Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept

12/24/22, 12:19 AM LITTORAL ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CONCEPT
LITTORAL ANTI-SUBMARINE
WARFARE CONCEPT
Naval Doctrine Command
1 May 1998
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Purpose ans Scope

Littoral ASW
Coordinated, Multiplatform ASW Concept
Capabilities and Constraints
Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
Purpose
Background
National Objectives
Joint and Naval Objectives
Littoral ASW Objectives
Anticipated Battlespace and Adversaries "The ASW Challenge
Introduction
The Environment
Threat Assessment
Stealth
Mobility and Endurance
Sensors
Weapons
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)
Operational Proficiency
Summary
Littoral ASW
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Missions and Tasks
ASW Missions
Littoral ASW Tasks
Littoral ASW Today
Realities & Imperatives
Future Operational Concept
Peacetime: Deterrence and Conflict Prevention

Crisis-to-War
Littoral ASW into the 21st Century
Coordinated, Multiplatform ASW
Future Operational Capabilities
Material and Weapons

Organization, Training and Doctrine
Missions and Task for Future Littoral ASW
Recommendations and Epilogue
Recommendations
Epilogue
List of Figures
Figure 1. Mission Support Pyramid

Figure 2. Strategic Foundation
Figure 3. The Relationship of ASW to the Tenets of Joint Vision 2010
Figure 4. Asymetric Threat Risk Analysis
Figure 5. Littoral ASW Mission, Operational tasks and Infrastructure Tasks
Figure 6. Defense-in-Depth Options
Figure 7. Future Missions, Operational Tasks and Infrastructure Tasks
Executive Summary
"He who will not apply new remedies must expect new evils." Sir Francis Bacon
Purpose and Scope.
This paper provides a Fleet perspective for development of future operational capabilities for littoral anti-submarine warfare
(ASW). It is an ASW warfighting concept. It is directed at flag and civilian leadership within the DoN, scientific,
technological and acquisition communities to provide Navy ASW goals. These goals must then be assessed, modified and
attained through a concept implementation process.
This concept reflects the fusion of both the operational and technical communities to define future operational methods and
capabilities to conduct successful ASW. It recognizes that new warfighting capabilities result from the co-evolution of
innovative technology, doctrine and training.
The description focuses on operations about 15 years from today (years 2010 to 2015). This time frame required the
analyses to consider present-day technology, operations, and scenarios, but permitted inclusion of new concepts, capabilities
and likely mandates. It looks beyond current Navy plans and the program of record, focusing on future operational
capabilities required by the U.S. Navy to enable and support future joint operations beyond 2010.
Many ASW capabilities and assets are applicable to both littoral waters and the open-ocean. The challenges of each area are
different, and in some cases, require unique capabilities. This paper limits its discussions to the littoral environment, forces
and operations. However, the narrow scope of this concept is not intended to imply that open-ocean ASW is a solved
problem. Open-ocean ASW remains a difficult task with many issues in common with littoral ASW and also many issues
unique to open-ocean operations.
The concept focuses on those capabilities required by the US Navy to conduct littoral ASW missions. Complementary
capabilities required of allied or joint forces are not detailed. When mentioned, specific systems are described only to help
illustrate an idea or the effect a system’s capability might have on the ASW concept described.
Littoral ASW
Littoral ASW operations protect naval forces, commercial and logistics shipping from enemy submarines, and thereby
enable naval forces to project power ashore, conduct strategic sealift operations, and control or interdict sea lines of
communications (SLOCs) that affect littoral objectives. In the context of US joint force operations, successful littoral ASW
clears the undersea battlespace of hostile submarine influence and permits US and combined forces to maneuver at will to
best employ their assets at the time and place of their choosing. In limited regional conflicts, the loss or crippling of a key
ship could unacceptably disrupt joint or naval force operations. The political realities of many regional conflicts could allow
an adversary to equate a stalemate at sea with a strategic victory.
The ASW systems and practices employed in the open-ocean are not necessarily those that work best in littoral waters.
Littoral ASW requires a complementary set of capabilities that address the special circumstances of naval operations in
littoral waters. The littoral battlespace’s complex, noisy environment undermines the effectiveness of acoustic ASW sensors
optimized for deep water, open-ocean ASW. In this environment, increasingly quiet and capable submarines operated by
potential adversaries further erode the position held by open-ocean ASW forces. Quiet threats operating in harsh
environments increase the utility of non-acoustic and active acoustic sensor systems. To be effective, sensors must be able to
automatically adapt to the environment.
The accelerating rate of technological innovation gives increasing Principles of Littoral ASW
advantages to the navies that most quickly introduce appropriate new
technologies into their fleets. This introduction process must be rapid, Understand and prepare the battlespace for joint force's
focused and include all aspects of procurement, training, operations, maneuvering upon the sea.
maintenance and support infrastructure. Close coordination of US Deny enemy submarines influence in the joint
Navy ASW concepts, programs, systems and operations will optimize operating area.
the ASW force’s capability in a period of declining resource Prosecute enemy submarines as close to their operating
allocations. bases as possible.
Emphasize integrated information connectivity and
flexibility at all levels.
Coordinated, Multiplatform ASW Concept Adapt sensors and weapons to the operational
environment to optimize effectiveness.
Littoral ASW operations during periods of armed conflict should
exploit defense-in-depth to maximize the flexibility of joint forces.
These operations could occur against enemy submarines at their base (preemption), as they exit or return to port (port
interdiction), as they approach the area of operations, threaten littoral sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and within the
area of operations.
Preemption prevents the employment of enemy submarine forces by neutralizing submarines at their piers, and by attacking
fixed support facilities essential to the effective employment of submarine forces. Because preemptive attacks deny
adversary forces the ability to maneuver, preemption, if politically permitted, may offer the best balance between ASW
effectiveness and economy of force.
Port interdiction offers opportunity to engage, monitor or tag adversary submarines before they can submerge. However,
harbors and harbor entrances are particularly demanding environments for the employment of ASW systems. Thus,
coordinated employment of appropriate sensors and weapon systems will be required to achieve optimal effectiveness in
port interdiction operations.
Outside the area of operations, ASW forces have the flexibility to exploit maneuver and mass to defeat adversary
submarines. This permits commanders to employ techniques such as barrier defense, defensive minefields and denial of
logistic support opportunities. It also permits placing ASW forces at points along the threat axis where sensors and weapons
may enjoy the benefits of more favorable environment, resulting in a higher probability of success.
SLOC protection may require ASW forces to protect large areas while placing a special premium on the effectiveness of
coordinated ASW operations near chokepoints. These areas have noisy, cluttered environments that geographically
concentrate both friendly naval forces and adversary submarines.
Within the area of operations, finding and neutralizing enemy submarines will demand the assignment of significant
forces to the ASW effort. Effective operations in the area of operations require numerous, coordinated ASW assets. Mêlée
and flaming datum situations will fully stress our ASW systems.
Each scenario relies on coordinated, multiplatform ASW. The range of possible threats places a premium on timely and
accurate information about adversary submarine operations, thus ASW commanders will require a responsive command and
control architecture to effectively coordinate their forces. The concept requires commanders to balance the operational
capabilities of available assets with mission objectives. These operational capabilities will depend on the assigned forces’
combat systems and materiel, training, doctrine, organization and leadership.
The mission objective of forward operating area ASW battlespace dominance directly supports the national military strategy.
Successful achievement of this mission rests upon properly shaping and employing the manpower and equipment provided
to implement the national military strategy.
Capabilities and Constraints

Task Imperatives. To conduct littoral ASW, naval forces must be able to:
detect, locate and target enemy submarines in littoral waters reliably,

respond rapidly and decisively to enemy submarine contacts that may last only a moment (fleeting contact),
employ integrated ASW systems (people, sensors, weapons and communications) with very high probability of
neutralizing the target, and
provide all commanders with a common tactical picture of the undersea battlespace.
Programmatic Realities. Continuing ASW program budget constraints, and the increasing capabilities of the evolving
submarine force threat, place additional imperatives upon all ASW programs. ASW programs must:
increase operator proficiency in the face of reduced manpower and equipment numbers. For example, through
improved training programs,
shorten training pipelines by designing operator and technician "friendly" systems,
incorporate appropriate leading-edge technologies through shorter, innovative procurement processes, increased use of
commercially available technologies (COTS), and adaptation of technologies not traditionally applied to ASW; and
reduce the acquisition and life-cycle support costs of systems so a greater portion of ASW resources can be focused on
at-sea operations.
Within these constraints and in the most challenging ASW operations, coordinated, multiplatform ASW operations promises
to provide the capabilities required of littoral ASW.
Coordination and Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I). Coordinated, multiplatform
operations ensure the most effective sensors and weapons are used when and where they are most needed. Continuous
awareness of the common tactical picture among ASW assets is essential to this concept. Assured C4I connectivity enables
ASW forces to respond to fleeting contacts, integrate their collective knowledge to form this common tactical picture to best
exploit their weapons’ capabilities.
All sensors, including those not historically associated with ASW, must be integral to the C4I network. For example,
surveillance systems previously associated with only strategic indication and warning missions must also provide tactically
useful information directly to ASW platforms.
Materiel and Weapon Systems. Optimization of materiel assets capable of capitalizing in a "plug and fight" environment is
essential to coordinated, multiplatform ASW.
Capable C4ISR systems are required to collect and evaluate battlespace information.
Environmentally adaptive sensors, used for cueing and targeting, must efficiently find targets in an ambiguous
battlespace environment and help ensure weapons reach their targets.
Effective ASW weapons, either lethal or nonlethal, and tags that overtly or covertly mark an adversary submarine and
report locating data to various sensors, are required to neutralize the submarine threat.
Coordinated, multiplatform littoral ASW draws from the experiences and knowledge gained through open-ocean ASW.
When appropriate, the equipment and practices employed in open-ocean ASW must be used in littoral operations.
The best sensor and weapons systems are those operated

outside the target's sphere of influence on our forces.
Training and doctrine. Effective training and doctrine are required to achieve the close coordination and responsiveness
necessary for successful littoral ASW. The training must be challenging and focused to develop and maintain ASW
expertise. Many area specific, political, warfighting and environmental differences make littoral ASW noticeably different
from open-ocean ASW. This mandates littoral ASW doctrine be continually developed, evaluated, revised and promulgated
as the Navy’s experience, systems, operations and goals evolve. Successful execution of both new and existing doctrine
requires proper training to develop and maintain proficient operators.
(New Equipment) x (Zero New Doctrine and Training) = ZERO
Organization and leadership. The organizational leadership structure required to support littoral ASW may also require
modification from that of parallel open-ocean ASW structures. Organizations must be able to work towards the visions of
the leaders while maintaining or improving an operational capability.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This concept addresses the capabilities required to conduct successful ASW and broadly defines the enabling capabilities
required to achieve the mission objective of forward operating area ASW battlespace dominance. Much innovation is
required to attain this goal of conducting fully integrated, multiplatform, ASW concurrently with power projection and other
military operations. The limitations of current day systems and doctrine restrict today’s ASW to platform-centric operations
conducted as an enabling phase distinct from the main warfighting effort to prevent unacceptable losses to enemy
submarines.
As improved equipment and updated tactics, techniques and procedures are developed, the state of ASW will evolve from
the sequential, platform-centric reality of today to the concurrent, network-centric construct of the future. To accomplish this
evolution, we must:
Increase the emphasis on updating the tactics, techniques and procedures for ASW to optimize the employment of
today’s equipment in the conduct of coordinated littoral ASW operations. This aggressive development and
implementation of updated doctrine must continue to drive the evolution of concurrent, network-centric ASW as more
capable equipment becomes available.
Establish a synergetic, systems approach to ASW in a Navy ASW Strategy to focus the efforts of the various resource
sponsors to most effectively develop the required ASW capabilities.
Develop an ASW transition plan that provides a path from current and near-term capabilities through mid-term
improvements and to the far-term to achieve the necessary future operational capabilities.
Establish an assessment process based on ASW warfighting tasks that is independent of platform. The "ASW System"
should use this process to measure the effectiveness of current ASW capabilities and to identify and prioritize future
ASW capabilities.
Update the training and doctrine to include networked, coordinated, multi-platform ASW capabilities concurrent with
technological advances and tactical developments. Additionally, continue to develop, evaluate and revise training and
doctrine as experience, systems, operations and objectives evolve.
Evaluate both current and emerging technologies, including those not typically associated with ASW applications, to
identify and develop appropriate technological "advances" to achieve the required future ASW capabilities.
Definitions
Anti-Submarine Warfare:"Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the
effective use of submarines." Joint Pub 1-02
Battlespace: "All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land, space, and the electromagnetic
spectrum that encompass the area of influence and area of interest." NDP-1
Battlespace Dominance: "The degree of control over the dimensions of the battlespace that
enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the enemy freedom of action. It permits power
projection and force sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential missions." NDP-1
Concept:
"A notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that
may lead to an accepted procedure." Joint Pub 1-02
A concept is a recommended solution to an opportunity or challenge. "Concepts provide the

foundation for evolution." Joint Vision 2010
Littoral: "Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region, within direct control of
and vulnerable to the striking power of naval expeditionary forces." NDP-1
Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare: as used in this paper, refers to issues pertaining to the
neutralization of the littoral submarine threat.
Undersea Battlespace Dominance: The ability to deny threat submarine operations in the joint
forces maneuver areas and their associated sea-based logistics support."
Undersea Warfare: "That segment of naval warfare which involves sensors, weapons, platforms,
and targets in the subsurface environment." NWP 1-02
Introduction
Purpose
This paper provides a concept for conducting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the littorals. It broadly defines the
capabilities necessary to conduct successful littoral ASW operations in the 2015 time frame. The discussion provides a
framework for the actions and innovations of many people whose work will turn this evolving concept into tangible changes
in organization, training, materiel and weapon systems, doctrine, and leadership. It is directed at the flag and civilian
leadership within the DoN, scientific, technological and acquisition communities. The littoral focus of this concept is not
intended to imply that open-ocean ASW is a solved problem. Open-ocean ASW remains a difficult task with many aspects
common with and some unique from littoral ASW.
Background
ASW, as defined in Joint Pub 1-02, is "operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of
submarines". ASW is a subset within the broader Navy definition of Undersea Warfare, defined in NWP 1-02 as, "that
segment of naval warfare which involves sensors, weapons, platforms and targets in the subsurface environment". ASW is
one of the warfare areas crucial to the success of any military operation that includes the use of maritime forces and
logistics.
The ASW systems of today have been optimized for operations in the open-ocean environment. The limitations of these
systems currently restrict ASW to small areas centered about the individual platforms conducting the operation. Protracted
sanitization operations, requiring a significant operational pause in advance of the main military operation are required to
prevent unacceptable losses to enemy submarines. As warfare moves into the 21st century, ASW must evolve from the
platform-centric, sequentially phased reality of today. Advances in technology, tactics and doctrine will produce an
integrated, network-centric architecture capable of denying enemy submarine influence throughout any joint operating area
concurrently with power projection and other military operations. The transition to network centric ASW requires a plan that
provides a path from current and near-term capabilities through mid-term improvements, to the far-term to achieve the
necessary future operational capabilities.
National Objectives.
As a maritime nation, the United States has continuing vital

economic, political, and military interests around the globe.
Forward...From the Sea describes US naval forces’ enduring
contributions of strategic deterrence, sea control, maritime
supremacy, and strategic sealift in support of the national
military strategy. It points out the unique contributions of
naval forces to power projection and forward presence.
Figure 2 describes how national objectives form the basis for
the translation of ASW missions that ultimately establish
manpower and equipment requirements.
Joint and Naval Objectives.
The Navy’s essential contributions to the accomplishment of

the national military strategy are defined in the core
competencies developed by the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces. While the Navy contribution to any joint military operation includes many things beyond the
core competencies, these are the areas where the Navy has primary responsibility. The importance of successful ASW as an
enabler to military operations is underscored by its inclusion as one of the four core competencies assigned to the Navy.
Figure 3 illustrates how dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics are
enhanced by information superiority to achieve full spectrum dominance. Successful ASW provides US and combined naval
forces the ability to maneuver at will and protects seaborne combined forces and logistics critical to achieving the joint
commanders’ mission. While successful ASW alone will not ensure successful completion of the mission, the
disproportionate effect of a single enemy submarine may be enough to ensure failure. The reality or merely the threat of
enemy submarine operations undermines the ability of joint forces to project power ashore. Some examples of the potential
impact of enemy submarine operations include the loss of or delays in the arrival of:
carrier based air power,

equipment and supplies prepositioned afloat for the Air Force, Army and Marine Corps, or
"just in time" focused logistical support carried on either naval or supporting commercial vessels.
The lack of tolerance for such losses could transform a rapid Core Competencies
deployment or strike operation into a long, protracted evolution. As a
result, the political realities of many regional conflicts could allow the Core Competencies are the set of specific capabilities or
adversary to equate a stalemate or operational pause at sea with a activities fundamental to a Service or agency role. They define
strategic victory. Future ASW capabilities must ensure that all power the Service's or agency's essential contributions to the overall
projection efforts are supported concurrently without the protracted, effectiveness of DOD and its unified commands. The Joint
Roles and Missions Commission determined in their May
sequential ASW operations required today.
1995 report "Directions for Defense" that the Navy's core
competencies are:
Littoral
ASW Carrier-based air power projection
Amphibious power projection
Sea-based air and missile defense and
Anit-Submarine Warfare
Objectives.
In order for joint and/or multinational forces to succeed, littoral ASW must prepare the battlespace for other seaborne forces
by denying enemy submarine influence in an operating area. Today this area is relatively small and centered about individual
ASW capable platforms. As a result, ASW today focuses on clearing adversary submarines from the operating area before
the arrival of the high value platforms and providing escort services to those platforms throughout the operation. This
deliberate, sequential method of operation is contrary to goals of Joint Vision 2010 and Forward...From the Sea.
Littoral ASW of the future requires the ability to deny adversary submarine influence over the entire joint operating area and
supporting seaborne logistic routes without lengthy preparatory operations. ASW operations must be integrated with and
conducted simultaneously with special force, mine countermeasure, theater missile defense, and high-paced naval power
projection operations.
Principles of Littoral ASW
Understand and prepare the battlespace for joint forces' maneuvering upon the sea.
Deny enemy submarines influence in the joint operating area.
Prosecute enemy submarines as close to their operating bases as possible.
Emphasize integrated information connectivity and flexibility at all levels.
Adapt sensors and weapons to the operational environment to optimize effectiveness.
Anticipated Battlespace and Adversaries

"The ASW Challenge"
Diesel-electric submarines constitute a growing threat, one that can be difficult to detect and defend against
in shallow water. Uncountered, these submarines can disrupt shipping and shut down vital sea lanes in
littoral areas. Many navies now operate diesel submarines, and additional countries could well follow suit.
William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense

Annual Report to the President and Congress
March 1996
Introduction
The submarine is a critical element of military strength -- for major powers projecting global might, for nations intent on
projecting regional influence, and for any nation determined to defend its coast. Many countries consider submarines a cost-
effective option for conducting a broad range of vital maritime missions. Adversaries are likely to employ submarines in any
of the following missions:
Coastal Defense. Operating in littoral areas, the submarine provides an important element of coastal defense. Diesel-
electric submarines are ideally suited for this short-ranged mission. Even relatively unsophisticated submarines can
hold naval forces at risk while posing a difficult challenge for ASW forces.
Sea Denial. A submarine can covertly conduct

surveillance, mining, and attack in busy shipping
channels or maritime choke points.
Power Projection. As a self-sufficient platform able
to operate stealthily in forward areas, a submarine
can project military power ashore by covertly
landing special operations forces or by attacking key
targets with cruise missiles armed with a variety of
munitions, including weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).
Strategic Deterrence. An ideal platform for carrying
ballistic missiles, the nuclear-powered submarine's
inherent stealth makes it hard to find and neutralize.
A country with such a submarine possesses a
formidable strategic deterrent.
The asymmetric effects of some potential adversary warfighting capabilities are discussed in The Concept For Joint
Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010, issued in May 1997. Figure 4 illustrates that while it is relatively difficult to
develop a capable submarine force, once it is developed, as several potential adversaries have done, it poses a high threat to
US forces. As a result, the US may find its forces deployed against a capable submarine threat in a variety of regions and
environments around the globe. Because submarines may operate almost anywhere in the world’s oceans it is not possible to
predict the battlespace exactly. The future threat will increasingly include diesel-electric or air independent propulsion
submarine designs operated by potential adversaries for coastal defense and regional influence. Nuclear-powered submarine
procurement by adversaries is expected to remain less common, but still poses a threat.
The Environment
Successful ASW operations in littoral regions will require the ability to adapt to the battlespace environment to maximize
sensor and weapon performance. The environment exhibits greater variability in many littoral regions as compared to that of
the open ocean. As a result, more parameters are of concern in properly characterizing and exploiting the environment in
these regions. New ASW technologies such as electro-optical, laser, and chemical detection may require critical
environmental support not available today. Environmental parameters that will be exploited in littoral regions include those:
Above the water’s surface:
Understanding and predicting meteorological conditions are required to design and employ effective visible, electro-
optical (EO), electric field (EF), infrared (IR), and electro-magnetic (EM) systems against these portions of a
submarine’s signature.
Below the water’s surface:
Within the nonhomogeneous littoral environment, understanding and adapting to a range of oceanographic conditions
will be necessary. Critical environmental parameters include:
Physical Parameters - waves, tides, currents, fresh water incursion from river outflows and eddies combine to create a
noisy and dynamic environment in which a submarine will be quieter than the surrounding environment. A simple
temperature profile will not be adequate to assess the oceanographic environment.
Geospatial Parameters - the bathymetry, bottom composition, and nearby topography could be used by submarines to
hide and complicate sensor performance predictions.
Biological Parameters - submarine movement activates bioluminescence in certain regions.
The highly variable environment in the littorals directly translates to a complex ASW environment. Since acoustics will not
be the sole detection mechanism, an environmental assessment will need to address the requirements of non-acoustic
detection systems as well.
Development of sensors and weapons that have the ability to dynamically and automatically adapt to the environment will
require:
An understanding of how variations in the environment affect the various sensor or weapons system parameters.
Accurate real-time measurement of environmental parameters.
Imbedded environmental models that can help translate in situ measurements into parametric adjustments to better
match the sensor or weapon system to the environment.
Threat Assessment
Although a submarine threat could come from any country that possesses at least one submarine and a desire to disrupt
shipping, the growing threat is that more countries can readily acquire diesel-electric submarines. The worldwide trend is
toward fewer, but more lethal submarines. While the total worldwide submarine order-of-battle is decreasing, the technology
available in new and backfit submarine systems is advancing. On average, the cost of diesel-electric submarines has
remained about the same, even though more advanced technology is being incorporated into each unit. Ten years from now,
many potential adversary submarines will be equipped with state-of-the-art systems.
Even without sophisticated technology, an adversary’s submarines may be able to perform their desired missions effectively.
The mission success of a submarine depends upon several elements including stealth; mobility and endurance; sensor and
weapon systems; operational proficiency; sustainability and maintainability; and command,
control, communications, and intelligence. By making trade-offs between these elements, a threat nation can choose a
combination of technologies that maximizes the "bang for the buck." For example, a nation concerned with a coastal defense
role for its submarines may choose reduced mobility and endurance to gain enhancements in other elements, such as stealth
and weapon firepower.
A submarine force composed of a few relatively unsophisticated "One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be
submarines is capable of conducting coastal defense or sea denial endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not
missions. Such a force can attack merchant and logistics shipping, know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be
conduct covert offensive mining, support special operations forces, victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows
attack amphibious ships, and hold regional naval forces at risk. neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in
every engagement."
Stealth Sun Tzu

The Art of War
Traditionally, a submarine’s ability to avoid detection is defined in
terms of its acoustic signature. There are many sources contributing to
a submarine’s acoustic signature. Machinery and other propulsion-related vibrations enter the water through the hull and
radiate in all directions. The propeller resonates when turning, and cavitation (noise generated by bubbles collapsing) can
develop. Additionally, the turbulent flow of water around the ship can excite the hull itself. Each type of noise has a unique
pattern, which can differ with speed, depth, and water conditions.
Quieting technologies continue to improve and are increasingly available to backfit older submarines. Hull coatings,
improved propeller design, and quieted propulsion plant equipment reduce the submarine’s overall noise levels, especially at
high speeds. Future incorporation of Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP), advanced batteries, and improved quieting measures
will reduce the submarine’s vulnerability to acoustic detection even more. All these pose challenges for US ASW
capabilities.
In littoral regions, non-acoustic signatures will become increasingly important. A submarine exhibits various non-acoustic
signatures, some of which are highly dependent on the submarine’s speed or depth. Chief among these are the magnetic and
electrical fields generated as a result of the materials used in the construction of the submarine. Systems are currently
available to reduce a submarine's magnetic and electrical signatures. Other non-acoustic signatures include the submarine’s
wake, contamination within the wake from bubbles or chemicals, radar reflectivity, and the heat generated by the
submarine’s propulsion plant.
Mobility and Endurance
Most potential adversaries will use low-speed, low-endurance diesel-electric submarines for coastal defense and limited
regional influence. These submarines must periodically surface or snorkel to run diesel-driven generators to recharge their
batteries.
Earlier submarine batteries allowed slow-speed submerged operations for about 12 hours. In contrast, modern battery
designs allow the submarine to increase its submerged endurance to as much as 3-4 days, and reduce the duration of its
vulnerability when charging batteries. Advanced submarine battery designs are under development worldwide and could
increase endurance up to 10-12 days of submerged operations.
AIP technology is becoming more prevalent in the conventional submarine export market. Currently, only the Swedish
GOTLAND class SS has an AIP capability. However, several other AIP designs, which include fuel cells, closed-cycle diesel
engines, and nuclear battery chargers, have been successfully tested. The expense of these systems is considerable and only
a small number of potential adversary navies will have this technology. Those nations incorporating AIP, however, will
increase their submarine’s submerged endurance at slow speed by up to five-fold.
For a nation with global or large-scale regional commitments, only nuclear-powered submarines have the endurance
required for sustained long-range, high-speed operations. Relatively few countries have commitments that justify the
expense, technical infrastructure, and political determination required to develop and maintain a nuclear submarine force.
The nuclear submarine programs of countries like Russia and China will continue to produce capable nuclear submarines
that will operate in both the open ocean and littoral waters.
Sensors
Rapid developments in computer and signal processing will result in increasingly capable sensor suites and tactical
information systems with more automated functions, making it easier to detect, classify, and engage targets successfully with
fewer operators.
Future sonar suites include advances such as flank arrays, towed passive sonar arrays, real-time self-noise monitoring, and
advanced signal processing capabilities. A low-end diesel submarine is likely to have a system equivalent to the present
KILO SS class sonar suite, which has a capable array married to simple processors. With enhanced signal processing and
displays coupled to the existing array, a low-end diesel submarine could become ASW-capable.
Several nations have shown an interest in submarine-mounted non-acoustic ASW systems to complement their acoustic
sensors. Such systems may appear in the market place at some future time, but none are currently available.
Weapons
Torpedoes increasingly have greater destructive power. Eight major producers offer at least 21 models of submarine-
launched torpedoes for export. The spectrum of torpedo systems and technologies spans from simple straight-running
weapons to wake-homing and sophisticated acoustic homing torpedoes. Heavyweight torpedoes, produced in 14 countries,
are the principal submarine-launched weapons. Modern submarine-launched heavyweight torpedoes can literally break some
warships in half. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive wake-homing torpedoes has put "fire and forget" weapons,
which are highly lethal and difficult to counter, into the hands of any potential adversary’s submariners.
Cruise missiles will further complicate the future threat picture. Russia, France and the US market submarine-launched anti-
ship cruise missiles. Modern anti-ship cruise missiles can be difficult to detect and allow little reaction time. China is
developing more advanced systems and is expected to market a submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missile after the year
2000. Although some of the newest missiles advertised for export could be launched from standard submarine torpedo tubes,
others require specially designed launchers. However, even with anti-ship cruise missiles in their inventory, a country must
also develop the over-the-horizon targeting architecture to effectively use the long ranges of these weapons. Future
technologies that will be incorporated into cruise missiles include improved stealth, guidance systems, seekers, digital
processing, and high-performance propulsion systems.
Russia is currently the only country that possesses a submarine launched anti-submarine cruise missile capability. However,
China has expressed an interest in developing its own submarine launched ASW missile and may be required to seek
Russian assistance to accomplish this endeavor.
Mines may be a particularly efficient method for an adversary to shape the battlespace. Minefields can restrict or deny the
maneuverability of ASW forces, or create relatively safe corridors and areas through which enemy submarines can operate.
Command activated minefields, turned ‘on’ or ‘off’ by the adversary as the conflict situation requires, may be particularly
threatening to littoral ASW forces. Even relatively unsophisticated mines can cause extensive damage and are notoriously
difficult to detect and remove. Most naval mines are dual-purpose, able to target submarines or surface ships. Mobile mines
have a torpedo after-body used to propel them a considerable distance into shallow waters or harbors where they function as
standard mines.
Submarine-launched, anti-air missiles continue to be marketed. Systems presently available are limited to shoulder-fired
variants, providing limited self-defense utility to submarines. Future systems will likely incorporate some form of internal
mounting and fire control system to support submerged launch of these weapons.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)
The technology is available today for potential adversaries’ navies to develop low cost, commercial off the shelf (COTS)
command and control architectures suitable to support operations within their littoral areas. Some potential adversaries will
undoubtedly acquire such C4I systems by 2010. Today’s technology can support a third party command and control network
through satellite or cellular networks. In the future, adversary nations may have access to satellite communications, over-the-
horizon targeting nets, and satellite imaging.
Operational Proficiency
The operational proficiency of the potential adversaries’ submarine forces varies greatly. At present, Libyan submarines are
inept and essentially non-operational, but the Indian and Chinese submarine forces are large with a core group of submarines
that are relatively well maintained and operate routinely at sea.1 An Argentine Type-209 diesel submarine (San Luis)
operated 800 NM from its base and made two attacks on British warships during the Falklands war.2 Faulted Argentine
torpedo fire control maintenance caused these attacks to fail. San Luis demonstrated considerable proficiency, however,
when it eluded the best ASW efforts of the Royal Navy. Over 200 items of ASW ordnance were employed against this one
submarine, mostly against numerous false contacts.
Clearly, the general operational proficiency of most potential adversaries’ submarine forces has not yet reached the level of
developed countries, such as Russia and various NATO countries. Nevertheless, detecting and tracking a submarine in the
littorals will remain a significant challenge.
Summary
Littoral ASW operations will be conducted in a complex environment against a quieter, more capable submarine threat.
These operations require the ability to adapt to the environment. Since a wide range of mission and cost options exist,
submarines operated by different countries will have differing levels of proficiency, stealth, mobility and endurance, sensor
and weapon systems, and C4I systems.
Most potential adversaries will likely employ their submarines for coastal defense and regional influence, including sea
denial and power projection. The littoral ASW battlespace of the future will be defined by these more capable threats
operating in their littoral waters and strategically important choke points. It is important to remember that submarines are
capable platforms and an adversary will not necessarily operate them as we expect.
"...Submarines will allow the consolidation of Iranian Naval

superiority in the entire Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz."
Admiral Shamkani
Head of the Iranian Navy 1994
Littoral ASW
The primary focus of maritime forces has shifted from global to regional threats.
Secretary of Defense Annual Report February 1996
Missions and Tasks

This section describes the missions and tasks of ASW as they apply to operations in the littorals.
ASW Missions
An ASW mission is a collection of tasks that support the Navy’s core competency of ASW. Each ASW mission is defined in
a littoral context, and refers to current ASW capabilities. The ASW-related missions supporting forward-deployed, joint
littoral warfare operations are:
Forward Operating Area ASW Battlespace Dominance -- This is the ultimate goal for littoral ASW. Once attained,
naval forces will sufficiently control the subsurface battlespace to enhance friendly freedom of maneuver while
restricting the enemy’s freedom of action. Tasks included in the efforts for ASW battlespace dominance must also
support power projection and force sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential missions.
Sea Control Operations -- Includes tasks required to gain adequate control of the seas in the US maneuver area
and thereby secure US objectives in regional operations.
Choke Point Operations -- Includes tasks required to ensure choke points are maintained free of submarines
that would deter or prevent the passage and freedom of navigation through any restrictive or strategically
significant geographic location.
Submarine Mission Denial -- Includes tasks required to prevent or hinder an enemy submarine from
accomplishing assigned missions.
Inherent to each of these missions are the tasks associated with developing and maintaining battlespace awareness, to
include environmental data, force locating data, and sensor/weapon performance predictions.
Littoral ASW Tasks
Littoral ASW tasks are actions required to successfully complete an ASW mission. These tasks are categorized as
operational or infrastructure support. Operational tasks are accomplished through the application of sensors, weapons and
decoys, using doctrine and tactics. Infrastructure support tasks are accomplished through a support system that develops and
tests equipment, trains operators for their proper use, and provides associated operational and materiel support for their
employment.3
Operational Tasks. These tasks directly support an ASW operation and can be performed by any asset available to the ASW
commander, including ships, submarines, aircraft, IUSS or other sensor systems, and many ASW weapons delivery vehicles.
Cueing -- The ability to detect the presence of a submarine in a general area by national or theater sensors (i.e. non-
tactical units).
Search -- A systematic reconnaissance for a submarine in a defined area.
Detection -- The perception of contact indications that may be a submarine.
Classification -- Ability to discriminate a contact as either a submarine or non-submarine and, if a submarine,
determine its identity.
Target Identification -- Action taken to determine the threat of a target to a force or unit.
Localization/Targeting -- The determination of a submarine’s position by reducing the general area of contact to
weapons acquisition criteria. Being prepared to make an appropriate response to a submarine’s hostile or threatening
actions, taking into account ROE, operational requirements, and capabilities.
Attack/Neutralization -- An ASW attack is the use of weapons against a submarine. Neutralization is action taken to
render submarine’s influence on military operations ineffective by any means available. This task includes:
Preemptive Strike -- A strike against a submarine port, moored submarines, submarine support facilities, and/or key
control nodes to prevent enemy submarine departure or to render the infrastructure unsuitable to support sustained
submarine operations.
Determined Attack -- An attack against a submarine prior to that submarine achieving an attack position.
Reactive Attack -- A counter-attack against a submarine following failure of the ASW system to detect and neutralize
an adversary submarine prior to it closing to effective weapons range of friendly forces.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) -- Use
of integrated systems, doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities and
communications to support a task force or ASW commander’s exercise of command and control, and communicating
the best information from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, through all phases of the operational
continuum.
Weapon and Sensor Optimization (WSO) -- Actions taken to employ the best available sensor to provide the most
timely and accurate targeting data to a weapon system capable of creating the desired level of target neutralization or
destruction. System operators inherently optimize their sensors and weapons for any given operational environment or
situation.
Battlespace Shaping -- Actions taken to restrict the adversary submarine operational area through the tactical
application of bathymetry, deception, sensors, and weapons.
Self-Defense -- Ability to detect and neutralize aggressive actions from a threat submarine.
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) -- Ability to determine the effectiveness of an attack.
Infrastructure Support Tasks -- Infrastructure support tasks provide the foundation upon which the Navy builds and
maintains operationally ready ASW forces:
Training and Proficiency -- Actions taken to provide training to ASW personnel, units, and forces to develop and
maintain adequate skills and capabilities to effectively conduct ASW doctrine and tactics.
Intelligence Assessment -- Involves the collection and analysis of all available information regarding an adversary. It
provides an accurate estimate of the situation, forecasts likely enemy course(s) of action, and allows us to apply
decisive combat power throughout the battlespace.
Post-Mission Analysis -- Review of mission events and data to determine effectiveness of sensors, weapons and
tactics.
Environmental Assessment -- Involves the collection and analysis of meteorological, oceanographic, and geospatial
data to support an understanding of environmental effects on ASW related sensors and weapons.
Materiel/Operational/Tactical Development -- Actions taken to translate, operationally test and evaluate concepts,
operational and technological innovations, to improve sensors, weapons, tactics, techniques and procedures that will
enhance an ASW force’s ability to conduct successful operations. This includes Navy research and development of
science and technology in support of Naval requirements.
Logistics (Materiel Support) -- Actions taken to aid, sustain and supply an ASW force.
Figure 5 depicts the capabilities currently required to accomplish littoral ASW. The littoral ASW pyramid is based on the
manpower and equipment provided to implement the ASW in support of the national military strategy. Infrastructure tasks
enable operational tasks to be performed. The operational tasks provide the means to dominate the forward operating area
battlespace.
The large size of the ‘Training and Proficiency’ and ‘Manpower and Equipment’ blocks represent their importance to ASW.
ASW cannot be done without properly manned, equipped, or trained personnel. No task will alone accomplish the mission.
Mission success currently requires all tasks be completed.
Littoral ASW Today

"At the same time we address the problems of today,
we must prepare now for tomorrow’s uncertain future."
NSC National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997
Since the significant impact of submarine warfare was first demonstrated during World War I, the goal of ASW has been to
provide a seamless, in-stride denial of adversary submarine influence on political and military objectives throughout an area
of interest. The nearly 100 years of incremental improvement in ASW has been matched by similar improvements in
submarine capabilities. Today, ASW operations are inefficient as they are sequential, asset intensive and require operational
pauses (sometime lengthy) to prepare a limited area to support naval force operations with acceptable risk. Thus, the
submarine continues to be one of the most effective methods of influencing the Navy’s ability to execute operations from the
sea.
Furthermore, today’s ASW capabilities are optimized for the open ocean environment. As the mission focus moves to the
littorals, the typically harsher environment limits the technical performance of existing ASW tactical sensors and weapons,
making it difficult to detect, localize and neutralize submarines. Additionally, the lack of environmental data bases, remote
and in situ sensors, real-time tactical sensors and weapons performance assessments that can automatically adapt to changes
in the environment degrade an ASW commander’s battlespace awareness and ability to achieve battlespace dominance in the
force operating area.
Near-term and mid-term ASW capabilities in the current program of record reflect historical analysis and limited,
incremental improvements in today’s systems to better match them to the operating environment. Most of these
improvements focus on acoustically based sensor and torpedo systems and C4I related data processing. While these
improvements may result in an improved ASW capability, they primarily support sequential operations.
Only far-term improvements offer the potential to conduct effective ASW concurrently with a naval force’s primary mission.
These improvements will only be achieved through the integration of innovative concepts into rigorous future operational
capability planning. Areas requiring enhancement for successful littoral ASW have been identified by several studies and
include:
Cueing (acoustic and non-acoustic) ASW Combat ID/Undersea IFF
Acoustic and Non-Acoustic Sensor Coordinated ASW Tactics

Systems
Weapons Coordinated ASW Training and Proficiency
Torpedo Self Defense Environmentally Adaptive Capabilities for

Sensors
ASW C4ISR Applications
(Improvements in any or all of these areas will also enhance open-ocean ASW capabilities.)
The Navy must develop a plan and investment strategy to transition ASW from current capabilities, through near and mid
term improvements and far-term innovations, to achieve the future operational capabilities necessary to deny adversary
submarines influence on maritime forces supporting joint or combined operations.
New Technology Insertion. Current procedures for the introduction of new ASW technology inadequately address the
issues generated by the accelerating rate of technological innovation. Specifically, present acquisition policies are too
inflexible to permit the rapid insertion of the newest technologies on ASW capable platforms. These procedures result in
ASW assets that are prematurely obsolete and significantly less capable than is technologically possible. Further, such
delays in procurement generate no cost savings since the need for replacement systems is accelerated.
ASW Community. Successful littoral ASW requires proficient operators employing effective and reliable sensor systems to
detect, classify and localize submarines, and weapons capable of neutralizing threat submarines. Presently the US uses a
variety of platforms for ASW and attempts to coordinate their efforts at sea such that each complements the actions of the
other. A synergetic, systems approach in a Navy ASW strategy is needed to drive cross-community coordination and focus in
the development and procurement of new or improved ASW capabilities.
Close coordination of ASW concepts, programs, systems and operations promises to optimize the ASW force’s capability in
a period of declining resource allocations. Coordination that focuses effort across platform and community resource
sponsors could match improvements and tasks to platforms to optimize overall ASW capabilities.
Realities & Imperatives
The littoral ASW operational concept for the future must be focused to accomplish missions within the context of enduring
realities:
Naval forces will operate in the littorals.

Defense budgets will limit:
The number of ASW-capable assets
Personnel availability, training and proficiency
Infrastructure support
ASW Research and Development funding
Rules of Engagement (ROE), including new environmental policy concerns, will shape and constrain operational
options.
Time and other operational constraints may not allow for the conduct of warfare operations in a sequential manner. We
must develop the capabilities necessary to conduct ASW and other warfare operations concurrently.
Given these realities, it is imperative that:
An integrated ASW system is capable of detecting, classifying, localizing and neutralizing all submarine threats
quickly and decisively in the littoral maneuver area and supporting SLOCs.
The distributed ASW network architecture does not negate an individual platform’s ability to conduct independent
ASW operations when required.
The system can negate submarine threats to a dispersed or transiting force.
The realities and imperatives are directly related. They provide the basis for measuring success or failure. Satisfying the
imperatives will demand adaptation of existing resources and infrastructure along with rapid integration of new
technologies. Cost efficiencies in existing programs are needed to make resources available for the coherent application of
new technology to support this operational concept.
Future Operational Concept

Littoral ASW is an enabler for joint and combined force power projection objectives including operations other than war. A
phased approach to the successful implementation of this operational concept requires dedicated peacetime action for
deterrence and conflict prevention to enable a smooth transition from crisis to war, if required. Littoral ASW supports forces
operating in the relatively confined waters of an adversary’s littoral to:
Deny adversary submarine influence in the joint operating area.

Project ASW forward to the limits of the authorized ROE.
Integrate assets in a "plug and fight" C4ISR environment to provide a seamless common tactical picture.
Neutralize or destroy, if applicable, adversary submarines while remaining beyond the adversary’s reach.
Peacetime: Deterrence and Conflict Prevention
During peacetime, sensors monitor environmental data in littoral regions of interest, adversary submarine capabilities,
including force readiness, infrastructure and operating patterns. The peacetime sensor system must integrate remote sensors
with national sensors to monitor locations and activities that identify a potential adversary’s submarine operations. Such
assets conduct port surveillance, identify critical submarine infrastructure nodes, and contribute to the overall assessment of
an adversary’s submarine capability. A combination of remote, autonomous and manned sensors will be used to detect,
localize and monitor submarines that are underway. The goals of peacetime operations are to assess the threat and:
Monitor the operational posture of potential adversaries.

Identify materiel, training, doctrine and organizational shortfalls that must be corrected in order to conduct effective
ASW operations against potential adversaries.
Convince any potential adversary that our ASW capabilities are formidable and can readily defeat the opposition
force.
Crisis-to-War
A range of options must be available to conduct littoral ASW operations. These operations could occur against enemy
submarines at their base (preemption), as they exit port (port interdiction), as they approach the defensive perimeter of the
area of operation, and within the area of operation.
As the focus of the ASW effort moves forward towards the adversary’s piers and support facilities, the number of assets
required to neutralize adversary submarines decreases, while the difficulty in obtaining approval of the required ROE
increases. A full range of options will provide the ASW commander the flexibility to accomplish his mission within the
applicable rules of engagement.
Preemption. The goal of preemption is to prevent the employment of enemy submarine forces by attacking submarines at
the pier, and those fixed facilities that are essential to the effective employment of submarine forces. Preemption could
include airstrikes with stand-off munitions, cruise missile strikes, Special Operations Forces, torpedo attacks, attacks by
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV), offensive mining, and Information Operations (IO). Both the adversary submarines
themselves and key submarine manpower and infrastructure elements such as munitions, command and control nodes,
logistics depots and refit/repair facilities could be targeted. A combination of real-time remote sensing and a fully
interconnected command and control network can provide operational commanders with refined targeting information, the
ability to coordinate attacks, and accurate battle damage assessment.
Preemption exploits an adversary’s need to base submarine forces and Rules of Engagement
their associated infrastructure at fixed geographic locations.
Preemption may employ both lethal and nonlethal technology, and may As is true of any military operation, the decision to emply
seek to either deny adversary submarines the ability to operate or to preemptive attacks must be based on both political and
deny them the stealth on which their effectiveness depends. military considerations. Prior to the commencement of
hostilities, preemption may not be compatible with the
The political implications of preemption dictate National Command strategic objectives of the National Command Authorities
(NCA). Even during armed conflict, use of available weapon
Authority (NCA) level approval of the ROE and possibly the
systems may pose an unacceptable risk of collateral damage.
operations plan. Since preemptive attacks deny adversary forces the The NCA must reconcile the magnitude of the submarine
ability to maneuver, preemption may offer the best balance between threat to littoral operations with these considerations and
ASW effectiveness and economy of force. appropriate recommendations from the military forces when
formulating Rules of Engagement (ROE) for military
Port interdiction. The goal of port interdiction is to neutralize enemy commanders.
submarine forces after they sortie but before they leave their home port
harbors. A secondary goal is to deny submarine forces already at sea the opportunity to resupply. Port interdiction includes
attacking enemy submarines with torpedoes, UUV delivered weapons, Special Forces or offensive mines, or tagging them
with covert or overt means to deny their stealth.
The geography and bathymetry of harbor entrances often provide Denying Stealth
natural chokepoints that geographically concentrate the targets,
facilitating detection and localization of underway submarines by Submarines depend on stealth for both mission effectiveness
autonomous, manned and remote sensing systems. coordinated and self defense. ASW forces perform "tracking" using
employment of appropriate sensors and weapon systems will optimize acoustic sensors, non-acoustic sensors, and non-traditional
the effectiveness of port interdiction operations with available forces. techniques (such as tagging) in order to deny adversary
submarines the opportunity to employ stealth. Overt tracking
seeks to influence submarine operations by making it clear that
Due to the larger area involved, port interdiction requires employment
stealth has not been achieved, while covert tracking seeks only
of more assets than preemptive tactics to neutralize enemy submarines. to hold submarines at risk of destruction pending attack
authorization.
ASW outside the area of operations (including SLOCs and Choke
Points). Depending on the relative locations of port facilities and the Commanders must balance these competing objectives.
area of operations, adversary submarines may need to transit between Choosing to track adversary submarines covertly limits the
the two before being able to influence naval operations from the sea. commander's choice of sensor and weapon systems while
Additionally, adversary submarines may approach the area of increasing the degree of surprise that can be achieved if
operations from other directions if they were deployed before the destruction of the adversary submarine is subsequently
authorized.
arrival of the naval forces or if third party submarine forces are
committed to the conflict by a government sympathetic to the principal adversary’s goals.
Conducting ASW at several discrete locations, such as chokepoints and SLOCs, or in a large area outside of the joint force
maneuver area imposes a greater requirement for a robust, responsive command and control architecture to effectively
coordinate the ASW forces. Additionally, a distributed network of environmental, tactical and national sensors must be
integrated into this command and control architecture to provide a theater-wide ASW picture to the warfare commanders.
Operating outside the area of operation offers ASW forces the flexibility to exploit maneuver and mass to defeat adversary
submarines. This permits commanders to employ techniques such as barrier defense, defensive minefields and denial of
logistic support opportunities.
ASW in the area of operations. The mere threat of an adversary submarine operating inside the area of operations can
adversely affect the mission effectiveness of naval forces. This potential demands the assignment of significant forces to the
ASW effort to neutralize adversary submarine threats within the area. Conducting effective ASW within the maneuver area
imposes the most pressing requirement for an integrated ASW system of sensors, weapons, information processing, and
personnel to capitalize on moments of fleeting contact to neutralize or destroy enemy submarines before they can achieve
their mission objectives.
Figure 6 depicts the range of defense-in-depth options. Each option is enhanced by the synergistic combination of sensor and
weapon capabilities achieved through coordinated, multiplatform ASW. This enhancement becomes increasingly important
as a force multiplier to offset increasing asset

requirements as the focus of the ASW operation moves
towards and into the joint area of operation. Projecting
the focus of ASW forward toward the enemy
submarine’s bases will reduce the assets required to
neutralize the enemy submarine’s influence. While
economizing the force required, the forward projection
of ASW reduces the warfare commander’s
responsiveness to changes in the situation by driving the
level of approval for the enabling ROE to higher levels
of the chain of command. The political implications of
preemptive tactics will most likely require NCA level
approval and control of the ROE.
Littoral ASW into the 21st Century

"Undersea warfare remains a tough business where the only acceptable position is one of absolute
operational primacy . . . We must ensure that the capabilities of our undersea warfare team are robust and
effective against a full spectrum submarine threat which is increasingly diverse and technologically
sophisticated"
ADM Jay Johnson, USN

Chief of Naval Operations, 1997
Quoted in "Worldwide Submarine Challenges 1997"
Operational maneuver at sea capitalizes on naval forces’ tactical mobility to thrust, feint, and drive home to a decisive point
—often from a great distance. It uses the vast reaches of seas to stretch the enemy, forcing him to defend thinly or create
gaps in his defenses. When necessary, maneuver at sea uses movement itself to control the depth of the battlespace, closing
and opening the enemy as needed. The naval force circa 2015 will be a networked force with distributed sensors and
weapons providing full battlefield coverage of both information and fires. Integral to this force is an integrated ASW system
capable of locating and quickly neutralizing enemy submarines, as even a single unlocated submarine could result in a
disproportionately significant operational impact. This ASW system is composed of a coordinated team of proficient
operators, ships, aircraft, submarines, remote sensors, unmanned autonomous or remotely piloted vehicles with capable
weapon and sensor packages. This system must be continually optimized to the environment to maximize its capabilities.
This ASW system will be able to deny adversary submarine influence over the entire joint operating area and supporting
seaborne logistic routes without lengthy preparatory operations. ASW operations will be integrated with and conducted
simultaneously with special force, mine countermeasure, theater missile defense operations and high-paced naval power
projection operations.
ASW program constraints and the capabilities of the emergent submarine threat, levy on ASW programs additional
imperatives. These programs must:
increase proficiency in the face of reduced manpower and equipment numbers, through improved training capabilities,
incorporate appropriate leading-edge technologies through a shorter procurement cycle and increased use of
commercially available technologies (cots),
Develop a "plug and fight" architecture that can capitalize on the synergy created in coordinated, networked
multiplatform operations. At the same time, this architecture should not penalize an individual platform’s capability if
required to conduct independent ASW operations, and
reduce life-cycle support costs so a greater fraction of ASW resources can be focused on operations.
Coordinated, Multiplatform ASW
The challenges of the littoral environment and increasingly sophisticated submarine adversaries, coupled with the multiple,
concurrent mission requirements, demand an ASW force that can respond rapidly and decisively. Funding constraints
common to all military programs argue strongly for versatile assets that meet ASW commanders’ needs with the least
expense. Coordinated, multiplatform ASW operations best meet these missions, challenges and constraints of littoral ASW.
Coordinated operations ensure the immediate availability of the most effective ASW sensors and weapons for use when and
where they are most needed. Continuous awareness of the common tactical picture among ASW commanders is essential to
this concept. Effective C4ISR connectivity enables ASW forces to respond to fleeting contacts, integrate their collective
knowledge and best exploit their weapons’ capabilities. Tactically significant information must be continuously distributed
so as to:
provide local commanders information upon demand (‘pull’ information),

provide relevant local information to all commanders as their circumstances change (‘push’ information), and
do so in spite of sometimes uncertain point-to-point communications links (i.e., the C4ISR architecture will be
‘distributed’, to ensure a communication path always exists to each platform.).
Multiplatform operations optimize available sensors and weapons, regardless of the platform from which they are employed.
Enabled by a common tactical picture and robust C4ISR, ASW commanders will be able to employ detection sensors to best
effect, ensuring enemy submarines are located reliably and quickly. Further, ASW commanders will be able to coordinate
various sensor platforms to provide targeting information to the weapon system best able to attack successfully.
Future Operational Capabilities
The future operational capabilities described below are provided as examples and are a point of departure for further
analysis as part of the concept implementation process. These analyses must:
Identify specific solutions that might be available in the near-term, mid-term and far term.
Identify the relative value added by potential solutions to assist in resource planning.
Identify solutions that are not viable and remove them from consideration.
Drive the development of Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to employ new equipment as it is introduced.
Materiel and Weapons
Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). A

survivable, real-time, joint C4ISR system architecture is central to coordinated, multiplatform ASW operations. This system
must be capable of providing a clear, complete picture of the undersea battlespace. A commander must be able to assimilate
the current status within a short time, one minute or less, of walking into the operations space. A Cooperative Undersea
Engagement (CUE) system can provide an integrated picture of the battlespace to optimize the coordinated engagement of
any undersea threat. This system must be based on a modular, common components for ASW systems that can be married
with platform specific input/output front ends to maximize the commonality in a "plug and fight" environment. Key
elements of the CUE system are:
Sensor and Weapon Operator Connectivity:

Decision-makers at each command level must have access to all sensor information affecting ASW operations.
Relevant friendly force and environmental information must also be available so operators can optimize their systems’
performance. The volume, variety and time-sensitivity of this information, and its multiple sources all increase the
importance of efficiently analyzing it.
A sensor network that:
collects and displays all appropriate environmental, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensor information,
offers relevant information to the ASW commanders in anticipation of its need,
includes information from national sensors,
includes high data rate connectivity with submerged weapons and sensors,
is environmentally adaptive;
Battlespace management tools that:
effectively uses the many information sources available to automatically fuse, classify and target enemy platforms,
perform contact management and mission planning, to include operational outcome projections and mission previews
to help define asset requirements, risk assessments and loss ratios,
accurately exchange information in real time for all sensors, platforms and weapons in theater,
provide a concise and accurate summary of the undersea warfare battlespace in real time,
support multi-level users, i.e., computer-to-computer data exchange, platform sensor operators, commander-to-
commander, etc.;
Weapon system employment decision tools that:
help assess the composite performance of all sensors, optimize their employment and help create dynamic mission
plans,
automate target motion analysis in three dimensions,
migrate or replace existing Tactical Decision Aids (TDAs) to an open architecture with common user interfaces,
aid collaboration on, and understanding of, information shared between platforms.
Environment. Detailed and thorough assessment of the battlespace environment can give warfare commanders a significant
advantage. One component of this assessment may be provided by improved METOC tools, the other may be provided by
"through the sensor" automated signal processing. US METOC advantages will aide in:
optimizing the efficiency and effectiveness of sensors and weapons,

undermining the adversary’s use of the environment as cover,
exploitation of marks left on the environment as a submarine passes, e.g., bioluminescence, and
providing US forces knowledge of the best operational and tactical positions.
Littoral ASW must incorporate search techniques, sensors and systems that exploit non-acoustic and active acoustic signals
in addition to the passive acoustic signatures currently preferred in open-ocean ASW.
METOC assessments and in situ analysis capabilities are required to support rapid appraisal and prediction of sensor and
weapon performance. In sufficient numbers, remote autonomous sensors could complement the capabilities of tactical assets
to collect environmental data. Remote sensors such as drifting data collectors, overhead systems, unmanned autonomous
vehicles and expendable devices may provide a cost-effective means of increasing sensor coverage within an ISR network,
even though few dedicated ASW platforms may be present. Real-time integration of all METOC sensor assets into the
C4ISR architecture would provide an enhanced assessment of a region’s spatial and temporal variability. A complete future
sensor system must be able to adapt itself to the changing tactical and environmental situation. For example, if local passive
acoustic conditions deteriorate during a search, the sensor system might shift its processing power and sensors to concentrate
resources on an alternative signal, for example, the EM signature.
Rapid and accurate environmental assessment is important, but combat sensors and weapons systems must also be
environmentally adaptive. These sensors should be able to sense the environment, collect the observations for input to
models and plans, and adjust the system accordingly, either automatically or through operator interaction. Collected
environmental and direct sensor response data will be processed with tailored computer models that consider the small-scale
effects associated with near-shore, littoral operations. Coupling these computer models with tactical decision aides will
enable intelligent systems to recognize patterns and present their information in ways most useful to the operators, for
example through high-resolution, three-dimensional displays. In the cluttered background of the littoral’s environment, such
processing and display methods gain increased importance.
Cueing Sensors. Ideally, locating information from cueing sensors will be of fire control target solution quality. Attacks on
enemy submarines require initial detection of the covert enemy as it operates anywhere in a large area (thousands of square
miles). If US or allied naval forces maneuver or operate in dispersed formations (as they are likely to do), the required ASW
search area will increase several-fold. ASW barriers designed to deny enemy submarines access to the area of operation rely
on cueing to trigger tactical prosecution. Cueing sensors that pass information to other platforms for prosecution could also
detect enemy submarines departing port. Alternately, the cueing sensor may set off an attack by torpedoes, mines or non-
lethal devices.
Cueing Technologies
In addition to passive acoustic sensors, new alternative technologies may improve cueing
capabilitites. These technologies include:
Bio-Indicators -- In-water organisms, activated by a passing submarine, generate organic

substances detectable by remote (perhaps spaceborne) sensors. Some organisms adhere to the
submarine and continue to reveal its presence.
Shallow Water Trip Wire -- A sensor or line of sensors (covertly) deployed across the enemy's
transit routes could incorporate acoustic and non-acoustic sensors to detect and identify
submarines. The real-time target information would be passed to other tactical platforms or could
trigger (lethal or non-lethal) weapons against the sub.
National I & W sensing systems' communications links to tactical commanders could be enhanced
to ensure real-time detection of submarine movements from port are automatically relayed to ASW
commanders. In many scenarios, real-time intelligence communication links could provide
operating forces with positioning (and potentially targeting) data.
Non-acoustic ASW sensors -- Continuing advances in non-acoustic signature detection and

processing may permit satellites or long duration unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and unmanned
undersea vehicles (UUVs) to find enemy submarines.
Targeting Sensors. The range limitations of current sensor systems determine the employment of existing platforms. The
harsh environment of littoral waters (when compared to deep, open-ocean environments) degrades the effectiveness of most
traditional ASW targeting sensors. Successful prosecution of enemy submarines requires environmentally adaptive targeting
and cueing sensors.
Targeting Sensors
At a harbor’s exit, acoustic targeting sensors may be least effective. Some new sensors, or improved methods of distributing
Here a cluttered acoustic environment and generally poor sound existing sensors, may afford new capabilities and thereby
transmission paths make sensors designed for deep waters far less affect littoral ASW concepts.
effective. Shallow depths and shoreline restrictions may limit the Remote Unmanned Sensor Vehicles might be used to deploy
maneuverability of the search and enemy platforms, further degrading sensors or active sources. These 'sensor dispensers' could
sensor effectiveness. operate in areas unacceptably threatening to manned platforms
(e.g., close ashore). Aerostats, UUVs, USVs, or UAVs might
Along ASW barriers, targeting sensors optimized for littoral waters be employed.
could be used to trigger activation of dormant minefields, or provide
firing solutions to other weapon platforms. Bi-static Resonant Acoustics -- Active acoustic sources may
casue submerged submarines to reflect or resonate modulated
Weapons. Existing ASW torpedoes (designed for attacks in deep frequencies back into the water column or to the surface.
water) are generally far less effective in the shallower, coastal waters. Advanced signal processing techniques may be able to
recognize these acoustic signals (underwater ) or the resultant
Here the need for rapid, decisive responses with weapons almost modulation of ocean surface waves (in spite of the action of
certain to achieve their goals, argues strongly for new weapons wind and wave).
systems.
Multiple, wide-angle electro-optic spectrum sensors may
Lethal torpedo attacks are a required capability. Because contact with provide continuous 360o coverage, automated to increase
the enemy is often fleeting, these attacks will likely be most successful detection confidence.
when launched as soon as possible. Closely coordinated ASW
operations may increase the number of weapons that can be quickly Submarine tagging (see box on non-lethal weapons) can be
targeted without creating mutual interference between weapons. This employed to help friendly forces maintain continuous track of
hard lesson was learned by the British in the Falklands crisis. enemy submarines.
Lethal Weapon Technology
A number of emergent technologies may improve the probability of achieving "hard kills". Taken
together they may provide future ASW forces with capabilities required to help meet this concept's
goals. These technologies include:
GPS accuracy in location and targeting. Integrating global positioning system (GPS) data into
sensors and weapons could improve the effectiveness of both and reduce a weapon's dependence
upon acoustics for final search. Additionally, it would increase the number and types of platforms
that could deliver the weapons.
High density fuels may reduce weapon volumes ten-fold, enabling smaller platforms (e.g., tactical
aircraft) to deliver them, or increase the speed or range of traditional launch platforms.
Miniaturization technologies, especially in electronics, could further reduce weapon size and
weight. Miniaturization may result in weapons small enough to be used by any delivery platform.
Smaller weapons might also enable dense attacks against fleeting contacts (similar to the
'hedgehog' ASW weapon).
Advanced ASW mines, capable of telling friend from foe, and perhaps with ranges of more than
two miles, could find wide use in anti-submarine barriers.
Depth charges or bombs, incorporating the technologies described above, may find wide
application and increased utility.
Advanced power sources, including a new lithium ion power source, may overcome historic safety
limitations of more volatile power sources.
Modular weapon component designs may result in an ASW torpedo whose interchangeable parts
permit it to be launched from varied platforms (ships, subs and aircraft).
Together, some of these technologies might be combined in a new shallow water weapon.
In addition to effective lethal weapons, ASW forces require non-lethal weapons to achieve mission kill in ASW scenarios
that preclude the use of lethal weapons. Such weapons could markedly reduce or disable the adversary’s capabilities, or
continuously alert friendly forces to his presence. Non-lethal weapons would provide the ASW commander additional
options to deny adversary submarine influence on US or allied naval operations.
Non-Lethal Weapons
These may incorporate new technologies or resurrect old ones. These include:
Submarine Tag -- A tag device, attached to a submarine's hull, reveals the submarine's position
and thereby removes its chief warfighting strength, stealth. Tags accurate to GPS standards, and
equipped with adequate communications transmitters, can provide position data at any depth.
Clandestine tags would be known only to friendly forces. An overt tag's presence, though known
to the target, could cripple the enmy commander's warfighting options and prevent him from
threatening US forces until the tag can be removed.
Sea Valve Bio-fouling -- Materials ingested into submarine ballast or drain systems (primary
control system) while in port could foul sea and control valves and prevent positive depth control.
Submarine screw and rudder fouling capabilities reduce the submarine's maneuverability or
increase its acoustic signature, making it easily tracked.
Snorkel mast accesses (exhaust or intake) could be disabled (open or shut), thereby forcing the
submarine to the surface.
Periscope damaging devices would restrict the submarine's ability to threaten surface forces and
limit its maneuverability.
Electrical distribution system or electronic system damage could be inflicted most easily when the
submarine is on the surface or in port.
Submarine nets, clandestine or overt, can restrict enemy submarine maneuvers from port, or
through other restricted waters.
Anti-submarine barriers can deny enemy submarines access to the area of operation. Coordinated and concentrated ASW
markedly increases and focuses the probability of detection and neutralization, reducing the enemy’s ability to penetrate into
the area of operation. Dense anti-submarine minefields, perhaps coupled with trip-wire sensor systems, may prove
particularly effective in this role.
Other Weapon and Materiel Innovations
Some technical innovations may provide ASW forces with capabilities that could alter
dramatically the dwarfighting concepts described in this paper. Because these capabilities will
likely not be available until after the time frame of this paper, they have not affected the
coordinated, multiplatform ASW concepts described. However, their potential effect on future
ASW warfighting concepts warrants a brief discussion. It is prudent to remember that thwarting
only one kind of weapon rarely guarantees success. Alternative enemy weapons could rapidly be
applied to fill the void.
Ship Torpedo Defense
The basic premise of the multiplatform coordinated ASW concept described above assumes that
enemy submarines pose significant threat to US naval forces and seaborne logistics shipping. If
adequate defensive systems existed to counter an enemy's weapons, more forces would be
available for other missions. Therefore, creation of effective anti-weapon weapons could make
traditional ASW less asset intensive.
Several defensive systems could contribute to such an anti-submarine weapon shield.
Torpedo Countermeasure Defenses -- improved torpedo detectors, countermeasures and

tactics to counter torpedoes.
Anti-torpedo Torpedo -- an anti-torpedo weapon would destroy enemy torpedoes.
Similarly, anti-torpedo depth charges may afford protection by destroying or disrupting
incoming torpedoes. Advanced nets designed to fould incoming torpedoes may also
contribute to this capability.
ASW Close In Weapons System (A-CIWS) -- similar in principle to the point-defense
systems designed to protect surface ships from cruise missile attacks.
Long Range ASW Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV)
A torpedo-like sensor/tagger with extended range, a UUV is operated remotely or autonomously to

detect and tag submarines, perhaps with remote command & control. Operating autonomously for
lengthy periods, UUVs would require high efficiency propulsion, maneuverability, sensors, stealth,
data processing, and connectivity. Multiple UUVs would operate simultaneously in probable
submarine operating areas, searching and assessing the environment. Collected data would be
communicated at regular intervals or continuously.
Organization, Training and Doctrine
Littoral ASW draws from the experiences and knowledge gained through open-ocean ASW. When appropriate, the
equipment and practices employed in open-ocean ASW should be used in littoral operations. Commonality reduces the costs
(e.g., training, planning, efficiency, etc.).
Nevertheless, the training and doctrine used to prepare for and conduct littoral ASW operations are substantively different
from those used for open-ocean ASW. The force organization and leadership required to support littoral coordinated,
multiplatform ASW may also require modification from open-ocean doctrine.
Training. The close coordination and responsiveness required in this concept are achievable only with training. In
conducting littoral ASW training, forces should:
ensure units carry out all ASW tasks in real-world littoral environments against high fidelity, realistic training targets
that are empowered to use unconventional and innovative submarine tactics,
coordinate exercises to practice multiplatform cooperative ASW in difficult environments both at sea and in shore
based trainers networked together in a synthetic environment,
emphasize competence in using and apply real world stress on C4ISR systems,
link simulators and real platforms at sea to simulate and practice coordinated operations in real and synthetic
environments that match as closely as possible the situations forces will face during conflict,
include, when practicable, at-sea ASW training in littoral environments with diesel submarine targets,
be integrated into battlegroup training for other littoral warfighting operations.
Doctrine. As with training, the development of doctrine must be Training

integrated with the development and deployment of new equipment
capabilities. ASW doctrine must be flexible enough to accommodate Technoligical advances will improve ASW training.
the many regionally specific environmental and political factors Organizational changes may increase proficiency though faced
affecting operations in the littorals. ASW doctrine must encompass full with reduced total training funds.
use of all sensors with equal priority and skill. This doctrine must
Common ASW displays, improved automated detection and
continually evolve to realize the improved capabilities offered by new
classification processing, uniform graphic user interfaces and
and current systems. The development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, common hardware will reduce training, logistics and
and procedures is an iterative process, where the path to success may maintenance needs.
be achieved through failure (trial and error). Timely dissemination of
revised doctrine is essential to ensure that all parts of the "ASW C4I links between shore-based units and at-sea platforms will
System" can fully exploit these improved capabilities. increase realism and the flexibility of training schedules while
reducing at-sea operating expenses.
Missions and Tasks for Future Littoral ASW
Reachback capability provides real-time assistance to ASW
operators when and where needed from a shore facility or
As improved equipment and updated tactics, techniques and onboard computer based "on-line" help.
procedures are developed, the state of ASW will evolve from the
sequential, platform-centric reality of today to the concurrent, network-centric construct of the future. The result of this
evolution is depicted in the revised pyramid shown in figure 7. This pyramid reflects the ability to target directly from the
initial cueing without lengthy search and localization phases currently required.
This pyramid represents a greater than 25% reduction in the number of operational tasks required to accomplish the littoral
ASW mission. This reduction will be made possible as significantly improved sensors, capable of providing weapons
targeting quality information from the initial detection/cue, are developed. Integration of these sensors in a network-centric
environment will eliminate or at least minimize the current requirement to further search the area identified by a cueing
system to localize the submarine to attack criteria. As these time, asset and material intensive tasks are removed from ASW
operations, the goal of concurrent, wide-area ASW will be achieved.
Recommendations and Epilogue

Recommendations
The goal for ASW in the future remains unchanged from the time the effectiveness of "modern" submarine warfare was first
demonstrated during World War I. This enduring goal is to provide a seamless, in-stride denial of adversary submarine
influence on political and military objectives throughout an area of interest. Despite nearly 100 years of improvement,
today’s ASW operations remain inefficient, sequential, asset intensive and require operational pauses (sometimes lengthy) to
prepare a limited area to support maritime operations at an acceptable level of risk. Continuing advancements in submarine
warfare have maintained the submarine as one of the most effective methods of adversely influencing the Navy’s ability to
execute operations from the sea.
The concept focuses on the littorals since the typically harsh littoral exasperates the difficulties in conducting successful
ASW. The principles developed are equally applicable to the problem of conducting successful ASW in the open ocean. The
near-term and mid-term improvements to ASW capability in the current program of record reflect historical analysis and
primarily represent incremental advances to better match today’s systems to the expected operating environment. While
these advances will improve ASW capabilities, they primarily support only sequential operations.
Far-term innovations offer the greatest potential to enable ASW forces to neutralize submarine threats throughout area of
interest concurrently with other primary missions. These new ideas must be integrated into rigorous future operational
capability planning.
To evolve the state of ASW from the sequential, platform-centric reality of today to the concurrent, network-centric
construct of the future, the Navy must:
Increase the emphasis on updating the tactics, techniques and procedures for ASW to optimize the employment of
today’s equipment in the conduct of coordinated littoral ASW operations. Update the training and doctrine to include
networked, coordinated, multi-platform ASW capabilities concurrent with technological advances and tactical
developments. Additionally, continue to develop, evaluate and revise training and doctrine as experience, systems,
operations and objectives evolve. This aggressive development and implementation of updated doctrine must continue
to drive the evolution of concurrent, network-centric ASW as more capable equipment becomes available.
Establish an assessment process based on ASW warfighting tasks that is independent of platform. The "ASW System"
should use this process to measure the effectiveness of current ASW capabilities and to identify and prioritize future
ASW capabilities.
Establish a synergetic, systems approach to ASW in a Navy ASW Strategy to focus the efforts of the various resource
sponsors to most effectively develop the required ASW capabilities.
Develop an ASW transition plan that provides a path from current and near-term capabilities through mid-term
improvements and to the far-term to achieve the necessary future operational capabilities.
Focus R&D efforts to achieve the Future Operational Capabilities. Evaluate both current and emerging technologies,
including those not typically associated with ASW applications, to identify and develop appropriate technological
"advances" to achieve the required future ASW capabilities.
Epilogue
Our present system for procuring equipment and developing tactics on an individual platform basis was adequate during the
Cold War era when we were countering the open-ocean, long-range, passively detectable submarine with independent
systems that were thought to be effective against the threat. The very nature of conducting ASW missions with Cold War
legacy systems afforded the ASW Commander long (e.g., hours and days) detection, classification, and tracking evolutions.
This type of ASW was able to counter the threat at ranges well beyond their weapon’s capability. It provided the sensor
operators and ASW commanders with ample time to derive target positions and fire control solutions. Now we are entering a
new millennium, with vastly improved, diversified threats operating primarily in their local areas of influence. As more of
the focus of the submarine threat moves to the littoral environment, a change in the ASW development and employment
philosophy is needed. Nearly forty years ago in January 1959, the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Arleigh Burke made the
following comment concerning ASW:
"There is no single or inexpensive answer to meeting this problem. It requires the close teamwork of all ASW forces--
surface, subsurface, and air-- served by an effective worldwide network of intelligence and communications.... But
technological breakthroughs are needed to solve the problems of detection, localization, and identification."4
This statement remains true today. ASW remains a difficult task both in the open ocean and in the littorals. We must look at
ASW as an overarching system, analyzed and procured with a mind toward overall capability vice that of individual
platforms. The best ASW system is one that can detect, target and neutralize well outside of the adversary submarine’s
sphere of influence on our forces afloat or ashore. The Navy’s current investment in legacy systems with extensive life cycle
infrastructure support impacts the ability to infuse new technologies and ultimately limits system effectiveness. As a result,
we sacrifice future capabilities necessary to effectively conduct ASW in order to support current operations. Previous
conflicts have shown us that it is dangerous to sacrifice future capability for present operations. This lesson applies across
the full spectrum of the littoral ASW... from acquisition to training, planning and operating we must prepare to fight
tomorrow’s wars, not the last one.
NOTES
1 "Statement of RADM Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, to the House Armed Services Committe,"
Department of the Navy(7 Mar 1991).
2 Scheina, R. L. "Where were those Argentine Subs?," Proceeding of the U.S. Naval Institute 110(3), pp 114-120 (Mar
1984).
3 The tasks listed have their doctrinal foundation in Joint Pub 1-02 (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) and
NWP 1-02 (Naval Supplement to DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).
4 Burke, Arleigh. House Appropriations Committee hearing 86:1:1, 23 January 1959, pp. 661, 691

Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept

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12/24/22, 12:19 AM LITTORAL ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CONCEPT

Naval Doctrine Command

Purpose ans Scope

Anticipated Battlespace and Adversaries "The ASW Challenge

Missions and Tasks

Littoral ASW Today

Realities & Imperatives

Future Operational Concept

Peacetime: Deterrence and Conflict Prevention

Littoral ASW into the 21st Century

Coordinated, Multiplatform ASW

Future Operational Capabilities

Material and Weapons

Missions and Task for Future Littoral ASW

Recommendations and Epilogue

Figure 1. Mission Support Pyramid

Purpose and Scope.

Capabilities and Constraints

detect, locate and target enemy submarines in littoral waters reliably,

The best sensor and weapons systems are those operated

(New Equipment) x (Zero New Doctrine and Training) = ZERO

Conclusions and Recommendations

A concept is a recommended solution to an opportunity or challenge. "Concepts provide the

As a maritime nation, the United States has continuing vital

Joint and Naval Objectives.

The Navy’s essential contributions to the accomplishment of

carrier based air power,

Principles of Littoral ASW

Anticipated Battlespace and Adversaries

William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense

Sea Denial. A submarine can covertly conduct

Above the water’s surface:

Below the water’s surface:

Stealth Sun Tzu

Mobility and Endurance

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

"...Submarines will allow the consolidation of Iranian Naval

Secretary of Defense Annual Report February 1996

Missions and Tasks

Littoral ASW Tasks

Littoral ASW Today

we must prepare now for tomorrow’s uncertain future."

NSC National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997

Cueing (acoustic and non-acoustic) ASW Combat ID/Undersea IFF

Acoustic and Non-Acoustic Sensor Coordinated ASW Tactics

Weapons Coordinated ASW Training and Proficiency

Torpedo Self Defense Environmentally Adaptive Capabilities for

ASW C4ISR Applications

Realities & Imperatives

Naval forces will operate in the littorals.

Given these realities, it is imperative that:

Future Operational Concept

Deny adversary submarine influence in the joint operating area.

Peacetime: Deterrence and Conflict Prevention

Monitor the operational posture of potential adversaries.

as a force multiplier to offset increasing asset

Littoral ASW into the 21st Century

ADM Jay Johnson, USN

Quoted in "Worldwide Submarine Challenges 1997"

Coordinated, Multiplatform ASW

provide local commanders information upon demand (‘pull’ information),

Future Operational Capabilities

Materiel and Weapons