The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case

Author(s): M. Athar Ali

Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1975), pp. 385-396
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311728
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 AsianStudies,9, 3 (1975), pp. 385-396. Printedin GreatBritain.
Modern

ThePassingof Empire:TheMughulCase
- M. ATHAR ALI

AligarhMuslimUniversity

THEREhave beennumerousattemptsto explainthe fall of the Mughal

Empire;and I trulyfeel great hesitationin addingmyselfto the long
list of its exponents.To historianslike Irvine and Sarkar)the decline
could be explainedin termsof a personaldeteriorationin the qualityof
the kingsand theirnobles.The:hareminfluencegrew- and women,for
some strange unscientificreason, are always supposedto be a bad
influence.The kings and nobles became more luxury loving, though
no-one has yet establishedthat the blughals duringthe sixteenthand
seventeenthcenturiesenjoyedany less luxuriousmode of living than
theireighteenth-century successors.lSarkar,in his monumentalHzstory
of Aurangzib, also elaboratedupon the traditionallyrecognizedfactor,
namely, Hindu-Muslim differences:Aurangzib'sreligious policy is
thoughtto have provokeda Hindu Reactionthat undid the unity that
had been so laboriouslybuilt up by his predecessors.2
Recently,therehas beenan attemptat a morefundamentalexamina-
tion. SatishChandrasoughtto find the criticalfactorin the Mughals'
failureto maintainthe mansab andjagirsystem,whoseefficientworking
wasessentialfor the survivalofthe Empireasacentralizedpolity.3Irfan
Habib, on the otherhand, has soughtto explainthe fall of the Mughal
Empire as an effect of the working of this very system. The jagir-
transfersled to intensifiedexploitation;and such exploitationled to
rebellionby zamindars (the superiorright-holders)and the peasantry.4
With all these factorsis sometimescompoundedyet another-the rise
of 'nationalities',subvertingand shatteringthe unified empire. The
thesis,developedby Sovietscholarslike Reisnerand maintainedby a
school of popularIndian Marxistwriters,has receivedstrangecorro-
borationfrom'youngand youngish'Americanscholarswho havefound
1William Irvine, LaterMughals,ed. Sarkar,2 vols., and J. N. Sarkar,Fall of the
MughalEmpire,4 VOlS? passim.
III (Calcutta,I 9 I 6), 283-364.
of Aurangzib,
2 J. N. Sarkar,History
3 Satish Chandra, Partiesand Politicsat the MughalCourt,I707-I7#0 (Aligarh,
I 959), pp x 111-xlvll.
\ . . . 5 . .

4 Irfan Habib, *4grarian Systemof MughalIndia, I556-I707 (Bombay, I963),

pp. 3I7-5I.

385
386 M. ATHAR ALI

newregionalpower-groups
in the statesthataroseduringthe eighteenth
century.S
It is easy to be lost in the welterof these 'factors'.It is also perhaps
possibleto reconcilecontradictionsby propoundinga cause-sequence-
causeformulaand by simplydisowningthe searchforthe singleultimate
cause.Such a synthesisis yet to be attempted;but I do not professany
ambitionto makethe attempthere. I shouldlike simplyto relate the
entiretext to what I conceiveto be the propercontext.
In followingthe scholarlydiscussionoverthe break-upof the Mughal
Empire,I have beenstruckby the fact that the discussionshouldhave
been conductedin such insularterms.The firstpart of the eighteenth
centurydid not only see the collapseof Mughal Empire:The Safavid
Empirealso collapsed;the Uzbek Khanatebrokeup into fragments;
and the Ottoman Empire began its career of slow, but inexorable
decline. Are all these phenomenamere coincidences?It seems to me
strainingone's senseof the plausibleto assertthat the same fate over-
came all the large empiresof the Indic and Islamicworldat precisely
the same time, but owing to quite diSerent(and rathermiscellaneous)
factorsoperatingin the case of each of them. Evenif the searchshould
ultimatelyprovefutile, one mustsee whetherit is possibleto discover
some commonfactor that caused more or less stable empiresto dis-
integrateandcreatedconditionsin whichnewpoliticalstructures,which
look large enoughon the map, like Nadir Shah'sempire,the Afghan
(Durrani)empire or the Maratha Confederacy,emerged and then
almostimmediatelybrokeinto splinteredfragments.
There is one remarkablepoint too, which may serve as the guide-
post in our search.The break-upof the empiresdistinctlyprecedesthe
impactfromthe armedattackof the westerncolonialpowers,notably
Britainand Russia.Butit precedesthe impactwithsucha shortinterval
that the questionmustarisewhetherthe riseof the Westwasnot in some
ways,not yet properlyunderstood,subvertingthe polity and societyof
the Easteven beforeEuropeactuallyconfrontedthe easternstateswith
its superiormilitarypower.
It is a regrettablegap in our study of the economichistoryof the
MiddleEastand India, that no generalanalysishas been attemptedof
the changesin the patternof tradeand marketsof thesecountries,as a
result of the new commercebetween Europe and Asia. There is a
tendencyto belittle the significanceof the great commercialdevelop-
mentsof the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesfor easterneconomies,
5 Cf. M. N. Pearsonin IndianEconomicand Social HistoryReview[I.E.S.H.R.], IX,
I I4 and note.
 THE PASSING -OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 3g7
owingto the smallvolumeof goodsthat enteredinternational,or-long-
distance,tradeat that time. But the real questionis not of volume,but
valueXIn termsof value,long-distancetrademusthave accoun--ted --for
a
sizeableportionof the grossproductin all the economieswith which
we are concerned.
The majorevent between I500 and I700 was certainlythe rise of
Europeas the centreof worldcommerce,with its dominanceover the
New Worldand the High Seas, and its total monopolyof the Cape of
Good Hope. Recentestimatessuggestan increasein the populationof
Europefrom about 50 millionsin I450 to I20 millionsin I700,6 an
outstandingachievementparticularlywhenwe bearin mindthe demo-
graphicdebacle of the Thirty Years War in Germanyand the slow
declineof populationin Spain.No similarestima-tes existfor Asia. But
it wouldseemthat Indianpopulationremainedlargelystabl-e- between
I600 and I800. Moreland'sestimateof I00 millionfor I600 has been
properlyquestioned,and the Sture of I50 million probablyis nearer
the truth.7The Censusof I868 72 discloseda populationof less than
250 million. India thus saw an increaseof barely 66 per cent in 270
years,whereasEuropehad enhancedits populationby some I40 per
cent in a periodof 250 years.This contrastin populationgrowthsug-
gests that a real shift in the economicbalance between Europeand
Asia had alreadyoccurredby the end of the seventeenthcentury.
This shift found its true repercussionin internationaltrade. The
discoveryof the Capeof GoodHope was certainlyan importantevent)
and in giving a direct,unhamperedroute to India, it had important
military consequencesin the eighteenth century. But the major
economicchangewas not representedonly by the new route (indeed,-it
is likelythat the older,Red Sea routeremainedas importanta channel
as the Cape until after I700)t It was, above all, representedby the
emergenceof Europeas the principalmarketfor the luxuriesand craft-
-manufactures of the world. Economichistorianshave so far remained
immersedmainly in Europe'sproblemof payments,a preoccupation
inheritedfrom the ulercantilistcontroversiesof the period.The other
compl-ementary aspects,viz., the increasein demandfor the products
of the world and the effiectof this on othermarketsof these products,
ap?eareitherto have escapednoticeor to have not receivedthe atten-
tiondue to them.
In other words,we have to considernot only the export of large
6 The estimatefor I4501S that of J. Russell (Fontana
Economic Historyof Europe,
VO1.I,P. 36) and for I70Q that of AndreArmengaud(ibid.,Vol. 3, p. 27).
7 Miss ShireenMoosavi,I.E.S.H.R.,X, I94.
388 M. ATHAR ALI

quantitiesof gold and silver (especiallythe latter)from Europeto the

East,but also the fact that a largepartof the luxurymanufacturesand
high-valueproductsof the Eastweredivertedfromtheirother,hitherto
'traditional'markets,and carriedto Europe.Unfortunately)owing to
the lack of fuller investigations,and partly to the limitationsin our
sources,it is difficultto set thisshiftin quantitativeterms.Butwherever
we lookin Asia near the end of the seventeenthcentury,the European
demandwas exercisingits pull, strongor feeble, director indirect.
The fact that Iran no longer remainedthe principalmarketfor a
wholerangeof Indiancommodities(indigo,pepper,chintz),and India
and Iran, together,no longer for a numberof Chineseexports (silk,
porcelain),speaksvolumesfor the relativeeconomicdecline of these
countries.Thisdecline,was,however,not only relative;it couldnot but
be absoluteas well. One-thirdof the Bengalsilkwas alreadyexported,
through the Dutch and the English, before I 667, and one-third
throughPersianand Armenianmerchants(muchof whichpresumably
for overlandtransportto Mediterraneanportsand thenceto Europe);
only a thirdremainedfor Indian markets.8The EuropeanCompanies
obtaineda practicalmonopolyof the pepperof the Westerncoast,and
they became the principal buyers of India's finest chintz, that of
Masulipatam.It is not verylikelythatproductionexpandedsufficiently
to meet the Europeandemandwithoutreducingthe shareof the other
markets.Indeed,if the productiondid expandto someextent,in condi-
tions of stationarytechnology,costs and prices must have gone up,
relativelyto the generalprice-level.
My suggestionis that these developmentscauseda seriousdisturb-
ance in the economiesof the Easterncountries,and intensifiedthe
financial difficultiesof the ruling classes. The Great Silk Road no
longer carriedthe great caravans;and this must have distinctlyim-
poverishedCentralAsia (the Uzbek Khanate).But in India and Iran,
too, the costsof luxuryarticlesrose - and, afterall, for membersof the
ruling classit was these luxuriesthat life was all about. The income
previouslyobtainedno longersufficed.Herewasa factorfor an attempt
at greater agrarian exploitation;and when that failed, or proved
counter-productive, for recklessfactionalactivitiesfor individualgain,
leading to interminablecivil wars. Such conditionswould, of course,
spell the end of the great empires.
While,obviously,what I have suggestedis repletewith speculation,
and requires much detailed investigationfor its substantiation,I
shouldlike to consideranotherimportanthistoricalfactorthat emerges
8 Tavernier,Travelsin India,I640-67 (tr. Ball, ed. Crooke,London, I925), IIn 2.
 THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 389
from a considerationof the Europe-Asiarelationship.The European
importsof easterngoodswere paid for mainlyin gold and silver;and
these, especiallythe latter, came from Latin Americain hithertoun-
precedentedquantities.13utthe Europeandemandfor thesecommodi-
ties was generated,not so much by the possessionof the specie,as by a
distinctqualitativeand quantitativedevelopmentof craftproduction,
leadingto the enrichmentof the entireeconomyand a notableexpan-
sion of its urbansector.At the beginningof the seventeentllcentury,
townslike Lahoreor Agradwarfedthe Europeancitiesof the period.By
I 700, EuropeantownslikeLondonand Parishad populations(overhalf
a million) exceedingthose of all Indian cities, except perhapsAgra.
Accordingto Deane and Cole'sestimate,I3 per cent of the people of
Englandand Waleswereliving in townsof s,ooo and above,in I 70I .9
This percentagehad not been reachedin India even by I9OI.
This spurt in Europeanurban growthwas the first productof the
new scienceand technologythat was generatingsmall advancesin a
numberof sectors,the cumulativeeSect of which was phenomenal.A
completelydifferentpicturewas presentedby Asia, especiallyIndia.
One neednot be a followerof Marx'stheoryof the unchangeableness of
traditionalIndiansocietyto acceptthe fact that therewas no conscious
spiritof technologicalinnovation(andscientificenquiry)hereandin the
Islamic East to match the spirit already motivatinga large part of
Europeansocietyin the seventeenthcentury.This does not mean that
no mechanicalinnovationwaspropagatedor spreadin the Eastduring
the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies.It has been shown that such
'generalization'did takeplace.10But what we are concernedwith is its
pace and scope. The pace was certainlyslow, and the scope severely
limited.Thisis manifested,aboveall, by the utterabsencein the litera-
tureof Indiaof any descriptionsof even the mostimportantproductsof
Europe'snew technology,e.g. the clock,the telescope,the flint-lock.
Whetherthe sourcelay in somestructuralfaultof Indianand Islamic
society,which perpetuatedthe divorcebetweenintellect and manual
labour,or whetherit lay in somepeculiarinhibitionagainstsciencein
Islamic (and Hindu) ideologyit is difficultto decide.The intellectual
aridityis manifest;its causesare obscure.
The aridity is relevantto us becauseof its economicand political
consequences.If technologicalgrowth resultedin urbanization,this
Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, BritishEconomic
9 Growth,s688-s959 (Cambridge,
I962),p 7
10Irfan EIabib, Bechnology andEconomy
of MughalIndia,Devaraj Chanana Memorial
Lecturesn I 97 I (cyclo-styled).
 M. ATHAR ALI
39o

-meatltthat the-expansion of townscouldprovidea safety-valveat times

India and
of agrariancrises.Since a similarprocessdid not occur in As has
othercountriesof the East,thissafety-valvewasmissingin India.
based
been pointedout} the Indian urbanpopulationwas parasitical,
A corollary of this is that
-uponthe expropriationof agrariansurplus.ll urban
of that surpluswas affected, the scope of
if the expiropriation
enlploymentalso declined. This meansthat, so long as craftproduction
in Europe
did -notobtain-anindependentbase, as it did increasingly of the
from the si-xteenthcenturyonwards,there was no possibility the
absorptio-n of the shock of an agrarianupheaval. In that sense,
army,waspeculiarly
M-ughalEtnpire,in spiteof its splendidprofessional
and peasant
vulnerableto the ill-armedbut million-headedzamindar
reb.els.l2
there was
Talkingabout the a^my,anotherpoint suggestsitself. If
technological changes
anything that was aSected most speedily by
worldit was the army.Artillery-making was the 'heavy
throughout-the
of the time. In Europeit attractedthe ingenuityof scientists
indukstry'
But as one
and mathematiciansfrom the sixteenthcenturyonwards.
of its development in each
moved eastwardfrornEurope the pace
India saw no
countrywould have appearedto be slowerand slower.
attemptotodesignnew artilleryweapons:making of muskets
-conscious
and ac-
and guns remaineda mere craft, with lro touch of science; The
cordingly by I 700 these were almost completely out-dated.
cavalry when its days
lSlughalscontinuedto rely upon sword-wielding
debacle at
were long over. It is, perhaps,this that led to their major
had be-tter
Karnalin I739, whe-nthey had to face Nadir Shah, who
artillery,imitatedfromthe Europeansand the Ottomans.l3
to derive
To me, then, the failureof the WIughalEmpirewouldseem
failure,sharedwith the entire Islamic world.
essentiallyfro-ma cultural
of Europe,
It was thisfailurethat tilted the economicbalancein favour
of Asia to
well beforeEuropeanarmiesreducedIndia and otherparts
It was this
colonialpossessions,protectoratesand spheresof influence. to
empires of the capacity
culturalfailure again that deprivedthe
crises.These twin economic consequences
grapplewith their agrari-an
werethemselvesthe causes of the politicaland militarydebacles;but as
intellectual
we havejust seen?evenmilitaryweaknessesflowedfromthe
stagn-ationthat seemsto have gripped the eastern world.

N.S. III (3), 55.

IrfanHabib, Enquiry, I.E.S.H.R.,X,
12 On the compositionof the Marathaarmy,see Satish Chandra,
pp. 346-5
2 I 7 and note. Cf. IrfanHabib, Agrarian
of
System India,
Mughal I.

13 Cf. Irvine,Later II,

Mughals, 352 addendum).
-(Sarkar's
 THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 39I

Of course,the wordstagnationis relative.It is quite possiblethat if

we were not in the compellingnecessityto have to be lookingover our
shouldersat what was being thought and written in Europeat the
sametime, we mighthave regardedthe IslamicEastand India during
sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesas fairlyproductivein the matterof
literatureand rationalsciences.Butwhilewe may admirethe poetryof
Hafiz, the rationalismof Abul Fazl, the religiouseclecticismof Dara
Shukoh,the astronomicalobservationsof RajaJai Singh)the fact re-
mains that of modernsciencethere is hardly a trace. This is so very
clear in the gij-i Muhammad shahi(I732), the celebratedwork of Jai
Singh. Here the entiretheoreticaltext is practicallyborrowedverbatim
fromthe 4g-i Ulughwthani, composednearly300yearsearlier.-Only the
tables are-changed.Jai Singh is interestedin Europeanastronomical
observations,and he refersto them in his preface.But Newton might
not have lived, so far as he is concerned.Thus the entireframeworkof
reasoningand thought,and, indeed,the limitsand scopeof reflection,
remainedthe same as had been defined by the great Arabic writers
beforethe twelfthcentury.IEhestirringswerethereandwereimportant;
but, unluckily,they broughtout only ripples,wherea flood)a break-
through,was neededin orderto put men'smindsinto new moulds.

II

The polities that emergedupon the collapseof the Mughal Empire

wereof demonstrablytwo kinds.In one classwerethe 'successionstatesf
likeHyderabad,BengalandAwadh,whichwerereallyfragmentsof the
Empire,that had to stand upon their ovfnfeet as the centralgovern-
ment decayedand becamepowerlessto assistor assert.They inherited
moreor lessthe entireNIughalmachineryof administration in a work-
ing order.In the secondcategorywere the MarathaConfederacy,the
Jats and the Sikhs, and the Afghans.Their origins as polities were
independentof the Mughal Empire,though they might occasionally
come to termswith it, or, indeed, in the case of the first two, even
acknowledgethe nominalsupremacyof the Mughal Emperor.They
were clearly the productsof the crisis that we have touched upon.
While they might use certain Mughal administrativeinstitutionsfor
theirown purposes,their mode of governmentwas by and large anti-
thetical to that of the Empire,and could not be reconciledwitll it.
Mughalprofessionalcavalrycould indeedsurvivewithin the Maratha
Confederacy,but only as Pindaris,that is, as real historicalDraculas,
 M. ATHAR ALI
392
who drankup the bloodof theirnew masters.The entire
contradiction
is summedup in the protestexpressedby AzadBilgramiin I 76I
that the
Marathaleaders,in spite of their conquests,were not behaving
as
rulers,but as zamindars.14
MysoreunderHaidarAli and Tippu Sultanstoodoutsidethese
two
categories,and was in some ways the most remarkable.On the one
hand, it representeda consciousattempt at implanting
Mughal ad-
ministrativeinstitutionsin an areathat had only beennominallya part
of the MughalEmpire.Thiswasmostclearlyto be seenin the
organiza-
tionof land-revenueadministration, as well as the army (notablyunder
HaidarAli). On the otherhand,it was the firststatein India to
makea
beginningtowardsmodernization,firstand foremostin the realmof the
armyand arms manufacture,but also even in commerce,
where the
EnglishEast India Company'spracticeswere soughtto be
imitated.ls
This preliminaryclassificationof eighteenth-century politiesis im-
portantnbecausesome writerstend to speakas if, irrespectiveof
these
largediSerencesin their essentialnatures,we could still find
some
commonbasisfor them. The theorythat thesepolitieswere
reflections
of the emergenceof 'regionalelites', or gave opportunitiesto
certain
groups,previouslyenjoyingonly limited prominence,to become
co-
sharersin power, are either statementsof the obviousin
sociological
terms,or are based upon rather untenable assumptionsabout
the
MughalEmpire.
Thus if the MughalErnpirebrokeinto certainfragments,with
each
fragment an autonomousor independentstate, its rulingclassmust,of
course,ipsofactobe regionalized.No longercould an officer
servingin
Awadhbe sent to the Deccan.Butthisis an effect,not a cause;and
it is
enforced regionalization,if anything.The case of Bengalthat is often
citedl6is ratherpeculiar.Here the nazims,or Governors,first
carried
outwhatin an earlierperiodwouldhave appearedas an act of
extreme
centralization.MurshidQuli Khan obtainedimperialsanctionfor the
conversion ofjagirsinto Skalisa,and thussecuredthe withdrawalof all
Mughal jagirdarsor commandersfromBengal.Then, becausehe com-
binedhis ofiice of Aazim with that of Diwan,or provincial
revenue
minister,he henceforthmanagedthe Shalisa;and he and his successors
remitted enormousamountsto the Mughal Emperor.l7By I740 this
practiceceased.Thus the BengalAawabsbecamemastersof the entire
4 Azad Bilgrami,Shizanv-i'Amira,Kanpur( I 87I ) ) p. 47.
5 MohibbulfIasan Khan, Historyof 7Cipu Sultan(CalcuttanI95I)
6 Phil Calkinsin jrournal
of AsianStudies,XXIX, 799f.
pp. 3+e+7.
7 Cf. Z. Malik in I.E.S.H.R. IY)
o69-70
 THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 393
revenuesof Bengalwithouthavingto sharethemwith thejagirdars, i.e.
withouttherebeingany trueremnantof Mughalnobilitycontinuingin
Bengal,except for the Xazimsthemselves.For managingthe lCkalisan
the nawabsrecruitedrevenue-farmers and officialsfrom amongstthe
local zamindars and merchant-bankers. Thisphenomenonhasgivenrise
to much misunderstanding about the emergenceof new elites.No such
emergenceis discerniblein Hyderabador in Awadh, where the jagir
systemcontinuedto be in vogue.
Informationabout merchants'role in administrationis rather too
readilyseized upon as evidenceof their increasedpoliticalparticipa-
tion. In factntheirrolein the MughalEmpirewas equallyimportant.l8
Quite obviously, the Gujaratmerchantsin the seventeenthcentury
exercisedinfluenceat the Mughal court that even the nagarseths of
Bengalin the eighteenthcenturymighthave envied.
The MarathaConfederacyn as I havesaidncannotbe groupedwiththe
SuccessionStatesfor any politicalanalysis.That it was a failureas an
attempt at Empire is admitted by all serious historians. While
succeedingso brilliantlyin the field, at least until I76I, tlle Marathas
failed to evolve even those minimumconventions-or fictionsnif you
like -thatare essentialfor buildingan empire.The sloganof Hindu-pad-
padshahi died an abortivedeath,possiblybecausethe Peshwaswere not
too keen to give undue weight to their titular sovereign,the rajaof
Satara.In their attemptto makethemselvesindependentof theirown
nominal masters,the Peshwasseemedalwayspreparedto accept the
nominalsovereigntyof the MughalEmperor,so long as the actualgains
weretheirs.Butjust as theyhad reducedtheirrajato a titularstatus,the
Peshwas,too, were subsequentlyto be reducedto a titular status by
Nana Phadries(Fardnawis).Thus therewas a simplefailureto estab-
lish even a stablerepositoryof sovereignpower.
The second difficultyfaced in the workingof the Marathapolity
aroseout of the fact that plunderremainedan essentialelementfor its
continuedfunctioning.It too oftenseemedthat chauthand sardeshmukAi,
and in lieu thereof, a general devastationof the country involved,
rather than its direct conquest, constitutedthe acme of Maratha
ambitions.Thus, whenfull-fledgedMarathaadministrationwas estab-
lishedanywhere(and, if MuhammadAli, authorof Mzrat-iAhmadi,is
to be believed, it could on occasionbe excellent), the country had
alreadybeen so ravagedthat the Marathascould only replenishtheir
resourcesby extendingthe rangeof plunder.
I do not wish to enterinto similardetailsfor the Abdalior Durrani
8 Cf. Pearsonin I.E.S.H.R.,IX, I I8 ffW.
 M.ATHAR ALI
394
Empire of Afghanistan)which duringthe latter half of the eighteenth
as
centurycame to include the whole of present Pakistan,as well
Ikashmir. But in some essentialfeatures,especiallythe dependence
uponplunder,it cxhibitedsimilaraspects.
were
One mightthensay thatonce the limitsforplunderingactivities
either becauseof geography,or of opponents,the tide was
reached, of
bound to turn;and civil warni.e. reallyplunderof the internalparts
states,was thereuponboundto breakout. This can be a plausible
these
explanation of the break-upof both the Marathaand Afghansystems.
might
But here I shouldlike to drawattentionto anotherfactorthat
haveintroduce-d an elementof exceptionaleconomicstrainpreciselyat
centrifugal
atime when these states were otherwisevulnerableto
In I757 the Britishconquest of Bengal began with the battle
tendencies. of
complete masters
of]?lassey,and within seven years they were It
India. This conquestwas not simplya mere political event.
Eastern
revenuesof
changedthe entirecomplexionof India'scommerce.The
Company,
BengalandBiharbecamethe sourceof theEnglishEastIndia
changed the entire
andwith these enormousresources,the English
directionof the exportsof Bengaland Bihar)as well as Coromandel.
diversion
Theexportssoonpassedthe £5-millionmark.l9Thiscomplete
patternof
ofcommercemusthaveresultedin the upsettingof the whole
of Gujaratand Agra) which
Indiancommerce.The commercialdecline
inevitable. Similarlya
importedsilk and cottonstuffsfromBengal,was
As the
the overlandtrade throughAfghanistanwas bound to suffer.
nineteenth
Englishadvancedfurtherinland at the beginningof the
century,the declinewould become still more marked.
strength
How adverselydid this economicprocessaffectthe political
it is obviously
of the MarathaConfederacyand the Afghan Empire)
by the fact
difficultto say with any degreeof conSdence.One is struck
have
that the suddencollapseof the AfghanEmpire,in I809, should
up to Delhi in Elphin-
followedso soonafterthe Englishadvance I803.
Shujaand
stonewho led a missionto the courtof the AfghanrulerShah
observed
who was a witnessof the dissolutionof his authority)himself
by Afghan
the declineof the tradeand the abandonmentof commerce
tribesmenin favourof agriculture.20 The -declinein commerceis thus
Britishcon-
establislled:What is still to be provenis its link with the
in I 797-8 (Deane
19The BrItIshimportsfromsEastIndiafamountedto £s,78s,ooo importsfromGhina;
& Gole, British Growth,
Economic p. 87). These importsincluded
but the Chinatradewas itselffinancedby exportsfromBengal.
zoMountstuartElphinstone,AnAccount of theKingdomof Caubul(London,I839), In
383, 387-S, etc.
 THE PASSING OF EMPIRE: THE MUGHAL CASE 395
quest on the one hand, and its role as a factor in the decline of
the Afghanempire.My plea is that both the processesoccur in such
sequencethat, at least tentatively,the litlk ought to be accepted.Per-
haps,closerscrutinyof the evidencewould some day put us on surer
ground.
Finally, a questionabout these 'transitionregimes'.Why is it that
when faced directlywith Britishpower)they attemptedno, or very
little, modernization? The caseof MysoreunderHaidarAli and Tippu
remainedunique. Marathasardars,like the Sindhias,would go no
further than having some regiments trained and commanded by
Europeanofficers.
Whatis singularis that at the ideologicallevel the Englishinfluence
should have made so little dent. It is true that informationabout
western sciences begins to appear in some Persian works; but on
inspectionthey are all foundto have been writtenat the directionand
wishesof an Englishofficialor clergyman.In the main, the Persian
literaturecontinuedin its well-establishedgroc)ves.Indeed, the eigh-
teenth centurysaw its maximumprogressin India. Checkingthrough
the workslistedin the late C. A. Storey'smonumentalPersianLiterature
-a Bio-bibliographical Survey,Alol. I, I found that whereasthere were
only six Hinduwriterswho wroteone bookeach in Persian,duringthe
seventeenthcentury,therewere duringthe eighteenthcenturyno less
than thirty-twoffindu writerswho wroteas many as forty-ninebooks.
This is a tributeto the strengthof the culturaltraditionbequeathedby
the MughalEmpire.But it also partlyexplains,I think,why the new
culture,comingfromEurope,held so little attraction,and was, there-
fore, almostwhollyignoredby the educatedin India.

III

The author of Siyar-alMutakAirin, himself a protege of the English,

presentedin hisworkan idealizedpictureof the Mughaladministration
whichhe set beforehis mastersas a model.He waswritingin I 78T. The
debate that subsequentlyoccurredbetween Grant, Shore and Corn-
wallis,reproducedin the celebratedFifthReport, showshow to the new
rulers,too, the rights and institutionsestablishedunder the Mughal
Empirewere of abidinginterest.Their claim to land-revenue,in par-
ticular,derivedfromMughalprecedentand practice.It hasbeenurged
that even the PermanentSettlementwas not totally exotic and was
rootedin the practiceof the Mughalgovernrnentin Bengalduringthe
396 M. ATHAR ALI

seventeenthcentury.2lMunro'sRyotwariSystemwaseven moreclearly
a developmentof the Mughalsystemof zabtassessmentthat lle foundin
voguein areasseizedfromMysore.MrsAsiya Siddiqihas commented
on how the British administratorsof the Ceded and Conquered
Provincesgreatlyreliedupon Indianland-revenueexpertise,svhich,as
reflectedin a worklikeDiwan-pasand, was simplya survivalof Mughal
land-revenuepractices.22In so far as the Mughalshad establisheda
uniformsysternof administrationall over the country, and a single
officiallanguage(Persian),tlle Englishwerehelpedtherebyin creating
an administrativemachinerythat was not too varied in characterto
rendercentralizedcontroldifficult,and yet was in someharmonysvith
existingconditions.23
While sayingall this, I shouldlike to referto a parallel.When the
Spaniardscapturedthe Inca emperorof Peru and stepped into his
shoes,they usedthe highlycentralizedstructureof the Incasto quickly
establishand extendtheirrule. But it can hardlybe said that the Inca
Empiresurvivedin any formthroughthe Spanishcolonization.Simi-
larly,the entirebasisof Britishrule in India was so differentfromthat
of the MughalEmpire,thatone can hardlyspeakof the formeras in any
sensea continuationof the latter.The conceptionof the revenuesof the
country,as grossprofitsof the EnglishEast India Company,was the
basic principle on which English dominion was founded; and the
Drainof Wealthto England,throughpublicas well as privatechanncls
wasthe ultimateobjectto be realized.Thusthe survivalsof the Mughal
Empirewere subvertedto a new use, and not employedto resurrect
anythingresemblingthe old Empire.Thatempirehaditsowninequities,
louttllese, to le fair to it, were of a diSerentform and content alto-
gether.
India, I 7s-9
21 Irfan Habib, AgrarianSystemof Me>ff/lal
22 A. Siddiqi, AgrarianCAhange IndianState (Oxford, I973), p. 178-g.
in a JVortXl
23 See the pexceptive lemalks of Eric .Stokesin Plzstand Pre.sent,No. 5S, pp. I44-5,
I46-7.