NEFİSE KÖVENÇ

According to Schopenhauer, the will does not possess total freedom to will as he asserts at the

end of the second chapter "a liberum arbitrium does not exist at all"(Schopenhauer, FW,101).

To prove this idea he first distinguishes the ordinary conception of freedom and his

conception of freedom. Schopenhauer's conception of freedom can be described as the

absence of a determinate sufficient ground that means freedom without necessity. If we start

to think of freedom in those terms, then we can ask the question "Is the will itself free ?"

Schopenhauer's concern is not if one is free to do what one wants but rather whether one can

will what to will.

Afterward, Schopenhauer presents self-consciousness and consciousness of other things. The

reason for this presentation is to find the source of will itself and whether we can control it.

Furthermore, Schopenhauer demonstrates that human beings always will to do something.

Therefore, our objects of desire are always external. However, what is external is not will

itself but our desires or detests that were decided priorly by will itself. Therefore, we can not

claim that we can will what to will or whether we can will opposite things because even

though we are self-conscious, this only enables us to observe the will expressing itself not to

see the will itself and have control over to change it.

To conclude, Schopenhauer claims that even though we can have physical freedom to do

what we will, the act of will called forth with necessity and we have no control over it but we

can just observe what will wills to do and whether we can do what we will or not.