Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Land Use Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol

Pro-poor change in the aftermath of disasters – Exploring possibilities at the

intersection of disaster politics and land rights issues in Central Philippines
Mariëlle van Es *, Bert Bruins
Water Resources Management Chairgroup, Environmental Sciences Group, Wageningen University, PO Box 47, Wageningen 6700AA, the Netherlands

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This article demonstrates how natural disasters can rearrange arenas of contestation over land use, ownership
Agrarian reform and titling. It analyses how state agents, organized civil society, communities and powerful business groups in
Disaster management three cases in rural Philippines dealt with the challenges and opportunities for agrarian reform after being hit by
Window of opportunity for change
typhoon Haiyan in 2013. Understanding this connection between agrarian reform and disasters will become
Typhoon Haiyan
Philippines
increasingly important to address the vulnerabilities of the marginalized in the context of climate change and
related rise in disasters. An actor-oriented perspective and a case study method was used to unravel how specific
communities engage with processes of agrarian reform after a disaster and how a crisis can change dynamics
between actors from above and below in agrarian reform processes. This is needed since the people’s perspective
on these processes is often missing and knowledge on the everyday experiences of social change is limited. The
cases show that disasters are a window of opportunity to reverse or accelerate complicated agrarian reform
processes: by restructuring dynamics between actors from below and above in existing, sometimes stagnated
agrarian reform processes, by revealing political dynamics that were invisible before or by creating new possi­
bilities to mobilize actors from above and below to claim access to land.

1. Introduction
On November 8,2013, typhoon Haiyan (known in the Philippines as
Yolanda), one of the strongest typhoons ever hit the Philippines (Sova­
cool, Tan-Mullins and Abrahamse, 2018). The typhoon with maximum
sustained winds reaching 315 km/h and gust up to 379 km/h destroyed
many houses, crops and fishing boats. It was the deadliest typhoon that
ever hit the country in recent history leaving 6300 dead, 1061 missing
and 28,689 injured. Haiyan destroyed or disrupted the livelihoods of
approximately 5.9 million people (Eadie, Atienza and Tan-Mullins,
2020; Lagmay et al., 2015). The total economic damage is estimated
at $1 billion (Sovacool et al., 2018).
1.1. The issue of climate change in the context of disasters
Major natural hazards such as typhoon Haiyan have a big impact on
social and environmental systems and become disasters when already
vulnerable populations are exposed to it (Eadie et al., 2020). Damage is
materialized in many different ways and the impacts of a disaster are
complex and complicated (Davidsson, 2020). Due to climate change the
occurrence of extreme weather events will rise and the levels of social
and economic damage will increase enormously (Aalst and van, 2006).
Climate change will add more uncertainty and complexity to the impact
of hazards on socio-ecological systems and the long-term changes in
society that may result from a disaster (Birkmann et al., 2008). In the
context of climate change a more in-depth understanding of these
change processes is needed (Birkmann et al., 2008).
Under certain conditions and in combination with other socio-
economic and political factors disaster risk reduction policies and
climate change policies aimed to reduce vulnerabilities actually increase
vulnerabilities and diminish the capacity of rural households to adapt
their livelihoods to the changing climate (Borras, Franco and Nam,
2020; Smith and Dressler, 2019). Climate change politics might displace
or dispossess more people from their land than actual climate change
(Franco and Borras, 2019). For example, no dwelling zones are demar­
cated and justified by climate-change related disaster prevention
(Franco and Borras, 2019). At the same time climate change politics can
be used to de-legitimize the mitigation and adaptation practices of rural
communities, e.g. a community forest that is not officially recognized as
conservation project by the government or powerful Non Governmental

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: marielle.vanes@outlook.com (M. van Es).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2023.106771
Received 14 October 2021; Received in revised form 30 March 2023; Accepted 6 June 2023
Available online 13 June 2023
0264-8377/© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
M. van Es and B. Bruins
Organisations (NGOs) can easily be reallocated and used for tourism
purposes or agribusiness (Borras et al., 2020; Dressler et al., 2020).
Access to natural resources is a critical factor that structures people’s
ability to cope with, recover from and adapt to disasters (Thomas et al.,
2019). Therefore, it is important to examine how disaster risk reduction
policies shape and are shaped by existing conflicts over natural re­
sources (Borras et al., 2020; Uson, 2017).
1.2. Disasters as window of opportunity for change
Disasters tend to act as catalyst for prior trends in and are influenced
by the structures of national disaster and development policies
(Mochizuki and Chang, 2017). Major disasters can create a window of
opportunity for change in various dimensions (e.g. legal, social, natural
and economic structures and settings) (Birkmann et al., 2008; Davids­
son, 2020). The damage and disruption created by major disasters can
provide an opportunity to challenge the dominant ways of thinking and
acting (Mochizuki and Chang, 2017). However, disasters can also open
up an opportunity for the political elite to reframe the causes and re­
sponses to the crisis in such a way that neoliberal reform seems to be the
only viable option (Uson, 2017). Disasters can create opportunities for
land speculation and land grabbing justified in the name of safety.
However, displacement in the wake of disasters can provide a powerful
motive for action and can trigger social mobilization for structural re­
form (Nel and Righarts, 2008). An opportunity for political and legal
reform can also benefit the poor when these policies promote equitable
access to land as part of a disaster risk reduction strategy (UN Habitat,
2010).
Understanding the opportunities for structural and institutional
change that reduces inequalities and increases long-term sustainable
development is needed (Davidsson, 2020). However, knowledge on
processes and factors that enable or hinder change is limited (Mochizuki
and Chang, 2017). Investigating the various dimensions and dynamics of
change can help disaster risk reduction practitioners to identify what
kind of interventions are needed to enable communities at risk to ach­
ieve positive recovery trajectories (Mochizuki and Chang, 2017). These
insights are not only useful in the field of disaster risk reduction but are
also relevant for other development practitioners because change in the
aftermath of a disaster can alter the trajectory of other development
processes like agrarian reform. The aim of this article is to show how
typhoon Haiyan opened up new arenas of contestation over land use,
ownership and titling between state agents, organized civil society,
communities and powerful business groups. It investigates the oppor­
tunities and challenges typhoon Haiyan posed for applying bibingka
strategies for land reform. By using an actor- oriented perspective we
investigated how local people try to exert agency and change the
pathway of disaster recovery and development. This helped to unravel
how specific communities engage with processes of agrarian reform
after a crisis and how a crisis can change dynamics in agrarian reform
processes. It connects disaster politics with process of agrarian reform.
Despite of numerous calls to integrate climate change, disaster risk
reduction and development both in development planning and disaster
risk reduction policies, disaster politics and processes of agrarian reform
are mostly studied separately (Seidler et al., 2018; Uson, 2017).
Recognizing the political connection between disaster management,
climate change and land issues is important to adequately address the
vulnerabilities of the marginalised and push for pro-poor change.
The paper is structured as follows: First, the methodology is
described. Then we elaborate on the applied concepts. In the remainder
of the paper three case studies show how typhoon Haiyan restructured
agrarian reform processes and opened up and limited the possibilities for
rural-poor communities to claim their titles. After the synthesis, the
paper ends with the discussion of the implications of its findings and a
conclusion.
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Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
2. Methodology
In this study a case in Sicogon and two cases in Eastern-Samar were
analysed to gain insights in land based conflicts after typhoon Haiyan
(see Fig. 1 for a map). The case of Sicogon was selected because it is the
biggest case of land grabbing in the aftermath of the typhoon. Eastern-
Samar is one of the regions that was most heavily affected by the
typhoon and it had a big impact on the conflicts around land in this area.
The selection of three cases gave the opportunity to look into engage­
ment with land issues in different regions and to gain a more in-depth
understanding of the differences between the areas. The fieldwork for
this research was conducted from September to December 2019 by the
first author. The study is based on 4 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
with communities from Eastern-Samar, field observations and individ­
ual interviews with farmers and fisherfolks from the communities in
Eastern-Samar and Sicogon, officials from various government agencies,
NGO staff, researchers and an employee of Ayala. In Eastern-Samar
members of Uswag- Este, part of Katarungan, a militant peasant orga­
nization, in the municipalities of Lawaan, Balangiga, Giporlos and
General MacArthur were interviewed. Various members from the
Federation of Sicogon Fisherfolk and Farmer Association (FESIFFA)
were interviewed. Key informants from the community have been
interviewed multiple times to verify information. Results were discussed
with NGO staff both during informal conversations and in-depth dis­
cussions. These helped to contextualize the data from interviews.
Newspaper articles, other official publications and academic literature
were used to validate data from interviews (and vice versa). The field
work was conducted with assistance from Rights Network, a network of
grassroot based Philippine NGOs, which is connected to Katarungan.
3. Conceptual framework
3.1. Window of opportunity for change
Disasters are part of unfolding political histories and “emerge from
pre-existing social relations and have the power to trigger change”
(Pelling and Dill, 2010:21). Disasters can create circumstances that lead
to “significant changes in society, institutions and organizations because
the impact of the disaster cannot be managed with existing regulatory
frameworks within existing institutions and organizations” (Birkmann
et al., 2008: 638). Disasters can restructure and reshape institutions,
organizations and environmental, socio- economic and political re­
lationships (Birkmann et al., 2008). Change in the aftermath of a disaster
is complex and diverse; it can be formal or informal, active, reflexive or
reflective, it can be socially progressive or regressive, can be planned or
unplanned and slow or rapid and takes place under uncertain and dy­
namic conditions (Birkmann et al., 2008). The outcomes of change are
affected by the actions and reactions of various actors and this change
takes place at multiple social levels (Pelling and Dill, 2006). Different
political discourses can be mobilized and compete for legitimacy
thereby shaping the scope for political change (Pelling and Dill, 2010).
Change in the aftermath of disasters can be observed in both political
discourse and material or resource flows and intersect with ongoing
political struggles (Pelling and Dill, 2010). These changes can be ana­
lysed by assessing “the distribution and implementation of rights and
responsibilities pre- and post-disaster” (Pelling and Dill, 2010:27).
In these change processes in the aftermath of disasters tipping points
that “determine the direction and significance of change” can be iden­
tified (Pelling and Dill, 2010:22). Pelling and Dill (2010) define four
tipping points for change. Firstly, unequal social and spatial distribution
of losses can result in challenging discourses around development and
state-society relations. Secondly, mobilization of alternative discourses
by both civil society and state actors. The third moment is the institu­
tionalization of this discourse in legislation and policies. Fourthly, di­
sasters can trigger a renegotiation of people’s freedoms, values, rights
and responsibilities. The topic of disasters as tipping points for
M. van Es and B. Bruins Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771

Fig. 1. overview of case study areas.

3
M. van Es and B. Bruins
‘transformative regime shifts’ or disaster risk management as catalysator
for development and a tool for altering the trajectory of development
has been widely studied among various scientific disciplines and these
ideas are embedded in the disaster management practices of many in­
ternational NGOs like Oxfam (Blackburn, 2018; Jeans, Castillo and
Thomas, 2017). However, most of the existing literature on disasters as
window of opportunity for change takes a system-oriented perspective,
neglecting the micro-politics and everyday experiences of social change
induced by disasters (Blackburn, 2018). There is a need to look into what
opportunities for change are created by and for whom since change does
not necessarily lead to beneficial outcomes for vulnerable groups. Naomi
Klein (2007) shows how disasters produced a return to the status quo in
which powerful groups use the disaster as market opportunity before
survivors are able to recover and regroup themselves. The window of
opportunity for change offers an perspective on the different dimensions
and directions of change and defines the range of imaginable actions.
Major disasters can provide an opportunity to change existing structures
of disaster response, e.g. creating new Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)
policies or establish an early warning system (Birkmann et al., 2008).
However, recovery and reconstruction can also provide opportu­
nities for capital accumulation for the political elite which hinder the
development of marginalized groups (Cretney, 2017). Various actors
react and resist to these changes and disasters can also open up spaces
for resistance, which can initiate institutional change that leads to more
equitable outcomes (Cretney, 2017; McSweeney and Coomes, 2011).
These directions of change are not pre- determined, yet they do not
happen outside the pre-disaster context. An actor-oriented perspective
can help us to unravel how different actors respond to disasters and
disaster induced changes.
3.2. Actor-oriented perspective
An actor-oriented perspective focuses on understanding “how spe­
cific individuals and social classes responded to processes of interven­
tion” (Drinkwater, 1992:370). An actor-oriented perspective “forces us
to look at what people are doing and to understand their actions form
their point of view” (Drinkwater, 1992:371). It tries to explain the
“different adaptations or responses to the same or similar circum­
stances” (Drinkwater, 1992:369). Taking an actor- oriented perspective
is needed to understand politics in peasant societies, such as the rural
areas in the Philippines. Politics in peasant societies usually does not
take place in usual places and forms in which “authorities in organisa­
tions make, implement and change policies regarding resource alloca­
tion” (Kerkvliet, 2009:231). Peasants “political thoughts and actions as
well as relationships between political life in rural communities and the
political systems in which they are located” usually become visible in
their daily practices (Kerkvliet, 2009:227). To understand peasant pol­
itics one needs to look into their daily experiences and how they resist to,
comply with or modify formal policies. These everyday politics “involve
little or no organisation, is usually low profile and private behaviour and
is done by people who probably do not regard their actions as political”
(Kerkvliet, 2009:232).
Using an actor-oriented perspective to analyse the conflicts around
land that emerged after Haiyan will help to understand disaster re­
sponses that are based on the concrete experiences of the actors that are
involved in these struggles (Nyamu-Musembi, 2002). Investigating
disaster response and recovery through the lens of the bibingka strategy
can provide useful insights in how marginal identities were constructed
and lived after Haiyan. It also gives a deeper understanding of how
different communities try to de-construct their marginality by their ef­
forts to claim their rights (Pantazidou, 2013).
3.3. Bibingka strategy
The sandwich strategy is a tool to direct institutional change pro­
cesses and originally focuses on the construction of social accountability
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Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
relations (Fox, 2015). It focuses on creating state-society synergies that
empower an enabling environment for collective action and state ca­
pacity to respond to social mobilization (Fox, 2015). Citizens action that
has the backing of allies within the state that are both willing and able to
get involved or has links with other citizens organizations to build
countervailing power, has the biggest chance to challenge authorities
and change the power balance (Fox, 2015). These interactions between
civil society and state reformers can push the reform agenda forward
and can result in positive and significant gains for the rural poor (Aceron
and Isaac, 2016).
In the Philippines the sandwich strategy has been named the bibingka
strategy, to explain and direct changes in land rights and agrarian re­
form struggles. An effective campaign for land reform involves a com­
bination of social mobilization from below and pro-reform initiatives
from above (Borras, 1999). The bibingka strategy highlights that both
state and civil society are important to have the biggest impact on land
reform programs. It provides practical insights on how to carry out an
effective campaign for land reform in the aftermath of disasters and is
commonly used by civil society organizations in the Philippines. This
perspective can be used to explain the variation and unevenness in land
redistribution outcomes over time (Borras, 1999). It reveals how dy­
namics between state, civil society and the private sector changed after
the disaster hit the area. It can help to explain how these changes in
state-civil society dynamics altered the possibilities for agrarian reform.
By doing so it provides insights in the opportunities for change that were
opened up or closed down after the disaster.
The opportunities for change are context dependent and opportu­
nities for change will unfold in diverse ways across provinces, munici­
palities and sectors (Fox, 2015). Clashing interests of the various actors
from ‘above’ and ‘below’ makes the interactions between state and civil
society very dynamic (Borras, 1999). The often heated conflicts between
different pro- and contra land reform actors are taking place simulta­
neously at different political levels (Borras, 1999). Access to power,
shifting alignments, availability of influential elites and cleavages
within and among these elites can create opportunities and political
openings for the rural poor to campaign for land reform (Borras and
Franco, 2009). The rural poor can in collaboration with civil society
organizations use several strategies to advocate for their rights such as
land occupation, dialogues, street marches, petition letters or padlock­
ing of offices of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (Borras and
Franco, 2009).
These reform processes are highly contested and inherently conflic­
tive since these anti- reform forces are deeply embedded in both state
and society and are often stronger than pro-reform forces (Borras, 1999).
These anti-reform obstacles refer to resistance from landlords and other
actors (corporations, private claimants, etc.) that have an interest in the
land (Borras, 1999). They use their guns, goons and gold to control
(local) politics and their access to the land (Franco, 2008).
4. Changing land rights struggles in the aftermath of Haiyan
4.1. Sicogon - people challenging a corporation
4.1.1. Introduction
About 1100 families live in three villages on Sicogon. Most house­
holds depend on artisanal fishing and homestead farming and some
work as public-school teachers or have jobs on the mainland (the island
of Panay, see Fig. 2) (Uson, 2017). The Sarrosa family-owned Sicogon
Development Corporation (SIDECO), bought land in the 1970 s and
turned the island in high-end tourism destination. However, in 1983 the
business was bankrupt and closed (Uson, 2017). About 70% of the land
is privately titled and owned by the Sarrosa family (Uson, 2017). The
remaining land is classified as public land. Two villages are located on
public land and one village on privately titled land. Each type of land
falls under responsibility of a different state agency, either the Depart­
ment of Agrarian Reform (DAR) or Department of Environment and
M. van Es and B. Bruins Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771

Fig. 2. Map of Sicogon Island & Carles municipality.

5
M. van Es and B. Bruins
Natural Resources (DENR) with their own guidelines and instruments
for appropriating and using land. This resulted in conflicts between the
different state agencies and both the landowner and the community are
using different tenure instruments to secure their access to the land
(Uson, 2017). Since 1994, when local government officials started the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) to distribute the land to the farmers on the island, there has been
a violent conflict between the land owner and the inhabitants. In 2002,
the NGO PROGRESSO became active on the island and supported the
community in their application for CARP. The land owner together with
the support of the Department of Tourism and the local business council
tried to reclassify the land to tourism area so it could no longer be part of
the CARP program. The land owner also filed similar cases before
various courts and agencies to wring out people’s resources and used
coercive tactics and threatened the beneficiaries from pursuing their
application (Uson, 2017). After the regional DAR direction issued a
Notice of Coverage to inform SIDECO that 335 ha of their land would be
redistributed under the CARP program, the land owner filed several civil
cases against the DAR director and other officials who issued the Notice,
claiming that CARP procedures were violated. Various times the land
owner applied for revocation of the Notice, justifying this with official
state documents like the Local Government Unit’s (LGU) Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Plan in which the whole island is classified as
tourism zone and claiming that because of its rocky soil the land is for
agriculture (Uson, 2017). However, local communities collectively
mobilized to protest the harassments and were able to team up with
political actors such as the regional DAR director. This opened space for
the landless rural poor to claim ownership of the land they had tilled
before (Uson, 2017). The DAR issued an Order of Finality and the
ownership of the farmland seemed to be in favour of the people.
Nevertheless, the conflict between the Sarrosa family and the commu­
nity was not settled. SIDECO and Ayala Corporation established the
Sicogon Island Tourism Estate Corporation (SITE), a joint venture and
worked together to change the island into a high-end tourist destination
and when typhoon Haiyan hit the island things radically changed.
4.1.2. Changing land battle
Just before the typhoon hit the island, the community almost
received their titles after a long struggle for agrarian reform. However,
after Haiyan the struggle continued. The typhoon opened-up the possi­
bility for powerful actors to reclaim the land and revealed the plans that
were invisible before. The typhoon destroyed 95% of all houses and all
fishing boats (interview president FESIFFA, 06–09–2021). Despite funds
flowing in from all over the world, the state was unable to mobilize
rehabilitation and relief funds and requested corporate companies to
sponsor the rehabilitation of the area. The Philippine government asked
the private sector to adopt a region in the affected area and rehabilitate
in four sectors: education, health, shelter & livelihood. However, these
companies have their own agendas and some took advantage of the
situation. Ayala Corporation chose the Iloilo region to help rehabilitate.
This was perhaps not surprising as they had plans to change the Sicogon
island in a high-end tourism destination. Typhoon Haiyan opened up the
possibility to change the direction of the land battle in favour of Ayala.
The company entered the island with armed guards and banned all relief
goods from other organizations such as the local social welfare agency of
the municipality and Save the Children (Uson, 2017). After two weeks
without shelter and food the communities were desperate and the need
for survival was at a point that they would accept any offer from
anybody. Then Iserve, an NGO connected to Ayala offered the commu­
nity two options:
1. The household would receive 150,000 Philippine Peso (PhP) ($2916)
if they would leave the island, destroy their house and sign a letter to
turn over their rights to Ayala. If they share their home with another
family, they would receive PhP 30,000 ($583).
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Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
2. The second option was to move to a relocation site on the mainland
(Iloilo) constructed by Ayala. They could opt to receive start-up
money of PhP 5000 ($97) material for a bangka (fishing boat).
After three years or more the household would receive the title,
depending on how fast the state could process this. Ayala would
provide the community facilities such as a fish landing, a market and
a school. This would be combined with a livelihood program. The
people could work in construction projects or as administration staff
members on the site and receive a daily salary of PhP 200 to PhP 300
($6-$10) (Uson, 2017)
Relocation would end suffering and therefore about 30% of the
population accepted one of the options (interview Maria-Angelina Uson,
24–09–2019, hereafter Uson interview). The offering of the option is a
clear example of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007). Ayala corporation is
using a disaster as a market opportunity and taking advantage of peo­
ple’s desperation. “What initially can be seen as a coercive tool to evict
people from the island suddenly is framed as humanitarian support”
(Uson interview). However, part of the community contested and
resisted to these changes after Haiyan. 780 households remained on the
island and federated into FESIFFA (Federation of Sicogon Fisherfolk and
Farmer Association) (Uson, 2017). Ayala did not allow any reconstruc­
tion and the security guards destroyed several houses after repairs
(interview FESIFFA members, 20–09–2019). When the harassments
were at a high level the communities moved into the forestland since this
is state owned property and the community could not be easily evicted
by SIDECO and Ayala (Uson interview). They were able to receive hu­
manitarian support from the church and NGOs here. By staying on the
island the community rejects the offer of Ayala. Continuing to live on the
island has become an act of resistance to Ayala since it challenges the
plans to change the island in a high-end tourism destination. The daily
life on the island has become a site of political struggle and control over
the land and its resources (interview board member Rights,
24–09–2019).
In September 2014 guards entered the forestland and accused the
community of illegal logging. DENR issued a warrant of arrest for the
barangay counsellors (barangay is the smallest government unit) and
another case was filed at Ombudsman for illegal occupation. This case
was dismissed. Using the Order of Finality people applied for a presi­
dential proclamation declaring the land in the forest a permanent
resettlement site (Uson, 2017). FESIFFA and Ayala started negotiating to
create an agreeable situation. On November 8, 2014, a compromised
agreement was signed, which was supposed to be a win-win solution. In
the agreement 30 ha residential area, 40 ha agricultural area, 38 million
PhP ($750, 000) for livelihood assistance and 72 million PhP ($1,42
million) for land development were promised. A priority was given to
housing. The donations should be given to FESIFFA and a collective title
would be granted to the CARP beneficiaries for the 40 ha of agricultural
land and a collective tenurial title would be awarded to the homeown­
ers’ associations (Uson, 2017). After the signing of the agreement the
harassments slowed down and the community moved out of the
forestland. When none of the promised land reforms were implemented,
FESIFFA leaders started a camp-out and protest in front to the DENR to
resume their advocacy on land rights in April 2017.
4.1.3. Finding allies within the state
Anti-reform elites also use their resources to mobilize actors within
the state and claim the land. SITE (Sicogon Island Tourism Estate Cor­
poration) applied for conversion of the CARP land to tourist area in July,
2015. This was granted in February, 2016. Because of the conversion the
land could no longer be distributed to the community since it was not
classified as CARP land anymore. However, in August 2017 FESIFFA
filed a case at DAR to force the implementation of the agreement and to
revoke the conversion of the land. In March 2019, during dialogues with
DAR and DENR in Manila DAR issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO). It
was decided that SITE has to refrain from continuing any kind of
M. van Es and B. Bruins
development activities (e.g. construction of structures or surveying)
within the area of Sicogon until the petition for revocation has been
solved (DAR, 2019). DAR asked the help of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to ensure the implementation of the CDO (DAR, 2019).
However, in October 2019 DAR rejected the motion of FESIFFA and
concluded that the agreement was implemented. After the rejection of
the motion Ayala continued its development on the island. Nevertheless,
FESIFFA continues fighting for the implementation of the agreement.
FESIFFA started to organize rallies at the airport to inform tourists
about the conflict on the island. By exposing their issues to the public
during rallies at the airport combined with the filing of a motion of
revocation of the land, FESIFFA was able to stop the operations of the
resort (temporarily). FESIFFA is planning to regularize demonstrations
at the airport once a month to continue to pressure Ayala and prevent a
re-opening of the resort. It shows that social mobilization can be very
effective to counter anti-reform forces. However, when the resort was
closed down Ayala forced all local businesses such as the Roma resort to
stop its operations as well and asked the help of PNP to stop all business
activities on the island (interview president FESIFFA, 06–09–2019). The
anti-reform forces in Sicogon are very strong and powerful and social
mobilization from below is not always effective because it can provoke
countermobilization from landlords or other actors who have an interest
in the land. The conditions under which FESIFFA is trying to claim their
rights are difficult and even violent. Ayala prohibited local visitors on
the island and is controlling who is staying on the island. Ayala also
prohibited reconstruction of the houses destroyed by the typhoon. They
monitor rebuilding efforts, destroyed several houses and blocked the
supply of materials from the mainland. However, when the harassment
slowed down after the signing of the agreement, the community was
able to partially rebuild their houses. During operation of the resort
spring water from the forest was diverted to the swimming pools. This
spring water is also the main source of water for the community and
during operation of the resort water was not always available.
Both Ayala and FESIFFA are trying to mobilize actors within the
state. The community filed several cases and protests to expose their
issues and advocate for support of state actors. The conflict is ongoing
and the outcomes are hard to predict, there have been some successes for
Ayala and some for the community. However, since land grabbing is
driven by economic interest and in the Philippines money has a big in­
fluence in decision-making, it is not unusual that decisions are taken that
favour the interest of the political and economic elite (Beringer, 2020;
Peluso and Lund, 2011). This means that peasant groups face structural
constraints that limit the possibilities for and effectiveness of their
mobilization.
4.1.4. Divide and rule strategy
Ayala and FESIFFA are in a struggle to influence state actors and the
community (Uson interview). However, the conditions under which
they are able to do so are very different. Anti-reform forces use their
power and resources to counter and break the power of mobilizations
from below. Creating divisions and friction within the community can
significantly reduce the impact of mobilization from below (Uson
interview). Before the typhoon there was a very strong movement on the
island to pursue CARP. Their titles almost had been granted but when
Haiyan struck Ayala used that to divide the community to reduce
resistance. When they offered the two options the social relations within
the community changed. People who were friends became enemies and
enemies became friends. Most people in Sicogon are blood related so it
created frictions within families (Uson interview). People were trying to
convince their relatives to also take the option and they are still doing so.
They will tell the others that the people of Sicogon do not have the re­
sources to fight against Ayala. In some cases the option taker is not in
good contact with their siblings and they do not talk anymore (interview
FESIFFA members, 20–09–2019). In other families part of the family
moved to other islands nearby and because of the geographical distance
social relations within families changed. One of the FESIFFA members
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Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
said she felt less close with her brother because she hardly sees him after
he moved out of the island (interview FESIFFA member, 13–12–2019).
Not only the options lead to divisions within families. Ayala is
employing local people. During the operation of the tourist resort people
worked as a tour guide and they did benefit from the development on the
island. There are families in which there are people working for Ayala
and there are people who are against. This created friction within
families and the community.
Ayala has its own NGO, IServe who also has community organizers
working on the island. The NGO helped the option two takers with the
establishment of several cooperatives. IServe created its own organiza­
tion which is also called FESIFFA. Ayala also established Sicogon
Caburihan Fish Farmers Association (SICAFFA), the Buaya Fish Farmers
Association (BUFFA) and others. They are asking FESIFFA members to
become a member of these organizations and withdraw their member­
ship of FESIFFA (interview President FESIFFA, 15–12–2021). However,
FESIFFA is still there. According to the president of FESIFFA Ayala
offered scholarships and money to several individual community
members, framing it as livelihood support or scholarships to individuals.
Some people were offered PhP 20000 ($389) if they would join the NGO
of Ayala. There are people who have taken this option. Ayala also
offered the PROGRESSO staff a job at the NGO of Ayala (interview
PROGRESSO staff, 21–09–2019). Alliances with civil society organiza­
tions and other external allies are often crucial to maximize the impact
of peasant mobilization. These external allies provide political and
logistical support such as contact with the media, legal advice or help to
identify a proper way to access state actors (Borras, 1999). Breaking the
relationship between the peasant group and its allies, is likely to reduce
the impact of mobilization from below.
5. Eastern-Samar – new opportunities to acquire titles
5.1. Introduction
Eastern-Samar is one of the poorest regions in the country. In 2012,
64% of the population was living below the poverty line (Alvarez, 2017,
see Fig. 3). Fishing and agriculture are the two main livelihood activities
(Alvarez, 2017). Remittances from international and domestic migrants
is another important income source since there is a lack of job oppor­
tunities in the area (ADB, 2015). Farmers mainly produce coconut, rice
and other food crops such as cassava.
In 2010 the government started the free patent titling program to
fast-track land titling in residential land by issuing patents to peasants,
fisherfolks and urban dwellers, who have been actually occupying the
residential public lands for a period of 10 years or more (Congress of the
Philippines, 2009). Applicants need a map of a land survey approved by
DENR, a technical description of the land and two supporting affidavits
of two disinterested persons living in the barangay where the land is
located (Congress of the Philippines, 2009). Besides, the applicant is
required to have occupied the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
e.g. a tax declaration. It provided a fast and cheap way to secure titles to
residential lands by easing the requirements and procedure of titles for
small lots in residential areas. Agricultural free patens are provided
under the Public Land Act (DENR, n.d.). It is a partnership between
DENR and Local Government Units (LGUs) to fast-track titling since ti­
tles are no longer acquired through the court. LGUs play an important
role since they are providing the data, resources and direct contact with
the applicants. In 2020 alone DENR Region 8 (covering the islands of
Samar, Leyte and Biliran) issued 1210 agricultural free patents and 2200
residential free patents (DENR, 2021). However, the program was not
implemented in Eastern-Samar, where about 70% of the land is untitled
and only about 20–30% of the people have a legal proof of ownership
such as a tax declaration or proof of sale (interview community orga­
nizer Eastern-Samer, 24–11–2019). This proof of ownership is needed in
the application for a free patent title.
M. van Es and B. Bruins Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771

Fig. 3. Map of Eastern-Samar.

8
M. van Es and B. Bruins
5.1.1. Accessing titling programs
Typhoon Haiyan provided an opening for Rights, a nationwide
network of grassroot based organizations supporting rural social
movements, to expand their area to Eastern-Samar. They wanted to
explore the possibility of mass movement building of disaster survivors,
thereby focusing on land tenure issues to guarantee that people will have
access to humanitarian assistance (personal communication Danny
Carranza, 25–05–2021). This support of civil society groups can enable
voiceless people to exercise their voice (Fox, 2015). The community
organizers from Rights observed that people without formal property
rights have difficulty in accessing humanitarian support (e.g. people
were denied housing repair materials because they did not have formal
land property rights). Peasants and fisherfolks realized the importance
of titling after Haiyan since a proof of ownership was required to access
shelter assistance and other support services to rebuild their lives. The
typhoon provided the opportunity to start a free-patent titling program
in Eastern-Samar and changed the dynamics between state and society
actors and opened up possibilities for rural poor communities to secure
access to their lands. Rights started a campaign for land rights in the area
and discovered that many occupants of public land did not have a title
despite the free patent laws. They organized the communities and in
2016 Rights and Katarungan started their advocacy to implement the
free patent titling in Eastern-Samar to increase tenure security in the
area. DENR in collaboration with Rights facilitated the application for
free-patent titling. Actors from below and above worked together to
implement the free-patent titling. Working together with the state was
crucial since titles can only be awarded by the state. However, in the
beginning the government was not willing to work together with
Katarungan.
Because people are united in Katarungan, a militant peasant orga­
nization, they are able to create a pressure from below and force the
government to talk. The government was not willing to talk to in­
dividuals, but as a group Katarungan could persuade the government
officials to talk with them. First, Katarungan organized dialogues at
provincial and national level to access data about the progress of the free
patent titling program and consulted the communities on the status of
the free patent titling program in Eastern-Samar. DENR claimed that
they facilitated the free patent titling program and that they accom­
plished their goals. However, data collected by Rights showed that large
parts of the land were still untitled. After various dialogues and rallies at
local, provincial and national level Katarungan was able to convince
DENR to start a pilot program to facilitate free patent titling. In 2017 the
pilot program to facilitate titling started in 7 barangays in the munici­
palities of Lawaan, Balangiga and Giporlos. These reform processes are
inherently conflictive and in the beginning the government resisted the
implementation of the free patent titling program. These struggles for
agrarian reform take place in a political arena in which “interlinked
human agencies are involved in the everyday negotiation of the role-
definition and role-enactment” of peasants (Long, 2001:40). These
linkages are highly dynamic and are constantly being renegotiated by
the struggles between different individuals and social groups and are
affected by outside forces (Long, 2001).
Allies with NGOs can help to create local capacity to respond to
openings for reform within the state and are often crucial in dissemi­
nating information (Fox, 2015). Rights provided information on the
free-patent titling and assisted people in getting the required documents.
Katarungan created voluntary documentation terms who validated the
documents. Earlier some farmers started their application for the free
patent titling program but were not able to proceed because they lacked
knowledge on the procedure. For example, they did not know which
documents were required and how to access these. Katarungan facili­
tated the application in their pilot project and explained the procedure
and assisted people in accessing the right documents.
Engagement with the state can also be effective to access resources to
be able to apply for the free patent titling program. Many people lacked
one or more of the required documents to apply for the free patent titling
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Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
program and they needed a private survey to be able to apply for titling.
However, they were not able to cope with the cost of the private survey.
During a dialogue Katarungan Balangiga was able to to convince the
DENR to reduce the costs of the private survey from 5000–8000 PhP
($98-$157) to 1000 PhP ($19.65) per lot for food and fuel (FGD Bal­
angiga, 04–11–2019).
This campaign was quite successful since during a dialogue between
DENR and Community of Yolanda Survivors and Partners (CYSP, a
coalition of 10 NGOs and 163 community organizations), DENR
considered the titling of occupied lands in Eastern-Samar part of its
humanitarian response. In 2017 DENR province acknowledged that land
titling was necessary as part of rehabilitation since a lot of Haiyan sur­
vivors were deprived from access to assistance from the government
since they did not have any proof of ownership of the land (Recuerdo,
2017). The application for the free patent titling started in 2018. On May
31 2019, 300 agricultural titles were distributed by DENR to the par­
ticipants in the pilot program in the municipalities of Lawaan, Balangiga
and Giporlos. Nevertheless, a big part of the land is not titled yet. The
program to fast track patent titling ended in 2020. Katarungan started a
dialogue with DENR at different government levels to push for an
extension of the program since a big part of the land is not titled yet, for
example in General MacArthur 50% out of a total of 11,729 ha is not
titled yet (Jumauay, 2019). A big part of the land in Eastern-Samar is not
titled because of incoherent land use and management policies, lack of
technical capacity and funding of LGUs to implement these policies,
highly unequal power relations and strong land lord resistance (Fitz­
patrick and Compton, 2014).
5.2. Eastern-Samar – challenging government relocation plans
Typhoon Haiyan originated in the Pacific Ocean and made landfall in
Eastern-Samar. About 90% of the houses were (partially) destroyed
(interview president Uswag-Este, 06–09–2019). The issuing of the No
Build Zone (NBZ) after typhoon Haiyan created a threat for eviction in
the area. The government is planning to move 200,000 people away
from the seashore as part of its efforts to build safer communities and
reduce the risk of storm surges (Fitzpatrick and Compton, 2014). The
NBZ is a zone of 40 m from the coastline in which the building of per­
manent structures is not allowed. As a consequence, fishers are not able
to practice their occupations anymore and cannot make a living since
they lose access to the land they use as landing spots fort their fishing
activities (Franco and Borras, 2019). Also people living in these
high-risk zones were excluded from various forms of aid and relief like
shelter assistance. However, construction and operation of infrastruc­
ture within the 40-meter zones is allowed if these are for commercial
purposes such as industry, malls and hotels. Hence, the NBZ is actually a
no-dwelling zone. The issuing of the NBZ can be seen as a strategy of the
government to assert control over land in coastal areas, justified in the
name of safety (Yee, 2018).
The National Housing Authority (NHA) was given the task of
rebuilding 205,128 permanent houses in the affected areas (Congress of
the Philippines, 2016). The people currently living in the NBZ are
identified as beneficiaries of the Haiyan relocation program. Six years
after the typhoon, the permanent housing units were still under con­
struction. In total 6840 houses were planned to be built in Eastern-Samar
of which only 2070 were completed by October 2019; the project
finished in 2020. Only 735 out of 2070 completed houses were occupied
in October 2019 (NHA, 2019). The typhoon created the possibility to
create a NBZ and this changed the dynamics in agrarian reform pro­
cesses, because people living in the NBZ are no longer able to secure
access to their lands and are relocated. However, many people are still
living in the NBZ area and are afraid they will be evicted from their
lands. In 2015 Rights expanded its campaign on land rights issues after
typhoon Haiyan to Eastern-Samar. Various organizations of farmers and
fisherfolks were established at barangay level and federated into
Katarungan. These organizations started their engagement with the
M. van Es and B. Bruins
government by asking the LGU information on the status of the per­
manent housing program. This was combined with a mass mobilization
organized by Haiyan survivors in front of the NHA office in Tacloban to
present their demands for the Permanent Housing Program. The farmers
and fisherfolks did not want to move to the relocation sites since the site
is too far from their original location and livelihoods. The sites also lack
access to basic and social services such as water, electricity and
schooling. The implementation of the NBZ and the relocation program
created new issues around land in the area.
In Eastern-Samar, Katarungan is advocating at different government
levels for involvement of the people in the implementation of the
housing program, to explore alternative relocation options and to make
the government accountable for the issues around the implementation of
the housing program. At local level Katarungan Giporlos initiated a
dialogue with the LGU about the lack of consultation on the housing
program. The mayor promised to consult the people before the land was
bought and to hire beneficiaries of the housing program for the con­
struction (FGD Giporlos, 05–11–2019). When the community was not
informed by the mayor, they tried to access information about the
implementation of the housing program from neighbouring municipal­
ities and higher government officials. In Balangiga Katarungan engaged
with the government and asked for consultation since the construction
of 300 out of 760 units had not started yet. However, the government did
not respond. Before they were able to access the construction site and
they monitored the construction of the houses. They found out that the
quality of the houses was substandard. Before, because of poor con­
struction the houses would move if you touched them. They were called
the ‘dancing houses’. Katarungan organized an official inspection of the
site with the media and municipal engineer (FGD Balangiga,
04–11–2019). Media coverage can provide an important tool to raise
political awareness and pressure the government to listen to oppressed
people (Borras, 1999). Katarungan Balangiga also issued a note of
refusal to NHA in which they included their complains about the
housing program. After an investigation of the committee on housing of
the House of Representatives the contractor was dismissed and a new
contractor took over the reconstruction. The people cannot access the
construction site anymore and are not able to monitor.
Katarungan is part of CYSP, which demands more people-centred
and participatory relocation. They work together to pressure the gov­
ernment to reform the reconstruction process and expose the anomalies
in the housing reconstruction. They organized several dialogues with the
office of the president and dialogues with representatives from the
Senate and Congress. Both the Senate and House of Representatives
conducted an investigation on the complaints of the survivors. This led
to the creation of the inter-agency task force on Haiyan Relocation and
Recovery. After this there have been several investigations and grassroot
consultations. However, no results were made public. At local level
Katarungan General MacArthur organized a dialogue at Commission of
Human Rights (CHR) to demand a field investigation of the quality of the
typhoon Haiyan houses and human rights violations in their area. In
September 2019, CHR conducted their investigation and sent a letter to
the mayor in which CHR asked to answer the complains of the benefi­
ciaries of the housing program in barangay 1 and 7. However, the mayor
has not answered. They were planning to follow-up at CHR.
On November 7, 2019, CYSP filed a case at the ombudsman in
Tacloban against the NHA officials involved in the anomalous imple­
mentation of the housing program to make them accountable for it.
Finding openings within the government is very difficult. The Uswag-
Este members have asked for consultation about the housing program
and created an alternative development plan (CYSP meeting Eastern-
Samar, 05–10–2019). Katarugan Eastern-Samar is trying to create a
pressure from above through social mobilization, they filed several
cases, organized dialogues and protests. They try to mobilize actors at
different levels (national, regional, local). However, because of lack of
allies within the state, the effects of the social mobilization of the
community is limited. It has led to several investigations both at national
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Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
and local level but no concrete decisions have been made to involve
people living in the NBZ in any decision-making.
Actors from above are highly diverse and the state has many roles. By
the issuing of the NBZ policy the state evicted coastal communities from
this area and created new issues around land. However, state agencies
engage with these new policies in distinct ways. In General MacArthur
the mayor threatened the people that she would destroy their houses in
the NBZ. DENR refused to give a permit for commercial lease, which is
still allowed, in the NBZ in General MacArthur because there were
people living in the area (FGD General MacArthur, 10–11–2019).
5.2.1. Dynamic pressure from below
Pressure from below is highly dynamic. Not all farmers and fisher­
folks organizations that are part of Katarungan participated in sustained
engagement. In 2016 Katarungan left General Macarthur because the
representative did not attend meetings and did not participate. The
people said that back then they did not realize the importance of titling.
However, when there was an actual threat for eviction in 2018 the
people decided to join Katarungan again because they needed the sup­
port of this organization (FGD GeneralMacArthur, 10–11–2019). This
example shows that depending on people’s perception on the impor­
tance of land titling they decided to join in collective action.
Participation in collective action can be constrained when people are
afraid. In the Philippines land-based violence is widespread and this
violence even resulted in the deaths of peasants and rural workers in
various cases. Everyday forms of violence such as harassments and
intimidation by company guards, private goons, paramilitary forces,
dragging rural poor claimants to criminal courts and so are more com­
mon and widespread (Borras and Franco, 2007). These forms of violence
have a significant impact on pressure from below and need to be
addressed. The LGU in Balangiga is tagging the Katarungan members as
an New People’s Army (NPA, a guerrilla army) group. In response to this
the Katarungan sent a letter to the LGU and invited them to a meeting
with Commission on Human Rights to prove that they are not part of the
NPA. Some members are afraid to be active and are not attending
meetings anymore because they think the police will capture them if
they join meetings. Also in the other municipalities members have been
tagged as NPA members. Because of this ‘red tagging’ people are afraid
to participate in rallies and mobilizations. In General MacArthur the
mayor threatened the people living in the NBZ that she will file a case if
the people did not self-demolish their houses in the NBZ. In barangay 2
four houses were self-demolished. The statement of the mayor created
fear in the community since the houses on the relocation sites are not
finished yet and people do not have a place to stay. When Katarungan
asked the mayor about it, she said that there was no schedule to move
(interview community organizer Eastern-Samar, 24–11–2019). In
October 2019 the mayor told the barangay captain that the people could
only stay in their current houses until December and the community was
afraid of forced eviction.
Different people have different perceptions on moving to the relo­
cation sites. Rural poor communities are heterogenous and are affected
in distinct ways by these new policies and new contestations over land.
This influences peoples participation in collective action and could
create conflicts within these communities. For example, the decision
whether to move to the relocation site or not creates tensions within the
community. People are trying to convince each other to move and this
changes the social relations within the communities. There are barangay
officials who try to persuade the people living in NBZ to move to the
relocation sites, while part of these people do not want to move. In
Lawaan the former mayor awarded housing units to people who were
not qualified as beneficiaries because during elections he promised his
supporters that they would receive a house if they vote for him (FGD
Lawaan, 03–11–2019). There are people who want to move to these
location sites since they are currently living on land from which they can
be evicted anytime. They can be evicted because they are not the owner
of the house (personal communication NGO official, 13–10–2019).
M. van Es and B. Bruins
Currently they rent, are a sharer or live with their relatives. By moving to
the relocation sites they can increase their tenure security (Meeting
CYSP Eastern-Samar, 05–10–2019).
5.3. Synthesis
The cases show that land rights issues that emerged after typhoon
Haiyan intersect with pre-disaster politics and policies and are shaped
by structural and institutional settings. However, the disaster also led to
significant changes in conflicts around land. Different tipping points that
opened up or constrained the possibilities for change can be identified.
Firstly, the unequal distribution of losses after Haiyan led to rural
communities challenging discourses around development and state-
society relations. Secondly, the mobilisation of alternative discourses
by civil society is an important tipping point. In all three cases the rural
poor had difficulties in accessing relief goods provided by the govern­
ment after the typhoon. Also, the mobilisation of alternative discourse
by civil society organisations was needed to take the struggle beyond the
local level. The communities applied bibingka strategies in their
campaign and tried to find allies within the state to create a pressure
from above and below to implement agrarian reform. It should be
acknowledged that despite there being some success in the three cases,
these are no easy successes since in all cases it took a series of mobili­
zations to force the government to (partially) implement its land redis­
tribution policies. Also violence or the threat of violence played a role in
mobilizations in the three cases, which impacted participation.
In Eastern-Samar peasants and fisherfolks realised the importance of
land titling since without a proof of ownership they were not able to
access relief goods. Nevertheless, the unequal distribution of losses did
not result in any social mobilization until the communities received
support from a NGO. The influx of NGOs in the area enabled the rural
poor to start an advocacy to access the free-patent titling program and
improve tenure security. This highlights that mobilization of alternative
discourses by civil society is critical in change processes in the aftermath
of disasters. In Eastern-Samar the mobilization of alternative discourses
led to institutionalisation of these discourses since DENR considered the
land titling part of its humanitarian response. The disaster led to a
renegotiation of people’s rights and responsibilities by opening up the
possibility for farmers and fisherfolks to access the free-patent titling
program.
In the other case in Eastern-Samar the communities try to challenge
existing discourses around relocation by advocating for people centred
relocation. This alternative discourse was mobilized with support of a
NGO. However, the possibilities for finding openings within the state to
implement these alternative relocation plans are limited and the com­
munity lacks allies within the state to be able to mobilise the alternative
relocation discourse. This limits the effect of the social mobilisation of
the community. It highlights that it is needed to find allies within the
state to be able to effectively mobilise an alternative discourse. Never­
theless, the mobilisation of alternative relocation discourse led to the
creation of an inter-agency task force on Haiyan relocation, which can
be considered as an example of the institutionalisation of the alternative
relocation discourse in legislation and policies. However, it did not lead
to a renegotiation of people’s rights and responsibilities and the gov­
ernment uses coercive tactics to convince people to move to the relo­
cation sites.
In Sicogon people resisted the development plans of Ayala by
refusing to relocate, thereby challenging the existing discourse that
changing the island into a high-end tourism location would be the only
viable option for development. The community tried to mobilise actors
within the state. However, the effects of this mobilisation of state actors
are mixed. The DAR sometimes decided in favour of the community and
sometimes in favour of the private claimant. The mobilisation of an
alternative discourse was not institutionalised in new policies or legis­
lation around agrarian reform. People’s rights and responsibilities were
not renegotiated despite efforts of the community to claim titles to the
11
Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
land.
The outcomes of change processes vary a lot between the case study
areas. One of the factors explaining this difference is the strong resis­
tance of a private claimant in the case of Sicogon, which also hinders the
possibility for rural communities to find allies within the state. In
Eastern-Samar resistance mainly comes from anti-reform actors within
the state. Also the cases have a different history of engagement with land
rights issues. In Sicogon typhoon Haiyan fed into an ongoing struggle
between the Sarrosa family and the community. Whereas in Eastern-
Samar it created new issues around land and opened up the possibility
to start a campaign to secure access to the land. Engagement with land
rights issues started after typhoon Haiyan, while in Sicogon the com­
munity has been struggling for about 20 years to claim rights to the land.
In Sicogon because of the direct threat for eviction mobilization started
earlier compared to Eastern-Samar.
These discourses for alternative development compete with dis­
courses for development that favour the interest of powerful state and
corporate actors. After the issuing of the NBZ the eviction of coastal
communities became a major concern. People living in the NBZ do no
longer have the possibility to claim a title to their lands. Nevertheless,
commercial parties can still apply for a commercial lease and use this
land. The NBZ provided an opportunity for the government to increase
its control over these areas, justified in the name of safety and disaster
prevention. This policy favours the private sector and in some cases
authorities already had plans to construct commercial establishments
within these areas (Yee, 2018). In Sicogon the crisis became an oppor­
tunity for the elite to change the trajectory of the conflict. The state
relied on corporate support for rehabilitation after the typhoon. These
powerful corporations however have their own agendas and used their
power to push for their interest. In Sicogon typhoon Haiyan changed the
game and revealed the partnership between Ayala and SIDECO and their
plans to transform the island in a high-end tourism destination. Both in
Sicogon and Eastern-Samar powerful actors had their plans ready and
Haiyan opened up the possibility to put their plans into action. These
plans closed down the opportunities for change for the rural poor. These
examples shows that the political actions of a wide range of actors in­
fluences the outcomes of land rights struggles and these relations are
highly dynamic.
6. Discussion
Disasters open up space for political change and contestation of
power. The tipping points identified by Pelling and Dill (2010), offers a
framework to analyse political change in the aftermath of disasters.
However, these different processes interact in dynamic and complicated
ways. In all three cases similar tipping points can be identified but they
have highly diverse outcomes. This shows the importance of studying
change processes at different scales, ranging from local to international.
This paper mainly focuses on the local scale but it should be acknowl­
edged that international politics also influence the outcomes of these
change processes.
Making these politics visible is quite challenging since these pro­
cesses are highly dynamic. Therefore, there is a need to follow these
processes of change through time (Pelling and Dill, 2010). The outcomes
of these changes can be both regressive and progressive and also this
changes over time. Therefore, depending on when these processes are
investigated conclusions might be different. For example, the singing of
the agreement in Sicogon in 2014 was considered as a win-win solution.
However, when this agreement was not implemented mobilizations
continued in 2017.
Considering climate change and the related increased impact of di­
sasters, integrating disaster risk reduction, development and climate
change adaptation is a major concern (Seidler et al., 2018). These case
studies demonstrate how disasters fed into ongoing development chal­
lenges and shows that disasters are highly political. For both actors
involved in disaster risk reduction or agrarian reform there is a need to
M. van Es and B. Bruins
look into the changes in political dynamics in the wake of disasters to be
able to support pro-poor change since this does not happen automati­
cally. This paper offers examples of local strategies to advocate for
pro-poor change. More research on the factors that hinder or enable
disaster risk reduction or agrarian reform practitioners to support
pro-poor change in the aftermath of disasters is needed.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides insights in how natural disasters can open up
new arenas of contestation over land use, ownership and titling between
state agents, organized civil society and powerful business groups.
Typhoon Haiyan created several new arenas of contestation over land,
but these intersect with pre-disaster political processes, institutional and
spatial arrangements and power relations. The cases show that disaster
are a window of opportunity to reverse or accelerate complicated
agrarian reform processes: by restructuring dynamics between actors
from below and above in existing, sometimes stagnated agrarian reform
processes, by revealing political dynamics that were invisible before or
by creating new possibilities to mobilize actors from above and below to
claim access to land. Disaster recovery and rehabilitation programs of­
fers opportunities from both sides to push their agendas in the name of
reconstruction and humanitarianism. Those who are in the best position
to find allies in the government are able to benefit from the
opportunities.
The response to the typhoon restructured the dynamics in agrarian
reform processes in various ways, creating both challenges and oppor­
tunities for rural poor communities to claim access to their lands. The
changes in agrarian reform processes provided new possibilities for
mobilization from below. The typhoon also provided the possibility for
NGOs to expand their area of operation and support local communities
in their struggle to resist eviction and gain access to their lands.
Changing dynamics between various actors from above and below can
provide an opportunity to secure access to land. However, the issuing of
the NBZ provided state actors the opportunity to radically change the
land use in these coastal zones. The NBZ limits opportunities for poor
communities to rehabilitate. In doing so it reinforces the vulnerability of
already marginalized people and legitimizes the operations of the elite
(Uson, 2017). Typhoon Haiyan also provided an opportunity for
powerful corporate actors to change the trajectory of conflicts over land
in their favour. Therefore, it is important to look into who benefits and
who carries the burden of these new policies about land use, ownership
and titling and how this affects peoples vulnerability to disasters.
These changes are complex and context-dependent. The everyday
experiences of changes after typhoon Haiyan varied greatly among the
three case study areas and even within communities different people
were affected differently. Change induced by disasters can give rural
communities the possibility to claim their rights when they are able to
mobilize actors within the state to create a pressure from above and
below. Local communities try to change the pathway of reconstruction
and recovery and challenge state authorities. They resist to and rene­
gotiate disaster governance and development norms. However, the
conditions under which rural poor communities operate are difficult and
can be violent. Their actions are limited by their position in the wider
socio-economic and political context.
This research demonstrates that bibingka, and more generally,
sandwich strategies can be very effective but are not always successful.
Social mobilization from below does not automatically result in action
from above and it can be difficult to find pro-reform actors within the
state. It can be a long-term process and resistance from other, often more
powerful actors can be very strong. Also powerful actors try to mobilize
actors within the community and state to push for their interest. A
struggle about who is able to exert their power over the community and
the government can emerge. However, the outcomes are not pre­
determined and depend on local and historical power relations.
There is a need to look at what changes for whom, who is advantaged
12
Land Use Policy 132 (2023) 106771
and who is disadvantaged. It is important to investigate these changes at
local level to understand the micro-politics and everyday experiences of
social change. In the context of climate change and related rise in di­
sasters understanding the interaction between agrarian reform processes
and disasters will be increasingly important. This research shows that
land issues and disasters shape and are shaped by each other and are
politically linked. Disaster politics intersects with issues of land grabbing
and control over land in complex and often subtle ways, reshaping
conflicts over natural resources (Borras et al., 2020). Disasters can
provide an opportunity for land grabbing, legitimate processes for land
grabs in the name of safety, conservation or humanitarian support
among others or reinforces the vulnerabilities of already marginalized
groups (Borras et al., 2020; Uson, 2017). Acknowledging the political
connection between disaster politics and land issues is necessary to be
able to address the vulnerabilities of the marginalised and advocate for
pro-poor change.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Mariëlle van Es: investigation, methodology, conceptualization and
writing- original draft Bert Bruins: methodology, conceptualization and
writing-review and editing.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Data Availability
Data will be made available on request.
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NHA (31 Oct. 2019) Status of Project Implementation (original YPHP) as of October 31,
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