafter charged under par. 3 of Art. 201 of the RPC,
No. 226679, 15 Aug. 2017). Thus, Obie Juan can now plea to
as amended by P.D. 969, which provides that the
a lesser offense.
penalty of prision mayor or a fine from P6,000 to
P12,000, or both such imprisonment and fine shall be
imposed upon those who shall sell, give away or
exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or
literature which are offensive to morals. Is Juan guilty
of the crime charged? Reasons. (1993 BAR)

A: NO. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged because the

law (Art. 201, RPC) covers only the protection of public
moral and not only the moral of an individual. (UPLC

61 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
Suggested Answers)
1. ANTI-GAMBLING ACT
P.D. No. 1602 as amended by R.A. 9287
G. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
(2022, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2011,
2010, 2009, 2008, 2006, 2005, 2003, 2001, 2000,
1999, 1997, 1996, 1994, 1993, 1991, 1990, 1988, 1987
BAR)
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
(2016 BAR)
Q: Define malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
(2016 BAR)
A: Malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person ought
not to do at all.
Misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a
person may or might lawfully do.
Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person
ought to do. (Black’s Dictionary, 6th Edition, West
Publishing 1990) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
DIRECT BRIBERY
(2019, 2014, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2006, 2005, 2001,
1997, 1994, 1993, 1990 BAR)
Q: During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao Shih was
arrested for selling 20 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) to a poseur-buyer. Cao Shih,
through an intermediary, paid Patrick, the Evidence
Custodian of the PNP Forensic Chemistry Section, the
amount of P500,000 in consideration for the
destruction by Patrick of the drug. Patrick managed to
destroy the drug.
State with reasons whether Patrick committed the
following crimes: (2005 BAR)
(a) Direct Bribery;
A: Patrick committed the crimes of Direct Bribery and
Infidelity in the Custody of Documents. When a public
officer is called upon to perform or refrain from
performing an official act in exchange for a gift, present or
consideration given to him (Art. 210, RPC), the crime
committed is Direct Bribery. Secondly, he destroyed the
shabu which is evidence in his official custody, thus,
constituting Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under
Art. 226 of the RPC.
(b) Indirect Bribery;
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
A: Indirect bribery was not committed because he did not
receive the bribe because of his office but in consideration
of a crime in connection with his official duty.
(c) Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act);
A: Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 8019 was not committed because
there was no actual injury to the government. When there
is no specific quantified injury, violation is not committed.
(Garcia-Rueda v. Amor, et al., G.R. No. 116938, 20 Sept.
2001)
(d) Obstruction of Justice under PD 1829.
A: Patrick committed the crime of Obstruction of Justice
although the feigner penalty imposable on Direct Bribery
and Infidelity in the Custody of Documents shall be
imposed. Sec. 1 of P.D. 1829 refers merely to the
imposition of the higher penalty and does not preclude
prosecution for obstruction of justice, even if the same
does not constitute another offense.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Obstruction of Justice is not
committee in this case, because the act of destroying the
evidence in his custody is already penalized by another
law which imposes a higher penalty (Sec. 1, P.D. 1829)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Deputy Sheriff Ben Rivas received from the RTC
Clerk of Court a Writ of Execution in the case of
Ejectment filed by Mrs. Maria Estrada vs. Luis Ablan.
The judgment being in favor of Estrada, Rivas went to
her lawyer's office where he was given the necessary
amounts constituting the sheriff’s fees and expenses
for execution in the total amount of P550.00, aside
from P2,000.00 in consideration of prompt
enforcement of the writ from Estrada and her lawyer.
The writ was successfully enforced. What crime, if any,
did the sheriff commit? (2001 BAR)
A: The sheriff committed the crime of Direct Bribery
under the second paragraph of Art. 210, RPC, since the
P2,000 was received by him “in consideration” of the
prompt enforcement of the writ of execution which is an
official duty of the sheriff to do. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
INDIRECT BRIBERY
(2017, 2015, 2009, 2006, 2005, 2001, 1997, 1993,
1990 BAR)
Q: Charina, Clerk of Court of an RTC Branch, promised
the plaintiff in a case pending before the court that she
would convince the Presiding Judge to decide the case
in plaintiff’s favor. In consideration therefor, the
plaintiff gave Charina P20,000.00. Charina was
charged with violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019,
prohibiting any public officer from directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
percentage, or benefit in connection with any contract
62
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
or transaction x x x wherein the public officer, in his
official capacity, has to intervene under the law.
While the case was being tried, the Ombudsman filed
another information against Charina for Indirect
Bribery under the RPC. Charina demurred to the
second information, claiming that she can no longer
be charged under the RPC having been charged for the
same act under R.A. 3019. Is Charina correct? Explain.
(2009 BAR)
A: NO, Charina is not correct. Although the charge for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and the charge for Indirect
Bribery (Art. 211, RPC) arose from the same act, the
elements of the violation charged under R.A. No. 3019 are
not the same as the felony charged for Indirect Bribery
under the RPC. (Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. No. L-56741-42, 15
Apr. 1988)
Hence, the crimes charged are separate and distinct from
each other, with different penalties. The two charges do
not constitute a ground for a motion to dismiss or motion
to quash, as there is no jeopardy against the accused.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Commissioner Marian Torres of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) wrote solicitation letters
addressed to the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and Industry and to certain CEOs of various
multinational corporations requesting donations of
gifts for her office Christmas party. She used the
Bureau's official stationery. The response was prompt
and overwhelming so much so that Commissioner
Torres' office was overcrowded with rice cookers,
radio sets, freezers, electric stoves and toasters. Her
staff also received several envelopes containing cash
money for the employees' Christmas luncheon. Has
Commissioner Torres committed any impropriety or
irregularity? What laws or decrees did she violate?
(2006 BAR)
A: YES. Commissioner Torres violated the following:
1. Indirect Bribery (Art. 211, RPC) for receiving gifts
offered by reason of office.
2. RA 6713 or Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees when he solicited and
accept gifts. (Sec. 7(d))
3. PD 46 making it punishable for public officials and
employees to receive, and for private persons to give
gifts on any occasion, including Christmas. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: A, who is the private complainant in a murder case
pending before a Regional Trial Court judge, gave a
judge a Christmas gift, consisting of big basket of
assorted canned goods and bottles of expensive wines,
easily worth P10, 000.00. The judge accepted the gift
63
knowing it came from A. What crime or crimes, if any,
were committed? (1997, 1993 BAR)
A: The judge committed the crime of Indirect Bribery
under Art. 211 of the RPC. The gift was offered to the
judge by reason of his office. In addition, the judge will be
liable for the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the
receiving of gifts by public officials and employees on
occasions like Christmas. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
QUALIFIED BRIBERY
(2010 BAR)
Q:
(a) What is the crime of Qualified Bribery? (2010
BAR)
A: Qualified Bribery is a crime committed by a public
officer who is entrusted with law enforcement and who, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or offer, refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
and/or death. (Art. 211-A, RPC)
(b) May a judge be charged and prosecuted for
such felony? How about a public prosecutor? A
police officer? Explain. (2010 BAR)
A: NO, a judge may not be charged of this felony because
his official duty as a public officer is not law enforcement,
but the determination of cases already filed in court.
On the other hand, a public prosecutor may be prosecuted
for this crime in respect of the bribery committed, aside
from dereliction of duty committed in violation of Art. 208
of the RPC, should he refrain from prosecuting an offender
who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present.
Meanwhile, a police officer who refrains from arresting
such offender for the same consideration above stated,
may be prosecuted for this felony since he is a public
officer entrusted with law enforcement. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
(2019, 2018, 2017, 2014, 2009, 2005, 2001,
1993 BAR)
Q: One Sunday afternoon, Mr. X, President of ABC
Corp., happened to bump into the Labor Arbiter
assigned to the illegal dismissal case filed by certain
employees against his company. During their
encounter, Mr. X promised the Labor Arbiter a luxury
car in exchange for a favorable ruling. The Labor
Arbiter immediately rejected the offer and walked
away.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
What crime did Mr. X commit under the RPC, if any?
Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: Mr. X committed the crime of Attempted Corruption of
a Public Official. He offered to give the Labor Arbiter a
luxury car in exchange for a favorable ruling on a pending
illegal dismissal case. By making such offer, Mr. X already
commenced the performance of material acts of execution
in corrupting the Labor Arbiter. He was not able to
perform all the material acts of execution only because the
Labor Arbiter refused to accept the offer. (Pozar v. CA, G.R.
No. L-62439, 23 Oct. 1990)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Mr. X committed no crime.
Because there was no acceptance, there is no crime, and
therefore, no penalty should be imposed. Nullum crimen
nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is no
law punishing it. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Ricky was driving his car when he was flagged
down by a traffic enforcer for over speeding. Realizing
his undoing, but in a hurry for a meeting, Ricky shoved
a PhP500 bill in the traffic enforcer’s pocket and
whispered to the latter to refrain from issuing him a
traffic violation receipt. The traffic enforcer still
issued him a ticket, and returned his money. What
crime, if any, was committed by Ricky? (2018 BAR)
A: Ricky in showing a P500 bill in the traffic enforcer’s
pocket, clearly committed the crime of Corruption of
Public Officials under Art. 212 of the RPC, which states
that any person who shall have made the offers or
promises or given the gifts or present to a public officer is
guilty of corruption of public officer. Even if the P500 bill
was returned it cannot erase the fact that gifts or presents
was given to the traffic enforcer. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
(2016, 2008, 2006, 2005, 2001, 1999, 1996, 1994,
1990, 1988, 1987 BAR)
Q: How is malversation distinguished from estafa?
(1999 BAR)
A: Malversation differs from estafa in that malversation is
committed by an accountable public officer involving
public funds or property under his custody and
accountability; while estafa is committed by non-
accountable public officer or private individual involving
funds or property for which he is not accountable to the
government. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Allan, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality
of Gerona, was in a hurry to return to his office after a
day-long official conference. He alighted from the
government car which was officially assigned to him,
leaving the ignition key and the car unlocked, and
rushed to his office. Jules, a bystander, drove off with
the car and later sold the same to his brother, Danny
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
for P20,000.00, although the car was worth
P800,000.00.
What are the respective crimes, if any, committed by
Allan, Danny and Jules? Explain. (2005 BAR)
A: Allan, the municipal treasurer is liable for malversation
committed through negligence or culpa. The government
car which was assigned to him is public property under
his accountability by reason of his duties. By his act of
negligence, he permitted the taking of the car by another
person, resulting in malversation, consistent with the
language of Art. 217 of RPC.
Danny committed the crime of fencing for having bought
the car, which was the proceeds of carnapping, a crime in
the nature of theft or robbery of motor vehicle. The
presumption of fencing applies to him for he paid a price
so inadequate for the value of the car.
Jules committed the crime of carnapping for the unlawful
taking, with intent to gain, of the government’s motor
vehicle.
NOTE: Unlawful taking of a motor vehicle is now governed
by the New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016 (R.A. 10883), not
by the provisions of the RPC on theft or robbery.
Q: Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos, were former
warehousemen of the Rustan Department Store. In
1986, the PCGG sequestered the assets, fund and
properties of the owners-incorporators of the store,
alleging that they constitute "Ill-gotten wealth" of the
Marcos family. Upon their application, Reyes and
Santos were appointed as fiscal agents of the
sequestered firm and they were given custody and
possession of the sequestered building and its
contents, including various vehicles used in the firm's
operations.
After a few months, an inventory was conducted and it
was discovered that two (2) delivery vans were
missing. After demand was made upon them, Reyes
and Santos failed to give any satisfactory explanation
why the vans were missing or to turn them over to the
PCGG; hence, they were charged with Malversation of
Public Property. During the trial, the two accused
claimed that they are not public accountable officers
and, if any crime was committed, it should only be
Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC.
What is the proper offense committed? State the
reason(s) for your answer. (2001 BAR)
A: The proper offense committed was Malversation of
Public Property, not estafa, considering that Reyes and
Santos, upon their application, were constituted as "fiscal
agents" of the sequestered firm and were "given custody
and possession" of the sequestered properties, including
the delivery vans which later they could not account for.
64
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
They were thus made the depositary and administrator of
properties deposited by public authority and hence, by the
duties of their office/position, they are accountable for
such properties. Such properties, having been sequestered
by the Government through the PCGG, are in custodia legis
and therefore impressed with the character of public
property, even though the properties belong to a private
individual. (Art. 222, RPC)
The failure of Reyes and Santos to give any satisfactory
explanation why the vans were missing, is prima facie
evidence that they had put the same to their personal use.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the NBI an
armalite rifle (M16) and a Smith and Wesson Revolver
Cal. 38. After a year, the NBI Director made an
inspection of all the firearms issued. Randy, who
reported for work that morning, did not show up
during the inspection. He went on absence without
leave (AWOL). After two years, he surrendered to the
NBI the two firearms issued to him. He was charged
with malversation of government property before the
Sandiganbayan.
Randy put up the defense that he did not appropriate
the armalite rifle and the revolver for his own use,
that the delay in accounting for them does not
constitute conversion and that actually the firearms
were stolen by his friend, Chiting. Decide the case.
(1994 BAR)
A: Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217, RPC. He is
accountable for the firearms they issued to him in his
official capacity. The failure of Randy to submit the
firearms upon demand created the presumption that he
converted them for his own use. Even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation, his failure to account for
the government property is enough factual basis for a
finding of malversation.
Indeed, even his explanation that the guns were stolen is
incredible for if the firearms were actually stolen, he
should have reported the matter immediately to the
authorities. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer of the town,
was also the treasurer of a charity ball of the church.
Because he was short of payroll funds for the
municipal employees, he used part of the church funds
to replenish the payroll funds with the intention of
returning the same when the public funds came.
(1990 BAR)
(a) Is Dencio guilty of malversation under the
RPC? State your reasons.
A: NO. The church funds used by Dencio do not constitute
public funds which are the proper subject of malversation.
Neither does said funds constitute the so-called private
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funds which could be the proper subject of malversation
under Art. 222, RPC, which pertain to private property
placed in the custody of public officers by reason of their
office.
(b) Assuming that he failed to replenish the
church funds, may he be held criminally liable
thereby?
A: YES. Momentary use of funds, since there is
defraudation, is tantamount to estafa under Art. 215 of the
RPC. This is because he received the funds in his capacity
as treasurer and there was temporary damage caused.
Personal benefit is not an element of the crime of estafa.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
TECHNICAL MALVERSATION
(2019, 2016, 2015, 2012, 1996 BAR)
Q: Governor A was given the amount of P10 million by
the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of
buying seedlings to be distributed to the farmers.
Supposedly intending to modernize the farming
industry in his province, Governor A bought farm
equipment through direct purchase from XY
Enterprise, owned by his kumpare B, the alleged
exclusive distributor of the said equipment. Upon
inquiry, the Ombudsman discovered that B has a
pending patent application for the said farm
equipment. Moreover, the equipment purchased
turned out to be overpriced. What crime or crimes, if
any, were committed by Governor A? Explain. (2016
BAR)
A: Governor A committed the crimes of (1) Technical
Malversation; and (2) Violation of Secs. 3(e) and (g) of R.A.
No. 3019.
Governor A committed the crime of Illegal Use of Public
Funds or Property punishable under Art. 220 of the RPC,
also known as Technical Malversation. The crime has
three elements: (a) that the offender is an accountable
public officer; (b) that he applies public funds or property
under his administration to some public use; and (c) that
the public use for which such funds or property has been
applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance. (Ysidro v
People, G.R. No. 192330, 14 Nov. 2012)
The amount of P10M granted by the Department of
Agriculture to Governor A, an accountable public officer, is
specifically appropriated for the purpose of buying
seedlings to be distributed to the farmers. Instead,
Governor A applied the amount to acquire modern farm
equipment through direct purchase from XY Enterprise
owned by his kumpare. The law punishes the act of
diverting public funds earmarked by law or ordinance for
a specific public purpose to another public purpose, hence,
the liability for technical malversation.
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Governor A can also be held liable for violation of Sec. 3(e)
of RA 3019, which has the following elements: (1) the
accused is a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial, or official functions; (2) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross excusable
negligence; and (3) his action caused undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
The facts show that the first element is present. The
second element is likewise present because “through
manifest partiality” in favoring his kumpare, Governor A
did not hold public bidding and directly purchased the
farm equipment from the latter. With respect to the third
element, Governor A’s actions caused undue injury to the
government as well as the farmers deprived of the
seedlings. His acts likewise gave his kumpare, a private
party, the unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference,
to the exclusion of other interested suppliers.
The act committed by the Governor is also in violation of
Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for entering a contract on behalf
of the government which is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A typhoon destroyed the houses of many of the
inhabitants of X Municipality. Thereafter, X
Municipality operated a shelter assistance program
whereby construction materials were provided to the
calamity victims, and the beneficiaries provided the
labor. The construction was partially done when the
beneficiaries stopped helping with the construction
for the reason that they needed to earn income to
provide food for their families.
When informed of the situation, Mayor Maawain
approved the withdrawal of ten boxes of food from X
Municipality's feeding program, which were given to
the families of the beneficiaries of the shelter
assistance program. The appropriations for the funds
pertaining to the shelter assistance program and
those for the feeding program were separate items on
X Municipality's annual budget. (2015 BAR)
(a) What crime did Mayor Maawain commit?
Explain.
A: Mayor Maawain committed the crime of Illegal Use of
Public Funds or Property punishable under Art. 220 of the
RPC. This offense is also known as Technical Malversation.
The crime has three (3) elements: (a) that the offender is
an accountable public officer; (b) that he applies public
funds or property under his administration to some public
use; and (c) that the public use for which such funds or
property were applied is different from the purpose for
which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance.
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The funds for the feeding program are not specifically
appropriated for the beneficiaries of the shelter assistance
program in X Municipality’s annual budget. Mayor
Maawain ought to use the boxes of food earmarked
particularly for the feeding program, which would cater
only to the malnourished among his constituents who
needed the resources for proper nourishment.
(b) May Mayor Maawain invoke the defense of
good faith and that he had no evil intent when
he approved the transfer of the boxes of food
from the feeding program to the shelter
assistance program? Explain.
A: NO. Mayor Maawain cannot invoke good faith when he
approved the transfer of the boxes of food from the
feeding program to the Shelter Assistance program.
“Criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense
because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order and convenience. It
is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not
the character or effect thereof that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or
criminal intent is completely irrelevant”. (Ysidoro v.
People, G.R. No. 192330, 14 Nov. 2012) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of Masinloc,
Zambales. On Jan. 10, 1994, she received, as municipal
treasurer, from the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the amount of P100,000.00 known as the
fund for construction, rehabilitation, betterment, and
Improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay
Phanix Road located in Masinloc, Zambales, a project
undertaken on proposal of the Barangay Captain.
Informed that the fund was already exhausted while
the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road remained
unfinished, a representative of the Commission on
Audit conducted a spot audit of Elizabeth who failed to
account for the P100,000 CRBI fund.
Elizabeth, who was charged with malversation of
public funds, was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of
that charge but was nevertheless convicted, in the
same criminal case, for illegal use of public funds. On
appeal, Elizabeth argued that her conviction was
erroneous as she applied the amount of P50,000.00
for a public purpose without violating any law or
ordinance appropriating the said amount for any
specific purpose. The absence of such law or
ordinance was, in fact, established.
Is the contention of Elizabeth legally tenable? Explain.
(1996 BAR)
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
A: NO. Elizabeth's contention that her conviction for
Illegal Use of Public Funds (Technical Malversation) was
erroneous is legally tenable because she was charged for
malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the RPC but
was convicted for Illegal Use of Public Funds which is
defined and punished under Art. 220.
A public officer charged with malversation may not be
validly convicted of Illegal Use of Public Funds (Technical
Malversation) because the latter crime is not necessarily
included nor does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation.
The Sandiganbayan should have followed the procedure
provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and
order the filing of the proper Information. (Parungao v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, 15 May 1991) From the
facts, there is no showing that there is a law or ordinance
appropriating the amount to a specific public purpose. As
a matter of fact, the problem categorically states that the
absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact, established.
So, procedurally and substantially, the Sandiganbayan's
decision suffers from serious infirmity. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS
(2015, 2014, 2009, 2002, 1997, 1996, 1990, 1989
BAR)
Q: During a town fiesta, A, the chief of police,
permitted B, a detention prisoner and his compadre,
to leave the municipal jail and entertain visitors in his
house from 10:00 AM to 8:00 PM. B returned to the
municipal jail at 8:30 PM. Was there any crime
committed by A? (1997 BAR)
A: YES. A committed the crime of Infidelity in the Custody
of a Prisoner. Since B is a detention prisoner, as Chief of
Police, A has custody over B. Even if B returned to the
municipal jail at 8:30 PM. A, as custodian of the prisoner,
has maliciously failed to perform the duties of his office,
and when he permits said prisoner to obtain a relaxation
of his imprisonment, he consents to the prisoner escaping
the punishment of being deprived of his liberty which can
be considered real and actual evasion of service under Art.
223 of the RPC. (U.S. v. Leon Bandino, G.R. No. 9964, 11 Feb.
1915) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to post a bail
bond for his provisional liberty pending trial of his
case, he was detained in the city jail. On the date of the
hearing of the estafa case, Daniel, a policeman
detailed in the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city hall
for the trial. Daniel removed the handcuffs of Ernani
and allowed him to sit on one of the chairs inside the
courtroom.
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As Daniel was talking to a lawyer inside the
courtroom, Ernani, with the help of a cigarette vendor,
Meynardo, who used his cigarette container as cover,
surreptitiously moved out of the room and escaped.
Ernani and Meynardo went to the comfort room for a
while, then went down the stairs and lost themselves
in the crowd. What crime/s were committed by
Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your reasons.
(1989 BAR)
A:
1. Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not criminally
liable for any offense. The detention prisoner who
escapes from detention does not commit any crime. If
he were a convict by final judgment who is serving a
sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty and
he escapes during term of his sentence, he would be
liable for Evasion of Service Sentence. (Art. 157, RPC)
2. Daniel, the policeman, committed the crime of Evasion
thru Negligence, one of the forms of Infidelity in the
Custody of Prisoner (Art. 224, RPC), the essential
elements of which offense are:
a. That the offender is a public officer;
b. That he has in his custody or charge a prisoner,
either detention prisoner or prisoners by final
judgment;
c. That such prisoner escaped from his custody thru
his negligence.
All of these elements are present, Daniel, a policeman
detailed in the city jail, is a public officer. As the escort
for Ernani in the latter’s trial, he had custody of charge
of a detention prisoner. Ernani escape was thru his
negligence because after removing Ernani’s handcuffs
and allowing him to sit in one of the chairs inside the
courtroom, he should have taken the necessary
precautions to prevent Ernani’s escape by keeping an
eye on him. Instead, he provided the opportunity for
the escape by talking with a lawyer and not keeping
watch over his prisoner.
3. Meynardo, not being a public officer, is guilty of the
crime of Delivering Prisoners from Jails (Art. 156,
RPC), which is committed by any person who either
removes from any jail or penal establishment any
person confined therein, or who helps the escape of
such person by means of violence, intimidation,
bribery of other means. The act of Meynardo in giving
to Ernani his cigarette container is helping in the
latter’s escape by other means. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: To secure the release of his brother Willy, a
detention prisoner, and his cousin Vincent, who is
serving sentence for homicide, Chito asked the RTC
Branch Clerk of Court to issue an Order which would
allow the two prisoners to be brought out of jail. At
first, the Clerk refused, but when Chito gave her
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 CRIMINAL LAW
P50,000.00, she consented.
She then prepared an Order requiring the appearance
in court of Willy and Vincent, ostensibly as witnesses
in a pending case. She forged the judge’s signature,
and delivered the Order to the jail warden who, in
turn, allowed Willy and Vincent to go out of jail in the
company of an armed escort, Edwin. Chito also gave
Edwin P50,000.00 to leave the two inmates unguarded
for three minutes and provide them with an
opportunity to escape. Thus, Willy and Vincent were
able to escape.
What crime or crimes, if any, had been committed by
Edwin, and the jail warden? Explain your answer.
(Question reframed) (2009 BAR)
A: Edwin, the jail guard who escorted the prisoner in
getting out of jail, committed the crimes of –
1. Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners, specifically
conniving with or consenting to Evasion for leaving
unguarded the prisoners escorted by him and provide
them an opportunity to escape (Art. 223, RPC); and
2. Direct Bribery for receiving the P50,000.00 as
consideration for leaving the prisoners unguarded
and allowing them the opportunity to escape. (Art.
210, RPC)
The jail warden did not commit nor incur a crime there
being no showing that he was aware of what his
subordinates had done nor of any negligence on his part
that would amount to infidelity in the custody of
prisoners. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Dancio, a member of a drug syndicate, was a
detention prisoner in the provincial jail of X Province.
Brusco, another member of the syndicate, regularly
visited Dancio. Edri, the guard in charge who had been
receiving gifts from Brusco everytime he visited
Dancio, became friendly with him and became relaxed
in the inspection of his belongings during his jail
visits. In one of Brusco's visits, he was able to smuggle
in a pistol which Dancio used to disarm the guards and
destroy the padlock of the main gate of the jail,
enabling Dancio to escape. What crime(s) did Dancio,
Brusco and Edri commit? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: Dancio committed the crime of direct assault under Art.
148 of the RPC for disarming the guards with the use of
pistol while they are engaged in the performance of their
duties.
Edri committed infidelity in the custody of prisoner or
evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the RPC.
As the guard in charge, Edri was negligent in relaxing the
inspection of the Brusco’s belongings during jail visits
allowing him to smuggle a pistol to Dencio, which he
subsequently used to escape. Edri also committed indirect
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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
bribery under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code by
accepting gifts from Brusco, who was part of the syndicate
to which Dancio belonged.
Brusco committed delivery of prisoner from jail under
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as bribery
under Article 210 of the same Code. Helping a person
confined in jail to escape constitutes this crime, and by
providing Dencio with a pistol, he helped him escape.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
OTHER OFFENSES OR IRREGULARITIES
BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
(2018 BAR)
Q: During the presentation of the prosecution’s
evidence, Reichter was called to the witness stand
with the stated purpose that he would testify that his
wife Rima had shot him in the stomach with a .38
caliber pistol, resulting in near fatal injuries. Upon
objection of the defense on the ground of the marital
disqualification rule, the presiding judge (Judge
Rossano) disallowed Reichter from testifying in the
case. Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the People of the Philippines went up on
certiorari to the CA questioning Judge Rossano’s
ruling.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment
declaring Judge Rossano’s ruling void ab initio for
having been made with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
directing Judge Rossano to allow Reichter to testify in
the criminal case for the stated purpose. This is based
on the fact that the marital privilege rule does not
apply where a spouse committed the crime against the
other.
As the CA decision became final and executory, the
criminal case before the RTC was calendared for trial.
At the scheduled trial, the prosecution called Reichter
to the witness stand in order to testify on the same
matter it earlier announced. The defense objected on
the ground that the CA erred in its disposition of the
certiorari case. Judge Rossano sustained the objection
and again disallowed Reichter from testifying in the
criminal case. Repeated pleas from the prosecution
for Judge Rossano to reconsider his ruling and to
allow Reichter to testify fell on deaf ears.
May Judge Rossano be convicted of a crime? If yes,
what crime did he commit? (2018 BAR)
A: YES. Judge Rossano may be convicted of the crime of
Open Disobedience (Art. 231, RPC) which provides that
any judicial or executive officer who shall openly refuse to
execute the judgment, decision or order of any suspension
authority made within the scope of the jurisdiction of the
latter and issued with all the legal formalities shall suffer
the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
prision correctional, special disqualification and fine.
The ruling was issued by the Court of Appeals, it was
already final and executory; the act of Judge disallowing
Reichter from testifying is open disobedience under the
law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Judge Rossano may be charged
and convicted of the crime of Dereliction of Duty under
Art. 206 of the RPC, which provides: Art. 206. Unjust
interlocutory order. – Any judge who shall knowingly
render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and
suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory
order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be
suspension.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Judge Rosario can
be held liable for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019 for
giving unwarranted preference, advantage or benefits to
private party through manifest partiality and evident bad
faith. In People v. Reyes (G.R. No. 177105-06, 12 Aug. 2010),
arrogant refusal to recognize and obey the CA decision
causing undue injury to the complainant and giving
unwarranted benefits ¢o private individuals constitutes
evident bad faith and manifest partiality contemplated in
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
1. ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRATICES ACT
R.A. No. 3019, as amended
(2022, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2014, 2011, 2010,
2009, 2008, 2005, 2003, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1997,
1991, 1990 BAR)
Q: May a public officer charged under Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law'' also be simultaneously or
successively charged with direct bribery under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain. (2019, 2010,
2009 BAR)
A: Yes, a public officer charges under Sec. 3 (b) of R.A No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) may also be
charged simultaneously or successively for the crime of
direct bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code,
because two crimes are essentially different and are
penalized under distinct legal philosophies. Whereas
violation of Sec. (b) of R.A. No. 3019 is a malum
prohibitum, the crime under Art. 210 of the Code is a mala
in se. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
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NOTE: Although the charge for violation of R.A. No. 3019
and the charge for Indirect Bribery arose from the same
act, the elements of the violation charged under R.A. No.
3019 are not the same as the felony charged for Indirect
Bribery under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if the
two cases shall be filed against the accused even if they
arose from the same incident.
Q: In 2003, the Province of Davao del Sur purchased
two vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice
Governor, respectively. The purchase requests, which
were all signed by Luis as then Governor of the
province, requested for the acquisition of one unit of
Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 and one unit of Toyota Hilux
4x4. The procurement of the sublect vehicles did not
undergo competitive public bidding as it was effected
through direct purchase. The mode of procurement
was approved by the members of the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) of the province. The two vehicles
were delivered to the provincial government, and
after inspection and acceptance by the concerned
officials, payments were issued to the suppliers.
Subsequently, a complaint was filed by a concerned
citizen before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
(OMB) claiming that the purchase of the provincial
government violated the procurement law. The OMB,
after due investigation, verfied that the provincial
govemment did not comply with the required
procedure of the procurement law. Based on this
finding, the OMB filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Information against Luls and the members of the BAC
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan found Luis and the members of
the BAC gully on the sole reason that violation of the
procurement law constitutes evident bad faith and
manifest partiality on the part of the accused.
Is the Sandiganbayan correct? Explain briefly. (2022
BAR)
A: The Sandiganbayan is not correct in convicting Luis and
the members of the BAC.
Criminal liability does not depend solely upon the
allegedly scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure.
For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the bidding had been rigged, this
pronouncement alone does not automatically result in
finding the act of petitioner similarly culpable. It is
presumed that he acted in good faith in relying upon the
documents he signed and thereafter endorsed. The
prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding
procedure, a circumstance which we need not presently
determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross
inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality on the
purchase order and despite knowledge that the winning
bidder did not offer the lowest price.
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In the instant case, Luis and the members of the BAC act of
pursuing the subject procurements was motivated not by
any corrupt intent to favor one car dealer over another or
to unduly receive any pecuniary benefit. Such actuations
were simply based on their honest belief that direct
procurement was legally permissible. (Martel vs. People,
G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, 2 Feb. 2021)
Q: One Sunday afternoon, Mr. X, President of ABC
Corp., happened to bump into the Labor Arbiter
assigned to the illegal dismissal case filed by certain
employees against his company. During their
encounter, Mr. X promised the Labor Arbiter a luxury
car in exchange for a favorable ruling. The Labor
Arbiter immediately rejected the offer and walked
away.
Assuming that Mr. X's offer was instead accepted,
should the Labor Arbiter be held liable for any crime
under the RPC? If so, for what crime? May the Labor
Arbiter also be held liable for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: The Labor Arbiter should be held liable for Direct
Bribery. Under Art. 210 of the RPC, public officer commits
direct bribery by accepting a gift in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties. By
accepting Mr. X’s offer of a luxury car, the Labor Arbiter
agreed to render a ruling in Mr. X’s favor.
The Labor Arbiter may also be held liable for violation of
RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Under Sec. 3(e), it is considered a corrupt practice of any
public officer to cause any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or give any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality when evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest
partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another (Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 186421, 17
Apr. 2017). Here, the Labor Arbiter committed manifest
partiality in favor of Mr. X. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Overjoyed by the award to his firm of a multi-billion
government contract for the development of an
economic and tourism hub in the Province of Blank,
Mr. Gangnam allotted the amount of P100 Million to
serve as gifts for certain persons instrumental in his
firm's winning the award.
He gave 50% of that amount to Governor Datu, the
official who had signed the contract with the proper
authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
25% to Bokal Diva, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
member who had lobbied for the award of the project
in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and 25% to Mayor
Dolor of the Municipality where the project would be
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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
implemented. Governor Datu received his share
through his wife, Provincial First Lady Dee, who then
deposited the amount in her personal bank account.
Previously, upon facilitation by Bokal Diva, Mr.
Gangnam concluded an agreement with Mayor Dolor
for the construction of the Blank Sports Arena worth
P800 Million. The project was highly overpriced
because it could be undertaken and completed for not
more than P400 Million. For this project, Mayor Dolor
received from Mr. Gangnam a gift of P10 Million, while
Bokal Diva got P25 Million. In both instances, Bokal
Diva had her monetary gifts deposited in the name of
her secretary, Terry, who personally maintained a
bank account for Bokal Diva's share in government
projects.
What provisions of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act), if any, were violated by any of the
above-named individuals, specifying the persons
liable therefor? Explain your answer. (2017 BAR)
A: Governor Datu, Mayor Dolor and Bokal Diva are liable
for violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019 for receiving
money in connection with government contract or
transaction for the development of an economic and
tourism hub where they have the right to intervene under
the law. Likewise, Mr. Gangnam, is also liable for violation
of Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019 on the basis of conspiracy. (Go
v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, 13
Apr. 2007)
Mayor Dolor and Bokal Diva are liable for violation of Sec.
3(b) of RA No. 3019 for receiving money in connection
with government contract or transaction for the
construction of the Blank Sports Arena or violation of Sec.
3(e) for giving Mr. Gangnam, a private party, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith by entering an agreement
for such construction, which is highly overpriced, or
violation of Sec. 3(g) for entering, on behalf of the
Government, into any contract or transaction for such
construction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same. Mr. Gangnam, for giving money to the said
public officers or for entering such contract, is also liable
for violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019 on the basis of
conspiracy. (Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: To aid in the rebuilding and revival of Tacloban City
and the surrounding areas that had been devastated
by the strongest typhoon. to hit the country in decades,
the Government and other sectors, including NGOs,
banded together in the effort. Among the NGOs was
Bangon Waray, Inc. (BaWI), headed by Mr. Jose Ma.
Gulang, its President and CEO. BaWI operated mainly
as a social amelioration and charitable institution. For
its activities in the typhoon-stricken parts of Leyte
Province, BaWI received funds from all sources, local
and foreign, including substantial amounts from
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
legislators, local government officials and the EU. After
several months, complaints were heard about the very
slow distribution of relief goods and needed social
services by BaWI.
The COA reported the results of its audit to the effect
that at least P10 Million worth of funds coming from
public sources channeled to BaWI were not yet
properly accounted for. The COA demanded
reimbursement but BaWI did not respond.
Hence, Mr. Gulang was criminally charged in the Office
of the Ombudsman with malversation of public funds
and failure of accountable officer to render accounts as
respectively defined and punished by Art. 217 and Art.
218 of the RPC. He was also charged with violation of
Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for causing undue injury to
the Government. In his defense, Mr. Gulang mainly
contended that he could not be held liable under the
various charges because he was not a public officer.
Discuss whether the charge of violation of R.A. 3019
against Mr. Gulang is proper. Explain your answer.
(Question reframed) (2017 BAR)
A: NO. As a general rule, a private individual can be held
liable for violation of R.A. No. 3019 if he conspired with a
public officer in committing this crime (Go v. The Fifth
Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, 13 Apr. 2007).
However, there is no showing in this case that a public
officer violated R.A. No. 3019 and Mr. Gulang conspired
with that public officer in committing this crime. Hence,
the charge against Mr. Gulang as a private individual
without a co-accused, who is a public officer, is improper.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court, promised the
accused in a drug case pending before the court, that
he would convince the judge to acquit him for a
consideration of P5 million. The accused agreed and
delivered the money through his lawyer to the clerk of
court. The judge, not knowing of the deal, proceeded
to rule on the evidence and convicted the accused.
Malo was charged with violation of Sec. 3 (b), RA 3019
which prohibits a public officer from directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share percentage or benefit wherein the public officer,
in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law.
He was later charged also with indirect bribery under
the RPC. Malo claims he can no longer be charged
under the RPC for the same act under RA 3019. Is he
correct? (2014, 2010, 2009 BAR)
A: NO. One may be charged with violation of R.A. 3019 in
addition to a felony under the RPC for the same delictual
act, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged
with a felony under the RPC. This is very clear from Sec. 3
of R.A. 3019. Also, R.A. 3019 is a special law, the elements
of the crime is not the same as those punished under the
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RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q:
(a) Melda who is the private secretary of Judge
Tolits Naya, was persuaded by a litigant,
Jumbo, to have his case calendared as early as
possible for a consideration of P500.00. May
she be held criminally liable for this
accommodation? Explain your answer. (1990
BAR)
A: The answer would depend or be qualified by the
implication of the phrase “to have his case calendared as
early as possible.”
If the phrase is interpreted as an unjust act and in
violation of the rule to give priority to the older cases, then
she would be liable under direct bribery for an act which
does not constitute a crime but is unjust. He may also be
held liable under Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 for “giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits.”
If the phrase is interpreted as a non-violation of the rules
and regulations, then she can only be held liable for direct
bribery.
(b) What will be the criminal liability of Melda if
she volunteered to persuade Judge Tolits Naya
to rule in Jumbo’s favor without asking any
consideration? Explain your answer. (1990
BAR)
A: Melda is not criminally liable because the act of
volunteering to persuade is not a criminal act. It is the act
of persuading that is considered a criminal act. The act
does not fall under Art. 210 of the RPC on Direct Bribery
nor does it fall under Art. 211 of the RPC on Indirect
Bribery. Neither does it fall under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 refers to
acts of persuading another public official to violate rules
and regulations. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
2. ANTI-PLUNDER ACT
R.A. No. 7080 as amended by R.A. No. 7659
(2017, 2016, 2014, 1993 BAR)
Q: City Engr. A, is the city engineer and the Chairman of
the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the City of
Kawawa. In 2009, the City of Kawawa, through an
ordinance, allotted the amount of P100 million for the
construction of a road leading to the poblacion. City
Engr. A instead, diverted the construction of the road
leading to his farm. Investigation further showed that
he accepted money in the amount of P10 million each
from three (3) contending bidders, who eventually lost
in the bidding.
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Audit report likewise showed that service vehicles
valued at P2 million could not be accounted for
although reports showed that these were lent to City
Engr. A’s authorized drivers but the same were never
returned. Further, there were funds under City Engr.
A’s custody amounting to P10 million which were
found to be missing and could not be accounted for. In
another project, he was instrumental in awarding a
contract for the construction of a city school building
costing P10 million to a close relative, although the
lowest bid was P8 million. Investigation also revealed
that City Engr. A has a net worth of more than P50
million, which was way beyond his legitimate income.
(2014 BAR)
(a) If you are the Ombudsman, what charge or
charges will you file against City Engr. A?
A: If I am the Ombudsman, I would file a case of Plunder
under R.A. No. 7080 against City Engineer A. It is very clear
from the facts given that all the elements of plunder are
present, namely:
1. The offender is a public officer holding a public office
in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
2. The offender amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through a combination of overt or
criminal acts of misuse, misappropriation, conversion
or malversation of public funds, receiving kickbacks
from persons in connection with a government
contract or project by reason of his office or position
and illegally or fraudulently conveying or disposing of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions; and
3. The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50 million.
(b) Suppose the discovered net worth of City Engr.
A is less than P50 million, will your answer
still be the same?
A: YES, the answer will still be the same since in plunder
the basis the combination of criminal acts or series of acts,
which constitutes the accumulation of more than P50
million. The predicate crimes are already absorbed in the
crime of plunder. City Engineer A’s net worth being less
than P50 million is not determinative of his liability, as
long as the wealth amassed/accumulated is more than
P50 million. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Overjoyed by the award to his firm of a multi-billion
government contract for the development of an
economic and tourism hub in the Province of Blank,
Mr. Gangnam allotted the amount of P100 Million to
serve as gifts for certain persons instrumental in his
firm's winning the award. He gave 50% of that amount
to Governor Datu, the official who had signed the
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
contract with the proper authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; 25% to Bokal Diva, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member who had lobbied
for the award of the project in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; and 25% to Mayor Dolor of the
Municipality where the project would be
implemented. Governor Datu received his share
through his wife, Provincial First Lady Dee, who then
deposited the amount in her personal bank account.
Previously, upon facilitation by Bokal Diva, Mr.
Gangnam concluded an agreement with Mayor Dolor
for the construction of the Blank Sports Arena worth
₱800 Million. The project was highly overpriced
because it could be undertaken and completed for not
more than ₱400 Million. For this project, Mayor Dolor
received from Mr. Gangnam a gift of ₱10 Million, while
Bokal Diva got ₱25 Million.
In both instances, Bokal Diva had her monetary gifts
deposited in the name of her secretary, Terry, who
personally maintained a bank account for Bokal Diva's
share in government projects.
(a) May each of the above-named individuals be
held liable for plunder? Explain your answer.
(2017 BAR)
A: NO. Governor Datu is not liable for plunder. To be held
liable for plunder, the pubic officer must amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. The word
“combination” means at least two different predicate
crimes; while the term “series” means at least two
predicate crimes of the same kind. A single predicate
crime amounting to 50 million pesos is not plunder. The
act of receiving P50 Million by Governor Datu in
connection with any government contract or project for
the development of an economic and tourism hub is a
predicate crime of plunder.
As regards, Mayor Dolor Kickback, the series acts of
receiving by or gift in the amount of P25 million and P10
million in connection with any government contract or
project for the development of an economic and tourism
hub and for the construction of the Blank Sports Arena,
respectively, are predicate crimes of plunder. However,
the aggregate amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired is less
than P50 million. Hence, plunder is not committed since
element that the aggregate amount of ill-gotten wealth is
at least P50 million is not present.
Bokal Diva is liable for plunder because he acquired ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P50 million
through a series of predicates crimes consisting of receipts
of kickback or gift in the amount of P25 million and P25
million in connection with any government contract or
project for the development of an economic and tourism
hub and for the construction of the Blank Sports Arena,
respectively.
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Mr. Gangnam, is liable for plunder for giving kickbacks to
Bokal Diva, and Terry for depositing the money in his
account for Bokal Diva are also liable for plunder. Under
RA No. 7080, any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
(b) Define wheel conspiracy and chain conspiracy.
Is either or both kinds existent herein? (2017,
2016 BAR)
A: In the case at bar, both types of conspiracy exists. The
distribution of commissions or gifts by Mr. Gangnam and
the acceptance of Governor Datu, Bokal Diva, Mayor Dolor
is a type of wheel conspiracy where a single person, Mr.
Gangnam, dealt individually with the public officials to
commit overt acts. The chain conspiracy, on the other
hand, is evident in the overpricing of the sports complex
through the facilitation of Bokal Diva, the conclusion of the
agreements by Mayor Dolor, and the distribution of the
gifts by Mr. Gangnam. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A “wheel conspiracy” occurs
when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups
(the spokes), typically interacting with the hub rather than
with another spoke; while a “chain conspiracy”, exists
when there is successive communication and cooperation
in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, 26 Feb. 2002)
Q: Through kickbacks, percentages or commissions
and other fraudulent schemes/conveyances and
taking advantage of his position, Andy, a former
mayor of a suburban town, acquired assets amounting
to P10 billion which is grossly disproportionate to his
lawful income. Due to his influence and connections
and despite knowledge by the authorities of his ill-
gotten wealth, he was charged with the crime of
plunder only after 20 years from his defeat in the last
elections he participated in. (1993 BAR)
(a) May Andy still be held criminally liable? Why?
A: NO, Andy will not be criminally liable because Sec. 6 of
RA 7080 provides that the crime punishable under this
Act shall prescribe in twenty years and the problem asked
whether Andy can still be charged with the crime of
plunder after 20 years. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO, Andy will not be criminally
liable. Under Sec. 6 of RA 7080, “the crime punishable
under this Act shall prescribe in twenty years.” For crimes
punished by special penal laws, Sec. 2 of Act 3326
provides that “prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
73
and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.” In this case, Andy was
charged with the crime of plunder after 20 years from his
defeat in the last elections he participated in, despite
knowledge by the authorities of his ill-gotten wealth. Thus,
the crime has already prescribed.
(b) Can the State still recover the properties and
assets that he illegally acquired, the bulk of
which is in the name of his wife and children?
Reason out.
A: YES, because Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 7080 provides that
recovery of properties unlawfully acquired by public
officers from them or their nominees or transferees shall
not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
3. PROHIBITION OF CHILD MARRIAGE LAW
R.A. No. 11596
a) FACILITATION OF CHILD MARRIAGE
BY PUBLIC OFFICER
H. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS OF 2003
R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. 11862
Arts. 246-266
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006,
2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998,
1997, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1989, 1988
1987 BAR)
PARRICIDE
(2018, 2015, 2012, 2006, 2003, 1999, 1997, 1996,
1994 BAR)
Q: After a heated argument over his philandering,
Higino punched on the head his wife Aika, who was six
(6) and a half months pregnant. Because of the impact,
Aika lost her balance, fell on the floor with her head
hitting a hard object. Aika died and the child was
expelled prematurely. After 36 hours, the child died.
(2015 BAR)
(a) What crime(s) did Higino commit? Explain.
A: Higino is liable for parricide under Art. 246 of the RPC
for the death of his wife, Aika. Higino is also liable for
infanticide under Art. 255 of the RPC. When a child was
killed below 3-days-old, the crime is infanticide regardless
of the person who killed such child. Moreso, a child who
had been born less than 7 months and lived for at least 24
hours already acquired personality. (Bar Q&A by Judge
Alejandria, 2022)
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 CRIMINAL LAW
(b) Assuming that when the incident occurred,
Aika was only 6 months pregnant, and when
she died, the fetus inside her womb also died,
will your answer be different? Explain.
A: YES. If the child died inside the womb of Aika, who was
only six months, the crime committed is complex crime of
Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. Killing the unborn
child as a result of the violence employed against the
mother without intent to abort is unintentional abortion.
Since the child died inside the womb of the mother,
unintentional abortion is committed regardless of viability
of the victim. Because the same violence that killed the
mother also caused unintentional abortion, the crime
committed is a complex crime (People v. Pacayna, Jr. G.R.
No. 179035, 16 Apr. 2008; People v. Robinos, G.R. No.
138453, 29 May 2002; People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 95851,
01 Mar. 1995; People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, 30
Mar. 1988) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Procopio, a call center agent assigned at a
graveyard shift, went home earlier than usual. He
proceeded immediately to their bedroom to change
his clothes. To his surprise, he found his wife Bionci in
bed making love to another woman Magna. Enraged,
Procopio grabbed a knife nearby and stabbed Bionci,
who died. (2015 BAR)
(a) What crime did Procopio commit, and what
circumstance attended the case? Explain.
A: The crime committed by Procopio is parricide qualified
by the circumstance of relationship. Killing a spouse after
having been surprised in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another woman is death under
exceptional circumstance under Art. 247 of the RPC.
However, in this case this is not death under exceptional
circumstance because Bionci was having homosexual
intercourse with another woman and not sexual
intercourse with a man. “Homosexual intercourse “is not
within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse”
in Art. 247. However, the crime of parricide is attended by
the circumstance of passion arising from a lawful
sentiment as a result of having caught his wife in the act of
infidelity with another woman. (People v. Belarmino, G.R.
No. L-4429, 18 Apr. 1952)
(b) Assuming that Procopio and Bionci were
common-law spouses, will your answer be the
same? Explain.
A: NO, the answer will not be the same. Procopio will be
liable for homicide in the instant case but he is entitled to
a mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. (Bar
Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
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Q: In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of Manila,
abandoned his wife and their son, Ricky, who was then
only 3-years-old. 20 years later, an affray took place in
a bar in Olongapo City between Pedro and his
companions, on one hand, and Ricky and his friends,
upon the other, without the father and son knowing
each other. Ricky stabbed and killed Pedro in the
fight, only to find out, a week later, when his mother
arrived from Manila to visit him in jail, that the man
whom he killed was his own father. (1996 BAR)
(a) What crime did Ricky commit?
A: Ricky committed parricide because the person killed
was his own father and the law punishing the crime (Art.
246, RPC) does not require that the crime be knowingly
committed.
(b) Suppose Ricky knew before the killing that
Pedro is his father, but he nevertheless killed
him out of bitterness for having abandoned
him and his mother, what crime did Ricky
commit? Explain.
A: The crime committed should be parricide if Ricky knew
before the killing that Pedro is his father, because the
moral basis for punishing the crime already exists. His
having acted out of bitterness for having been abandoned
by his father may be considered mitigating. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Aldrich was dismissed from his job by his employer.
Upon reaching home, his pregnant wife, Carmi, nagged
him about money for her medicines. Depressed by his
dismissal and angered by the nagging of his wife,
Aldrich struck Carmi with his fist. She fell to the
ground. As a result, she and her unborn baby died.
What crime was committed by Aldrich? (1994 BAR)
A: Aldrich committed the crime of Parricide with
Unintentional Abortion. When Aldrich struck his wife,
Carmi, with his fist, he committed the crime of
maltreatment under Art. 266(3) of the RPC. Since Carmi
died because of the felonious act of Aldrich, he is
criminally liable of parricide under Art. 246, RPC in
relation to Art. 4(1) 1 of the same Code. Since the unborn
baby of Carmi died in the process, but Aldrich had no
intention to cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich
committed unintentional abortion as defined in Art. 257,
RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich produced two
grave or less grave felonies, he falls under Art. 48, RPC, i.e.
a complex crime. (People v. Salufrancia, G.R. No. L-50884,
30 Mar. 1988) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
(2018, 2016, 2015, 2007, 2001, 1991, 1988 BAR)
Q: Rafa caught his wife, Rachel, in the act of having
sexual intercourse with Rocco in the maid’s room of
their own house. Rafa shot both lovers in the chest,
but they survived. Rafa charged Rachel and Rocco with
adultery, while Rachel and Rocco charged Rafa with
frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide.
In the adultery case, Rachel and Rocco raised the
defense that Rafa and Rachel, prior to the incident in
question, executed a notarized document whereby
they agreed to live separately and allowed each of
them to get a new partner and live with anyone of
their choice as husband and wife. This document was
executed after Rachel discovered that Rafa was
cohabiting with another woman. Thus, they also
raised the defense of in pari delicto. In the frustrated
parricide and frustrated homicide cases, Rafa raised
the defense that, having caught them in flagrante
delicto, he has no criminal liability.
Will the actions for frustrated parricide and frustrated
homicide prosper? (2018 BAR)
A: YES. The actions for frustrated parricide and frustrated
homicide will prosper, and Rafa will be found guilty of
these crimes. The penalty, however, that the trial court can
impose is only destierro not penalties for frustrated
parricide and frustrated homicide, being the spouse of
Rachel. (Art. 246, RPC)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO. The actions for frustrated
parricide and frustrated homicide will not prosper
because Rafa is entitled to the benefit of Art. 247 of the
RPC.
Art. 247 of the RPC states that any legally married person
who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall
suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them
physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
The action will prosper to allow the court to receive
evidence. However, Rafa can be held liable only for
destierro based on Art. 247 of the RPC. The act committed
by Rafa amounts to at least serious physical injuries, so
the penalty of destierro will be imposed. If the court finds
that the act amounts to less than serious physical injuries,
Rafa will not have any criminal liability. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
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Q: Jojo and Felipa are husband and wife. Believing that
his work as a lawyer is sufficient to provide for the
needs of their family, Jojo convinced Felipa to be a
stay-at-home mom and care for their children. One
day, Jojo arrived home earlier than usual and caught
Felipa in the act of having sexual intercourse with
their female nanny, Alma, in their matrimonial bed. In
a fit of rage, Jojo retrieved his revolver from inside the
bedroom cabinet and shot Alma, immediately killing
her. (2016 BAR)
(a) Is Art. 247 (Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted
Under Exceptional Circumstances) of the RPC
applicable in this case given that the
paramour was of the same gender as the
erring spouse? (2016, 2015 BAR)
A: NO, Art. 247 of the RPC is not applicable. Under the
RPC, for Art. 247 to apply, the offender must catch his or
her spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person. In People v. Marciano Gonzales (G.R.
No. 46310, 31 Oct. 1939), the Court held that to avail of the
privilege under Art. 247, the accused should surprise his
wife in the "very act of sexual intercourse”. Sexual
intercourse generally presupposes the penetration of the
man’s sexual organ into that of a woman's.
In this case, the paramour was of the same gender as the
erring spouse. As such, there is legally, no sexual
intercourse to speak of, hence, Art. 247 is not applicable.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: YES, Art. 247 of the RPC is
applicable. The requisites of Art. 247 are: (1) a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) he
or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or
both of them any serious physical injury “while in the act”
or immediately thereafter; and (3) he has not promoted or
facilitated the prostitution of his wife or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
All the foregoing requisites are present in the case at hand.
It is a given in the problem that Jojo caught Felipa and
Alma in the “act of sexual intercourse.” The law did not
qualify that the other person with whom the spouse be
caught committing sexual intercourse be “male or female.”
Hence, the gender of the paramour, Alma, being of the
Same gender as the erring spouse, Felipa, is immaterial.
NOTE: The answer given presupposes that Jojo and Felipa
are legally married.
(b) Is Felipa liable for adultery for having sexual
relations with Alma?
A: NO. Under Art. 333 of the RPC, adultery is committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse
with a “man” not her husband. Thus, Felipa in having
homosexual intercourse with Alma, a “woman,” is not
committing adultery. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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Q: Macky, a security guard, arrived home late one
night after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see
Joy, his wife and Ken, his best friend, in the act of
having sexual intercourse. Macky pulled out his
service gun and shot and killed Ken. Macky was
charged with murder for the death of Ken.
The court found that Ken died under exceptional
circumstances and exonerated Macky of murder but
sentenced him to destierro. The court also ordered
Macky to pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P50,000.00. Did the court correctly
order Macky to pay indemnity? (2007 BAR)
A: NO, the court did not act correctly. Since the killing of
Ken was committed under the exceptional circumstances
in Art. 247, RPC, it is the consensus that no crime was
committed in the light of the pronouncement in People v.
Coricor (G.R. No. 48768, 04 Dec. 1947) that banishment
(destierro) is intended more for the protection of the
offender rather than as a penalty. Since the civil liability
under the RPC is the consequence of the criminal liability,
there would be no legal basis for the award of indemnity
when there is no criminal liability. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
MURDER
(2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2012, 2011, 2010,
2009, 2008, 2007, 2005, 2004, 2001, 1999, 1996,
1995, 1993, 1991, 1989, 1987 BAR)
Q: Define murder. What are the elements of the crime?
(1999 BAR)
A: Murder is the unlawful killing of a person which
otherwise would constitute only homicide, had it not been
attended by any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery or taking advantage of superior
strength, or with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons
to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise;
3. By means or on the occasion of inundation, fire,
poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an
airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use
of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity;
5. With evident premeditation; or
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanely
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was
unlawfully killed; (2) that such a killing was attended by
any of the above-mentioned circumstances; (3) that the
killing is not parricide nor infanticide; and (4) that the
accused killed the victim. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Lina worked as a housemaid and yaya of the one-
week-old son of the Sps. John and Joana. When Lina
learned that her 70-year-old mother was seriously ill,
she asked John for a cash advance of P20,000.00, but
the latter refused. In anger, Lina gagged the mouth of
the child with stockings, placed him in a box, sealed it
with masking tape, and placed the box in the attic.
Lina then left the house and asked her friend Fely to
demand a P20,000.00 ransom for the release of the
spouses' child to be paid within twenty-four hours.
The spouses did not pay the ransom. After a couple of
days, John discovered the box in the attic with his
child already dead. According to the autopsy report,
the child died of asphyxiation barely minutes after the
box was sealed.
What crime or crimes, if any, did Lina and Fely
commit? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: Lina is liable for murder. Gagging the mouth of the child
with stockings, placing him in a box, sealing it with
masking tape, and placing the box in the attic were only
the methods employed by the defendant in committing the
murder qualified by treachery (People v. Lora, G.R. No. L-
49430, 30 Mar. 1982). Taking advantage of the defenseless
condition of the victim by reason of his tender age, one-
week old, is treachery. (People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347,
04 Mar. 2004)
She is not liable for kidnapping with murder. The essence
of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual
confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation
of his liberty. In this case, the victim was not deprived of
his liberty since he immediately died. The demand for
ransom did not convert the offense into kidnapping with
murder. The defendant was well-aware that the child
would be suffocated to death in a few moments after she
left. The demand for ransom is only a part of the diabolic
scheme of the defendant to murder the child, to conceal
his body and then demand money before the discovery of
the cadaver. (People v. Lora, G.R. No. L-49430, 30 Mar.
1982)
Fely is not liable for murder as principal or accomplice
since there is neither conspiracy or community of design
to commit murder since her criminal intention pertains to
kidnapping for ransom. In addition, her participation of
demanding ransom for the release of the child is not
connected to murder. Her criminal mind to assist Lina in
committing kidnapping for ransom is not constitutive of a
felony. Mens rea without actus reus is not a crime. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
76
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Q: Eddie brought his son Randy to a local faith healer
known as "Mother Himala." He was diagnosed by the
faith healer as being possessed by an evil spirit. Eddie
thereupon authorized the conduct of a "treatment"
calculated to drive the spirit from the boy’s body.
Unfortunately, the procedure conducted resulted in
the boy’s death. The faith healer and tree others who
were part of the healing ritual were charged with
murder and convicted by the lower court. If you are
appellate court Justice, would you sustain the
conviction upon appeal? Explain your answer. (2007
BAR)
A: NO, the conviction of murder should not be sustained
because there was no intent kill. The intent of the accused,
on the contrary is to treat Randy of his illness. However,
considering that proximate cause of Randy’s death is the
ritual, accused may be held criminally liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Candido stabbed an innocent bystander who
accidentally bumped him. The innocent bystander
died as a result of the stabbing. Candido was arrested
and was tested to be positive for the use of “shabu” at
the time he committed the stabbing.
What should be the proper charge against Candido?
Explain. (2005 BAR)
A: Candido should be charged with murder qualified by
treachery because the suddenness of the stabbing caught
the victim by surprise and was totally defenseless. Being
under the influence of dangerous drugs is a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime
(Sec. 25, RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002). Hence, the penalty for murder shall be imposed in
the maximum.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Candido should be charged
with homicide only because the incident which gave rise
to the stabbing occurred accidentally. There is no
conscious and deliberate adoption of the means, method,
and manner of attack. However, the penalty for homicide
shall be imposed in the maximum because Candido was
under the influence of dangerous drugs when he
committed the crime, which is a qualifying circumstance
under Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 9165.
Q: A, a 76-year-old woman, was brought to the
hospital in a coma with slight cerebral hemorrhage.
An endotracheal tube was inserted in her mouth to
facilitate her breathing. B, a hospital janitor, removed
the tube. The victim started to convulse and bleed in
the mouth. Only the timely arrival of the nurse
prevented the patient’s death. The patient was then
transferred to another hospital where she died the
next day of cardio-respiratory. Is B criminally liable?
If so, what crime was committed? (1991 BAR)
77
A: YES. B is criminally liable for Murder (qualified by
treachery) because the death of A appears to be the
proximate cause of the overt acts of B.
A died of cardio-respiratory arrest which evidently was
brought about by the convulsion and bleeding in the
mouth of the victim due to the removal by B of the
endotracheal tube twice. The two acts of B can be
considered as the result of one criminal design.
In People v. Umaging (G.R. No. L-52797, 31 Aug. 1981), the
Supreme Court ruled that removal of the endotracheal
tube is attempted murder, qualified by treachery, because
the patient did not die. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
HOMICIDE
(2022, 2019, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2005,
2003, 1996, 1995, 1994, 1992, 1990, 1989 BAR)
Q: Explain and illustrate the stages of execution of the
crime of homicide, taking into account the nature of
the offense, the essential element of each of the stages
of execution and the manner of committing such
intentional felony as distinguished from felony
committed through reckless imprudence. (2012 BAR)
A: Homicide as an intentional felony has three stages,
attempted, frustrated and consummated. In whatever
stages homicide is committed, intent to kill must be
established for being an indispensable element thereof.
However, if the victim died as a consequence of wounds
caused by an act committed with malice, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed. Hence, the crime committed is
consummated homicide. If the victim died as a
consequence of an act committed with recklessness, the
crime committed is Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide. But if the victim did not die as a consequence of
wounds caused by an act committed with malice, intent to
kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. If intent
to kill is proven, the crime committed is frustrated or
attempted homicide. If intent to kill is not proven, the
crime committed is physical injuries.
If the offender with intent to kill attempted to inflict or
inflicted non-mortal wound upon the victim, he already
directly commenced an overt act to commit homicide.
Hence, the crime committed is attempted homicide if he
failed to inflict mortal wounds upon the victim by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. If the offender with intent to kill inflicted
mortal wounds upon the victim, he already performed all
acts of execution which would produce the homicide as a
consequence. Hence, the crime is either frustrated
homicide if death is not produced despite the mortal
character of the wound due to cause independent of the
will of the offender or consummated homicide if death is
produce.
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
All the elements necessary for execution and
accomplishment of homicide are present if the victim die
due to wounds inflicted with the offender with intent to
kill.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Elements of the crime – homicide as an intentional felony
has three stages, attempted, frustrated and consummated.
In whatever stages homicide is committed, intent to kill
must be established for being an indispensable element
thereof. However, if the victim died as a consequence of
wound cause by an act committed with malice, intent to
kill in conclusively presumed and the crime committed is
consummated homicide. But if the victim did not die as a
consequence of wounds cause by an act committed with
malice, intent to kill must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. If intent to kill is proven, the crime
committed is frustrated or attempted homicide. If intent to
kill is not proven, the crime committed is physical injuries.
Thus, lack of intent to kill is a defense in attempted or
frustrated homicide.
Nature of the crime – if the offender with intent to kill
attempted to inflict or inflicted non-mortal wounds upon
the victim, he already directly commenced an overt act to
commit homicide. Hence, the crime committed is
attempted homicide if he failed to inflict mortal wounds
upon the victim by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. If the offender with
intent to kill inflicted mortal wounds upon the victim, he
already performed all acts of execution which would have
produced the homicide as a consequence. If death is not
produced despite the mortal character of the wounds due
to causes independent to the will of the offender, the
crime committed is frustrated homicide. If death is
produced, the crime committed is consummated homicide.
Intentional felony and culpable felony – homicide
regardless of stages must be committed with malice
(general intent) and intent to kill (specific intent). Even if
there is no intent to kill and evil intent, the offender is
liable for culpable felony if the victim died or injured as a
result of the recklessness of the former. If there is no
intent to kill, evil intent, and recklessness on the part of
the accused, he is not liable for his intentional act, which
cause the death of or injury upon the victim because of the
exempting circumstance of accident. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Moe, Curly, and Larry were drinking and singing
inside a karaoke bar when suddenly, Buboy entered
the bar and without warning, immediately shot all
three of them using a caliber .45 pistol.
Thereafter, Buboy ran out of the bar to escape. Moe,
Curly, and Larry died instantly due to gunshot wounds
in their heads and bodies. With the help of
eyewitnesses, Buboy was arrested. After inquest, the
prosecutor charged Buboy with three counts of
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Homicide.
Do you agree with the charge of Homicide against
Buboy? Explain briefly. (2022 BAR)
A: NO, I do not agree. Although, mere suddenness of the
attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted does not positively tend to prove
that they thereby knowingly intended to ensure the
accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any
risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim
might offer, the immediate and without warning attack
made by Buboy, consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means. methods and forms in the execution of
the crime which tended directly to insure such execution,
without risk to himself. (People v. Gayon, GR No. 230221,
10 Apr. 2019)
The sudden and unexpected attack made on the
unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend themselves and thereby ensuring the commission
the crime constitutes treachery which qualifies the killing
to the crime of Murder.
Q: Ms. M, a Malaysian visiting the Philippines, was
about to depart for Hong Kong via an Indonesian-
registered commercial vessel. While on board the
vessel, which was still docked at the port of Manila,
she saw her mortal enemy, Ms. A, an Australian
citizen. Ms. A was seated at the front portion of the
cabin and busy using her laptop, with no idea
whatsoever that Ms. M was likewise onboard the ship.
Consumed by her anger towards Ms. A, Ms. M
stealthily approached the Australian from behind, and
then quickly stabbed her neck with a pocketknife,
resulting in Ms. A's immediate death. Operatives from
the Philippine National Police - Maritime Command
arrested Ms. M for the killing of Ms. A, and thereafter,
intended to charge her under the RPC. Ms. M
contended that the provisions of the RPC cannot be
applied and enforced against her because both she
and the victim are not Filipino nationals, and besides,
the alleged crime was committed in an Indonesian-
registered vessel.
Assuming that the provisions of the RPC can be
applied against Ms. M, what crime under the RPC
should she be charged with? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: Ms. M should be charged with the crime of Homicide
under the RPC. Art. 249 of the RPC punishes any person
who shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248, including
treachery. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself,
suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose
was to kill, so long as the decision was made suddenly, and
the victim’s helpless position was accidental. (People v.
Lubreo, G.R. No. 74146, 02 Aug. 1991)
78
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
In a number of cases, the Court held that treachery cannot
be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and
unexpected. (People v. Vilbar, G.R. No. 186541, 01 Feb.
2012)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Ms. M should be charged with
Murder. She killed Ms. A by stealthily approaching the
latter from behind and stabbing the latter’s neck with a
pocketknife. Ms. M therefore employed means and
methods which tend directly and specially to insure the
execution of the planned killing, without risk to herself
arising from the defense which Ms. A might make. Hence,
there was treachery on Ms. M’s part, and treachery
qualifies an act of killing to Murder. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Belle saw Gaston stealing the prized cock of a
neighbor and reported him to the police. Thereafter,
Gaston, while driving a car, saw Belle crossing the
street. Incensed that Belle had reported him, Gaston
decided to scare her by trying to make it appear that
he was about to run her over. He revved the engine of
his car and drove towards her but he applied the
brakes.
Since the road was slippery at that time, the vehicle
skidded and hit Belle causing her death. Was Gaston
criminally liable? What is the liability of Gaston? Why?
(2005 BAR)
A: YES, Gaston is liable for Belle's death because even
though Gaston has no intent to kill Belle rather just to
scare Belle. "To scare" does not indicate intent to kill.
However, under Art. 4 of the RPC, provides in part that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. In other words, the
rule is that when a person, by a felonious act, generates in
the mind of another a sense of imminent danger,
prompting the latter to escape from or avoid such danger
and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person
committing the felonious act is responsible for such
injuries or death. (US v. Valdez, , G.R. No. L-16486, 22 Mar.
1921; People v. Apra, G.R. No. L-26789, 25 Apr. 1969)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: YES, Gaston is liable for Belle's
death because by his acts of revving the engine of his car
and driving towards Belle is felonious, and such felonious
act was the proximate cause of the vehicle to skid and hit
Belle, resulting in the latter's death. Stated otherwise, the
death of Belle was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of Gaston's felonious act. (People v. Apra, G.R.
No. L-26789, 25 Apr. 1969) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after some
customers inside a nightclub became unruly, guns
were fired by a group, among them A and B, that
finally put the customers back to their senses.
Unfortunately, one customer died. Subsequent
investigation revealed that A’s gunshot had inflicted
79
on the victim a slight wound that did not cause the
deceased’s death nor materially contribute to it. It was
B’s gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the
deceased. A contended that his liability should, if at
all, be limited to slight physical injury. Would you
agree? Why? (2003 BAR)
A: NO. I beg to disagree with A’s contention that his
liability should be limited to slight physical injury only. He
should be held liable for attempted homicide because he
inflicted said injury with the use of a firearm which is a
lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a
firearm. (Araneta, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. L-43527, 03 July 1990)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in a street
fight. Lino then suddenly drew his balisong and
lunged at Okito. In an effort to break up the fight,
Tommy tried to snatch the balisong from Lino but not
before the latter had inflicted a wound on Okito. As
Lino withdrew the weapon and attempted to stab
Okito a second time, Tommy tried to grab the weapon
again. In so doing, his left forearm was slashed. As he
succeeded in snatching away the balisong with his
right arm, it flew with such force, that it hit Nereo, a
passerby who was seriously injured. Explain your
answers fully. (1992 BAR)
(a) What is the criminal liability of Lino with
respect to Okito, Tommy and Nereo?
A: As far as Okito is concerned, Lino is liable for frustrated
homicide, assuming that the wound suffered by Okito is
such that for reasons or causes independent of the will of
Lino (such as timely medical attention) Okito would have
died. If the injury is not serious enough, the liability is only
attempted homicide.
Intent to kill is manifest because of the use of a deadly
weapon. For the injury on the arm of Tommy, Lino is liable
only for physical injuries (serious, less serious or slight,
depending on the nature of the injury). Apparently, there
is no intent to kill.
For Nereo, Lino should be liable for serious physical
injuries as the wounding of Nereo was the natural and
logical consequences of Lino’s felonious act.
(b) In turn, is Tommy criminally liable to Nereo?
A: Tommy is exempted from criminal liability for the
injury to Nereo as he was performing a lawful act with due
care and the injury was caused by mere accident (Art.
12(4)), or that he was in lawful exercise of a right (Art.
11(6)), that is, defense of a stranger. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
(2010, 1997 BAR)
Q: A, B and C are members of SFC Fraternity. While
eating in a seaside restaurant, they were attacked by
X, Y and Z, members of a rival fraternity. A rumble
ensued in which the above-named members of the two
fraternities assaulted each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner resulting in the death of A. As it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed A, the
members of the two fraternities who took part in the
rumble were charged for death caused in a
tumultuous affray. Will the charge prosper? Explain.
(2010 BAR)
A: NO, the charge of death caused in a tumultuous affray
will not prosper. In death caused by tumultuous affray
under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential
that the persons involved did not compose groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally. In this case, there is no
tumultuous affray since the participants in the rumble
belong to organized fraternities. The killer of A, a member
of SFC Fraternity could not be any other but member of
the rival fraternity. Conspiracy is therefore present among
the attackers from the rival fraternity and thus rules out
the idea of an affray. The liability of the attackers should
be collective for the crime of homicide or murder as the
case may be. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight erupted in
the public plaza. As a result of the tumultuous affray, A
sustained one fatal and three superficial stab wounds.
He died a day after. B, C, D and E were proven to be
participants in the “rumble”, each using a knife
against A, but it could not be ascertained who, among
them, inflicted the mortal injury. Who shall be held
criminally liable for the death of A and for what?
(1997 BAR)
A: B, C, D, and E being participants in the tumultuous
affray and having been proven to have inflicted serious
physical injuries, or at least, employed violence upon A,
are criminally liable for the latter’s death. And because it
cannot be ascertained who among them inflicted the
mortal injury on A, there being a free-for-all fight or
tumultuous affray, B, C, D and E are all liable for the crime
of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Art. 251 of
the RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
PHYSICAL INJURIES
(2018, 2017 BAR)
Q: Why is there no crime of frustrated serious physical
injuries? (2017 BAR)
A: According to Justice Regalado, the crime of physical
injuries is a formal crime since a single act consummates it
as a matter of law; hence, it has no attempted or frustrated
stage. Once the injuries are inflicted, the offense is
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
consummated. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Mrs. Robinson is a teacher at an elementary school.
In one of her classes, she found, to her consternation,
that an 8-year-old Richard was always the cause of
distraction, as he was fond of bullying classmates
smaller in size than him.
One morning, Reymart, a 7-year-old pupil, cried
loudly and complained to Mrs. Robinson that Richard
had boxed him on the ear. Confronted by
Mrs. Robinson about Reymart’s accusation, Richard
sheepishly admitted the same. Because of this, Mrs.
Robinson ordered Richard to lie face down on a desk
during class. After Richard obliged, Mrs. Robinson hit
him ten (10) times on the legs with a ruler and
pinched his ears. Richard ran home and reported to
his mother what he had suffered at the hands of Mrs.
Robinson. When Richard’s parents went to Mrs.
Robinson to complain, she interposed the defense that
she merely performed her duty as a teacher to
discipline erring pupils.
Richard’s parents ask your advice on what actions can
be instituted against Mrs. Robinson for acts
committed on their minor child. (2018 BAR)
(a) May Mrs. Robinson be charged with child
abuse OR slight physical injuries? Explain.
A: YES. Mrs. Robinson can be charged with either child
abuse under R.A. No. 7610 or slight physical injuries if the
injuries inflicted constitute slight physical injuries. Sec. 10
of R.A. No. 7610 provides that “Any person who shall
commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty, or
exploitation, or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Art. 59 of P.D. 603 but not covered by the RPC
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor.”
In other words, Richard’s parents may choose to
prosecute Mrs. Robinson under the RPC or R.A. No. 7610. I
will advise them to consider R.A. No. 7610 as there was no
showing of the extent of the physical injuries inflicted.
(b) May Mrs. Robinson be charged with child
abuse AND slight physical injuries? Explain.
A: NO. Mrs. Robinson cannot be charged with both of child
abuse and slight physical injuries, because the latter is
deemed absorbed in the charge of child abuse. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
80
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
RAPE
(2019, 2017, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2011, 2009, 2004,
2002, 2000, 1998, 1996, 1995, 1993, 1992, 1987 BAR)
Q: A, a male, takes B, another male, to a motel and
there, through threat and intimidation, succeeds in
inserting his penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is
A’s criminal liability? Why? (2002 BAR)
A: A shall be criminally liable for rape by committing an
act of sexual assault against B, by inserting his penis into
the anus of the latter.
Even a man may be a victim of rape by sexual assault
under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the RPC, as amended, “when
the offender’s penis is inserted into his mouth or anal
orifice.” (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape by carnal knowledge, how does the
accused commit attempted rape by carnal knowledge?
(2017 BAR)
A: It is consummated rape when it describes a penis
touching the vagina is the penis penetrating the cleft of the
labia majora, however minimum or slight. In other words,
the penis' mere touch of the pudendum would not result
in any degree of penetration since the pudendum is a
muscular part located over the labia majora and therefore
mere touch of or brush upon the same would only
constitute attempted rape, not consummated. Similarly, a
penis' mere grazing of the fleshy portion, not the vulva
cleft of the labia majora, will also constitute only
attempted rape and not consummated rape, since the
same cannot be considered to have achieved the slightest
level of penetration. Stated differently, the Court here
elucidates that "mere touch" of the penis on the labia
majora legally contemplates not mere surface touch or
skin contact, but the slightest penetration of the cleft of
the labia majora, however minimum in degree. (People v.
Agao, GR No. 248049, 04, Oct. 2022)
NOTE: this case is beyond the cut-off period.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: To be held liable for attempted
rape by carnal knowledge, the penis of the accused must
not touch the labia of the pudendum of the victim, but his
acts must be committed with clear intention to have
sexual intercourse. Intent to have sexual intercourse is
present if it is shown that the erectile penis of the accused
is in the position to penetrate (Cruz v. People, G.R. No.
166441, 08 Oct. 2014) or the accused actually commenced
to force his penis into the victim’s sexual organ. (People v.
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 Dec. 2013) If the offender
touches the body of the victim through force, with lewd
design but without clear intention to have sexual
intercourse, the crime committed is acts of lasciviousness.
(People v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, 13 Aug. 2014) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
81
NOTE: this is the rule prior to Agao v. People (04, Oct.
2022).
Q: 16-year-old Aliswan prodded Amethyst, his
girlfriend, to remove her clothing while they were
secretly together in her bedroom late one evening.
Failing to get a positive response from her, he forcibly
undressed her. Apprehensive about rousing the
attention of the household who did not know of his
presence inside her room, she resisted him with
minimal strength, but she was really sobbing in a
muffled manner. He then undressed himself while
blocking the door. Yet, the image of a hapless and
sobbing Amethyst soon brought him to his senses and
impelled him to leave her room naked. He did not
notice in his hurry that Amante, the father of
Amethyst, who was then sitting alone on a sofa in the
sala, saw him leave his daughter's room naked.
Outside the house, the now-clothed Aliswan spotted
Allesso, Amethyst's former suitor. Knowing how
Allesso had aggressively pursued Amethyst, Aliswan
fatally stabbed Allesso. Aliswan immediately went
into hiding afterwards.
Upon learning from Amethyst about what Aliswan had
done to her, an enraged Amante wanted to teach
Aliswan a lesson he would never forget. Amante set
out the next day to look for Aliswan in his school.
There, Amante found a young man who looked very
much like Aliswan. Amante immediately rushed and
knocked the young man unconscious on the
pavement, and then draped his body with a prepared
tarpaulin reading “RAPIST AKO HUWAG TULARAN.”
Everyone else in the school was shocked upon
witnessing what had just transpired, unable to believe
that the timid and quiet Alisto, Aliswan's identical
twin brother, had committed rape. (2017 BAR)
(a) A criminal complaint for attempted rape with
homicide was brought against Aliswan in the
Prosecutor's Office. However, after
preliminary investigation, the Investigating
Prosecutor recommended the filing of two
separate Informations: one for attempted rape
and the other for homicide. Do you agree with
the recommendation? Explain.
A: NO. I do not agree with the recommendation for the
filing of attempted rape. Intent to have sexual intercourse
is an essential element of attempted rape. In other words,
intent to lie with the victim must be closer. However, this
intent is not established for failure to show that Aliswan
had done acts to have sex with Amethyst (Cruz v. People,
G.R. No. 116441, 08 Oct. 2014); or that Aliswan had actually
commenced to force his penis into the victim’s sexual
organ (People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 Dec. 2013).
Moreover, he spontaneously desisted from committing
further lascivious acts after undressing Amethyst which is
a defense in attempted rape. Undressing the victim with
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
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 CRIMINAL LAW
lewd design merely constitutes Acts of Lasciviousness.
(People v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, 13 Aug. 2014)
However, I agree with the recommendation of separate
charges instead of a special complex crime. Acts of
lasciviousness cannot be merged with homicide to form a
special complex crime. There is no special complex crime
of acts of lasciviousness with homicide under the statute
books. Moreover, to be held liable of a special complex
crime, there must be a direct connection between the
components thereof. In this case, the homicide is not
directly connected with the acts of lasciviousness since the
killing was motivated by personal grudge of Aliswan
against Alesso, which has no link to the crime committed
against Amethyst.
(b) After receiving medical attendance for 10
days, Alisto consulted you about filing the
proper criminal complaint against Amante.
What crimes, if any, will you charge Amante
with? Explain.
A: In People v. Lasala (G.R. No. L-12141, 30 Jan. 1962), the
Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed in Less
Serious Physical Injuries under Art. 265 of the RPC as the
medical attendance if for a period of 10 days only.
Considering, however, that the Less Serious Physical
Injuries was inflicted with manifest intent to insult or
offend the offended party or under circumstances adding
ignominy to the offense, there shall be an added penalty of
fine not exceeding P500 pesos. (Art. 265(2), RPC) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Amante may be charged for
violation of R.A. No. 7610. Being 16 years old and a minor,
the act of Amante constitutes child abuse as he maltreated
Alisto when he inflicted on him physically with cruelty.
Further, by draping his body with a prepared tarpaulin
with a statement "rapist ako wag tularan,” it debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Alisto. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2023)
Q: Maita was the object of Solito's avid sexual desires.
Solito had attempted many times to entice Maita to a
date in bed with him but Maita had consistently
refused. Fed up with all her rejections, Solito abducted
Maita around 7 p.m. one night. With his cohorts, Solito
forced Maita into a Toyota lnnova and drove off with
her to a green-painted house situated in a desolate
part of the town. There, Solito succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of Maita against her will.
Meanwhile, the police authorities were tipped off that
at 11:30 p.m. on that same night Solito would be
selling marijuana outside the green-painted house.
Acting on the tip, the PNP station of the town formed a
buy-bust team with PO2 Masahol being designated the
poseur buyer. During the buy-bust operation, Solito
opened the trunk of the Toyota lnnova to retrieve the
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
bag of marijuana to be sold to PO2 Masahol. To cut the
laces that he had tied the bag with, Solito took out a
Swiss knife, but his doing so prompted PO2 Masahol to
effect his immediate arrest out of fear that he would
attack him with the knife. PO2 Masahol then
confiscated the bag of marijuana as well as the Toyota
lnnova.
Two Informations were filed against Solito in the RTC:
one for Forcible Abduction with Rape, raffled to
Branch 8 of the RTC; the other for Illegal Sale of Drugs,
assigned to Branch 29 of the RTC. Was Solito charged
with the proper offenses based on the circumstances?
Explain. (2017 BAR)
A: YES. The charge of Rape through Forcible Abduction is
correct. The rule is settled that if the main objective of the
accused is to rape the victim, the crime committed is rape
even if he abducted her forcefully. Forcible abduction is
absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Art. 48
of the RPC is applicable, since forcible abduction is an
indispensable means to commit rape. (People v. Mejoraday,
G.R. No. 102705, 30 July 1993; People v. Almanzor, G.R. No.
124916, 11 July 2002; People v. Sabadablab, G.R. No.
175924, 14 Mar. 2012)
Where the victim was abducted with lewd design and
brought to a house (People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. L-40988,
15 Apr. 1988; People v. Buhos, G.R. No. L-40995, 25 June
1980; People v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 137383-84, 23 Nov.
2000) in a desolated place where she was raped, forcible
abduction should be treated as a necessary means to
commit rape, and thus, the crime committed is a complex
crime of Rape through Forcible Abduction under Art. 48 of
the RPC.
The charge of sale of dangerous drugs is improper since
this crime is consummated only upon the delivery of the
dangerous drugs to the poseur buyer for a consideration.
Since in this case, Solito has not yet delivered the
marijuana to PO2 Masahol when the latter apprehended
the former; therefore, the crime committed is not sale of
dangerous drugs but Attempted Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
In People v. Figueroa (G.R. No. 186141, 11 Apr. 2012),
where the sale was absorbed when the police officers
immediately placed accused under arrest, the crime
committed is attempted sale. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Charlie was charged for the Qualified Rape of AAA.
The Information alleged that AAA was 14 years old at
the time the crime was committed and that Charlie
was AAA's stepfather. The presentation of AAA's birth
certificate during the trial duly established the
following: (1) that AAA was indeed 14 years old at the
time of the rape; and (2) that AAA's mother is BBB and
her father was the late CCC. BBB and Charlie only
became live-in partners after CCC's death. The RTC
found Charlie guilty of qualified rape. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals convicted Charlie of simple rape.
Charlie appealed before the Supreme Court. How will
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
you rule and why? (2015 BAR) Heinous Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC, by adding
the phrase “or is demented.” (UPLC Suggested Answers)
A: I will reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
convict Charlie for the crime of Qualified Rape. NOTE: in determining whether a person is "twelve (12)
years of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation
Under Art. 266-B of the RPC, the crime of Rape is qualified should be in accordance with either the chronological age
when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual
is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is
this case, Charlie was the common law spouse of BBB, established. (People v. Rabelas, GR No. 253603, 14 June
AAA’s mother. At the time of the crime, AAA was below 18 2021)
years old. The following qualifying circumstances were
alleged in the information and proven by the evidence. 1. ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2003
Thus, Charlie should have been convicted of the Qualified R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 11862
Rape and not Simple Rape only. (Compendious Bar (2014, 2012, 2009 BAR)
Reviewer on Criminal Law: Based on Bar Exam Syllabus
(2023) by Dean Nilo T. Divina)
Q: The creditor who resorts to forced labor of a child
under the pretext of reimbursing himself for the debt
Q: Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way home to
incurred by the child's father commits the crime of
Quezon City which was driven by Roger. Flordeluna
slavery. (2009 BAR)
noticed that Roger was always placing his car
freshener in front of the car aircon ventilation but did
A: FALSE, the crime committed violates Anti-Trafficking of
not bother asking Roger why. Suddenly, Flordeluna
Persons Act. 9208. The purpose of trafficking is
felt dizzy and became unconscious. Instead of bringing
exploitation which includes exploitation or the
her to Quezon City, Roger brought Flordeluna to his
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
house in Cavite where she was detained for two (2)
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude, or
weeks. She was raped for the entire duration of her
the removal or sale of organs. (People v. Casio, G.R. No.
detention. May Roger be charged and convicted of the
211465, 03 Dec. 2014)
crime of rape with serious illegal detention? (2000
BAR)
a) ACTS OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Sec. 4, R.A. No. 11862
A: NO. Roger may not be charged and convicted of the
(2014, 2012)
crime Rape with Serious Illegal Detention. Roger may be
charged and convicted of multiple rapes. Each rape is a
Q: Loko advertised on the internet that he was looking
distinct off’ense and should be punished separately.
for commercial models for a TV advertisement. Ganda,
Evidently, his principal intention was to abuse Flordeluna;
a 16-year-old beauty, applied for the project. Loko
the detention was only incidental to the rape. (UPLC
offered her a contract, which Ganda signed. She was
Suggested Answers)
asked to report to an address which turned out to be a
high-end brothel. Ganda became one of its most
Q: The complainant, an eighteen-year-old mental
featured attractions. What is Loko’s liability, if any?
retardate with an intellectual capacity between the
What effect would Ganda’s minority have on Loko’s
ages of 9 and 12 years, when asked during the trial
liability? (2014 BAR)
how she felt when she was raped by the accused,
replied “Masarap, it gave me much pleasure.”
A: Loko may be held liable for the crime of trafficking in
persons under Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 9208 which declared
With the claim of the accused that the complainant
unlawful to recruit, or to receive a person by any means,
consented for a fee to the sexual intercourse, and with
including those done under the pretext of domestic
the foregoing answer of the complainant, would you
employment for the purpose of prostitution. Loko
convict the accused of rape if you were the judge
recruited Ganda in the guise of making her a commercial
trying the case? Explain. (1996 BAR)
model, the deceit that Loko employed to recruit Ganda for
the purpose of prostitution making him liable for
A: YES, I would convict the accused of rape. Since the
trafficking in persons.
victim is a mental retardate with an intellectual capacity of
a child less than 12 years old, she is legally incapable of
Ganda’s minority is a qualifying circumstance since R.A.
giving a valid consent to the sexual intercourse. The sexual
No. 9208 provides that when the trafficked person is a
intercourse is tantamount to a statutory rape because the
child, the crime is considered qualified trafficking. (Sec.
level of intelligence is that of a child less than 16 years of
3(b) in rel. to Sec. 6(a), R.A. No. 9208) (UPLC Suggested
age (as amended by R.A No. 11648). Where the victim of
Answers)
rape is a mental retardate, violence or intimidation is not
essential to constitute rape. (People v. Trimor, G.R. 106541-
42, 31 Mar. 1995) As a matter of fact, R.A. No. 7659, the

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 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: When the adoption of a child is effected under the
Inter-Country Adoption Act for the purpose of
prostitution, what is the proper charge against the
offender who is a public officer in relation to the
exploitative purposes? (2012 BAR)
A: Adoption or facilitating the adoption of child for the
purpose of prostitution constitutes trafficking in person
(Sec. 4(f) of RA No. 9208). The means to commit trafficking
in person can be dispensed with since the trafficked victim
is a minor (Sec. 3). However, trafficking is qualified when
trafficked person is a child or when the adoption is
effected through Inter-Country Adoption Act of and said
adoption is for the purpose of prostitution. (Sec. 6(a) and
(b)) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
b) ACTS THAT PROMOTE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Sec. 5, R.A. No. 11862
c) QUALIFIED TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Sec. 6, R.A. No. 11862
2. ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004
R.A. NO. 9262
(2020-21, 2018, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2011, 2010)
a) DEFINITION OF TERMS
Sec. 3
(2010 BAR)
Q: Define "Battered Woman Syndrome." (2010 BAR)
A: “Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a scientifically
define pattern of psychological and behavioural symptoms
found in woman living in battering relationships as a
result of cumulative abuse. (Sec. 3(d), R.A. No. 9262)
b) ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND THEIR CHILDREN
Sec. 5
(2018 BAR)
What crimes did Ruben commit: (2018 BAR)
(a) For beating and humiliating Rorie?
A: For beating and humiliating Rorie, such acts violate R.A.
No. 9262, known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004,” particularly Sec. 3(a)
thereof under “Physical Violence” referring to acts that
include bodily or physical harm against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.
(b) For withdrawing support for Rona?
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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
A: For withdrawing support for Rona, such act is a
violation of R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3(d), which reads:
“Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but
is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the
victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Art. 73 of the
Family Code. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
c) PROTECTION ORDERS
Secs. 8-16
d) BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE
Sec. 3
(2016, 2015, 2010 BAR)
Q: What are the three phases of the "Battered
Woman Syndrome"? (2016, 2010 BAR)
A: The three (3) phases of the BWS are:
(1) tension-building phase;
(2) acute battering incident; and
(3) tranquil, loving, or non-violent phase. (People v.
Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, 15 Jan. 2004)
Q: Would the defense prosper despite the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the RPC? Explain. (2010 BAR)
A: YES. Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that victim-
survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and
civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements of justifying circumstances of self-defense under
the RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Romeo and Julia have been married for 12 years
and had two (2) children. The first few years of their
marriage went along smoothly. However, on the fifth
year onwards, they would often quarrel when Romeo
comes home drunk. The quarrels became increasingly
violent, marked by quiet periods when Julia would
leave the conjugal dwelling.
During the times of quiet, Romeo would court Julia
with flowers and chocolates and convince her to
return home, telling her that he could not live without
her; or Romeo would ask Julia to forgive him, which
she did, believing that if she humbled herself, Romeo
would change. After a month of marital bliss, Romeo
would return to his drinking habit and the quarrel
would start again, verbally at first, until it would
escalate to physical violence.
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
One night, Romeo came home drunk and went straight
to bed. Fearing the onset of another violent fight, Julia
stabbed Romeo, while he was asleep. A week later,
their neighbors discovered Romeo’s rotting corpse on
the marital bed. Julia and the children were nowhere
to be found. Julia was charged with parricide. She
asserted “battered woman syndrome” as her defense.
(2016 BAR)
(a) Explain the cycle of violence.
A: The Battered Woman Syndrome is characterized by the
so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1)
tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or at least, nonviolent) phase.
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs
– it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another
form of hostile behavior. The woman tries to pacify the
batterer through a kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply
staying out of his way. The acute battering incident is
characterized by brutality, destructiveness and
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this
incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this
phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an
end to the violence. The final phase of the cycle of violence
begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this
tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief.
(b) Is Julia’s “battered woman syndrome” defense
meritorious? Explain.
A: YES. Under Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 9262, “Battered Woman
Syndrome” refers to a scientifically defined pattern of
psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women
living in battering relationships as a result of “cumulative
abuse”. Under Sec. 3(b), “Battery” refers to an act of
inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child
resulting in physical and psychological or emotional
distress.
In sum, the defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be
invoked if the woman in marital relationship with the
victim is subjected to cumulative abuse or battery
involving the infliction of physical harm resulting to the
physical and psychological or emotional distress.
Cumulative means resulting from successive addition. In
sum, there must be “at least two battering episodes”
between the accused and her intimate partner and such
final episode produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save
her life. (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, 15 Jan. 2004)
In this case, because of the battering episodes, Julia feared
the onset of another violent fight and honestly believed
the need to defend herself even if Romeo had not
commenced an unlawful aggression. Even in the absence
of unlawful aggression, however, Battered Woman
Syndrome is a defense. Under Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 9262,
85
Battered Woman Syndrome is a defense notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the RPC such as
unlawful aggression. (Sec. 26, R.A. No. 9262) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Dion and Talia were spouses. Dion always came
home drunk since he lost his job a couple of months
ago. Talia had gotten used to the verbal abuse from
Dion. One night, in addition to the usual verbal abuse,
Dion beat up Talia. The next morning, Dion saw the
injury that he had inflicted upon Talia and promised
her that he would stop drinking and never beat her
again. However, Dion did not make good on his
promise. Just after one week, he started drinking
again. Talia once more endured the usual verbal
abuse. Afraid that he might beat her up again, Talia
stabbed Dion with a kitchen knife while he was passed
out from imbibing too much alcohol. Talia was
charged with the crime of parricide. (2015 BAR)
(a) May Talia invoke the defense of Battered
Woman Syndrome to free herself from
criminal liability? Explain.
A: NO, a single act of battery or physical harm committed
by Dion against Talia resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress on her part is not
sufficient to avail of the benefit of the justifying
circumstance of “Battered Woman Syndrome”.
The defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked
if the woman with marital relationship with the victim is
subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the
infliction of physical harm resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must be
“at least two (2) battering episodes” between the accused
and her intimate partner and such final episode produced
in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, 15 Jan. 2004)
(b) Will your answer be the same, assuming that
Talia killed Dion after being beaten up after a
second time? Explain.
A: YES, Talia can invoke the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome to free herself from criminal liability for killing
her husband since she suffered physical and emotional
distress arising from cumulative abuse or battery. Under
Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 9262, victim survivors of Battered
Woman Syndrome do not incur any criminal or civil
liability despite the absence of the requisites of self-
defense. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: Ms. A had been married to Mr. B for 10 years. Since
their marriage, Mr. B had been jobless and a
drunkard, preferring to stay with his “barkadas” until
the wee hours of the morning. Ms. A was the
breadwinner and attended to the needs of their three
(3) growing children. Many times, when Mr. B was
drunk, he would beat Ms. A and their three children,
and shout invectives against them. In fact, in one of the
beating incidents, Ms. A suffered a deep stab wound
on her tummy that required a prolonged stay in the
hospital. Due to the beatings and verbal abuses
committed against her, she consulted a psychologist
several times, as she was slowly beginning to lose her
mind. One night, when Mr. B arrived dead drunk, he
suddenly stabbed Ms. A several times while shouting
invectives against her.
Defending herself from the attack, Ms. A grappled for
the possession of a knife and she succeeded. She then
stabbed Mr. B several times which caused his
instantaneous death. Medico-Legal Report showed
that the husband suffered three (3) stabbed wounds.
Can Ms. A validly put up a defense? Explain. (2014
BAR)
A: YES. Ms. A can put up the defense of battered woman
syndrome. It appears that she is suffering from physical
and psychological or emotional distress resulting from
cumulative abuse by her husband.
Under Sec. 26 of R.A. 9262, “victim survivors who are
found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman
syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.”
As a rule, once the unlawful aggression ceased, stabbing
the victim further is not self-defense. However, even if the
element of unlawful aggression in self-defense is lacking,
Ms. A, who is suffering for battered woman syndrome, will
not incur criminal and civil liability. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
3. ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009
R.A. No. 9775
(2011 BAR)
a) DEFINITION OF TERMS
Sec. 3
b) UNLAWFUL OR PROHIBITED ACTS
Sec. 4
(2011 BAR)
Q: Mr. P owns a boarding house where he knowingly
allowed children to be videotaped while simulating
explicit sexual activities. What is Mr. P's criminal
liability, if any? (2011 BAR)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
a. Corruption of minors under the Penal Code
b. Violation of the Child Pornography Act
c. Violation of the Child Abuse Law
d. None
A: B. Violation of the Child Pornography Act.
4. SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION
ACT
R.A No. 7610 as amended
(2022, 2020-21, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2006, 2004,
2002, 1993 BAR)
Q: To motivate their 8-year-old daughter to study well
and have a better future, her parents resorted to
making her kneel on rice spread on the floor, spanking
her with a bamboo stick, or requiring her to stand in
the rain for hours if her grades fell below 80 in any
subject. Did the parents commit a crime? Explain
briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
A: YES, the parents are liable for Child Abuse under R.A.
7610.
R.A. 7610 punishes; (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c)
child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. When a child is
subjected to physical abuse or injury, the person
responsible can be held liable under R.A. No. 7610 by
establishing the essential facts above. It need not prove
that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty, and child
exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child
because an act prejudicial to the development of the child
is different from the former acts. (Patulot vs. People, G.R.
No. 23507, 07 Jan. 2019)
Here, the offenders cannot invoke that their acts are
merely imposition of parental discipline as the acts are
excessive and abusive. Hence, the parents may be liable
for violation of R.A. 7610. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria,
2022)
a) DEFINITION OF TERMS
Sec. 3, R.A. No. 7610
(2022, 2017 BAR)
Q: Joben, a school principal, called high school
students Paula and Gina, both 15 years old, to the
faculty room regarding the sexual text message
circulating around campus which made reference to
Joben’s daughter. In front of teachers and some
students, Joben shouted at Paula and Gina, asking
them who sent the said text message. Joben also
threatened to sue them and said: “Siguro nainggit
kayo sa anak ko kasi maganda sya, matalino, at
mayaman. Sabihin niyo kasi sa mga magulang niyo
magsumikap sila para maging mayaman din kayo. Di
yung tatamad-tamad.” Joben then raised her middle
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
finger in front of Paula and Gina, saying “Mga burikat
(whore)!”
Later that day, Paula and Gina narrated the incident to
their parents and said that they were ashamed of
going back to school.
Is Joben guilty of violating Sec. 10(a) of Republic Act
No. 7610 for other acts of child abuse? Explain briefly.
(2022 BAR)
A: NO, Joben is not liable for R.A. No. 7610. In Escalano v.
People (G.R. No. 226991, 10 Dec. 2018), which involved
facts similar to the instant case, the Court held that the
mere shouting of invectives at a child, when carelessly
done out of anger, frustration, or annoyance, does not
constitute Child Abuse under Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610
absent evidence that the utterance of such words was
specifically intended to debase, degrade, or demean the
victim’s intrinsic dignity. In simple terms, there was a
failure to establish the specific intent to debase, degrade,
or demean required in child abuse cases under Sec. 10(a)
in relation to Sec. 3(b)(2) of R.A. No 7610 (Brubas v.
People, G.R. No. 254005, 23 June 2021)
Q: Tonito, an 8-year-old boy, was watching a free
concert at the Luneta Park with his father Tony. The
child stood on a chair to be able to see the performers
on the stage. Juanito, a 10-year-old boy, who was also
watching the concert, could not see much of the
performance on the stage because Tonito was blocking
his line of sight by standing on the chair.
Using his elbow, Juanito strongly shoved Tonito to get
a good view of the stage. The shove caused Tonito to
fall to the ground. Seeing this, Tony struck Juanito on
the head with his hand and caused the boy to fall and
to hit his head on a chair. Tony also wanted to strangle
Juanito but the latter's aunt prevented him from doing
so. Juanito sustained a lacerated wound on the head
that required medical attendance for 10 days.
Tony was charged with child abuse in violation of Sec.
10(a), in relation to Sec. 3(b)(2), of R.A. No. 7610 for
allegedly doing an "act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being."
In his defense, Tony contended that he had no
intention to maltreat Juanito, much less to degrade his
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. Was
Tony criminally liable for child abuse under R.A. No.
7610? Explain your answer. (2017 BAR)
A: NO. Tony laid hands on Juanito without intent to
debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Juanito as a
human being. It appears that the laying of hands on
Juanito have been done at the spur of the moment and in
anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
87
son, Tonito, who fell to the ground due to the shoving of
Juanito. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so
essential in the crime of child abuse; hence, the crime
committed is only physical injuries. (Bongalon v. People,
G.R. No. 169533, 20 Mar. 2013) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
b) CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSE
Sec. 5, R.A. No. 7610 as amended by 11648
(2022, 2020-21, 2018, 2016 BAR)
Q: Madame X, with the promise of money, and without
the use of force, intimidation, or threat, enticed Zia, a
15-year-old, to engage in oral sex by allowing Madame
X to lick Zia’s vagina. Zia consented because she
needed the money. What crime, if any, was committed
by Madame X? (2022 BAR)
A: Madame X is liable for Acts of Lasciviousness but the
penalty to be imposed shall be that provided under R.A.
No. 7610.
R.A. No. 7610, as amended by R.A. No. 11648, punishes
those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Art. 335(3), for rape and Art. 336 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the RPC, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under 16 years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; xxx
It bears emphasis, as well, that consent is immaterial in
cases involving violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No.
7610. The law being malum prohibitum, the mere act of
committing lascivious conduct with a child subjected to
sexual abuse already constitutes the offense. (Carbonell v.
People, G.R. No. 246702, 28 Apr. 2021) (Bar Q&A by Judge
Alejandria, 2023)
Q: Interviewed for a newspaper, a former beauty
queen revealed that when she was 16 years old, she
had her first sexual intercourse with her ex-boyfriend,
who was then 28 years old. In her narration, she said
that she did not know what she was doing and noted
that her ex-boyfriend of a more advanced age misled
her into doing what he wanted. She added that, at
certain points during the encounter, she repeatedly
said no but her ex-boyfriend was just too strong for
her. The ex-boyfriend left her shortly thereafter. Was
there a crime committed by the ex-boyfriend? Explain
briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
A: YES, the ex-boyfriend is liable for violation of R.A. 7610.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
in child abuse cases under R.A. No. 7610, the sweetheart
defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The
language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish those who
commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse. Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial
in cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No.
7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the
offense. It is malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
(People v. Udang, Sr., G.R. No. 210161, 10 Jan. 2018)
Here, regardless whether the former beauty queen gave or
did not give her consent to the sexual intercourse, the
adult ex-boyfriend having sexual intercourse with a 16-
year-old child defined under the law is liable for
committing sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610. (Bar Q&A by
Judge Alejandria, 2023)
Q: With a promise of reward, Robert asked Romy to
bring him a young girl that he (Robert) can have
carnal knowledge with. Romy agreed, seized an 8-
year-old girl and brought her to Robert. After
receiving his reward, Romy left while Robert
proceeded to have carnal knowledge with the girl.
(2018 BAR)
(a) For what felony may Robert and Romy be
charged?
A: Robert may be charged with the crime of Child
Prostitution or other sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610, as amended by R.A. No. 11648, by having sexual
intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution. Because
the victim was under 16 years of age, (in this case, 8
years), Robert shall be prosecuted under Art. 266-A and
266-B of the RPC.
Romy, on the other hand, may be charged with the crime
of Child Prostitution or other sexual abuse under Sec. 5(a)
of R.A. No. 7610 by acting as procurer of a child prostitute.
(b) Will your answer in (a) be the same if the
victim is a 15-year-old lass who was enticed,
through cunning and deceit of Romy, to
voluntarily go to the house of Robert where
the latter subsequently had carnal knowledge
with her?
A: YES. R.A. No. 7610 covers sexual abuse committed
against a child or children below 18 years of age. Children
who, for money, profit, or any other consideration due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse. Robert and Romy may be prosecuted under
the said law. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Q: Braulio invited Lulu, his 11-year-old stepdaughter,
inside the master bedroom. He pulled out a knife and
threatened her with harm unless she submitted to his
desires. He was touching her chest and sex organ
when his wife caught him in the act.
The prosecutor is unsure whether to charge Braulio
for acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, for
lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 (Special
Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discrimination Act); or for rape under Art. 266-A of
the RPC. What is the crime committed? Explain. (2016
BAR)
A: The acts of Braulio of touching the chest and sex organ
of Lulu who is under 16 years of age, are merely Acts of
Lasciviousness and not attempted rape because intent to
have sexual intercourse is not clearly shown. (People v.
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 Dec. 2013)
The same acts of touching the chest and sex organ of Lulu
under psychological coercion or influence of her
stepfather, Braulio, constitutes sexual abuse under Sec.
5(b) of RA No. 7610. (People v. Optana, G.R. No. 133922, 12
Feb. 2001)
Since the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Art.
336 of the RPC are met, in addition to the requisites for
sexual abuse under Sec. 5 of RA No. 7610, and the victim is
under 16 years of age, Braulio shall be prosecuted for acts
of lasciviousness under the RPC but the penalty imposable
is that prescribed by RA No. 7610. (Amployo v. People, G.R.
No. 157718, 26 Apr. 2005) Under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610
(as amended by R.A No. 11648), when the victim (child
subjected to sexual abuse) is under 16 years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted (for acts of
lasciviousness) under Art. 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended: Provided, That the penalty for lasciviousness
conduct when the victim is under 16 years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
c) ATTEMPT TO COMMIT CHILD PROSTITUTION
Sec. 6, R.A. No. 7610
d) CHILD TRAFFICKING
Sec. 5, R.A. No. 7610 as amended by 11648
e) ATTEMPT TO COMMIT CHILD TRAFFICKING
Sec. 8, R.A. No. 7610
f) OBSCENE PUBLICATION AND INDECENT SHOWS
Sec. 9, R.A. No. 7610 as amended by 11648
g) EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN
Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7610 as amended by R.A. No. 9231
88
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
OTHER ACTS OF NEGLECT, ABUSE, CRUELTY OR
EXPLOITATION AND OTHER CONDITIONS
PREJUDICIAL TO THE CHILD'S DEVELOPMENT
Sec. 10
(2016, 1993 BAR)
Q: Arnold, 25 years of age, was sitting on a bench in
Luneta Park, watching the statue of Jose Rizal, when,
without his permission, Leilani, 17 years of age, sat
beside him and asked for financial assistance,
allegedly for payment of her tuition fee, in exchange
for sex.
While they were conversing, police operatives
arrested and charged him with violation of Sec. 10 of
R.A. No. 7610, accusing him of having in his company a
minor, who is not related to him, in a public place. It
was established that Arnold was not in the
performance of a social, moral, and legal duty at that
time. Is Arnold liable for the charge? Explain. (2016
BAR)
A: NO, Arnold is not liable. Under Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 7610,
as amended by R.A No. 11648, any person who shall keep
or have in his company a minor, 16 years or under or who
in 10 years or more his junior in any public or private
place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret,
pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or
other tourist resort, or similar places is liable for child
abuse.
To be held liable under Sec. 10(b) of R.A. No. 7610, it is
indispensable that the child in the company of the
offender must be 16 years old or under or who is 10 years
or more his junior in a public place. In this case, Leilani is
17 years of age, and she is only 8 years younger than
Arnold. Moreover, Leilani sat beside Arnold without his
permission. Hence, he is not in the company of a child in a
public place.
Lastly, applying the episdem generis principle, Luneta Park
is not a place similar to hotel, motel, beer joint,
discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage
parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Sometime in Dec. 1992, retired Lt. Col. Agaton,
celebrating the first year of his compulsory retirement
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had in his
company a 14-year-old girl whose parents were killed
by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and being totally
orphaned has been living or fending for herself in the
streets in Manila. They were alone in one room in a
beach resort and stayed there for two (2) nights. No
sexual intercourse took place between them. Before
they parted, retired Lt. Col. Agaton gave the girl
P1,000.00 for her services. She gladly accepted it.
(1993 BAR)
89
(a) What crime may the retired colonel be
charged with, if any? Discuss.
A: The retired colonel may be charged with child abuse, in
violation of R.A No. 7610, a law providing special
protection against child abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination. One of the acts of child abuse or
exploitation penalized under Art. VI of R.A No. 7610 is that
of keeping company of a minor who is ten (10) years or
younger than the offender in a hotel, motel, beer house,
disco joint, pension house, cabaret, sauna or massage
parlor, beach resort, and similar places.
Considering that Lt. Col. Agaton is a retiree pursuant to a
compulsory retirement, while the child he kept company
within a private room in the beach resort, is only 14 years
old, there must be an age difference of more than 10 years
between them. This fact plus the circumstance that Lt. Col.
Agaton stayed with the child, a girl, in one room at such
beach resort for two nights, and thereafter he gave her
P1,000.00 "for her services", constitutes the very evil
punished, among other acts, in said law.
(b) What possible defenses can he interpose?
Explain.
A: The possible defenses Lt. Col. Agaton may interpose
are:
(a) That the child is related to him within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity or by a bond
recognized in law, or local customs and traditions; or
(b) That he was only acting in pursuance of a moral, social
or legal duty. (Sec. 10 (b), Art. VI, R.A. No. 7610) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
5. PROHIBITION OF CHILD MARRIAGE LAW
R.A No. 11596
a) DEFINITION OF TERMS
Sec. 3
b) UNLAWFUL ACTS
Sec. 4
c) PUBLIC CRIMES
Sec. 5
6. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER PROTECTION
AGAINST RAPE AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND
ABUSE, INCREASING THE AGE FOR DETERMINING THE
COMMISSION ON STATUTORY RAPE
R.A No. 11648
a) AMENDMENT ON RAPE
Sec. 1
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
b) AMENDMENT ON QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Sec. 2
I. CRIMES AGAINST
PERSONAL LIBERTYAND SECURITY
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2016, 2014, 2012, 2009,
1999, 1998, 1991, 1989, 1988, 1989 BAR)
KIDNAPPING; ILLEGAL DETENTION
(2020-21, 2016, 2014, 2009, 1991 BAR)
Q: The accused in a pending case forcibly snatched the
daughter of a Judge and kept her in an undisclosed
location. The accused then called to tell the Judge that
the daughter would only be released if the Judge
would acquit the accused in the pending case.
moreover, that at the time abduction is committed with
lewd design; hence, his abduction constitutes illegal
detention. Since Angelino was killed in the course of the
detention, the crime constitutes Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention with Homicide under Art. 267.
Having sexual intercourse with Angelino is not rape
through sexual intercourse since the victim in this crime
must be a woman. This act is not rape through sexual
assault either. Razzy did not insert his penis into the anal
orifice or mouth of Angelino or an instrument or object
into anal orifice or genital orifice, hence, this act
constitutes acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336. Since the
acts of lasciviousness is committed by reason or occasion
of kidnapping, it will be integrated into one and indivisible
felony of kidnapping with homicide. (People v. De Leon,
G.R. No. 179943, 26 June 2009; People v. Jugueta, G.R. No.
202124, 05 Apr. 2016)

Max is liable for kidnapping with homicide as an

Did the accused commit a crime with these acts?
accomplice since he concurred in the criminal design of
Explain briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
Razzy in depriving Angelino his liberty and supplied the
former material aid in an efficacious way by helping him
A: YES, the accused is liable for Serious Illegal Detention
beat the latter. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
against the daughter of the judge.

Q: A charged B with the crime of rape. While the case

In the case at bar, when the accused detains the daughter
was pending in court, B, together with his mother and
of the judge and was not allowed to be released until the
brother, overpowered A while riding a tricycle,
judge acquits him, there was actual deprivation of the
dragged her inside a carenderia owned by them and
victim’s liberty. Deprivation of liberty is qualified to
detained her for two (2) days. They demanded that
serious illegal detention when the victim is a female
she sign an affidavit of desistance and reimburse B the
punishable under Art. 267 of the RPC.
sum of P5,000.00 which he paid to his lawyer in the
case. She was released only after she signed the
The accused may also be liable for the crime Grave
affidavit asking for the dismissal of the case and
Coercion under Art. 286 of the RPC. Since the purpose of
delivered to B P1,000.00. She promised to deliver the
the accused is to compel the judge to acquit him, the
balance of P4,000.00 30 days later. What crime/s
taking of the judge’s daughter constitutes violence to
was/were committed by B, his mother and brother?
control the judge to do something against his will. (Bar
(1991 BAR)
Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)

A: This is Kidnapping with Ransom which is kidnapping or

Q: Angelino, a Filipino, is a transgender who
illegal detention committed by a private person for the
underwent gender reassignment and had implants in
purpose of extorting ransom. Since the victim is a woman,
different parts of her body. She changed her name to
it is serious. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Angelina and was a finalist in the Miss Gay
International. She came back to the Philippines and
Q: Virgilio, armed with a gun, stopped a van along a
while she was walking outside her home, she was
major thoroughfare in Manila, pointed the gun at the
abducted by Max and Razzy who took her to a house in
driver and shouted: "Tigil! Kidnap ito!"
the province. She was then placed in a room and Razzy
forced her to have sex with him at knife's point. After
Terrified, the driver, Juanito, stopped the van and
the act, it dawned upon Razzy that Angelina is actually
allowed Virgilio to board. Inside the van were
a male. Incensed, Razzy called Max to help him beat
Jeremias, a 6-year-old child, son of a multi-millionaire,
Angelina. The beatings that Angelina received
and Daday, the child’s nanny. Virgilio told Juanito to
eventually caused her death. What crime or crimes, if
drive to a deserted place, and there, ordered the
any, were committed? Explain. (2016 BAR)
driver to alight. Before Juanito was allowed to go,
Virgilio instructed him to tell Jeremias’ parents that
A: Razzy is liable for Kidnapping with Homicide.
unless they give a ransom of P10-million within 2
Abducting Angelino is not forcible abduction since the
days, Jeremias would be beheaded. Daday was told to
victim in this crime must be a woman. Gender
remain in the van and take care of Jeremias until the
reassignment will not make him a woman within the
ransom is paid. Virgilio then drove the van to his
meaning of Art. 342 of RPC. There is no showing,
safehouse.

U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S 90
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
What crime or crimes, if any, did Virgilio commit?
Explain. (2009 BAR)
A: The crime committed against Jeremias, the 6-year-old
child, is Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention under
Art. 267(4) of the RPC.
The criminal intent of Virgilio is to deprive Jeremias his
liberty to demand ransom. Whether or not the ransom
was eventually obtained will not affect the crime
committed because the demand for ransom is not an
element of the crime; it only qualifies the penalty to death
but the imposition of the penalty is now prohibited by R.A.
No. 9346.
As to Daday, the nanny of the child who was told to remain
in the van and take care of the child until the ransom is
paid, the crime committed by Virgilio is Serious Illegal
Detention because the offended party deprived of liberty
is a female (Art. 267(4), RPC).
Virgilio also committed Grave Coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for
seriously intimidating the driver with a gun pointed at him
to drive to a deserted place.
TRESPASS TO DWELLING
(2012, 1994 BAR)
Q: What is the criminal liability, if any, of a private
person who enters the dwelling of another against the
latter's will and by means of violence or intimidation
for the purpose of preventing some harm to himself?
(2012 BAR)
a. The private person is criminally liable for
qualified trespass to dwelling.
b. The private person is criminally liable for
simple trespass to dwelling.
c. The private person incurs no criminal
liability.
d. The private person is criminally liable for
light threats.
A: C. Under Art. 280 of the RPC, qualified trespass to
dwelling is committed by any private person who shall
enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will and
by means of violence or intimidation. However, the
provisions of Art. 280 shall not be applicable to any
person who shall enter another’s dwelling for the purpose
of preventing some serious harm to himself. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way
inside the house of Mamerto. Jay, Mamerto’s son, saw
Dante and accosted him. Dante pulled a knife and
stabbed Jay in his abdomen. Mamerto heard the
commotion and went out of his room. Dante, who was
about to escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered
injuries which, were it not for the timely medical
attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto
91
sustained injuries that incapacitated him for 25 days.
What crime/s did Dante commit? (1994 BAR)
A: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling,
frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay, and less
serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be
complexed with frustrated homicide because when the
trespass is committed as a means to commit a more
serious crime, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the
greater crime and the former constitutes an aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. (People v. Abedosa, G.R. No. L-
28600, 21 Mar. 1928)
Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of
Jay because he had already performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the intended felony
of homicide were it not for causes independent of the act
of Dante. Dante had the intent to kill judging from the
weapon used, the manner of committing the crime and the
part of the body stabbed.
Dante is guilty of less serious physical injuries for the
wounds sustained by Mamerto. There appears to be no
intent to kill because Dante merely assaulted Mamerto
without using the knife. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
THREATS AND COERCION
(2016, 2014, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 1999, 1998,
1989, 1988, 1989 BAR)
Q: A entered the house of B. Once inside the house of
B, A took and seized personal property by compulsion
from B with the use of violence and force upon things,
believing himself to be the owner of the personal
property so seized. What is the criminal liability of A?
(2012 BAR)
A. A is criminally liable for robbery with violence
because he employed violence in the taking of
the personal property from B, robbery
characterized by violence being graver than
ordinary robbery committed with force upon
things.
B. A is criminally liable for robbery with force
upon things in an inhabited house because the
act was committed in a house constituting the
dwelling of one or more persons.
C. A is criminally liable for grave coercion
because the presumption of intent to gain is
rebutted.
D. A is criminally liable for qualified trespass to
dwelling because he employed violence.
A: C. A is criminally liable for grave coercion because
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
the presumption of intent to gain is rebutted.
A is not criminally liable for robbery since the
presumption of intent to gain, an element of this crime, is
rebutted because he took the personal property under a
bona fide belief that he owns the property. However, A is
liable for grave coercion because he used violence in
seizing the property by reason of his mistaken belief that
he owned it.
Q:
(a) Distinguish coercion from illegal detention.
(1999 BAR)
A: Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention as
follows: In coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the
employment of violence or serious intimidation
approximating violence, without authority of law, to
prevent a person from doing something not prohibited by
law or to compel him to do something against his will
whether it be right or wrong; while in Illegal Detention,
the basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of
a person thereby depriving him of his liberty without
authority of law. If there was no intent to lock up or detain
the offended party unlawfully, the crime of illegal
detention is not committed.
(b) Forcibly brought to the police headquarters, a
person was tortured and maltreated by agents
of the law to compel him to confess a crime
imputed to him. The agents failed, however, to
draw from him a confession which was their
intention to obtain through the employment of
such means. What crime was committed by
the agents of the law? (1999 BAR)
A: Evidently, the person tortured and maltreated by the
agents of the law is a suspect and may have been detained
by them. If so and he had already been booked and put in
jail, the crime is Maltreatment of Prisoner and the fact that
the suspect was subjected to torture to extort a confession
would bring about a higher penalty, in addition to the
offender’s liability for the physical injuries inflicted.
But if the suspect was forcibly brought to the police
headquarters to make him admit the crime and
tortured/maltreated to make him confess to such crime,
but later released because the agents failed to draw such
confession, the crime is Grave Coercion because of the
violence employed to compel such confession without the
offended party being confined in jail. (US v. Cusi, G.R. No. L-
3699, 18 Mar. 1908)
It is noted that the offended party was merely “brought” to
the police headquarters and is thus not a detention
prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the crime
committed would be Maltreatment of Prisoners. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Q: Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his initials. He
saw Roy wearing the said necklace. Isagani asked Roy
to return to him the necklace as it belongs to him, but
Roy refused. Isagani then drew his gun and told Roy,
“If you will not give back the necklace to me, I will kill
you!” Out of fear for his life and against his will, Roy
gave the necklace to Isagani. What offense did Isagani
commit? (1998 BAR)
A: Isagani committed the crime of Grave Coercion (Art.
286, RPC) for compelling Roy, by means of serious threats
or intimidation, to do something against the latter’s will,
whether it be right or wrong. Serious threats or
intimidation approximating violence constitute grave
coercion, not grave threats. Such is the nature of the threat
in this case because it was committed with a gun, is a
deadly weapon.
The crime cannot be robbery because intent to gain, which
is an essential element of robbery, is absent since the
necklace belongs to Isagani. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Lina worked as a housemaid and yaya of the one-
week-old son of the Sps. John and Joana. When Lina
learned that her 70-year old mother was seriously ill,
she asked John for a cash advance of P20,000.00, but
the latter refused. In anger, Lina gagged the mouth of
the child with stockings, placed him in a box, sealed it
with masking tape, and placed the box in the attic.
Lina then left the house and asked her friend Fely to
demand a P20,000.00 ransom for the release of the
spouses' child to be paid within 24 hours. The spouses
did not pay the ransom. After a couple of days, John
discovered the box in the attic with his child already
dead. According to the autopsy report, the child died
of asphyxiation barely minutes after the box was
sealed.
What crime or crimes, if any, did Lina and Fely
commit? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed by Lina is Murder for killing a
child of tender years. Fely shall not be liable for murder
because there is no showing that she participated with
Lina in putting the child in the box which caused the
latter's death.
The act of demanding ransom by Fely would not
constitute the crime of Kidnapping since there was
actually no “taking to another place” was committed for
the purpose of detaining the child in exchange for ransom.
Fely may be liable however for Light Coercion under Art.
287(2) of the RPC, which provides; any other coercions or
unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a
fine ranging from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or both, for
demanding ransom for the release of the spouses' child to
be paid within 24 hours. It cannot be said that such act
constitutes Grave Coercion in the absence of violence
employed. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
92
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
1. CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012 A: The accused may be liable under R.A. No. 10175, or the
R.A. No. 10175 Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Under Sec. 4(c)(4), a
(2022, 2019, 2018 BAR) cybercrime offense includes the unlawful or prohibited
acts of libel as defined in Art. 355 of the RPC committed
through a computer system or any other similar means
a) CYBERCRIME OFFENSES
which may be devised in the future. Thus, R.A. No. 10174
Sec. 4
penalizes the publication of a libelous article on an online
(2022, 2019, 2018 BAR)
news platform, and the penalty to be imposed shall be one
(1) degree higher than that provided under the RPC,
Q: During the 2022 national elections, Bern posted on
pursuant to Sec. 6. thereof. (UPLC Suggested Answer)
her Facebook page a statement that Alfredo, an
incumbent mayor vying for re-election, has a pending
Q: Mr. S, a businessman and information technology
corruption case with the Sandiganbayan for pocketing
practitioner, claimed to have devised an innovative
Php 20,000,000.00 of public funds under his custody.
business model. He would diligently compile a list of
Czarina, Bern’s friend, saw the post and commented
known personalities and entities in the fields of
online, stating: “Bhie, true yan. Alfredo is so corrupt.
entertainment, arts, culture, and sports, and acquire
Marami ding binabahay yan. Sugarol pa!” Donnabel,
numerous domain names on the internet using the
also Bern’s friend, reacted to Bern’s post by clicking
names of these known personalities and entities for
the “like” button. Another person, Justine, who is a
the purpose of selling these registered domain names
stranger to Bern and her friends, but who claims to be
to said personalities and entities in the future.
a crusader for good governance, came across the said
post. Finding it relevant to her advocacy and crusade,
Does Mr. S's "innovative business model" expose him
Justine shared the link to Bern’s post on her Twitter
to any criminal liability under the Cybercrime
account. Who among Bern, Czarina, Donnabel, and
Prevention Act of 2012? If so, for what crime? Explain.
Justine, if any, are liable for the crime of Cyberlibel?
(2019 BAR)
(2022 BAR)

A: YES. Mr. S’s “business model” exposes him to liability

A: Only Bern shall be liable for Cyberlibel. Liking, sharing,
for Cyber Squatting under Sec. 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime
or retweeting a libelous post would generally not be
Prevention Act of 2012. (R.A. No. 10175)
criminal in nature, and subject the person liking, sharing,
or retweeting to liability for the crime of cyberlibel.
Cyber Squatting is the acquisition of a domain name over
(Disini, et al. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, 11 Feb.
the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
2014). Under the legal maxim, nullum crimen nulla sine
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same,
poena lege, if there is no law punishing such act, and in the
if such a domain name is:
absence of legislation expressly prohibiting such activity,
there should be no crime. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria,
a. Similar, identical or confusingly similar to an
2023)
existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time of the
Q: Mr. L is a newspaper reporter who writes about
domain name registration;
news items concerning the judiciary. Mr. L believed
that members of the judiciary can be criticized and
b. Identical or in any way similar with the name of a
exposed for the prohibited acts that they commit by
person other than the registrant, in case of a
virtue of the public nature of their offices. Upon
personal name; and
receiving numerous complaints from private citizens,
Mr. L released a scathing newspaper expose involving
c. Acquired without right or with intellectual
Judge G and his alleged acts constituting graft and
property interests in it. (UPLC Suggested Answer)
corruption. Consequently, Mr. L was charged with the
crime of Libel.
Q: Robin and Rowell are best friends and have been
classmates since grade school. When the boys
In response, Mr. L contended that truth is a valid
graduated from high school, their parents gifted them
defense in Libel and in this relation, claimed that he
with a trip to Amsterdam, all expenses paid. At age 16,
was only exposing the truth regarding Judge G's
this was their first European trip. Thrilled with a
misdeeds. Further, Mr. L contended that in any event,
sense of freedom, they decided to try what Amsterdam
his expose on Judge G is based on the complaints he
was known for. One night, they scampered out of their
received from private citizens, and as such, should be
hotel room, and went to the De Wallen, better known
deemed as a mere fair commentary on a matter of
as the Red-light District of Amsterdam. There, they
public interest.
went to a "coffee shop" which sells only drinks and
various items made from opium poppy, cannabis, and
What is the effect on the criminal liability of an
marijuana, all of which are legal In Amsterdam. They
accused if he or she publishes a libelous article on an
represented themselves to be of age, and were served,
online news platform? Explain. (2019 BAR)

93 U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
and took shots of, cannabis and marijuana products.
They indulged In these products the whole night, even J. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
if it was their first time to try them. (2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2005, 2003,
Before returning to Manila, they bought a dozen 2002, 2001, 2000, 1996, 1992, 1988, 1987 BAR)
lollipops laced with cannabis, as souvenir and
“pasalubong” for their friends. They were accosted at
the Manila International Airport and were charged
ROBBERY
with importation of dangerous drugs under the
(2022, 2020-21, 2019, 2018, 2012, 2010, 2009, 2003,
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. They
2002, 2001, 2000, 1996, 1992, 1988, 1987 BAR)
were also charged with use of dangerous drugs after
pictures of them in the "coffee shop" in Amsterdam
NOTE: See also Q&A under Special Complex Crimes – page
were posted on Facebook, showing them smoking and
8.
taking shots of a whole menu of cannabis and
marijuana products. Their own captions on their
Q: One Sunday afternoon, while standing at the corner
Facebook posts clearly admitted that they were using
of C.P. Garcia and Katipunan Avenues, an off-duty
the dangerous products. The pictures were posted by
police officer accosted a motorcycle rider and asked
them through Private Messenger (PM) only for their
them to alight. The off-duty police officer then
close friends, but Roccino, the older brother of one of
inspected the motorcycle's compartment box.
their best friends, was able to get hold of his younger
Pretending that a sachet of shabu was found, the off-
brother's password, and without authority from his
duty police officer demanded PHP1,000.00 in order to
brother, accessed his PM and shared Robin and
prevent an arrest.
Rowell's Amsterdam photos on Facebook.

Fearful of being incarcerated for life for a crime that

Can Roccino be prosecuted for the act of accessing and
was not really committed, the motorcycle rider
sharing on Facebook the private pictures sent by PM
readily complied. Unknown to the off-duty police
to his brother? If yes, for what crime? (2018 BAR)
officer, a surveillance camera caught the entire
incident. Will a charge of robbery prosper against the
A: Roccino shall be liable for the violation of R.A. No.
off-duty police officer? Explain briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. All
crimes defined and penalized by the RPC, as amended, and
A: YES, the charge for Robbery against off-duty police
special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
officer will prosper.
information and communications technologies shall be
liable under R.A. No. 10175. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
The elements of the crime of robbery under Art. 293 of the
RPC are (1) that there is taking of personal property; (2)
b) OTHER OFFENSES
the personal property belongs to another; (3) the taking is
Sec. 5
with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

There is intimidation when there is unlawful coercion;

extortion, duress; putting in fear. To take, or attempt to
take, by intimidation means “willfully to take, or attempt
to take, by putting in fear of bodily harm.” As shown in
United States v. Osorio (G.R. No. 6660, 17 Jan. 1912),
material violence is not indispensable for there to be
intimidation, intense fear produced in the mind of the
victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is
sufficient. (Jomar Ablaza v. People, G.R. No. 217722, 26 Sept.
2018)

In this case, the demand of the police officer for PHP1,000

to refrain from arresting the motorcycle rider and because
of fear of being incarcerated for a crime he did not commit
and the motorcycle rider complied, the charge for robbery
against the off-duty police officer is proper since the
taking with intent to gain, committed through intimidation
are present. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)

U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S 94
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Q: A entered the house of another without employing
force or violence upon things. He was seen by a maid
who wanted to scream but was prevented from doing
so because A threatened her with a gun. A then took
money and other valuables and left. Is A guilty of theft
or robbery? Explain. (2002 BAR)
A: A is liable for robbery because the intimidation he
employed on the maid before the taking of the money and
other valuables. It is the intimidation of the person
relative to the taking that qualifies the crime as robbery,
instead of simply theft.
The non-employment of force upon things is of no
moment because robbery is committed not only by
employing force upon things but also by employing
violence against or intimidation of persons. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: A, brother of B, with the intention of having a night
out with his friends, took the coconut shell which is
being used by B as a bank for his coins from inside
their locked cabinet using their common key.
Forthwith, A broke the coconut shell outside of their
home in the presence of his friends. (2003 BAR)
(a) What is the criminal liability of A, if any?
Explain.
A: A is criminally liable for Robbery with Force upon
Things, because the coconut shell with the coins inside,
was taken with intent to gain and broken outside of their
home. (Art. 299 (b)(2), RPC)
(b) Is A exempted from criminal liability under
Art. 332 of the RPC for being a brother of B?
Explain.
A: NO. A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art.
332 because said Article applies only to theft, swindling,
or malicious mischief. Here, the crime committed is
robbery. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: In dire need of money, Mr. R decided to steal from
his next-door neighbor, Mrs. V. On the night of May 15,
2010, Mr. R proceeded with his plan entered Mrs. V's
bedroom by breaking one of the windows from the
outside. Finding Mrs. V sound asleep, he silently
foraged through her cabinet, and stashed all the
bundles of cash and jewelries he could find.
As Mr. R was about to leave, he heard Mrs. V shout,
"Stop or I will shoot you!", and when he turned
around, he saw Mrs. V cocking a rifle which has
pointed at him. Fearing for his life, Mr. R then lunged
at Mrs. V and was able to wrest the gun away from her.
Thereafter, Mr. R shot Mrs. V, which resulted in her
death. Mr. R's deeds were discovered on the very same
night as he was seen by law enforcement authorities
fleeing the crime scene.
95
What crime/s did Mr. R commit under the RPC?
Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: Mr. R committed Robbery with Homicide under Art.
293, in relation to Art. 294, par. 1 of the RPC. The elements
of the crime are: (a) the taking of personal property with
the use of violence or intimidation against the person; (b)
the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d)
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used it is generic sense, was committed. It
must be established that the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery and the killing is merely
incidental thereto.
Here, Mr. R’s intent to commit robbery preceded the
taking of Mrs. V’s life. The killing took place on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Wielding loose firearms, Rene and Roan held up a
bank. After taking the bank’s money, the robbers ran
towards their getaway car, pursued by the bank
security guards. As the security guards were closing in
on the robbers, the two fired their firearms at the
pursuing security guards. As a result, one of the
security guards was hit on the head causing his
immediate death.
For the taking of the bank’s money and killing of the
security guard with the use of loose firearms, the
robbers were charged in court in two separate
Informations, one for Robbery with Homicide
attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of
loose firearms, and the other for Illegal Possession of
Firearms. Are the indictments correct? (2018 BAR)
A: The indictment for Robbery with Homicide is correct.
Robbery with homicide, a special complex crime, is
primarily a crime against property and not against
persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery
with the latter being the main purpose of the criminal. The
elements of robbery with homicide are: (a) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to
another; the taking is characterized by intent to gain or
animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion, the crime of
homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed.
The indictment for Illegal Possession of Firearm is wrong.
In the case of People v. Gaborne (G.R. No. 210710, 27 July
2016), the Supreme Court clarified the issue, to wit: In
view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and
R.A. No. 10591, to P.D. No. 1866, separate prosecutions for
homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order.
Instead, illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken
as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It
is clear from the foregoing that where murder results
from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
FACULTY OF CIVI L LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
qualified illegal possession but murder. In such a case, the
use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a
separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere
aggravating circumstance.
Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it
becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The
intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal
possession of firearm and the commission of homicide or
murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a single
offense. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A person who, on the occasion of a robbery, kills a
bystander by accident is liable for two separate
crimes: robbery and reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. (2009 BAR)
A: FALSE, the crime committed is still Robbery with
Homicide because when someone dies, regardless who the
person is and regardless the number of persons killed on
occasion of Robbery, the crime committed is Robbery with
Homicide.
Q: Christopher, John, Richard, and Luke are fraternity
brothers. To protect themselves from rival
fraternities, they all carry guns wherever they go. One
night, after attending a party, they boarded a taxicab,
held the driver at gunpoint and took the latter's
earnings.
What crime, if any, did the four commit? Enumerate
the elements of the crime. (2010 BAR)
A: The crime committed is robbery by a band since there
were four (4) offenders acting in concert in committing
the robbery and all the four were armed.The elements of
this crime are: 1. unlawful taking of personal property
belonging to another (the earnings of the taxi-driver);2.
intent to gain in the taking; 3. violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things was employed
in the taking; and4. there were more than three armed
malefactors taking part in the commission of the robbery
(Art. 296 in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code)
THEFT
(2020-21, 2018, 2015, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2008, 2005,
2001, 2000, 1998, 1989 BAR)
Q: While executing a search warrant, a police officer
pocketed and absconded with the mobile phone of the
occupant of the premises being searched. The mobile
phone was not the subject of the search warrant. It
was not enumerated in the order.
Did the police officer commit a crime? Explain briefly.
(2020-21 BAR)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
A: YES, the police officer is liable for Theft. Theft is
consummated when three (3) elements concur: (1) the
actual act of taking without the use of violence,
intimidation, or force upon persons or things; (2) intent to
gain on the part of the taker; and (3) the absence of the
owner’s consent.
The police officer who is not authorized to take the mobile
phone, not being included as subject of the search warrant
and he took the same without to gain or animus lucrandi is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of
thing subject of asportation. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria,
2022)
Q: During a Senate hearing in aid of legislation, a
Senator's staff member took a resource person's
mobile phone without their consent or knowledge.
While the hearing was ongoing, the staff member read
the resource person's messages contained in the
mobile phone and hurriedly wrote notes which were
passed to the Senator. Thereafter, the staff
surreptitiously returned the mobile phone.
The resource person would not have noticed that the
mobile phone was taken had it not been for a TikTok
video posted by a journalist who was present during
the hearing. The TikTok video caught the entire act of
the Senator's staff member. The TikTok video even
had accompanying music and narration. The video
became viral. Can the staff member be liable for Theft
of the mobile phone? Explain briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
A: YES, the staff member shall be liable for the crime of
Theft.
Theft is consummated when three (3) elements concur:
(1) the actual act of taking without the use of violence,
intimidation, or force upon persons or things; (2) intent to
gain on the part of the taker; and (3) the absence of the
owner’s consent.
Intent to gain is presumed from all furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. (Herman Medina v. People, G.R. No. 182648, 17
June 2015)
The act of the staff member in taking the mobile phone,
without the owner’s consent and his act of taking
information therein to be used by the Senator that may be
used by him in the session satisfies the element of intent
to gain. The fact that the mobile phone was returned is of
no moment as the crime had already been consummated.
(Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)
Q: Is the crime of theft committed by a person who,
with intent to gain, takes a worthless check belonging
to another without the latter's consent? (2012 BAR)
96
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
A: YES. All the elements of the crime of theft are present:
that there be taking of personal property; that the
property belongs to another; and that the taking be done
with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner.
Q: Is the crime of theft susceptible of commission in
the frustrated stage? Explain your answer in relation
to what produces the crime of theft in Its
consummated stage and by way of illustration of the
subjective and objective phases of the felony. (2011
BAR)
A: There is no crime of Frustrated Theft, and this is well-
settled in the case of Valenzuela v. People. In that case, the
SC held that unlawful taking/asportacion, is the
deprivation of the one's personal property, is also the
element which produces Consummated Theft. This is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing belonging to another. Without
asportacion, there can only be attempted theft. That being
the case, the crime of theft cannot be committed in the
frustrated stage.
Q: On the way home from work, Rica lost her necklace
to a snatcher. A week later, she saw what looked like
her necklace on display in a jewelry store in Raon.
Believing that the necklace on display was the same
necklace snatched from her the week before, she
surreptitiously took the necklace without the
knowledge and consent of the store owner. Later, the
loss of the necklace was discovered, and Rica was
shown on the CCTV camera of the store as the culprit.
Accordingly, Rica was charged with theft of the
necklace. Rica raised the defense that she could not be
guilty as charged because she was the owner of the
necklace and that the element of intent to gain was
lacking.
What should be the verdict if: (2018 BAR)
(a) The necklace is proven to be owned by Rica?
A: Under Art. 308 of the RPC, theft is committed by any
person who, with intent to gain but without violence,
against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the
latter's consent. While the CCTV captured Rica
surreptitiously taking the necklace from a jewelry store
without the knowledge and consent of the store owner,
she cannot be charged with theft, because the taking was
made under a claim of ownership. The fact of ownership
negates any intention to gain, as Rica cannot steal the
necklace which she claims to own.
(b) It is proven that the store acquired the
necklace from another person who was the
real owner of the necklace?
97
A: Even if it was proven that the necklace was bought by
the store from another person who was the real owner of
the necklace, Rica still cannot be held liable for theft
absent a felonious intent. “Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea”. A crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.
The ruling in U.S. v. Vera (1 Phil 485, 31 May 1974) is
emphatic; i.e., if a person takes personal property of
another believing it to be his own, the presumption of
intent to gain is rebutted and therefore he is not guilty of
theft. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Bruno, a taxi driver, had an indebtedness in the
sum of P10,000.00 which would become due in one
week. He was starting to worry because he still had
not raised the amount to pay for his debt. Every day,
he had prayed for divine intervention. One night,
while returning the taxi to the garage, he found a
wallet on the back seat. Inspecting it, he learned that it
contained exactly P10,000.00 cash, the amount of his
obligation, and IDs. Thinking it was divine
intervention, and that his prayers were answered, he
took the money and used it to pay his debt. (2015
BAR)
(a) What crime, if any, did Bruno commit?
Explain.
A: Bruno committed the crime of theft. The owner is
known to Bruno because there are IDs found in the wallet.
Under Art. 308 of RPC, “theft is likewise committed by any
person who, having found lost property, shall fail to
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner”
(b) Assuming that instead of using the money,
Bruno turned over the wallet and its contents
to the nearby police station, and it was the
chief of police of that station who
appropriated the money for his own benefit,
what crime was committed by the chief of
police? Explain.
A: The chief of police is liable for theft. Although he is not
the one who found the property, he is considered as finder
in fact since the property was surrendered to him by the
actual finder. He acquired the position occupied by the
actual finder and assumed by voluntary substitution the
obligation to surrender the property to the lawful owner.
Appropriating the property is of the same character of that
made by one who originally found the same. (People v.
Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, 31 Mar. 1923) The liability of the
finder in fact is the same liability of the finder in law. Thus,
what the Chief of Police committed is Theft. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
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 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: Francis Garcia, a Jollibee waiter, found a gold
bracelet in front of his working place in Makati and,
upon inspecting it, saw the name and address of the
owner engraved on the inside. Remembering his
parents’ admonition that he should not take anything
which does not belong to him, he delivered the
bracelet to PO1 Jesus Reyes of the Makati quad
precinct with the instruction to locate the owner and
return it to him. PO1 Reyes, instead, sold the bracelet
and misappropriated the proceeds. Subsequent events
brought out the fact that the bracelet was dropped by
a snatcher who had grabbed it from the owner a block
away from where Francis had found it and further
investigation traced the last possessor as PO1 Reyes.
Charged with theft, PO1 Reyes reasoned out that he
had not committed any crime because it was not he
who had found the bracelet, and moreover, it turned
out to have been stolen. Resolve the case with reasons.
(2001 BAR)
A: PO1 Reyes is criminally liable. His contention that he
has not committed any crime because he was not the one
who found the bracelet and it turned out to be stolen also,
is devoid of merit. It is enough that the bracelet belonged
to another and the failure to restore the same to its owner
is characterized by intent to gain.
The act of PO1 Reyes of selling the bracelet which does not
belong to him and which he only held to be delivered to its
owner, is furtive misappropriation with intent to gain.
Where a finder of lost or mislaid property entrusts it to
another for delivery to the owner, the person to whom
such property is entrusted and who accepts the same,
assumes the relation of the finder to the owner as if he
was the actual finder; if he would misappropriate it, he is
guilty of theft. (People v. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, 31 Mar.
1923) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Sunshine, a “beauteous” colegiala but a shoplifter,
went to the Ever Department Store and proceeded to
the women’s wear section. The saleslady was of the
impression that she brought to the fitting room three
(3) pieces of swimsuits of different colors. When she
came out of the fitting room, she returned only two (2)
pieces to the clothes rack. The saleslady became
suspicious and alerted the store detective. Sunshine
was stopped by the detective before she could leave
the store and brought to the office of the store
manager. The detective and the manager searched her
and found her wearing the third swimsuit under her
blouse and pants. Was the theft consummated,
frustrated, or attempted? Explain. (2000 BAR)
A: The theft was consummated because the taking or
asportation was complete. The asportation is complete
when the offender acquired the exclusive control of the
personal property being taken. In this case, when
Sunshine wore the swimsuit under her blouse and pants
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
and was on her way out of the store, with evident intent to
gain, the taking constitutes theft and being complete, it is
consummated. It is not necessary that the offender is in a
position to dispose of the property. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
QUALIFIED THEFT
(2016, 2006, 2002, 1992 BAR)
Q: A fire broke out in a department store. A, taking
advantage of the confusion, entered the store and
carried away goods which he later sold. What crime, if
any, did he commit? Why? (2002 BAR)
A: A committed the crime of Qualified Theft because he
took the goods on the occasion of and taking advantage of
the fire which broke out in the department store. The
occasion of a calamity such as fire, when the theft was
committed, qualifies the crime under Art. 310 of the RPC,
as amended. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A is the driver of B’s Mercedez Benz car. When B
was on a trip to Paris, A used the car for a joy ride with
C whom he is courting. Unfortunately, A met an
accident. Upon his return, B came to know about the
unauthorized use of the car and sued A for Qualified
Theft. B alleged that A took and used the car with
intent to gain as he derived some benefit or
satisfaction from its use. On the other hand, A argued
that he has no intent of making himself the owner of
the car as he in fact returned it to the garage after the
joy ride. What crime/s, if any, were committed?
Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed by A is Carnapping. The unlawful
taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the Anti-
Carnapping Law (RA 6539, as amended) and not by the
provisions on qualified theft or robbery. (People v.
Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, 08 June 2004) The concept of
carnapping is the same as that of robbery and theft. Hence,
rules applicable to theft or robbery are also applicable to
carnapping. (People v. Asamuddin, G.R. No. 213913, 02
Sept. 2015) In theft, unlawful taking should be understood
within the Spanish concept of apoderamiento. In order to
constitute apoderamiento, the physical taking must be
coupled with the intent to appropriate the object, which
means intent to deprive the lawful owner of the thing,
whether permanently or temporarily. (People v.
Valenzuela, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007)
In this case, A took the car without the consent of B with
intent to temporarily deprive him of the car. Although the
taking was “temporary” and for a “joy ride”, the Supreme
Court in People v. Bustinera (supra), sustains as the better
view which holds that when a person, either with the
object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive,
or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he
is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the
personal property belonging to another and using it, his
98
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility,
satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Domingo is the caretaker of two (2) cows and two
(2) horses owned by Hannibal. Hannibal told Domingo
to lend the cows to Tristan on the condition that the
latter will give a goat to the former when the cows are
returned. Instead, Tristan sold the cows and pocketed
the money. Due to the neglect of Domingo, one of the
horses was stolen. Knowing that he will be blamed for
the loss, Domingo slaughtered the other horse, got the
meat, and sold it to Pastor. He later reported to
Hannibal that the two horses were stolen.
What crime/s, if any, were committed by Domingo?
Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: Domingo is liable for Qualified Theft. Although Tristan
received the horse with the consent of the owner,
Hannibal, his possession is merely physical or de facto
since the former is the employee of the latter. Slaughtering
the horse, which he physically possessed, and selling its
meat to Pastor shall be considered as taking without the
consent of the owner with intent to gain, which constitutes
theft. (Balerta v. People, G.R. No. 205144 26 Nov. 2014)
Since the horse is accessible to him, the theft is qualified
by the circumstances of abuse of confidence. (Yangco v.
People, G.R. No. 209373, 30 July 2014)
Further, Domingo committed an act in violation of the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D. No. 533). Cattle rustling is
the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without
the consent of the owner/raiser of large cattle, which
includes cows and horses, whether or not for profit or
gain, or whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation or intimidation of any person or
force upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or
taking its meat or hide without the consent of the
owner/raiser. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY AND REAL RIGHTS
(2019, 2018, 1998, 1996, 1989, 1988 BAR)
Q: A group of homeless and destitute persons invaded
and occupied the houses built by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) for certain military personnel. To
gain entry to the houses, the group intimidated the
security guards posted at the entrance gate with the
firearms they were carrying and destroyed the
padlocks of the doors of the houses with the use of
crowbars and hammers. They claimed that they would
occupy the houses and live therein because the houses
were idle, and they were entitled to free housing from
the government.
99
For the reason that the houses were already awarded
to military personnel who have been found to have
fully complied with the requirements for the award
thereof, NHA demanded the group to vacate within ten
(10) days from notice the houses they occupied and
were still occupying. Despite the lapse of the deadline,
the group refused to vacate the houses in question.
What is the criminal liability of the members of the
group, if any, for their actions? (2018 BAR)
A: The members of the group who, by means of violence
against or intimidation, shall take possession of any real
property or shall usurp any real rights in property
belonging to another, is criminally liable under Art. 312 of
the RPC or Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of
Real Rights in Property. In addition, they may also be
charged with other crimes resulting from their acts of
violence. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Teresita is the owner of a two-hectare land in
Bulacan which she planted to rice and corn. Upon her
arrival from a three-month vacation in the United
States, she was surprised to discover that her land had
been taken over by Manuel and Teofilo who forcibly
evicted her tenant-caretaker Juliana, after threatening
to kill the latter if she would resist their taking of the
land. Thereafter, Manuel and Teofilo plowed,
cultivated and appropriated the harvest for
themselves to the exclusion of Teresita. (1998 BAR)
(a) What crime or crimes did Manuel and Teofilo
commit? Explain.
A: Manuel and Teofilo committed the crime of Usurpation
of Real Rights under Art. 312 of the RPC for employing
violence against or intimidation of persons. The threats to
kill employed by them in forcibly entering the land is the
means of committing the crime and therefore absorbed in
the felony, unless the intimidation resulted in a more
serious felony.
(b) Suppose Manuel and Teofilo killed Juliana
when the latter refused to surrender
possession of the land, what crime or crimes
did the two commit? Explain.
A: The crime would still be Usurpation of Real Rights
under Art. 312, RPC, even if the said offenders killed the
caretaker because the killing is the violence against
persons which is the means for committing the crime and
as such, determinative only. However, this gives way to
the proviso that the penalty provided for therein is in
addition to the penalty incurred in the acts of violence
(murder or homicide) executed by them. The crime is
similar to a robbery where a killing is committed by
reason thereof, giving rise only to one indivisible offense,
plus the fine mentioned therein. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of land in the
foothills which he planted with lanzones. On his last
visit there, he was shocked to discover that his land
had been taken over by a group of 15 families whose
members had forcibly driven away his caretaker, had
appropriated the fruits for themselves, and were not
threatening to kill him should he try to eject them.
What crime should Jorge charge these 15 families?
Explain. (1988 BAR)
A: Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2 separate crimes
namely:
(a) Violation of Art. 282, Grave threats x x x; and
(b) Violation of Art. 312 which provides that: “Occupation
of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property. – Any person who, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real
rights in property belonging to another, in addition to
the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed
by him, shall be punished by a fine...” (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
SWINDLING AND OTHER DECEITS
(2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2002, 1996 BAR)
Q: What crime is committed by a capataz who enrolls
two fictitious names in the payroll and collects their
supposed daily wages every payday? (2017 BAR)
A: The crime committed is Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents. A capataz is a foreman for the
government and since the falsification of the public
document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the
proper charge is Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: Domingo is the caretaker of two (2) cows and two
(2) horses owned by Hannibal. Hannibal told Domingo
to lend the cows to Tristan on the condition that the
latter will give a goat to the former when the cows are
returned. Instead, Tristan sold the cows and pocketed
the money. Due to the neglect of Domingo, one of the
horses was stolen. Knowing that he will be blamed for
the loss, Domingo slaughtered the other horse, got the
meat, and sold it to Pastor. He later reported to
Hannibal that the two horses were stolen. (2016 BAR)
(a) What crime or crimes, if any, did Tristan
commit? Explain.
A: Tristan is liable for Estafa through Misappropriation
under Art. 315 of RPC. Their transaction is a
commodatum. He received the cows with the duty to
return the same thing deposited and acquired legal or
juridical possession. Selling the cows as if he owned it
constitutes misappropriation or conversion within the
contemplation of Art. 315. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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Q: In Aug. 2018, B entered a contract with S for the
purchase of the latter's second-hand car in the amount
of P400,000.00 payable in two (2) equal monthly
installments. Simultaneously with the signing of the
contract and S's turnover of the car keys, B executed,
issued, and delivered two (2) post-dated checks, all
payable to S, with the assurances that they will be
honored on their respective maturity dates.
However, all two (2) checks were dishonored for
being drawn against insufficient funds. Consequently,
notices therefore were duly issued to and received by
B, but this notwithstanding, no payment
arrangements were made by him. Further, upon S's
investigation, it was uncovered that B's checking
account had only P50,000.00 when it was opened in
June 2018 and no further deposits were made after
that. S also found out that B knew fully well of such
circumstance at the time he issued the two (2) checks.
What crime/s should B be charges with and for how
many counts? Explain. (2019, 2018 BAR)
A: B should be charged with 1 count of Estafa and 2 counts
of violation of B.P. 22. Under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC,
estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation is committed when: (a) the offender post-
dated a check, or issued a check in payment of an
obligation; and (b) such postdating or issuing a check was
done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. Here, B’s act of postdating checks in
payment of an obligation was the efficient cause of the
defraudation. Postdating the checks was committed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
B should also be charged with two (2) counts of violation
of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. B.P. 22 may be
violated by making or drawing and issuing any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check, which check
is subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment. Here, all the elements
of the offense are present. B issued two (2) checks, which
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds. The gravamen of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of the check, thus, the issuance of each bouncing
check constitutes as one count of the offense.
While a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from
an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present
different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from
each other. (Rimando v. Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583, 13 Oct.
2014) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
Q: Val, a Nigerian, set up a perfume business in the
Philippines. The investors would buy the raw
materials at a low price from Val. The raw materials
consisted of powders, which the investors would mix
with water and let stand until a gel was formed. Val
made a written commitment to the investors that he
would buy back the gel at a higher price, thus assuring
the investors of a neat profit. When the amounts to be
paid by Val to the investors reached millions of pesos,
he sold all the equipment of his perfume business,
absconded with the money, and is nowhere to be
found. What crime or crimes were committed, if any?
Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed is estafa through false pretenses
(Art. 315 (2)(a)). Val defrauded the investors by falsely
pretending to possess business or imaginary transactions.
The fact that he sold all the equipment of his perfume
business, and absconded with the money when the
amounts to be paid by him to the investors reached
millions of pesos shows that the transaction or his
business is imaginary, and he defrauded the victims.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: A sold a washing machine to B on credit with the
understanding that B could return the appliance
within two weeks if after testing the same, B decided
not to buy it. Two weeks lapsed without B returning
the appliance. A found out that B had sold the washing
machine to a third party. Is B liable for estafa? Why?
(2002 BAR)
A: NO. B is not liable for estafa because he is not just an
entrustee of the washing machine which he sold; he is the
owner thereof by virtue of the sale of the washing machine
to him. The sale being on credit, B as buyer is only liable
for the unpaid price of the washing machine; his
obligation is only a civil obligation. There is no felonious
misappropriation that could constitute estafa. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: On March 31, 1995, Orpheus Financing Corp.
received from Maricar the sum of P500,000 as money
market placement for sixty days at fifteen (15)
percent interest, and the President of said Corp.
issued a check covering the amount including the
interest due thereon, postdated May 30, 1995. On the
maturity date, however, Orpheus Financing Corp.
failed to deliver back Maricar's money placement with
the corresponding interest earned, notwithstanding
repeated demands upon said Corporation to comply
with its commitment. Did the President of Orpheus
Financing Corporation incur any criminal liability for
estafa for reason of the non-payment of the money
market placement? Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: NO. The President of the financing corporation does not
incur criminal liability for estafa because a money market
transaction partakes of the nature of a loan, such that non-
payment thereof would not give rise to estafa through
101
misappropriation or conversion. In money market
placement, there is transfer of ownership of the money to
be invested and therefore the liability for its return is civil
in nature. (Sesbreño v. CA, G.R. No. 84096, 26 Jan. 1995)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
ARSON
(2019, 2015, 2000, 1995, 1994, 1989 BAR)
Q: Mr. A has a long-standing feud with Mr. B. As
payback for Mr. B's numerous transgressions against
him, Mr. A planned to bum down Mr. B's rest house.
One night, Mr. A went to the rest house and started
pouring gasoline on its walls. However, just as Mr. A
had lit the match for burning, he was discovered by
Mr. B's caretaker, Ms. C, and was consequently
prevented from setting the rest house on fire. Mr. A
was then charged with Frustrated Arson. (2019 BAR)
(a) Is the charge of Frustrated Arson proper?
Explain.
A: NO, the proper charge is Attempted Arson. Under Art. 6
of the RPC, there is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Here,
Mr. A commenced the commission of arson by pouring
gasoline on the house and lighting a match. However, he
did not perform all the acts of execution which includes
setting the rest house on fire. Thus, Mr. A should only be
liable for Attempted Arson.
(b) Assuming that Mr. A successfully burned down
Mr. B's rest house, and as a result, Ms. C was
trapped therein and was subsequently killed
in the fire, what crime/s did Mr. A commit?
Explain.
A: In cases where both burning and death occur, in order
to determine what crime was committed, there is a need
to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the
main objective is the burning of the building or edifice but
death results by reason or on occasion of arson, the crime
is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if the main objective is to kill a particular person who
may be in the building or edifice, when fire is resorted to
as a means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed
is murder only; and (c) if the objective is to kill a
particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but the fire is resorted to as a means to cover up
the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed – homicide/murder and arson. (People v. Sota
and Gadjadli, G.R. No. 203121, 29 Nov. 2017)
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 CRIMINAL LAW
Here the main purpose was to burn the house and the 1. ANTI-FENCING LAW
death of Mr. C was only incidental, hence, arson was P.D. No. 1612
committed, and the homicide is absorbed. (UPLC (2016, 2014, 2013, 2010, 2005, 1996, 1995, 1992,
Suggested Answers) 1990, 1987 BAR)

Q: Senio planned to burn Bal's house. One evening,

a) FENCING
during a drinking spree at his house, Senio told his
(2016, 2014, 2013, 2010, 1995, 1987 BAR)
friends what he intended to do and even showed them
the gasoline in cans that he would use for the purpose.
Q: What are the elements of fencing? (1995 BAR)
Carlo, a common friend of Senio and Bal, was present
at the drinking spree. He was still sober when Senio
A: The elements of fencing are:
told them his plans. Before going home, Carlo warned
Bal that Senio would burn his house and had already
(a) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
bought gasoline that would be used for the purpose.
Bal reported the matter to the police authorities.
(b) Accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the
Meanwhile, Senio went to Bal's house and proceeded
crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
to pour gasoline around the walls of the house and it
conceals or disposes or buys and sells or in any
was at that point when he was caught by the police.
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
What crime did Senio commit, if any? Explain. (2015
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of
BAR)
said crime;

A: Senio is liable for Attempted Arson. He manifested

(c) The accused knows or should have known that said
before his intention to burn the house of Bal to his friends.
article, item, object, or anything of value has been
He then performed the act of pouring gasoline around the
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
walls of the house to execute his criminal design to
theft; and
commit arson. This is not just a preparatory act, because it
already ceased to be equivocal and revealed a clear
(d) There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
intention to burn the house. In sum, he already
himself or for another. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
commenced the commission of the crime of arson directly
by overt acts but he did not perform all acts to execute his
Q:
criminal design to commit arson by setting the house on
(a) What is the difference between a fence and an
fire due to a cause other than his spontaneous desistance,
accessory to theft or robbery? Explain. (1995
and that is, having been caught by the police. (UPLC
BAR)
Suggested Answers)

A: One difference between a fence and an accessory to

Q: One early evening, there was a fight between Eddie
theft or robbery is the penalty involved; a fence is
Gutierrez and Mario Cortez. Later that evening, at
punished as a principal under P.D. No. 1612 and the
about 11 o’clock, Eddie passed by the house of Mario
penalty is higher, whereas an accessory to robbery or theft
carrying a plastic bag containing gasoline, threw the
under the RPC is punished two degrees lower than the
bag at the house of Mario who was inside the house
principal, unless he bought or profited from the proceeds
watching television, and then lit it. The front wall of
of theft or robbery arising from robbery in Philippine
the house started blazing and some neighbors yelled
highways under P.D. No. 532 where he is punished as an
and shouted. Forthwith, Mario poured water on the
accomplice, hence the penalty is one degree lower.
burning portion of the house. Neighbors also rushed
in to help put the fire under control before any great
Also, fencing is a malum prohibitum and therefore there is
damage could be inflicted and before the flames have
no need to prove criminal intent of the accused; this is not
extensively spread. Only a portion of the house was
so in violations of RPC.
burned. Discuss Eddie’s liability. (2000 BAR)
(b) Is there any similarity between them? (1995
A: Eddie is liable for Destructive Arson in the
BAR)
consummated stage. It is destructive arson because fire
was resorted to in destroying the house of Mario which is
A: YES, there is similarity in the sense that all the acts of
an inhabited house or dwelling. The arson is
one who is an accessory to the crimes of robbery or theft
consummated because the house was in fact already
are included in the acts defined as fencing. In fact, the
burned although not totally. In arson, it is not required
accessory in the crimes of robbery or theft could be
that the premises be totally burned for the crime to be
prosecuted as such under the RPC or as a fence under P.D.
consummated. It is enough that the premises suffer
1612. The state may choose to prosecute the person either
destruction by burning. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
under the RPC or, P.D. 1612, although the preference for
the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing

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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612. creates a
presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty
based on the value of the property. (Dizon-Pamintuan v.
People, G.R. No. 111426, 11 July 1994) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
(1) DEFINITION
Sec. 2
(2016 BAR)
Q: Ofelia engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry,
was charged with violation of PD 1612, otherwise
known as the Anti-Fencing Law, for having been found
in possession of recently stolen jewelry valued at
P100,000.00 at her jewelry shop. Her defense is that
she merely bought the same from Antonia and
produced a receipt covering the sale. She presented
other receipts given to her by Antonia representing
previous transactions. Convicted of the charge, Ofelia
appealed, arguing that her acquisition of the jewelries
resulted from a legal transaction and that the
prosecution failed to prove that she knew or should
have known that the pieces of jewelry which she
bought from Antonia were proceeds of the crime of
theft. (2016 BAR)
(a) What is a “fence” under P.D. 1612?
A: A “fence” includes any person, firm, association
corporation or partnership or other organization
who/which commits the act of fencing. (Sec. 2(b), P.D.
1612)
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and
sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known
to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. (Sec. 2(a), P.D. 1612)
(b) Is Ofelia liable under the Anti-Fencing Law?
Explain.
A: NO, Ofelia is not liable under the Anti-Fencing Law.
While under the said law mere possession of any good,
article, item, object, or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing, such evidence when sufficiently
overturned constitutes a defense.
In this case, Ofelia's defense that she merely acquired the
jewelry through a legitimate transaction is sufficient.
Further, there is no other circumstance as regards the
jewelry which would indicate to Ofelia, an innocent
purchaser, that the jewelry was the subject of theft. There
was even a receipt produced by Ofelia for the transaction.
103
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: YES, under Sec. 5 of P.D. 1612,
mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. Failure to
prove that Ofelia knows, or should have known that the
jewelry is stolen is not a defense since this element is
presumed to be present because Ofelia is in possession of
the stolen property. Moreover, there is no showing that
Ofelia secured a permit or clearance from PNP station
commander of the place of sale required in Sec. 6 of P.D.
1612. (UPLC Suggested Answer to a 1995 bar question)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: NO. Although Ofelia as a
possessor of a stolen property is presumed to have
committed the crime of fencing such presumption is
overcome by presentation of the receipts showing that her
transaction is legitimate. The logical inference follows that
Ofelia had no reason to suspect that the jewelry was
stolen. Admittedly, there is no jurisprudence to the effect
that a receipt is a sufficient defense against charges of
fencing, but logically and for all practical purposes, such
receipt is proof—although disputable—that the
transaction in question is above-board and legitimate.
Absent other evidence, the presumption of innocence
remains. (D. M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 118590,
30 July 1996) (UPLC Suggested Answers)
(2) PRESUMPTION OF FENCING
Sec. 5
(2014, 2013, 2010, 1987 BAR)
Q: Manolo, an avid art collector, was invited to Tonio’s
house. There, Manolo noticed a nice painting that
exactly looked like the painting which he reported was
stolen from him some years back. Manolo confronted
Tonio about the painting, but Tonio denied any
knowledge, claiming that he bought the painting
legitimately from a friend. Manolo later proved to
Tonio that the painting was indeed the stolen painting.
What crime/s, if any, may Tonio be charged with?
(2014 BAR)
A: Tonio may be charged with the crime of fencing. Under
Sec. 5 of P.D. 1612, a mere possession of a stolen article or
object or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery is prima facie evidence of fencing.
Here, since Tonio is in possession of a stolen property, it is
presumed that he committed the crime of fencing. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Roberto bought a Toyota Fortuner from Iñigo for
P500,000. While driving his newly bought car, Roberto
met a minor accident that made the examination of his
vehicle's Registration Certificate necessary. When the
policeman checked the plate, chassis, and motor
numbers of the vehicle against those reflected in the
Registration Certificate, he found the chassis and
motor numbers to be different from what the
Registration Certificate stated. The Deed of Sale
covering the sale of the Fortuner, signed by Iñigo, also
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bore the same chassis and motor numbers as
Roberto's Registration Certificate. The chassis and
motor numbers on the Fortuner were found, upon
verification with the LTO, to correspond to a vehicle
previously reported as carnapped.
Roberto claimed that he was in good faith; Iñigo sold
him a carnapped vehicle and he did not know that he
was buying a carnapped vehicle. If you were the
prosecutor, would you or would you not charge
Roberto with a crime? (2013 BAR)
A: I will charge Roberto with violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law. The elements of “fencing” are:
a. a robbery or theft has been committed;
b. the accused, who took no part in the robbery or
theft, “buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any another manner deals in any article or object
taken” during robbery or theft;
c. the accused knows or should have known that the
thing was derived from that crime; and
d. by the deal he makes he intends to gain for
himself or for another.
Here, someone carnapped the vehicle, and sold it to
Roberto who did not take part in the crime. Roberto
should have known also that the car was stolen because it
was not properly documented as the deed of sale and
registration certificate did not reflect the correct numbers
of the vehicle’s engine and chassis. Apparently, he made
no effort to check the papers covering his purchase. Lastly,
Roberto’s defense of good faith is flawed because P.D.
1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is
regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of
criminal intent. (Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, 25 Jan.
2012)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The facts given show that
Roberto “bought” the car from Iñigo; that a “deed of sale”
covering the subject vehicle was executed by Iñigo; that
there is also a copy of the “Registration Certificate”; that
Roberto aver, too, of being a buyer in good faith and
lacking any knowledge that the subject car is a carnapped
vehicle.
As against the foregoing, there is only a certification from
the Land Transportation Office showing that the vehicle
had been previously reported as carnapped.
Consequently, in light of the satisfactory explanation of
Roberto of his possession of the vehicle, the presumption
of authorship of the theft upon a person found in
possession of the stolen personal property finds no
application in the instant case. There is thus, no probable
cause or evidence to warrant the prosecution of Roberto
for any wrongdoing. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Q: Arlene is engaged in the buy and sell of used
garments, more popularly known as "ukay-ukay."
Among the items found by the police in a raid of her
store in Baguio City were brand-new Louie Feraud
blazers. Arlene was charged with "fencing." Will the
charge prosper? Why or why not? (2010 BAR)
A: NO, a charge of “fencing” will not prosper. “Fencing” is
committed when a person, with intent to gain for himself
or for another, deals in any manner with an article of value
which he knows or should be known to him to have been
derived from proceeds of theft or robbery (Sec. 2, P.D.
1612). Thus, for a charge of fencing to prosper, it must first
be established that a theft or robbery of the article subject
of the alleged “fencing” has been committed – a fact which
is wanting in this case.
It should be noted that the suspect is engaged in the buy
and sell of used garments, which are in the nature of
personal property. In civil law, possession of personal or
movable property carries with it a prima facie
presumption of ownership. The presumption of “fencing”
arises only when the article or item involved is the subject
of a robbery or thievery. (Sec. 5, P.D. 1612) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received from the
Provincial Treasurer of the Province five (5) brand
new typewriters for use in the municipal treasurer’s
office. Each typewriter is valued at P10,000.00. Since
Pedro needed money for the hospitalization of his sick
son, he sold four (4) of the typewriters to his friend,
Rodolfo, a general merchant in San Isidro for
P2,000.00 each. Rodolfo, as a general merchant knew
that one typewriter could easily be between P6,000.00
to P10,000.00. For this reason, he readily agreed to
buy the typewriters. Rodolfo then resold the
typewriters at P6,000.00 thus making a profit of
P16,000.00.
Two months after the transaction, Pedro was audited
and the investigation as to his accountabilities led to
the discovery that Rodolfo bought the four (4)
typewriters from Pedro. Is Rodolfo liable as an
accessory or for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law?
(1987 BAR)
A: Rodolfo is not liable for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law as this law refers only to the buy and sell of articles of
value which are the proceeds of robbery and theft. Rodolfo
is liable as an accessory to the crime of malversation as he
purchased the typewriter for P2,000.00 each only
although he knew it could easily be sold for P6,000.00 to
P10,000.00. Therefore, he profited or assisted the
principal to profit from the effects or proceeds of the
commission of the crime. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
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 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
b) EXCEPTION
(1) WITH CLEARANCE OR PERMIT TO SELL
Sec. 6
K. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
(2019, 2016, 2013, 2010, 2009, 2007, 2006, 2005,
2002, 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991 BAR)
ADULTERY & CONCUBINAGE
(2019, 2010, 2005, 2002, 1994, 1991 BAR)
Q: A is married. He has a paramour with whom he had
sexual relations on a more or less regular basis. They
meet at least once a week in hotels, motels, and other
places where they can be alone. Is A guilty of any
crime? Why? (2002 BAR)
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
(2019, 2016, 2013, 2009, 2006, 1994, 1993, 1992
BAR)
Q: Mr. O, a 75-year-old retiree who has been a
widower for the last ten (10) years, believed that, at
past 70, he is licensed to engage in voyeurism to
satisfy his lustful desires. If not peeping into his
neighbors' room through his powerful single-cylinder
telescope, he would trail young and shapely girls
along the hallways and corridors of shopping malls.
While going up the escalator, he stayed a step behind a
mini-skirted, 20-year-old girl, and in the heat of the
moment, put his hand on her left buttock and
massaged it. The girl screamed and hollered for help.
Mr. O was thus apprehended and charged with Acts of
Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC. Mr. O's
counsel, however, claimed that Mr. O should only be
charged with the crime of Unjust Vexation.

Is the contention of Mr. O's counsel tenable? Explain.

A: A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by having sexual
(2019 BAR)
intercourse under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife.
A: NO, the contention of Mr. O’s counsel is untenable.
Under Art. 366 of the RPC, the elements of Acts of
Having sexual relations on a more or less regular basis in
Lasciviousness are:
hotels, motels, and other places may be considered
scandalous circumstances that offends public conscience,
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness
giving rise to criticism and general protest, such acts being
or lewdness;
imprudent and wanton and setting a bad example. (People
(2) That the lascivious act is committed against a person
v. Santos, 86 SCRA 705)
of either sex; and
(3) That it is done under any of the following
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation;
A is not guilty of any crime because a married man does
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason
not incur the crime of concubinage by merely having a
or otherwise unconscious;
paramour, unless under scandalous circumstances, or he
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
keeps her in the conjugal dwelling as a mistress or
abuse of authority; or
cohabits with her in any other place. His weekly meetings
(d) When the offended party is under 12 years of
with his paramour do not per se constitute scandalous
age or is demented.
circumstance. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Lascivious conduct is defined as “the intentional touching,

Q: A, a married woman, had sexual intercourse with a
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
man who was not her husband. The man did not know
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttock, or the introduction
she was married. What crime, if any, did each of them
of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
commit? Why? (2002 BAR)
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse , humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
A: A, the married woman, committed the crime of adultery
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
under Art. 333 of the RPC, as amended, for having sexual
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
intercourse with a man not her husband while her
area of a person.” (Orsos v. People, G.R. No. 214673, 20 Nov.
marriage is still subsisting. But the man who had carnal
2017)
knowledge of her, not knowing her to be married, shall not
be liable for adultery. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Here, when Mr. O touched the buttocks of the offended
party, he was animated with lewdness; thus, acts of
lasciviousness was committed.

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ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: YES, the contention of Mr. O’s Those who are regarded as “domestic” in relation to the
counsel is tenable. Mere touching or massaging the victim, enjoying the confidence and intimacy shared by
buttocks does not clearly indicate sexual design. To be members of the same household, such as household
liable under acts of lasciviousness, the act must be one helpers and boarders living under the same roof and with
that shows perversity to gratify sexual arousal or desire. same household as the victim. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Circumstances in the problem fell short to qualify as one.
Thus, unjust vexation is proper where it only brought 1. ANTI-PHOTO AND VIDEO VOYEURISM ACT OF 2009
annoyance and irritation to the woman. (UPLC Suggested R.A. No. 9995
Answers)
a) DEFINITION OF TERMS
Q: At the Maligaya Disco Club, Leoncio and Evelyn
Sec. 3
were intimately dancing a very seductive dance
number. While gyrating with their bodies, Leoncio
b) PROHIBITED ACTS
dipped his private parts in Evelyn’s buttocks.
Sec. 4
Incensed, Evelyn protested, but Leoncio continued
and tightly embraced her. (2009 BAR)
2. SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST
(a) What crime or crimes, if any, did Leoncio CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION, AND
commit? Explain. DISCRIMINATION ACT
R.A. No. 7610, as amended
A: Leoncio committed the crime of unjust vexation only
because the act was done in the course of dancing. The act a) CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER ACTS OF ABUSE
of dipping his private parts in Evelyn’s buttocks during a Sec. 5, R.A. No. 7610 as amended by R.A. No. 114648
very seductive dance, although offensive to Evelyn, may be
viewed as part of a dirty dancing. Lewd intent cannot (1) COMPARE PROSECUTION FOR
simply be presumed from the act of dirty dancing. The fact ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS UNDER ART. 366, RPC, AND
that the act was perpetrated in a public place and with an R.A. NO. 7610, AS AMENDED
audience, negates lewd designs or lascivious intent, which
is essential in the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
L. CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL
(b) Would your answer be the same if, even after STATUS OF PERSONS
the music had stopped, Leoncio continued to (2012, 2004, 2002, 1995, 1994 BAR)
dance dirty, rubbing his private parts on
Evelyn’s buttocks? Explain.
SIMULATION OF BIRTH
A: NO, the crime would then be acts of lasciviousness.
(2002 BAR)
That the music for dancing had already stopped, puts an
end to any pretense of dancing by Leoncio. His continued
Q: A childless couple, A and B, wanted to have a child
dirty acts absent the dancing as there was no music
they could call their own. C, an unwed mother, sold
anymore is patently lewd and lascivious. More so, Evelyn
her newborn baby to them. Thereafter, A and B caused
already protested Leoncio’s lewd acts in the course of
their names to be stated in the birth certificate of the
dancing. So where the dance ended, Leoncio’s continued
child as his parents. This was done in connivance with
dirty acts cannot be veiled as still part of dancing. (UPLC
the doctor who assisted in the delivery of C. What are
Suggested Answers)
the criminal liabilities, if any, of the couple A and B, C,
and the doctor? (2002 BAR)
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
(2007 BAR)
A: The couple A and B, and the doctor shall be liable for
the crime of Simulation of Birth, penalized under Art. 347
Q: What are the three (3) classes of offender in the
of the RPC, as amended. The act of making it appear in the
crime of qualified seduction? Give an example of each.
birth certificate of a child that the persons named therein
are the parents of the child when they are not really the
A:
biological parents of said child constitutes the crime of
1.) Those who exercise moral influence over the
simulation of birth.
victim, such as a priest who acts as spiritual
adviser of the victim, or a teacher in the school
While C, the unwed mother, is criminally liable for “child
where the victim is enrolled;
trafficking,” a violation of Art. IV, Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7610.
The law punishes inter alia the act of buying and selling of
2.) A brother or ascendant by consanguinity of the
a child.
victim, such as her uncle; and

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2023 GOLDEN NOTES
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The couple A and B, the unwed
mother C, and the doctor being all involved in the
simulation of birth of the newborn child, violate R.A. No.
7610. Their acts constitute child trafficking which are
penalized under Art. IV of said law. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
BIGAMY
(2012, 2004, 1995, 1994 BAR)
NOTE: In Pulido v. People, (G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, J.
Hernando), the Supreme Court abandoned its earlier
pronouncements and held that “a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio
prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case.
Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity in
the first and/or second marriages presented by the
accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense,
irrespective of the time within which they are secured.”
Q:
(a) What are the elements of the crime of bigamy?
(2012 BAR)
A: In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis (G.R. No. 138509, 31 July
2000), the Supreme Court laid down the elements of
bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a
subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage
would not have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
(b) If you were the judge in a bigamy case where the
defense was able to prove that the first
marriage was null and void or a nullity, would
you render a judgment of conviction or
acquittal? Explain your answer. (2012 BAR)
A: I would render a judgment of acquittal. A void ab initio
marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy
even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.
(Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, J.
Hernando)
(c) Assuming the existence of the first marriage
when accused contracted the second marriage
and the subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, would you render a
judgment of conviction or acquittal? Explain
your answer. (2012 BAR)
A: I would render a judgment of acquittal. In the case of
Pulido v. People (G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, J.
Hernando), the SC held that a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio
prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case.
Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
107
the first and/or second marriages presented by the
accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense,
irrespective of the time within which they are secured.
The aforesaid conclusion is anchored on and justified by
the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the
legislative intent of Art. 40 of the Family Code and the
fundamental rules of construction governing penal laws.
The Family Code specifically provides that certain
marriages are considered void ab initio namely, Arts. 35,
36 (on Psychological Incapacity), 37, 38, 44 and 53. These
marriages are void from the beginning. To all legal intents
and purposes, the void ab initio marriage does not exist
and the parties thereto, under the lens of the law, were
never married. While Art. 40 of the Family Code provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, the SC ruled that said requirement
under Art. 40 is merely for purposes of remarriage and
does not affect the accused's right to collaterally attack the
validity of the void ab initio marriage in criminal
prosecution for bigamy. (Pulido v. People G.R. No. 220149,
27 July 2021, J. Hernando)
Q: CBP is legally married to OEM. Without obtaining a
marriage license, CBP contracted a second marriage to
RST. Is CBP liable for bigamy? Reason briefly. (2004
BAR)
A: Whether CBP could be held liable for bigamy or not,
depends on whether the second marriage is invalid or
valid even without a marriage license. Although as a
general rule, marriages solemnized without license are
null and void ab initio, there are marriages exempted from
license requirement under Chapter 2, Title 1 of the Family
Code, such as in Art. 27 which is a marriage in articulo
mortis. If the second marriage was valid even without a
marriage license, then CBP would be liable for bigamy.
Otherwise, CBP is not liable for bigamy but for Illegal
Marriage in Art. 350 for the RPC, specifically designated as
"Marriage Contracted Against Provisions of Laws." (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
Q: Joe and Marcy were married in Batanes in 1955.
After two years, Joe left Marcy and settled in
Mindanao where he later met and married Linda on
12 June 1960. The second marriage was registered in
the civil registry of Davao City three days after its
celebration. On 10 Oct. 1975 Marcy who remained in
Batanes discovered the marriage of Joe to Linda. On
01 Mar. 1976 Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy
against Joe.
The crime of bigamy prescribed in fifteen years
computed from the day the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents. Joe
raised the defense of prescription of the crime, more
than 15 years having elapsed from the celebration of
the bigamous marriage up to the filing of Marcy's
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complaint. He contended that the registration of his
second marriage in the civil registry of Davao City was
constructive notice to the whole world of the
celebration thereof thus binding upon Marcy. Has the
crime of bigamy charged against Joe already
prescribed? (1995 BAR)
A: NO, the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is
computed from the time the crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents. The
principle of constructive notice which ordinarily applies to
land or property disputes should not be applied to the
crime of bigamy, as marriage is not property. Thus, when
Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy on 07 Mar. 1976, it was
well within the reglementary period as it was barely a few
months from the time of discovery on Oct. 10, 1975.
(Sermonia v. CA, G.R. No. 109454, 14 June 1994) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
M. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
(2019, 2016, 2013, 2011, 2005, 2002 BAR)
SLANDER; ORAL DEFAMATION
(2011, 2003, 1996, 1994, 1993, 1990, 1988 BAR)
Q: During a seminar workshop attended by
government employees from the Bureau of Customs
and Bureau of Internal Revenue, A, the speaker, in the
course of his lecture, lamented the fact that a great
majority of those serving in said agencies were utterly
dishonest and corrupt.
The following morning, the whole group of employees
in the two bureaus who attended the seminar, as
complainants, filed a criminal complaint against A for
uttering what the group claimed to be defamatory
statements of the lecturer.
In court, A filed a Motion to Quash the Information,
reciting fully the above facts, on the ground that no
crime was committed. If you were the judge, how
would you resolve the motion? (2003 BAR)
A: I would grant the Motion to Quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, since there
is no definite person or persons dishonored.
The crime of libel or slander is a crime against honor such
that the person/s dishonored must be identifiable even by
innuendoes. Otherwise, the crime against honor is not
committed. Moreover, A was not making a malicious
imputation, but merely stating an opinion; he was
delivering a lecture with no malice at all during a seminar
workshop. Malice being inherently absent in the
utterance, the statement is not actionable as defamatory.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S
2023 GOLDEN NOTES
Q: Because of a pendency of a labor dispute, two (2)
belligerent labor unions had a confrontation in a
picket line during which the President and the
Secretary of one union shouted to the members and
officers of the rival union composed of men and
women, the following: “Mga tuta, mga walang bayag,
mga kabit ng Intsik, mga tuta, mga segunda mano.”
Are the President and the Secretary of said union
liable for oral defamation/slander? (1993 BAR)
A: NO. The President and the Secretary of the Union are
not liable for oral defamation or slander because there is
no identity of the offended party. The individual defamed
or slandered was not singled out. (People v. Uy Tioco, G.R.
Nos. 9986 & 9891, 22 Dec. 1915)
1. CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012
R.A. No. 10175
(2019, 2016, 2013, 2011, 2005, 2002 BAR)
a) LIBEL
(2019, 2016, 2013, 2011, 2005, 2002 BAR)
Q: Mr. L is a newspaper reporter who writes about
news items concerning the judiciary. Mr. L believed
that members of the judiciary can be criticized and
exposed for the prohibited acts that they commit by
virtue of the public nature of their offices. Upon
receiving numerous complaints from private citizens,
Mr. L released a scathing newspaper expose involving
Judge G and his alleged acts constituting graft and
corruption. Consequently, Mr. L was charged with the
crime of Libel.
In response, Mr. L contended that truth is a valid
defense in Libel and in this relation, claimed that he
was only exposing the truth regarding Judge G's
misdeeds. Further, Mr. L contended that in any event,
his expose on Judge G is based on the complaints he
received from private citizens, and as such, should be
deemed as a mere fair commentary on a matter of
public interest. Are the contentions of Mr. L tenable?
Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: YES. Mr. L’s contention that truth is a valid defense in
libel is tenable. Under Art. 361 of the RPC, if the
defamatory statement is made against a public official
with respect to the discharge of his official duties and
functions, and the truth of the allegations is shown, the
accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he
does not prove that the imputation was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends. (Lopez v. People, G.R.
No. 172203, 14 Feb. 2011)
Q: A is the president of the corporate publisher of the
daily tabloid, Bulgar; B is the managing editor; and C is
the author/writer. In his column, Direct Hit, C wrote
about X, the head examiner of the BIR-RDO Manila as
follows:
108
 QuAMTO (1987-2022)
“Itong si X ay talagang BUWAYA kaya ang logo ng
Lacoste T shirt niya ay napaka suwapang na buwaya.
Ang nickname niya ay si Atty. Buwaya. Ang PR niya ay
90% sa bayad ng taxpayer at ang para sa RP ay 10%
lang. Kaya ang baba ng collection ng RDO niya.
Masyadong magnanakaw si X at dapat tanggalin itong
bundat na bundat na buwaya na ito at napakalaki na
ng kurakot.”
A, B, and C were charged with libel before the RTC of
Manila. The three (3) defendants argued that the
article is within the ambit of qualified privileged
communication; that there is no malice in law and in
fact; and that defamatory comments on the acts of
public officials which are related to the discharge of
their official duties do not constitute libel.
Was the crime of libel committed? If so, are A, B, and C
all liable for the crime? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: YES, the crime of libel is committed. Fair comment on
acts of public officers related to the discharge of their
duties is a qualified privileged communication, hence, the
accused can still be held liable for libel if actual malice is
shown. In fair comment, actual malice can be established
by showing that comment was made with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. (Guingguing v. The Honorable CA, G.R. No.
128959, 30 Sept. 2005) Journalists bear the burden of
writing responsibly when practicing their profession, even
when writing about public figures or matters of public
interest.
The report made by C describing a lawyer in the Bureau of
Customs as corrupt cannot be considered as “fair” and
“true” since he did not do research before making his
allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations
were baseless. The articles are not “fair and true reports,”
but merely wild accusations. He has written and published
the subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the
same were false or not. (Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No.
161032, 16 Sept. 2008)
A, president of the publishing company, B, managing
editor, and C, writer of the defamatory articles, are all
liable for libel. Under Art. 360 of the RPC, the publisher,
and editor of newspaper, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent. The law
makes the publisher and editor liable for libel as if they
were the author. (Tulfo v. People, supra) (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: A was nominated Secretary of a Department in the
Executive Branch of the government. His nomination
was thereafter submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. While the
Commission was considering the nomination, a group
of concerned citizens caused to be published in the
newspapers a full-page statement objecting to A’s
appointment. They alleged that A was a drug
109
dependent, that he had several mistresses, and that he
was corrupt, having accepted bribes or favors from
parties transacting business in his previous office, and
therefore he was unfit for the position to which he had
been nominated. As a result of the publication, the
nomination was not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The official sued the concerned
citizens and the newspapers for libel and damages on
account of his non-confirmation. How will you decide
the case? (2002 BAR)
A: I will acquit the concerned citizens and the newspapers
involved from the crime of libel. One of the requisites of
libel is the existence of malice on the part of the accused.
In this case, the publication is made from a moral or social
duty. Thus, there is an absence of malice.
As a nominee for the public position of a Department
Secretary, A’s moral, mental, and physical fitness becomes
a public concern. The publication merely reflects on his
public character and image as a public official. Hence, the
act of publishing such criticisms is bereft of malice. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
N. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
(2013, 2012, 2008, 2007, 2001 BAR)
Q: After drinking a bottle of Jack Daniels, Jonjon drove
his BMW sports car at high speed, rammed into a
group of crossing pedestrians, and hit a traffic light
post. The incident caused the death of one (1)
pedestrian, serious injuries to three (3) others, and
the destruction of the traffic light post. If you were the
prosecutor, what would you charge Jonjon? (2013
BAR)
A. Homicide with serious physical injuries
through simple negligence.
B. Damage to property, serious physical injuries
and homicide through reckless negligence.
C. Simple negligence resulting in damage to
property, serious physical injuries and
homicide.
D. Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
serious physical injuries and damage to
property.
A: D. Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, serious
physical injuries, and damage to property.
Q: AB was driving a van along a highway. Because of
her recklessness, the van hit a car which had already
entered the intersection. As a result, CD who was
driving the car suffered physical injuries, while
damage to his car amounted to P8,500.00. What is the
proper charge against AB?
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 CRIMINAL LAW
A. AB should be charged with complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with slight physical injuries.
B. AB should be charged with reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property.
A: NO, the conviction of murder should not be sustained
because there was no intent kill. The intent of the accused,
on the contrary, is to treat Randy for his illness. However,
considering that proximate cause of Randy’s death is the
ritual, accused may be held criminally liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)

C. AB should be charged with complex crime of slight

physical injuries with damage to property.

D. AB should be charged with slight physical injuries

and reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property. (2012 BAR)

A: A. Reckless imprudence under Art. 365 is a single

quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes. Hence, conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various consequences. Thus, AB
may be convicted of one crime, either Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries or
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
(Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, GR No. 172716, 17 Nov. 2010)
(UPLC Suggested Answers)

Q: Olimpio caught a cold and was running a fever. His

doctor prescribed paracetamol. Olimpio went to a
drug store with the prescription, and the pharmacist
sold him three (3) tablets. Upon arriving home, he
took a tablet. One hour later, he had a seizure and
died. The autopsy showed that the tablet he had taken
was not paracetamol but a pill to which he was
allergic. The pharmacist was charged with murder. Is
the charge proper? If not, what should it be? Explain.
(2008 BAR)

A: The charge was improper. The pharmacist should be

charged with criminal negligence, or reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, because there was no intent to kill
Olimpio. The accused inexcusably lacked precaution in
failing to dispense the proper medicine to the victim
which caused the latter’s death. (Art. 365, RPC) (UPLC
Suggested Answers)

Q. Eddie brought his son Randy to a local faith healer

known as "Mother Himala." He was diagnosed by the
faith healer as being possessed by an evil spirit. Eddie
thereupon authorized the conduct of a "treatment"
calculated to drive the spirit from the boy’s body.
Unfortunately, the procedure conducted resulted in
the boy’s death.

The faith healer and three (3) others who were part of
the healing ritual were charged with murder and
convicted by the lower court. If you are appellate
court Justice, would you sustain the conviction upon
appeal? Explain your answer. (2007 BAR)

U N I V E R S IT Y O F S A N T O T O M A S 110
2023 GOLDEN NOTES