EOC Management

“Dr Michael Fagel has assembled a group of experts in a variety of areas of emergency
management and has edited a highly usable book that belongs on the desks of EM professionals.
Most emergency operations plans have appendices relating to specific critical events. The
organization of Fagel’s book around hazard-specific issues makes it easy to find useful guidance
when planning for a wide range of critical incidents from agroterrorism to pandemics to active
shooters to large scale public events. The coverage is very up-to-date, as evidenced by references
into 2011 and coverage of such modern topics as the impact of social media on emergency
management. Having taught with Dr Fagel, I see in this book the effective classroom style that I
associate with his work, but translated into a very practical and useful manual. All-in-all, it’s a
book that’s easy to recommend.”
Frank K. Cartledge, Professor Emeritus, Louisiana State University
“As an academician and practitioner of emergency services, I am constantly looking for texts that
are valuable not only in the classroom, but applicable to real life problems we face in the field. In
Principles of Emergency Management and Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), the authors have
hit the nail on the head. Do not let the title fool you. While the text is rich with the history of the
emergency management discipline and worthy of academic study in the classroom, the text also
provides practical information to the practitioner to enhance their operations in the field. I highly
encourage the use of this text by anyone interested in emergency management and how it applies
across the emergency services spectrum. This text will become an essential resource for emergency
services operations for years to come.”
Marion Blackwell, PhD, EFO, Chief of the Spartanburg (SC) Fire Department
“Principles of Emergency Management and Emergency Operations Centers (2nd ed) is an excellent
resource for academicians, emergency managers, first responders, emergency planners, and
students preparing for careers in the emergency management field. The authors’ and editors’
expertise and experience is evident as this book provides a comprehensive, holistic study of
emergency management and emergency operations centers. Clear and cogent thinking and superb
writing on the critical topic of emergency management makes this a must have reference source
for anyone practicing in or studying the field of emergency management.”
Chuck Williamson, PhD, Dean, School of Public Service and Administration, Anderson University
“Mike Fagel is one of those rare individuals able to seamlessly put together an astonishing depth of
academic knowledge and expertise with successful real-world experience. From the moment he
reported into the FDNY World Trade Center Incident Command Post being established in a
firehouse that had once been the FDNY’s Museum on Duane Street just North of Ground Zero, he
displayed a can-do, let-me-help-you attitude that was tremendously received by all. His
Emergency Management as well as Health and Safety Management expertise combined with a
truly caring and empathetic disposition helped bring order to the chaos following 9/11. Many
rescue workers, including myself, owe our post-9/11 physical and mental health from his untiring
labors. All would do well to verse themselves in the knowledge found in this new text.”
Charles R. Blaich, Deputy Chief of Department, FDNY (ret), Logistic Chief, World Trade Center
Incident Command Post Colonel, USMC (ret)
“This book continues to be the must-read primer for all those engaged in emergency management
activities across the spectrum. The well-researched, superbly written second edition incorporates
lessons learned from recent disasters and crises, and introduces emergent practices to add to the
response toolkit. With over 100 years of experience in emergency management combined, the
authors address the emergency management topic like no one else in the field! Read and learn
from the best.”
Jennifer Hesterman, Colonel, US Air Force (ret), ASIS Award Winning Author
“In this 2nd edition, the combination of skills needed to effectively develop an Emergency
Operations Plan as well as establish an EOC are thoroughly discussed. Fagel has produced a text,
along with his colleagues, that will take the reader through the important and ongoing process of
emergency planning on a daily basis. I have served and presented with several of the authors in
my roles at ASIS, and find this text to be spot on with what we need to do today, for a safer
tomorrow.”
Lawrence J. Fennelly, CPOI, CSSM
Principles of Emergency Management
and Emergency Operations Centers
(EOC)
Emergency operations centers (EOCs) are a key component of coordination

efforts during incident planning as well as reaction to natural and human-
made events. Managers and their staff coordinate incoming information
from the field, and the public, to support pre-planned events and field
operations as they occur. This book looks at the function and role of EOCs
and their organizations.
The highly anticipated second edition of Principles of Emergency
Management and Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) provides an updated
understanding of the coordination, operation of EOCs at local, regional,
state, and federal operations. Contributions from leading experts provide
contemporary knowledge and best practice learned through lived
experience. The chapters collectively act as a vital training guide, at both a
theoretical and practical level, providing detailed guidance on handling each
phase and type of emergency. Readers will emerge with a blueprint of how
to create effective training and exercise programs, and thereby develop the
skills required for successful emergency management.
Along with thoroughly updated and expanded chapters from the first
edition, this second edition contains new chapters on:
The past and future of emergency management, detailing the evolution

of emergency management at the federal level, and potential future
paths.
Communicating with the public and media, including establishing
relations with, and navigating, the media, and the benefits this can
provide if successfully managed.
In-crisis communications.
Leadership and decision-making during disaster events.
Facilitating and managing interagency collaboration, including analysis
of joint communications, and effective resource management and
deployment when working with multiple agencies.
Developing and deploying key skills of management, communication,
mental resilience.
Planning for terrorism and responding to complex coordinated terrorist
attacks.
Developing exercises and after-action reports (AARs) for emergency
management.
Michael J. Fagel, PhD, CEM has been involved with all phases of public
safety and emergency response since the early 1970s. His career has spanned
decades in FEMA as well as law enforcement, emergency medical services,
fire rescue and emergency management, and Occupational Safety & Health
Administration (OSHA). He is a university instructor at numerous
institutions in their graduate programs in public policy specializing in anti-
terrorism, critical infrastructure, and homeland security. He teaches at the
Illinois Institute of Technology, Northern Illinois University and Eastern
Kentucky University. He has been a field instructor for the National Center
for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) at Louisiana State
University (LSU) since 2002. Fagel’s third textbook, Crisis Management and
Emergency Planning, earned the ASIS Inaugural Book of the year award. His
latest book, Soft Targets and Crisis Management, was published in 2016 by
CRC Press. He serves as a Subject Matter Expert and SME worldwide on
crisis response and planning.
Principles of Emergency Management
and Emergency Operations Centers
(EOC)
Second Edition
Edited by Michael J. Fagel, PhD, CEM

Rick C. Mathews, MS, NRP (ret)
J. Howard Murphy, PhD, FacEM, CEM, NRP
Second edition published 2022
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2022 Taylor & Francis
The right of Michael J. Fagel to be identified as the author of the editorial

material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted
in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
First edition published by CRC Press 2011
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Fagel, Michael J., editor.
Title: Principles of emergency management and emergency operations
centers (EOC) / edited by Michael J. Fagel, Rick C. Mathews, James
Howard Murphy.
Description: 2nd Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2021. | Revised edition of
Principles of emergency management and emergency operations centers
(EOC), 2011. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021009448 (print) | LCCN 2021009449 (ebook) | ISBN
9781482235036 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315118345 (ebook) | ISBN
9781482235050 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781351635134 (mobi) | ISBN
9781351644624 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Emergency management.
Classification: LCC HD49 .P75 2021 (print) | LCC HD49 (ebook) | DDC
658.4/77–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021009448
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021009449
ISBN: 978-1-4822-3503-6 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-11834-5 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345
Typeset in Adobe Garamond Pro

by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Cover composite image and copyright by Rick C. Mathews 2020 with
contributing images provided by Brian R. Burt, Kammie Juzwin, and
Michael J. Fagel.
Dedication
Today, more than ever, it’s important that we dedicate this book to the
public safety community, the public health professionals and their families.
Every one of us knows people, real people, who have been affected by the
challenges of yesterday, today, and tomorrow. We must never forget those
who have gone before us, and those who will come after us to make a
difference. Our own families have supported us in our public safety and
educational professional endeavors. We have made serving others our
lifelong mission. In that light, please remember those who made the ultimate
sacrifice, as well as their families. We must break down any barriers to
cooperation and move forward, together, to make a difference.
Thank you,
Mike, Rick, Howard, and Erin
Contents
Foreword
ROBERT J. COULLAHAN
Preface
Acknowledgments
Editors
Contributors
From the Editors
Module One:
Introduction and History of Emergency Management
1 Introduction: Why Is This Book Important to You? What’s in It for

Me?
MICHAEL J. FAGEL AND SHANE STOVALL
2 The Evolution of Federal Emergency Management and Planning

Guidance: Changes since 9/11 and Katrina
LARS SKINNER
3 EOC Operation
GREG BENSON
4 Disaster and the Law

THOMAS D. SCHNEID
5 Emergency Management Laws and Mandates: What Drives

Emergency Management Planning and Policy
SHANE STOVALL
Module Two:
Facilitation of Effective Emergency Management
6 Developing a Planning Team

MICHAEL J. FAGEL AND LUCIEN G. CANTON
7 Assessing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Risks within the Community

ROBERT D. HUGHBANK AND RICHARD J. HUGHBANK
8 Developing Your Emergency Operations Plan

SHANE STOVALL AND MICHAEL J. FAGEL
9 Exercises and AARs in Emergency Management

RICK C. MATHEWS
10 Current Media Environment

RANDALL C. DUNCAN
11 Successfully Navigating Media for the Emergency Manager

STEPHEN COMBS
12 EOC Design
LUCIEN G. CANTON AND NICHOLAS STAIKOS
13 Stress Management and Mental Health Considerations in

Emergency Contexts
KAMMIE JUZWIN
14 Effective Leadership in Emergency Management—A Research-
Driven Discussion
J. HOWARD MURPHY
Module Three:
Multiagency Coordination
15 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management

DEREK ROWAN
16 Role of Interagency Liaison

PATRICK J. JESSEE
17 Emergency Management and Public Health Collaboration

RICK C. MATHEWS AND J. HOWARD MURPHY
18 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

J. HOWARD MURPHY AND LARS SKINNER
19 Managing Volunteers
MARK E. CHAMBERS
20 Emergency Management Facilitation of Responder’s Health and

Safety
DAVID STUMBO, CHRISTINE B. PETITTI, AND MICHAEL J. FAGEL
Module Four:
Emergency Management Specialized Applications
21 Planning for Terrorism

MICHAEL J. FAGEL
22 Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks

J. HOWARD MURPHY
23 Facility Vulnerability and Security
J. LAWRENCE CUNNINGHAM
24 The Future of Emergency Management

STEPHEN KRILL WITH J. HOWARD MURPHY
Appendix 1: Pandemic-Ready EOC Design Considerations

NICHOLAS STAIKOS
Appendix 2: Vulnerability Assessment
GREG BENSON AND ALEXANDER FEIL
Appendix 3: A Chief Elected Official’s View on Emergency Management
RON HAIN
Afterword
ROLAND CALIA
Index
Foreword
Over 30 years ago I had the privilege of meeting Dr Michael Fagel at an

annual conference of what was then the National Coordinating Council on
Emergency Management, the latter-day International Association of
Emergency Managers (IAEM) in South Bend, Indiana. I knew immediately
he was apart from the typical emergency manager in the practice at the
time, he was energetically committed to lifting the standards of the
emergency management profession to a new level of knowledge, education,
and readiness. His enthusiasm for addressing contemporary and emergent
threats and hazards was palpable and his commitment to higher education
was unambiguous, long before undergraduate and graduate degree
programs were widespread in this vital interdisciplinary domain. From that
time forward we maintained a close professional collaboration across a wide
range of critical infrastructure and national preparedness program areas.
Dr Fagel’s work spanned the spectrum of critical analytic thinking for
counterterrorism intelligence practitioners to medical emergency response to
CBRN incidents. We worked closely on several federal programs in
homeland security response, recovery, and mitigation. While Dr Fagel never
faltered in his support to the national emergency management operational
mission he always made time to sustain his passion for higher education and
professional development, serving on the faculty of universities and serving
National Laboratories with valuable operational lessons learned to advance
the technologies, tactics, and techniques of emergency managers. His work
has been a living “improvement plan” for the practice of emergency
management planning, training, and exercises.
This is a field guide for the safety, security, and success of the emergency
management mission. The book defines the essential knowledge needed at
the nexus of emergency management, emergency response, interagency
coordination, and critical infrastructure operations. From individual health
and safety to institutional protective measures, this is a unique handbook for
use before and during field deployment.
The book is an essential and ready reference for every emergency
operations center, business continuity command center, and public safety
training academy. It is an A to Z treatment of risk, readiness, and solutions
for institutional resilience. What is most powerful about the work is that it
has been developed by a superbly qualified and operationally experienced
cadre of contributing authors with contemporary knowledge of the threats,
hazards, and lessons learned in response to real world events.
The updated book revisits many of the most vexing response and recovery
challenges and provides a roadmap for deliberative improvements to existing
plans and training programs, while enhancing measures of effectiveness in
exercise design and conduct. In this update Dr Fagel and his team have once
again created a compendium of timely insights and solutions, inviting the
reader into the realm of what future responsible emergency management
leadership and frontline responders will confront and conquer.
Robert J. Coullahan, MS, CEM, CPP

President
Readiness Resource Group
Preface
Many things have changed since we put together the first edition of this
book. The impact that public health would have on our everyday lives was
contemplated in several of our other texts in this series, but not to the extent
we address such in this book.
Public safety has come through as a partner with public health. The
impacts on emergency medical services, fire rescue, law enforcement,
emergency management, as well as public health have been significant and
the challenges associated with the COVID-19 global pandemic have served
as a catalyst for collaboration. The role of emergency planning has been
brought to the forefront again on a daily basis. Our partners in the public
safety answering points, or 9-1-1 dispatch operations were also a key
element in our response and recovery operations throughout this crisis.
Altogether, the entire public safety community was challenged and tested,
and we learned from each other. The authors of the various chapters in this
book have served during many crises, some large, some small. But we all
have had a role in the new challenges that have come to our own
jurisdictions. It is our sincere desire to offer this important work to you as
we move forward from the various challenges with the goal of becoming
stronger, more prepared, and more resilient than before.
It is in our collaborative work for our communities’ benefit that we shine.
Public safety, public health, and education are all critical parts that must
work together before, during, and after a critical incident to effectively serve
the public. Regardless of the emblem on our uniform we are all in this
together.
Thank you.
Acknowledgments
Creating the second edition of this textbook for the emergency management
community has been a most challenging and rewarding endeavor.
My close colleagues and friends have helped to create a wealth of
information that we believe will prove useful in your professional and/or
academic endeavors.
In this volume, I have enlisted the aid of my close and trusted colleagues
to be co-editors of this important work. Together, Howard Murphy and Rick
Mathews have constantly amazed me with their perseverance to help create
the text. Kudos to Erin Fisher who has helped keep us all on track in this
process as our technical editor. This has proven to be one of the most
challenging times in our history with a public health emergency that has
challenged our nation and the world.
It is our collective hope that this text, along with the companion texts we
have written, will continue to prove valuable to the numerous people who
have come to rely on our writings.
The team of authors comprised of seasoned professionals have made this
book an authoritative text for the future. We cannot express enough our
sincere gratitude to those people who helped make the first, and now the
second, edition valuable reference tools for the public safety community.
Editors
Michael J. Fagel, PhD, CEM has been involved with all phases of public
safety and emergency response since the early 1970s. His career has spanned
decades in FEMA as well as law enforcement, emergency medical services,
fire rescue and emergency management, and the Occupational Safety &
Health Administration (OSHA).
Fagel was deployed to the World Trade Center attacks in 2001 for the U.S.
Department of Justice for over 100 days. He also was deployed to the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, while he served as a FEMA (then DHS)
reservist for ten years. He helped to stand up the CERIAC Intelligence
Center for the National Guard Bureau.
He is a university instructor at numerous institutions in the graduate
programs in public policy specializing in anti-terrorism, critical
infrastructure, and homeland security. He teaches at the Illinois Institute of
Technology, Northern Illinois University and Eastern Kentucky University,
while also working as field instructor for the National Center for Biomedical
Research and Training (NCBRT) at Louisiana State University (LSU) since
2002.
He has worked with numerous defense contractors and helped to
implement a National Emergency Management Program policy for a US ally
in the Middle East. He has also spent 17 years at the Argonne National
Laboratory in Homeland Security and Training, and has served as an elected
and appointed official in public safety.
Fagel is a member of the ASIS School Safety & Security Council. His third
textbook, Crisis Management and Emergency Planning, earned the ASIS
Inaugural Book of the Year award. His latest book, Soft Targets and Crisis
Management, was published in 2016 by CRC Press. He serves as a Subject
Matter Expert and SME worldwide on crisis response and planning.
Rick C. Mathews, MS, NRP (ret) founded the Mathews Group, LLC, in
October 2017, which provides consulting, training, education, and a host of
other services—most to agencies, companies, and others within the broad
homeland security enterprise. The founding occurred as he transitioned from
over 40 years of full-time employment within public service. His career
included 30 years as an EMT and paramedic. He served as the EMS director
for many of those in both large community and small rural services. He has
delivered training and education to EMS, fire service, law enforcement
personnel, and others for over 45 years, and continues in this effort today.
During his career, Mathews has been called upon to lead the development
of training and education for the emergency responder, public safety,
counterterrorism, and homeland security communities at local, state, and
federal levels. During the early years of his career, he developed and
delivered local and state-level training and education programs in Indiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, he was invited to
LSU to manage the development and delivery of bioterrorism training on
behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice and later, the Department of
Homeland Security. Concurrently, his portfolio also included a similar role
in support of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, later
transitioning to DHS, concerning hospital and medical community response
to weapons of mass destruction. In 2004–05 Mathews was appointed
Assistant Director for Research and Development at the National Center for
Biomedical Research and Training. By 2007, his division was responsible for
developing over 24 national-level courses in the areas of bioterrorism,
agroterrorism, advanced tactical operations (LE), WMD Sampling (fire
service and hazmat), and a host of other subjects focusing on the needs of
emergency responders, first receivers, public health, those responsible for
counterterrorism efforts, and many others.
In 2007, Rick was recruited by the State University of New York to
establish a national level training center to support the needs of New York,
international, federal, local, and private-sector agencies focusing on
homeland security and counterterrorism. He concluded his public service
career in late 2017 and began his current activities by establishing the
Mathews Group, LLC, which includes the Center for Counter-Terrorism
Training (AKA: C2T2), Mathews & Associates (consulting services), and rcm
Imaging (commercial imaging services).
Although he will tell you that he thinks of himself as a “southerner”, he
has made upstate New York his home since 2007.
J. Howard Murphy, PhD, FacEM, CEM, NRP has contributed to the
development of many of the existing United States emergency management,
homeland security, complex medical and public health operations, and
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) policies, programs, and
organizations. Dr Howard Murphy has mentored many professionals across
the spectrum of emergency response to national defense and national
security. Currently serving as the Program Coordinator and Associate
Professor for Anderson University’s Emergency Services Management and
Homeland Security degree programs within the School of Public Service and
Administration, Howard Murphy possesses 37 years of experience as an
emergency responder including at the chief, director, and commissioner
levels, 31 years in emergency management, 26 years of national security
experience, and retired from the military after 34 years of service within the
Army National Guard, U.S. Army, and Army Reserve. His military and
civilian education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, the U.S. Army War College, a Bachelor of Arts (Carson-Newman
University), a Master of Business Administration—Healthcare
Administration (City University of Seattle), a Master of Strategic Studies
(U.S. Army War College), and a Doctor of Philosophy in Organizational
Leadership with research focused on emergency management (Piedmont
International University). He has also completed the Harvard Kennedy
School of Government and T.H. Chan School of Public Health Executive
Education Program in National Preparedness, and a Disaster Science
Fellowship with the Academy of Emergency Management. He is a Certified
Emergency Manager (since 1998) with the International Association of
Emergency Managers, a hazardous materials specialist, and a National
Registry Paramedic serving his community’s Emergency Services Division
as a part-time Emergency Management Coordinator and paramedic.
Erin M. Fisher, MS, Assembly Editor, has been involved in advanced

research in the areas of criminal justice and emergency management since
2016. She currently serves as an Academic Success Advisor for graduate and
adult studies students at Anderson University in Anderson, South Carolina.
Her students are professionals seeking their degrees in criminal justice,
homeland security, and emergency services management. Erin received her
undergraduate degree from Anderson University in 2015 where she earned
her Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice with a concentration in Homeland
Security in Emergency Preparedness. In 2017, she graduated from the
University of Cincinnati with a Master of Science in Criminal Justice and
Criminology. She returned to Anderson University in 2017 to begin her work
in higher education.
Contributors
Greg Benson, MPA, CFO has served 40 years in the public safety field. His
career has spanned operations, administrative, and command-level
assignments in fire suppression and emergency management agencies.
Benson has extensive experience in street-level response and command in a
wide range of emergency incidents, including fires, mass casualty incidents,
and disasters. Chief Benson has been an advocate of integrating training and
operations among multidisciplinary public safety agencies to improve
preparedness, response, and resiliency to the communities served. He has
collaboratively developed and conducted high-risk and disaster response
training with a range of public/private entities. Benson has functioned in all
EOC roles during incidents and large-scale events.
He has earned a Master’s degree in Public Administration, numerous
executive-level emergency service certifications, and designation as a Chief
Fire Officer by the Center for Public Safety Excellence. Chief Benson is an
adjunct instructor at Chicago area universities and colleges in emergency
service operations, emergency management, and cybersecurity.
Competencies include conducting vulnerability and organizational
assessments, performance analysis, program evaluation, benchmarking
systems, and technology integration in operations for process improvements.
He has contributed to textbooks and other professional publications. He
continues to research and contribute best organizational practices on
contemporary preparedness and response challenges. He remains committed
to supporting community preparedness, response, and resiliency through
training, education, exercises to increase capabilities and reduce
vulnerabilities.
Lucien G. Canton, MBA, CEM, CBCP is an independent management

consultant specializing in helping managers lead better in crisis. Mr Canton
served as the Director of Emergency Services for San Francisco and as an
Emergency Management Programs Specialist and Chief of the Hazard
Mitigation Branch for FEMA Region IX. He is the author of Emergency
Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, which is used
as a textbook in many higher education courses.
Mark E. Chambers, NRP (ret), CEEP, CHEC-II is a an internationally

recognized expert with regards to disaster and emergency planning and
operations. Mr Chambers has acted in a management or advisory capacity
for more than 20 countries including the United States. He has been the lead
in the development and implementation of local, state, and federal response
plans and is credited with dozens of successful response operations across
the United States and around the world. He currently leads an international
consulting firm based in the United Arab Emirates.
Stephen Combs, MSEM, SCCEM, MPIO has served as a Public Information

Officer with Anderson County Sheriff’s Office in South Carolina for the past
six years. He has trained at the Master Public Information Officer level
through the Department of Homeland Security’s Emergency Management
Institute. He has been involved in more than 25 emergency management
activations, deployments, and exercises, including the “Flood of the
Century” in October 2015, an elementary school shooting in September 2016,
and the largest mountain wildfire in South Carolina history in November
2016.
He is a South Carolina Certified Emergency Manager (SC CEM), a
Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Basic Training Instructor, a
member of the National Information Officers Association, a member of the
South Carolina Chapter of InfraGard, a member of the Palmetto Alliance of
Public Information Officers, and a member of the South Carolina Emergency
Management Association.
Stephen is an Adjunct Instructor with Texas A&M’s Engineering
Extension Service, where he teaches the Public Information in an All-
hazards Incident course. He has also taught public information courses as a
guest lecturer with Anderson University’s Command College of South
Carolina and is an instructor of public information and warning courses
with the South Carolina Emergency Management’s Training Division.
Stephen is a magna cum laude graduate of Western Carolina University
where he earned a Bachelor of Science Business Administration degree in
Management and was inducted into Beta Gamma Sigma, the international
honor society for Collegiate Schools of Business. Currently, Stephen is
completing a Master of Science degree in Emergency Management through
Lander University.
J. Lawrence Cunningham, MS is a highly experienced security consultant

with 20 years of diverse, supervisory experience in the United States Secret
Service and 26 years as a security consultant. Mr Cunningham founded
Essential Security Strategies, LLC in 1995, which conducts risk assessments,
physical security surveys and provides security training for governments
and private organizations worldwide. Consultancy experience includes the
formulation of tailor-made security plans and the implementation of a wide
range of integrated security protocols with specific emphasis on proactive
security strategy development. Consultancies include Exxon/Mobil, Harvard
University, the International Monetary Fund, NASCAR, the Bush/Cheney
Presidential Campaign, Harpo Studios, Michael Jordan Jump, Inc., RLJ
Companies, the American Battle Monuments Commission, George
Washington University, U.S. Airways, Gate Gourmet, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) Army Officer Corps, the UAE royal family and the
Jordanian royal family. Many of these efforts have resulted in the
formulation of institutional security best practices policies. Mr Cunningham
has recently trained the Jordanian military and civilian population in
protection methods for their personnel and critical infrastructure against
chemical threats and contamination. He regularly instructs diverse
emergency responder and academic audiences worldwide, addressing
evolving active shooter and related terrorist threats. He is also a sought-after
premises liability expert addressing corporate security lapses lawsuits.
Mr Cunningham is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) certified
instructor and lead subject matter expert (2005–present) for The National
Center for Biomedical Research & Training—Academy of Counter-Terrorist
Education (NCBRT-ACE) at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, LA.
He serves as course developer, course evaluator and lead instructor in the
following seminars: Executive Seminar: Prevention of, Response to and
Recovery from Campus Emergencies, Prevention & Deterrence of Terrorist
Acts, Critical Thinking and Analytic Methods, Site Protection and
Observation Techniques, Fundamentals of Criminal Intelligence, Creative
Thinking and Intelligence Analytic Methods, Practical Intelligence Writing
and Briefing, Terrorist Threat Guidelines, Chemical Weapons Collective
Protection Measures, Fraudulent Documents and The Instructor Development
Workshop. These courses are presented to military and responder audiences
across the globe.
During Mr Cunningham’s Secret Service tenure (1974–94), he was
assigned to numerous divisions where he developed new initiatives resulting
in policy changes affecting the investigative and protective arms of the
agency. While assigned to the White House Presidential Protective Division
(1982–7), Mr Cunningham performed supervisory roles, mentored newly
assigned protective agents, and conducted numerous lead security advances
to protect the president of the United States and associated officials
attending officially sanctioned domestic and international events. As the
Agent in Charge of the Secret Service field office in San Jose, California
(1987–94), Mr Cunningham supervised the security arrangements for official
visits of world leaders including US presidents, Pope John Paul II, President
Mikhail Gorbachev and other heads of state to the Silicon Valley and the
Monterey Peninsula. Investigative achievements included the development
of precedent-setting cyber-crime and “high-tech” criminal cases resulting in
updated federal criminal statutes.
An accomplished athlete, Mr Cunningham has completed more than 50
marathons and numerous Ironman triathlon events.
Randall C. Duncan, MPA, CEM (ret) represented local governments as an

emergency manager for 28 years in Kansas and Oklahoma. He retired as
Emergency Management Director for Wichita/Sedgwick County (Kansas).
Currently, he is the Deputy Director of Training for Paradigm Liaison
Services, where he assists in designing and supervising a cadre of contract
instructors delivering training to local emergency responders and
government officials in the field of pipeline safety. During his local
government career, he was administered a “baker’s dozen” of presidential
declarations of major disaster and emergency. In 2000, Duncan was the first
local government emergency manager to accompany FEMA/Emergency
Management Institute officials on a World Bank sponsored program to the
Republic of Turkey to provide assistance to Istanbul Technical University in
setting up a center of excellence for emergency management. In September
2001, Duncan provided support to New York City Fire Department (FDNY)
at the World Trade Center in conjunction with the U.S. Department of
Justice. Duncan also participated in the Classified Biological Warfare
Improved Response Program in conjunction with the U. S. Army Soldier
Biological and Defense Command (SBC Com) at Aberdeen Proving Grounds
in Maryland. In 2012, Duncan provided assistance to the State of New York
Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) in their
response to Superstorm Sandy. Duncan earned a Master’s in public affairs
with an emphasis on disasters and emergency management from Park
University and a Bachelor of Arts in political science from Southwestern
College. He has served as an Adjunct Instructor at the Emergency
Management Institute, Emmitsburg, Maryland, the Hauptmann School of
Public Affairs at Park University, and the Butler County (Kansas)
Community College.
Alexander Feil was born and raised in Los Angeles, California, and earned
his bachelor’s degree in Psychology from Fordham University in New York.
While attending Fordham, Alex was a member of the US Army ROTC and
accepted to the FDD in 2006, an Anti-Terrorism fellowship during which he
traveled to Washington, DC and Israel for enhanced education. After
graduating from Fordham University, Alex spent a year employed as a safari
guide stationed in East Africa, hosting clients from around the world. After
returning stateside, he joined the Marine Corps serving in Afghanistan as an
intelligence officer and Scout Sniper Platoon Commander. Alex transitioned
to the private sector serving as the Intelligence Manager for the executive
protection firm based in Los Angeles. He was then recruited to assist in
establishing an intelligence analysis center for a Los Angeles-based non-
profit organization, providing intelligence and security consultation to the
local community. In 2016, Alex established his first company, Sourced
Intelligence, a private-sector intelligence firm, and in 2018, he cofounded
EasySet a software platform designed to efficiently conduct physical security
assessment reports. He currently lives in California.
Ron Hain, Sheriff, served in law enforcement for over 22 years and has been
credited with hundreds of major criminal arrests. He is a nationally
recognized expert in interstate criminal and terrorist interdiction, having
worked in varying capacities, including narcotics officer, canine handler,
SWAT team leader, and developed, implemented, and supervised the
Sheriff’s Office Criminal Interdiction Team.
Hain has received five meritorious service awards and two Deputy of the
Year awards for several successful major criminal investigations. He was
also twice nominated for the Kane County Officer of the Year Award and
has received the nationally presented “Relentless Award” in 2013 for his
work in criminal interdiction. In his career, Hain has seized over 4,000 lbs. of
dangerous drugs and over $3,000,000 in illicit currency, along with hundreds
of illegally possessed firearms associated with those crimes.
Hain was elected as Kane County Sheriff in November of 2018 and his
team immediately implemented employment diversion programs into the
jail, along with medically assisted treatment to support and redirect inmates
with drug addiction issues. Sheriff Hain’s focus is to take a zero-tolerance
approach to street crime while providing positive life paths for incarcerated
Kane County residents in an effort to drive down recidivism and crime rates.
Richard J. Hughbank, DM is a retired U.S. Army Military Police officer

with over 21 years of experience and is a combat veteran in the War on
Terror. During his time as a Military Police officer, he served on multiple
planning, training, and operations staffs. Additionally, Richard served as a
MP Commanding Officer, Provost Marshal, and Antiterrorism/Force
Protection officer in locations around the world. Currently, Richard is a
Senior Military Operations Analyst at the Joint Forces Component
Command – Integrated Missile Defense, focusing on the Homeland Defense
mission in conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency. Previously, he was
an Associate Professor of Homeland Security Studies at various universities.
He has a Master’s degree in Business and Organizational Security
Management, a Master’s degree in Counseling Education, a Graduate
Certificate in Terrorism Studies, and a Doctorate in Homeland Security and
Management. Richard is a certified Conventional Physical Security
Specialist, Special Reactions Team operator, and Hostage/Crisis Management
Specialist. He has conducted vulnerability assessments in numerous
countries during peace and wartime activities. Richard has authored over 75
research articles, book chapters, and a book in the fields of terrorism,
counterterrorism, security, homeland security, leadership, psychology, and
other related topics.
Robert D. Hughbank, PsyD is a professor in the Political Science

department at the University of Maryland Global Campus. He earned a
Doctor of Psychology in Criminology and Justice Studies, and he has a
Master of Arts in Homeland Security. Bob was an Intelligence Analyst in the
Army, and a veteran of the Vietnam War, with over 25 years’ experience in
law enforcement. He has published peer-reviewed articles and a book
chapter in the fields of security, psychology, terrorism, and homeland
security.
Patrick J. Jessee, MS, MSc, MPPA, CCEMT-P, WEMT, AFO is a
Lieutenant/EMT with the Chicago Fire Department where he currently
serves as part of the Division of Special Operations, Hazardous Incident
Team. With over 20 years of operational experience, he has been an active
member of emergency medical services, fire suppression and rescue, special
operations, training, and headquarters staff where he worked on many
projects including the development of General Orders, Standard Operations
Procedures, and the development of the department SharePoint programs.
Jessee holds numerous public safety certifications in emergency
management, fire, EMS, special operations, training, and leadership. He
holds master’s degrees in Public Policy and Administration (Northwestern
University), Threat and Response Management (University of Chicago),
Biology (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign), and undergraduate
degrees in Biology (DePaul University) and Chemistry (Southern Illinois
University at Edwardsville).
Kammie Juzwin, PsyD is a licensed clinical psychologist and holds a

professional certification Diplomate in Police and Public Safety Personnel
(SPCP), specializing in the treatment of trauma, forensic trauma, police and
public safety personnel psychology. She is the Police Psychologist to the
Bartlett (Illinois) Police Department. Other forensic affiliations include office
wellness, after incident intervention, pre-employment and promotional
psychological evaluation, and forensic pre-employment outcome research.
She also participates as a Mental Health responder and Vice President for
the Northern Illinois Critical Stress Debriefing team; Regional Mental Health
Coordinator for the Illinois Medical Emergency Response Team (IMERT)
and is a federal level disaster mental responder on the Victim Information
Center team on the DMORT-VIC. Juzwin has taught for the Chicago FBI
Crisis and Hostage Negotiation class, and consulted to law enforcement in
wellness and officer and citizen crisis situations. She serves on the ethics
committee for the IACP-Police Psychologist Section, and the Diplomate
committee for the Society for Police and Criminal Psychology.
Dr Juzwin previously held the consultant Director of the Self-Injury
Recovery Services Program at Alexian Brothers Behavioral Health Hospital,
and has a clinical practice specializing in the treatment of high-risk patients
presenting complex trauma, self-injury, and disordered eating. She provided
program development for specialty treatment units, supervision and training
to hospital staff and students, as well as to professional and community
audiences. Dr Juzwin is the author of two books on self-injury written for
clinicians working with patients and families of those who self-injure, and
co-authored and contributed to other publications on these topics. She held
an academic position as full professor at Argosy University/ISPP-
Schaumburg, teaching in the area of assessment, ethics and the law, suicide,
self-injury, eating disorder, trauma, forensic trauma, and police psychology.
Clinical areas of interest lie in the areas of identification and treatment of
high-risk patients (NSSI, ED, trauma, and suicide). She has published in both
clinical and disaster management areas.
Stephen Krill, Jr., MS, PMP is equal parts engineer and businessman
executive, with experience including corporate growth, business operations,
and talent management for small and large federal contractors. He possesses
core expertise in organizational strategy, IT and systems engineering, and
program management. Krill is a frequent speaker at international
conferences and a contributing author to textbooks and standards on crisis
management, cyber security, and disaster response. He earned a BS degree in
nuclear engineering from the University of Cincinnati, an MS degree in
environmental engineering from Johns Hopkins, and an MBA graduate
certificate from Virginia Tech. Stephen is additionally certified in Project
Management, Business Continuity, and Emergency Management—and holds
two US patents.
Christine B. Petitti, MPH recently retired from the Department of Health

and Human Services as the Chief of Safety. In this position she provided
policy, oversight, guidance, and consultation services to the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) operating divisions and staff divisions for
matters related to occupational safety and response safety. Petitti was the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and Safety
Officer for National Disaster Medical System responding to multiple
declared and undeclared disasters. She is a Certified Safety Professional and
has served as the Emergency Management Group Safety Officer for multiple
National Special events. Petitti received her Bachelor’s in Chemistry from
Purdue University and her Master’s in Public Health is from Benedictine
University. She came to HHS from the Department of Labor/OSHA/Office of
Emergency Management and Preparedness. During her 13 years with Labor
she served as a technical specialist at the National Office for their Continuity
program, disaster response and guidance and policy documents, as a Senior
Trainer at their training institute, as the Region V Emergency Response
Coordinator and Safety Officer and as an OSHA compliance officer. During
this tenure she travelled to many active disaster sites and worked with
multiple agencies throughout those responses. Christine served as the
volunteer Safety Officer for the Emergency Management Agency in her
previous area of Chicago. She is a certified FEMA ICS instructor.
Editors’ Note: During the assembly of our manuscript, our friend and
colleague, Christine, passed away after a courageous fight against cancer.
Please see Chapter 20 for more information on Christine’s enduring legacy.
Derek Rowan, the President of Ascenttra, brings a unique and extensive

operational knowledge of all levels of government, the first response
community, healthcare industries, private-sector organizations, the US
intelligence community, continuity of operations, adult education, and
training. He was an active volunteer firefighter in Fairfax County Virginia
for over 25 years, a certified fire department officer for over 20 years and a
rescue specialist with FEMA’s Virginia Task Force 1 and the United States’
International Search and Rescue USAR Team 1 for almost a decade. Rowan
has responded to large-scale disasters around the US including Hurricane
Fran, Hurricane Andrew, Northridge earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, the
bombing in Oklahoma City, and the attacks of 9/11, holding a variety of
tactical, command, and strategic positions. Rowan and his team have
developed hundreds of exercises for all levels of government and the private
sector throughout the world, encompassing every imaginable scenario from
small focused senior leader tabletops to complex around the globe.
Thomas D. Schneid, JD, LLM, PhD is the Chair of the Department of Safety
and Security and a tenured professor in the School of Safety, Security and
Emergency Management in the College of Justice and Safety at Eastern
Kentucky University. Schneid has worked in the safety, human resource, and
legal fields and has represented numerous corporations and individuals in
OSHA and labor/employment related litigations throughout the United
States. He has earned a BS in education, MS and CAS in safety, and Juris
Doctor (JD in law) from West Virginia University, an LLM (Graduate Labor
and Employment Law) from the University of San Diego, an MS in
International Business and a PhD in Environmental Engineering. Schneid is
a member of the bar for the U.S. Supreme Court, 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals and a number of federal districts as well as the Kentucky and West
Virginia Bar. He has authored and/or co-authored numerous texts, including:
Workplace Safety and Health: Assessing Current Practices and Promoting
Change in the Profession (2014); Corporate Safety Compliance: Law, OSHA
and Ethics (2008); Labor and Employment Issues for the Safety Professional
(2011); Americans With Disabilities Act: A Compliance Guide (1994); ADA: A
Manager’s Guide (1993); Legal Liabilities for Safety and Loss Prevention
Professionals (2010); Fire and Emergency Law Casebook (1996); Creative
Safety Solutions (1998); Occupational Health Guide to Violence in the
Workplace (1999); Legal Liabilities in Emergency Management (2001); and
Fire Law (1995). He has also co-authored several texts including Food Safety
Law (1997), Legal Liabilities for Safety and Loss Prevention Professionals
(1997), Physical Hazards in the Workplace (2001), and Disaster Management
and Preparedness (2000), as well as over 100 articles on safety and legal
topics.
Lars Skinner, Col (ret) served 29 years on active duty in the Marine Corps
and in the Army Reserve, retiring at the rank of Colonel in 2020. He served
as an AH-1W pilot in the Marines, and in Civil Affairs, CBRNE, Joint
Planning, and Medical Operations assignments in the Army, with
deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Horn of Africa. As a civilian he has
served on multiple response teams, including regional hazmat,
counterterrorism, and FEMA USAR teams. He has worked as an instructor
for DHS on terrorism/security issues, and for the army as an instructor for
Tech Escort Unit CBRNE Sensitive Site Exploitation teams and National
Guard WMD-CST units.
Nicholas Staikos, AIA, principal of Staikos Associates Architects has over 35

years of experience in the design of technologically complex projects,
including mission critical facilities for emergency management serving
government and industry. Under his leadership, Staikos Associates
Architects has completed numerous mission critical facilities development
projects for all levels of government. The firm has guided the development of
EOC design projects beginning with assessment of needs, criteria evaluation,
architectural programming, and design through to technology deployment
and occupancy. Their projects have been recognized for their operational
effectiveness and have received regional and national design awards as well
as international recognition. Additionally, the firm’s work at the
Montgomery County (Maryland) Emergency Communications Center and
the state of Delaware’s Emergency Operations Center were among the first,
if not the first, such centers to integrate emergency management,
transportation management and public safety on a physical as well as
functional level. The firm’s market segments include public safety and
transportation management for projects such as 9-1-1 call centers, fusion
centers, and transportation management centers. Staikos has authored
articles on integrating security into computer facilities design and site
planning.
Shane Stovall, CEM serves as the Director of Emergency Services for
Western Carolina University. Stovall has served over 25 years in the
Emergency Management field, both in the public sector and private sector.
This includes serving as the Director of Emergency Management for the City
of Plano, Texas and in various positions at the Charlotte County Office of
Emergency Management in Punta Gorda, Florida. Stovall graduated in
December 1995 from the University of North Texas with a Bachelor’s degree
in Emergency Administration and Planning. In addition to his education,
Stovall holds his certification as a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) from
the International Association of Emergency Managers. Stovall is an active
member of the emergency management community, and has served in many
local, regional, and national roles promoting emergency management
programs. Stovall has performed in various capacities in large-scale
emergencies and disasters throughout his career. He has developed Master’s
level courses on Terrorism, Emergency Management, Homeland Security
and Cyber Security, and Emergency Management Administration for several
universities.
David Stumbo, EdD, CSP, OHST has worked in occupational safety and
health for over 20 years with service in various positions within the
Kentucky OSH Program. He now serves as Associate Professor in Eastern
Kentucky University’s Department of Safety, Security, and Emergency
Management.
From the Editors
This text is the compilation of the works and observations of over 20 subject
matter expert contributors, each with more than 20 years of experience in
the emergency management/emergency services fields. Accordingly, each
brings to the text related but unique perspectives. In such a project, there are
a couple of roads to follow. One such road is that of consensus, meaning an
effort is made to bring the entire contributor team to the point of consensus
on each chapter’s structure and message. The other road is to enable each
contributor to express the opinions and observations of the respective
author, the caveat being that contributors are required to distinguish
whenever possible ‘facts from opinions”. Facts are, in most cases, expected to
be supported by sources and references. In this endeavor, we, the editors,
chose to encourage contributors to feel free to express their respective views
and opinions while supplying sources and references for the remainder of
their content. This road, we think, provides the reader with multiple
perspectives and observations based on the contributors’ expertise and
experiences. We leave it to the reader and educator to interpret these
opinions and observations within the context of your experience and
circumstance.
Rick, Howard, and Mike
Module One
Introduction and History of
Emergency Management
Chapter 1
Introduction: Why Is This Book
Important to You? What’s in It for Me?
Michael J. Fagel and Shane Stovall
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-2
Emergency Management has emerged as a profession with its practitioners

playing essential roles in addressing the myriad of hazards threatening
communities (Crews, 1999; Cwiak et al., 2017) to develop more prepared and
resilient communities (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007).
In contrast to traditional emergency services responders, e.g., firefighters,
law enforcement officers, and emergency medical technicians who save
lives, Emergency Managers “save communities” (S. Phelps, personal
communication, January 9, 2012).
Emergency responders think tactically while Emergency Managers must
understand the tactics but think and perform at the operational and strategic
levels. Emergency Managers must not only understand emergency services
and health services capabilities and capacities, they must also understand
culture, politics, economics, infrastructure, geography, topography, and
environment of their respective jurisdiction. Emergency Managers must take
a holistic approach in their thinking of systems within their respective
organization, community, state, or nation. They focus on hazard mitigation
to prevent or reduce the impacts of disasters, disaster preparedness including
emergency planning and training, disaster response operations, and disaster
recovery operations to restore basic services within the community
(Murphy, 2018; Waugh & Sadiq, 2011).
Whether you are a student looking to get into the profession of
Emergency Management or are a seasoned veteran in Emergency
Management that is either continuing his or her education or just reading up
on the latest and greatest information in the field, there is no doubt that we
live in a time where natural, human-made, and technical disasters are
prevalent. There has been no time where the job of an Emergency Manager
has been more important than the present. Planning, training, education and
exercises (PTEE) dealing with all-hazards prevention/mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery are critical in ensuring the resilience of
our communities and organizations.
As we have seen over the last few decades, human-made, natural, and
technological disasters have become increasingly visible in media coverage,
as well as in our personal lives. At the time of the publication of this book,
COVID-19 has presented unique challenges to emergency management,
medical care facilities, law enforcement, public health, and numerous other
crisis-related stakeholders. During this same time, we have seen increased
social unrest inflamed by social and political issues that have arisen.
Additionally, we have seen disasters repeatedly take their toll on our
communities. Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3 provide examples of major
natural, human-made, and technological disasters that have occurred since
2015 in the United States (this list is not all-inclusive).
Image 1.1 Signs of the Times: The Pandemic
Source: Image and Copyright Rick C. Mathews 2020
The following table (Table 1.2) shows some of the human-made incidents
that have occurred between January 2015 and August 2020.
The following table (Table 1.3) provides a list of major technological
disasters that have occurred between January 2015 and December 2017.
One must take into account that the previous tables only cover 2015–20!
These tables do not take into account some of the most influential disasters
in most recent history as they relate to Emergency Management. Those
disasters include Hurricane Andrew (1992), the Oklahoma City bombing
(1995), the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina (2005),
the Deep-Water Horizon oil spill (2010), and Hurricane Sandy (2012).
The list of events can take up the entire book, we have chosen to show
some from each category in the United States, while there are numerous
events worldwide that continue to make banner headlines.
Do not forget the Tokyo subway attack with sarin liquid in March of 2005
that killed over a dozen people and injured thousands.
The Oklahoma City bombing, on April 19, 1995 that killed over 169 people
at the moment of the attack, and many more have succumbed to their
injuries. Fagel and Mathews (authors in this text) both responded to this
horrific event in 1995 that changed the trajectory of our careers.
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 was also an event
that many people think was the first terrorist act in the US, but it was not.
Just looking at the website fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/, you will see links
to Amerithrax Investigation, Anthrax in 2001.
Table 1.1 Natural Disasters (January 2015 – August 2020)
Natural Disasters (January 2015 – August 2020)
Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

Year Location
Type Injuries

Year Location
Type Injuries
San Antonio,
TX and other
2020 Hail $1.2 billion in damages
parts of South
Texas
Texas, Illinois,
$1.3 billion in damages;
2020 Hail, tornadoes North
2 deaths
Carolina
Kansas,
Missouri,
Arkansas,
$1.7billion in damages; 2
2020 High winds; hail Alabama,
deaths
Tennessee,
South
Carolina
Southeastern
Tornado outbreak $3 billion in damages; 35
2020 and Eastern
(140 tornadoes) deaths
United States
Tennessee,
Alabama,
Tornado outbreak/ $2 billion in damages; 25
2020 Mississippi,
hail/high wind deaths
Kentucky,
Missouri
Tornado outbreak Southeastern
2020 (80 tornadoes)/high and Northern
10 deaths
winds United States

Year Location
Type Injuries
Some argue that this

could not be a naturally
formed hazard, but that
2019– COVID-19;
Pandemic has not been
2020 Nationwide
substantiated yet at the
time of the writing of
this book.
California and $4.5 billion in damages;
2019 Wildfires
Alaska 3 deaths
Tornado Texas and
$1.7 billion in damage; 2
2019 outbreak/hail/high Central
deaths
winds United States
Tropical storm Texas Gulf $5.1 billion in damages;
2019
imelda Coast 5 deaths
North $1.6 billion in damages;
2019 Hurricane dorian
Carolina 10 deaths
Mississippi
River,
2019 Flooding Midwest and
4 deaths
Southern
United States
Arkansas $3.1 billion in damages;
2019 Flooding
River 5 deaths
Rocky
Mountains,
Tornado outbreak $4.5 billion in damage; 3
2019 Central and
(190 tornadoes) deaths
Northeastern
United States

Year Location
Type Injuries
Texas,
Louisiana,
Mississippi,
Tornado outbreak Alabama,
2019 (50 tornadoes)/high Georgia,
7 deaths
winds North
Carolina,
Ohio,
Pennsylvania
Midwestern >1 million acres in
2019 Flooding
U.S. agricultural land
flooded; 3 deaths
California,
2018 Wildfires Western
106 deaths
United States
Southern
2018 Drought Plains of $3.1 billion in damages
United States
Mexico Beach, $25.5 billion in damages;
2018 Hurricane michael
Florida 49 deaths
North
Carolina, $24.5 billion in damages;
2018 Hurricane florence
South 53 deaths
Carolina
2018 Hail Colorado $2.3 billion in damages

Year Location
Type Injuries

2018 Hail Texas to homes, businesses,
and vehicles
Central,
Derecho Eastern, and $1.4 billion in damages;
2018
event/high winds Northeastern 5 deaths
United States
Southeastern
Tornado outbreak $1.4 billion in damages;
2018 and Eastern
(70 tornadoes) 3 deaths
United States
Northeastern $2.3 billion in damages;
2018 Winter storm
United States 9 deaths
Central and
2018 Winter storm Eastern
22 deaths
United States
hundreds of homes
2017 Wildfires California
destroyed in Los
Angeles; 54 deaths
Puerto Rico,
2017 Hurricane maria U.S. Virgin
2,981 deaths
Islands
Hurricane $77.16 billion in
2017 Florida
irma/flooding damages; 97 deaths
Hurricane Texas, $125 billion in damages;
2017
harvey/flooding Louisiana 89 deaths

Year Location
Type Injuries
Minnesota,
2017 Hail $2.5 billion in damages
Wisconsin
Missouri,
$1.8 billion in damage;
2017 Flooding Arkansas,
20 deaths
Illinois
Central and
Tornado outbreak $1.9 billion in damages;
2017 Southeastern
(70 tornadoes) 6 deaths
United States
$1.6 billion in damage; 5
2017 Flooding California
deaths
California,
Alabama,
Florida,
Tornado outbreak Georgia,
$1.2 billion in damages /
2017 (79 tornadoes)/high Louisiana,
24 deaths
winds Mississippi,
South
Carolina,
Texas
Western and $2.6 billion in damages;
2016 Wildfires Southern 2,500 structures
United States destroyed; 21 deaths
2016 Drought California $3.8 billion in damages
North
Hurricane Carolina, $10.9 billion in damages;
2016
matthew Georgia, 49 deaths
Florida

Year Location
Type Injuries

2016 Flooding Louisiana
13 deaths
Wes Virginia
2016 Flooding/tornadoes and Ohio
23 deaths
Valley
Flooding (Tax Day 1,144 homes and
2016 Houston, TX
Flood) apartments flooded; 8
fatalities
Western
2015 Drought $5 billion in damages
United States
Texas and
Tornadoes and $2.2 billion in damages;
2015 Midwest
flooding 50 deaths
United States
Western
2015 Wildfire United States
12 deaths
and Alaska
South $2.2 billion in damages;
2015 Flooding
Carolina 25 deaths
Flooding
$460 million in
2015 (Memorial Day Houston, TX
damages; 7 deaths
Flood)
Central and
Ice storm/blizzard/ $3.3 billion in damages;
2015 Eastern
cold wave 30 deaths
United States
Source: Table provided by Shane Stovall
Note: Data from (NSDS, 2020)

Table 1.2 Table 1.2 Human-made Incidents with 10 or more casualties from
January 2015 to August 2020
Man-Made Incidents with 10 or More Casualties (January 2015 –

August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Incident Type Injuries
Riots occurred nationwide in

multiple large cities in 23 dead* (at
response to the death of the writing
George Floyd, an African- of this book,
American man in civil unrest
2020 Riots/civil unrest
Minneapolis, MN, while is still
being arrested by occurring in
Minneapolis police. Protestors some
and police clashed for several locations)
days.
Mohamed Saeed Alshamrani 4 dead
Active shooter/ opened fire in a training (including
2019
terrorism classroom at the U.S. Naval assailant); 8
base in Pensacola, FL injured
Seth Ator began shooting at
law enforcement officers in
Midland, Texas. He fled the
scene and continued shooting
at people. He hijacked a US
7 dead, 21
2019 Active shooter Postal Service truck and killed
injured
the mail carrier. He drove
toward Odessa, Texas and
continued shooting people
until he was killed by law
enforcement.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Connor Betts entered the

Oregon Historic District in
Dayton, OH wearing a mask, 7 dead; 21
2019 Active shooter
body armor, and hearing injured
protection and began
shooting people.
Patrick Crusius entered a
Active Walmart store in El Paso,
23 dead; 22
2019 shooter/domestic Texas and began shooting. He
injured
terrorism was anti-Hispanic. Crusius
was apprehended by the FBI.
Santino Logan, wearing body
armor and carrying a rifle, 3 dead; 17
2019 Active shooter
began shooting at the Gilroy injured
Garlic Festival in Gilroy, CA.
13 dead
DeWayne Craddock began
(including
shooting at the Virginia
2019 Active shooter the
Beach Municipal Center in
assailant); 4
Virginia Beach, VA.
injured
Gary Martin reentered the
6 dead
Henry Pratt Company
(including
manufacturing facility
2019 Active shooter the
warehouse in Aurora, IL and
assailant); 6
began shooting during his
wounded
termination meeting.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Ian Long began shooting at

13 dead
the Borderline Bar and Grill
(including
2018 Active shooter in Thousand Oaks, CA. He
assailant);
used smoke grenades during
16 wounded
his attack.
Robert Bowers opened fire in
the Tree of Life Synagogue in
Active
Pittsburg, PA. Suspect 11 dead; 6
2018 shooter/somestic
apprehended after exchanging wounded
terrorism
gunfire with law
enforcement.
David Katz lost a video game
3 dead
tournament, went to his car
(including
2018 Active shooter to retrieve weapons, and
assailant);
returned to the bar and began
11 wounded
shooting.
Dimitrios Pagourtzis began
shooting classmates and
teachers at Santa Fe High
School in Santa Fe, Texas.
10 dead; 12
2018 Active shooter Shooter attempted to deploy
wounded
IEDs, but they failed to
detonate. Shooter was
apprehended by law
enforcement.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Man driving stake into a

459,123
wasp nest caused a spark that
acres
started one of two fires that
burned; 280
developed into the
2018 Wildfire buildings
Mendocino Complex wildfire
destroyed; 1
in Northern California. Cause
death; 4
of second fire that made up
injuries
complex is unknown.
Nikolas Cruz began shooting
students and teachers at
Marjory Stoneman Douglas
High School in Parkland,
Florida. Cruz blended in with 17 dead; 17
2018 Active shooter
other students and evacuated wounded
with them. He was later
apprehended by law
enforcement at another
location.
Gabriel Parker began
shooting classmates at
Marshall County High School 2 dead; 21
2018 Active shooter
in Benton, KY. He was later wounded
apprehended by law
enforcement.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Kevin Neal began shooting at

his neighbors in Rancho
Tehama Reserve in Tehama
County, CA. After killing 3
neighbors, he stole a car and
began shooting at vehicles
and pedestrians. He drove to
an elementary school where 5 dead; 14
2017 Active shooter
he was prevented from wounded
entering. He fired into the
doors and windows of the
school, injuring 5 children.
Law enforcement pursued
him and shot him. He
committed suicide after being
shot by law enforcement.
Devin Kelly began shooting
outside the First Baptist
Church in Sutherland Springs,
Texas. He then went inside
and began shooting at the
26 dead; 20
2017 Active shooter congregation. He fled the
wounded
scene after being shot by a
citizen when leaving the
church. The shooter
committed suicide after being
pursued by the citizen.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Stephen Paddock, from his

58 dead; 489
hotel room, began shooting
wounded
into a crowd of people
(many
attending the Route 91
others
2017 Active shooter Harvest Festival in Las Vegas,
sustained
NV. He committed suicide
injuries
before law enforcement
incidental to
arrived at his room in the
the event)
hotel.
A child playing with burners
on a stove started a fire at an 13 dead; 14
2017 Structure fire
apartment complex in the injured
Bronx in New York City.
Esteban Santiago-Ruiz began
shooting in the Terminal 2
baggage area of the Fort
Lauderdale-Hollywood
5 dead; 8
2017 Active shooter International Airport in Fort
wounded
Lauderdale, FL. When the
shooter ran out of ammo, he
surrendered to law
enforcement.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
A pickup truck was rammed

into pedestrians near the
World Trade Center in New
York. An Islamic flag and a
note stating “Islamic State 8 dead; 11
2017 Terrorism
lives forever” in Arabic was wounded
found near the truck. The
attacker was self-radicalized
to the beliefs of the Islamic
State.
5 dead (law
Micah Johnson began
enforcement
shooting at police during a
officers); 11
Black Lives Matter protest in
wounded
2016 Active shooter Dallas, Texas. Johnson held a
(including 9
sniper position and shot at
law
officers. Johnson was killed
enforcement
by a bomb-carrying robot.
officers)
Omar Mateen entered the
Pulse Nightclub in Orlando,
50 dead
Florida and began shooting.
(including
2016 Active shooter The shooter was killed when
assailant);
law enforcement breeched the
53 wounded
building and began
exchanging gunfire with him.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
A fire at a converted
warehouse in Oakland, CA.
Although cause is unknown,
2016 Structure fire there were previous reports of 36 deaths
pallet stairways, faulty
electrical systems, and other
extreme fire hazards.
Riots broke out as a result of
the shooting death of Sylville
Smith in Milwaukee, WI
1 dead, 10
2016 Riots/civil unrest while being chased by police.
injuries
The officer was charged, but
acquitted. Numerous other
arrests took place.
Cedric Ford began shooting
from his vehicle in Newton,
KS and wounded one
4 dead
person.He travelled about two
(including
2016 Active shooter miles and wounded another.
assailant);
He then travelled to his place
14 wounded
of employment and opened
fire. Shooter was killed by
law enforcement.
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Syed Farook and Tashfeen

Malik began shooting in the
parking lot of the Inland
Regional Center in San
16 dead
Bernardino, CA. Then went
(including
2015 Active shooter inside the building and began
assailants);
shooting coworkers of one of
22 wounded
the shooters. The shooters
fled the scene and were killed
by law enforcement a few
hours later.
Robert Dear began shooting
at a Planned Parenthood –
Colorado Springs Westside
Health Center in Colorado 3 dead; 9
2015 Active shooter
Springs, CO. The shooter wounded
eventually surrendered to law
enforcement after exchanging
gunfire.
14 dead, 666
2 teenagers dropped lit
injuries;
matches onto the ground in
17,900 acres
the Great Smoky Mountain
burned;
2015 Wildfire National Park and caused a
2,000
large wildfire that burned
buildings
through Gatlinburg and
damaged or
Pigeon Forge, TN.
destroyed
August 2020)
Man-Made Deaths &

Year Details
Christopher Harper-Mercer
began shooting classmates in
a classroom at Umpqua 10 dead
Community College in (including
2015 Active shooter
Roseburg, OR. The shooter assailant); 7
committed suicide after wounded.
exchanging gunfire with law
enforcement.
John House opened fired on
3 dead
moviegoers in the Grand 16
(including
2015 Active shooter Theater in Lafayette, LA. He
assailant); 9
committed suicide after law
wounded
enforcement arrived.
Dylan Roof began shooting at 9 dead
a prayer service at the **included
Emanuel African Methodist due to the
Episcopal Church in coverage
2015 Active shooter
Charleston, SC. He fled the and
scene and was later magnitude
apprehended by law of the
enforcement. incident
Source: Table provided by Shane Stovall
Note: Data from (FBI 2016; FBI 2018; FBI 2019; FBI 2020)
Image 1.2 Aerial Photograph of Hurricane Sandy Storm Damage at Mantoloking,
New Jersey Coastline
Source: Thompson, 2012
Table 1.3 Technological Hazards and Incidents from January 2015 to December
2017
Technological Hazards and Incidents (January 2015 – December

2017) **No large incidents found in 2015 or 2016 although smaller
incidents occurred
Man-
Made Damages, Deaths,
Year Details
Incident Injuries
Type
incidents occurred
Man-
Year Details
Incident Injuries
Type
Massive inflow from Over 10,000 residents

heavy rains caused the evacuated. Rising
eastern side of the waters due to the breech
Edenville Dam in severely damaged the
Dam Gladwin and Midland village of Sanford. Dow
2020
failures County, Michigan to Chemical’s Midland
overflow. This caused operations were
the downstream Sanford threatened, but no
Dam to fail and serious damage
overflow. occurred.
Major storm caused 1 dead, several
heavy rain, snow melt, structures and roadways
and ice breakage to washed away. Water
Dam cause the Niobrara River pipeline under the
2019
failure to rise. The Spencer Dam riverbed destroyed,
in Nebraska, an earthen which cut off the water
dam, was breached in supply for 2,000 people
two places. in Boyd County.
Faulty construction
caused the partial
Structure collapse of the Hard
2019 3 dead; 18 injured
collapse Rock Hotel in New
Orleans, LA (under
construction).
incidents occurred
Man-
Year Details
Incident Injuries
Type
Faulty design caused a

pedestrian bridge that
Structure was under construction
2018 6 dead, 8 injured
collapse at Florida International
University to collapse
onto the highway below.
Burned 153,336 acres;
Caused by a faulty
destroyed 18,804
electric transmission line
2018 Wildfire buildings; 85 deaths; 17
in Northern California
injuries; 52,000
(Butte County).
evacuated
>2.2 billion in damages;
Caused by downed 281,893 acres burned;
2017–
Wildfire power lines in Southern 1,063 buildings
2018
California. destroyed; 2 deaths; 2
injuries
incidents occurred
Man-
Year Details
Incident Injuries
Type
Heavy rainfall resulted

in flooding that
damaged the main
180,000 people living
spillway and emergency
downstream were
Dam spillway of the Oroville
2017 evacuated. $1.1 billion
failure Dam in Northern
in response and repair
California. 180,000
costs.
people living
downstream were
evacuated.
A contractor working on
replacing a bridge in the
Outer Banks, NC
Utility accidentally severed an
2017 7,000 people affected.
accident electrical cable and
caused a blackout for 8
days in the middle of the
summer.
Explosion at a power
Utility plant in San Fernando 140,000 people affected
2017
failure Valley, CA cut power to for many hours.
over 140,000 persons.
Source: Table provided by Shane Stovall and Michael J. Fagel
Note: Data from (Congressional Research Service, 2019; NASA 2020; NASA, 2018; OSHA,
2020)
Image 1.3 Sarin Attack on Tokyo Subway
Baptist Street Church bombing, Birmingham, Alabama September 15,

1963, killing four young African American girls and injuring more than 20.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT?
Active violence attack at a school, religious facility, mall, or anywhere

else
Major weather event such as a storm
Cyber attack or failure
Bombing
Chemical or biological event
Pandemic
Civil unrest or insurrection
Major transportation attack, accident, or failure
World Trade Center attacks in New York City, the Pentagon, in Metro
Washington, DC, the plane crash in Shanksville, PA, brought down by the
heroic passengers and crew who fought the terrorists on September 11, 2001,
that resulted in over 2,600 deaths at the World Trade Center. There were
over 120 killed at the Pentagon and over 250 people perished on the four
aircraft that were used as weapons during that fateful day on 9/11. At the
time of writing, over 1,000 responders have developed cancer after their
actions at the World Trade Center due to exposure to dust containing
asbestos, crystalline silica, lead, cadmium, polycyclic and aromatic
hydrocarbons (including the co-author of this chapter, Michael Fagel, who
spent 100 days at ground zero).
Let us never forget Rick Rescorla, the head of security for Morgan Stanley
in the South Tower of World Trade Center. Rick saved over 200 lives during
the attack. He began planning for evacuation ever since the 1993 World
Trade Center attack. Rick, a Viet Nam veteran, realized that the WTC
buildings would be targets again (see
https://bethunderwoodbooks.com/2020/09/11/rick-rescorla/).
And here is the key lesson of the entire textbook, we must learn, learn
every single day from history, and be prepared. Rick developed evacuation
plans that are credited with saving thousands of lives that day.
Rick was one of many who gave their lives that day in service to others
above self: 343 firefighters and EMS personnel from FDNY perished, 67
police officers, as well as elevator operators, building managers, and people
who helped others escape the devastation. People like you and all of us
TOGETHER can make a difference. Our co-authors in this book have ALL
made a difference in the daily lives of thousands.
It is now up to you to take up and keep paying it forward by studying

this textbook.
Think of what YOU can do with the knowledge you will gain from this
textbook. YOU can save lives by planning, practicing, educating, and
exercising.
The key elements of the historical events depicted throughout this text are
that we—as emergency planners, emergency managers, public safety
responders—must all be prepared for whatever event occurs. History may be
a guide, but we must always be ever vigilant and prepared for “what’s next.”
Fagel worked the Northern Illinois University Valentine’s day shooting in
2008, where the assailant (I will not mention his name here) killed five
students and injured 15 more.
The list of events and hazards as outlined above can take on many shapes
and sizes. Do not focus your plan on just one element. Plan for multiple
types of natural or human-made events that may occur to your organization,
geographical area, school, facility, or community. Read the text and
continually evaluate your own plans.
After examining the different hazards and the frequency at which any
given hazard can occur, it should not be difficult to realize the importance
and magnitude of the responsibilities relating to a job as an Emergency
Manager. The Emergency Manager must understand how to mitigate these
hazards, prepare their communities or organizations for these hazards,
respond to these hazards, and drive the community and/or organization
from these incidents. Once one begins to add human-made and
technological disasters to the list, the table that has just been examined
grows exponentially larger for just this snapshot in time. Therefore, it is
important for the Emergency Manager to understand his or her job
comprehensively—from the foundation aspects of Emergency Management
to the advanced methodologies used to carry out the roles and
responsibilities of the job. Additionally, it must be recognized that whether
the Emergency Manager is only performing Emergency Management duties,
or is performing Emergency Management, the job cannot be done alone.
Emergency Management requires numerous stakeholders in the federal,
state, regional, local levels in the public, private, non-profit, and volunteer
sectors in order to achieve effectiveness and meet community and
organizational expectations.
In this book, the reader will examine many different foundational and
advanced aspects of Emergency Management and gain an understanding of
how these aspects play a pivotal role in the professional field of Emergency
Management.
Foundational Aspects of the Job

When one is exploring entry into the field of Emergency Management, or
even refreshing knowledge on what is already known about the profession,
it is important to visualize all of the actions needed to get ready for, to
respond to, and to recover from numerous hazards. There are numerous
necessary actions, and the responsibilities are vast. All these roles,
responsibilities, and actions will have a foundational impetus. These driving
forces can be mandates legislatively, operationally, or administratively, or
they can be driven by industry best practices and lessons learned from prior
disasters. However, before one even gets to this point, it is important to
understand the history of the Emergency Management field, to include the
history of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
general methodologies and practices that have been brought forth to assist
state and local governments to build their own Emergency Management
programs. From as early as 1803, when the U.S. Congress passed an act to
assist the city of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the management of large
emergencies and disasters at the federal levels of government have evolved
tremendously (see https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44801/6).
For more than two centuries since the New Hampshire fire, the federal
government has evolved its approach to preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from disasters. Likewise, state and local governments have
developed and maintained their own respective Emergency Management
programs in order to serve their constituents in their communities. Because
every disaster is different, and the needs of citizens are changing, so must
the ways that governments prepare for, respond to and recover from hazards
that adversely affect the communities they serve. Through time, the federal,
state, and local governments have worked more efficiently and effectively in
the management of large emergencies and disasters. New laws, policies,
community social needs, changing economies, politics, lessons learned, and
research have all influenced the field of Emergency Management throughout
history and will continue to do so.
Likewise, more small businesses and large corporations have implemented
business continuity and incident management processes that assist them in
managing emergencies and providing continuous service to their
customerbase following an emergency or disaster. Many laws and
regulations have mandated that certain sectors of business have programs
that address the management of emergencies that could adversely affect not
only the business itself but also the customers (i.e., healthcare, financial
institutions, higher education, transportation providers, utility providers).
The first section of this book will examine the history of the field of
Emergency Management, as well as the laws and regulations that have been
developed through time that drive how Emergency Managers in public and
private sectors develop their Emergency Management and Business
Continuity programs today. Additionally, the first part of this book will
explain how the Emergency Manager must be able to justify the need for an
Emergency Management program. While this may seem obvious,
Emergency Managers must often grapple with the question, “What do you
do when there are no disasters?” The Emergency Manager must be able to
engage decision-makers and Emergency Management stakeholders in order
to gain buy-in for their programs and all the elements it supports. The
Emergency Manager must be able to explain and show the return on
investment to the community leaders. To put it bluntly, the Emergency
Manager must be able to “sell” his or her Emergency Management program
to the community or organizational leaders. Without the support of
decision-makers, whether it be in the public sector or the private sector, it
will be difficult to be able to make progress on any project or initiative
related to Emergency Management. In the end, this will only hurt the
community and customers served by the Emergency Management entity.
The Emergency Manager or Business Continuity Planner must have upper-
level support in his or her efforts.
Image 1.4 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Logo
Source: U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2020
For the Emergency Manager or Business Continuity Planner to be

successful, he or she must have a clear understanding of the foundational
aspects of Emergency Management. In order to establish or maintain an
effective Emergency Management program, it is critical to understand the
legal and historical aspects of why certain things are required. It is also
important to know how to build the case for the Emergency Management
program. This first section of the book will provide the reader with this
valuable information.
Effective Emergency Management Elements—Assessing,

Planning, Training Planning, EOCs
The starting point for any Emergency Management or Business Continuity
program is planning. In almost every case, the development of plans must
involve stakeholders from various areas outside of the Emergency
Management Office. This can include community and/or organizational
departments, private businesses, volunteer agencies, and citizens/customers
at the federal, state, regional, and local levels. No single Emergency Manager
can do it alone. Anyone who thinks that should probably find another
profession. Plans can include:
Emergency Operations Plans

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Community Vulnerability Plans
Continuity of Operations Plans/Business Continuity Plans
Hazard Mitigation Plans
Economic Recovery Plans
Post-Disaster Recovery Plans
Building Emergency Action Plans
Sheltering Plans
Evacuation Plans
Hazard-Specific Plans
Standard Operations Procedures/Standard Operating Guidelines.
Once these plans are complete, the stakeholder must be trained to the
plans, and they must be exercised. Exercising a plan allows the exercise
participants to test procedures and carry out roles and responsibilities in a
simulated environment (before an incident occurs). Conducting these
exercises allow stakeholders to identify where improvements may be needed
in the plan. Improvement Action Plans assign improvements to a person or
agency in order to make sure the improvements are made to the plan and
possibly to a critical process. Without effective planning and training,
exercises and plans are at a very high risk of failure. The second module of
this book will address the various aspects of emergency planning and
exercising.
Image 1.5 Typical Community EOC Depicting Useful Technology
Source: Provided by Michael J. Fagel
Another core element of any Emergency Management program is the

Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC serves as a multiagency
coordination center for a community or organization. This is often done
prior to an event, as well as during training, exercises, and during a large-
scale emergency or disaster. There are multiple ways to structure and
manage an EOC, and the Emergency Manager must be keen on structuring
and managing and EOC in a way that is best for the community or
organization to manage the incident. The Emergency Manager must know
about EOC technologies (i.e., incident management software, resource
tracking, weather monitoring) and how to effectively manage the people and
personalities that could be present in the EOC. This requires both good
leadership and management skills. This requires good operational skills as
well as good skills in dealing with people and building and maintaining
relationships in a high-stress environment. This element will further be
expanded on in the third section of this book.
The second portion of this book will arm the new Emergency Manager, as
well as the veteran Emergency Manager, with information that will help to
layout a programmatic and operational direction for an Emergency
Management program. The elements covered will give the reader
information that can be used to build on the knowledge learned in the first
module of this book.
As mentioned previously, emergencies and disasters require numerous
stakeholders to handle all the functions that need to be addressed (i.e.,
transportation, communications, firefighting, search and rescue, utilities, law
enforcement, health, public information, etc.). Whether it be in the field at
an Incident Command Post, or more likely in an Emergency Operations
Center, it is important that the Emergency Manager understand what skill
sets and expertise each stakeholder brings to the incident. The Emergency
Manager must picture themselves in the role of coordinator of all these
critical resources and sets of expertise.
Additionally, in many larger incidents, Incident Management Teams
(IMTs) may be employed. IMTs can be built locally for further managing
incident response and recovery, or they can be brought in to supplement
local resources that may either be limited or fatigued due to the incident or
possibly even non-existent. The Emergency Manager must understand the
function of the IMTs and how they can be built locally or requested through
mutual aid processes through regional, state, or federal channels. Emergency
Managers also must have a clear understanding of how IMTs integrate into
local response and recovery efforts. The third section of this book will
explain these concepts and give the reader a better understanding of the use
of IMTs and the utilization of the expertise of multiple stakeholders when
managing emergencies and disasters.
The Changing Landscape of Emergency Management
When one thinks about Emergency Management, the public-sector
Emergency Manager is often who comes to mind—that person at the local,
state, or even the federal government managing mainly natural emergencies
and disasters. However, as we have seen, the landscape is ever-changing.
Since even before the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has
had to deal with terrorism. These terrorist attacks led to the development of
the Department of Homeland Security, which became an umbrella agency
for numerous agencies to include FEMA. While terrorism is often viewed
primarily as a law-enforcement function, the Emergency Manager plays a
critical role in planning for a terrorist incident. A single terrorist incident or
a complex coordinated terrorist attack can lead to a cascade of other issues
that the Emergency Manager should have already addressed in their
Emergency Operations Plan (i.e., mass casualty (injuries and fatalities),
search and rescue, fire, hazardous material release, building collapse, utility
damage/failure, evacuation, interoperable communication among
responding agencies, public health, public information). Therefore, the
Emergency Manager needs to understand the different types of terrorist
modes – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive (CBRNE) and
plan for those cascading issues that could occur as a result of a terrorist
attack.
As was alluded to, Emergency Managers do not only work in the public
sector. Emergency Managers work in the private sector, public sector, the
volunteer sector, and in numerous institutions and organizations. In this
book, the authors will provide you with information on Emergency
Management in one of these sectors—the higher education sector.
Institutions of Higher Education (IHE) can be thought of as cities within
themselves. IHEs typically have a governing structure (i.e.,
president/chancellor, vice presidents/vice provost, and numerous non-
academic department directors such as facilities management and police).
However, many do not have all the resources that their neighboring cities or
counties may have. Therefore, partnerships between IHE and surrounding
jurisdictions are typically necessary to effectively handle emergencies and
disasters that can occur on campuses. IHEs have unique challenges due to
the types of populations that they serve and the resources they may or may
not have. For example, if the institution is heavily geared towards specialty
research that may involve laboratories of many types, that adds a distinction
as well. This is just one example of a sector that may have an Emergency
Manager. Many Emergency Managers may have IHEs in the communities
that they serve or with whom they partner. It is important to understand
their resources that can be used to assist the community, as well as the
vulnerabilities that may exist at the respective campus(es).
Image 1.6 Smoke Pours Out of the Pentagon Following a Terrorist Attack on
September 11, 2001
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019
The last section of this book will address some more “non-traditional”
roles that Emergency Management has evolved into over the last couple of
decades. It is important that the Emergency Manager understand that other
Emergency Managers may exist within their community, and those people
can provide important information and resources related to emergency and
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.
Summary
For the Emergency Manager to be effective, he or she must be very familiar
with the history of Emergency Management, the major elements that make
up an Emergency Management program, and what the future looks like for
the profession. Events, emergencies, and disasters will be ever-present in
most organizations or communities. Increasing community and customer
expectations require the Emergency Manager to be knowledgeable about all
facets of how to prevent/mitigate hazards, prepare the community or
organization for those hazards, and how to respond to and recover from
emergencies and disasters that strike. This book provides many principles
and concepts that will allow both the aspiring Emergency Manager to build
a foundation of knowledge that they can carry forward into their career. For
the veteran Emergency Manager, this book provides for a “refresher” of
knowledge that they may have already had but may have forgotten, or
possibly provides new ideas and concepts that can be implemented in their
community, facility, school, or house of worship. We are always learning.
The job of the Emergency Manager is becoming more critical as we
continually witness incidents and events that were unheard of in times past.
That is no longer true! The types of events that have occurred in the last few
decades seem to be progressing at an unparalelled pace (i.e., terrorist attacks
of 9/11, infrastructure failures, cyberterrorism, COVID-19). Pandemics have
occurred in the US since 1918 (see https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/1918-commemoration/1918-pandemic-history.htm). The
information provided herein will help the Emergency Manager to rise to
these ever-changing challenges.
References
Crews, D. (1999). The Case for emergency management as a profession.
Australian Journal of Emergency Management. Retrieved from:
http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUJlEmMgmt/2001/14.pdf
Cwiak, C., Campbell, R., Cassavechia, M., Haynes, C., Lloyd, L., Brockway,
N., Navarini, G., Piatt, B., & Senger, M. (2017). Emergency management
leadership in 2030: Shaping the next generation meta-leader. Journal of
Emergency Management, 15(2), 81–97. doi:10.5055/jem.2017.0317
Murphy, J.H. (2018). A quantitative study of key indicators of effective
emergency management leadership (Order No. 28187456). Available from
ProQuest Dissertations & Theses A&I. (2439371486). Retrieved from:
https://search-proquest-com.libezp.lib.lsu.edu/dissertations-
theses/quantitative-study-key-indicators-effective/docview/2439371486/se-
2?accountid=12154
Thompson, G. (2012). Aerial photograph of Hurricane Sandy storm damage
at Mantoloking, New Jersey coastline. [Photo]. United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, Washington, DC. Retrieved from:
https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/aerial-photograph-hurricane-sandy-
storm-damage-mantoloking-new-jersey-coastline (public domain).
U.S. Department of Defense (2019). Smoke pours out of the Pentagon
following a terrorist attack on Sept. 11, 2001. [Photo]. A 9/11 reflection:
The Pentagon in photos. U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
Retrieved from:
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Features/Story/Article/1939053/a-911-
reflection-the-pentagon-in-photos/
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2020). FEMA logo.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Washington, DC. Retrieved from: https://fema.gov
Waugh, W.L., Jr., & Sadiq, A. (2011). Professional education for emergency
managers. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 8,
1–7. doi: 10.2202/1547–7355.1891
Chapter 2
The Evolution of Federal Emergency

Management and Planning Guidance:
Changes since 9/11 and Katrina
Lars Skinner
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-3
Introduction
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) conduct emergency management based on an
existing doctrine that largely originates at the federal level. Likewise, planning for
mitigation, response, and recovery is strongly influenced by the federal government’s
planning guidance. So both EOC staff and responders in the field must have a solid
understanding of current federal emergency management and planning doctrine. Yet
trying to discern current guidance can be a difficult task, both because old
publications are still easy to find. New ones do not always make clear what they are
superseding or what has changed from previous editions.
Many of the complex, intractable problems emergency managers face today are
ones that can be difficult to anticipate/plan for definitively, and/or for which there
are no “solutions” in the sense of objective answers that do not themselves result in
additional problems (see “wicked problems” in Rittel & Webber, 1973). Trying to
parse the current guidance on emergency planning and management can also be
rather difficult. This chapter considers the myriad of federal publications that provide
the foundation of doctrine, how and to a degree why guidance has changed, and the
current state-of-art. It seeks to clarify federal emergency management (EM)-related
legislation and published guidance over the last 25-plus years. The rationale for why
the new Federal EM doctrine replaced previous legislation and publications and how
the succeeding guidance differs from what it replaced can be confusing, presenting a
challenge to anyone working in the emergency management field.
The publications reviewed in this chapter mostly begin during the Clinton
administration. But it is worth mentioning that for most of the Cold War period
(1947–91), before the Carter and Reagan administrations, emergency management
guidance from the federal level was civil defense-related and concerned with
responding to/mitigating a nuclear attack. The focus and much of the funding was at
the state and local level. During the Carter administration (1978–9), FEMA came into
existence, and both the Carter and Reagan presidencies saw increased federal
funding for state and local emergency management activities.
Image 2.1 Fallout Protection Guidebook
Source: Image by Rick C. Mathews 2020

Image 2.2 ODP Emergency Responder Guidelines
Following the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, the Tokyo sarin attack, and
the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, much of the national focus shifted to terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The Nunn–Lugar–Domenici (NLD) Act
was passed in 1996 and provided authorities and funding for many new programs
related to countering WMDs (cWMD). The Act included provisions for domestic
preparedness, interdiction, control, and disposition of WMDs and related materials
and coordination of policy and countermeasures against WMDs’ proliferation (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1996).
Another milestone in federal guidance/focus was creating the Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP) in 1998, an outcome from the NLD Act. ODP was first
established in the Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop/implement a national
program to enhance state and local government capabilities to prepare for/respond to
incidents of WMD-related terrorism. In 2003 the ODP moved to the newly created
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its mission changed as well, broadening to
include primary responsibility to build and sustain the nation’s preparedness, reduce
vulnerabilities, prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism (per Sec. 430,
Homeland Security Act of 2002).
This was the beginning of some confusion and conflicting guidance on emergency
management doctrine and priorities, as ODP was focused on terrorism, and FEMA
remained concerned with natural disasters. Yet both were involved with emergency
management and issued guidance on the same. Mitigation funding also moved
increasingly to dealing with terrorism, leaving natural disasters to take a lower
priority (even though they happen in the US in multiple locations every year)
(Borenstein and Young, 2005; Chung, 2013; Haddow et al., 2017).
After 9/11, both ODP and FEMA became part of DHS. Terrorism remained a
central focus, perhaps understandably. The Bush administration issued HSPD 5,
changing the Federal Response Plan to the National Response Plan, and mandating
the use of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by tying its use to
funding (Bush, 2003).
Image 2.3 National Planning Scenarios
Source: Image by Rick C. Mathews 2020, U.S. DHS, 2010

Image 2.4 Target Capabilities List—September 2007
In 2003, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and DHS developed 15

representative National Planning Scenarios (NPS) for use in all levels of homeland
security preparedness activities. According to the National Planning Scenarios Ver.
21.3 2006 Final Draft (PublicIntelligence. net, 2010), were expected to be the
minimum number and scope of scenarios required to build a range of response
capabilities and resources. The scenarios were the first step in the capabilities-based
planning efforts of the nation. Accordingly, the NPS was used to implement HSPD-8,
which included the initial National Preparedness Goal and the National Exercise
program. The capabilities-based planning process included creating the Target
Capabilities List or TCL, intended to describe the capabilities of the four initial
homeland security preparedness mission areas: prevent, protect, respond, and
recover. The TCL final version (2007) included 37 target capabilities. As mentioned,
the TCL relied heavily on the NPS and an interim development tool, the Universal
Task List, which was created from the NPS. As visioned, the TCL was a generic
planning tool that provided a basis for assessing capabilities and needs and a
resource for strategy development. Although the TCL contained measures and
metrics for each of the 37 capabilities, it was a planning guide, not a rigid set of
resource requirements. The TCL was expected to be a guide to assist all levels of
jurisdictions, as well as state and local governments, in achieving the preparedness
priorities delineated in the National Preparedness Guidelines and Goal forming the
nation’s all-hazards preparedness framework.
The response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 forced a re-prioritization of federal
planning, management, response, and recovery with a renewed focus on natural
disasters. One significant outcome following Katrina was moving the Preparedness
Directorate of DHS under the control of FEMA. Today, the dual concerns of
terrorism and natural disasters are meant to be captured by the term “all hazards,”
though it can be argued that one is truly prepared for nothing by preparing for
everything.
The following discussion is divided by Presidential Directives (PDs), National-
level Plans, NIMS/ICS, and Planning Guidance. It concludes with a look at where
doctrine and practice stand today. Later chapters in this book will address specific
aspects of emergency management related to operating an EOC.
Presidential Directives
These Executive Branch policies have had significant impacts on incident
management at all levels. Table 2.1 summarizes the relevant ones in the last four
administrations. While each administration may change the title somewhat, the
scope of direction is equivalent (PDD: Presidential Decision Directive; HSPD:
Homeland Security Presidential Directive; NSPD: National Security Presidential
Directive; PPD: Presidential Policy Directive; NSPM: National Security Presidential
Memorandum).
Pre-9/11
PDD-39, published in 1995, designated the FBI as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for
domestic counter-terrorism response. FEMA was designated as a lead for ensuring
the Federal Response Plan is adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorist
attacks domestically (Clinton, 1995).
PDD-62, published in 1998, established the Office of the National Coordinator for
Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism, which worked within the
National Security Council (Clinton, 1998). PDD-62 also established FEMA as the lead
for consequence management of a WMD with the FBI as the lead federal response
agency for WMD attacks.
Table 2.1 Presidential Directives Related to Emergency Management by Administration
Year Administration/Directives
1993–
Clinton
2001
1995 PDD/NSC-39: U.S. Policy on Counter-terrorism
1998 PDD/NSC-62: Protection Against Unconventional Threats
1998 PDD/NSC-63: Critical Infrastructure Protection
1998 PDD/NSC-67: Continuity of Government
2001–09 Bush(#43)
2001 NSPD-1: Organization of NSC System
2001 HSPD-1: Org./Op. of Homeland Security Council
2002 HSPD-3: Homeland Security Advisory System
2002 HSPD-4: Natl. Strategy to Combat WMD
Year Administration/Directives
HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents (NIMS, NRP

2003
Guidance)
2003 HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Protection
2003 HSPD-8: National Preparedness
2007 HSPD-19: Combatting Terrorist use of Explosives
2007 HSPD-8, Annex I: National Preparedness
2007 HSPD-20 / NSPD-51: National Continuity Policy
2007 HSPD-21: Public Health & Medical Preparedness
2009–17 Obama
2009 PPD-1: Organization of NSC System
2009 PPD-2: Natl. Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
2011 PPD-8: National Preparedness
2013 PPD-21: Crit. Infrastructure Security & Resilience
2013 PPD-22: Natl. Security Special Events
2013 PPD-23: Security Sector Assistance
2016 PPD-44: Enhancing Domestic Incident Response
2017–
Trump
2020
2017 NSPM-4: Organization of the NSC, HSC, & Subcommittees
2018 NSPM-14: Natl. Biodefense
Source: Provided by Lars Skinner
(Information source: Federation of American Scientists, 2019)
Note: Thus far (June, 2020), the Trump administration has not issued any directives that are directly
related to disaster/emergency management. National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 4
(April 4, 2017) “Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and
Subcommittees,” does not significantly impact this topic. National Security Presidential
Memorandum (NSPM) 14, “Support for National Biodefense,” issued September 18, 2018, issued
guidance to implement the National Biodefense Strategy that was released in December of 2017
(Rovito, 2018); the Strategy was updated in September, 2018 (see: https://www.hsdl.org/?
abstract&did=815921). The Trump administration did declare the COVID-19 pandemic to be a
national emergency, but this was not in the form of a presidential declaration (see:
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=835596).
Post-9/11
HSPD-5 “Management of Domestic Incidents” (published in 2003) purpose was to
“enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by
establishing a single, comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS).”
The Secretary of DHS was designated the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for
domestic incidents. The Secretary must develop and administer a National Response
Plan (NRP), which “shall integrate Federal Government domestic prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan”
(Bush, 2003).
HSPD-5 directed DHS to establish the NIMS, including:
A core set of concepts, principles, terminology, technology for the ICS

Multi-agency coordination systems
Unified command
Training
Identification/management of resources
Qualifications and certification
Collection, tracking, reporting of incident information/resources.
HSPD-8 “National Preparedness” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003)

describes “the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a
response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism
incident.” It is an “all-hazards” approach to preparedness, prevention, and response
and was meant as a complementary directive to HSPD-5. HSPD-8 defined
emergency-management-related terms and directed the Secretary of DHS to develop
a “National Domestic All-Hazards Preparedness Goal” that includes:
Image 2.5 Core Capabilities by Mission Area
Source: National Preparedness Goal (2nd ed.), U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015
Measurable readiness priorities and targets that balance vulnerabilities/risks

with resources required to prevent, respond, and recover;
Standards for preparedness assessments and strategies; and
A system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness.
The National Preparedness Guidelines, published in 2007 as a component of the

DHS Secretary’s response to HSPD-8, outlined 37 core capabilities in four mission
areas and 15 National Planning Scenarios (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2007). The primary mechanism for the delivery of Federal Preparedness Grants will
be awarded to States. HSPD-8 (through the Secretary of DHS) also established a
process for evaluating/developing standards for First Responder equipment. (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2003).
Image 2.6 National Preparedness Guidelines 2007
HSPD 8 Annex 1, published in 2007, sought to establish a standard,

comprehensive approach to national planning, following the Homeland Security
Management System as described in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. It
called for a standardized National Planning Process and Integration System with
three levels of planning—strategic, operational, and tactical.
Annex 1 requires the development of an Integrated Planning System (IPS) that
includes:
National planning doctrine and planning guidance

Mechanisms for developing and analyzing a mission and potential courses of
action
Description of the process for plan refinement and proper execution
Description of the process linking regional, state, local, and tribal plans,
planning cycles, and processes
Vertical/horizontal integration of Federal, State, local, and tribal plans
Guidance for all-hazards planning, with comprehensive, practical fundamental
planning principles that can be used at all levels.
It is also required for the National Planning Scenarios to be developed, with

updates on a biennial basis (Bush, 2007).
Post-Katrina
PPD-8 “National Preparedness” (Directive, 2011) is intended to strengthen the
nation’s security and resilience by systematic preparation against threats posing the
most significant risk, including terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, and natural
disasters. PPD-8 seeks to achieve this Goal using five Frameworks/Mission Areas
(Prevent, Protect, Mitigate, Respond, Recover). PPD-8 supersedes HSPD-8 and is
intended to meet many requirements of Subtitle C of the “Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act” (PKEMRA). PPD-8 modified the capabilities-based
planning process and expanded the National Planning Frameworks by adding the
“Mitigation” framework. PPD-8 added emphasis on reducing the consequence of
potential disasters, working to increase the nation’s overall resilience. It also
identified the lead Federal Government official for each Framework. PPD-8 meets the
PKEMRA requirement of establishing a National Preparedness Goal and the
National Preparedness System. It also addressed many national preparedness
requirements of the PKEMRA, and uses capability targets to guide the allocation of
resources (Directive, 2011).
PPD-8 includes direction related to:
National preparedness goal

National preparedness system
National frameworks
Federal interagency operational plans (FIOPs)
National preparedness report
A campaign to build and sustain preparedness.
Compared to HSPD-8, PPD-8:
Added “mitigation” to national planning missions

Resulted in a reduced focus on national planning scenarios in capabilities-based
planning
Directed creation of national planning frameworks for each of the five mission
areas (Brown, 2011).
Note that the Frameworks are all in their second edition, except for “Response,”
which is in its third edition (see: https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-
resource-library). While both HSPD-8 and PPD-8 used a capability-based planning
approach, HSPD-8 principally used the 15 National Planning Scenarios as the
foundation for the Targeted Capabilities List (TCL). The National Preparedness Goal
under PPD-8 identified a set of 32 core capabilities needed to reach the end-state
objective in each of the five mission areas, with three core capabilities required in all
mission areas. In comparison, the Goal developed out of HSPD-8 included a TCL
with 37 capabilities across four mission areas, with five common to all areas. Table
2.2 shows the two directives, while Table 2.3 shows the Mission Areas compared to
the Core Capabilities.
National Preparedness Goal, Guidelines, and System—these concepts have
become somewhat confusing, in part because of how they were required in multiple
Presidential Directives. HSPD-8 called for developing a “national domestic all-
hazards preparedness goal.” The National Preparedness Goal will “establish
measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential
threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.” The Goal
will include readiness metrics, standards for preparedness assessments and strategies,
and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness for major incidents.
Federal agencies were directed to adopt quantifiable performance measurements for
training, planning, equipment, and exercises. The National Preparedness Goal
includes standards for the national preparedness assessments and strategies as well
as a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2003).
Table 2.2 HSPD-8 & PPD-8 Comparison
Directive Capabilities Frameworks/Mission Areas Natl. Planning Scenarios
HSPD-8 37 4 15
PPD-8 32 5 15
Table 2.3 Crosswalk of Framework/Mission Areas and the 32 Core Capabilities
Framework
/ Mission Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery
Area
Capabilities Planning
Public Information and Warning
Operational Coordination
Framework
Area
Community
Resilience
Long-term
Vulnerability
Reduction
Intelligence & Risk &
Infrastructure Systems
Information-sharing Disaster
Resilience
Assessment
Threats &
Hazards
Identification
Framework
Area
Critical
Transportation
Environmental
Response /
Health & Safety
Fatality
Management
Services Fire
Management &
Suppression
Economic
Logistics &
Recovery
Supply Chain
Health &
Management
Social
Mass Care
Services
Interdiction & Disruption Services Mass
Housing
Search & Rescue
Natural
Operations On-
&
scene Security,
Cultural
Protection, &
Resources
Law
Enforcement
Operational
Communications
Public Health,
Health Care, &
Emergency
Medical Services
Situational
Assessment
Screening, Search, &
Detection
Framework
Area
Access
Control &
Identity
Verification
Cybersecurity
Physical
Protective
Forensics
Measures
&
Risk
Attribution
Management
for Protection
Programs &
Activities
Supply Chain
Integrity &
Security
Information Source: National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition—Fact Sheet (2015)
The National Preparedness Guidelines (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,

2007) were intended to finalize the National Preparedness Goal (announced as part of
HSPD-8) and associated tools. The Guidelines superseded the Interim National
Preparedness Goal and contained four critical components:
Image 2.7 Achieving National Preparedness Goal via Preparedness System
National preparedness vision (very similar in phrasing to the goal)

15 National planning scenarios
Universal task list (1,600 key tasks for the development of essential capabilities
required to manage the scenarios)
Target capabilities list (37 specific capabilities that communities, the private
sectors, and all government levels should collectively possess as a basis for
effectively responding to disasters. ultimately, these 37 capabilities were
condensed into 32 core capabilities).
– The guidelines were also described as a collection of documents that

“collate many plans, strategies, and systems into an overarching
framework, the National Preparedness System.” This included 17 different
national security-related strategies, plans, capabilities lists, training and
exercise programs, lessons-learned, and assessment systems (see Image 2.5
in the document, “The Guidelines in Context”). The Guidelines were to be
supported by the National Preparedness System, which provides a way to
organize preparedness programs and activities. The National Preparedness
System was described in the 2007 document as consisting of:
Policy and doctrine

Planning and resource allocation
Training, exercises, and lessons learned
Assessment and reporting (U.S. department of homeland security,
2007).
PPD-8 also directed the development of a National Preparedness Goal that

identified core capabilities necessary for preparedness and a National Preparedness
System that guides activities to achieve the Goal. PPD-8 requires the development of
an implementation plan for completing the National Preparedness Goal and System.
The Goal should define the core capabilities needed to prepare for specific types of
incidents. The National Preparedness Goal was updated in 2015, though the stated
goal itself was unchanged from 2011. The second edition incorporated lessons
learned from real-world events and the National Preparedness System’s
implementation, which had changed significantly from its 2007 formulation. The
system is how the nation meets the Goal, and includes guidance for planning,
organization, equipment, training, and exercises to build and maintain domestic
capabilities. The system also requires an annual National Preparedness Reports
(Directive, 2011).
National-Level Plans
These plans have often (though not always) been driven by Presidential Directives,
and sought to provide a comprehensive approach to emergency management and
Federal support to state, local, tribal, and territories. Table 2.4 summarizes the
differences between plans.
Pre-9/11
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency,
1992, 1999, 2003) provided mechanisms for coordinating the delivery of Federal
assistance and resources to assist state and local governments overwhelmed by a
major disaster/emergency and supported the Stafford Act’s implementation. Image
2.8 shows an outline of the FRP. Types of Federal assistance available were/are initial
response resources, emergency services, loans/grants, and technical assistance (U.S.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1992).
Image 2.8 Federal Response Plan
The second edition (1999) included four new Support Annexes (Community
Relations, Donations Management, Logistics Management, and Occupational Safety
and Health) and two new appendices (FRP Changes and Revision, and Overview of a
Disaster Operation). Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes included (for each
implementing agency): Purpose/Scope, Policies, Situation (including planning
assumptions), a Concept of Operations (including national and regional response
structures, notifications, and response actions), and primary/supporting agency
responsibilities (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999). The 2003 third
edition was amended to reflect the creation of DHS, among other post-9/11
legislative changes. It was marked “interim” in anticipation of impending major
changes (such as the issue of the National Response Plan) (U.S. Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2003).
Post-9/11
The National Response Plan (NRP) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004,
2006a) superseded the Initial National Response Plan (INRP), FRP, U.S. Government
Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), and
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). Following its name change,
the NRP was developed through extensive coordination with Federal, State, Local,
and Tribal agencies, the private-sector, first-responder, and emergency management
entities nation-wide to make it a National rather than solely Federal plan. The NRP
differed from the FRP by integrating all levels of government into a common
incident management framework. It incorporated coordination roles for Federal
agencies that reflected new laws and Presidential directives (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2004). A 2006 second edition of the NRP included preliminary
lessons learned from the 2005 hurricane season (including Katrina) (U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, 2006a).
The NRP included: Purpose /Scope, Planning Assumptions and Considerations,
Roles and Responsibilities, a Concept of Operations, and Incident Management
Actions. In addition to a Base Plan, the NRP had 15 Emergency Support Function
Annexes (three more than the FRP – Public Safety & Security, Long-Term
Community Recovery & Mitigation, and External Affairs). It reworded several
Support Annexes and added two for a total of nine. The NRP also added six Incident
annexes, for a total of seven (likely given the 9/11 attacks and the Anthrax incidents
that same year). The NRP discussed using the Joint Field Office (JFO), which replaced
the DHS/EPR/FEMA Disaster Field Office (DFO). It also discussed and clarified the
roles of the Principal Federal Official (PFO), Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), and
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The NRP provided details on the
use/deployment of Emergency Response and Support Teams and the flow of initial
national-level incident management actions. It discussed integrating the NRP with
NIMS and provided a compilation of National/International Interagency Plans
(Appendix 4). The NRP was intended as an application of the NIMS. NIMS provides
a template, but it’s not an operational incident management plan. Using the NIMS
framework, the NRP provided a coordinating structure, mechanisms for operational
control of Federal support to State, local, and tribal emergency managers (Couig, et
al., 2005).
Post-Katrina
The National Response Framework (NRF) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2008, 2013a, 2019) supersedes the NRP, which was viewed as inadequately addressing
the roles and responsibilities of parties involved in response at state and local levels.
The NRP was not considered a proper operational plan understood by emergency
managers/planners (Lindsay, 2008). It incorporates critical lessons learned from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and builds upon NIMS as a consistent template for
managing incidents. The NRF commits the Federal government and response entities
at all levels of government to complete strategic and operational plans for the
incident scenarios specified in the National Preparedness Guidelines. These plans are
to be used to update the Incident Annexes to the Framework, which were maintained
from the NRP.
The NRF is comprised of the core document, 15 Emergency Support Function
(ESF), eight Support Annexes, seven Incident Annexes, and four Partner Guides
(Local Government, State, Private-Sector and NGO, and Federal Response). It uses
the same 15 ESFs as the NRP and has an expanded discussion of how the JFO should
be used, NIMS/ICS, the Multiagency Coordination System (MACS), Unified
Command, and Mutual Aid and Assistance.
The NRF highlighted several organizational changes, such as two Policy
Coordination Committees at the assistant secretary level: Domestic Readiness Group
(DRG) and the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). It also discussed new
headquarters-level support structures—the National Operations Center (NOC), and
associated operational components that provide integrated mission support, the
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the National Infrastructure
Coordinating Center (NICC). Also mentioned were supporting Federal Operations
Centers, the National Military Command Center (NMCC), National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the Strategic Information and Operations
Center (SIOC). The 2008 edition specifies using the Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide (CPG) 101 for planning guidance (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2008).
The Federal planning structure uses three levels of Federal plans for each National
Planning Scenario: a Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) and Strategic Plan, a
National-Level Interagency Concept Plan (CONPLAN), and Federal Department and
Agency Operations Plans (OPLANs). The Framework employs common criteria to
measure key aspects of response planning: acceptability, adequacy, completeness,
consistency/standardization of products, feasibility, flexibility, and
interoperability/collaboration (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013a).
The National Planning Scenarios are the highest priority of Federal planning
efforts and represent the country’s most significant dangers. HSPD-8, Annex I,
“National Planning,” described the use of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, which
are grouped into eight scenario sets that share common characteristics. Table 2.4
provides a comparison of all three national-level plans.
A 2019 update to the NRF was published in October 2019. This fourth edition of
the NRF added ESF #14—Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure Annex, which
replaced the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Support and Private Sector
Coordination Support Annexes. This edition also emphasizes the concept of seven
“community lifelines,” which enable continuous operation of critical government and
business functions: Safety and Security; Food, Water, Shelter; Health and Medical;
Energy (Power & Fuel); Communications; Transportation; and Hazardous Materials.
Lifelines are meant to assist with the root cause, impact analysis, and
prioritizing/deploying resources to mitigate an incident’s consequences. ESFs are
intended to provide core capabilities to stabilize community lifelines (U.S.
Table 2.4 National-Level Plan Comparison
Component FRP NRP NRF
ESFs 12 15 15
Support Annexes 7 9 8
Incident Annexes 1 7 7
Partner Guides - - 4
Coordinating Entities DFO JFO JFO
Command Structure ICS NIMS/ICS NIMS/ICS
NIMS and ICS

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command
System (ICS) have both had a significant effect on how emergency management is
performed in this country. While ICS has been in use for decades in some
jurisdictions, what has changed is the prevalence of both NIMS and ICS across the
country and how they are integrated into national-level plans/doctrine.
Pre-9/11
After multiple fires in California in 1970, the USFS, LAFD, and LACoFD jointly
formed Fire Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergency
(FIRESCOPE) (Neamey, 2011). The goal of the original FIRESCOPE was to develop 1)
a Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS), to handle off-site coordination issues
above the incident level, and 2) an ICS. In the 1980s, the National Wildfire
Coordinating Group (operating using the Large Fire Organization (LFO) concept)
decided to implement FIRESCOPE ICS, which was then developed into the “National
Interagency Incident Management System” (NIIMS) (Jensen & Waugh (2014),
Stambler & Barbera (2011)).
Reports written after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing reported that ICS had
worked well, and the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) performed
effectively if all functions were in place. Federal/State/Local coordination and
collaboration were essential for response and recovery operations, and ESFs 2–9
were activated. Two Multi-Agency Coordination Centers (MACCs) were also
established (OK Dept. of Civil Emergency Management, 1996).
Post-9/11
The events of 9/11 were a major test of response agencies’ abilities to manage and
command a large, complex event. At the World Trade Center (WTC) scene,
numerous communication systems failed, not just radios but contacts between FDNY
and Law Enforcement (LE) agencies. There was no Incident Command Post (ICP)
that was common to both police and fire personnel. Most tellingly, New York City,
up to that point, had failed to adopt standard use of ICS (Dwyer et al., 2002). Mutual
Aid was poorly coordinated, and the city had not formally adopted/coordinated the
use of Mutual Aid Compacts. The response also highlighted the need for more
planning, focusing on consequence management (Hayden, 2002).
In contrast, the Pentagon response was considered to have gone smoothly with
few preventable problems. One of the major findings of the Arlington FD review was
that the ICS should be adopted as the national standard for emergency response
command and control. Education and training on ICS should be significantly
expanded, especially among law enforcement organizations (Arlington County,
2003).
Significantly, some of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations were that nation-
wide adoption of the ICS should be implemented, as well as security assistance be
allocated based on vulnerabilities and risks. The Commission also endorsed the ANSI
proposal for a national preparedness standard, based on the “American National
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs”
(NFPA 1600). The goal was/is to have a common set of criteria, terminology for
preparedness, management, COOP, etc. (Kean & Hamilton, 2004).
The NIMS was issued in 2004 subsequent to the directive contained in HSPD-5,
requiring the development of NIMS. To help ensure widespread compliance with the
NIMS, Federal guidelines were established requiring the NIMS adoption as part of
the eligibility standards for jurisdictions to receive Federal preparedness funding.
NIMS supplemented the NRP (now NRF). NIMS included “FIRESCOPE ICS,” as part
of MACS and ICS concepts (Neamey, 2011). NIMS/ICS differs from
FIRESCOPE/NIIMS ICS in that NIMS adds “Intelligence” as an optional area to the
previous ICS structure (Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics,
Finance/Administration) (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004).
NIMS-approved ICS originally had 11 core management characteristics at the
incident management level. The five most critical are: common terminology, modular
organization, a manageable span of control, integrated communications, and the
Chain of Command & Unity of Command/Unified Command (Hannestad, 2005).
Post-Katrina
FEMA released a revised version of NIMS in October 2017. This revision of NIMS
retains key concepts/principles from 2004 and 2008 versions while incorporating
lessons learned from real-world incidents, exercises, and national policy (see:
http://www.fema.gov/nims-doctrine-supporting-guides-tools). The 2017 edition of
NIMS also seeks to clarify the process for certifying and credentialing incident
personnel and lays the foundation for developing a national qualification system. It
also reinforces the point that NIMS and ICS apply to all incident personnel, ranging
from the ICP to staff at the National Response Coordination Center. Lastly, the new
edition discusses functions and terminology for staff in EOCs. It clarifies
relationships between ICS staff, EOCs, and senior leaders/policy groups (i.e., at the
strategic level of emergency management) (U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2019).
The value of NIMS and ICS has been shown in multiple incidents since 9/11, such
as the response to the Boston Marathon bombings (Gates et al. (2014), and Fielding et
al. (2014)). But there still exists a need to implement NIMS more widely at the state
and local government levels. Within entities whose primary mission isn’t
“emergency response,” but that may still play a critical role as a resource (Leonard,
2016).
Emergency Management Planning Guidance

Unlike the more apparent progression of Presidential Directives and National Plans,
planning guidance has mostly been disseminated without a clear mandate and
succession of previous planning doctrine. As measured by the amount of guidance
published, efforts to improve how plans are written and implemented increased
significantly after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Compared to the adoption of the NIMS,
ICS, and associated concepts like Unified Command, it is also more difficult to see
where and how such guidance has made a difference (which is not to say that it
hasn’t). What follows is a discussion of those publications that appear to be the
widest in scope and were felt to be the most important of all the many issued,
particularly since Katrina. Image 2.9 provides a comprehensive summary of the
planning guidance that has been published, while Image 2.14, after this section,
explains document succession. What follows is a discussion of selected documents
that are more comprehensive or appeared to have been most influential on the
development of planning doctrine.
Pre-9/11
Before FEMA existed, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 created national civil
defense agencies and infrastructure systems. The Disaster Relief Act of 1969 created
the position of Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), to serve as the President’s
representative during disasters. In 1974 the Disaster Relief Act clarified the process
for issuing Presidential Disaster Declarations (Stumpf, 2009). But perhaps one of the
most significant pieces of pre-9/11 legislation was the Stafford Act in 1988 that laid
out the process by which a Governor requests disaster assistance from the Federal
government when State/Local resources are overwhelmed (Gereski, 2006).
One of the first comprehensive guidance documents for planning was the State
and Local Guide (SLG) 101 in 1996, which replaced Civil Preparedness Guides 1–8,
1–8A, 10. This document discussed State and local EOPs, and FEMA’s approach to
risk-based, all-hazards emergency operations planning. It provided regulatory
requirements related to writing EOPs and integrating state EOPs with the Federal
Response Plan (FRP). It also discussed the hazard analysis process (U.S. Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1996).
Post-9/11
Perhaps counterintuitively, there was not a lot of planning guidance issued
immediately after 9/11. For this discussion, most notably was the Homeland Security
Act (HSA) of 2002, which, among many other measures, moved FEMA under the
DHS umbrella and designated FEMA as the Federal agency that administers the
Stafford Act, and also placed the agency under the control of the DHS Secretary
(Bea, 2006).
Post-Katrina
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was a watershed moment (no pun intended) in the history
of emergency planning. The inadequate response, coming after several post-9/11
initiatives, seemed to lay bare the degree to which FEMA had been hollowed out as
an agency (Bosner, 2011), as well as the lack of capacity for useful operational
planning doctrine and practitioners of the same. This resulted in numerous planning
guidance documents over the next 12+ years, but it is difficult to follow what leads to
what.
Problems in responding to Katrina related to poor leadership decisions, lack of
capabilities, organizational failures, overwhelmed communication systems, and
inadequate statutory authorities (Bea, 2006; U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2006). The “White House Katrina Lessons Learned Report” stated that key
decision-makers in both the state and federal governments were unfamiliar with the
NRP and NIMS and did not understand how to use ICS (United States, 2006). They
also didn’t know how to operate a Joint Field Office, which prevented their ability to
coordinate Federal, State, and Local response activities efficiently. DHS failed to
declare Katrina an “Incident of National Significance,” and did not convene the “The
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned.” DHS also failed to
designate a PFO and did not invoke the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRP.
Further, there was a breakdown in communication between National Guard units in
the field and the JTF-Katrina Commander, U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) planners (Gereski, 2006).
Image 2.9 Early ICS Development Timeline
Source: Provided by Lars Skinner and Rick C. Mathews 2020
Image 2.10 Post-Katrina Assessments and Revisions
Source: Image and Copyright Rick C. Mathews 2005/2020

In response, Congress passed the “Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act” (PKEMRA) in 2006. The PKEMRA:
Reorganized FEMA, consolidated emergency management functions and

enhanced FEMA’s status and autonomy (the FEMA Administrator is now a
Deputy Secretary in DHS)
Created ten regional FEMA offices, including:
– Regional advisory councils

– Regional office strike teams
– Regional emergency communication coordination working groups
Emphasized COOP, COG in federal government

Established the national integration center, which manages, maintains both
NIMS and the NRP, and the “catastrophic incident annex,” “catastrophic
incident supplement” to the NRP
Created the National Operations Center (NOC) and the National Infrastructure
Simulation & Analysis Center (NISAC)
Required preparation/submission of annual national preparedness reports—the
first such report wasn’t published until 2011 (U.S. Senate, 2006).
PKEMRA requires each federal agency with NRP responsibilities to meet their
operational responsibilities in the National Preparedness Goal, comply with NIMS,
train response personnel, and develop Operational Plans (OPLANs), capabilities for
all-hazard federal responses. The Act authorized State, Local use of the State
Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), and the Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) for funding to develop evacuation plans and programs (Bea, 2006).
That same year (2006), FEMA issued the National Planning and Execution
System (NPES). The NPES was an initial effort to meet the requirements from
HSPD-5 for a coordinated, comprehensive planning process for DHS operations. It
provided initial planning guidance for prioritizing efforts and capabilities. The NPES
discussed planning nomenclature based on HSPD-5, the NRP, and NIMS. It discussed
the draft, four-phase “Incident Decision-Making Process” (IDMP), similar to DOD’s
seven-step Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), and explicitly acknowledges
the similarities to DOD planning doctrine in JOPES/APEX (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2006b). See Table 2.5 for an outline of the IDMP, compared to
the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017).
The NPES outlined DHS responsibilities to publish CONPLANs for each of the 15
National Planning Scenarios (excepting hurricanes)—see Table 2.6 for a list of
scenarios.
Note that some federal emergency managers found the scenarios’ response actions
to overlap so much that the scenarios were deemed not useful and are now used in
planning to a lesser degree (T. Kennedy (HHS), personal communication, February 5,
2018). Use of the scenarios was also replaced by the guidance in HSPD-8 and PPD-8,
to use targeted capabilities in planning instead (HSPD-8 (2003), and PPD-8 (2011)).
The NPES also discussed contingency planning documents, including Course of
Action (COA) estimates, the Base Plan (CONOP, the concept of support, anticipated
timelines), CONPLAN, and OPLAN. It also covered DHS Levels of operation and
associated planning—see Tables 2.7 and 2.8 to compare the DHS and DOD concepts.
From this point on, it is clear that DHS and FEMA were adopting many aspects of
the military planning process due to a lack of clear development in planning doctrine
and the proven effectiveness of the military system.
The Integrated Planning System (IPS) was issued in January 2009 and replaced
the NPES. Directed by HSPD-8, Annex I, the IPS complements NIMS and the
guidance given in CPG 101. The IPS uses the National Planning Scenarios and was
updated every two years (it has not been). IPS doctrine supports guidance given in
HSPD-5, HSPD-8, Annex I, the NRF, NIMS, the National Preparedness Guidelines,
and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The IPS discusses and explains the
intents of Strageic Guidance Documents, a strategic plan, a CONPLAN, an OPPLAN,
and tactical plans. It lists the steps in developing a Federal SGS and discusses the
Federal Strategic Plan and CONPLAN development in five phases:
Table 2.5 Comparison of the FEMA IDMP & DOD JOPP
Phase 1:
National Phase 2: Phase 3:
Phase 4: Plan
Incident Concept Plan
Refinement/Execution
Management Development Development
Guidance
Phase 1:
National Phase 2: Phase 3:
Phase 4: Plan
Incident Concept Plan
Refinement/Execution
Management Development Development
Guidance
• Plan/Orders
• Mission • COA Preparation
Analysis Analysis • Rehearsal
• Mission • Course of • COA • Revision
IDMP
Identification Action Comparison (Contingency) or
(COA) • COA Execution (Crisis
Development Approval Action)
• Assessment
• Step 4:
COA
• Step 2: Analysis &
Mission Wargaming
Joint • Step 1:
Analysis • Step 5: • Step 7: Plan or
Operations Planning
• Step 3: COA Order Development
Planning Initiation
COA Comparison
Process
Development • Step 6:
COA
Approval
Table 2.6 The 15 National Planning Scenarios
1 Nuclear Detonation – Improvised Nuclear Device

2 Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax
3 Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza
4 Biological Attack – Plague
5 Chemical Attack – Blister Agent
6 Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemical
7 Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent
8 Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion
9 Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake
10 Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane
11 Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Device
12 Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device
13 Biological Attack – Food Contamination
14 Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease
15 Cyber Attack
Table 2.7 Comparison of DHS & DOD Planning Process
DHS DOD
COA Estimate Commander’s Estimate (Level 1)

Base Plan Base Plan (Level 2)
CONPLAN CONPLAN (Level 3)
OPLAN OPLAN (Level 4)
Source: FEMA (2006)
Table 2.8 Comparison of DHS & DOD Levels of Operation
DHS DOD
National Strategic
Regional Operational
Field Tactical
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2006)
1. Understand the situation

2. Determine goals and objectives
– Information analysis (identify critical facts and assumptions, update staff

estimate, develop threat/hazard scenario, develop objectives, develop tasks,
create a mission statement, identify available resources, brief senior
leaders, notify planning communities of interest)
– COA development
3. Plan development
– COA analysis
– COA comparison
– COA approval
4. Plan preparation and review

5. Plan refinement through training, exercising, and execution.
These phases are not significantly different than the four phases of planning given
in the NPES’ IDMP (Table 2.5 previously). The IPS also provides formats for a
Federal Strategic Plan (Annex B), CONPLAN (Annex C), OPLAN (Annex D), and an
overview of risk management/the IPS (Annex E) (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2009).
A significant piece of planning guidance was/is the Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 “Developing and Maintaining Emergency
Operations Plans,” first issued in 2009 (U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2010). CPG 101 replaced the SLG 101 (U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 1996), and provided guidance on planning fundamentals and planning to
support prevention, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. CPG 101 provides
methods for emergency planners to:
Image 2.11 Planning Levels and Relationships
Conduct planning using a process that represents the actual population in the
community, involving community leaders and the private sector
Ensure plans are developed using risk analysis
Identify operational assumptions, resource demands
Prioritize planning efforts to smooth the transition from development to
execution
Integrate/synchronize efforts between federal and lower levels of government.
CPG 101 emphasizes that the process of planning is as important as the resulting
plan, that plans must be flexible and adaptable, and that effective plans convey the
goals/objectives of the intended operation and the tasks, resources required to
achieve them. The second edition in 2010 superseded the guidance given in version
1.0 and rescinded the interim CPG 301. It provides the fundamentals of planning,
EOP formats/functions (Base Plan, Supporting Annexes), explains the planning
process (essentially the same five phases as in the IPS), and gives a checklist of
planning questions. CPG 101 discusses the NRF, the 15 ESFs, FEMA Regional Plans,
and State/Territorial/Tribal/Local (SLTT) EOPs (U.S. Federal Emergency
The Functional Planning Guide (draft), issued in January 2011 (U.S. Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2011b), discussed deliberate versus incident
planning and covered five types of incident plans:
Incident Action Plans (IAP)

Advance Operational Plans (AOP)
Incident Strategic Plans (ISP)
Regional Support Plans (RSP)
National Support Plans (NSP).
Functional planning is ad hoc planning to address specific functions/contingencies

or any incident planning not addressed as one of the other five plans. This guide
discussed a six-step planning process, the same one discussed in the Regional
Planning Guide (2011) and in CPG 101 under “How to develop complex EOPs.” It
provides details on COA development/evaluation, and discusses writing a functional
plan, uses a similar five-paragraph format as the Military (Situation, Mission,
Execution, Administration/Logistics, Command/Signal). Appendix 2 provides a
functional plan template with five paragraphs and seven annexes (U.S. Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2011b).
Issued in 2012, the Federal Plan Development Process (FPDP) Handbook was
based on NIMS and CPG 101. The goal of the FPDP is to standardize the planning
process, provide guidance on how to complete the steps, and tasks required to
develop a comprehensive plan. The FPDP applies to strategic, operational, and
tactical-level plans. It applies to functional, capabilities-based, threat-based, all-
hazards, and scenario-based planning. It was developed consistent with PPD-8,
NIMS, CPG 101, and the DOD’s JOPPS/Adaptive Planning. The FPDP was meant to
be interim guidance on the planning process until the National Planning System was
approved. It described the phases and tasks of the planning process, best practices,
lessons learned, templates, examples of plans, and a Planner’s Toolkit. The FPDP uses
the same five planning phases, as in the 2009 IPS document (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2012).
The CPG 201 “Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)
Guide” was issued in 2012 and version 2.0 in 2013 (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2013b). CPG 201 discussed the steps in conducting a THIRA, including
identifying threats/hazards, setting capabilities targets for each core capability
identified in the National Preparedness Goal (required by PPD-8).
The THIRA process is: 1) Identify the threats and hazards of concern; 2) Give the
threats and hazards context (relative to the community); 3) Establish capability
targets; and 4) Apply the results. The 32 core capabilities described in the National
Preparedness Goal should be used to organize “capability targets” in the THIRA
process. The manual also discusses the National Preparedness System (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2013b).
The FEMA Operational Planning Manual (U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2014a) is described as the first comprehensive FEMA standard for
conducting operational planning (both deliberate and crisis action planning). It
reflects guidance from CPG 101, CPG 201, the FEMA Operational Planning
Keystones, and the FEMA Incident Management & Support Keystones. It uses a six-
step process and provides guidance on using deliberate plans during crisis action
planning.
The manual provides a template for writing a deliberate plan (Appendix C) and
discusses the National Planning System and its four elements. ESFs and RSFs serve
as Executive Groups for disaster operations (U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2014a).
The manual describes types of deliberate planning products such as Federal
Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs), Regional All-Hazard Plans, and Hazard-
Specific Annexes. The manual also discusses crisis action planning products:
Incident Action Plans (IAPs)

Incident Strategic Plans
Advanced Operations Plans (AOPs)
National/Regional Support Plans
Recovery Support Strategies (RSS)
Functional Plans (focused on specific capability)
The manual also clarifies plan alignment at the various levels of

government/response entities. See Image 2.12 below. It has a detailed discussion of
plan development, including COA development/analysis/comparison, CONOPS,
OPLAN design, specified/implied tasks, etc., as well as what is in a five-paragraph
Base Plan. Lastly, the manual discusses the six-step process used in CAP, the
“Planning P,” and the “Operations O.” The outline of how to plan remains relatively
consistent over the previous five years or so of planning documents, to include the
Operational Planning Manual. Many of the details vary, however.
The National Special Security Event (NSSE) Manual was issued in 2014 (U.S.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014b). HSPD-7 states that the DHS
designates national significance events are “National Special Security Events”
(NSSEs). The NSSE manual discusses the same six-step planning process as that in
CPG 101 and the FEMA Operational Planning Manual. It provides a Lead Federal
Agency (LFA) list (consistent with HSPD-7):
U.S. secret service—planning, coordinating, implementing security operations

FBI—intelligence, counter-terrorism, and federal criminal violations
FEMA—emergency management, consequence management planning, and
coordination (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014b).
An important complement to the Operational Planning Manual is the Incident

Action Planning Guide (IAP), first issued in 2012, with a revision in 2015. This
guide aligns the IAP process with the Operational Planning Manual, the National
Preparedness Goal, and the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act. The IAP guide
recommends using deliberate plans as IAPs, and linking national and regional
support plans. Five phases are discussed (similar to previous outlines): 1) Understand
the Situation; 2) Establish Incident Objectives; 3) Develop the Plan; 4) Prepare &
Disseminate the Plan; and 5) Execute, Evaluate, & Revise the Plan (U.S. Federal
The FEMA National Planning System (NPS) issued in 2016 includes the National
Planning Architecture (three levels of planning and plans integration) and the
Planning Process. The six-step planning process described in the NPS is taken from
the CPG 101 manual (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2016). The NPS
is the most recent planning guidance issued by DHS or FEMA and is considered a
component of the National Preparedness System. The NPS includes:
National planning frameworks for each of the five mission areas (prevent,
protect, mitigate, respond, recover)
Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) for each mission area
Federal department/agency operational plans for implementation of the FIOPs
Planning guidance to state, local, tribal/territorial, NGOs, and the private sector.
Image 2.12 Deliberate Plan Alignment

The NPS discusses three levels of planning: strategic, operational, and tactical.
Each level of planning can, in turn, be divided into two categories: deliberate
planning (in advance of an incident); and incident action planning (during the
incident, similar to DoD’s crisis action planning). Strategic-level planning examples
would include:
National Strategies
State Someland Security Strategies
Local Hazard Mitigation Strategy.
Operational-level planning examples would include:
Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs)

Department and Agency Operational Plans
Local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Insular Area Mitigation Plans
State Emergency Operations Plans
Pre-Disaster Recovery Plans
NGO, Private Sector Organization Plans.
Image 2.13 depicts the relationship of the five National Planning Frameworks with
FIOPs and State and Local plans. Incident annexes to the Response and Recovery
FIOP consider WMD, electrical grid, and petroleum-related aspects of risks not
elsewhere addressed by the FIOP. NRF and NIMS concepts guide federal operational
response planning and FIOPs, which in turn provides guidance on roles,
responsibilities, critical tasks, resourcing, etc.
Image 2.13 Alignment of Planning Efforts with PPD-8 (National Preparedness)
Table 2.9 Planning levels vs. Guidance Documents
Level of Planning Associated Document
Strategic PPD-8, Implementation Plan, Natl. Preparedness Goal

Operational Natl. Planning Frameworks, Natl. Preparedness System
Tactical Interagency Operational Plans
Note: Table 2.9 summarizes the plans associated with two of the most critical current source
documents for planning guidance.
Table 2.10 Source Documents for Implementation Plans
Planning
Guidance Implementing Plans
Source
National Planning Scenario Sets, Federal

IPS
Strategic/Concept Plans, FEMA Regional Concept Plans
CPG-101 FEMA Regional Concept Plans, State and Local plans
Source: IPS, Figure 4.2 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009)
Tactical-level planning examples include Event Plans and Pre-positioning Plans.
Depending on what level of planning one is working at, one would consult different
documents for guidance. See Tables 2.9 and 2.10 for examples.
Lastly, the DHS Department Plan Development Process (DPDP) Handbook is
essentially an update of the FEMA Federal Plan Development Process (FPDP)
Handbook that was issued in 2012. The DPDP has not been officially published as yet
—a draft came out in late 2016, but this writing has not been finalized.
Image 2.14 below lists guidance that was either meant to be comprehensive in
scope, required to meet legislative mandates, and specifically superseded previous
publications. It depicts which plans/guidance documents evolved into which new
documents and the most current edition.
Where Are We Now?

Given how much doctrine has changed, especially since Katrina, it is worth
considering the practical effects on the emergency response/management
community. At the Federal level, National Preparedness Reports are required
annually by PPD-8 and provide a good snapshot of the previous years’ incidents and
milestones, including any notable legislation. The National (NPR) and State (SPR)
annual preparedness reports (2012 to present) provide an excellent list of planning
resources, as do the FEMA THIRAs. As of 2013, the THIRA process added target
performance levels for each of the 32 Core Capabilities (U.S. Federal Emergency
Agencies now have the benefit of the DHS “National Planner’s Course,” which
instructs participants on many of the planning concepts mentioned in this paper, but
specifically focuses on the planning process typified by MDMP, JOPP, and FEMA
planning documents (see: https://emilms.fema.gov/IS453/assets/npc.pdf).
Since 9/11, in most jurisdictions:
COOP, COG is emphasized in EOPs

Emergency managers have a heightened role in city and county government
Image 2.14 Development of DHS/FEMA Specific Guidance/Doctrine
“Homeland security” now has an additional role assigned to emergency

managers and other planners
Each of the 56 FBI field offices has agents assigned to support local, state
governments re WMD incidents (Fagel, 2010).
Mutual Aid is now considered an essential emergency management tool. The

“Emergency Management Assistance Compact” (EMAC) was the first national
disaster–relief compact since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950 and
became law in 1996 (Public Law 104–321, see https://www.emacweb.org/). EMAC
provides a process by which a state during governor-declared states of emergency or
disasters can request other states to send personnel, equipment, and supplies to help
with response and recovery efforts. This includes transferring services and virtual
support, such as GIS mapping. Before 9/11, only 40 states participated in the EMAC,
but today all 50 states and U.S. territories are members (Hannestad, 2005).
Public Health components are now part of the National Response Framework and
NIMS—the National Disaster Medical System has been expanded along with the
Laboratory Response Network. CDC’s Strategic National Stockpile now covers
prophylaxis for over 50 million people (Khan, 2011).
Post-9/11, the emphasis has shifted from recovery to proactive response to
recognize how much of the burden is on local and non-professional responders.
There is greater public involvement, such as the “Citizen’s Preparedness Corps,” and
an increased focus on NGOs’ preparedness. The use of public service alerts and
smartphone apps has greatly increased, and hospitals now have comprehensive
disaster plans that are regularly reviewed, tested, and updated (Reynolds, 2014).
Communication and logistical linkages among area hospitals, as well as other
agencies, have been strengthened. The use of and training on the Hospital ICS has
been widely implemented. E.D.s are now well-stocked with antidotes, drug therapies
for CBRN-related exposures. The CDC has increased its ability to perform syndromic
surveillance and increased the Strategic National Stockpile capabilities. However, for
most jurisdictions, surge capacity remains a critical vulnerability (Nearest & Zero,
2011).
Pre-9/11, many hospitals lacked disaster plans and weren’t prepared to respond to
large-scale events; 2002 marked the debut of the “Hospital Preparedness Program”
(see: https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/Pages/default.aspx), the
primary source of federal funding supporting regional healthcare system
preparedness. Changes resulting from this program post-9/11 include:
Improved surge capability

Increased preparations for chemical or biological attacks
Increased interagency coordination
Drills and exercises with local response agencies
More employee training.
Changes post-Katrina include:
Improved interoperable communications

Altered standards of care
Hospital preparedness plans (Hartwell & Responder, 2012).
Since 9/11, FEMA has issued many guides that assist in assessing vulnerabilities
and hardening buildings against attack. Titled the “FEMA Risk Management Series”
(see: https://www.fema.gov/media-library/resources-documents/collections/3), they
address threats from earthquakes, flooding, and terrorist attack.
There have also been numerous changes post-9/11 to the NFPA Standards related
to building safety/design and firefighting equipment (which can be found at
https://www.nfpa.org/Codes-and-Standards/All-Codes-and-Standards/List-of-Codes-
and-Standards).
FEMA considers NFPA Standard 1600 to be the standard for evaluating business
preparedness plans (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007).
There has been a significant increase in large urban areas with first responders–
dedicated wireless information networks (i.e., the New York City Wireless
Information Network, “NYCWiN”—see:
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doitt/agencies/nycwin.page). There have also been
notable improvements in Fireground/incident scene accountability systems. DHS
adopted 27 NFPA Standards as guidance for compliance with NIMS (Durso, 2011).
The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) has become the Federal model for the T.C.T.
mission. In 2001 there were just 35 JTTFs. As of 2016, there are now 104 JTTFs
operating full-time. The cross-functional nature of the JTTF facilitates intra- and
inter-task cooperation, reduces traditional jurisdictional disputes—all JTTF members
are on the same team, with the same mission. There have been problems under the
NRF because of multiple competing goals in over-lapping command structures,
spread across different agencies/locations; the JTTF concept has helped alleviate this
(Goodman, 2008).
Response to large scale incidents using the combined support from federal (Title
10: Active Duty and Reserves) and state (Title 32: National Guard) assets has proved
challenging to coordinate and manage effectively. In response, legislators at the State
and Federal Government levels created a policy that authorizes the use of a single
military commander, termed a Dual Status Commander (DSC). The DSC assumes
simultaneous but mutually exclusive command and control over both federal and
state military forces during Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations.
This concept provides the Federal and State chain of command (CoC) with a
common operating picture. Note, however, that under the DSC, Title 10 and 32
personnel still retain separate CoCs. A pre-designated Title 10 Officer serves as
Deputy Commander to the DSC—this ensures that Title 10 Forces execute the DSC’s
intent, and the Deputy can also advise the DSC on Title 10 issues. The DSC concept
has been used successfully during multiple planned events since 2004 (Schumacher,
2011). Note that the DCO is not considered part of the Unified Command; the DCO’s
staff is the “Defense Coordinating Element” (Carwile, 2005). The DSCA response to
Hurricane Sandy in 2012 was the first time that DSCs assumed command of both
Title 10 and Title 32 forces during a no-notice/ limited-notice incident. While the
concept received high marks, many improvements have been suggested, and the
concept continues to evolve (McNeil & Burke, 2015).
Our nation has made tremendous progress due to the many terrorist incidents and
natural disasters we experienced, not just in doctrine, training, and equipment, but
also in how all of that is employed. Post-Katrina, FEMA used a renewed emphasis on
directing a “surge force” of personnel and equipment to deploy in advance of a
storm/event. FEMA had over 31,000 staff on the ground working in response to
Harvey. FEMA also used a surge force in support of Sandy in 2012. FEMA now has
the authority to direct other agencies to shift resources once a disaster is declared,
emphasizing the importance of making early declarations. States continue to rely on
mutual compacts/support agreements, which have proven their worth many times
(Mann & Jamerson, 2017).
As an example of evolving emergency management, Federal responders to Harvey
benefitted from some of the lessons from Katrina, including:
Most of the required paperwork was completed in advance

Responders now have better plans and more training
Federal and local response personnel now work using the same “playbook”
(NIMS)
Emergency supplies were in position before the storm arrived
Many hospitals and nursing homes are now better equipped to evacuate and do
so early
FEMA administrators must have relevant professional experience with disasters
The general public is now viewed as a partner for responses (Philipps, 2017).
Of course, challenges remain, and new lessons–learned to arise from every large
incident. The federal response to Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico was criticized on
several points:
Lack of involvement of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)

Allegations that elected officials did not integrate/work with the JFO
Public perception that the federal government response was too slow
The scale of the disaster was much larger than appreciated (and occurred just
after Irma)
Large numbers of local and state workers, responders were victims themselves
Tensions over the proper role of FEMA—response/recovery operations, rather
than rebuilding infrastructure (Achenbach & Hernández, 2017).
One should note that money has often been misspent since the initial flood of
terrorism-related budget items since 9/11. The equipment has been deemed of
dubious value: $100–150 billion spent on federal Homeland Security programs. (Brill,
2016). It is hoped that with the experience of the last 19 years and many incidents,
the emergency management and response community can better plan and prepare
how to make the best use of increasingly limited resources.
Despite all the progress mentioned above, there is still much room for
improvement as the nation’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates, in
the author’s opinion, the nation still lacks a comprehensive ability to conduct
widespread, adequate testing. Without this, one cannot answer critical questions:
how many people contracted the coronavirus, and when did they contract it, and
where was the point of contact? It is possible that testing would have allowed
doctors to triage patients better and informed hospitals when to expect a surge in
patients. Testing would enable public health officials to assess both the severity of an
outbreak and the degree of shortfalls in PPE and essential equipment such as
ventilators. Absent this information, years of emergency management and pandemic
planning have likely significantly reduced the impact of containing the virus’s
spread and mitigating the damage (Madrigal & Meyer, 2020).
The nation also does not have adequate contact-tracing capabilities or sufficient
PPE for first responders and medical staff.
Many of the issues playing out in the pandemic response mirror comments from
an analysis of many of the most high-profile incidents that occurred in the US over
the last three decades. A review of after-action reports (AARs) and published lessons
learned and interviews with emergency managers/responders that participated in
them was conducted. The problems identified/documented across many years, and
involving very different types of incidents, were surprisingly consistent (and
therefore, one might think, anticipated). They included: failure of communications
systems; breakdowns in command-and-control; and deployment of resources too
slow to keep pace with long, large-scale incidents. The authors noted that the most
significant lessons learned involved inter-agency issues.
Furthermore, most AARs tended to focus on tactical and operational matters and
past policy failures. By doing so, the critiques offered little insight into addressing
strategic aspects of disasters and failed to consider perspective, preventative
measures to improve future responses (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). As Mark Twain is
reputed to have said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”
Conclusion
This chapter discussed the results of a comprehensive review of EM-related guidance,
focusing on planning doctrine. It discussed changes since 9/11, particularly guidance
published by FEMA and its parent agency DHS, after Hurricane Katrina and passage
of the PKEMRA legislation. Changes in policy related to planning have been less
clear than those associated with PDs and Nation-level plans (i.e., FRP, NRP, NRF).
However, current guidance (following military planning doctrine in many ways) is
embodied mainly in the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Incident
Action Planning (IAP) Guide, Federal Plan Development Process (FPDP) Handbook,
the Operational Planning Manual, and the National Planning System. A significant
update to the FPDP is in draft form now, originally to be published at some point in
2018. In conclusion, Federal guidance on EM-related planning has evolved
significantly from where it was before 9/11; current doctrine will remain a work in
progress as policy adapts to new threats and lessons learned from previous disasters
and attacks. Taken as a whole, the field of emergency planning and management has
progressed a great deal since 9/11.
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Chapter 3
EOC Operation
Greg Benson
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-4
Introduction
The need for capable and competent emergency operation center (EOC)
operations continues to expand as emergency events grow larger in
duration, intensity, and with increased geographic impact. Emergency
management’s mission will continue to evolve as threats, hazards, and
vulnerabilities become more dynamic. Emergency events often span multiple
jurisdictions requiring collaboration with local, state, and federal agencies
and private stakeholders. Providing a multidisciplinary and multiagency
approach to EOC operations is paramount in effectively managing these
complex events. Reducing the amount of ambiguity in operations will
increase the clarity of roles and positions and improve operations. More
ambiguity will increase the level of dysfunction, creating a disaster within
the disaster.
Image 3.1 Part of a Large EOC Organized with ESFs, Sections, and Collaborative
Spaces (VAEM and VEST EOC)
Trained and qualified staff, appropriate physical resources, and systems

are necessary for EOC operations to meet affected communities’ needs.
Strategic level focus on coordination, communication, and resilience are
areas that an EOC provides for communities. Strategic focus supports the
management of consequences and the political aspect that is present at all
large-scale events. Change is a constant in emergency management. Change
requires an amount of adaptability in EOC operations to meet community
hazards and risk levels. Ongoing training, education, and exercises are
necessary to develop the level of operations. Sustainable funding is an area
that is often overlooked or minimized. Funding, or ongoing investment in
EOC’s, will provide a return on investment to support community
sustainability.
EOC Operations
EOC operations are dependent on the facility, systems, and people. While
some larger organizations may have a dedicated EOC that is hot 24/7, the
majority have space utilized in other capacities on a day-to-day basis.
Having a clear road map to activating systems is a critical, dedicated space,
or not. Activation and staffing plan development needs to include all
potential participants in the process. Inclusion in the development process
begins to establish both essential relationships as well as expectations
between organizations. Policies and procedure development should include:
Notification procedures
Activation procedures
Communication system activation procedures
Logistics support procedures
Staffing assignments and procedures
Safety and security procedures
Demobilization procedures.
Collaboration with internal and external stakeholders during the

development of policies and procedures will increase buy-in. Dialogue with
stakeholders will increase the levels of awareness and identify areas of
vulnerability or weakness that can be addressed through collaboration.
Written procedures and policies are only concepts unless exercised on a
routine basis. An EOC activation and exercise at least annually will provide
the ongoing feedback and capture any changes that have occurred. The
actual EOC policy and procedure manual should be devoid of people’s
names and only list positions. A separate page can provide the names of
people with preassigned positions. This model avoids looking for Sally Smith
during activation and finding out she had left the organization six months
prior.
Pre-identification of positions that will be expected to function in the
EOC can incorporate training and education requirements into job
descriptions. This creates more explicit expectations for individuals. Making
the Public Works Director’s assignment to be the Planning Section Chief
during EOC operations creates role, training, and education expectations.
The organizational budget process should reflect EOC operations needs.
Determining who will be the second and third choices for each position
creates the same level of expectations.
Establishing a community-based emergency planning working group
helps identify, involve, and engage various stakeholders. Entities involved in
the working group can share information, emergency needs, and resource
availability. Healthcare, educational, and large commercial facilities all have
both needs and resources for operations in a large-scale emergency event.
Preparedness, response, and resilience in each organization affect the
broader community. Regularly scheduled meetings of the working group
will provide for information sharing as relationships are developed. Food is a
great incentive to get people to attend.
Image 3.2 EOC Operations Section Chief’s Desk (VAEM and VEST EOC)
EOC Technology
EOC operations are no longer strictly physical. The technology exists and
continues to evolve that supports virtual EOC operations. Evaluation of
different platforms, implementation, training, and use needs to occur before
the event. The assessment may consider what other nearby agencies are
currently using. Sharing a system is beneficial. An internet-based system
sounds great unless the internet is down. Training and familiarization
during an actual system use are not optimal and can lead to mistakes and
errors. Gaining familiarity with system capabilities during exercises and
planned events will provide a return on investment when a large event
occurs.
Leading during the day-to-day organizational activities and a crisis
requires different skill sets. Leaders in EOC operations need to be
experienced, collaborative, adaptable, and strategic problem solvers.
Strategic direction is provided from the EOC for a centralized decision-
making model. Tactical decision-making will need to be completed in a
more decentralized model. Leader actions to develop trusting partnership
relationships prior to the event is beneficial. EOC operations involve
multiple jurisdictions and agencies, creating the potential for a high level of
uncertainty and ambiguity. Being able to pivot or expand operations in a
crisis event is critical. An event that starts as an earthquake can quickly
become more complex with the realization that the domestic water system is
no longer functional. An active shooter event in the aftermath of a flood will
also dramatically shift immediate priorities. EOC planning with stakeholders
provides the opportunity to both develop relationships but also increase
response capability through planning. Collectively conducted planning and
exercises lead to trust development across multiple disciplines and
organizations.
Leadership in the EOC is a primary factor in the influence of field-level
effectiveness. A clear and controlled direction can provide a higher level of
order during the event. This capability impacts the efficacy of
multifunctional teams when brought together during operations. Effective
leaders maintain external and internal situational awareness to balance
operational needs against personal capabilities. This process includes
recognition of their own biases during the decision-making process. The
ability to make appropriate decisions under time and stress is developed
through experience. The development of decision-making skills is essential
to ensuring operational needs can be met. Being able to delegate lower-level
decisions confidently is an additional important factor in the EOC operation
process. Gathering the appropriate information and making a decisive choice
is a factor that is vital and often missing in EOC leaders. It is not unusual to
have conflicting information coming into the EOC. Observing the big
picture and identifying potential contradictory and contradictory
information is an essential function of EOC leadership. Each operational
phase will require a demonstration of different leadership philosophies. The
initial response will likely require a more robust presence than recovery
phases. A leader that can synthesize various inputs to see the bigger picture
and take action will benefit the operations.
Image 3.3 The Podium in an EOC from Which Leaders May Address the
Personnel (VAEM and VEST EOC)
Change
Change occurs in communities and should be reflected in emergency
planning operations. A detailed vulnerability analysis will provide a view of
hazards, risks, and potential consequences. Demographic, socio-economic,
and economic shifts occur in communities continually. These shifts will
impact political and policy decisions that need to be considered in
emergency operations planning. Changes within communities will have a
direct impact on EOC operations.
Change drivers provide both a challenge and an opportunity. Critical
change drivers include:
Community resilience
Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA)
Social media communications
Emergency management effectiveness
Link to political and operations.
Image 3.4 Continuous Community Shifting Factors
EOC operations support community resilience capabilities. An EOC

development process that includes capability assessment and exercises will
provide the venue to develop a framework for resilience before the incident
occurs. An organization’s ability to anticipate, plan, and respond to events
and threats flexibly is a definition of resiliency. EOC operations conducted
through a resilient framework will provide for the ability to respond to
unpredictable circumstances, whether human or natural, caused. EOC
leadership that is continually evaluating and monitoring the community
environment will be in a more resilient position to act when needed.
Continual training, exercises, and operations will support the development
of individual and team knowledge, skills, and abilities to function in a
resilient and coordinated manner when the event occurs. This concept is
consistent with the need for emergency preparedness planning to be a
continuous process that involves stakeholders from the community to
leverage effectiveness. Integrating adaptive capability in the EOC operations
through professional personnel development provides the capacity to
address and manage events that stretch the imagination.
EOC operations can be leveraged to provide programs and resources after
the emergency is mitigated and transition into rebuilding. This model
leverages the structures and relationships that are developed through EOC
operations. Partnerships and engagement at the individual and
organizational levels provide a significant return on investment during
rebuilding.
Emergency events are presenting with increased levels of complexity and
uncertainty. This will result in EOC operations in a VUCA environment.
Political risk to VUCA is uncertainty in decision-making. Ensuring that
information sharing is occurring at the appropriate levels will reduce the
level of adversity to risk.
Social media is an essential tool in EOC operations. The use of social
media should be considered a two-way street with a unified message
strategy utilized for outgoing messaging. Seeking information from
community members via social media can be used for situational awareness
and in comparison with other sources. Integrating Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) into the communication flow can help create maps to monitor
trends and patterns. Failing to use social media appropriately can leave a
critical link out of the communications chain with the community.
Image 3.5 External Affairs—JIC at a Warm EOC (VAEM and VEST EOC)
Determining the effectiveness of EOC operations is subject to a variety of

factors and the perception of evaluators. Achieving a positive outcome for
the community is an overarching goal. How this is measured should be
determined during emergency management program development, training,
and exercises. The media may evaluate effectiveness differently than EOC
professionals. Providing accurate, timely, and relevant information to the
media and community can minimize areas of criticisms. Consistent
messaging is one of the most critical aspects of communications.
A Joint Information Center (JIC) can provide the framework for
consistent messages. One area of awareness is the potential motivation for
agencies to usurp each other politically through messages. A JIC can provide
tools to manage this communication process, while this may never be
eliminated completely.
Politics will always have a role in EOC operations. This may be due to
internal or external stakeholder tensions. Local political pressures will
heavily influence policy decisions. Resources may be desired for allocation
to one area of the community over another due to an elected official’s
residence.
EOC Competency
Competencies needed in the EOC and those required for day-to-day
organizational operations differ. EOC competencies are a blend of hard and
soft skills. Placing people with the wrong skills in EOC operations will have
an impact downstream. You may be a vp of sales or department head for
human resources in your day-to-day position. The same skills and
competencies that make you successful in those positions may detract from
EOC operations positions. Mr or Ms Bossy Pants may not be the fit to work
in a section chief position.
Identifying the positions beforehand, with a depth of two or three people
per position, will provide the necessary staffing when needed. Having only
one person assigned to be planning section chief will ensure that person is
on vacation when the event occurs. Assigning people to EOC positions
based on their organizational jobs provides an opportunity to add references
to job descriptions and attend training to gain technical skills.
Being able to develop team cohesion, make decisions, and stay mission-
focused are required in EOC operations. The consensus agreement of a
strategic mission will provide a touchstone for all personnel involved in the
EOC. Operational thinking occurs in the field. The EOC is the place for
strategic thinking. Tasks are linked to strategy through a tactical framework.
Team building and networking are closely related but different. Both
involve bringing diverse groups of people together to achieve an objective.
Team building is typically conducted within the organization. Bring a
diverse group together in an EOC establishes the framework of the
organization. Team building forms the internal dimension of collaboration.
Networking occurs outside the organization as an external dimension. Team
building and networking are both relationship dependant and benefit from
pre-incident interactions.
Leading EOC operations requires an awareness of change management
and transformational leadership skills to guide operations in the desired
direction that fosters motivation from EOC team members. Actions taken in
the response phase will be different than in the recovery phase. Applying
similar leadership skills will support success in either phase. Fostering a
leadership model and avoiding the boss mentality will provide for higher
levels of team engagement.
A high level of social skills, communications, motivating, and decision-
making are valuable EOC leadership competencies. EOC operations may
bring many people together who previously were not acquainted.
Demonstrating social skills in promoting team development is one of the
essential skills. Social skills will be less critical in the early phases of
response. EOC managers should remember that what is said and done will
be recalled for a long time after the incident is terminated.
EOC communications will occur with internal and external stakeholders
in both verbal and written forms. Remembering that all communications can
either support or damage operations is critical. This awareness can be
incredibly valuable post-incident when legal actions may occur.
Motivating EOC members can be challenging during long-term
assignments. EOC leadership that recognizes an individual’s contribution
can help keep the motivation bucket full. An awareness of the impact of the
event on EOC team member’s personal lives is also essential. Is your
planning section chief going to be entirely focused on EOC operations if
their house was damaged in the event?
Decision-making can be one of the more challenging competencies. No
decision is a decision. Being decisive in the response and recovery phases
can look differently. EOC managers may not know all the information they
would like before making a decision. This can vary significantly in day-to-
day organizational operations where studies and reports can be provided to
address perceived gaps in information. EOC operations will benefit from
targeted questions. Will the contemplated decision meet the overall mission?
What is the risk/benefit of the proposed action? EOC leaders being open to
information and perspectives they may not like is vital to making an
informed decision.
Trust Development Security

Security of an EOC is often forgotten or downplayed in the fog of an
activation. Considering the physical, cyber, and food security needs of an
EOC is a means to mitigate vulnerabilities during a time of extreme
exposure. Bad actors could plan an attack against an EOC while everyone is
focused on the original event. The development of an EOC safety and
security plan will reassure staff that the first event is to be focused on, not a
secondary event at the EOC due to vulnerabilities as a soft target. A physical
EOC location should undergo a comprehensive vulnerability assessment.
This structured process will support identifying vulnerabilities that may
affect the use of the facility. During the assessment process, a review of Na-
Tech (Natural-Technological) incidents should be considered. A Na-Tech
event starts with one type of event but then adds layers from cascading
events. Considering critical staff and facility needs will be provided during
the vulnerability assessment process. Using a best practices template of
bringing in an outside expert is valuable to identify vulnerabilities that on-
site staff may see every day and miss as deficiencies. Security and safety
reviews should be conducted annually. Comprehensive assessments should
be performed on a two- or three-year basis to reflect changes in the
community or physical area.
Image 3.6 Security at the EOC

Applying the model of security in depth will support deterring, detecting,

and documenting potential breaches. Security in depth integrates active and
passive systems in complementary manners to reduce vulnerability and
provide response protocols to breaches. Area security and point security
provide the needed layers to protect the EOC and human assets. Security in
depth can be compared to the layers of an onion. Each layer serves a purpose
and requires removal to access the next level. As each layer is removed, the
remover’s hands obtain more onion fragrance. By the time you get to the
core, you are truly smelling like an onion and cant hide what you were
doing.
EOCs are physical locations and therefore required physical security.
Having an EOC that has been designed explicitly as an EOC is ideal. More
than likely, the EOC will serve another day-to-day purpose as a part of an
existing building. Security is assessed and implemented in layers starting
with access from public streets. Controlling access to the EOC location is a
means to reduce vulnerability. An EOC that is accessible from a public
parking lot can be disrupted in several means. Placing surveillance cameras
in strategic locations at the EOC location will establish a means to monitor
the area of operations 24/7. Having security screen people and vehicles
needing to access the EOC is both a means of accountability and security.
Having a secondary location for EOC operations will provide physical
backup. The time to check the operational aspects of the second location is
not during the event.
EOC operations rely heavily on technology, making cybersecurity a
critical component. Steps to reduce cybersecurity vulnerability may include
only using vetted computer hardware on the network and not allowing
thumb drives to be accessed on computers. The cybersecurity team can
establish a protocol for someone wishing to provide documents or other
information from a thumb drive or cloud service. Creating a whitelisted
group of websites that can be accessed will also reduce exposure to someone
accidentally hitting a site with an unknown threat.
Insider Threat
EOC operations are vulnerable to insider threats. Threats from malicious
actions or accidental actions are possible. External facing security systems
such as firewalls and access controls are necessary. Physical or cyber insider
threats should be considered in planning with appropriate mitigation
strategies implemented. One vulnerability to consider is a Bring Your Own
Device (BYOD) policy. Connecting a vulnerable device to the EOC network
could introduce a variety of threats. Continuous network monitoring by IT
staff help to detect early signs of attack. Additional considerations include
the use of USB ports for external drives. Photography and social media
policy should also be included. EOC staff who take and post photos of
themselves in the EOC may create a vulnerability for the facility, operations,
and themselves. Doxing, developing profiles of people from the internet,
police, fire, and other emergency service staff, is reported to increase. EOC
policies to prevent, detect, and respond to insider threats should be
developed. An insider threat assessment will provide identification of
processes, equipment of behaviors that may create vulnerabilities.
Conducting background checks on staff assigned to EOC operations is
another area for consideration to minimize insider threats.
Food Security
Why go to all the trouble of a physical attack when you can significantly
impact through food? It is not unusual for people to want to provide food
and snacks for EOC staff. Doing so exposes staff to food that may contain
items to cause immediate or delayed health reactions. Mrs Jones providing a
plate of cookies may not seem like a credible threat. You have no way of
knowing the ingredients that might have been used. Being grateful and
accepting food and snacks, just not consuming them, should be considered
to avoid vulnerability. Vetting a list of food suppliers before activation as
part of planning will minimize staff risk while ensuring healthy food is
available. Attacking your EOC through pizza should be sought to be
avoided.
Competencies
EOC operations will bring multiple agencies together during complex and
dynamic events. Organizational factors from each diverse agency will
influence operations’ ability under these high risk and stressful situations.
Organizational practices of each will need to be blended to work in a
collaborative environment achieving consensus-driven objectives effectively.
Image 3.7 Potential Insider Cyber Threats
Each organization will bring its history, culture, practices, and emergency
management experiences to the table. Previous organization and personal
relationships are also brought into the EOC. Agencies seeking to act
autonomously will increase the likelihood of conflict and misaligned tactical
operations. Establishing a collective manner to manage complex incidents
will contribute to better stakeholder outcomes and safer field operations.
Multiagency coordination will occur concurrently in the EOC and field.
Strategic coordination will provide a more effective message during the
development and execution of mitigation actions. Cultural and mission
differences of agencies will emerge and require leader management to
minimize impacts. Measures can be taken pre-activation to increase the
ability to collaborate effectively and gain a level of trust among leaders.
Engaging stakeholders in preparedness, training, and exercise activities is an
effective means to develop effective relationships over time.
The use of a command and control structure in operations is often an area
of concern with external stakeholders. Public safety organizations apply
command and control functions through Incident Command (IC) activities
daily. Healthcare facilities, such as hospitals, educational facilities, and
critical infrastructure entities such as utilities, may use IC structures
variations. Knowing the means, manner, and frequency that the IC is
applied in allied agencies is beneficial. EOC operations that recognize the
subject matter expertise that each agency brings will be in a more influential
position to provide synergy in managing the event.
An ongoing emergency management dialogue that includes routine
training and exercise will provide knowledge of resources, limitations, and
interests to all entities. This process will support the development of diverse
entities’ alliances, provide opportunities for meaningful engagement, and
establish personal relationships. Each of these activities will be needed in the
dynamic situations experienced in an EOC as conflict and stress are
managed.
Clarity of EOC roles is critical to bring multiple agencies together in an
emergency. Each organization will possess different cultures, staff behaviors,
and assumptions regarding the event and collaborative expectations. Even
items such as command structure may be different, creating functional gaps
and potential for miscommunication. Developing relationships with agencies
and entities that are likely to be involved before a large-scale emergency
event is beneficial. These relationships will then support effective operations
in an EOC that translate into improving service delivery at the street level.
Effective EOC leadership is supported by relationships that are based on
trust. The ability to shorten the trust development phase can be established
through role clarity and awareness of stakeholder responsibilities. Trust is
further enhanced by a willingness to show vulnerability when appropriate.
This means the EOC staff should be willing to acknowledge when they do
not know all the answers. Facilitating a discussion to engage other
stakeholders will present opportunities to share knowledge and ideas toward
the best decision for the situation. The ambiguity between multiple
stakeholders challenges the potential to make the best possible decisions
with the given information.
The level of collaboration that information and resource sharing requires
is influenced through collaboration that begins at the strategic leadership
levels. Emergency services managers should see the development of
networks for EOC operations as a social responsibility. Integrating various
stakeholders in the process will increase preparedness levels and provide for
an increased level of success at the tactical level. Stakeholder participation in
purposeful training and exercises facilitates the development of
understanding and trust. Timely decision-making is leverage through the
process to lower the level of ambiguity and conflict and stakeholder roles.
Leaders should remain aware that the area of performance that matters
most is at the community level. An EOC that functions like a well-oiled
machine yet still fails to translate into tactical and task success at the
community level is not a success. Emergency system performance is heavily
dependant on work conducted before the event supports preparedness and
integration with social and economic responsibilities.
Risk-Based Planning in EOC Operations

An increased level of interconnectedness in our communities creates
additional challenges in emergency management. The relationship between
capability, risk, vulnerability, and resilience is ever-evolving. All sectors of
the community should be included in engagement between sectors and
various levels of government. An increase in risk-based planning will create
a stronger bond that will foster resilience. Risk-based planning that identifies
specific hazards and vulnerabilities will increase community needs’
awareness based upon particular risks. Aging critical infrastructure and
limited resources can be identified and addressed through the strategic
plan’s approach. A limited amount of resources may increase the emphasis
on risk-based planning for preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.
Risk-based planning scenarios will help to determine trigger points to
request additional local, state, and federal aid.
The term capability has numerous definitions. In general, a capability is
an organizational framework to utilize resources, knowledge, and skills to
manage a condition or event. Capability requires that the use of resources,
knowledge, and skill is conducted intentionally to achieve an objective. Risk
is the uncertainty and level of probability associated with an event.
Vulnerability is a function of the severity of consequences and the level of
protection afforded. Resilience is a factor of the ability to absorb impact
from a disruptive event and return to a state of normalcy. Collaborative
networks and community-based partnerships contribute to resilience.
Resilience building is a process that involves continuous management of the
capabilities, risk, and vulnerability.
Risk-based planning is beneficial in focusing community preparedness on
appropriate risks. As we have recently learned, no area is immune from a
pandemic. Weather-related emergencies can be assessed based on historical
patterns. Risk-based planning focuses on events that are most likely to occur
while establishing a framework for staying adaptable for the unexpected.
Including all stakeholders in the risk-based planning process will increase
the value to the community. The completed plan is essential. A premium
level of return on investment comes from the engagement of stakeholders in
the planning process.
EOC Operational Complexity

Effective EOC operations require the use of structure and systems that are
dependent on people using the system. The basic ICS system is
straightforward in operation but can evolve into high complexity unless
managed. All systems have the potential for failure. More sophisticated and
complex systems have an increased level of failure risk. Failure in systems is
rarely the result of a single event or cause. A simple failure can lead to a
cascade of failures. Failures can be a combination of professional, financial,
or political factors that contribute to human errors. Training and exercises
are opportunities to determine and address failure points. Conducting root
cause analysis will provide potential identification of underlying causes that
can then be mitigated. The level of experience that EOC staff brings
influences the point and impact of a failure. Role clarity and decreased
ambiguity will contribute to reducing the number of areas where failure can
originate.
Implementing a philosophy of Crew Resource Management (CRM) in
EOC operations establishes the framework for identification and action to
avoid failures. The use of all EOC staff in CRM implementation will increase
the potential to decrease errors, lower stress, and increase operations
efficiency. CRM establishes that all staff is empowered to report any error or
potential error that is observed.
One complex concern of extended EOC operations could be labeled as
EOC fatigue. EOC fatigue can set in when a person has been operating in a
high-stress position for an extended period. Having backups is essential to
allow individuals the ability to take a break and not feel that they are
compromising operations. An additional concern of EOC fatigue is making
errors due to being overwhelmed and not being able to focus on all items in
a concentrated manner.
Performance Indicators of EOC Operations (Ops)

How performance is measured, quantifying the impact and achievement of
objectives is vital to gauge operational effectiveness. Also, these factors can
be tied to funding, political, and community support. Linking performance
measures to capability is critical in determining a realistic scope of actions
and expectations. There is no national level of performance measures leaving
that determination up to local EOC SMEs. Measures of performance for each
community will be different based on several variables such as funding,
hazard levels, and stakeholders’ engagement. EOC SMEs seeking to engage
stakeholders actively is critical in identifying measures and corresponding
funding support levels. Each community will have some differences, but in
general, elected and appointed officials, major business owners, and social
groups are starting points. Identifying and assessing these groups’ priorities
may help determine areas of strategic importance that collectively will need
to be considered in planning. Coalitions may be formed through this process
that provides information, resources, and potential funding. In one
community, Emergency Management leaders developed a coalition of major
corporations present in the community. The group met every quarter to
assess needs and develop plans collectively. Financial and physical resources
were made available through enhanced local disaster response capabilities to
the region. Table Top Exercises (TTX) were conducted annually to test and
evaluate plans. The group was able to determine marketing methods for
community disaster preparedness actions collaboratively. Realistic
performance measures were developed and tracked that included plan
development, TTX, and the number of people opting into mass notification
systems. These measures were useful in assessing performance,
preparedness, identifying trends, and guided decision-making in an
informed way.
Personal relationships were developed that provided the major
stakeholder’s confidence in the EM staff functioning in the EOC during an
event. Emergency preparedness levels increased in the community as a
result of the coordinated actions that occurred. Political support to provide
funding for EOC needs was met as a result of the engagement of elected and
appointed officials with other stakeholders in the community. The risk in
providing a higher level of funding was minimized through the broad
support of stakeholders and constituents in the community. The process took
commitment and time to initiate with a very high return on investment.
The engagement of key stakeholders establishes a means to communicate
individual preparedness awareness to the others in the community. In the
scenario above, the major corporations had approximately 5,000 total
employees living in the region. Collective and coordinated communications
on personal preparedness efforts were reinforced through multiple means,
including newsletters, social media, etc. Encouragement to opt into mass
notification systems and other aspects of knowledge sharing, preparedness,
and communications were being established. Moving from an unprepared
state to awareness and commitment will create a higher level of
preparedness and community resilience.
EOC operations remain a mystery to many stakeholders in the
community. Making people aware of the benefits of an EOC that is linked to
their needs will create stronger community support resulting in increased
political support with a byproduct of funding. Identification and engagement
with stakeholders are crucial. Being both purposeful and productive, aligned
with needs, is an effective means to demonstrate the benefits of an EOC
program in preparation, response, and resilience development.
Contemporary Challenges
Coordinated EOC operations require that multiple components blend
together. Increasing the use of technology involves assurance that systems
are interoperable and have redundancy. Coordinating components can be a
challenge as events start locally and expand to include regional, state, and
federal resources. Critical factors to include in planning, training, and
exercising are:
Testing interoperable communications systems with a level of

redundancy
Testing public notification systems
Image 3.8 Measuring Performance in EOC Operations
Development of systems to gather information from the public.

Crowdsourced information can be valuable once vetted
Development of systems for monitoring and tracking situational
awareness
A resource tracking system that applies to all stakeholders.
Over-reliance on using the internet or cloud without a backup plan can

create gaps in multiple areas. Many agencies have adopted cloud-based
systems to support EOC operations. Ensuring these digital systems are
compatible or establishing a platform agreed to by all is a means to ensure
compatibility. Staff familiarity with the technical and administrative support
systems adopted needs to be conducted before an activation. Learning to use
a system during activation will create gaps and increase stressors
unnecessarily. Developing a pool of qualified staff to operate systems is also
critical. Otherwise, the event will occur when the only person that knows
how to configure the system is on vacation.
Funding
Funding EOCs can be challenging. A reference to community safety,
security, and resilience in the community mission statement or strategic plan
can make funding less complicated. Gaining funding support from
policymakers will likely be more comfortable if they have already publically
recognized the importance of an EOC in the community. Using the EOC for
community events is another manner to both stay visible and develop
positional skills. EOC facilities and hardware should fall into the same
capital replacement cycle as other jurisdictional items. Opening up the EOC
to find rotary dial phones, Commadore 64 computers, and horse stalls may
indicate a lack of attention to current environmental needs.
Creating specific capital and operating line items for EOC operations is
another means to appropriately fund operations. This avoids pooling EOC
funding with other areas to use the funds and leave EOC levels lower or in
deficit. Separating operational budgeting can include funds for staff training
and exercises on a routine basis. Transparency and accountability are
established through this process. Training and exercises that are completed
as planned will use specified portions of the budget and provide a visible
measure of what was or was not completed. Another consideration when
discussing EOC budgets is encouraging the money as an investment in
preparedness, not an expenditure. The price to develop and maintain an EOC
will provide a community return on the investment when the event(s) occur.
Summary
Contemporary humans and naturally caused events are becoming more
complex, with an increase in duration, intensity, and geographic impact.
EOC operational evolution to meet these dynamic events is becoming more
critical to communities’ safety, security, and resilience. The coordinated
approach afforded through EOC operations is beneficial with the increase in
multiagency disciplines and stakeholders involved in disaster response,
mitigation, and recovery. Technology will continue to evolve, creating both
new tools and new vulnerabilities. EOC leaders being aware of trends and
emerging technologies is vital.
A staff that is trained and can competently work in a command and
control system is essential. Succession planning for the long-term
sustainability of operations is a strategic factor that leaders need to build in
the overall program. Threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities will continue to
evolve, requiring a process like an approach. Development of support from
policy-makers to support funding at appropriate levels takes effort and
political acumen without being political. Actions taken to develop, sustain,
and operate an EOC will provide the critical community returns on the
investments when a potentially devastating event occurs.
Chapter 4
Disaster and the Law

Thomas D. Schneid
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-5
There are many different kinds of practices within the legal profession. As
seen on the numerous billboards and television advertisements, some
attorneys specialize in representing individuals or plaintiffs. Conversely,
some attorneys specialize in defending insurance companies or private
entities, often titled defense counsel. For most, if not all corporations, some
corporate attorneys or counselors guide and direct the corporate functions.
Some attorneys specialize in courtroom work known as litigators. And there
are also specialty practices ranging from family law to labor law. The law is
interwoven into virtually every aspect of an individual’s work and home
life. Nearly every entity possesses specialized legal expertise to identify
potential risks, avoid potential risks, and rectify wrongs that that happen
within the scope of operations. When assembling your emergency
management team, should a competent and experienced legal “counselor” be
part of your team to identify risks, identify applicable laws and regulations,
manage regulatory functions, provide legal assistance and often provide a
different viewpoint to the team?
Within the emergency management function, a competent attorney can
serve as a counselor and advisor and a team member. Your legal counsel can
provide guidance and direction and identify pitfalls that the emergency
management team can avoid. Legal counsel can provide guidance when
dealing with governmental agencies, contract issues, insurance issues, and
related interactions. Serving as a team member, legal counsel may not be an
expert in the functions and activities within the emergency and disaster
preparedness planning process; but, can provide a unique viewpoint and a
sharp eye in identifying legal risks which the emergency management team
may not have identified or were unaware of.
In identifying and selecting a legal counselor for your team, this legally
trained individual should possess all of the skills and abilities of a competent
attorney licensed in your jurisdiction as well as the skills of an effective
communicator and a proactive advisor. Furthermore, he or she should be
knowledgeable about the emergency and disaster preparedness realm. For
private-sector emergency and disaster teams, a member of your
organization’s in-house legal team may be appropriate. In the public sector,
your city, county attorney, or outside local counsel may be available.
As your emergency and disaster preparedness team begins their work,
your team should be aware that the myriad of laws that function within our
society daily are still in effect in an emergency or disaster situation. Laws—
whether criminal, civil, or federal, state or local—which may not be
immediately apparent or enforced during an emergency or disaster situation
have a way of being enforced after the immediate impact of the emergency
or disaster situation wanes. In today’s litigious society with the prevalence
of the iPhone camera and instantaneous news, members of the emergency
and disaster preparedness team must be knowledgeable and prepared for the
potential of legal actions that can emerge before, during, or following an
incident. Team members must be aware of their surroundings and what they
say and do at all times.
Image 4.1 Clarification of Laws
In the area of criminal law, emergency and disaster preparedness team

members, as with any individual in the United States, are subject to our
criminal laws. Criminal laws are designed generally to protect society and
can remove freedom from a convicted offender. Criminal laws can be federal
but are predominately state laws. Whether at the level of misdemeanors
(lower offenses) or felonies (higher offenses), crimes can and have been
committed during emergency and disaster situations. From theft to arson,
individuals inside and outside of your organization can individually commit
crimes during an emergency or disaster situation. Enforcement is often
difficult due to the emergency or disaster situation; however, with the
prevalence of cameras and other avenues providing evidence, the crime is
usually identified, and appropriate legal actions are initiated. As a member
of your team, legal counsel can often provide training to your emergency
and disaster preparedness team and assist in developing appropriate
background screening and other assessments.
As criminal laws are designed to protect society, civil laws are designed to
correct unfairness between parties and correct injustices resulting in money
for related non-criminal damages. Civil cases often result from one party
damaging the other party violating an agreement, or another injustice that
the court can remedy by awarding money or related damages. For
emergency and disaster preparedness teams, civil cases often fall within the
category called “tort law,” resulting from circumstances such as injuries
outside the protections provided under state workers’ compensation laws
and contract disputes. Civil actions can be brought in state or federal court
depending upon the jurisdiction and damage amount.
Image 4.2 Types of Laws
Of importance for an emergency and disaster preparedness team is tort

law, which is focused on a wrongful act by one party and an award of
money damages against the other party (e.g., a private-sector emergency
where damage is done to a neighboring facility). Generally, tort law in the
United States has evolved as a body of law. For example, rules such as
reasonable care must be used so as not to injure another person. The
institutional structure through which these laws and rules are applied in the
court system is called litigation, and this system is as essential as the laws
and regulations in achieving equity.
An area of tort law in which legal counsel can educate your emergency
and disaster preparedness team is the area of mass torts. Mass tort cases
involve many injuries or fatalities caused by one incident, such as an
explosion or a singular source, such as a chemical release from an operation.
Although relatively new, mass tort cases have presented challenges to the
court system due to the sheer number of cases. In these very complex cases
involving many plaintiffs, the court has developed rules to consolidate and
manage these actions. However, as we have seen in many cases, a company
that loses the action often files for bankruptcy, and the court must then work
to distribute any company assets to a large number of plaintiffs in an
equitable manner. The litigation cost for both the plaintiff and defendant in
these types of mass tort cases can be millions of dollars.
Tort law for physical harm is generally divided into three categories,
namely intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability. An intentional tort
is when a person intends to commit harm. Negligence, in general terms, is
carelessness. Strict liability (often product liability) generally creates liability
by law for a person or entity who did not mean to harm another and has
exercised reasonable care in attempting to avoid the harm—however, the
injury happened. Torts against non-physical interests can include
defamation, invasion of privacy, misrepresentation, and intentional infliction
of emotional harm.
As an example of an intentional tort, let’s say team member 1 engages in
an altercation with a spectator. Then team member 1, along with individual
2, intentionally punches individual 3 in the nose. This would be the
intentional tort of assault and battery. Emergency and disaster team
members can encounter this type of action during the heat of the moment at
an emergency or disaster scene.
Image 4.3 Tort
Negligence is a primary area of importance for emergency and disaster

team members. Negligence is defined as “the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary considerations which
ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do or the doing of something
which a reasonable and prudent man would not do” (Black’s Law
Dictionary). The primary elements of a negligence action include Duty,
Breach, Causation, and Damages.
Emergency and disaster team members should provide substantial
attention to the first element of a negligence action, namely, has a legal duty
been created through the plaintiff’s relationship? Has a member of the
emergency and disaster preparedness team created a duty in the eyes of the
law? This is an area in which legal counsel can research and train emergency
and disaster team members regarding the scope and breadth of any duty
that may have been created.
Generally, as a citizen, the courts have found a general duty of reasonable
care. For adults, the courts usually have utilized a reasonable person
standard of which a person should not place another at foreseeable risk of
harm through their actions or conduct. For children, the courts often use a
child standard of care, and for individuals with disabilities, the standard is a
reasonable person with the same abilities. For companies, the manufacturer
of goods general duty of care is to act reasonably to protect persons who
may come in contact with the product produced if: there is a knowledge of
probable danger arising from the product, knowing that others will share
danger, and the proximate or remoteness of the relation is a factor to
consider. The scope of liability for the manufacturer of product scope of
potential liability is expanded.
Under the limited duty rule, an individual owed no duty to assist, act, or
rescue another person. However, there are some exceptions to this rule,
including misfeasance (you caused the harm), special relationship (work
relationships, special dependency), voluntary assumption of duty (must
rescue or special skills). This is an important area for emergency and disaster
preparedness team members to review carefully. Legal counsel can research
and train emergency and disaster team members about any specific duty
created through participation as a team member.
In the private sector, emergency and disaster team members may also act
as the company’s agent. Legal counsel can research and train emergency and
disaster preparedness team members as to any duty created as the owner or
occupier of land. In general, the landowner owes no duty of reasonable care
to trespassers. However, a duty may be owed if an injury occurs to a
trespasser due to willful, wanton misconduct or through gross negligence.
The landowner is responsible for knowing the conditions of the land and
any artificial conditions created on the land. Landowners owe a duty to
licensees or individuals granted access to the land, such as contractors.
Landowners owe a duty to warn or make safe any dangerous conditions as
long as the landowner knows of such conditions. Individuals invited on the
land, or invitees must be warned of dangerous conditions by the landowner.
Owners can be held liable if he/she should have known about the dangerous
conditions. The land is open to the public (or public invitees), there is an
implied assurance by the landowner that the premises are reasonably safe
for entry. Legal counsel can educate emergency and disaster preparedness
team members as to any duty that may have been created and methods
through which any created duty can be discharged through warning or
making the property safe. This is especially important during the clean-up
phase following any incident.
Of particular importance to emergency and disaster preparedness team
members is the “Attractive Nuisance Doctrine” involving children. Legal
counsel can train and educate the emergency and disaster preparedness
team members in this important area. Owners or occupiers of property owe
a duty to trespassing children (e.g., construction site following the incident).
If something human-made that attracts children to the land where there is a
risk of harm, a duty of care is created requiring the risk or unsafe condition
to be removed or safeguarded to protect the children.
If the court finds that a duty is created for an emergency and disaster
team or member, the second element which must be proved in a negligence
action is that of breach. In essence, did the defendant breach his/her duty to
the plaintiff? If a duty has not been created, there can be no breach. If a duty
has been created, did the defendant breach this duty resulting in the harm to
the plaintiff? The court will focus on whether the defendant breached the
duty of a “reasonably prudent person” under the circumstances. A
“reasonable prudent person” is a legal standard representing how the
average individual would responsibly act in the same or similar
circumstances. Legal counsel can explain and educate emergency and
disaster team members in this important area.
Res Ipsa Loquitur or “the thing speaks for itself” is a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant was negligent, “which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant’s exclusive control, and that
the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of
negligence.” Under the Rules of Evidence, the defendant’s negligence can be
inferred from the facts of the accident, the character of the accident or
circumstances leading to the accident. In essence, the accident could not
have occurred and the thing which caused the injury was under the
management and control of the defendant. Especially in the private sector,
emergency and disaster team members should also be aware that the
Doctrine of Respondeat Superior (“let the master answer”) can be utilized
where the accident occurred. No one knows who was in control, the
supervisor or superior over the area can be the target of the action.
Additionally, exclusive control is not usually required, however, the power
to control and exercise this control is often sufficient, under Res Ipsa
Loquitor, to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant.
If the court finds there was a duty and the duty was breached, the third
element of a negligence claim is examined, namely causation, or was the
negligence the cause of the injury? The court will look for the causal link
between the defendant’s acts or omissions and the actual injury or harm to
the plaintiff. If there is a causal link between the act and the injury, the third
element’s hurdle is met. If there is no linkage between the act and the injury,
the case is dismissed. However, the court may also look at the foreseeability
of the risk and the injury. In essence, whether the defendant could have
reasonably foreseen that his/her actions might cause an injury. If the
defendant’s actions or omissions can be linked to the plaintiff’s injuries,
although through possible random acts, a linkage could be found. If the acts
involved an act of nature or the acts or omissions could not be foreseeable,
the defendant would most likely prevail, and the action dismissed.
Emergency and disaster preparedness team members should be aware
that all negligence action elements must be proved prior to moving to the
final element of damages. The final element in a negligence action is the
damages. The court will compensate the plaintiff for his/her injuries and the
resulting costs, such as medical costs, property repair, and other losses,
through the award of monetary compensation or money. These damages are
often called compensatory damages, and proof of damages is usually
required. In certain circumstances such as where the defendant’s actions
were outrageous, showed reckless indifference, or showed willful and
wanton disregard, punitive damages may be permitted. Punitive damages
serve two general purposes: to punish the defendant for his/her actions and
deter others from similar actions. Punitive damages usually have no limits
and are left to the discretion of the judge or jury.
Legal counsel can research and educate emergency and disaster team
members as to the availability and scope of possible immunities within the
specific jurisdiction. Emergency and disaster preparedness team members
should be aware of the immunities and defenses in negligence actions,
depending on the state. In the public sector, Sovereign Immunity precludes
actions against the federal government, state government, and related
governmental functions. Most states have abandoned this immunity in favor
of permitting tort actions with restrictions and limitations.
Assumption of the Risk defenses can be expressed or implied. Under the
expressed Assumption of the Risk defense, the plaintiff expressly provides
oral permission to release the defendant from any obligations of the duty of
care. For emergency and disaster preparedness teams, this is often by
contract or waiver. Legal counsel can educate the emergency and disaster
team about the requirements of any release and what acts are beyond the
scope of any release.
Actions sounding in negligence happen every day in courtrooms around
the country, from the slip and fall accidents in the grocery stores to plant
explosions. Legal counsel can help emergency and disaster team members
recognize this area of risk and prepare to minimize or eliminate these risks
where possible. Although workers’ compensation is often the exclusive
remedy for work-related injuries and illnesses, contractors, spectators, and
even trespassers present a risk which emergency and disaster teams should
recognize and address before, during, and after any incident.
Another area of importance in which legal counsel can assist any
emergency and disaster preparedness team is in the area of contracts. A
contract, in its basic form, is an OFFER between two or more parties, and
the ACCEPTANCE of such offer by the parties and a trade of some type of
CONSIDERATION (money, goods, services, etc.). By definition, a contract is
“an agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to
do or not to do a particular thing. Its essentials are competent parties,
subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement and mutuality of
obligation” (Black’s Law Dictionary).
Contract law provides structure and enforcement; however, individuals
are provided the freedom and autonomy to negotiate and agree upon the
terms and conditions of a contract. The basic principles of contract law
simply provide what elements are required to make a legally enforceable
contract. Usually, a contract can be oral or written. For emergency and
disaster preparedness teams, virtually all contracts agreed upon within the
job scope, are required to be in written form. Whereas oral contracts are
often forbidden. Legal counsel can train and educate team members as to the
specific requirements of the organization.
Legal counsel can educate and assist in an area important to every team
member—workers’ compensation. Emergency and disaster team members
should be aware that workers’ compensation cases among their employees—
whether due to an injury occurring at the incident or any other time while
on the job—will differ as each state possesses its own workers’ compensation
administrative system with individual state law governing every aspect of
workers’ compensation within the state. Unlike OSHA, there is no
overriding federal oversight for state workers’ compensation programs.
Generally, most workers’ compensation systems have been designed to
provide payment for medical fees and time lost from work, and a monetary
value on the loss of function or appendage to the injured employee. Each
state establishes its own values while employees and state revenues fund the
workers’ compensation system. Each state possesses its individual required
forms, documents, and procedures.
Workers’ compensation evolved as a compromised method to eliminate
the burden on the court systems and to provide certainty for both the
employee and the employer. For the injured employee, the aforementioned
benefits of workers’ compensation are acquired through an established
administrative process. For the employer, who is usually required to
participate in the state workers’ compensation system, the major benefit is
that injured employees would be barred from pursuing legal action,
resulting in higher costs and the certainty of the cost as established by the
individual state workers’ compensation laws. For the courts, the volume of
workers’ compensation cases is managed through the established
administrative system with most avoiding the court system altogether.
Generally, the negative aspects of workers’ compensation for injured
workers include reduced benefits, such as 66% of their average weekly wage
for time-loss benefits, a fixed schedule for permanent or total disability, and
often the bureaucracy of the workers’ compensation system. For employers,
the primary issue often involves the increasing costs of workers’
compensation, usually established by state legislatures, and the management
of the workers’ compensation claims. Although the workers’ compensation
systems in most states have all but eliminated the need for the courts to be
involved in workers’ compensation claims, new theories and legislation has
created inroads wherein certain claims or actions would be permitted to be
heard before the state court system. With individual states establishing and
effectively managing their workers’ compensation system, emergency and
disaster preparedness teams should be aware that while there are many
similarities among and between individual state workers’ compensation
systems, there are also many differences. Absent one system to preside over
workers’ compensation in the United States, an expanding scope of
inequities has developed among and between state programs. For example,
the benefit levels for time loss and permanent partial disability for identical
injuries would result in substantially different monetary payments to the
injured employee, depending on the state. Again, this is an area where legal
counsel can advise and assist the emergency and disaster preparedness team.
In general, most, if not all, state workers’ compensation systems provide
no-fault coverage to employees whose injury or illness arises “out of or in
the course of employment” or, in essence, on the job. Virtually every state
possesses a claim and other forms that are required to be completed by the
injured employee, the employer and/or the medical provider, or all parties.
Upon initiation of a claim, most states provide full and complete coverage
for all medical costs for as long as the claim remains open. Many states have
a maximum number of weeks or years the claim can remain open. The
second area of coverage is time loss or TTD payments. Often based upon the
employee’s wage, with a minimum requirement and a maximum cap, the
employee usually receives between 65% and 70% of his/her wages, often after
an initial waiting period (3–7 days). The last category of benefits is often a
Percentage of Permanent Disability or loss (often referred to as “PPD”).
Depending on the state, a panel of individual physicians would evaluate the
injured employee when he/she reaches maximum medical recovery and
determine a percentage of loss. This percentage is converted to a monetary
amount that the employee receives for the loss.
Legal counsel can be very beneficial in educating and assisting emergency
and disaster teams in labor, employment and anti-discrimination. These are
very complex areas of the law—whether federal or individual state laws—
and require team members’ training and education to avoid potential
violations.
Federal Laws
Below is a listing of a majority of the potentially applicable federal laws
within these areas.
Labor
National Labor Relation Act

Labor Management Relation Act
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
Labor Arbitration
Railway Labor Act
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act
Norris–Laguardia Act
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Act
ostal Service Labor Relations
Hobbs Act (Anti-Racketeering)
Byrnes Act (Anti-Strikebreaker)
Anti-Discrimination Laws
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title VII)
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Equal Pay Act (EPA)
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)
Federal Anti-Discrimination Executive Orders 11246
Federal Wage and Hour Laws
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

Walsh–Healey Act
Davis–Bacon Act
Government Service Contract Act
The Copeland Act
The Miller Act
Consumer Credit Protection Act
Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act
Federal Retirement, Welfare and Privacy Laws
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)

Social Security Act
Railroad Retirement Act
Health Maintenance Organizations Act (HMO)
Federal Unemployment Tax Act
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act
Federal Employee Compensation Act
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
The Jones Act
Laws Enforced by Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
This law makes it illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of

race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. The law also makes it illegal to
retaliate against a person because the person complained about
discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an
employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit. The law also requires
that employers reasonably accommodate applicants’ and employees’
sincerely held religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act

This law amended Title VII to make it illegal to discriminate against a
woman because of pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to
pregnancy or childbirth. The law also makes it illegal to retaliate against a
person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge
of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination
investigation or lawsuit.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA)
This law makes it illegal to pay different wages to men and women if they
perform equal work in the same workplace. The law also makes it illegal to
retaliate against a person because the person complained about
discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an
employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
This law protects people who are 40 or older from discrimination because of
age. The law also makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the
person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or
participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
This law makes it illegal to discriminate against a qualified person with a

disability in the private sector and in state and local governments. The law
also makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person
complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or
participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit. The
law also requires that employers reasonably accommodate the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless doing so would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.
Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Among other things, this law amends Title VII and the ADA to permit jury
trials and compensatory and punitive damage awards in intentional
discrimination cases.
Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
This law makes it illegal to discriminate against a qualified person with a

disability in the federal government. The law also makes it illegal to retaliate
against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a
charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination
investigation or lawsuit. The law also requires that employers reasonably
accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
employer’s business.
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)

Effective November 21, 2009
This law makes it illegal to discriminate against employees or applicants

because of genetic information. Genetic information includes information
about an individual’s genetic tests and the genetic tests of an individual’s
family members, as well as information about any disease, disorder, or
condition of an individual’s family members (i.e., an individual’s family
medical history). The law also makes it illegal to retaliate against a person
because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of
discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination
investigation or lawsuit. (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
located at http://www.eeoc.gov).
Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor
Wages & hours

Workplace safety & health
Workers’ compensation
Employee benefits
Unions & their members
Employee protection
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
Employee Polygraph Protection Act
Garnishment of wages
The Family and Medical Leave Act
Veterans’ preference
Government contracts, grants, or financial aid
Migrant & seasonal agricultural workers
Mine safety & health
Construction
Transportation
Plant closings & layoffs
Posters
Related agencies
The Department of Labor (DOL) administers and enforces more than 180
federal laws. These mandates and the regulations that implement them cover
many workplace activities for about 10 million employers and 125 million
workers.
Following is a brief description of many of DOL’s principal statutes most
commonly applicable to businesses, job seekers, workers, retirees,
contractors and grantees. This brief summary is intended to acquaint you
with the major labor laws and not to offer a detailed exposition. For
authoritative information and references to fuller descriptions on these laws,
you should consult the statutes and regulations themselves.
Rulemaking and regulations provide brief descriptions of and links to
various information sources on DOL’s rule-making activities and
regulations.
Wages and Hours
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) prescribes standards for wages and
overtime pay, which affect most private and public employment. The act is
administered by the Wage and Hour Division. It requires employers to pay
covered employees, who are not otherwise exempt, at least the federal
minimum wage and overtime pay of one-and-one-half times the regular rate
of pay. For non-agricultural operations, it restricts the hours that children
under age 16 can work and forbids the employment of children under age 18
in certain jobs deemed too dangerous. For agricultural operations, it
prohibits the employment of children under age 16 during school hours and
in certain jobs deemed too dangerous.
The Wage and Hour Division also enforces the labor standards provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that apply to aliens authorized
to work in the US under certain non-immigrant visa programs (H-1B, H-
1B1, H-1C, H2A). (U.S. Department of Labor located at http://www.dol.gov).
Workplace Safety & Health
The Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act is administered by the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Safety and health
conditions in most private industries are regulated by OSHA or OSHA-
approved state programs, which also cover public sector employers.
Employers covered by the OSH Act must comply with the regulations and
the safety and health standards promulgated by OSHA. Employers also have
a general duty under the OSH Act to provide their employees with work and
a workplace free from recognized, serious hazards. OSHA enforces the Act
through workplace inspections and investigations. Compliance assistance
and other cooperative programs are also available.
Workers’ Compensation
If you worked for a private company or a state government, you should

contact the workers’ compensation program for the state in which you lived
or worked. The U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs, does not have a role in the administration or oversight of state
workers’ compensation programs.
The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA),
administered by The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP),
provides for compensation and medical care to certain maritime employees
(including a longshore worker or other person in longshore operations, and
any harbor worker, including a ship repairer, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker)
and to qualified dependent survivors of such employees who are disabled or
die due to injuries that occur on the navigable waters of the United States, or
in adjoining areas customarily used in loading, unloading, repairing or
building a vessel.
The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
(EEOICPA) is a compensation program that provides a lump-sum payment
of $150,000 and prospective medical benefits to employees (or certain of their
survivors) of the Department of Energy and its contractors and
subcontractors as a result of cancer caused by exposure to radiation, or
certain illnesses caused by exposure to beryllium or silica incurred in the
performance of duty, as well as for payment of a lump sum of $50,000 and
prospective medical benefits to individuals (or certain of their survivors)
determined by the Department of Justice to be eligible for compensation as
uranium workers under section 5 of the Radiation Exposure Compensation
Act (RECA).
The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8101 et seq.,
establishes a comprehensive and exclusive workers’ compensation program
which pays compensation for the disability or death of a federal employee
resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty.
The FECA, administered by OWCP, provides benefits for wage loss
compensation for total or partial disability, schedule awards for permanent
loss or loss of use of specified members of the body, related medical costs,
and vocational rehabilitation.
The Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) provides monthly cash payments and
medical benefits to coal miners totally disabled from pneumoconiosis (“black
lung disease”) arising from their employment in the nation’s coal mines. The
statute also provides monthly benefits to a deceased miner’s survivors if the
miner’s death was due to black lung disease.
Employee Benefit Security
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates employers

who offer pension or welfare benefit plans for their employees. Title I of
ERISA is administered by the Employee Benefits Security Administration
(EBSA) (formerly the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration) and
imposes a wide range of fiduciary, disclosure, and reporting requirements on
fiduciaries of pension and welfare benefit plans and on others having
dealings with these plans. These provisions preempt many similar state laws.
Under Title IV, certain employers and plan administrators must fund an
insurance system to protect certain kinds of retirement benefits, with
premiums paid to the federal government’s Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC). EBSA also administers reporting requirements for
continuation of health-care provisions, required under the Comprehensive
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the health care
portability requirements on group plans under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Unions and Their Members

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 (also
known as the Landrum–Griffin Act) deals with the relationship between a
union and its members. It protects union funds and promotes union
democracy by requiring labor organizations to file annual financial reports,
by requiring union officials, employers, and labor consultants to file reports
regarding certain labor relations practices, and by establishing standards for
the election of union officers. The act is administered by the Office of Labor-
Management Standards (OLMS).
Employee Protection
Most labor and public safety laws and many environmental laws mandate
whistleblower protections for employees who complain about violations of
the law by their employers. Remedies can include job reinstatement and
payment of back wages. OSHA enforces the whistleblower protections in
most laws.
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
Certain persons who serve in the armed forces have a right to reemployment
with the employer they were with when they entered service. This includes
those called up from the reserves or National Guard. These rights are
administered by the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS).
Employee Polygraph Protection Act
This law bars most employers from using lie detectors on employees but
permits polygraph tests only in limited circumstances. It is administered by
the Wage and Hour Division.
Garnishment of Wages
Garnishment of employee wages by employers is regulated under the

Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) which is administered by the Wage
and Hour Division.
The Family and Medical Leave Act
Administered by the Wage and Hour Division, the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) requires employers of 50 or more employees to give up to
12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave to eligible employees for the birth or
adoption of a child or for the serious illness of the employee or a spouse,
child, or parent.
Veterans’ Preference
Veterans and other eligible persons have special employment rights with the
federal government. They are provided preference in initial hiring and
protection in reductions in force. Claims of violation of these rights are
investigated by the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS).
Government Contracts, Grants, or Financial Aid
Recipients of government contracts, grants or financial aid are subject to

wage, hour, benefits, and safety and health standards under:
The Davis–Bacon act, which requires payment of prevailing wages and

benefits to employees of contractors engaged in federal government
construction projects;
The McNamara–O’Hara service contract act, which sets wage rates and
other labor standards for employees of contractors furnishing services
to the federal government;
The Walsh–Healey public contracts act, which requires payment of
minimum wages and other labor standards by contractors providing
materials and supplies to the federal government.
The above is not an all including listing of all the federal laws which may
be applicable to an emergency and disaster preparedness team. Legal
counsel, as a team member and familiar with the team’s operations, can
identify the applicable laws and provide education and guidance to the team
members. An emergency and disaster preparedness team, absent of legal
counsel, could be walking into a legal minefield and may not even be aware
that the mines exist.
In addition to the myriad of laws “on the books” today, emergency and
disaster preparedness teams should be aware of the many new technologies
and uses of existing technologies which are emerging and could impact
operations. Legal counsel as an advisor to the team can identify these
emerging issues as well as the potential pitfalls each issue can create for the
team. One of the most current is the carrying of a firearm by a team
member, contractor or other individual affiliated with the emergency and
disaster preparedness team.
While the 2nd Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
citizens with the rights to own and possess firearms; many states possess
conceal and carry laws permitting qualified individuals to acquire a license
to carry a concealed weapon. Individuals believe that they can rightfully and
legally carry a concealed weapon in all locations. However, with the
prevalence of workplace shootings, school shootings and other gun related
injuries and deaths, many companies and organizations have established
policies and protocols prohibiting employees and others from carrying a gun
or other weapon on company property.
For most emergency and disaster preparedness teams as well as
companies and organizations, the risk of harm which could result from
employees carrying concealed weapons usually far exceed the individual
employee’s right to carry a concealed weapon in the workplace. Generally,
companies and organizations should be aware of the potential legal
liabilities and risks involved including, but not limited to, workers’
compensation claims, OSHA violations (under the General Duty Clause),
negligence actions, and actions under state tort laws for injuries resulting
from the discharge of a weapon on company property. In order to limit
potential legal liabilities, many companies and organizations have
established policies in which firearms, concealed or open, as well as all items
of weaponry, are prohibited in the workplace or on company owned or
controlled property. Although state laws vary widely, companies and
organizations have generally been permitted to implement and enforce
policies prohibiting firearms as well as other identified weapons from the
workplace.
Legal counsel can familiarize the team with not only the federal laws but
also individual state laws regarding concealed carry as both may impact
whether an employee is permitted to carry a concealed weapon in the
workplace. Additionally, legal counsel can advise that in certain states, there
can be a legal risk associated with prohibiting employees from carrying a
concealed weapon. Under several state concealed carry laws, employees and
others are permitted to keep their firearm in their personal vehicle even if
the vehicle is on company property. Most states require a posted notice to
employees when implementing a policy and protocol to ban firearms and
weapons on company property.
In developing a policy and protocol for a firearm and weapon-free
workplace, legal counsel can assist the team in adopting very specific
verbiage utilized in the policy to avoid potential conflicts or
misunderstandings. Posting of the policy and protocol, as well as appropriate
signage, is usually required. Additionally, to ensure complete clarity,
terminology, such as firearm and weapon, should be clearly defined as well
as the scope and boundaries in which the policy is in effect. Careful
consideration should be provided to meet the requirements of the individual
state laws in regards to parking lots, company vehicles and job sites off
company property.
Legal counsel can educate the team members regarding the prohibited
conduct (e.g. bringing a concealed handgun to work) as well as the
proscribed disciplinary action (disciplinary action up to and including
discharges). Depending on the scope of the emergency and disaster
preparedness team’s operations, this policy should consider the inclusion of
temp workers, subcontractors and other non-employees within the scope of
the policy if working on company property or at the incident scene.
Additionally, legal counsel can educate team members on incorporating
specific information in the policy regarding the reasonable search of
employee lockers, employee vehicles, company property, as well as desks,
lunch boxes and clothing bags. Within the policy should be specific language
identifying what would happen if an employee refused to permit the search
(i.e., voluntary termination) as well as non-employees, such as vendors, who
refuse to permit a search (prohibited from entry).
The emergency and disaster preparedness team should be aware that the
issue of concealed carry could also impact the overall emergency and
disaster program, workplace violence program as well as active shooter
programs. Legal counsel can provide education as well as training and
advise in the assembly of an appropriate policy for your emergency and
disaster preparedness team.
Another emerging area that can impact emergency and disaster
preparedness teams is the legalization of marijuana. With a substantial
number of states legalizing the use of marijuana for medical and/or
recreational use, safety and health professionals and employers are
challenged with issues involving controlled substance testing and marijuana
use on the job while maintaining a safe and healthy environment. Adding to
the myriad of issues involving marijuana use is the current economic
conditions where the unemployment rate in the United States has dropped
below 4% and companies and organizations cannot acquire qualified
employees (and/or applicants who can successfully pass the controlled
substance testing). Although most private-sector emergency and disaster
preparedness teams rely on company or organization mandated controlled
substance testing to ensure that employees are not working under the
influence, many companies and organizations are removing marijuana from
their drug-testing panels in order to increase the applicant pools as well as
potentially reduce costs in testing.
Emergency and disaster preparedness teams should be aware that the
trend toward legalization suggests that this will continue, and a recent poll
identified that 60% of people in the United States favor the legalization of
marijuana. With companies removing THC from their testing panels, the
responsibility will shift to safety and health professionals to train their
supervisors to identify employees who may be working in an impaired
condition, provide safeguards for safety sensitive positions, ensure that
disciplinary policies and related policies are up-to-date and in line with
current law and design programs which will create and maintain a safe and
healthy environment within the perimeters of the potential risk probability.
Drone technology has emerged as a new tool in the toolbox of many
emergency and disaster preparedness teams. With the use of drones, of
varying levels and functions (e.g., ranging from military to recreational use),
emergency and disaster preparedness teams should be aware of laws and
regulations created within this emerging area. The use of drones is a
relatively new area and has steadily increased primarily due to the improved
technology and the lower price.
government agency possessing jurisdiction over the airways of the United
States is the Federal Aviation Administration (known as the FAA). The FAA
has established new rules and regulations regarding the operation of drones.
Emergency and disaster preparedness teams should also be aware that if a
state or local law addressing the use of drones is enacted, the FAA rules and
regulations would be preempted by the FAA rules and regulations thus
invalidating the state or local law or rule. However, state and local laws or
ordinances within the state or local government’s specific policing power,
such as land use or local police power, generally are outside of the FAA
regulations.
There can be many positive aspects to the use of drones by emergency
and disaster preparedness teams within the scope of work and within
operational boundaries. However, as legal counsel can advise emergency and
disaster preparedness teams, drones can also create new potential risks when
used by others to impact the incident scene and other areas. Issues involving
privacy have been addressed within the FAA regulations as well as by many
states. Additionally, issues regarding the use by law enforcement for
surveillance has been addressed by the FAA requiring law enforcement to
secure a warrant similar to other types of surveillance. In a number of states,
specific laws have been passed addressing surveillance by drones by private
citizens. Drones can be used for a multitude of purposes, including
terrorism. The FAA has established rules regarding the air space and use of
drones around prisons, stadiums, airports and other critical infrastructure.
FAA has adopted the term unmanned aircraft (UA) to describe drones.
Although there are many different aircrafts in the category of drones,
including but not limited to, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), RPV (remotely
piloted vehicle), and ROA (remotely operated vehicle), the category has been
primarily divided by recreational and non-recreational use. Recreational use
vehicles have limited size and are flown solely for recreational or sport
purpose. These types of drones are governed by the voluntary safety
standards adopted by the Academy of Model aeronautics. Drones operated
for non-recreational purposes in the United States and governed by the FAA
are required to obtain a Certificate of Authorization (COA) to operate in
national airspace. In 2015, the FAA, under the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act, required all drones weighing more than 250 grams flown for
any purpose to be registered with the FAA. (PL 131) Failure to register can
result in significant civil penalties (see National Law Review, Neal, Gerber
and Eisenberg LLP, December 17, 2015).
Image 4.4 Disaster and the Law
Emergency and disaster preparedness teams who are using or plan to use
a drone within their operations should be cognizant of the FAA as well as
state and local laws, regulations, and ordinances. Additionally, safety and
health professionals should verify and discuss surveillance and privacy
issues as well as licensure issues with their legal and human resource
departments. Conversely, emergency and disaster preparedness teams
should address the potential use and risks that others can create against your
operations or structures. As with most tools, a drone can be very beneficial
in providing an aerial view of equipment, disaster situations, and non-
traditional workplaces. However, drones also possess the potential to be used
in events of terrorism, invasion of privacy, improper surveillance, and other
uses.
In summation, in today’s litigious American society, is it essential to have
competent legal counsel as part of your emergency and disaster
preparedness team. Although legal counsel is not an emergency and disaster
preparedness expert, he/she can serve as an advisor to identify applicable
laws that may impact the operations or planning functions and educate the
team about the specific risks involved with the law/s. There are laws, known
or unknown to the emergency and disaster preparedness team, which
potentially impact every person, plan, and decision. Absent competent legal
counsel to advise and guide the team through this legal jungle by identifying
the risks for team assessment, blind decisions will be made which can have
far-reaching impacts on the team and the function. The solution is simple:
find and place for a competent attorney/advisor on your emergency and
disaster preparedness team and listen when he/she provides legal advice.
Your team may be made up of emergency and disaster preparedness experts,
but your legal advisor is the guru in the legal world.
Chapter 5
Emergency Management Laws and

Mandates: What Drives Emergency
Management Planning and Policy
Shane Stovall
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-6
Whether you are a new emergency manager or a seasoned veteran in the

field of emergency management, there are laws, guidance, and best practices
that need to be followed to ensure effective hazard mitigation, prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery in our communities. This chapter
focuses on a few of the core laws and guidance that drive the plans, policies,
and programs emergency managers must implement and maintain. This
contributes to the preparation of government agencies and departments, the
private sector, volunteer agencies, and the citizens of the community to
respond and recover from emergencies and disasters, regardless of the
causing hazard.
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act is a
core law of significant importance for Emergency Managers across the
United States.
Genesis of the Robert T. Stafford Act
Before 1950, the U.S. Congress passed 128 separate laws to manage
emergencies and disasters that affected the United States. This was necessary
because there was not a piece of comprehensive legislation that addressed
disaster relief. This system led to inconsistencies in the administration of
disaster relief. In 1950, Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act
(Public Law 81-875), which gives the President of the United States the
authority to provide federal disaster assistance upon a Governor’s request.
The request is for the President to consider issuing a major disaster
declaration, thereby, if approved, facilitates the availability of federal
disaster assistance.
Image 5.1 Public Law 92-288
The Federal Disaster Relief Act made it clear that federal assistance was
merely to supplement state and local response and recovery efforts and not
to be the “front-line” response and recovery agency for any disaster.
Therefore, a major disaster declaration would only be approved once it was
evident that state and local resources were overwhelmed and/or had
expended a reasonable amount of funds toward response and recovery.
The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-769) improved
upon the 1950 legislation. While the bill in 1950 was felt to handle “routine”
and small-scale disasters effectively, it did not adequately handle large-scale
disasters. Some of the measures included in the Federal Disaster Recovery
Act of 1966 allowed federal agencies to provide disaster loans below-market
interest rates. Additionally, the federal government was allowed to give aid
to unincorporated areas.
However, the federal government would soon learn that further work was
needed on the Disaster Relief Act. Two large-scale disasters spotlighted some
areas for improvement. The first disaster was Hurricane Agnes, which
caused catastrophic damage to the United States’ eastern part in June 1972
(National Weather Service, n.d.).
Hurricane Agnes caused disastrous flooding in various locations along the
eastern seaboard, leading to 122 deaths and over $2 billion in damage
(National Hurricane Center, n.d.). This became the costliest natural disaster
to affect the United States to that date. The second disaster occurred in April
1974 when tornadoes struck across ten states. These disasters provided state,
local, and federal government some lessons learned on improvements that
were needed to the Disaster Relief Act—particularly relating to individual
and family assistance.
The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-288) improved
upon the Disaster Relief Acts of both 1950 and 1966. This legislation required
federal agencies to assist local and state agencies with direct information
about impending threats and provide technical assistance to state and local
officials in public warnings about impending disasters. This legislation
allowed the federal government to offer disaster assistance to individuals
and households through the Individual and Family Grant (IFG) program
upon the issuance of a Presidential Disaster Declaration.
Image 5.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Source: Image by FEMA
The IFG provides 75% of the funding for state-administered programs that
give individuals and families funds to purchase clothing, furniture, and other
essential needs adversely affected by a disaster.
The Disaster Act of 1974 was the federal government’s first effort to
formalize hazard mitigation efforts intending to reduce the effects of
disasters before they occur. Up to this point, federal, state, and local
governments have merely responded to disasters as they occurred.
Additionally, the Act promoted a multi-hazard approach to emergency
planning, which compelled local, state, and federal governments to focus
mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery planning efforts on all
hazards that could affect a jurisdiction or region.
The Birth of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA)
In late March 1979, the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station’s
partial meltdown in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, required over 100 entities to
coordinate and provide response and recovery efforts.
The response was fragmented and, therefore, inefficient. This incident
further led to the recognition that a coordinated emergency management
agency was needed in order to coordinate emergency mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. In April 1979, President Jimmy
Carter signed an executive order that created the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). This agency consolidated and unified several
different agencies’ effort to make federal disaster efforts more effective and
efficient. This agency’s mission is to “lead Americans to prepare for, prevent,
respond to, and recover from disasters” (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2019a).
The Introduction of Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Act
The Robert T. Stafford Act Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Public Law 100-707), called the Stafford Act, was signed into law on
November 23, 1988. This law replaced all previous Disaster Relief Acts. Since
its inception, the Stafford Act has been amended multiple times based on
lessons learned from catastrophic disasters impacting the United States.
The Stafford Act is divided into seven titles. Emergency management
professionals must be familiar with state, and local emergency management
efforts relating to disaster assistance and relief. The following is a general
synopsis of the content of each title.
Title I—Findings, Declarations, and Definitions

This section provides a general overview and intent of the Act. This
legislation intends to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance
by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out
their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from
such disasters by:
1. Revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief programs;

2. Encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster preparedness
and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and organizations by the
states and by local governments;
3. Achieving greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster
preparedness and relief programs;
4. Encouraging individuals, states, and local governments to protect
themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace
governmental assistance;
5. Encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from
disasters, including the development of land use and construction
regulations; and
6. Providing federal assistance programs for both public and private losses
sustained in disasters (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019b,
pp. 1–3).
Image 5.3 Public Law 100-707
Title II—Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Assistance

This section of the Stafford Act describes the need for a national disaster
warning system and allows for the use of a national civil defense or a
commercial communication system to issue warnings to the public.
Title II also authorizes the establishment of a national disaster
preparedness program that includes the appropriate federal agencies and
gives the President of the United States the ability to provide technical
assistance to states completing comprehensive disaster preparedness plans.
Title II also lays out details for pre-disaster hazard mitigation plans. The
federal government can provide financial assistance to states through the
National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund. States develop mitigation plans,
which often include the development of local mitigation strategies to lessen
the impact of disasters on infrastructure, the economy, and public health.
This effort is led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency assisted by
numerous other federal, state, and local agencies, along with the American
Red Cross (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019b, pp. 4–10).
Title III—Major Disaster and Emergency Assistance

Administration
This section of the Stafford Act describes the emergency and major disaster
declaration process. This process includes the appointment of a Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) by the President for each disaster, responsible
for analyzing the types of relief needed, the establishment of a field officer,
and coordination of relief among state, local, and non-profit entities.
This section addresses the non-discriminatory requirements for the
delivery of federal disaster assistance. These requirements cover the
processing of disaster assistance applications, the distribution of supplies,
and the delivery of disaster assistance funds or services.
Title III establishes the penalties for misuse of funds obtained under the
Stafford Act. These penalties include fines of up to one-and-a-half times the
amount of misused funds. Additionally, the U.S. Attorney General can bring
a civil action against any individual who violates any part of the Stafford
Act, to include maximum civil penalties of $5,000 per violation.
Additionally, Title III sets forth requirements for mitigation plans. Each
local or tribal plan is required to describe actions to mitigate hazards and
risks within the jurisdiction and establish a strategy for implementing those
actions. State mitigation plans must indicate the technical support provided
to local and tribal entities (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019b,
pp. 11–28).
Title IV—Major Disaster Assistance Programs

When a disaster occurs, a state’s governor activates that state’s emergency
plan. If the Governor determines that the disaster will overwhelm state and
local resources, the governor can request the President for a disaster
declaration. The request details the number of resources that the state has
available to handle the disaster. Including the Governor’s agreement to the
cost-sharing stipulations under the Stafford Act. The baseline cost-sharing
requirements are that the federal government will pay 75% of eligible
disaster costs, with state and local governments paying 25% of the eligible
disaster cost (often termed “matching funds”).
Image 5.4 Requesting Presidential Declarations

Title IV of the Stafford Act delineates the President’s authority, roles, and
responsibilities concerning the provision of federal assistance for disasters.
The President’s powers under the Stafford Act include:
Directing federal agencies to provide direct and technical assistance to

affected areas;
Coordination of disaster relief assistance;
Directing the distribution of needed supplies such as food, water,
medicine, transportation, and logistical needs;
Provision of legal, relocation, temporary housing (18-month
maximum), and unemployment assistance;
Facilitation of community disaster loans (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2019b, pp. 29–67).
Title V—Emergency Assistance Programs

Title V of the Stafford Act describes the powers and authorities of the
President, which includes assistance with debris removal. Debris removal is
often one of the highest costs of disasters, particularly natural disasters.
Additionally, this section of the Stafford Act also outlines how states can
request a Presidential Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration. The
President has the authority to unilaterally declare an emergency; however,
such a situation is uncommon. Image 5.4 above illustrates the steps required
in requesting a Presidential Disaster Declaration (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2019b, pp. 68–70).
Title VI—Emergency Preparedness

Title VI of the Stafford Act speaks to the actions needed to prepare for all
hazards. Among these actions are:
Planning—Creation of functional emergency operations plans. The

planning process includes multiple stakeholders that have roles before,
during, and after a disaster. Planning consists of the following:
– Emergency Preparedness Plan/Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
(Title VI of the Stafford Act explains the requirements for these
Plans)
– Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP)
– Hazard Mitigation
– Hazard-Specific Planning
– Special Event Planning
Training and exercising—Ensuring that emergency and disaster

personnel are trained in their roles associated with plans and protocols.
This can include exercising the plan to ensure familiarity with
expectations, roles, and responsibilities.
Creation of warning systems—Ensuring that the public can be
notified in a timely manner about an impending threat to property or
life so that appropriate emergency protective measures can be taken.
These systems should include considerations for multiple languages
based on community demographics, as well as communication and
warning for those who may be sight or hearing impaired.
Evacuation planning—Identifying the resources and developing plans
needed to evacuate people out of harm’s way, including sheltering.
These plans should include those that may be shut-ins or those who
may have functional and access needs.
Stockpiling of supplies—Anticipating what will be needed following a
disaster and ensuring that the jurisdiction has enough supplies in
preparation for an emergency or incident. Supplies may include water,
non-perishable food, cots, or numerous other common needs following
a large-scale emergency or disaster.
Protection of critical infrastructure—Planning and providing hard
protection of infrastructure that may be critical to the community
and/or economy (i.e., government buildings, utilities, financial sector
assets, etc.)
Dissemination of emergency preparedness information—Public
education is critical. Emergency managers must use various means to
educate the public on how to protect themselves, their families
(including their pets), and their property from multiple hazards. The
public must also be informed on what actions to take should a hazard
threaten the community.
This section of the Stafford Act also outlines the authority and
responsibilities of the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. Additionally, Title VI of the Stafford Act indicates that every state
should employ a full-time emergency preparedness director (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2019b, pp. 71–85).
Title VII—Miscellaneous
As the title of this section suggests, Title VII of the Stafford Act is a
collection point for changes and additions made to the Stafford Act over
time. This section gives the President the authority to determine any rule or
regulation that may be needed to effectively implement the Stafford Act.
Among some of the amendments are:
Payment or approved public and individual assistance is to be

distributed within 60 days of its approval.
The act states that the federal government is to treat puerto rico as a
state (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019b, pp. 86–9).
Summary
The elements in the Stafford Act are codified in more detail in the Code of
Regulations, Title 44 (commonly known as 44 CFR; see Code of Federal
Regulations, 2013). The Stafford Act and 44 CFR are core documents
(legislation and regulations) that direct emergency and disaster mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery at the federal, state, and local levels.
These are expected to be amended as the country experiences more disasters
and more lessons are learned. Emergency managers must become familiar
with the Stafford Act and 44 CFR and keep abreast of both documents’
changes.
National Incident Management System

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, it was determined that a
national approach to incident management would further improve the
effectiveness of emergency response providers and incident management
organizations when dealing with any hazard, whether it be natural, man-
made, or technological. This national approach applies to all jurisdictional
levels and functional disciplines to allow for consistency in emergency and
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.
On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 (U.S. Office of the Federal Register, 2003),
which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop, among other
actions, and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS).
According to HSPD-5:
This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local
governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover
from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability
and compatibility among Federal, State, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of
concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multi-
agency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of
resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification;
and the collection, tracking and reporting of incident information and incident resources.
(Department of Homeland Security, 2003, pp. 3–4)
The guiding principles of NIMS place a focus on flexibility,

standardization, and unity of effort in incident management for both
emergencies and large-scale disasters. FEMA published the first document
related to NIMS in 2004 and then revised it in 2008 and again in 2017. The
2017 NIMS document is organized into three major components (as opposed
to seven in previous versions). These three major components encompass all
elements in previous versions of the NIMS doctrine. Those elements are:
Resource management—This element of NIMS covers standardized
mechanisms and methodologies to “systematically manage resources,
including personnel, equipment, supplies, teams, and facilities, both
before and during incidents to allow organizations to more effectively
share resources when needed” (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2017, p. 1).
Command and coordination—This element “describes leadership
roles, processes, and recommended organizational structures for
incident management at the operational and incident support levels and
explains how these structures interact to manage incidents effectively
and efficiently” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017, p. 2).
Communications and information management—This element
“describes systems and methods that help to ensure that incident
personnel and other decision-makers have the means and information
they need to make and communicate decisions” (Federal Emergency
Management Agency 2017. p. 2).
Under NIMS, Resource Management covers a comprehensive set of

guidelines for local, state, and federal management of resources before,
during, and after an incident. The guidance provided under NIMS includes
the following:
Preparedness (Before the Incident)
Identifying and typing resources

Qualifying, certifying, and credentialing personnel
Planning for resources (i.e., stockpiling, mutual aid agreements,
assigning resources, and contracting resources)
Acquiring, storing, and inventorying resources
Response (During an Incident)
Identifying resource requirements/needs

Ordering and acquiring resources
Mobilizing resources
Tracking and reporting resources
Demobilization
Reimbursement and restocking of resources
The guidelines that NIMS puts forth for Command and Coordination as
comprehensive and focus on tactical activities as well as incident support,
policy guidance, and outreach and communication with the media during an
incident. The major elements addressed by NIMS regarding Command and
Control include:
Use of common terminology

Management by objectives
Span of control
Resource management (as discussed above)
Chain of command and unity of command
Dispatch/deployment of resources (as discussed above)
Incident action planning
Incident facilities and locations (i.e., emergency operations centers
(EOCs), staging areas, incident command posts, multiagency
coordination centers, etc.)
Integrated communications
Image 5.5 NIMS Resource Management Process

Source: Provided by Rick C. Mathews 2020
Unified command
Accountability
Information and intelligence management
Joint information system (JIS)/joint information center (JIC).
Communications and Information Management is the third and final

section of the NIMS guidance. This section’s key principles focus on
interoperability; reliability, scalability, portability; resilience and
redundancy, and information security. The key elements addressed in the
guidance related to Command and Management are as follows:
Communications Management
Standardized communication types
– Strategic
– Tactical
– Support
– Public
Policy and planning

Communications equipment standards
Communications agreements
Training and exercises using interoperable communications plans and
equipment.
Incident Information
Incident reports
Incident action plans
Data collection and processing
Communications Standards and Formats

Common terminology
Use of plain language
Data interoperability
Use of technology and procedures
Information security/operational security
Each of these areas is important for the Emergency Manager to be

familiar with. Some jurisdictions may only adopt certain aspects of NIMS,
but the expectation is that NIMS is adopted by every jurisdiction in its
entirety. For more information on the NIMS and all of its components and
guidance, you can find those on the FEMA website at:
https://www.fema.gov/nims-doctrine-supporting-guides-tools.
State Laws and Guidance

While there are many federal laws and sets of guidance relating to
Emergency Management functions, many states have legislation that
mandates how the state and its local political jurisdictions will manage
emergencies and disasters before, during, and after they occur. Many of
these mandates are consistent with federal laws and guidance. However,
some of these administrative rules and guidance may exceed what the
federal mandates and guidance put forth. Much is dependent on the unique
needs, organization structure, and political considerations for the respective
state.
It is important that Emergency Managers be familiar with State laws that
govern local emergency and disaster management. Many of these impose
requirements that could be tied to operational funding or disaster assistance.
Industry-Specific Laws and Guidance

Depending on which sector an emergency manager works, he or she may be
subject to specific laws that govern emergency management within that
sector. This section will examine some of these laws to allow the reader to
gain familiarity with them.
Higher Education
Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime
Statistics Act (Clery Act, 1990) (Pub.L. 101–542)—The Clery Act is a
federal law that amends the Higher Education Act of 1965. The Clery Act
requires colleges and universities to disclose certain timely and annual
information about campus crime and security policies. This law was enacted
after the rape and murder of Jeanne Clery at Lehigh University in
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania in April 1986. The attack on Clery was one of
many violent crimes that had occurred at the university within a three-year
period. Clery’s parents sued the university and won, stating that if they had
known of the record of crime at the university, Clery would not have
attended (Gross & Fine, 1990).
This led to the development of the Clery Act, which requires universities
and colleges who receive federal financial aid to do the following.
1. Publish an annual security report—By October 1 of each year,

institutions are required to publish their Annual Campus Security
Report (ASR) to all prospective and current students and employees of
the institution. This report requires that the crime statistics for the
previous three years be provided to the report’s readers.
Additionally, the report must provide information on safety and
security policies and procedures implemented by the institution, as well
as descriptions of campus programs and outreach that deal with crime
prevention.
2. Issue timely warnings—The Clery Act identifies specific crimes that
present a threat to students and employees’ safety. The institution is
required to provide timely notification to the campus community when
one of these crimes has occurred and/or poses a threat to the
institution. Examples of such crimes include homicide, robbery,
burglary, motor vehicle theft, arson, and sexual assault.
3. Provision of a public-facing crime log that shows crimes that have
occurred at the campus over a minimum of the previous 60 days—
These logs are to include the date, time, and nature of the crime, along
with the disposition of the crime (i.e., arrest made, still under
investigation, etc.).
4. Provide a public-facing fire log—Much like the crime log, the
institution is required to disclose a list of fire alarms and actual fire
incidents to the public that includes the date, time, and cause (if
known). These statistics are to be included in the institution’s Annual
Safety Report.
5. Maintenance of crime statistics for the previous eight years—These
include crimes that are often defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting
Handbook, published by the United States Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation online under the title Crime in the
U.S. (FBI, 2014). In 2014, amendments were made to the Clery Act,
which included reporting stalking, dating violence, and domestic
violence.
6. Designation of campus security authorities (CSAs)—According to
the Code of Federal Regulations pertaining to the Clery Act, a CSA is
defined as ‘any official of an institution who has significant
responsibility for student and campus activities, including, but not
limited to, student housing, student discipline, and campus judicial
proceedings” (Code of Federal Reggulations, 2014). CSAs are
responsible for reporting crimes to the institution’s law enforcement
agency for investigation and includes numerous institutional
employees. These CSAs are required to be trained annually
(Department of Education, 2016).
Institutions that do not follow the Clery Act requirements are subject to
fines by the Department of Education. As an example, one university (name
intentionally omitted) was fined $4.5 million in 2019 for failure to properly
classify crimes, failure to issue timely warnings, failure to establish Campus
Safety Authorities, and several other violations (Department of Education,
2019). This is one example of many where institutions have been fined for
not following the requirements of the Clery Act.
While many institutional police departments may handle many of the
Clery Act requirements, emergency management plays a crucial role in
reporting requirements (i.e., emergency planning, evacuation planning,
warning, and notification). In some institutions, the Clery Act
responsibilities are solely part of the responsibilities of the emergency
manager (who may work for the university law enforcement agency).
Healthcare
In September 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
published an administrative rule in the Federal Register. The “Emergency
Preparedness Requirements for Medicare and Medicaid Participating
Providers and Suppliers Final Rule” (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2019) became a regulation in November 2016. Any medical facility
that accepted Medicare and/or Medicaid funds was bound by these
regulations one year after promulgated.
This rule established national preparedness requirements for 17 different
types of medical facilities to include hospitals, nursing homes, and dialysis
facilities. The Joint Commission (formerly known as the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)). The Joint
Commission is empowered by the U.S. Congress to be the accrediting
agency for healthcare facilities in the United States. For a healthcare facility
to be accredited, they must follow all the emergency preparedness
regulations.
Elements of the Emergency Preparedness Standard for the Join
Commission include:
All-hazards threat and risk assessment;

All-hazards planning that includes how sickened or injured patients are
to be cared for should an emergency or disaster occur;
Emergency and disaster training and exercises to include the national
incident management system;
Hazard-specific protocols, to include the response to chemical and
radiological hazards.
As an Emergency Manager in the healthcare field, it is imperative to

understand all the emergency preparedness regulations placed on healthcare
facilities.
Failure to meet these standards could result in the loss of accreditation for
the healthcare facility. This could be catastrophic for the healthcare facility
for the standards are related to patient safety and care. Insurance companies
could see it as a reason to not pay patient claims, which could make it very
difficult to collect payments from a patient. This could lead to a large
financial issue which could cause the facility to close. While this is a worst-
case scenario, it illustrates the need for the healthcare emergency manager
to be familiar with the Joint Commission standards related to emergency
preparedness.
Conclusion
This chapter outlines many of the essential laws and guidelines that
Emergency Managers must be cognizant of in order to establish and
maintain efficient and effective programs relating to all-hazard mitigation,
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The laws and guidelines
outlined are by no means an exhaustive list. It is imperative that the
Emergency Manager research what laws may be applicable to their
organization or jurisdiction and implement them accordingly. These laws
can be federal, state, or even local ordinances, laws, rules, regulations.
From these laws and guidelines, many organizations have developed best
practices. The Federal Emergency Management Agency hosts a “Best
Practices Stories” web page (https://www.fema.gov/best-practices-stories)
that contains numerous best practices from around the United States. This is
a starting point. Other best practices can be found at professional emergency
management conferences, on federal, state, and local websites; and on the
websites of professional emergency management associations.
To conclude, it is imperative that the Emergency Manager, whether brand
new to the field or one with vast experience, be knowledgeable of the laws
and guidance related to Emergency Management. There are occasional
changes to these laws and guidelines that may lead to operational or
administrative shifts in an Emergency Management Agency. Therefore,
staying apprised of emergency management guidance, laws, and best
practices is a big key in leading a successful Emergency Management
program.
References
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (2019). Emergency
preparedness requirements for Medicare and Medicaid participating
providers and suppliers final rule, Federal Register. Retrieved from:
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/09/16/2016-
21404/medicare-and-medicaid-programs-emergency-preparedness-
requirements-for-medicare-and-medicaid
Clery Act (1990). Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and
Campus Crime Statistics Act, Public Law 101-542.
Department of Education (2019). Secretary DeVos levies largest-ever Clery
Fine against Michigan State University, requires major corrective action
following systemic failure to address sexual abuse. Retrieved from:
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-levies-largest-
ever-clery-fine-against-michigan-state-university-requires-major-
corrective-action-following-systemic-failure-address-sexual-abuse
Department of Education (2016). The Handbook for Campus Safety and
Security Planning. Department of Education, Washington, DC. Retrieved
from: https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2003). Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-5. Retrieved from:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Securit
y%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf
Code of Federal Regulations (2013). 44 CFR, Emergency management and
assistance. Retrieved from: https://ecfr.federalregister.gov/current/title-44
Code of Federal Regulations (2014). 34 CFR 668.46. Institutional security
policies and crime statistics. Retrieved from:
https://ecfr.federalregister.gov/current/title-34/subtitle-B/chapter-VI/part-
668/subpart-D/section-668.46
FBI (2014). Crime in the U.S. Retrieved from: https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/cius-home
Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Publ. L. No. 81-875 (1950).
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2019a). Emergency
Management Institute (EMI) overview. Retrieved from:
https://training.fema.gov/history.aspx
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2019b). Stafford Act as
amended, and related authorities. Retrieved from:
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1582133514823-
be4368438bd042e3b60f5cec6b377d17/Stafford_June_2019_508.pdf
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2017). National Incident
Management System: Third Edition. Retrieved from:
ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf
Gross, K. & Fine, A. (1990). After their daughter is murdered at college, her
grieving parents mount a crusade for campus safety. People. Retrieved
from: https://people.com/archive/after-their-daughter-is-murdered-at-
college-her-grieving-parents-mount-a-crusade-for-campus-safety-vol-33-
no-7/
National Hurricane Center (n.d.). Hurricanes in history. Retrieved from:
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/
National Weather Service (n.d.). Flood of June 1972—Hurricane Agnes.
Retrieved from: https://www.weather.gov/bgm/pastFloodJune1972
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Publ. L.
No. 100-707 (1988).
State of Missouri Emergency Management Agency (n.d.). Disaster
declaration process. Retrieved from:
https://sema.dps.mo.gov/recover/federal-disaster-declaration-process.php
U.S. Office of the Federal Register (2003). Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 5, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Retrieved
from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=4
Module Two
Facilitation of Effective Emergency
Management
Chapter 6
Developing a Planning Team

Michael J. Fagel and Lucien G. Canton
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-8
The Emergency Planning Team

Emergency planning must always be a team effort.
Any event will require effective coordination among every department
within your organization. Planning as a cohesive team helps to ensure that
everyone having the expertise to contribute in a plan or response is a part of
the process. Team planning also helps to ensure the buy-in of all key players
or stakeholders. Buy-in is a critical portion of the process.
Who Should Be on the Planning Team?

Different types of events require different expertise and response
capabilities. The specific individuals and organizations involved in a
response will vary by the type of event or mission. Some may involve only
an internal response, whereas others may require the response of external
agencies, such as law enforcement, fire services, public health, emergency
management and emergency medical services (EMS).
These external agencies must cooperatively be involved in large-scale
planning, as well as other agencies, such as those responsible for hazardous
materials (hazmat) response, should be included as well. Picture a large
industrial facility that may operate its own.
Table 6.1 presents a breakdown of potential team members for an office-
industrial-educational organization. Table 6.2 shows elements for a
municipal type operation. Not all organizations will have such a breakdown
of personnel, and dependent on the size of the organization, one person may
be responsible for multiple roles. All individuals do not need to be included
in every aspect of the planning process, but they should be consulted in
areas that affect them directly or for which they will be responsible. These
elements are a suggestion for your consideration. In reality, the planning
team may have a member from each department/unit that operates daily in
your jurisdiction/organization.
These are meant to be sentence starters to get your thoughts organized.
Many organizations have team members, alternates, and subgroups as well.
You do not want a team that is so large to be cumbersome and
unworkable.
Image 6.1 Planning Team

Table 6.1 Possible Emergency Planning Team Members-Organization
Individuals/Organizations What They Bring to the Planning Team
Support for the emergency planning

Chief executive officer process, policy guidance and decision-
(CEO) or designee making capability, and the authority to
commit the organization’s resources
Knowledge of the Incident Command
System (ICS), knowledge of
organizational procedures, safety
Plant manager or
requirements, hazardous materials
designee
response requirements; knowledge of
external agencies or the ability to
interface with them
Knowledge of the organization’s safety
planning and steps already taken, as
Safety director
well as the ability to interact with all
departments
Knowledge of individual department
Departmental supervisors
procedures, safety requirements, and
or designee
personnel
Knowledge of medical treatment
requirements for a variety of
EMS/Employee health situations, knowledge of medical
director or designee treatment facility capabilities, and
specialized personnel and equipment
resources
Individuals/Organizations What They Bring to the Planning Team
Knowledge of hazardous materials that

are produced, stored, or transported
into or off the organization’s campus,
knowledge of Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Occupational
Hazardous materials Safety and Health Administration
coordinator (OSHA), and Department of
Transportation (DOT) requirements for
producing, storing, and transporting
hazardous materials, knowledge of
how to respond to hazardous materials
incidents
Specialized personnel and equipment
resources, and additional personnel
and equipment resources; includes fire,
Mutual aid partners EMS, and law enforcement for the
community in which the facility is
located as well as other community
departments as needed
Table 6.2 Possible Emergency Planning Team Members-Governmental
What They Bring to the Planning Team

Officials
(including but not limited to)
SUPPORTS:
Chief Elected
• Planning process
Official of
• Policy
Jurisdiction
• Authority to commit resources
What They Bring to the Planning Team
Officials
(including but not limited to)
UNDERSTANDS:
• THIRA
Director of
• Jurisdictional resources
Emergency
• Ability to Interact with outside agencies
Management
• Maintains and operates the EOC as director of
the EOC during operations
Law
Enforcement
Agency
Police Chief- Supports integration & collaborative efforts within
Sheriff- Public their agencies and the communities
Safety
Director-
Commissioner
Various Knowledge of individual department operational
Departmental responsibilities and functions required in a crisis or
Agency Heads planned event situation
Knowledge about public health integration within
Public Health various incidents and relationship to the other
agency operations
Finance Able to effectively bring all of the required
Director functions to emergency status during deployment
Specialized personnel and equipment resources,
and additional personnel and equipment resources;
Mutual aid
includes fire, EMS, and law enforcement for the
partners
community in which the facility is located as well
as other community departments as needed
Getting the Team Together

Getting all of the collaborators and contributors in the planning process
together and to take an active interest in the planning process will be an
arduous task. To schedule meetings with so many participants may be even
more difficult. It is critical, however, to have everyone’s participation in the
planning process, at least in the early stages and at critical points along the
way, to draw from their expertise and ensure their buy-in to the plan.
The expertise and knowledge that participants bring of their departments’
needs and resources are crucial to developing an accurate plan that considers
the entire organization’s needs and the resources that could be made
available in an emergency. It is definitely to the organization’s benefit to
have the active participation of all key players.
There are several steps that can be taken to gain cooperation from
participants and to gain their involvement in the planning process.
Plan ahead—Give the planning team plenty of notice of where and

when the planning meeting will be held. If time permits, survey the
team members to find the time and place that will work for them.
Provide information about team expectations—Explain why
participating on the planning team is important to the participants’
departments and to the organization as a whole. Show the team
members how they will contribute to a more effective emergency
response.
Involve the principal elected official/organizational leader to sign the
meeting notice—This will send a clear message that emergency
planning is important to the organization and that the participants are
expected to attend.
Allow flexibility in scheduling after the first meeting—Not all team
members will need to attend all meetings. Task forces and
subcommittees can complete some of the work. Where this is the case,
gain concurrence on timeframes and milestones, but let the
subcommittee members determine when it is most convenient to meet.
It also may be beneficial to talk to emergency managers from similar
organizations in the community to gather input on how to gain and
maintain interest in the planning process, as well as to see what practices
they already have in place that work or have already been tested.
Team Operation
Unlike working alone, working with personnel from other departments to
plan for emergencies requires some give and take—in other words,
collaboration. Collaboration is the process in which people work together as
a team on a common mission—in this case, the development of a
community/jurisdiction/organization emergency operations plan (EOP).
Successful collaboration requires:
A commitment to participate in shared decision-making

A willingness to share information, resources, and tasks
A professional sense of respect for individual team members
Although collaboration among EOP planning team members may be
difficult, it benefits the community as a whole by strengthening the
overall response to disaster.
Collaboration can:
Expand resource availability through sharing

Enhance problem solving through the cross-pollination of ideas.
Stages of Team Formation

Collaboration does not come automatically. Building a team that works well
together takes time and effort and typically evolves through five stages:
1. Forming—Individuals come together as a team. During this stage, the

team members may be unfamiliar with one another and uncertain of
their roles on the team.
2. Storming—Team members may become impatient, disillusioned, and
may disagree.
3. Norming—Team members accept their roles and make progress toward
the goal.
4. Performing—Team members work well together and make progress
toward the goal.
5. Adjourning—Their task accomplished, team members may feel pride in
their achievement and some sadness that the experience is ending. It is
important to remember that the team should remain intact for the
purpose of exercising and revising the plan.1
Team Roles
To keep the team focused throughout the planning stages, it is important for
team members to assume roles. Perhaps the most important role is that of
team leader. The team leader initiates appropriate team-building activities
that move the team through each stage and toward its goal. Other team roles
may include:
The taskmaster, who identifies the work to be done and motivates the
team
The innovator, who generates original ways to get the group’s work
done
Image 6.2 Team Roles
Image 6.3 Characteristics of an Effective Team

The organizer, who helps the group develop plans for getting the work
done
The evaluator, who analyzes ideas, suggestions, and plans made by the
group
The finisher, who follows through on plans developed by the team.
Together, all members contribute toward making the team productive.
Characteristics of an Effective Team

You will know that the planning team is on track when it displays the
following characteristics:
Works toward a common goal

Accepts the leader who provides direction and guidance
Communicates openly
Resolves conflicts constructively
Displays mutual trust
Shows respect for each individual and his or her contributions.
Summary
Emergency planning requires collaboration from a variety of individuals and
organizations. The benefits of collaboration far outweigh the difficulties that
you will face during the planning process. Some of the benefits include
elimination of duplication of services, expanded resource availability, and
enhanced problem-solving.
The planning process can be made easier by planning ahead, providing
information about team expectations, and allowing flexibility in scheduling.
It may be to your benefit to talk to emergency managers from other
communities to gain their input on the planning process.
Successful team operation requires a commitment to participate in shared
decision-making, a willingness to share information, and a professional
sense of respect for individual team members.
You will know that you have an effective planning team when members
agree on and work toward a common goal; provide open communication;
and display constructive conflict resolution, mutual trust, and respect for
other team members.
Note
1. Smith, M.K. (2005). Bruce W. Tuckman—forming, storming, norming and performing in groups. The
Encyclopedia of Pedagogy and Informal Education. Retrieved August 31, 2020 from:
http://infed.org/mobi/bruce-w-tuckman-forming-storming-norming-and-performing-in-groups.
Chapter 7
Assessing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and

Risks within the Community
Robert D. Hughbank and Richard J. Hughbank
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-9
Introduction
While there are many aspects and responsibilities within the field of
emergency management, assessing threats, risks, and vulnerabilities within a
community are at the core and require careful consideration, planning, and
interrelations among pivotal government organizations, non-government
organizations (NGOs), and stakeholders. The key to conducting a viable
vulnerability assessment is conducting risk and threat assessments first to
identify the potential for vulnerabilities. The creation of cogent plans,
policies, and procedures that are trained and exercised is critical once the
assessments are complete. Additionally, communications between the
appropriate agencies that can best mitigate an identified threat, combined
with a clear chain of command, will facilitate well-executed responses based
on guidance from the Emergency Operation Center.
One helpful process of conducting assessments is the Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) provided by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment is a three-step risk assessment process
that helps communities answer the following questions.
What threats and hazards can affect our community?

If they occurred, what impacts would those threats and hazards have
on our community?
Based on those impacts, what capabilities should our community have?
The THIRA helps communities understand their risks and determine the
level of capability they need to address those risks.
Image 7.1 THIRA 2019

Image 7.2 Critical Infrastructure—Dams
Source: Provided by Michael J. Fagel
Homeland Security Vulnerabilities

The methodology for identifying and characterizing resources is based on
the hazards and high-value target vulnerabilities that are determined by
state, local, or tribal government leaders in advance. Each identified target
will have a unique associated set of hazards (e.g., dams burst but rarely do
they burn down) that require a specific set of resources to respond to each of
them. The collection of the resource requirements will drive the
investigation toward specific sets of resources that are related to high-value
targets. Emergency managers should examine all available data on those
resources, identify any significant shortfalls, and assign staff members (self
or volunteers if a small shop) to pursue key information.
Shortfalls of various types are identified and characterized (e.g.,
equipment, trained personnel, policy) so that effective strategies can be
devised to correct them. Once gaps in response planning and capabilities are
identified, a strategy must be developed to fill the actual void between
requirements and capabilities. This strategy must identify and quantify the
shortfalls in response capability for the selected high-value targets and
recommend specific actions for preparedness, mitigation, or elimination of
those shortfalls.
Managing Risk in Homeland Security

Managing risk is both an art and science. The art lies within the ability of
someone to think outside the box. In other words, think like the criminal or
threat you are assessing risk and vulnerabilities against as it directly relates
to a perceived attack on a certain person, facility, or city. This art form
comes from using threat assessments received from local, state, and federal
law enforcement and intelligence agencies and practical experience.
The science of risk management comes in the form of threat, risk, and
vulnerabilities assessment tool discussed with the chapter. Once again,
experience with risk management is important as a risk and vulnerability
assessor uses quantitative values based on qualitative evaluations. The
human factor will usually result in varying assessments of the same area or
facility based on experience. In the end, it is the assessor’s job to provide
data and information to the client(s) for them to make the final decision on
how to move forward with the protection of a given person, facility, or city.
Role of Intelligence in Assessing Threats and Vulnerabilities

Intelligence is data fragments that are collected by varying sources, assessed
for potential relevance, analyzed, and converted into a product to support a
specific customer. It is also important to note that intelligence is both a
process and a product. In the information and computer age, intelligence has
become even more critical.
Image 7.3 Risk Management
Image 7.4 Exit for NSA Complex
There are multiple forms of intelligence: Human Intelligence (HUMINT),

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence
(MASINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Strategic Intelligence
(STRATINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Technical Intelligence
(TECHINT). Reduced to the lowest common denominator, intelligence is the
information of the world around us, which is used to create an invaluable
product to assess threats, risks, and vulnerabilities.
Strategic intelligence is used for long-term planning and other broad
topics such as operational capabilities of a potential threat. With painstaking
analysis and the use of computers to produce explicit evaluations and
concise intelligence assessments, risk and vulnerability assessors can have a
foundational tool to effectively use in an effort to identify potential threats
and targets within their community.
Based on their experience, the authors observed that nearly all illegal
activity can be identified in advance by intelligence indicators. It is the
observation of these indicators, and the proper analysis of their significance,
that could directly lead to relevant intelligence information. Someone will
not necessarily recognize specific stand-alone indicators at first, but to a
trained intelligence analyst, those indicators could prove viable in the
development of assessment plans (Hughbank, Githens, & Hughbank, 2010).
Emergency Management Phases

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has created five
phases to assist in preparing for, executing, and recovering from natural and
human-made catastrophic events (Homeland Security, 2015). The five phases
are generally accepted across the nation to ensure all cities, counties, and
states are properly aligned with FEMA guidance and federal monetary
support.
Prevention Phase
Prevention focuses on preventing hazards, principally from possible natural
disasters or human-made attacks. Preemptive measures are identified and
calculated to deliver long-lasting safety from catastrophes. However, not all
disasters can be averted—even with the most careful of planning and
preparation. The risk of the potential loss of a facility or life may be reduced
with proper, continuous, and strategic planning. Activities focused on
prevention must be ongoing when planning and training for a potential or
perceived catastrophic event. Planning for natural or human-made disasters
is not static, rather dynamic. Prevention is a risk-driven, coordinated,
flexible, and professional approach to an all-hazards accounting for all
stakeholders.
Image 7.5 Five Mission Areas—Prevention
Image 7.6 Five Mission Areas—Protection

Protection Phase
Protection refers to all of the safeguards pertaining to protecting the
homeland (United States) againt terrorism, human-made, and natural
disasters. The primary focus point of this phase is to protect people, vital
national interests, and the democratic way of life which requires diverse
activities. These activities include:
Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs);

Defense of agriculture and food;
Critical infrastructure protection;
Protection of key leadership and events;
Border security;
Maritime security;
Transportation security;
Immigration security; and
Cybersecurity.
Mitigation Phase
Mitigation, while a separate phase, works hand-in-hand with the
preparation phase. Prevention attempts to minimize the likelihood that a
disaster will happen, while mitigation is the steps taken to reduce the loss of
life and damage to community infrastructure. It is important to note that the
ultimate goal of the mitigation phase is to minimize, if not completely
eliminate, loss of life.
Mitigation is a community’s determination to reduce the loss of life and
property by reducing the effect of catastrophes. It involves structural and
non-structural actions taken to reduce the effect of disasters and is a
continuous process effectively used throughout the Emergency Management
Cycle.
Image 7.7 Five Mission Areas—Mitigation
Response Phase
Response includes the synchronization and management of resources,
including personnel, equipment, and supplies. It uses the Incident Command
System (ICS) in an all-hazards method and takes measures to protect life,
property, and the environment. Response consists of the support and
involvement throughout or directly after a disaster. The response stage is a
consequence of an emergency or catastrophic disaster and is frequently
calculated in hours, days, weeks, and months.
Response is the emergency manager’s reaction to all challenges which
disasters generate. As emergency managers respond to catastrophe, they
must employ all their emergency preparedness tools, for example,
emergency plans, strategies and methods, and EOC training to respond to
any disaster.
Image 7.8 Five Mission Areas—Response
Image 7.9 Five Mission Areas—Recovery
Recovery Phase
Recovery is the synchronized progression of sustaining communities affected
by a catastrophe in the rebuilding of infrastructure and restoration of human
emotional and physical welfare, which is generally calculated in months and
even years. It affects many stakeholders, and it is important to address them
by taking an all-hazards approach to recovery.
Recovery involves endeavors that remain past a catastrophic event with
the focus of reestablishing damaged, crucial community utilities, and to
supervise maintenance efforts. The recovery phase is initiated without delay.
The goal of the recovery phase is to establish normalcy to the community
affected by the disaster and regain a sense of safety and normalcy.
Risk Management
The risk management process can be effective in situations where
undesirable events could cause significant negative impacts, and there are
insufficient resources to defend against all such eventualities. The objectives
of the risk management process are:
The realistic identification of assets that need or require protection;

The risks to assets identified by a thorough assessment;
The security policies, practices, and procedures that will provide the
desired level of security at an affordable price.
Achieving the objectives of the risk management process requires

responsible and balanced thought processes and sound judgment in
developing, selecting, and implementing security policies, practices, and
procedures. An emergency manager must be mindful that although the
principles of managing risk are the same at all levels of government and
industry, their application may differ as a result of differences in objectives,
accountability mechanisms, and legal requirements.
Categories of Incidents to Consider for Evaluations

There are three categories to consider when evaluating hazards.
1. Technological
a. Cyber (civil communications and data network infrastructure)
information is an asset that needs protection. Almost all
businesses, and all governments, have vital information that could
potentially cripple or destroy a business or government.
Information protection is a critical element of a security plan.
Knowing who has the information, where it is, when it is
accessible, and how it could be compromised are crucial issues.
b. Botnets, distributed denial-of-service (DDOS), hacking, malware,
pharming, phishing, ransomware, spam, spoofing, spyware, Trojan
horses, viruses, Wi-Fi eavesdropping, worms, others.
2. Human-made
a. Insider threats
b. Criminals
c. Terrorists
d. Riots/Protests (Mass gatherings)
e. Arson
Image 7.10 Three Categories to Consider for Evaluation
f. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives

(CBRNE)—Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
g. Airline disasters
3. Natural
a. Tropical Storms
b. Hurricanes
c. Tornadoes
d. Earthquakes
e. Pandemics
f. Floods
g. Wildfires
h. Tsunami
i. Lightning
j. Dust
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21)

Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience has identified 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors considered
vital to the United States. The damage or destruction of these sectors could
have an incapacitating effect on national and economic security, or national
public health or safety. Here are the 16 sectors identified and discussed in
PPD 21 (White House, 2013):
1. Chemical sector
2. Commercial facilities sector
3. Communications sector
4. Critical manufacturing sector
5. Dams sector
6. Defense industrial base sector
7. Emergency services sector
8. Energy sector
9. Financial services sector
10. Food and agriculture sector
11. Government facilities sector
12. Healthcare and public health sector
13. Information technology sector
14. Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector
15. Transportation systems sector
16. Water and wastewater systems sector
Emergency Operations Center

Hardening an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) should be one of the
initial steps in protecting a community as it typically serves as the central
hub for all emergency planning and execution for first responders and
government leaders, when activated during large-scale emergencies or
disasters. Once a facility has been identified to house the EOC, the
vulnerability assessment process should begin to ensure the safety and
security of those charged with monitoring and reacting to catastrophic
events.
Once the vulnerability assessment is complete and community leaders
(e.g., city manager, mayor, etc.) identify the most prudent actions to take in
securing the EOC, the facility must be structurally hardened, secured, and
protected. Protecting the EOC includes protecting the actual facility, the
building where it is located, and the surrounding area. The redundancy in
security measures will help to ensure both the personnel and information
within the EOC are protected. The primary approach to EOC vulnerability
assessments, facility hardening, and increased area security to make certain
there is sustainability, interoperability, survivability, and flexibility during a
catastrophic event.
Image 7.11 Modern EOC (VDEM EOC)
The EOC has been identified as the central hub, during disasters, for
planning and coordinating emergency agencies and their respective
activities within the jurisdiction. The key to that success lies within
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) systems. The C3 element to
an EOC is essential to coordinating in a contiguous environment where
multiple incidents may be occurring simultaneously. The ability for
leadership to command and control a catastrophic event is imperative, and
the EOC affords the opportunity to lead personnel and manage resources
from a central location. This also allows on-scene leaders to make decisions
and effectively communicate essential information to the EOC where the
“larger picture” is created for strategic decisions away from the incident.
Image 7.12 Operations Section Chief at VDEM EOC
Image 7.13 The Podium VDEM EOC
Finally, communications are the lifeline of any catastrophic response.

Many after-action reviews from incidents occurring across the nation have
identified communication successes and failures. Two of the largest concerns
with communications during a multi-response situation include a lack of
universal communication nets between various response agencies and the
loss of communications as a whole. The use of different communication nets
across law enforcement, fire service, EMS, and multiple first responder
agencies from other cities or countries creates a communication nightmare
that can be addressed and potentially corrected in the EOC. Additionally,
with numerous first responders on-scene, there is a potential for overloading
the cellular towers creating a complete shutdown for telephonic
communications.
Community as a Whole
Communications
A communications plan is the heart of the EOC. Without communications
among various stakeholders and responders, there can be no coordination of
effort. Duplication of effort is not only a waste of time, but it keeps needed
responders from other, possibly critical efforts.
There are many ways to get information out to stakeholders and the
community. For example, internal emergency management communication
may come via radio, email, cell phone voice and messaging, and landline. It
is vital that when using radio communication to and between police, fire,
and emergency medical services (EMS), that no private codes be used and
that all communication be open and in common language.
Critical Community Facilities

FEMA identifies critical community facilities as follows (Federal Emergency
Police stations, fire stations, EMS stations, public safety answering

points, critical vehicle, and equipment storage facilities, and emergency
operations centers needed for emergency and disaster response
activities before, during, and after the event;
Medical facilities, including hospitals, nursing homes, blood banks, and
health care facilities (including those storing vital medical records)
likely to have occupants who may not be sufficiently mobile to avoid
injury or death during an emergency, or disaster;
Schools and daycare centers, especially if designated as shelters or
evacuation centers;
Power generating stations and other public and private utility facilities
vital to maintaining or restoring normal services to disaster areas
before, during, and after the disaster;
Drinking water and wastewater treatment plants. Structures or
facilities that produce, use, or store highly volatile, flammable,
explosive, toxic, and/or water-reactive materials (Federal Emergency
Image 7.14 Fire Service as a Component of the Critical Community Facilities

(NKFR)
Essential Service Facilities

Essential service facilities include those that have little chance of being in a
flood plain. Typical essential service facilities include:
Hospitals;
Police stations;
Public safety answering points;
Fire stations;
EMS services;
Physical and cyber storage records.
Again, it is important to attempt to locate the essential service facilities in

locations that are not subject to local recurring natural disasters like floods.
Resource Locations
Responding to fire, the necessity for the evacuation of individuals, EMS, and
law enforcement operations require access to resource locations. The EOC
should have a map of all critical and essential service facilities that are
current and easy to read. It is essential for growing communities where the
scope of change is high because of new routes and the new facilities that are
necessary to sustain the growth.
A map is especially critical for rural communities, and it should show all
access routes to the facilities in the event that one or more routes are
blocked. This is but a small part of the EOC and emergency management
planning effort.
Image 7.15 EMS as a Component of an Essential Service (EMS Arriving with
Transports at the Pete Maravich TMOSA Following Hurricane Katrina)
Regional Environmental Assessments

The Federal Emergency Management Agency uses risk mapping, assessment,
and planning (Risk MAP), which evaluates disaster risks, but focuses mainly
on flooding since flooding is a national risk hazard. Flooding is one of the
most common and financially devastating natural disasters (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, n.d.).
Depending upon the region, new infrastructure and weather pattern
changes require a constant state of assessment, especially in those months
when locational hazards are most likely to present themselves. It is
important that cities and states understand their environmental risk(s) and
plan to protect and preserve the environment and historic sites.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) begins with
designing or modifying the facility to diminish the chance for anxiety of
crime and civil disorder. The importance of CPTED design comes down to
the purpose and use of space. CPTED is an exercise that diverges from the
traditional target-hardening approach to crime mitigation. To safeguard the
people, information, and property of facilities and critical infrastructure, the
emergency manager must understand what those assets signify to business
or government entities.
Asset and risk assessments are the problem-seeking portions of the
CEPTD process. Problem-solving occurs after the problem-seeking process
has been accomplished. Accordingly, CPTED is based on three functions of
human space known as the 3-D approach, which is a modest space
assessment guide which assists management in determining the suitability of
how any space is designed and used (National Crime Prevention Council,
2003):
Image 7.16 CPTED Based on Three Functions of Human Space
Designation—What is the function or intended use of the facility?;

Definition—Define the facility. What are the psychosocial, legal, and
cultural ways in which the facility is defined?;
Design—Is the space delineated to support the prescribed or intended
behaviors of the occupants?
The physical and psychological safety of facility occupants depends

heavily on carefully planned and designed security elements. Using the
CPTED approach to define and address the appropriate infrastructure
necessities assists in the reassurance of the client that they are receiving a
thoughtfully, strategically, and functionally designed security system that
has the ability to respond to threat, risk effectively, and vulnerability
requirements.
Types of Assessments
All cities and facilities face a certain level of risk associated with various
threats. These threats may be the result of natural events, accidents, or
intentional acts to cause harm. Regardless of the nature of the threat,
emergency managers, city leaders, and facility owners have a responsibility
to minimize or manage risks from these threats to the extent possible. This is
how they are interrelated:
Roles and responsibilities of federal agencies involved in infrastructure

protection;
Designated sector-specific agencies.
Conducting threat, vulnerability, and risk assessments have become easier

as processes are now computerized and specific to the different types of
potential vulnerabilities. However, the processes for assessing risk to a
particular critical infrastructure come with varying degrees of accuracy
based on the experience of the risk assessor. Simply stated, risk assessments
are both objective and subjective. The objectivity is derived from the specific
numeric values representing a level of risk or vulnerability. However, how
those numeric values are assigned subjectively is based on the professional
conducting the assessment. If two professional risk assessors conducted an
independent assessment of the same structure, there is a high probability
that their final reports would yield differing overall assessment values based
on individual experiences and personal biases. This is why it is vital to
provide assessments to community and organizational leaders with the
caveat that the reports are simply a tool used to provide critical insights and
recommendations with varying degrees of certainty.
Once an assessment is completed and delivered to the proper decision-
making authorities, there are other important factors considered when
determining which facilities to protect and how much protection is provided
or requires upgrading. Decisions to improve assessed vulnerabilities are also
based on politics, funding, and resource availability—none of which are
considered during the assessment process. Emergency managers must
conduct assessments independent of organizational, city, county, and state
leadership influences and biases.
Importance of Modeling
Risk management modeling plays a critical role in the risk assessment
process. Predictive modeling is both an art (experience) and science (data-
driven algorithms). Modeling allows for a simulation of different scenarios
involving a particular threat, risk, or vulnerability to a given target. For
example, an emergency manager may select a specific target (e.g., hospital)
and create scenarios involving various threats that could threaten the
identified target. Modeling also serves as a less expensive approach toward
determining the potential vulnerabilities of a selected target (e.g., a hospital)
based on the various types of threats identified for that target. It is important
to note that while finances are a critical component for decision-making
concerning the stakeholders; however, it is not a primary concern for
emergency managers for determining risks, threats, and vulnerabilities.
Here are two examples of risk management modeling when focusing on
the vulnerabilities of a given asset.
SCENARIO 1: Modeling a specific asset. Based on the current structure
and security measures in place to protect the structure, each potential threat
(i.e., technological, human-made, and natural) previously identified in the
area is used to “attack.” Once the simulation has concluded and all data
points collected, the data is reviewed and assessed to identify whether the
current protective measures are sufficient to mitigate the threat(s). If the
measures are found lacking, then new protective measures are identified and
recommended to the stakeholders.
SCENARIO 2: Modeling a specific threat. This is based on a specific
threat that has been previously identified for that area such as a tornado,
cyber activity, or criminal activity. The simulation would include the path of
a tornado or crime based on the neighborhood and crime statistics for the
area and the potential damages caused by such an “attack.” As noted in
SCENARIO 1, once the simulation has concluded and all data points
collected, the data is reviewed and assessed to identify whether the current
protective measures are sufficient to mitigate the threat(s). If the measures
are found lacking, then new protective measures are identified and
recommended to the stakeholders.
Predictive Modeling
Predictive modeling, also referred to as predictive analytics, is a process that
uses data and statistics to predict potential outcomes through the use of data
models. There are several predictive modeling programs on the market to
assist with the analytics. Determining the type of model depends on the
particular interests of the organization or stakeholder and their defined
success criterion. The purpose of a risk assessment model is for the
emergency manager to provide highly accurate risk, threat, or vulnerability
predictions to assist the stakeholders make the best possible decisions for
protecting against identified threats and risks or specific vulnerabilities
within their city, county, state, or region.
Raising New Assessment Questions

The primary goal of modeling is to simulate realistic emergency situations
that may occur based on the local area and region and evaluate the potential
outcomes concerning loss of life and damage to structures. After modeling
simulations have completed, questions should arise as a result of the
modeling outcomes.
How can we best mitigate the loss of life?;

How can we best mitigate damage to property?;
How can we improve emergency responses?;
Do first responders have the proper equipment?;
Do first responders have the proper training?
Are communications effective and continuous regardless of the
incident?;
Are the right leaders/decision-makers in place and experienced?;
Have jurisdictional issues been addressed and resolved?
The key to assessing modeling outcomes and raising new risk assessment
questions is to think outside the box. Become creative when addressing
contemporary issues and concerns. Also, be flexible and realistic when
addressing the stakeholders. Remember, emergency managers conduct
assessments and make recommendations—do not take constructive criticism
personally.
Modeling Definitions
A threat assessment model is a representation of an organization’s plan
regarding the identification of possible threats and the means that it will
implement to minimize or counter those threats (Kimmons, 2019). A Risk
Assessment Model (RAM) is developed for assessing risk levels as various
project stages with various work trades.
Threat Assessments
The first step in a risk management program is a threat assessment. A threat
assessment considers the full spectrum of threats (i.e., natural, human-made,
and technological) for a given facility and location. Each assessment should
examine supporting information to evaluate the likelihood of an occurrence
for each category of threat. For natural threats, historical data concerning
the frequency of occurrence for given natural disasters such as tornadoes,
hurricanes, floods, fire, or earthquakes can be used to determine the
credibility of any given threat. For human-made threats, the crime rates in
the city and its surrounding area provide a good indicator of the type of
criminal activity that may threaten a given facility. Also, the type of assets
and activity located within a facility may also increase the target
attractiveness in the mind of the aggressor.
To more effectively and efficiently utilize the limited resources available,
an accurate assessment of the threat must be accomplished. A thorough
threat assessment requires the collection of all available information on
potential threat activities within the community, city, county, and state.
Emergency managers gain a broader perspective of physical security,
security engineering, and operational activities that must be addressed to
successfully avoid, deter, or mitigate potential threats. Once completed, the
threat assessment provides the basis and justification for recommendations
regarding force protection enhancements and program/budget requests.
Likewise, counterintelligence personnel conduct vulnerability assessments to
gauge threats posed by varying threats and to identify weaknesses in the
information and operational security arena.
In developing and maintaining a current threat assessment, the
emergency manager should use the following resources as appropriate.
Federal, state, and local security officials;

Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials;
National and international trade associations;
Air security assessment (Federal Air Marshals, DHS, or TSA) and the
intelligence community;
Local and foreign media reports.
Once credible threats are identified, a vulnerability assessment must be
performed. Threat and vulnerability assessments, along with risk analysis,
can be applied to any facility or organization (Renfro & Smith, 2008).
Vulnerability Assessments
A vulnerability assessment is a process of identifying, quantifying, and
prioritizing (or ranking) the vulnerabilities within a given system.
Vulnerability, from the perspective of emergency management, means
assessing the threats from potential hazards to the population and to the
infrastructure developed in that particular community. Additionally,
vulnerability is a combination of the attractiveness of a facility as a target
and the level of deterrence and defense provided by the existing
countermeasures.
The vulnerability assessment considers the potential impact of loss from a
successful attack as well as the vulnerability of the facility and its location to
an attack. The impact of loss is the degree to which the mission of the
agency is impaired by a successful attack from the given threat. Once
credible threats are identified, a vulnerability assessment must be performed.
It is essential to note the assessment of vulnerabilities is a continuous
process since threats evolve, or change, regularly. Vulnerability assessments
are typically performed according to the following steps.
Identifying the vulnerabilities or potential threats;

Assigning quantifiable value (or at least rank order) and importance to
those resources;
Cataloging response and mitigation assets and capabilities in a system;
Mitigating or eliminating the most serious vulnerabilities for the most
valuable resources.
A vulnerability assessment shares multiple commonalities with a risk

assessment, but they are technically different processes.
A key component of the vulnerability assessment is properly defining the
ratings for the impact of loss and vulnerability. These definitions may vary
significantly from facility to facility. For example, the amount of time that
mission capability is impaired is an important part of the impact of loss. If
the facility being assessed is an air traffic control tower, a downtime of a few
minutes may be a severe impact of loss; while for a social security office, a
downtime of a few minutes would be minor.
With respect to assessments directly related to a potential human-made
disaster, it is important to note the attractiveness of a given target is a
subjective measure of the asset or facility in the eyes of an aggressor and is
influenced by the function or symbolic importance of the facility. For
example, a terrorist may feel that a power plant is a relevant target since the
destruction of an entire power grid will disrupt day-to-day operations
within a given community creating immeasurable chaos.
While there are varying approaches and key definitions about
vulnerability assessments, here are a few key definitions to consider when
conducting such an assessment.
Very high: This is considered a high-profile facility that provides an

attractive target for potential technological, natural, or human-made
adversaries;
High: This is considered a high-profile facility that is identified as an
attractive target where the level of deterrence and defense provided by
the existing countermeasures is inadequate;
Moderate: This is a moderate-profile facility (not well known outside
the local city or county) that serves as a potential target where the level
of deterrence or defense provided by the existing countermeasures is
considered marginally adequate;
Low: This is not a high-profile facility that serves as a potential target
where the level of deterrence provided by the existing countermeasures
is adequate.
Image 7.17 CARVER Assessment Tool
The vulnerability assessment may also include a detailed analysis of the

potential impact of loss from a CBRNE attack.
There many types of vulnerability assessment models and tools on the
market for an emergency manager or physical security specialist to use
based on the type of facility requiring the assessment. Each assessment tool
focuses on a specific type of potential target, ensuring that all critical assets
within the identified target are properly identified and addressed during a
given assessment. For instance, conducting a vulnerability assessment of a
hospital, school, or water dam would vary significantly compared to an
assessment of a historical target such as those in the Washington, DC area
(Renfro & Smith, 2008). Examples of various vulnerability tools include, but
are not limited to, the following.
The criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and

recognizability (CARVER) risk and vulnerability assessment tool is
designed to identify and rank specific targets so that attack resources
can be efficiently used. The CARVER assessment tool was originally
developed by U.S. special operations to use as a targeting tool for
offensive operations against critical infrastructure key resources
(CIKR). It began as a tool to detect critical vulnerabilities in a system or
infrastructure that could surgically be exploited to cause wide-ranging
effects.
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a risk management
system designed for websites. If a website has the ability to use a
database to collect information, data breaches become one of the
greatest concerns.
The Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) is
a secure web-based software program created by the Department of
Defense and designed to assist decision-makers in prioritizing, tracking,
and managing vulnerabilities on an installation.
Sandia’s Risk Assessment Methodology (Sandia RAM) is a series of
Risk Assessment Methodologies (RAMs) for differing critical
infrastructures designed to assess vulnerabilities and risks at various
types of facilities and critical infrastructure (CI) systems.
Risk Assessments
A specific risk assessment focuses on a threat, vulnerability, and
consequences, three important components of risk. It is a combination of the
impact of loss rating and the vulnerability rating used to evaluate the
potential risk to a facility from a specifically designated threat. Each
identified target security requirement should be based on a risk assessment,
which is accomplished at the earliest stages of the assessment process. The
likelihood of an event occurring, along with the consequences, is all
considered through the use of numbers for each section. As previously
discussed, the use of a numeric system is both subjective and objective in
nature. The Department of Homeland Security has created a formula that
could be used to calculate risk. The current formula for calculating risk is,
R=TVC, where R = Risk, T = Threat, V = Vulnerability, and C =
Consequence. However, the most important part of the formula is the
vulnerability of a given target.
Based on the risk assessment, Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x
Consequence; however, there are some noted concerns to address. As a
mathematical equation, the numbers used to insert into the chart are
subjective in nature solely based on the assessor’s personal inputs.
Additionally, risk assessments only focus on one potential outcome at a
time.
Not unlike vulnerability assessments, there are multiple risk assessment
models used based on the type of risk that has been identified.
Maritime security risk assessment methodology (MSRAM) is a process

primarily utilized by the united states coast guard (USCG) to assess the
threats of terrorism against critical infrastructures and key resources
within ports of the US as well as private-sector organizations.
The integrated terrorism risk assessment (ITRA) is used to assess
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and was
created in 2008. It is useful when attempting to identify breaches,
threats, and vulnerabilities in the exposed areas of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear terrorism.
Biological terrorist risk assessment (BTRA): The BTRA provides
information about biodefense investments. It is a comprehensive risk
assessment conducted by the department of homeland security every
two years with the aid of local law enforcement, the intelligence
community, and scientists who can provide critical information relating
to biological threats.
Risk analysis methodology for critical asset protection (RAMCAP) is an
assessment used to evaluate consequences, vulnerability, and risks
created by human-made and natural hazards. RAMCAP is the
assessment product specified in the national infrastructure protection
plan (NIPP) for use in cross-sector comparison and is a seven-step
process with the primary focus on resilience.
European risk assessment and contingency planning methodologies for
interconnected energy networks (EURACOM) is risk assessment
methodology used by multiple countries throughout Europe to
collaborate and address various risks to critical infrastructure within
the energy industry.
Operational risk management (ORM) is an assessment model designed
for finance, funds, and investment industries. Several industries fall
under the definition of critical infrastructure by having a lasting effect
on a nation’s defense or economy if incapacitated or destroyed (as
experienced by the COVID-19 pandemic). The ORM assessment model
is a six-step model:
1. Identify the hazards

2. Assess the risks
3. Analyze risk control measures
4. Make control decisions
5. Implement risk controls
6. Supervise and review.
Critical infrastructure modeling and simulation (CIMS) is a risk

assessment tool utilized by policy- and decision-makers to review
threats, interdependencies between sectors, and calculate damage.
Hurricane katrina initiated the development of the CIMS tool, which
visually depicts interdependencies of critical infrastructure and key
resources (CIKR) that illustrate potential second and third-order effects
to other CIKRs in the case of a given catastrophic event.
Information risk assessment methodology 2 (IRAM2) is an information
management method designed to evaluate vulnerabilities, threats, and
potential impacts on businesses.
The DREAD risk assessment is a qualitative model which asks five
questions:
1. Damage potential (how much are the assets affected?)

2. Reproducibility (how easily can the attack be reproduced?)
Table 7.1 DREAD Model
Risk rating Result
High 12–15
Medium 8–11
Low 5–7
3. Exploitability (How easily can the attack be launched?)

4. Affected users (What’s the number of affected users?)
5. Discoverability (How easily can the vulnerability be found?)
The answer to these questions is addressed as high, medium, or low. The

rating values represent the severity and are expressed as numbers (3 = high,
2 = medium, 1 = low). Then, the risk rating is obtained by adding rating
values for all items and comparing the results with the information provided
in Table 7.1.
Working with Stakeholders within the Community

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments are conducted by emergency
management teams. However, assessment evaluations and proposed
solutions are a group-think process involving various stakeholders and
decision-makers. The stakeholders that may be involved in, but are not
limited to, this process includes:
Local government leaders

Local business owners
Local first responder leadership
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Tribal leadership (if applicable)
Risk assessment tools and applications enable emergency managers the
ability to visualize various scenarios to the identified risks and allow for the
calculation of potentially catastrophic impacts. Through the use of
technology and assessment simulation tools, you can more effectively
communicate accurate information to the stakeholders at large, which will
effectively facilitate their decisions and support. It is important to note that
computer software analysis primarily provides data output. When briefing
stakeholders, data can prove confusing and daunting. The best way to
approach a stakeholder briefing is by interpreting the data and providing
information.
Jurisdictional Issues
As noted previously, the Emergency Operations Center is responsible for
coordinating or handling command, control, and communications during a
catastrophic event response. One of the major issues addressed during such a
response is the ability to continuously communicate effectively with all of
the first responders on-scene. This can prove difficult at best, and the
difficulty is only exponentially increased when a response involves multi
jurisdictions.
A multijurisdictional response involves multiple jurisdictional first
responders. An example includes multiple law enforcement agencies, fire
departments, or emergency medical service teams from the same city,
county, or state. This particular example becomes more complicated when a
federal agency becomes involved with the incident. Another key example
includes an incident involving natural disasters (e.g., tornado, hurricane,
earthquake, etc.), technological disasters (e.g., an attack on a power grid), or
a human-made disaster (e.g., terrorist attack) that includes multiple, adjacent
counties.
At this point, jurisdictional issues may arise and could create additional
problems during the actual responses, potentially removing focus from the
issues at hand. Posturing can present major issues during multijurisdictional
responses with first responder leaders on-scene, as well as with senior
government leaders. The best approach toward minimizing, if not
eliminating, jurisdictional issues in advance of a catastrophic event is to
prepare Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Pre-Planned Responses
(PPRs) in advance. Additionally, practicing multijurisdictional responses in
advance of a major event could flush out certain issues missed during the
planning phase and help create greater fidelity between first responder
agencies.
The development of SOPs and PPRs should occur during the planning
phase of the emergency management cycle, and continuous improvements
are made throughout the remainder of the cycle based on rehearsals,
changes in equipment, workforce, and logistics; and in the case of senior
leadership turnover. Unfortunately, most SOPs and PPRs are created and
placed on the shelf to collect dust until a time presents itself where they are
needed.
Conclusion
The FEMA Emergency Management Cycle has proven an effective model
and tool for use by stakeholders, senior leaders, and first responders at all
levels of government. At the core of all responses involving natural, human-
made, and technological disasters is the Emergency Operations Center. The
EOC is a critical asset in the fight against catastrophic events. It is important
to identify, protect, and furnish the EOC with the proper equipment and
skilled professionals to assist key leaders during an emergency.
Threat assessments, risk assessments, and vulnerability assessments must
be conducted by trained professionals and used by the stakeholders during
the decision-making process. Once the assessments are completed and
evaluated, the CPTED approach will serve as an invaluable tool and a set of
guidelines for creating a safer and more functional work environment. Once
the proper safety and security measures are in place, creating emergency
response tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and PPRs must occur
using as many participants as possible, ensuring critical input is collected
from all agencies involved in the emergency response process.
Although stakeholders and senior first responder leaders are unable to
effectively identify and predict all possible catastrophic event scenarios in
advance, they can work collectively to help mitigate unnecessary problems
within their agencies and jurisdictions. Furthermore, prior planning and
practice of execution among multiple jurisdictions will better serve the
community as a whole.
Conducting risk and vulnerability assessments based on local and
regional threat assessments is important. It is important that emergency
managers, and the collective staff, think outside the box when conducting
assessments, evaluating safety measures, and creating an emergency
operations center.
References
Federal Emergency Management Agency (n.d.). Risk Mapping, Assessment
and Planning (Risk MAP).
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2013, July 26). Critical Facility
Design Considerations.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2020). Critical facilities and higher
standards. FEMA Fact Sheet.
Homeland Security (2015, September). National Preparedness Goal, Second
Edition.
Hughbank, Richard J., Githens, Don, & Hughbank Robert D. (2010,
July/August). Intelligence and its role in protecting against terrorism.
Police and Security News, 26(4), 42–8.
Kimmons, Ronald (2019, May 8). What is a threat assessment model?
Retrieved from: https://bizfluent.com/info-8600202-threat-assessment-
model.html
National Crime Prevention Council (2003, October). Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design Guidebook.
Renfroe, Nancy A., & Smith, Joseph L. (2008, May 24). Threat/vulnerability
assessments and risk analysis. Applied Research Associates, Inc. Retrieved
from: https://www.wbdg.org/resources/threat-vulnerability-assessments-
and-risk-analysis
White House (2013, February 12). Presidential Policy Directive—Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience.
Chapter 8
Developing Your Emergency

Operations Plan
Shane Stovall and Michael J. Fagel
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-10
When large-scale emergencies or disasters strike, our citizens, customers,

and communities expect that an organized, efficient, and effective response
will take place and that a return to normal will be timely. This requires that
preemptive planning, communication, and coordination occurs among the
many stakeholders. This holds whether one is an emergency manager in the
public sector or the private sector. To accomplish this, an Emergency
Operations Plan (EOP) needs to be developed that lays the foundation for
hazard prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
This foundational document cannot be built in a silo and must be developed
with a multidisciplinary team that crosses multiple sectors. If this is not
done, the plan will likely fail, and the response and recovery from an
incident will be fragmented and duplicitous. They will not serve the
customers/citizens and the affected community’s needs. As the old adage
goes—“If you fail to plan, you are planning to fail” (Benjamin Franklin).
This chapter will look at some fundamentals when developing an EOP to
include planning fundamentals formats, the plan contents, training and
exercising, and maintaining the EOP.
General Emergency Planning Principles
Phases of Emergency Management

To understand what needs to be considered in an EOP, the Emergency
Manager must have a solid understanding of Emergency Management
phases. The phases of Emergency Management work in a cyclical manner.
Prevention consists of actions taken to eliminate risks from disasters.

Prevention was added to the cycle to address the elimination of
reducing human-made events such as terrorist activities.
Mitigation (Protection) involves reducing the effects of a potential
disaster before it occurs. This involves reducing the threat to people,
property, and/or the environment.
Image 8.1 General Emergency Management Principles
Preparedness involves those actions that individuals, organizations, and

communities take to be ready for when an emergency or disaster
occurs. Developing emergency plans is a critical element to
preparedness. Other preparedness measures include purchasing or
stockpiling supplies, signing agreements with neighboring jurisdictions
or the private sector to supplement response capabilities, and
conducting drills or exercises to test plans and protocols (and to
determine potential gaps, if any) that have been developed to
coordinate the response to and recovery from emergencies and
disasters. Training is also an important aspect of preparedness.
Response involves those actions taken immediately following an
emergency or disaster to save and protect lives, address human needs,
protect the environment, protect and restore critical infrastructure, and
address the social, psychological, physical, and economic effects of the
incident.
Recovery involves both short- and long-term efforts for restoring the
organization or community to pre-disaster conditions. These efforts
often focus on the mitigation of future hazards and actions that build a
sustainable and resilient community or organization. Recovery usually
begins with the response efforts and continues for some time.
All-Hazards Analysis and Planning

No place is immune from disasters. Therefore, the emergency manager must
be familiar with the hazards and risks specific to their community and /or
organization. There are three categories of disasters: natural, human-made,
and technological. Table 8.1 shows the different types of hazards under each
category.
When examining the hazards to which a community is vulnerable, the
emergency manager conducts what is known as a hazard analysis. The
hazard analysis involves developing a community or organizational profile
which considers each of the following.
Magnitude of the hazard—How strong is the hazard? What size of

hazard is possible? Are there certain geographic areas that could
experience a bigger exposure to hazard (i.e., with flooding,
communities by waterways).
Table 8.1 Types of Hazards
Technological/Industrial
Human-Made Hazard (**in some
Natural Hazard
Hazard instances, could be
human-made)
▪ Active
▪ Avalanche ▪ Bridge Failure
Assailant/Shooter
▪ Civil Unrest
▪ Biologic ▪ Contamination (air,
(protests and
(Epidemic/Pandemic) water, food)
riots)
▪ Blizzard ▪ Cyber-terrorism ▪ Dam/Levee Failure
▪ Hazardous
▪ Drought Materials Spill ▪ Industrial Accidents
due to negligence
▪ Hazardous Material
▪ Release (including oil
▪ Pollution
Downburst/Microburst spills) due to equipment
failure
▪ Extreme Cold ▪ Structure Fires
▪ Terrorism
(Chemical,
Biological,
▪ Extreme Heat
Radiological,
Nuclear,
Explosive)
▪ Flood ▪ Mining Accidents
▪ Nuclear and Radiation
▪ Fire (natural caused)
Accidents
▪ Transportation
▪ Landslide
Accidents
Technological/Industrial
Human-Made Hazard (**in some
Natural Hazard
Hazard instances, could be
human-made)
▪ Lightning ▪ War ▪ Structural Collapse

▪ Wildfires
▪ Telecommunications
▪ Hailstorm (accidental,
Failure
arson)
▪ Ice Storm ▪ Utility Failure
▪ Mudslide
▪ Sinkholes
▪ Space Weather
▪ Tornado
▪ Tropical Cyclones
▪ Tsunami
▪ Volcano
Source: Shane Stovall
Frequency of the hazard—Historically, how often has the hazard

occurred? Information for this can be found from the national weather
service, local newspapers, or other historical data sources.
Duration of the hazard—Does the hazard have a “season” (i.e.,
hurricane season, tornado season, are there times where the hazard
may have larger impacts than others?)
Speed of onset—Many hazards give ample warning. However, there
may be others that have a rapid onset. This needs to be identified for
planning purposes.
There are multiple sources where the emergency planning team can
obtain information for thread and hazard information for their specific
organization or community. These sources can include:
Existing federal, state, regional local, and tribal emergency plans, to
include hazard mitigation plans
Forecasts or models of future risks due to changing weather, changes in
population demographics, or emergent threats
Historical data from newspapers, websites (i.e., national weather
services), and other reports
Intelligence fusion center bulletins and assessments
Existing threat and hazard identification and risk assessments (THIRA).
Each hazard has the capability of producing cascading emergencies or

disasters. Therefore, the emergency manager must have a full understanding
of each of these disasters’ effects. For example, a tornado can lead to utility
failures, infrastructure damage or failure, fires, hazardous materials releases,
and numerous other issues. Therefore, the emergency manager must train
not to take each hazard only at face value. To be successful, the emergency
manager must be able to identify all hazards and risks to which their
community is vulnerable. Failing to take all hazards into consideration could
lead to severe consequences for the community and the emergency manager
himself/herself.
This information is compiled for each hazard and developed into a
jurisdictional or organizational hazard and vulnerability analysis. This
information is critical in determining planning needs when developing an
Emergency Operations Plan.
Community-Based Planning
When developing an emergency operations plan, the emergency manager
must plan based on the community’s total needs, or in the case of an
organization—the entire organization. Community-based planning is “the
concept that planning must not only be representative of the actual
population within the community (or organization) but also must involve
the whole community in the planning process” (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2010). Community-based planning includes planning
for special populations such as children, non-English-speaking constituents
and customers, and those with functional or access needs. In the public
sector, those community needs may include planning for those populations
in nursing homes, assisted living facilities, hospitals, group homes, prisons,
and those who may not own vehicles and cannot self-evacuate or seek help
on their own. In addition to these challenges, today’s emergency managers
must think about those citizens who may have pets or service animals.
Many consider their pets and service animals to be members of their family,
presenting unique planning challenges in family members, presenting
unique planning challenges in evacuation and sheltering cases.
When taking a community-based approach, the emergency manager must
consider private-sector interests. Often, these private-sector entities employ
large numbers of community members. Additionally, these businesses may
supply the community with critical goods and services.
When developing the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), the emergency
manager must understand the community’s population characteristics,
including demographic data, populations in congregate living arrangements,
and other unique needs present in the community. In the private sector, it is
necessary for emergency managers to understand the internal and external
customers of their business or organization and to include them in the
emergency planning process.
The emergency planning team must include appropriate representation of
the community. Emergency Operations Plans should not be developed by
the emergency manager alone. Emergency managers should assemble that
will carry out the different roles of the plan and carry out the plan’s
different roles and members of the community or organization who the plan
will serve. Table 8.2 provides some examples of people to consider for
inclusion on the emergency planning team. This list is by no means all-
inclusive but does provide the emergency planner with some suggestions.
Table 8.2 Emergency Planning Stakeholders
Emergency Planning Stakeholders

Emergency Planning Stakeholders
Administration (i.e., City

Governmental Entities Outside of
Council, County Management,
the Community (i.e., mutual aid
Corporate Leadership,
partners, state and federal
Institutions of Higher
agencies/partners)
Education Leadership)
Agriculture Healthcare Partners
Business Continuity Law Enforcement/Security
Citizens/Customers Legal Counsel
Chamber of Commerce Private Sector Business Partners
Communications Public Health
Department Heads (as
determined by the jurisdiction Public Information
or organization)
Emergency Management Purchasing/Procurement
Educational Institutions (School
District, Colleges, Universities, Risk Management
Vocational Schools)
Environmental Health and
Social Services
Safety
Utility Companies (i.e., power,
Facilities Management
water, gas, sewer, cable)
Not-for-Profit/Non-
Governmental Organizations (i.e.,
Fire Department American Red Cross, Faith-Based
Organizations, Community
Organizations)
Mass Transit
Airports and their Respective
Services
Source: Shane Stovall and Michael J. Fagel 2020
Emergency Planning and Senior Leadership

No Emergency Operations Plan will be successful without getting the buy-in
from senior leadership in the jurisdiction or organization before the
planning commences. Additionally, senior leadership must be included in
the emergency planning process and must be kept apprised of progress and
any obstacles during the planning. Having the buy-in of senior officials
helps to place more of an impetus and priority on the emergency planning
process resulting in the expectation of fewer planning team conflicts that
interfere with the process.
Gaining senior leadership’s buy-in requires understanding a few key
points. First, the Emergency Operations Plan is a foundational document to
the community or organization’s hazard prevention, mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. The document is not static; it will
change. It must be a living document. The plan will identify the hazards to
which the community or organization is vulnerable.
Additionally, the plan will analyze each hazard’s threat to the community
or organization. Based on this risk, threat and vulnerability analysis, the
planning group addresses the community or organizational capabilities
based on the resources available (i.e., people, materials, equipment). The plan
will also describe general description each jurisdictional or organizational
entity’s roles and responsibilities as they pertain to an all-hazards approach.
Image 8.2 Relationships Among Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Planning
Senior officials generally determine how Emergency Operations Plans

should be developed, maintained, and implemented. They approve of the
plan, and ensure that it is promulgated appropriately. Therefore, senior
officials must be involved throughout the planning process. The more
involved they are in developing the plan, the better success the Emergency
Manager will have in completing the plan in a timely manner and
implementing the plan during an incident.
Types of Emergency Planning

There are three different tiers of emergency planning. The Emergency
Operations Plan encompasses two, if not all three of these tiers:
Strategic Plansare documents that guide the jurisdiction or organization as

to how it will achieve the goals it has established and how it is expected
to meet its related responsibilities over the long-term. Frequently, the
plans’ priorities are driven by federal and state mandates; local policy
plays a part. The strategy is certainly a vital component in developing
the Emergency Operations Plan.
Operational Plans provide descriptions of roles and responsibilities, tasks,
and actions to be taken during an emergency or disaster. Operational
Plans often describe how specific departments or organizational units
will integrate with other units from within and outside the jurisdiction
or organization. These plans are not as specific as Tactical Plans and
tend to take a broader approach to those tasks and actions needed.
Operational Plans link strategy with tactics.
Tactical Plans are specific and focus on coordinating personnel, equipment,
materials, and other resources during the response and recovery phases
of an emergency or disaster. These Plans are either a direct component
of the Emergency Operations Plan or are contained within an
organization’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Standard
Operating Procedures tend to require frequent updating and often
address a wide range of tasks, including those related to emergencies or
“steady state” operations. Accordingly, the “SOPs” related to the EOP
require coordination whenever revisions to either set of documents
occur.
Planning Methodology
There are a few approaches to emergency planning. Emergency managers
determine which approach is best based on their community or
organization’s politics, structure, and needs. One approach is not necessarily
“better” than another. Multiple methodologies are often used to ensure that a
comprehensive EOP results from the effort.
Functional or function-based planning focuses on specific functions

that jurisdictions or organizations must perform before, during, and
after emergencies and disasters. Some examples of functions include
communications, public information, firefighting, law enforcement,
public works and engineering, and mass care.
Scenario or hazards-based planning targets specific hazards or
scenarios as the foundation for planning. Based on the threat of the
scenario or hazard to the community, the emergency planning team
develops roles, responsibilities, goals, objectives, and tasks necessary to
manage the specific scenario. Using this approach across the entire EOP
can lead to planning redundancies since many actions or roles may be
the same or similar for multiple hazards. This approach works best
when used to build hazard-specific annexes to the EOP.
Capabilities-based planning examines whether a jurisdiction or
organization has the right resources, plans, personnel, training,
equipment, and materials to perform a specific emergency function. For
instance, if a jurisdiction is looking at its sheltering capability, their
planning may focus on providing facilities, the appropriately trained
personnel, materials, and equipment to serve their community
following a disaster.
Emergency Operations Plan Content and Structures

There are various formats that jurisdictions and organizations can use to
build their Emergency Operations Plan. Some plan structures include a
departmental or agency structure, a functional structure, an Emergency
Support Function structure, and an Incident Command Structure. Some
jurisdictions may use a hybrid or mix of different organizational strategies.
The EOP structure depends on the jurisdiction’s needs, including
organizational or political needs. None of these formats are mandatory. The
organizational or jurisdictional Emergency Manager should check to see
whether their state prescribes a particular format for EOPs.
Elements of an Emergency Operations Plan
The Basic Plan

The basic section of the EOP lays the foundation. It identifies authorities and
references and includes basic guidelines applicable through all of the plan,
including annexes. The following are some of the foundational elements that
should be included, as suggested in FEMA’s Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide 101—Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010).
Introduction Documents
Promulgation document—This document (resolution, ordinance, etc.)

makes the EOP an official organizational or jurisdictional document.
The promulgation document ratifies all of the roles and responsibilities
put forth in the EOP and it assigns the tasks in the EOP to the
appropriate organizations.
Approval page—This is usually included in the promulgation document.
This document indicates that the EOP supersedes all previous plans and
outlines any authority delegations. This page should include the
organization’s signature or jurisdiction’s senior official.
Record of changes—The Emergency Manager should include this in
every emergency plan. This tracks all updates and changes. This record
includes the date and summary of changes facilitating the reader to go
directly to any plan changes.
Record of distribution—Like the Record of Changes, this should also be
included in each emergency plan. This document indicates the
distribution and related date and the plan’s format (hard or electronic
copy). If the distribution is by “hard copy,” then the number of copies
printed may be included.
Table of contents—This should be logically organized and provides the
location for each of the major sections and subsections of the EOP. One
best practice for electronic copies is the inclusion of hyperlinks.
Purpose, Scope, Situation, and Planning Assumptions

Purpose—This section lays the foundation for the EOP, provides the
rationale, and intends to use the plan.
Scope—This scope states the plan’s applicability related to the breadth
of emergencies and disaster types. This section typically delineates the
departments, agencies, and organizations it guides and the geographic
area or facility (is) to which it applies.
Situation overview—This section covers the environment for which the
plan was written. Often, this information is based on the jurisdiction’s
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA),
including:
– Types of hazards
– Community vulnerability to hazards (probability and impact of
hazards)
– Vulnerability of critical facilities to hazards (i.e., healthcare
facilities, schools, government facilities, utilities)
– Vulnerability of specified economic sectors (i.e., financial, small
business, agriculture)
– Demographics of community or jurisdiction, and populations that
may be particularly vulnerable to specific hazards as well as
special needs
– Maps depicting the areas vulnerable to hazards (i.e., storm surge
maps, flood maps)
– Dependencies on other jurisdictions for critical resources
– Overview of community resources (facilities, equipment,
workforce, services) to handle emergencies and disasters.
Planning Assumptions provides the key assumptions developed as part of

the foundation for the plan.
Concept of Operations
This section describes the intent of how an emergency or disaster should be
coordinated and managed within the respective jurisdiction, agency, or
organization. Clear methodologies to set and meet response and recovery
goals are explained. This may include:
Levels of activation or alert

Who are authority holders for activation of the EOP (e.g., who can
activate the plan.)
Trigger points for activation
Warning and coordination
Guidance for integration of the national incident management system
(NIMS)
– General continuity of operations/continuity of government,

including lines of succession for senior officials, public safety
officials, and other key leadership
– Alternate facilities for emergency operations centers
Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

This section describes the organizational structure used to manage
emergencies and disasters within the jurisdiction or organization. This
section will also describe the general roles and responsibilities to be
performed by each department, organization, or function without outlining
the technical details of those roles and tasks (this will be done later in the
annexes of the EOP). Best practices in emergency planning have found that
showing the general roles, functions, or departmental assignments in some
form of a matrix is ideal for supplementing the narrative description of roles
and responsibilities.
Describes the approach to be used for EOC management and
coordination. For example, using the Incident Command process within the
EOC or some hybrid of the ESFs, etc.
Direction and Control

This section, sometimes called “Command and Control,” provides a
framework for all direction, control, and coordination activities during
major incidents or disasters. This section describes who the strategic and
tactical decision makers are for incidents, and how the direction and
coordination will take place between senior leadership, field commanders,
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) or Multi-Agency Coordination
Center (MACC), and what authorities are delegated by senior leadership to
on-scene commanders or departmental agency heads during a major
incident or disaster. Not being clear on these lines of direction and control
can lead to confusion, frustrations, and inefficiencies during emergency and
disaster response and recovery.
This section also describes multi-agency coordination among jurisdictions
and organizations. Additionally, this section provides a framework as to how
agency Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Standard Operating
Guidelines (SOGs) should nest into or complement the EOP (a key goal of
the emergency planning team is to make sure that there is not conflicting
information in departmental SOPs/SOGs and the EOP). Not ensuring that
these documents are synced will lead to confusion and numerous problems
in the disaster response and recovery phases.
Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination

During an emergency or disaster, there is a lot of critical information that is
produced and shared. Some of that information includes situation reports,
incident objectives and tasks, resource lists and requests, intelligence
information, and information to the public. In this section, the emergency
planning team will identify the potential types of critical or essential
information, the source of that information, the format of the information
being shared, the manner it is to be shared, and if there are any timing
expectations for the production and distribution of said information. This
information is best shown in a matrix or a table.
Communications
Communication among and between agencies is historically one of the first
issues to arise. Communication failures or disconnects have historically been
one of the first issues to arise during a disaster. Unfortunately, they are often
the last things to be fixed. This section provides a framework for delivering
communications support to organizational and jurisdictional agencies and
mutual aid partners. This section addresses general operational but non-
technical issues.
The emergency planning team summarizes regional or national
interoperable communications plans of which they are apart. References to
applicable departmental SOPs and SOGs are also appropriate.
Administration, Finance and Logistics

This section includes:
General policies for the acquisition, procurement, tracking, and

management of resources
References to mutual aid agreements (MAAs) and memorandum of
understanding (MOU) including the emergency management assistance
compact (EMAC). This may include the national intercollegiate mutual
aid agreement (NIMAA) for institutions of higher education
Human resources policies for augmenting staff during emergencies and
disasters, including hiring temporary personnel, reassigning public
employees, and utilizing volunteers
Policies pertaining to financial records and their retention, tracking
costs, reporting needs, making requests for resources, and
compensating contractors and other private entities for use of
resources. Policies need to be consistent with applicable local and state
regulations and the FEMA public assistance requirements. Emergency
managers must be proactive in anticipating and implementing
documentation needs for their organization or jurisdiction.
Plan Development and Maintenance

This section describes the overall planning process, including the
development of the emergency planning team and actions taken to complete
the EOP. Responsibility needs to be assigned to update and maintain the
EOP. This section also provides a schedule and program for training and
exercising the EOP, reviewing and evaluating the document in its entirety,
as well as incremental updates. The EOP is an important document requiring
review and updating according to need and a predetermined schedule.
Although some states require EOP updating on a three-to-five-year schedule,
best practices typically indicate that plans should be reviewed annually and
updated accordingly. Regular training and exercising help to maintain the
EOP’s viability. Don’t allow your plan to lose its usefulness, deteriorating
into nothing more than a paperweight.
Authorities and References

This section is a compendium of applicable authorities, laws, regulations,
and guidance documents that provided the plan’s foundation.
Some of the federal or national authorities and references that can be used
in the development of the EOP include:
Authorities
– Comprehensive environmental response, compensation, and

liability Act (CERCLA), 42 USC 103
– Emergency management and assistance, 44 code of federal
regulations (CFR)
– Emergency planning and community right-to-know act, 42 USC
116
– Federal radiological emergency response plan (FRERP)
– Hazardous waste operations & emergency response, 29 code of
federal regulations (CFR) 1910.120
– Homeland security act of 2002 and successive revisions to the act
– Applicable presidential directives
– National incident management system (NIMS), october 2017
– Various national response, disaster, and recovery documents and
applicable annexes
– Robert T. stafford disaster relief & emergency assistance act, (as
amended—includes disaster mitigation act of 2000), 42 U.S.C 5121
– Standard on disaster/emergency management and business
continuity programs: NFPA 1600
References
– FEMA, CPG 101: developing and maintaining emergency

operations plans (Version 2.0)
– FEMA continuity of guidance circular: fema national continuity
programs (February 2018)
– FEMA homeland security exercise and evaluation program
(January 2020)
– FEMA public assistance program and policy guide (June 1, 2020)
– U. S. department of homeland security, national disaster recovery
framework (Second Edition), (June 2016)
– U.S. department of homeland security, national mitigation
– U.S. department of homeland security, national preparedness goal
(Second Edition), (September 2015)
– U.S. department of homeland security, national prevention
– U. S. department of homeland security, national response
framework (NRF) (Fourth Edition), (October 2019)
– U.S. department of homeland security, CPG-201: Threat and hazard
identification and risk assessment and stakeholder preparedness
review guide (May 2018)
Emergency Functions and Structure of Annexes
Emergency Functions
The annex structure to the EOP should be consistent. The annexes focus on
critical operational needs and functions. The annexes provide more detail
and describe processes, roles, and responsibilities, including lead and
supportive agencies or positions for each annex. Some examples (non-
inclusive) of functionally related annexes include:
Direction and control

Warning coordination
Communications
Sheltering and mass care
Public information
Public health and medical
Resource management
Functional and access needs
Impact and damage assessment
Search and rescue
The emergency planning team determines which emergency functions to

include. One set of functions that could serve as a model for the emergency
planning team is the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) outlined in the
National Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security, 2019, pp.
21–2). These include:
ESF-1: Transportation
ESF-2: Communications
ESF-3: Public works & engineering
ESF-4: Firefighting
ESF-5: Information and planning
ESF-6: Mass care, emergency assistance, temporary housing, & human
assistance
ESF-7: Logistics
ESF-8: Public health & medical services
ESF-9: Search & rescue
ESF-10: Oil & hazardous materials response
ESF-11: Agriculture & natural resources
ESF-12: Energy
ESF-13: Public safety & security
ESF-14: Cross-sector business and infrastructure
ESF-15: Standard operating procedures
Structure of Annexes
According to the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101—Developing and
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2010), there are three primary types of structures or formats for
annex structure: the traditional functional format, the agency or
department-specific format, and the Emergency Support Function (ESF)
format. No format or structure is required to be used by any jurisdiction.
Therefore, the use of a particular structure is solely at the discretion of the
jurisdiction or organization.
Image 8.3 Traditional EOC Format
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010
Traditional Functional Format

This format for EOPs has been used for a few decades. This format was put
forth by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the early 1990s and
is the most common format found in EOPs today. While this format is
commonly used, it could be considered out of date to some Emergency
Managers who want to make their plans consistent with current state and
federal plans. However, it may still remain functional for many
organizations and jurisdictions for their needs.
The agency- or departmentally-focused EOP format is based on
departmental or agency tasks rather than specific functions. Smaller
communities and organizations may find this format more useful when
there are not enough personnel to take lead roles in a traditional functional
EOP or Emergency Support Function (ESF) format.
Emergency Support Function (ESF) Format

This format is used in the National Response Framework (NRF) and adopted
by many states when developing or re-formatting their EOP. This format
intends to achieve consistency in emergency planning from the federal level
to the state level. Additionally, many local jurisdictions have followed suit.
Some have called this planning consistency to plan the “courthouse to the
White House” approach. Having this consistency across plans allows for
easier assimilation of federal and state resources into local emergency and
disaster response and recovery efforts at the local level.
Hazard- or Incident-Specific Annexes

Hazard- or incident-specific annexes focus on specific types of incidents that
may pose significant challenges to the jurisdiction or organization. These
annexes focus on a particular type of incident or a particular hazard and
delineate specific regulations, protocols, and guidelines dealing with the
response to and recovery from the incident.
Image 8.4 Agency-/Department-Focused EOP Plan Format

Image 8.5 ESF-Focused EOP Plan Format
Conclusion
The development of an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is critical for
effective all-hazards prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and
approval, it should not sit on a shelf, awaiting the next emergency or
disaster. The different stakeholders must be trained in their respective roles
relating to the EOP, and it must be exercised. Based on these exercises’
results, there are often adjustments that need to be made to the document to
ensure that areas for improvement are addressed in the plan.
References
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2010). Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101—Developing and Maintaining Emergency
Operations Plans Version 2.0.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2018, May). Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 201-Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment and Stakeholder Preparedness Review Guide.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2019, October). National
Response Framework, Fourth Edition.
Chapter 9
Exercises and AARs in Emergency

Management
Rick C. Mathews
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-11
Introduction
Exercises and After-Action Reviews/Reports continue to be a staple in the
emergency manager’s toolbox. Exercises in the USA are typically developed
according to the guidelines and requirements established by the United
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as delineated within the
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). If a
jurisdiction or organization is anticipating the use of one of the DHS grants
programs to support its exercise program, then said exercises must be
developed and conducted according to the HSEEP requirements. In addition
to the HSEEP doctrine and supporting materials, there are many well-crafted
texts and text chapters that are available in print or electronically. Most
provide excellent guidance and detailed approaches to exercise design,
development, and delivery. One such text is Crisis Management and
Emergency Planning (Fagel, 2014). Section V contains three chapters,
specifically addressing exercise design and development. These chapters
include Matthew Lawrence, Derek Rowan, and James McGee, all learned
and well-experienced subject matter experts. Accordingly, this chapter
endeavors to be non-duplicative and should not be construed as being
contrary to HSEEP or out of step with Lawrence, Rowan, and McGee’s
excellent work. Instead, this chapter will discuss exercises in a broader
context and will strive to tie them to a jurisdiction’s or organization’s
evaluation program. Additionally, this discussion will provide experiential
insight into exercises based on decades of development and delivery
experience. Likewise, the After Action Review/Report (AAR, n.d.) is explored
in this chapter.
Exercises and Exercise Program Overview

Of note, HSEEP states in its introduction, “An exercise is an event or
activity, delivered through discussion or action, to develop, assess, or
validate plans, policies, procedures, and capabilities that
jurisdictions/organizations can use to achieve planned objectives” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2020). This statement is a component of
the HSEEP doctrine’s “purpose,” which does not mention the word
“training.” The introduction only mentions “training” in two places. First, it
states under the subsection “Applicability and Scope,” “The Foundation of
the HSEEP doctrine incorporates lessons learned and best practices from the
exercise community and current policies and plans that support training,
technology systems, tools, and technical assistance” (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2020). Later in the subsection “Training,” the doctrine
suggests that jurisdictions and organizations should make training decisions
based on information “derived from assessments, strategies, and plans
developed in previous steps of the Integrated Preparedness Cycle” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2020). Reading the HSEEP Program
doctrine guidance will result in the finding that “training” and “exercises”
are closely related but not interchangeable. Specifically, training and
exercises are both critical components of the Integrated Preparedness Cycle,
together with “Organize/Equip,” “Evaluate/Improve,” and “Plan.” The key
takeaway is that the emergency management and preparedness leaders
should keep the relationship of training and exercise in perspective and
avoid the tendency to consider them the same.
After Action Reviews/Reports

An After Action Review (AAR) is an assessment or evaluation process that
occurs after an exercise, event, or activity. The After Action Report (AAR) is
the documentation of the review and its findings/conclusions. In practice,
the acronym AAR is used synonymously for both. However, it is crucial to
understand and appreciate that the review process is the actual activity that
assesses and that the report is the informal or formal documentation of that
activity. Considered together, the AAR is an essential component of an
effective exercise program that comports with the HSEEP guidance and
which can be enormously useful to preparedness and or emergency
management leaders. Moreover, the AAR is an essential evaluative tool for
assessing the jurisdiction’s or organization’s response to an actual event or
disaster.
Evaluations and Assessments

There are many definitions of the word “evaluate” or “evaluation”. Merriam-
Webster defines “evaluate” as: “1) to determine or fix the value of; 2) to
determine the significance, worth, or condition of usually by careful
appraisal and study” (https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/evaluate). Although the word “evaluate” appears
dozens of times within the HSEEP doctrine, no actual working definition of
the term appears (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020). The
document assumes that the reader understands the word and that ambiguity
is rarely a factor, although there seems to be no clear evidence supporting
this assumption. Nonetheless, the process of evaluating or assessing levels of
preparedness, application of formal “plans,” achievement of expected
outcomes, etc., is, without doubt, one of the most critical responsibilities of
emergency managers and preparedness leaders.
Purpose and Use of the Exercise
An exercise is an essential tool available to the emergency manager, agency
or department chief, and jurisdiction leader. It is useful as a tool to identify
preparedness gaps, assess tactics, information and communication flows, and
acquired capabilities, among others. The actual use of the exercise is
primarily dependent upon its design and measurable objectives. The
following list, although not exhaustive, illustrates some of the purposes for
which exercises are useful.
Assess a response team’s tactics in responding to a particular event

Assess an EOC team’s operational coordination and tempo in
responding to major incidents
Assess a planning cell’s capabilities related to a specific type of event
Assess the ability of an EOC team to produce timely and effective
situational reports
Evaluate emergency management’s ability to activate an EOC to a
particular level against established expectations or standards
Assess an operational team’s ability to use a new piece of equipment
effectively, or use a new asset configuration
Demonstrate a team’s or jurisdiction’s response capabilities
improvement against prior events or established standards
Evaluate an operational team’s tactical timing when presented with a
specific set of circumstances
Assess a jurisdiction’s capacity to adopt routine operating procedures
or an unplanned event or emergency
Assess new team members as operational components of an existing
structure
Determination of the understanding of a new or revised plan
Facilitation of or practice in specific tactics or operational procedures.
It is vital to understand that an exercise is a tool applicable to many and

varied purposes. Accordingly, design the exercise for the intended use. One
size does not fit all. As an example, assume the following scenario.
A jurisdiction has spent considerable time revising its overall emergency
operations plan (EOP) and the EOC coordination process. It schedules a
functional exercise for the EOC, which will involve the EOC’s activation to
its highest operating level. The most significant aspect of the jurisdiction’s
EOC procedural revisions dealt with how “requests” processing for logistical
assistance occurs. Accordingly, most of the exercise injects for the EOC
related to logistics either directly or indirectly. At the last minute, the
jurisdiction’s policy-makers were invited to participate in the event, playing
their role in the policy-making group. It was stated that the policy-makers
are rarely involved in exercises and that this one was an excellent
opportunity to include them. After the activity, a comment was made that
the policy-makers were not well engaged, as no issue arose that required
policy-maker level consideration. One could conclude that the exercise was
poorly planned as it didn’t involve the policy-makers. Although an accurate
conclusion, it did not reveal the actual shortcoming. The exercise was
initially developed as a functional activity focusing on the logistical process
with injects tied to that process. Injects that would have created
circumstances requiring the policy group’s consideration were not created as
there was no need for them. In this instance, the exercise could have
successfully assessed the logistical processing piece but failed concerning the
policy-makers as that piece had not been planned.
Construct exercises with expectations and assumptions delineated in time
for the various activities to be developed sufficiently for the target audience.
In the scenario described, one alternative that could have been adopted
would have been to allow policy-makers to observe the exercise play but not
involve them. That alternative would not necessarily meet the expressed
needs but would have mitigated the event’s shortcomings concerning the
policy-makers’ play. As stated, it is crucial to delineate the anticipated
activities purpose, specific needs of the groups involved, and the makeup of
the players expected to participate.
Exercise Development Considerations

One of the essential elements of the HSEEP doctrine deals with
understanding the role exercises can play in preparedness. An exercise
planned, developed, and delivered well can:
facilitate the familiarization of personnel with leadership’s expectations

as well as roles and responsibilities
cause interaction and communication within an agency and across
jurisdictions
provide a tool that can be used to assess and validate plans, policies,
and procedures
provide a tool useful in identifying capabilities possessed or absent
be used as a tool to identify strengths and weaknesses.
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020)
Assume for a moment that a relatively new deputy emergency manager is

leading a jurisdiction’s development efforts for its annual senior leader level
exercise. Without guidance that amplifies the tasking, the deputy emergency
manager will experience difficulties in accomplishing the mission. What
does this mean? Some of the critical pieces of advice that are necessary
include:
Composition of the “players” or exercise participants

Exercise playtime restrictions or expectations
Development timeframe established
Particular areas of interest or concern for focus
Issues from past senior-level exercises that need addressing or
avoidance
Recent emergency operations plan, Executive Orders or expectations, or
legislative changes that should be incorporated
Type of exercise expected (discussion, table-top, etc.)
Other operational levels lower than “Senior” will be playing as well
Sim cell or simple facilitation?
The assistance available in the development and the delivery of the
exercise
Will the public/press be in attendance, or will they have access to the
AAR?
Will a non-disclosure agreement be required for the
development/delivery team or for the participants?
Responsibility for documentation and AAR?
Budget
Other administrative restrictions or expectations.
In addition to the above’s advisement, the deputy emergency manager

will seek exercise guidance from HSEEP. Discussion related to planning, in
general, is found in Chapter 6 of this book and should be helpful. Specific
technical direction is delineated in the HSEEP doctrine and supporting
materials available from FEMA and will not be repeated here.
Types of Exercises Based on HSEEP Guidance

HSEEP delineates several types of exercises, each with common and unique
characteristics. The challenge is to determine which type of exercise best
meets the organization’s or jurisdiction’s needs within the constraints of
time, budget, and other resources. The HSEEP describes exercise types
includes the following (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020).
Discussed-based exercises
– Seminar
– Workshop
– Tabletop exercise (TTX)
– Game
Operations-based exercises
– Drill
– Functional exercise (FE)
– Full-Scale exercise (FSE)
Exercise Development Experiential-Based Recommendations

Through its HSEEP doctrine and supporting documents, the DHS provides
very detailed and comprehensive guidance concerning how to plan and
develop an exercise. This doctrine discusses the need for and conduct of a
myriad of preliminary and development meetings, workgroups, and the like.
The reader is strongly encouraged to read the HSEEP doctrine and to
complete FEMA provided HSEEP training. Chapter 6 of this text offers
theory and practical approaches to planning, an essential part of the exercise
development process. To be non-duplicative, this section of the chapter
proffers recommendations and ideas born from exercise development and
delivery experience and which may not be readily available in standard texts
and publications.
Consider for a moment the scenario described earlier that tasked a new
deputy emergency manager with leading a jurisdiction’s exercise
development efforts for a senior-level exercise. Clarifying many essential
pieces of information was the first order of business. Experience teaches that
attempting to change development direction significantly becomes
exponentially more challenging the further into the development process the
team travels before making this determination. A better approach is
identifying and clarifying areas in question, scope, timeframe, resources, and
expectations before the process starts.
In one situation, a very experienced emergency manager accepted
employment as the emergency management lead for a relatively large
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction had recently, but before the agency’s leadership
transition, responded successfully to a major storm. The response was
successful, but many issues surfaced, and morale across the agency and
jurisdiction was mixed. The manager needed to develop some “ground
truths” regarding the emergency management agency’s EOC capabilities,
internal leadership, legacy processes, and inter-agency communications
during an activation. He felt that the best way to do the assessment was to
conduct a relatively no-notice, level 1 activation (highest level) of the EOC,
which would enable observation of how the leadership team would initially
respond to a no-notice disaster. To best facilitate the leadership team’s
assessment, the manager decided to develop and deliver the exercise using
subject matter experts from outside the agency and jurisdiction. The
thinking was that this would allow the leadership team to respond and
operate without the likely bias and subjectivity that could occur if the
development was internal.
Accordingly, a non-agency subject matter expert led the development
team. At the outset, all of the considerations discussed earlier had been
clarified. The clarification was complete with one caveat. A no-notice
activation presented multiple challenges associated with a no-notice
activation, mainly since the EOC was staffed at the activation level by a
blend of personnel from various agencies. The exercise developed as a
“functional exercise” focusing on the operations of the EOC. One of the
focus areas was on the leadership team at the deputy manager level, as
requested. Injects, via a Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) were created.
The Simulation Cell (SimCell) operational platform designed included
subject matter expert (SME) facilitators.
SME observers were identified. About two-thirds of the way along the
development path, the manager faced circumstances that dictated two
critical assumptions needed to change. The no-notice aspect had to change
for various administrative reasons related to the number of agencies that
needed to participate. The decision was made to inform all of the agencies of
the exercise’s date but to withhold other information. This decision was the
right one as it enabled all of the agencies to participate as needed fully. That
change in assumptions frankly had little or no impact on the exercise
development process as the event’s scope remained unchanged. The second
assumption of change did impact the development process. The manager
made the wise decision to include the key deputy managers in the final
development and subsequent delivery. This change well supported the bigger
picture and was the right call at the time, but it did change the chemistry of
the development team and, ultimately, the exercise’s delivery. The exercise
was successful and met the manager’s expectations and needs (author’s
personal notes, 2020).
The key takeaway from this anecdotal discussion is that even with careful
planning, expectation clarifications, adequate budget, and related resources,
including excellent SMEs, things can often happen. Consider the same
scenario if the preparation had not been detailed and/or the resources
inadequate. Successful mission execution would likely not have been the
outcome.
When tasked with the mission for leading the development efforts for an
exercise, consider the following broad recommendations, based on many
years of experience.
Complete the HSEEP training and study the doctrine. This cannot be
overstated.
At the outset, delineate all expectations related to the exercise.
Organize them into overarching and focused categories. Memorialize
them in written form and circulate across the leadership.
Ensure that the expectations delineated are understood, accepted by,
and approved by the leadership. If there is dissent or disagreement,
work it out before proceeding further. Modify written and categorized
expectations and re-circulate them. Seek approval of these.
Do the same thing for exercise assumptions. Assumptions are the
underlying foundation for the activity, understood and agreed to by the
leadership and the team. Assumptions are similar to expectations but
not the same. Assumptions include the essential elements of the
exercise itself, including who is in charge, roles and responsibilities,
budgetary constraints, legal and political constraints, date and start
time, and so on. In an ideal world, all assumptions would be identified
before the planning and would remain unchanged. Whereas
expectations need to be pretty definite at the start, assumptions can and
frequently change (see preceding anecdotal example). It is strongly
recommended that if an assumption is going to be changed, the genesis
and rationale be transparent and documented. Accordingly, make
appropriate adjustments and note them.
The exercise team leader (“you”) needs to complete a thorough self-
assessment at the moment of tasking. If the team leader’s assessment of
himself/herself is that s/he is more of a “big picture” person and less
focused on details, then a deputy needs to be identified. This person
must be a “detail” person and must be willing, able, and accomplished
at being brutally truthful with the team leader. One of the few
certainties in life that failure to heed this recommendation almost
always leads to harrowing consequences. Smart “big thinkers” do not
minimize the importance of this.
As the exercise development team moves smoothly toward a successful
event, the team leader needs to search for the issues and potholes in the
road ahead. The search includes looking for ways that assumptions
might deviate from identified, bad case scenarios explored, and “what
ifs” analyzed. This process does not necessarily need to be a team effort,
but informal discussions of concerns that arise can be helpful. Expect
the unexpected.
Be honest with yourself, the team, and leadership regarding the
timeline and progress toward the goal.
Typically, the more realistic the scenario, the better the exercise will
work as a tool for assessment. The details drive realism.
If players’ judgments are one of the areas to be assessed, then exercise
injects are scripted to create judgment situations. Accordingly, the
injects and their insertion’s context must paint the assumed picture for
the players to consider in rendering said judgments. The intent is to
assess the player’s judgment related to a fictional scenario and set of
circumstances that resemble realism, not the player’s ability to figure
out what the exercise team was attempting to create. Exercise “noise”
often includes unintended scenario situations that confuse players
(author’s personal notes, 2020).
A corollary to the point above is that exercise controllers can contribute
to the exercise “noise” by either not understanding the intent and
details of a particular inject or set of injects, or by choosing to run a
specific set of injects “off script.” It is crucial to manage the exercise
team to minimize exercise “noise” or problems; do not assume that left
to their thinking, exercise team members will always stay true to the
script without encouragement.
Before creating the MSEL in detail, first lay out a reasonable scenario
timeline that will help organize the injects and the creative thought
behind them.
As the MSEL develops and the exercise begins to take shape,
concurrently draft notes related to needed resources and related
logistics required for the injects to work.
Exercise Purpose, Scope, Type, and Parameters

As is described in the HSEEP doctrine (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2020), there are various program priorities, reasons, or purposes for
exercises. Hazard, threat, and risk assessments are often drivers. Real-world
events or recent exercises may create a need for an organization or
jurisdiction to exercise. Plans, policies, and procedures may be the instigator.
Sometimes strategies and tactics may not have been necessary to implement
for some time, and leadership feels a need to re-familiarize agencies or
jurisdictions with them. In other situations, revisions to plans and
procedures may dictate the need to exercise to ensure that everyone is
familiar with them.
Often grants include provisions requiring the grantee to exercise within
the framework of the grant’s purpose. Cooperative agreements and contracts
may contain similar requirements. Finally, the jurisdiction’s multi-year
Integrated Preparedness Plan (IPP) will almost always drive the need for
certain exercises. The exercise team must understand the drivers and
purpose of the exercise being developed in order to meet the requirements
being examined.
The scope and type of exercise to be developed are usually driven by the
same factors as the purpose. The purpose of the exercise should dictate the
type of exercise most appropriate. If the exercise is expected to provide a tool
to evaluate how emergency responders actually respond to an emergency,
then the exercise type must be operational. Similarly, if the purpose is to
assess how an agency’s logistics section receives a request and packages the
item for transport to the location, then an operational exercise would be
best. On the other hand, if the intent is to validate how agency managers
and supervisors select appropriate procedures or assess the level of
familiarity existing among agencies and departments with plans and
strategies, one of the discussion-based exercises would work (U.S.
The participation level includes identifying which agencies, as well as
which positions and functions, will “play.” This identification identifies the
levels and types of participation expected and the number of persons in each
type and position. With the knowledge of the type of exercise and the
expected participation level, additional scope elements can be determined.
For example, where would be a suitable location or will there be multiple
locations? Will additional locations need to be identified for logistical,
SimCell, and staging operations or contained within the actual exercise site?
How long will the exercise run? Add to this duration the needed time to
prep and time to complete after action reviews and post-event activities. At
this point, the scope of the exercise will begin to take shape. Determine if
other factors (typically outside the span of control) will or are likely to factor
into the event. Concurrently, think about the “what ifs” concerning the
levels, functions, and number of exercise participants. What if an expected
agency is not able to participate in the exercise? What if a real-world event
occurs during the exercise, and one or more agencies stop play (to respond
to the emergency)? What if a new agency wants to participate? What if
something happens and the exercise site is no longer available or functional?
Given the data now available and probable solutions to the “what if”
questions, the exercise scope can now be determined.
The exercise scope describes the size, “shape,” and related aspects of the
exercise and when it will occur. Assuming all exercises’ broad purpose is to
assess or evaluate, it is important to clarify the program priorities,
objectives, and capabilities to be assessed. As discussed earlier, program
priorities may be based on a host of indicators, including:
Risk, threat, and hazard assessments

AARs from real-world events or previous exercises
Revisions to policies, procedures, or plans
External program requirements such as grants, cooperative agreements,
and contracts
From jurisdictional planning efforts such as an integrated preparedness
plan.
The program priorities driving the purpose of the exercise serve as the
foundation for the development of exercise objectives, which provide the
fundamental mechanisms to tie the exercise components to preparedness
core capabilities objectively. Again, HSEEP doctrine guides as to how
objectives should be crafted and tied to capabilities (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2020). The critical element of objectives is that each one
must be measurable and specific, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. The
delineation of objectives and related capabilities facilitate the team’s ability
to develop the exercise evaluation parameters that will ultimately be used to
fulfill the exercise’s overarching role: to assess or evaluate.
Exercise Scenario and MSEL

Regardless of the type, the exercise play is based largely upon a fictitious but
realistic scenario that describes the environment and context for the play
and outlines a base chain of events or timeline. The scenario constructed and
used in the exercise play can span a wide range of events or situations
ranging from relatively small and finite events to the very large, complex—
often with no clear ending. It can be based on naturally occurring events
such as storms (all types and levels), accidental chains of events leading to a
mishap (again small to large), or to human-caused attacks. HSEEP doctrine
suggests that the scenario should be “plausible, realistic, and challenging”
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020).
Regardless of the scenario being considered, there are several relevant
recommendations to consider, all based on decades of experience.
Make sure that the scenario selected is realistic for the jurisdiction it is
intended. For example, a scenario involving a snowstorm hitting the
jurisdiction in play would not be appropriate for an area that rarely, if
ever, experiences snow. An active violence attack inside a high-rise
building is better suited for a jurisdiction with high-rise buildings or an
agency that could likely respond to such an attack in that kind of
environment.
Make sure subject matter experts (expertise in the scenario event or
attack) are used to develop or at least review the scenario being
designed to ensure that the scenario is technically accurate. Failure to
adhere to this advice will usually result in an exercise considered to be
“hokey” or very unrealistic by participants, which will significantly
diminish the value of the exercise as a valid assessment tool and can
severely cripple the credibility of the agency and exercise team.
A well-constructed exercise timeline will include a prequel. A prequel
is usually not part of the exercise play but does provide an excellent
contextual backdrop for the scenario. It may consist of a simple
notation that the weather conditions and general activity in and around
the jurisdiction are “normal” for the scenario day to be played. Critical
parts of the prequel would also include such information as to whether
any hidden hazards, threats, or vulnerabilities exist. If the scenario
involves some human-caused attack or string of actions, a plausible
description of how the bad actors arrived or prepared for the attack
should be written. This helps to add credibility to the overall event
plausibility and ensure that a realistic starting picture is presented. For
example, if the scenario is to be played based on a department’s
reduced operating capability (less capable than it usually possesses)
then the reason for the capability drop must be provided (e.g., fire
department’s single elevated stream apparatus is unavailable this day
due to a mechanical failure discovered yesterday causing the rig to be
in the shop for a couple of days).
Ensure that the terminology and lingo used in the scenario accurately
reflect the agencies and jurisdiction involved. For example, if the
agency never refers to its ambulances as “buses,” avoid using that term
in the scenario except for actual passenger buses. Terminology and
jargon may become a potential issue in situations where the exercise
development and delivery teams are not from the jurisdiction to be
exercised.
A technique used in almost all operational type exercises is
“notionalizing.” This technique states certain actions are happening (or
not happening), that the weather, time of day, or date is something
other than what is the case. An example would be telling the exercise
participants to “pretend” that it is 10 p.m. instead of 10 a.m. or to
pretend that it is raining when the fact is that it is bright and sunny. If
the scenario involves an act of violence that would have been seen had
the event been real, then the exercise players may be told that “assume
you just saw subject being struck by a round from a rifle, killing the
subject.” The role player is then told to lie on the floor or ground. This
creates a notional event. Although the necessary ingredients are in the
mix, the number of notional injects should be kept to the minimum
needed to create the scenario being staged.
Having exercise play progress in real time is always best, but the play
must often be artificially “sped up.” If specific actions and reactions
during an operational exercise are key indicators for assessment, then
the play should move ahead in real time. Assume a scenario being used
that involves a hostage-taking situation to which an agency has
responded with multiple law enforcement levels, including patrol
officers, a tactical team, and hostage negotiators. Assume further that
only the patrol officer positions are involved in the exercise. Experience
tells us that the hostage negotiation process may take hours in real life,
but the actual time available in the exercise for these players is only
minutes. First, the involvement of negotiators in the exercise play
would be notional only, and second, the exercise would likely involve a
time jump. This would mean play would be artificially paused by the
exercise controller, explaining that negotiations have been ongoing for
“x” amount of time and that time is back in play “y” minutes or hours
later. The exercise could have a notional inject telling the players what
the result of the negotiations was or role players could portray the
likely actions at that point once play is again starting “y” minutes or
hours later.
During exercise play, there will almost always be individuals in and
around the exercise play area that are not players. One large group of
non-players is the exercise delivery team, which can be comprised of
those that control or facilitate the exercise play, observing evaluators,
outside observers or guests, safety and security personnel, etc. It is
necessary in all types of exercises that non-players be
distinguished/marked from players. The exercise delivery team is
labeled differently from the players and the observing guests. The most
common method used is to allow players to participate in the uniforms
or clothing they typically wear, guests/outside observers wear a specific
color vest, and the delivery team wears a different color. Sometimes the
delivery team is further distinguished according to their set of duties or
functions. This method of identification must be planned and
logistically prepared. Make sure the exercise development team plans
accordingly.
In almost all cases, the exercise development products, including the
scenario and MSEL, will be held close to the vest and not released
before the exercise. To that end, Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) are
executed with all members of the development team, among others.
The date, time, and often the location of the exercise will generally be
released (almost a requirement if participants are going to play), but the
actual scenario will remain confidential. This should be considered to
be a “best practice.” But what about after the exercise?
In some cases, NDAs are executed with all participants for a variety of
reasons. Past exercise scenarios and related tools are often shared
among exercise designers and developers, as these documents can be
valuable resources for future exercises. There is a caveat, however.
Exercise developers have lifted scenarios, either in their entirety or
large elements, from one cover and placed them in new covers for
different locations. Much can be learned by reviewing the work
products of others; these works can be inspirational. However, do not
fall into the trap of simply copying the scenario and injecting it into the
current project. First, it is not ethical. Second, better scenarios are
crafted specifically for the jurisdiction or the organization to be
exercised. As stated earlier, operational parameters differ, sometimes
significantly; scenarios are not “one size fits all.”
The same core scenario can be crafted in various ways to fit the
program drivers, objectives, and capabilities being evaluated. This is
accomplished through MSEL variations with injects developed to fit the
player positions, perspectives, exercise type, etc. This approach is
beneficial when a jurisdiction or organization needs to exercise
different components at different times. They all face the same scenario,
but their look and feel are adjusted to fit the particular set of players
participating. For example, consider a jurisdiction’s desire to exercise
its emergency responders, emergency management capability, and
senior leaders in response to and control a sizeable civil disturbance or
civil unrest. The boots on the ground responders’ perspective and
operational actions would differ from the senior leaders. It is highly
unlikely that a large city’s mayor would make his/her way to the
disturbance’s front lines; this type of action would almost certainly
escalate the unrest. Therefore the senior leaders would participate in
the exercise in the environment suitable for overarching leadership
while the responders would exercise in a more realistic and hands-on
manner. The two factions would be linked but controlled differently.
Similarly, the emergency management team would most likely be
exercised in the EOC. This scenario could be exercised separately and at
different times, or all three could be exercised concurrently with one
group’s actions impacting the others. For most, the concurrent approach
would be the most appealing and realistic, yet it would certainly
require a very complex, cumbersome, and relatively expensive delivery
operation to be successful.
As described in the HSEEP doctrine materials, the Master Scenario Event

List (MSEL) is simply a chronological list of injects and delivery actions that
are used to make the exercise work. Consider a novel that is licensed for a
cinematic production. One of the first steps necessary is for the novel to be
used as the basis for a screenplay and script. The story is converted into a
format of dialogue, actor movements, special effects, etc., that, when
executed, can produce a movie. One big difference between a film and
exercise, however, is the film is usually shot and is always played back as a
single string of events while an exercise is more like a three-ring circus
where there are three performance rings in view under the big top, with one
playing concurrently with the other. The exercise is further complicated by
having multiple rings playing together but with each linked in some manner
with the other. The action of one can directly impact another, or it can
change the contextual background of others. The MSEL is often constructed
by several development teams concurrently with each team assigned to a
particular scenario aspect and player group. The injects created by each team
are assembled into a single MSEL, with each inject and action being time-
stamped to indicate when the action is to occur during the exercise. The
injects scrubbed by an editor ensure that the elements fit logically and are
scheduled to happen in a logical time sequence. An example of a set of
injects follows.
Table 9.1 Sample MSEL
Exercise Type of Inject

Description Comment
Time Inject Method
Exercise Type of Inject
Description Comment
Time Inject Method
Phone Earthquake
Text is what the caller
0850 Report to in ABC Phone
says to PSAP
PSAP County
Phone
Power Text of email reports
Report to
0851 Outage Email specific location of a
Emergency
Report power outage
Management
Local emergency
manager calls state
Phone
Earthquake emergency
Report to
0852 in DEF Phone management to report
Emergency
County a possible earthquake
Management
(county is adjacent to
abc county)
Report to state
emergency
Cell towers
0852 Email Email management that
out
cellular service is out in
two counties
Source: Provided by Rick C. Mathews from Personal Documents
Note: The above illustration is fictional but was based on an actual MSEL used in a
major functional exercise informed by author’s notes.
The format of the MSEL varies from one exercise to another. Still, certain
key elements are always present, such as time of inject (usually two times
provided: real-world exercise anticipated time and the scenario time), inject
event, short description, method of inject, specific message or action,
intended receiver of inject, expected actions immediate to the receipt, and so
on. Simply stated, the MSEL is the script for the exercise.
As with the scenario, there are several recommendations for the MSEL,
based on decades of experience.
Ensure that versioning controls are in place for the MSEL drafts. It is
almost impossible to design and craft an entire MSEL in a single sitting
or day. It almost always the case that multiple teams will be developing
the MSEL concurrently, often in different rooms or virtual chat rooms.
At the outset, develop a master MSEL template, usually in a
spreadsheet program. This template includes a prescribed font, font
size, cell width, number of columns, etc. Once crafted, the template is
used by everyone without exception. At the end of each team workday,
the completed draft MSEL of each is sent to a master clearinghouse that
incorporates all sub-MSELs into one master document (hence the
reason for using a template), to which is assigned a new version
number. This new draft version is then sent back out for subsequent
workdays with the teams using the new draft version as its starting
point.
All MSEL development teams must use the same base documents in
venues, agencies, assets, etc. If these are to change during the exercise, a
set time in the exercise is selected for the change. Each team adjusts to
the base/asset changes at that time (such as if the available resources for
use change due to resources being expended or additional assets
arriving).
Make at least two backups of all evolving documents (MSEL, support
materials, etc.) at the end of each workday, period.
On exercise day, even if every exercise control function is electronic,
make sure that at least one hard copy of the complete MSEL is
physically available at each exercise site. Remember, “Mr Murphy” is
always invited to every exercise; sometimes, he shows up and insists on
participating.
As the exercise scenario and MSEL are developed, it is vital that every
event and inject included are directly related to one or more established
exercise objectives. Likewise, make sure that every exercise objective is
addressed sufficiently in the scenario and MSEL. This step cannot be
overemphasized. Keep in mind that the exercise is being developed to meet
one or more program priorities, related objectives, and capabilities. The
purpose of the exercise is to evaluate, and that process will endeavor to
address each objective. If no part of the exercise play touches a particular
objective, then that objective cannot be adequately evaluated. Mission
failure can result. In a similar vein, adding events and injects to the scenario
and MSEL without expressed purpose can cause the exercise not to flow
correctly or could potentially confuse evaluators. This is not to say that
injects may be added that do not tie to specific objectives. They can and
often are added. In most instances, they are added to provide context or to
fill a void. It may be needed to provide operational distractions as would
normally occur in real-world operations in some situations. In every case,
however, it is important to add a comment to the MSEL that identifies the
addition’s purpose or need. Please keep the number added to a minimum
and make sure they are not added to cause players to fail (see comment
failure later in this chapter).
Exercise Documentation
Arguably, one of the strongest characteristics of the HSEEP doctrine and
related materials (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020) is the wealth
of supporting documentation it describes and templates it provides. Which
documents will be needed for a specific exercise varies based on the type of
exercise, size of the event, number of people involved. Rather than repeat
what is contained in the HSEEP doctrine, simply suffice it to say that these
materials should be consulted, considered, and used to the extent they can.
Indeed, the exercise design team can revise the templates for their specific
use and add additional ones to the mix as necessary. Just make sure all of the
bases outlined in HSEEP are covered. One other benefit of employing these
documents is that the exercise development team and almost certainly the
delivery team will include individuals experienced in exercise design and
delivery. Accordingly, they will almost certainly be familiar with the
documents suggested in HSEEP.
Exercise Conduct, Play, or Delivery

Suppose one explores the HSEEP doctrine and supporting materials. In that
case, one might quickly observe that the number of people needed to run an
exercise is more extensive than most would think necessary. Many might
conclude that the exercise “wiring diagram” is approaching being
bureaucratic. Frankly, it would be hard to argue against that conclusion. But
experience has taught most of us involved in exercise design, development,
and delivery that there is a good reason for each inclusion. HSEEP depicted
examples include the two following diagrams. Image 9.1 illustrates the
suggested control structure for a discussion-based exercise.
It may help think about each of the positions (not only in these two
examples but in all HSEEP organizational examples) as functional needs and
not as individuals. In some cases, depending upon the scope, size, and
related characteristics of a specific exercise, one individual may cover more
than one functional area. The case may often be reversed, which may mean
that more than one person may be needed for a particular function, based on
the span of control, concurrent operations, etc. Evaluate each function
carefully and staff accordingly. Failure to do so will almost certainly send an
automatic invitation to Mr Murphy to visit your exercise.
Image 9.1 Illustrates the Suggested Control Structure for an Operations-Based
Exercise
Source: Image Provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020
Image 9.2 Operations-Based Exercise Control
Source: Image provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020

Concerning exercise delivery or conduct, several recommendations are
provided for consideration:
For operational exercises, always include safety and security as key

issues requiring attention. The more movement, action, and emotions
that exercise requires or generates, the more likely unsafe acts can
occur. There must always be someone tasked solely with safety at every
venue or major operational area. There are no excuses or exceptions to
this.
Regardless of the exercise type, always factor in the basic human needs
for everyone involved, including the players, observers, controllers,
facilitators, scribes, and others. Restroom facilities and refreshments
(water alone may not be enough) depending upon the time span of the
exercise) need to be addressed and provided.
Some exercises are closed to the public and press and media; others are
fully public or may allow the press and media to observe. If outsiders
are going to be permitted at the exercise venues, make sure to designate
where they can go and what areas are restricted. Security personnel
may be necessary to help manage this. The press and media represent
the public and generally want to observe play, document what they see,
and perhaps interview individuals. The jurisdiction’s leadership almost
always makes decisions as to what can and cannot be permitted. One
or more Public Information Officers should be assigned to the press and
media. The PIOs will often want to enable the press and media to
photograph and video portions of the exercise. The PIOs must
coordinate with the exercise delivery manager to minimize the
distractions and possible interference they might make in the exercise
play. Work this out ahead of time and plan accordingly. It is also
helpful to note that “Mr Murphy” routinely tags along with the press
and media, “just saying.”
An exercise may be scripted and planned; almost every delivery will
somehow include something unplanned or considered. Things like this
happen. The exercise delivery manager must be prepared for these
things and needs to be in any of the team’s “loops” considering or
experiencing these aberrations.
It is always helpful to document observations that relate to how the
exercise is being operated, coordinated, etc., while play ensues.
Observers and scribes are primarily tasked with watching and
recording how participants play and their actions. These are vital to the
evaluation of the participants in keeping with the intent of the exercise.
But also, importantly, the exercise team needs to observe and document
its operations. However, note that these secondary observations should
be recorded separately from the primary notes as they are not typically
part of the players’ assessment. However, they are most useful when
conducting the host exercise team’s “hotwash” and for lessons learned.
Final Comments on Exercises

Developing and delivering exercises for organizations and jurisdictions is an
important tool used in evaluating the jurisdiction’s readiness. Exercises are
also very time-consuming and relatively expensive. Exercises require
significant commitments of time from everyone involved in the planning,
development, and delivery processes. Often, organizations and most
jurisdictions simply do not have the resources to pull from other vital
operations to develop and deliver an exercise. In most cases, jurisdictions
and many organizations will seek outside consulting companies to assist.
The federal government (DHS, DHHS, DoE, DoD, and others) have
supported this need through grants and contractual programs. Engaging a
contractor to assist will likely be most beneficial to the organization or
jurisction. The vast majority of consultants and contractors can be expected
to provide great value and excellent service. Most organizations and
juridictions that have engaged contractors for this service would likely say
that contractors:
Do a great job
Are very helpful
Provide objective services and analysis
Have access to necessary subject matter experts
Are absolutely “fluent” in HSEEP.
All of these points are true, but be mindful that a contractor does not
absolve the organization or jurisdiction from its need for due diligence or
responsibility to make sure the exercise meets its needs.
Another area for short discussion deals with “failure.” If one is going to
evaluate objectively, one must understand that not everyone or every
organization is outstanding or even satisfactory on every test or situation. So
how does this apply to the “exercise.” In training, there are two, and usually
strongly felt, views about allowing students to fail. Most educators and
trainers strive to facilitate learning by all, learning that the student has
passed all of the tests and criteria established for satisfactory completion of
the course. Many will argue that in skill lanes where students are learning
psychomotor skills, students should be stopped at any point where they
appear to deviate from the correct procedure or methodology. The argument
is that allowing the student to complete a skill station rotation incorrectly
will result in incorrect muscle memory.
For new skill development in skill lanes, this author agrees with that
theory and endeavors to implement the approach with all skill lanes. But
training and education are about much more than just developing correct
skills. If one studies Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning and the most current
version of it (Anderson et al., 2001), one will see that there are multiple
levels of learning within the three domains, with the highest levels dealing
with creating, evaluating, and analysis. To achieve these higher levels of
learning, one must render judgments based upon available information. To
accomplish that, the individual must have experience in observing correct
and incorrect sets of information. Most of us in education will affirmatively
state that we learn the most from our mistakes.
Exercises, by definition, are evaluations. At the outset of the exercise
development process, it was discussed that clarity around program priorities
and objectives had to occur. It is necessary that the jurisdictional leadership
and the exercise development manager know what is and is not to be
evaluated. In some situations, leadership may feel reasonably comfortable
with the organization or the jurisdiction’s mix of agencies and their
respective capabilities. However, what they feel is that there is a point at
which one or more elements will fail, but where that point is remains a
mystery. In such a circumstance, leadership may ask that the exercise runs
until an end of failure is reached. This seems like a fair request but one that
is usually surrounded by landmines. If asked to design and conduct an
exercise to this point, it is necessary to dig deeper into what is actually being
requested. Where does leadership think that point might be? Are there areas
that leadership wants to explore specifically? Are there areas that leadership
specifically or generally desires you to avoid? After the clarification
discussion, memorialize your understanding and ask the leader to formally
“sign-off” on the agreement.
Generally, exercises are about players managing situations and
circumstances with the experience, policies, protocols, and resources
available. It is about the recognition, application, communication, and
command-and-control, more than anything else. Exercises are usually
expected to be a fair test and one that everyone is expected to pass, albeit at
different levels. Most would argue that exercises are a generally valuable and
proper use of resources at the end of the day.
After-Action Reviews and Reports

It is generally held that the formal After-Action Review process was
developed by the U.S. Army and was published by the army in 1999 in a
document entitled “Foundations of the after action review process”
(Morrison & Meliza, 1999). Since then, the After-Action Review process
(AAR) has been written about, discussed, and implemented in some form or
fashion by a host of organizations, agencies, departments, etc. The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security is one such department that has
incorporated the AAR into various processes. Indeed, the AAR is a vital part
of the exercise process and is discussed by HSEEP in section 5 of the
doctrine document (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020). AARs are,
in the main, used to guide a post-operation assessment of what occurred. It
is usually expected to understand what went right or well and what went
wrong or could be improved.
The AAR is related to but distinctly different from a “hotwash.” The AAR
is a formal process, while the hotwash is conducted immediately at an
operation’s conclusion and is an informal process. The hotwash is expected
to facilitate immediate feedback from those that just completed the
operation without outside influences affecting the process. A hotwash is
extremely valuable in clarifying what took place by those that just
completed it. It is important to understand that the two processes are not
interchangeable, and one does not negate the need for the other. The After-
Action Review will often be facilitated by an objective third party and is
typically formally documented. From the documentation is drafted the
After-Action Report (also abbreviated AAR). Although the AAR (review
process) is generally an objective and thorough process, the resulting AAR
(report) is not always as detailed and can be (but not always) written for
public consumption, meaning the report may seem to take a more favorable
spin on aspects of the operation that could have been improved. Regardless
of how the report is written, the most important part of the process is the
actual review of the operation by the group. In all instances, the report
should provide, at a minimum, a factual timeline of what happened and at
what time it occurred. The timeline is typically annotated with significant
Situational Reports along the path that illustrate key events, decisions, or
actions. It may include changing weather conditions, casualty counts, etc.
The AAR (report) should generally not ascribe blame or causes of
shortcomings. Often, such ascriptions can be taken out of context by readers
that are not well informed. Simultaneously, the jurisdictional leadership may
demand that the report contain everything, including an analysis of what
happened by subject matter experts (ascription of blame).
A few words of advice about AARs, again from decades of experience.
The old adage “don’t shoot the messenger” is undoubtedly not always
applicable in real-world AARs (experiential scars attest to this).
Agreeing on the person leading an AAR process and subsequently
drafting the report will almost certainly not be agreeable to everyone. If
asked to fill that role, bear that in mind.
AARs in exercises, particularly in real-world events, are usually almost
always published concurrently with an improvement plan. Often the
Improvement Plan is incorporated into the AAR. These are traditionally
“good things” as they tend to soften the negative aspects of an AAR.
(Organizations and jurisdictions can point to improvement steps being
taken and less on the negative observations made in the AAR.)
Suppose the person leading the AAR process is an objective third party.
In that case, the report is generally expected to also be objective,
presenting “the good, the bad, and the ugly,” so to speak. Bear that in
mind when completing the task, and especially when submitting the
report. It is often useful to ask yourself if what you are submitting is, in
fact, objective and without bias. If it is not, do a quick self-hotwash
before submitting the report.
If the AAR assignment includes the AAR team agreeing to NDAs, then
honor said agreements and do not disclose the report or side notes to
anyone, especially the press. Control access to the document. One good
practice is to label the report (cover and each page after that) with the
phrase “DRAFT, Work in Progress.” Although not a sure bet, this type
of label on most government documents is expected to prevent the
release of the documents to the public and the press. Once submitted,
leadership may review and either remove the labeling or ask you to
submit a final report without the notations. If submitting the report to a
private entity, general practice is to label the report with “Proprietary
Information,” which is also expected to minimize the document’s
unintended release to the public and press. But be mindful that once a
draft AAR is submitted to the organization or jurisdiction, leaks can
occur for a host of reasons. When that happens, the organization,
contractor, or individual that wrote the After-Action Report will often
be the first source blamed.
Moreover, the findings presented within the report may be interpreted
differently by different people. An example of such a leak can be
located in the Albany, NY newspaper. The story was based on a leak of
a draft version of the AAR and an accompanying management
document. The finger-pointing was initially and incorrectly directed at
the author, causing an unpleasant few days (Odato, 2014).
Simply stated, be factual, objective, and to the point in the drafting of
the report.
Conclusion
The author’s intent in this chapter was to present insight and general
guidance regarding the development and delivery of exercises and the
conduct of After-Action Reviews and issuance of After-Action Reports. The
intent was not to rehash the HSEEP doctrine document nor to restate what
others have written. Instead, it was to provide recommendations and
guidance informed by over four decades of experience in the development
and delivery of exercises and in the conduct of AARs related to exercises
and real-world events.
References
AAR (n.d.). After-action reviews. Retrieved from:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After-
action_review#:~:text=An%20after%20action%20review%20(AAR,develope
d%20by%20the%20U.S.%20Army
Anderson, L.W., Krathwohl, D.R., Airasian, P.W., Cruikshank, K.A., Mayer,
R., Pintrich, P.R., Raths, J., & Wittrock, M.C. (2001). A Taxonomy for
Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of
Educational Objectives. Addison Wesley Longman.
Fagel, Michael J. (2014). Crisis Management and Emergency Planning—
Preparing for Today’s Challenges. CRC Press. Retrieved from:
https://doi.org/10.1201/b16072
Morrison, J., & Meliza, L. (1999), Foundations of the after action review
process. Special Report 42. US Army Research Institute.
Odato, James (2014, February 8). Report Rips State Handling of Superstorm
Sandy Response, Times-Union,
https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Report-rips-state-handling-of-
Superstorm-Sandy-5217760.php
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2020). Homeland Security Exercise
and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). Retrieved from:
https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-
preparedness/exercises/hseep
Chapter 10
Current Media Environment

Randall C. Duncan
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-12
Establishing and dealing with relationships with the media is, perhaps, one
of the most important elements of a comprehensive emergency management
program (Duncan 2017, p. 171). To successfully navigate this complex—and
at times, frustrating—journey, we need to look at both the latest
developments in media as well as its origins. This relationship, more than
any other, has the potential to provide significant benefits and credibility for
an emergency management program if navigated successfully. If not, this
relationship can generate major problems and political upheaval for
emergency management.
To facilitate our examination of this topic, let us start by taking a look at
what we mean when we refer to “the media.” Traditionally, we have defined
media as consisting of television, newspapers, and radio. That list has been
modified more recently to include terms like “internet” and “social media.”
To continue our journey, we will need to understand the nuances between
the various types of traditional media and the implications of near-instant
transmission capabilities of the newer varieties of media (Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, TikTok, and others). The ability to instantly transmit accurate
and factual information also comes the ability to transmit false information
instantly—sometimes referred to as “fake news.” In today’s environment. The
phenomena of fake news is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary
(https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/English/fake-news) as “false
stories that appear to be news on the internet or using other media, usually
created to influence political views or as a joke.” We’ll discuss this in more
detail later in our examination.
The printed word has been the longest standing element of
communicating with the public since the invention of the modern printing
press in 1450 by Johannes Gutenberg. The printed word was augmented
more recently by the advent of voice (radio) and moving pictures
(television). The most recent innovation surrounding mass communications
with the public and others is the near-instant availability of printed words,
voices, and pictures, and other information (or misinformation) through the
advent of social media and the internet. These have led to yet another
fundamental change in the way information impacts our lives.
The Printed Word: Newspapers

While the printed word from Gutenberg’s press made its advent in 1450,
arguably, the first newspaper published in the United States was called
Publick Occurrences Both Foreign and Domestick, edited by Benjamin Harris
and printed by Richard Pierce on September 25, 1690 (PaperAge Magazine,
2004, p. 52). And, with the publication of this first newspaper also came the
first controversy. The printer failed to apply for a permit to print the
publication and addressed such indelicate topics as the morals of French
nobility. The first issue of this newspaper was also the last. It was banned
four days later by the Governor and Council of Massachusetts
(Massachusetts Historical Society, 2004).
Image 10.1 Emergency Management Cycle
Image 10.2 Fake News
As newspapers became more accepted and time progressed, they became

the primary outlet for news events—both local and from other faraway
locations. This was accomplished using the telegraph—which allowed
newspaper correspondents to travel to areas far away from where the
newspaper was published and file a story (for more details on the telegraph,
please see “The Spoken Word: Radio” below). The use of telegraphy to cover
these events far away from home also impacted the style in which they were
written—called the “inverted pyramid.” The inverted pyramid style of
writing called for the correspondent to relay the most important facts first,
followed by those of lesser importance in the story (Scanlan, 2003).
Image 10.3 Inverted Pyramid Writing Style
Table 10.1 What Traditional Print Organizations Want—The Written Word
Item Explanation
Print media wants to paint a picture in the

Details
reader’s mind with words.
Questions Will be more oriented toward details.
How far away from the edge of the road did it
come to rest?
Background Were there flames? If so, how high?
Information History related to an event.
Has this ever happened before?
History of individuals involved in the event.
Item Explanation
Traditional: Usually, daily. Current policy may be

Deadline
impacted by newspaper websites.
Source: Provided by Randall C. Duncan
Newspapers, generally, are considered to provide more in-depth coverage

of an event due to being able to devote more space to a particular topic.
Because of this, newspapers will typically be interested in a greater level of
detail. To find out more about what newspapers are interested in, please see
Table 10.1.
The Spoken Word: Radio

We really can’t discuss the history of radio without more discussion about
the wired telegraph, which we first mentioned above, in relation to
newspapers. This was the technical innovation that allowed newspaper
correspondents to report on events far away from home. The telegraph was
realized in the United States by Samuel Morse, who did his most famous
demonstration on May 24, 1844, when he sent a “Morse code” message from
the Supreme Court Chambers to Alfred Vail in Baltimore (Wallace Jr., 2012).
Guglielmo Marconi then began developing what would be broadcast radio—
he received the Morse code letter “S” from a wireless transmitter in Poldhu,
Cornwall, England, on a wireless receiver in Newfoundland, Canada (Public
Broadcasting System 1998a). A few years later—on Christmas Eve, 1906—
some wireless telegraph operators on board ships were surprised as they
heard the Christmas carol “Silent Night” and a voice reading bible verses
which interrupted the Morse code they normally heard on their wireless
receivers (Public Broadcasting System, 1998b).
From this small beginning, radio was on its way to becoming a mainstay
of entertainment and information in the American home. This conveyed to
the public, the voices of presidents, dictators from overseas, and Hollywood
stars endorsing commercial products. We could actually hear what Franklin
Delano Roosevelt sounded like, rather than simply reading his words in the
daily newspaper.
The radio stations that operate today are generally separated into various
interest groups called “formats.” Some of these formats include news/talk
stations, music stations, non-English radio, and satellite radio stations. To
find out more about what radio is interested in, please see Table 10.2.
Table 10.2 What Radio News Wants—The Spoken Word
Item Explanation
Radio news utilized short, concise information in the

voice of the newsmaker.
Details
Typically, they are 10-to-15-second “actualities” or
“sound bites.”
News & More stories; a little more depth than other radio
Talk formats
Public Uses “natural sound.” Records background noises and
Radio sounds of an event happening with an open mic.
Non-
Help to reach those who speak a language other than
English
English within the community.
Stations
Music May or may not carry news. If they do, it typically
Stations consists of only short news items.
Hourly, depending on the schedule of newscasts. May
Deadline
also operate a website.
Moving Pictures and Words: Television

The first authorized television broadcast took place in Wheaton, Maryland (a
suburb of Washington, DC) on July 2, 1928, by C.F. Jenkins (Popular
Mechanics, 1928). The pinnacle of television may have come on the evening
of March 7, 1955, when one in two Americans watched Mary Martin’s
portrayal of “Peter Pan” on live television (Bogart, 1958). Other live events
marking the impact of television coverage on the way Americans received
their news included the Kennedy–Nixon debates and the first step on the
moon. More modern examples of live coverage of events—especially by the
“24-hour news television channels”—include September 11, 2001 and the
COVID-19 coverage. The addition of live images to go with the sound
literally brought the world into our homes every day. There are a plethora of
local television stations (including network affiliates) airing several different
types of news programs. They can range from spot news/breaking news of
particular activities currently happening to the regularly scheduled news
programs. Typically, these local stations will have an affiliation with a
network and will present a network originated program of national and
international news. To find out more about what television is interested in,
please see Table 10.3.
Media Political Bias

Today’s news typically comes from a variety of political perspectives. This is
called bias. Simply put, many media outlets now do not hide their
preference for political views on topics—whether centrist, left-wing, or right-
wing. This phenomenon is becoming so common that some websites are
now cataloging media outlets by their bias. See, for example, the AllSides
website (https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-chart). This
website uses “multi-partisan, scientific analysis, and transparent
methodology” to rate online news sources by their political leaning (far left,
lean left, central, lean right, far right).
Table 10.3 What Television News Wants—Moving pictures and words
Item Explanation
Item Explanation
Video of the event may determine whether there is a

story.
A story that otherwise would not make the news may
Details
become a story if there is video.
Similarly, a story of real importance may not make the
news if there is no video.
Local news includes spot news; regular local news;
Types of investigative reports. Also, feature news programs
News (either local or network); national news; and
international news.
Varies depending on the type of news that will be
broadcast. Major deadlines are typically for the evening
Deadline
news and late night news broadcasts. Television stations
typically operate websites, too.
A careful consumer of news will make sure they are aware of the political
bias of news sources they look to for information. It is sometimes
enlightening to seek out news from sources with a bias opposite our own to
see other perspectives on the events of the day.
References
Bogart, L. (1958). The Age of Television. F. Unger Publishing Company.
Duncan, Randall C. (2017). Emergency management and the media. In
Michael J. Fagel & Jenifer Hesterman (Eds.), Soft Targets and Crisis
Management, pp. 171–87. CRC Press.
Massachusetts Historical Society (2004). Collections Online. Retrieved June
22, 2020 from: http://masshist.org/database/187
PaperAge Magazine (2004, November/December). PaperAge. Retrieved June
22, 2020 from:
http://paperage.com/issues/nov_dec2004/11_2004newspapers.pdf
Popular Mechanics (1928). What television offers you. Popular Mechanics
50(5), 820–4.
Public Broadcasting System (1998a). People and Discoveries: Marconi
Receives Radio Signal over Atlantic 1901. Retrieved June 23, 2020 from:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aso/databank/entries/dt01ma.html
Public Broadcasting System (1998b). KDKA Begins to Broadcast 1920.
Retrieved June 23, 2020 from:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aso/databank/entries/dt20ra.html
Scanlan, Chip (2003). Writing from the top down: Pros and cons of the
inverted pyramid. Poynter. Retrieved June 23, 2003 from:
https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2003/writing-from-the-top-
down-pros-and-cons-of-the-inverted-pyramid
Wallace Jr., Harold D. (2012, May 10). Smithsonian National Museum of
American History. Samuel Finley Breese Morse: Artist and Inventor.
Retrieved June 23, 2020 from:
https://americanhistory.si.edu/blog/2012/05/samuel-finley-breese-morse-
artist-and-inventor.html
Chapter 11
Successfully Navigating Media for the

Emergency Manager
Stephen Combs
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-13
Not long after reports of shots fired rang out from a small elementary school
in a rural north-western county in South Carolina, telephone calls from
media outlets worldwide began to overwhelm the county’s emergency
management division’s public information officer. The emergency manager,
himself trying to gain situational awareness of the still-unfolding active
assailant incident, quickly saw local media trucks ascend on the scene. With
microphones in hand and cameras rolling live, reporters began asking
questions as soon as their feet touched the ground from the vehicles. Over
the next few hours, the tragic event suddenly plunged a section of the
county into a national spotlight, something previously never experienced.
For emergency managers across the country, scenes similar to this one
have become increasingly common. The details are often different, but the
arrival of media trucks and a sudden flash of light as cameras begin to roll is
something for which many emergency managers are ill-prepared. In this
chapter, we’ll examine the role of the media, what to do when a crisis
happens, what messaging on blue-sky days versus during an emergency, and
how to work with partners at various levels to ensure unified messaging.
Emergency managers, working with media partners and using social
media platforms, empower their communities with public information.
Public information is the resource individuals use to make decisions and act
concerning life-safety, property protection, and the avoidance of harm or
injury. It applies to agency stakeholders, including the general public, media,
internal agency personnel, and partnering agencies (Becker, 2016).
Understanding the Role of Media

Traditionally, television, newspaper, and radio stations have been the
primary source of information for the public. In the past, local television
stations hosted morning news programs followed by early evening
broadcasts and ended the day with an 11 p.m. finale that showcased all the
top news of the day.
Newspapers delivered early in the morning or late in the afternoon
carried stories of events that occurred the day before. Radio stations
typically carried top-of-the-hour updates of the latest headlines from around
the country, but all of that has changed with the growth of the internet and
social media platforms.
As the hunger for 24-hour news has grown, live broadcast media has
taken over the airwaves, and stations such as CNN, MSNBC, FOX News,
and others carry endless national stories and commentary. The internet and
social media platforms have allowed average citizens to become breaking-
news reporters and go live at an incident long before network personnel is
on scene. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, there are currently
about 52,000 reporters, correspondents, and broadcast news analysts
employed nationwide in the media industry. That number is expected to
decline by 11% over the next ten years (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020).
Like other industries, media outlets are in business to make money and
depend on viewership to draw in advertising dollars. With a move by many
away from traditional news outlets to internet-based sources, the average
local TV audience has declined over the last year by as much as 19%,
depending upon time slot (Matsa & Fedeli, 2019).
According to a Pew Research Center survey of 34,897 US adults conducted
October 15–November 8, 2018, on the Center’s American Trends Panel and
Ipsos’s Knowledge Panel. The 41% of Americans who say they prefer getting
their local news via TV and the 37% who like it online far outpace those who
prefer a printed newspaper or the radio (13% and 8%, respectively) (Pew
Research Center, 2020).
Still, “the vast majority of Americans who get news from local TV
stations primarily do so the old-fashioned way: from the television set (76%),
not from the stations’ websites or social media accounts (22%)” (Pew
Research Center, 2020).
Keeping these statistics in mind, emergency managers must understand
that media partnerships are critical to public engagement and messaging
strategies. At the same time, it’s essential to recognize that each media
platform obtains information and broadcasts it differently. Emergency
managers should become familiar with the demographics that use each
platform and then determine the most appropriate medium for the audience
and message to maximize reach and encourage engagement with followers.
Traditional media outlets shape what is seen across all the various
platforms, but the ultimate decision that makes the news rests with
consumers, the viewing public. Remember, media organizations are business
ventures and, as such, cater to the demands of their audience. So, just like a
retail establishment, the product provided may vary locally, regionally, and
nationally depending on viewer trends. Ultimately, the stories and interests
that attract the largest audience are the same ones that advertisers flock to
reach their customers. The same principles that drive economic decisions
with traditional media are the same in the world of social media.
Feeding the Beast—What the Media Wants

Knowing what the media wants is key to understanding what makes
something newsworthy. The following criteria are what often determines if
information becomes news. The elements that make something newsworthy
include:
Impact—Will this information affect a substantial number of people?
Proximity—How close to the audience is an incident or event?
Timeliness—How recently did the event occur?
Prominence—How well-known are the involved people or
organizations?
Uniqueness—Is this something that regularly occurs or something
that’s extraordinary?
Conflict/controversy—What kind of disagreement is happening
between people or organizations?
Human interest—Does a situation exist where the audience can relate?
What emotions are involved?
Sound/visual—Do the sounds and images make for interesting content?
(Becker, 2016)
As mentioned previously, the way media outlets gather and disseminate

information varies. Printed media, such as newspapers, magazines, and
specialty publications, often use words to paint a picture for their readers.
Generally, reporters for these organizations require greater detail about
events. They may want more in-depth background information, including
historical significance.
Radio stations want engaging or interesting sound bites. This platform
typically has time restrictions for newsworthy items and will deliver short,
very concise information. Emergency managers who can master seconds-
long sound bites are more apt to get their story out to radio listeners. The
use of non-English stations may be a useful tool to reach a wider audience
within a given community.
Television organizations have an apparent appetite for visually appealing
content. Providing video with an associated story will often determine
whether something is considered for broadcast. While interviews with
television reporters are usually longer than those on radio, short, concise
statements still have the greatest chance of being included in a final story.
More now than ever before, traditional news providers are moving to
online platforms. Real-time, breaking news stories mean the deadline for
consumers is immediate as a story is unfolding. Web content producers still
require the same access to information, but reporters may go live in the field
as an event occurs.
An emergency manager can be involved in these stories by providing
information to the public regarding life-safety measures that can be taken to
reduce the potential risk of harm. In this case, simple messages of “avoid the
area,” “stay inside,” “evacuate now,” etc., provide meaningful actions citizens
can take with minimal effort. The key here is to ensure life-safety messages
are clear and concise leading to the expected response.
Regardless of the media platform, all news organizations want access to
the scene, including interviews with policymakers, response workers, and
victims or survivors in time to meet their organizational deadlines (Becker,
2016).
Knowing Your Audience—Tailoring the Message to Increase

Reach
A barbershop, nail salon, houses of worship, civic organizations, the corner
market, and community halls all have one thing in common. They are places
where people historically gather and exchange information. In many ways,
social media has replaced these locations and provided a common platform
for citizens to access news and other relevant information. Knowing the
makeup of individuals that might use specific platforms can assist
emergency managers in getting the right information to the right people at
the right time to make the right decision for themselves and their loved
ones. This concept is the heart of public information and community
outreach.
Image 11.1 Communication
A critical aspect of public information is a comprehensive communication

strategy. When crafting messaging for stakeholders, emergency managers
will best reach constituents by understanding who their audience is, what
message content needs to be delivered, and what mechanism or tool is best
suited for delivery.
Well-developed and coordinated public information, education, and communications plans and
strategies make it possible to share public safety information, including lifesaving measures or
evacuation routes through threat and alert systems in a timely, consistent, accurate, and accessible
manner. Plans should include processes, protocols, and procedures for developing draft news
releases; media lists; and contact information for elected/appointed officials, community leaders,
private sector organizations, and public service organizations. Planners should ensure their
information communication plans facilitate disseminating public information. Public information
communications should also be included in training and exercises.
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017, p. 46)
The American Community Survey, found on the United States Census

Bureau’s website, collects data on every community and provides essential
information emergency managers can use to examine community
population groups. Information includes social, economic, housing, and
demographic characteristics at the national, state, and local levels (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2020). Knowing such things as the age of residents,
languages spoken, housing types, and transportation mode allows an
emergency manager to tailor messages to specific community groups.
Particular attention should be given to individuals with access and
functional needs. Whenever possible, messages are distributed through
social media channels. Alternate text should always accompany images to
support individuals using screen readers. Use subtitles for videos when
possible. Not only are subtitles important for individuals with hearing
impairment, but often, people will watch videos without the sound up on a
device, allowing them to read the subtitles without using the sound function.
In 2020, Facebook reported an average of 1.82 billion daily active users
globally, a 12% increase over the same period the year before (Moore, 2020).
“Around eight-in-ten (79%) of those 18 to 29 use Facebook—much higher
than the share of those 65 and older (46%)” (Gramlich, 2020). By knowing
who uses a given social media platform, emergency managers can better
target specific messages to a particular audience, thereby increasing the
likelihood of the news reaching its intended recipient.
Keep in mind that:
adults with mobile connectivity are especially likely to be online a lot. Among mobile internet
users—the 86% of Americans who use the internet at least occasionally using a smartphone, tablet
or other mobile devices—92% go online daily, and 32% go online almost constantly.
(Perrin & Kumar, 2020)
Gearing content to mobile users is the key to maximizing engagement.

Knowing where people gather to obtain important information is critical to
public information success.
In these times, citizen reporters are popping up across social media
platforms. Within seconds, a story is easily broadcast live on Facebook,
Instagram, and YouTube using a mobile device. If a situation is sensational
enough, it can quickly go viral and has the potential to affect public
perception of your agency.
Facing Crisis Scenarios

Success as an emergency manager is dependent upon relationships. When
disaster strikes or an emergency occurs, that is not the time to be handing
out business cards and introducing oneself to media representatives.
It is best to develop strong working relationships with media partners
during blue-sky days. Emergency managers need to get accurate, timely
information on an incident’s size and severity in a crisis. Also, using pre-
established relationships allows emergency managers to quickly disseminate
life-safety details and communicate to the public what is being done by
responding agencies to resolve the situation.
Understanding how to build relationships with media partners is a critical
component of public information. Conducting regular media outreach is one
way to develop rapport. Providing local perspectives on national incidents or
giving access to organizational leaders and facilities or equipment helps
establish and maintain relationships. Stories that highlight the good being
done by an agency and educational campaigns and programs available to
the public will help communities understand where an organization fits into
the community’s response and builds trust with media partners and the
general public.
The Joint Information System

An asset in an emergency manager’s public information toolbox is the Joint
Information System (JIS). The Joint Information System is defined as “the
processes, procedures, and tools to enable communication to the public,
incident personnel, the media, and other stakeholders” (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2017, p. 42).
A JIS is a networking mechanism that brings together representatives
from responding agencies, so that messaging is done collaboratively. This
coordination ensures a unified message but still allows for an agency’s
representatives to communicate independently with their respective
stakeholders. A JIS can be as simple as two emergency managers talking on
the phone or via a web meeting. Still, they could be as involved as dozens of
agency public information officers working in multiple locations.
The JIS mission is to provide a structure and system for:
Developing and delivering coordinated interagency messages;

Developing, recommending, and executing public information plans
and strategies on behalf of the incident commander or unified
command, EOC director, or MAC group;
Advising the incident commander or unified command, MAC group,
and EOC director concerning public affairs issues that could affect an
incident management effort; and
Addressing and managing rumors and inaccurate information that
could undermine public confidence.
The Joint Information System cuts across the three levels of incident management (on-
scene/tactical, center/coordination, policy/strategic) and helps ensure coordinated
messaging among all incident personnel.
The benefits of operating within a JIS are that information is shared

among participating agencies ensuring information released to the media
and public is accurate. Also, in a large-scale incident where resources are
limited, a JIS uses shared resources and acts as a force-multiplier for smaller
agencies and organizations that may not have enough public information
personnel.
The Joint Information Center

When an incident occurs requiring multiple agencies to respond, the
activation of an Emergency Operations Center generally will also cause the
activation of a Joint Information Center (JIC). A JIC is a physical location
where public information officers from responding agencies gather to
coordinate incident messages. The site and size of a JIC are scalable and are
dependent on the number of agencies involved.
An incident should have a single JIC, but the system is flexible and
adaptable enough to accommodate multiple physical or virtual JICs allowing
for scalable command and control. While the goal of a JIC is consistent
messaging free of conflicting information from all agencies involved in a
response, organizations participating in incident management retain their
independence and control information regarding their programs and policies
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017). JICs can be organized in
many ways, depending on the size and scope of the incident. Table 11.1
provides examples of several JIC types.
The structure of the JIC follows that of the Incident Command System
(ICS):
ICS is a standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination of on-scene incident
management that provides a common hierarchy within which personnel from multiple
organizations can be effective. ICS specifies an organizational structure for incident management
that integrates and coordinates a combination of procedures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and
communications.
Table 11.1 Examples of JIC Types
Type Characteristics
▪ Optimal physical location for local and Incident

commander, unified command, or EOC director-assigned
Incident
PIOs to co-locate
JIC
▪ Easy media access (paramount to success)
▪ May be located at an EOC
Virtual ▪ Established when physical co-location is not feasible
JIC ▪ Incorporates technology and communication protocols
▪ Smaller in scale than other JICs
Satellite
▪ Established to support the primary JIC
JIC
▪ Operates under the primary JIC’s control
▪ Supports wide-area, multiple-incident ICS structures
Area JIC ▪ Could be established locally or statewide
▪ Media access is paramount
Type Characteristics
▪ Typically established for long-duration incidents

▪ Established to support federal incident management
National
▪ Staffed by numerous federal departments and/or
JIC
agencies
▪ Media access is paramount
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2017, October). National
Incident Management System, Third Edition. Homeland Security Digital Library.

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=804929. Page 44.
Using ICS for every incident helps hone and maintain the skills needed to coordinate efforts
effectively. ICS is used by all government levels as well as by many (non-governmental
organizations) and private sector organizations. ICS applies across disciplines and enables incident
managers from different organizations to work together seamlessly. This system includes five
major functional areas, staffed as needed, for a given incident: Command, Operations, Planning,
Logistics, and Finance/Administration.
The Emergency Manager’s Role in Communications

In smaller jurisdictions with limited staffing, the emergency manager may
serve as the public information officer. This scenario is not ideal but can
work short-term, depending on the size and scope of an incident. The
emergency manager’s vital responsibility is to ensure that the Joint
Information System is incorporated in the emergency operations plan and
any corresponding annexes. Also, standard operating procedures must be
written to trigger points for a JIC activation, supporting personnel
responsibilities, the chain of command and approval authorities for
messages, and facility location, including expected equipment requirements.
The emergency manager is also responsible for activating the JIC when an
incident’s size and scope required. The emergency manager ensures
preplanned systems go into effect. According to the Emergency Management
Institute (2016), several triggers may necessitate a JIC activation and include:
Emergency management assistance compact (EMAC) activation
Impact of the incident
The potential level of media attention
Duration of the incident, response, and recovery
Activation of the emergency operations center
Of course, every jurisdiction is different and may have additional

activation triggers. The EOP and SOP should outline the mobilization of
public information personnel and resources.
Crisis Communication and Community Outreach
National Preparedness Goal and Public Information

The National Preparedness Goal is “A secure and resilient nation with the
capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that
pose the greatest risk” (Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 1).
The National Preparedness Goal describes the Nation’s security and
resilience posture through core capabilities necessary to deal with the risks
we all face. Using an integrated, layered, and whole community approach as
the foundation for building and sustaining core capabilities and preparing to
deliver them effectively, the National Preparedness Goal defines what it
means to prepare for all types of disasters and emergencies (Department of
Homeland Security, 2015, p. 1).
Using the core capabilities, we achieve the National Preparedness Goal by:
Preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an actual act of

terrorism.
Protecting our citizens, residents, visitors, assets, systems, and networks
against the greatest threats and hazards in a manner that allows our
interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive.
Mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of
future disasters.
Responding quickly to save lives, protect property and the
environment, and meet basic human needs in the aftermath of an
incident.
Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, strengthening,
and revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and the economy, as well
as the health, social, cultural, historical, and environmental fabric of
communities affected by an incident (Department of Homeland
Security, 2015, p. 1).
Core capabilities are essential for the execution of each of the five mission areas: Prevention,
Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery (see Table 11.2). The core capabilities are not
exclusive to any single government or organization, but rather require the combined efforts of the
whole community.
[…]
Three core capabilities: Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational
Coordination, span all five mission areas. They serve to unify the mission areas and, in many
ways, are necessary for the success of the remaining core capabilities.
Additionally, several core capabilities involve more than one mission area and are listed in each
mission area as appropriate. The core capabilities, like the risks we face, are not static. They will be
vetted and refined, taking into consideration the evolving risk and changing resource
requirements. Further, there is an expectation that each of the core capabilities will leverage
advances in science and technology and be improved through post-event evaluation and
assessment.
(Department of Homeland Security, 2015, pp. 3, 4)
The National Preparedness Goal defines the primary objective of Public

Information and Warning as to:
Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community
through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate
methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions
being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.
(Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 6)
Each of the five mission areas also identifies specific preliminary targets
associated with public information and warnings within a given incident
phase.
Prevention
Share prompt and actionable messages, to include national terrorism

advisory system alerts, with the public and other stakeholders, as
appropriate, to aid in the prevention of imminent or follow-on terrorist
attacks, consistent with the timelines specified by existing processes
and protocols.
Provide public awareness information to inform the general public on
identifying and providing terrorism-related information to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities, thereby enabling the public to
act as a force multiplier in preventing imminent or follow-on acts of
terrorism (Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 6).
Protection
Use effective and accessible indication and warning systems to

communicate significant hazards to involved operators, security
officials, and the public (including alerts, detection capabilities, and
other necessary and appropriate assets) (Department of Homeland
Security, 2015, p. 8).
Mitigation
In an accessible manner, communicate appropriate information on the

risks faced within a community after the conduct of a risk assessment
(Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 11).
Response
Inform all affected segments of society by all means necessary,

including accessible tools, critical lifesaving and life-sustaining
information to expedite the delivery of emergency services, and aid the
public in taking protective actions.
Deliver credible and actionable messages to inform ongoing emergency
services and the public about protective measures and other life-
sustaining actions and facilitate the transition to recovery (Department
of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 13).
Table 11.2 Core Capabilities by Mission
Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery
Planning
Public Information and Warning
Community
Resilience
Long-term
Vulnerability
Reduction
Intelligence and Risk and
Infrastructure Systems
Information Sharing Disaster
Resilience
Assessment
Threats and
Hazards
Identification
Interdiction and Critical Economic
Disruption Transportation Recovery
Environmental Health
Response/Health and
and Safety Social
Fatality Services
Management Housing
Services Natural
Fire and
Management
Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Cultural
Recovery
and Suppression Resources

Logistics and
Supply Chain
Management
Mass Care
Services
Mass Search and
Rescue
Operations
On-scene
Security,
Protection, and
Law
Enforcement
Operational
Communications
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
Situational
Assessment
Screening, Search, and
Detection
Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery
Access
Control and
Identity
Verification
Cybersecurity
Physical
Protective
Forensics
Measures
and
Risk
Attribution
Management
for Protection
Programs and
Activities
Supply Chain
Integrity and
Security
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2020, July 20). National
Preparedness Goal. https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-

preparedness/goal. Page 3.
Recovery
Reach all populations within the community with effective, actionable

recovery-related public information messaging and communications
that are accessible to people with disabilities and people with limited
english proficiency, protect the health and safety of the affected
population, help manage expectations, and ensure stakeholders have a
clear understanding of available assistance and their roles and
responsibilities.
Support affected populations and stakeholders with a system that
provides appropriate, current information about any continued
assistance, steady-state resources for long-term impacts, and
monitoring programs in an effective and accessible manner
(Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 18).
In all emergencies and crises, emergency managers must ensure that

effective public communication occurs no matter the size or scale.
Stakeholders require information appropriate to ongoing threats and actions
to be taken. Be a credible source of timely, reliable, and actionable
information for emergency responders and community citizens.
Partnerships—When Local Resources Are Not Enough
Local/Tribal Response
Local people, local resources, and local relationships are what remain long
after the occurrence of a disaster. Every crisis or disaster begins and ends
locally. When emergency managers work with the whole community to
build greater resilience, most situations will be resolved with available
resources, but what happens when local resources are not enough?
A plane crash, major natural disaster, radiological incident, or pandemic
will quickly deplete local resources. Some of these events naturally trigger
state or federal responses. In the case of an airplane crash, local responders
may be the first on a scene. Still, it won’t be long before representatives from
federal agencies such as the National Transportation Safety Board and the
FBI arrive and begin the investigation process. A major disaster may result
in a Stafford Act declaration making federal resources available from FEMA
to supplement those at the state and local level.
When a threat is developing or an incident has occurred, local and tribal
emergency managers execute emergency operations plans. They active the
emergency operations center and joint information system. Working in
partnership with elected officials, a local state of emergency may be declared
as life-safety messages are disseminated to community members. Once the
incident command is established, and objectives and tactics are identified,
available resources are inventoried, and local mutual aid agreements are
initiated. It’s during this process that the addition of state resources is
necessitated.
If an incident is large enough, such as a hurricane or major earthquake,
the state may activate its EOC and coordinate with the governor’s office to
declare a state of emergency. As the size and scope of an incident grow, so
does the number of resources needed to respond and eventually affect pre-
disaster status recovery. Even when state and federal resources are involved,
the local or tribal emergency manager’s role does not cease. The local
emergency manager is closest to the incident and has information about the
local environment that will significantly enhance outside agencies and
organizations’ response.
State, tribal, and local governments are generally responsible for their
citizens’ health, welfare, and safety. These life-safety mandates are carried
out using authorities enumerated in local laws and codes (Becker, 2016).
National Response Framework

The National Response Framework (NRF) provides foundational emergency management doctrine
for how the Nation responds to all types of incidents. The NRF is built on scalable, flexible, and
adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to align key
roles and responsibilities across the Nation.
[… .]
When all levels of government become engaged, a response is federally supported, state-
managed, and locally executed, with tribes, territories, and insular area governments often
managing the response, as well. The Federal Government’s support and response during disasters
build on and are affected by the capacity of state, tribal, territorial, insular, and local governments,
as well as the business community and NGOs.
(Department of Homeland Security, 2019, pp. ii, 7)
The NRF groups those resources most often required for response efforts at
the Federal level into Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).
While the National Response Framework uses Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs) to deliver core capabilities, the recently developed concept
of Community Lifelines has been adopted at the national level and in many
state and local jurisdictions to enable the continuous operation of critical
government and business functions. ESFs are the main structures involved in
a response effort. Most agencies and organizations adhere to a similar ESF
construct, but variation may exist where the name and or function differs
slightly from the 16 Federal ESFs; for example, in the state of South
Carolina, there are 20 ESFs (South Carolina Emergency Management
Division, 2020), whereas the state of California has 18 functions, but
combined several in August of 2013 to better meet the needs of the state’s
emergency response (California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services,
2020).
Stabilizing community lifelines is the primary effort during a response to lessen threats and
hazards to public health and safety, the economy, and security. Together, the community lifelines
reframe incident information to provide decision-makers with the root cause and impact analysis.
This construct maximizes the effectiveness of federally supported, state-managed, and locally
executed response. Photo 11–2 identifies the seven community lifelines: Safety and Security; Food,
Water, Shelter; Health and Medical; Energy (Power & Fuel); Communications; Transportation; and
Hazardous Materials.
(Department of Homeland Security, 2019, p. 8)
Within the Community, Lifelines construct, Public Information and

Warning falls under the communications sector and as ESF 15, External
Affairs, in a Federal response. At the Federal level, the Department of
Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA)
coordinates information gathering, analysis, and dissemination support to
Federal, state, and local/tribal organizations.
Image 11.2 Community Lifelines for Incident Stabilization
Source: Image by FEMA
When an incident occurs requiring Federal response, emergency

managers at the local/tribal level will interact with state and federal
organizations in a JIC where media relations and operations are coordinated.
During an activation, the number of staff required is based on the incident’s
needs, remaining scalable and flexible throughout the response and recovery.
In general, the more Federal involvement in the JIS/JIC, the more an
emergency manager can expect to provide additional space, equipment, and
other resources. Depending upon the incident’s size, DHS/FEMA may
provide satellite trucks, communications equipment, media equipment, and
personnel.
Regardless of the event’s size or duration, the mission remains the same;
getting the right information to the right people at the right time so they can
make the right decisions for themselves and their family members.
Putting It All Together

It’s been said that the last place an emergency manager should be handing
out business cards and making introductions is in the middle of a crisis.
Integration between local, state, and Federal agencies is accomplished more
quickly when an emergency manager is familiar with the information
process and systems that will come into play before a coordinated response
to a major disaster or crisis.
Emergency managers should establish communications with media
outlets, local response agencies, state representatives, and, if possible,
Federal agencies. Participation in training and exercises and collaboration on
planning and decision-making during response and recovery are essential to
maintaining positive rapport. Following an incident, participation in
hotwash discussions, after-action report development, and other lessons-
learned opportunities will ensure stronger partnerships throughout the
emergency management community.
References
Becker, D. (2016, July). The Media—Who Are These People and What Do They
Want. Basic Public Information Officer Course. South Carolina Emergency
Management Division.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020, September 1). Reporters, Correspondents,
and Broadcast News Analysts: Occupational Outlook Handbook. Office of
Occupational Statistics and Employment Projections, U.S. Department of
Labor, Washington, DC. Retrieved from: https://www.bls.gov/ooh/media-
and-communication/reporters-correspondents-and-broadcast-news-
analysts.htm
California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (2020, November). State
of California Emergency Plan & Emergency Support Functions. Retrieved
from: https://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/planning-
preparedness/state-of-california-emergency-plan-emergency-support-
functions
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2015, September). National
Preparedness Goal, 2nd edition. Retrieved from:
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
06/national_preparedness_goal_2nd_edition.pdf
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2019, October 28). National
Response Framework. Retrieved from:
04/NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf
Emergency Management Institute (2016). E/L 105 Public Information &
Warning Instructor Guide. Department of Homeland Security, Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2017, October). National
Incident Management System, 3rd edition. Homeland Security Digital
Library. Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=804929
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2020, July 20). National
Preparedness Goal. Retrieved from: https://www.fema.gov/emergency-
managers/national-preparedness/goal
Gramlich, J. (2020, July 31). 10 Facts about Americans and Facebook. Pew
Research Center. Retrieved from: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-and-facebook
Matsa, K.E., & Fedeli, S. (2019, December 31). Trends and Facts on Local
News: State of the News Media. Local TV news fact sheet. Retrieved from:
https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/local-tv-news
Moore, R. (2020, October 29). Facebook Reports Third Quarter 2020 Results.
Facebook. Retrieved from: https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-
release-details/2020/Facebook-Reports-Third-Quarter-2020-
Results/default.aspx
Perrin, A., & Kumar, M. (2020, May 30). About three-in-ten U.S. adults say
they are “almost constantly” online. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from:
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/25/americans-going-
online-almost-constantly
Pew Research Center. (2020, May 30). For local news, Americans embrace
digital but still want strong community connection. Retrieved from:
https://www.journalism.org/2019/03/26/for-local-news-americans-
embrace-digital-but-still-want-strong-community-connection
South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SC EDM) (2020). South
Carolina Emergency Operations Plan. Emergency Operations Plan—South
Carolina Emergency Management Division. Retrieved from:
https://scemd.org/em-professionals/plans/emergency-operations-plan
U.S. Census Bureau (2020, March 30). American Community Survey Data.
The United States Census Bureau. Retrieved from:
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data.html
Chapter 12
EOC Design
Lucien G. Canton and Nicholas Staikos
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-14
Introduction
The concept of an emergency operations center or EOC is straightforward: it
provides a central location for the response, recovery, and continuity
operations, interagency coordination, and executive decision-making. But
like much in emergency management, the devil is in the details. The simple
fact is that no two EOCs function in the same way and their roles are
frequently different. For example, in a smaller jurisdiction, the EOC may
serve as a command post where operational, tactical, and executive
decisions are made. In larger jurisdictions, the EOC is a point of
coordination with executive decisions being made elsewhere.
This suggests that the EOC’s design as a facility must include an
understanding of how the organization intends to operate and how that
vision can best be supported.
Developing Strategy
As was noted above, each EOC functions differently, so the starting point in
EOC design is understanding the context in which the EOC will function.
This means articulating a vision that identifies the ideal state desired and
then identifying the EOC’s mission that supports that vision. This is the
starting point for discussion, modified by decisions based on cost/benefit
analyses, available locations, and risk tolerance. In turn, this will drive
decisions such as the level of occupancy and facility use. For example, while
large jurisdictions have dedicated EOC facilities, smaller jurisdictions and
private-sector organizations frequently rely on multi-use facilities.
The strategy outlines the parameters that will serve as the framework for
the design criteria developed by the EOC design team, which, in turn, will
drive the architectural design of the facility. For example, do the risks faced
by the organizational limit options for the location of the EOC? How much
is the organization prepared to spend? Do budget limitations limit the size of
the EOC? Will the EOC be a stand-alone or a multi-use facility? Will the
EOC serve as a command post or a point of coordination? Will staff be
housed on-site or go home at shift change? Will meals be provided during a
shift? All these decisions have implications for planning space requirements.
Image 12.1 An Example of a Jurisdictional Level and Adapted Space EOC
Source: Image provided by Howard Murphy

Image 12.2 An Example of a State Level—Dedicated Purpose EOC (VDEM-VEST)
OPS Floor
The strategy describes what the EOC is intended to do while the design
criteria developed by the EOC design team identifies how this will be
achieved.
The EOC Design Team

An effective EOC is one based on the input of those who will use it. To that
end, the starting point in EOC design is creating an EOC design team
consisting of members who will or may be involved in EOC operations. Like
any emergency planning, the team should be inclusive and include
representatives from as wide a range of participants as possible.
Internal agencies and departments. The obvious starting point is the

group of internal agencies and departments that will form the EOC
staff’s core. In the public sector, this will include key response agencies
such as police, fire, and emergency medical services. Still, membership
should go beyond just these key agencies to include functions not
always thought of as response agencies such as attorneys, personnel,
public health, and public information.
Non-governmental organizations. Many key functions, such as mass
care, are beyond the local government’s capabilities and rely on non-
governmental organizations’ services. The Red Cross, for example, has
a unique relationship with the federal government via charter to
provide disaster services that date to 1900. Other voluntary
organizations, such as radio amateur clubs or community emergency
response teams, also offer support to many EOC operations. Faith-
based organizations have played a substantial role in disasters in mass
care and recovery operations. Involving these organizations in EOC
planning has many advantages; it enhances understanding of their
capabilities and resources. It provides for input from the communities
they represent. It identifies the best methods for accessing their services
in a crisis. From an EOC perspective, it identifies logistical
requirements for their EOC representatives, particularly
communications equipment.
Private-sector organizations. EOC operations will involve many for-
profit private-sector organizations such as utilities and hospitals. In
some cases, they are represented by business organizations and may
have EOCs of their own. Whether they are represented in the EOC or
operate independently, their involvement in EOC planning can improve
interorganizational cooperation during a crisis.
Being highly inclusive does mean that many people may be involved in
EOC design, and the organizational structure of the team becomes
important. An effective approach is to identify a core team that will set the
agenda, develop the draft design criteria, resolve conflicts, and supplements
this with a larger review team that will review the design criteria and
provide input and feedback. As noted in Chapter 6, it is also possible to
involve people and focus work efforts by creating working groups and task
forces to address specific functions or technical issues.
Design Criteria
While the final EOC design will be developed by technical experts such as
architects, electricians, and plumbers, their work is based on design criteria
that specifies the specific goals that the project must achieve. The design
criteria are developed by the EOC design team and are based on several key
considerations.
Risk assessment. The risk assessment affects EOC design in two

important ways. First, it defines the type of events to which the EOC is
intended to respond. Second, it identifies risks that could affect the
survivability of the EOC. While this second factor seems obvious, it is
not always considered in EOC site selection. For years, the state of
California’s EOC was located in a major flood plain. The City of New
York’s decision to construct an EOC in the World Trade Center
following a terrorist bombing is also questionable.
Continuity of operations. It should be evident that the survivability of
the EOC in a crisis is essential. However, not all EOCs are integrated
with an organization’s continuity planning. This could affect the ability
of agencies that are expected to support response operations and the
EOC. Stovepipe planning (i.e., planning for separate events
independently from each other) can result in a competition for
resources and decision-making conflicts during a crisis. There is also
the problem that can occur when design teams and architects define
words differently. In the early days of EOC planning, design teams
were unaware that the term “survivable” to an architect meant
specifically that the facility would not kill its occupants. This meant
that EOC designs had to exceed the standard design criteria for
survivability to be assured of being functional in a crisis.
Facility use. While large organizations can afford a dedicated EOC,
many find that it is more cost-effective to design a multi-use facility
that can be used for other purposes such as office space, training, or
conferences. The intended use of the facility will have a bearing on
design. For example, there may be a need for secure storage space for
equipment and supplies or additional technical installations to assist in
a rapid conversion to EOC operations.
Space requirements. Determining the size of the EOC is a difficult task.
There is a considerable variation in need between a jurisdictional level
response and one that will involve supporting agencies from state and
federal agencies. This suggests that the design team must consider the
minimum, maximum, and average space requirements. It also indicates
that while the EOC may serve as a hub for interagency coordination,
EOC planning should also consider the need for decentralized
operations based on alternate facilities.
Functional requirements. EOC design is based on the simple concept
that “form follows function.” This means that the design team must
consider the requirements of the functions that will be performed in the
EOC. These requirements consist of two considerations. The first is the
obvious one of the space requirements needed for personnel and
equipment and the optimal positioning for the function’s efficient
performance. It should also include the need for augmentation of the
function as a crisis expands. The second consideration is not so obvious.
It involves an understanding of how the various functions will interact
with each other. For example, the planning function has frequent
interaction with operations and the public information officer. Logistics
works closely with the financial function.
Image 12.3 Example of a Training Room that Can Covert to an EOC
Source: Image and Copyright Brian R. Burt, Used with Permission
Space Requirements
As noted above, space requirements are an essential driver in developing the
design criteria. Several factors should be considered in identifying space
requirements.
Operational space. As noted above, each function has specific

requirements for equipment and personnel. This space should be
configured to allow maximum efficiency in performing those functions
and should include any necessary storage for supporting materials such
as maps, plans, and records. Planning for operational space should also
include external representatives such as non-governmental agencies
and private-sector representatives.
Meeting space. EOC operations rely heavily on the formation of ad hoc
working groups targeting specific problems. There is also a need for
planning and coordination meetings and executive briefings. This
generates a need for meeting space. Ideally, this should include multiple
meeting rooms where possible.
Technical space. Modern EOCs rely heavily on technology. This
requires that the EOC include space for technical support such as server
rooms, switching equipment, and audiovisual support.
Utility systems. EOCs rely on systems to be continuously operational.
This means that critical systems are assumed to have backups such as
generators, multiple electrical feeds, and parallel communications
systems. Another critical issue of the decision is the level of need and
the level of filtering required in Heating, Ventilation, and Air
Conditioning (HVAC) systems.
Personal space. Sustained EOC operations can generate a need for areas
for breaks and meals. Food may be prepared on-site or catered, each of
which has its space requirements. Some EOCs also provide sleeping,
showering, and laundry facilities for off-duty staff and locker facilities
to store personal items.
Security systems. An EOC is, by nature, a secure facility. This is
especially true during a crisis. EOC design should include planning for
personnel and equipment space for functions such as access control,
secure parking areas, and medical emergencies.
Facility support. While the focus is on operational issues, an EOC is
still a facility, much like any office building. There will be a need for
support such as janitorial services and deliveries. This can pose
problems during sustained operations, particularly if planning was
limited to a single shift rather than the continuous support required
during full activation.
Supplies. Like any office, EOCs require necessary supplies and office
equipment to function. EOC design should include adequate storage
space for these supplies.
Operations Room Design
Origins
The operations room, where internal and external responders report, is the
nerve center of today’s EOC. Like the field of emergency management, its
evolution is ongoing, driven by the continually changing technological
landscape and the adoption of new practices derived from lessons learned. It
was initially conceived as space where essential public and private agency
representatives came together to collect, evaluate, and disseminate
information. These multipurpose spaces were born out of the context of civil
defense. They were somewhat similar in layout and typically created with a
bunker mentality as survivability was paramount.
Image 12.4 Break or Personal Space in EOC
The accommodations were spartan, and the facility was used for other
purposes until escalating threat levels warranted activation. While their
principal function was to provide the responding agencies a seemingly
protected place to maintain communications with their respective
organizations’ operational structures, they were also viewed as a place of
refuge for governing authorities, thus ensuring government continuity. It
wasn’t unusual to find these centers located in the lower basement levels of
a municipal building or at times as a stand-alone underground facility.
Interestingly these presumed-to-be-well-protected locations were held
hostage by external events outside of their control such as plumbing failures
from above or flooding via backed-up drainage systems from below. Further,
by being collocated with many other users, any form of building evacuation
such as a fire alarm or other such alert would mandate exit from the
occupied space, not to mention the impact of sprinkler discharge seeking the
lowest level.
As the Cold War tensions defused, officials soon realized that the threats
from natural disasters would be more likely to occur and could have
significant consequences on government’s day-to-day function and affect
the lives and welfare of a large proportion of the jurisdictions’ population.
This growing awareness produced the need for enlarged staff to administer
recovery programs and focused support during the crisis and drove the need
for more capable facilities.
The September 11 attacks shifted emergency management’s focus from an
all-hazards approach to one that was biased toward homeland security and
counterterrorism. The emergency management community raised the
concern over the short-sightedness in this shift in emphasis. Then, the
impact of Hurricane Katrina and the other storms reminded everyone that
emergency management and response demand a broad base of preparedness
found in an all-hazards approach.
This transitional awareness helps drive a new mindset among community
leaders that EOCs and their operations centers should ensure government
survivability and facilitate continuity of operations for the private sector by
striving to return to normalcy. Our leaders recognize that this is even more
important now that globalization and interdependency are no longer
academic concepts but a reality. The linkage between suppliers,
manufacturers, producers, and consumers is one of the key threads that bind
a nation together. A robust and strong economic base has come to represent
a key component of a country’s strength. As a result, the EOC and its
operations room play a pivotal role in managing a crisis, and the EOC has
had to become a sophisticated communications hub to fulfill its mission
during the cycle of mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery rather
than just a command-and-control center during a crisis.
Today’s Focus
Regardless of the scale of an emergency, the success of a coordinated
response almost always depends on several key factors.
1. Redundant and interoperable communications systems, which are

balanced vertically and horizontally
2. Comprehensive ability to quickly determine and coordinate asset
utilization
3. Organizational flexibility to accommodate a variety of responding
entities, which are driven by event type
4. In-depth situational awareness
5. Access to all supporting resources to formulate alternative response
scenarios.
One must also recognize that because of the speed at which events can
unfold and the need to engage a myriad of supporting players, a well-crafted
plan should be in place. To be effective, it should target the most likely types
of events for the locale and be adapted/adjusted based on multiagency
exercises. The plan—the tools—are the baseline of preparedness, for as we
have often seen, events never follow the script, and scenario adaptation will
be necessary.
Another reality that our political establishment can sometimes forget is
that all disasters are local. Even during a widening crisis, organizational
effectiveness starts with the local responders and then gradually draws upon
the next level of support. Having said this, we have all seen situations where
the local entity failed to quickly recognize that events were spiraling beyond
their capabilities and failed to request support fast enough. This is where the
value of the EOC’s operations room is leveraged. For while the incident
command is focusing on the immediate issues on the ground, the
professionals in the EOC with a theater-wide view can implement and guide
a strategic response measured by the needs coming from the field.
Additionally, we must further recognize that staffing realities dictate that
no matter the jurisdiction’s size, support during the initial stages of an event
will come from a 24/7 watch component. This on-duty team acts as the
tripwire providing the vital linkages in the response chain. They will do so
until the facility reaches full staffing wherein interface with each supporting
agency’s organization will be handled by their responding entity. Therefore,
this watch staff will need to have all the skills and tools to capably manage
the initial response until the activated agencies’ appropriate representatives
are dispatched to the EOC to provide real-time coordination within their
respective infrastructure.
Can Organizational Structure Impact Room Design?

The short answer to this question is a definite yes. Our experience has
shown that the responsible agency’s management structure most definitely
influences the layout style for the operations (OPS) room. Predictably, it will
tilt either toward a C2 (command and control) or to a C4 (which I prefer to
refer to as communicate, collaborate, coordinate, and, to a more limited
degree, control) setup. This bias’s determining factor is quite often
dependent on whether the agency has a public safety or emergency
management heritage. There is a clear chain of command in public safety
environments as in the military, and room layout will focus its attention on
either a common information display wall or command structure. Those
agencies from an emergency management lineage will tend to tilt toward a
collaborative or clustered environment. In many jurisdictions, hybrid models
have begun to be implemented.
Regardless of the layout, the reality is that a fundamental shift has
occurred. The modern EOC’s success will be dependent on its ability to
foster the coordination and disseminating of information to the appropriate
consumers. These activities will be coordinated through the event managers
and the emergency support function (ESF) personnel who are positioned in
the operations room. And even as advancements in technology lend
credibility to the notion that the future will create a virtual EOC, recent
events continue to suggest that face-to-face collaboration is a more efficient
and effective form of problem-solving. This reality, I believe, extends to all
levels of government.
Design’s Role in Supporting the Evolving Mission

One must keep in mind that developing a comprehensive design for an EOC,
and its operations room must consider a wide range of considerations that
will affect internal and external features. These items encompass responder
accessibility, hazard zone proximity, availability of redundant services,
maintenance of secure operations, and leveraging natural hardening through
siting to physical hardening of both structures and systems. All of these
factors and others must be considered when developing the design criteria
and programmatic requirements for the facility. The degree to which a
facility is hardened is primarily influenced by the risk analysis generated
from the threat and hazard assessment. This discussion will focus on the
various design options for the internal organization of the operations room
of the modern EOC to create a well-conceived and functional center.
Management studies have shown that design does indeed have a
significant impact on workplace effectiveness. Repeatedly, environmental
comfort for the occupants’ physical and psychological needs has been shown
to play a significant role in mitigating the detrimental effects of high stress,
which accompanies crises. Of the many factors that form the basis of an
integrated design, the following are a few key components:
Ergonomics
– Console design
– Visual display design
– Seating comfort
– Technology integration
– Adaptability to a diversity of user body types
Environmental comfort
– Variable glare-free lighting control
– Acoustical control
– Thermal comfort and control
Space allocation
– Operator positions
– Supporting services
– Breakout areas
– Policy room
– Strategic response planning
– Quiet rooms
– Resource management
– Extended stay accommodation
– Self-sufficiency
Circulation and access control
– Hierarchical circulation system

– Electronics used to augment physical security design
– Layout supports workflow
Relationship to support spaces
– Ease of accessibility
– Ability to be serviced while in operation
Sustainable utility systems
– Redundant services
– Diverse routing
– Resupply capability
– Flexible cable management system.
By adequately considering these and other requirements, the workplace
environment designers will significantly impact the operational
effectiveness, thus shaping the quality of an entity’s response. When
implemented appropriately, these features and concepts will become
transparent to the user as they will not be a source of discomfort. This will
improve performance dramatically as fatigue and frustration play a
prominent role in degrading operational effectiveness.
The impact of design becomes even more apparent as the scale of an event
escalates as these challenges become more complicated due to their potential
consequences. Time and time again, we read of the failings of response
efforts, such as with Hurricane Katrina and in the earthquake in Haiti, when
events of a catastrophic nature can overwhelm the system. Logistical
entanglements, lack of communication, or conflicting requests produce chaos
and unacceptable results. Whether physical or virtual, facilities will not
produce the needed result without a well-coordinated plan and effective
communications and logistical support.
Fundamentals
Each jurisdiction needs to have a solution tailored to its needs. The following
narrative and accompanying diagrams illustrate several of the fundamental
ways in which the focal point of an EOC, the operations room, can be
configured to optimize a jurisdiction’s response’s effectiveness. As the reader
reviews the concepts, it is crucial to keep in mind that operation efficiency
improves when the functional space is purposefully built yet affords the
flexibility to adjust for refinement of operation. At times this may seem to
be an unreachable goal, but it is achievable. This discussion deals primarily
with the space and big-picture issues of technology integration and not its
deployment nor optimal position assignment for the responding entities.
Additionally, each of the plans presented can support the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), some better than others.
One should also remember that many of these requirements, including
situational awareness, asset control, and collaborative problem-solving, are
scalable to all jurisdictional levels. Further, the need for this capability and
attendant sophistication increases as the jurisdictional landscape and
physical area encompassed growth due to increased political complexity.
Regardless of the many variations of layout currently in use, the operations
room’s design can be characterized by six basic configurations, each of
which can be applied to all response levels. For this analysis, we will
describe them as follows.
Traditional multipurpose
Cubicle cluster
Horseshoe
Stadium/theater
Collaboration pods—theater style
Iris
Even virtual centers will utilize similar organizational structures for the
network control center.
Although they may be referred to by other names, these are the basic
configurations for today’s modern operations room. As previously
mentioned, the preference of one design form over another is often
influenced by the government’s branch in which the agency finds itself. This,
in turn, affects the leadership style and whether the organization’s roots are
from public safety, which favors a C2 arrangement, or from emergency
management, which tilts toward a C4. Of course, this doesn’t mean that you
can’t have a collaborative environment with a central focus context.
In addition to the design of the operations room’s internal arrangement, a
well-thought-out concept of the supporting spaces for functions such as
policy-making, strategic planning, breakout rooms, quiet rooms, sleeping
areas, equipment rooms, locker rooms, and break rooms must be
implemented. These interrelationships’ interrelationship play a significant
role in establishing an effective center and dramatically influences the
center’s success during periods of activation.
Review of Layouts
Multipurpose
The multipurpose layout was traditionally used in smaller jurisdictions

where dedicated space for response activities was not available. This
template featured a simple room with a flat floor, which could serve a
multiplicity of uses from conference space to community meetings (Image
12.5). Because of its multipurpose nature, conversion to a full-fledged OPS
room/EOC required setup time for furniture configuration, technology
deployment, communications installation, and so forth.
Two Positives
1. Multipurpose
2. Flexible configuration.
Six Negatives
1. Time required for physical setup

2. Technology deployment can be challenging; use of floor boxes can
reduce set up time
3. Need storage space to store supporting equipment
4. Challenges in lighting control when layout changes
5. With flexibility comes a lack of focus
6. Acoustics generally are substandard.
Image 12.5 Training/Multi-Use Room
Source: Staikos Associates Architects 2010, Used with Permission
Cluster/Pod Example
Image 12.6 shows a cluster/pod example.

Five Positives
1. Allows for reconfiguration to enhance collaboration of responding

entities
2. Allows for reassignment of cubes to entities having a higher level of
interaction
3. Demands uniformity of technology to be conveniently flexible
4. Allows adoption of a hoteling concept with user logins to redefine
occupant
5. Can adjust to variable numbers of related responder personnel.
Five Negatives
1. Does not provide a central focus for the disseminated or displayed
information
2. On-the-fly reconfiguration is not as simple as it would seem and,
therefore, not typically done until after an event, on lessons learned
basis before the next event
3. Reconfiguration based upon specific event experience may not apply to
a different type of activation
Image 12.6 Multipurpose Cluster Example
4. Use of cube positions even with seated height walls are more
challenging to reorient than simple desking
5. Conflict between dedicated services and storage capability versus
flexibility.
Horseshoe
The horseshoe layout development allows the participants to view

commonly displayed information yet maintain eye contact with their fellow
responders (Image 12.7). This arrangement is typically geared to a smaller
room so that some direct conversation can occur across the room. When
arranged on a stepped floor, supporting associates of the principals seated at
the primary table can be positioned in close proximity.
Five Positives
1. In a smaller room environment, eye and voice contact can be

maintained so that each speaker can follow the body language of the
other principal
2. Opportunity for tiered or level OPS floor
3. Opportunity for centrally focused display wall
4. Allows for OPS floor breakout area or mini-conference room, close at
hand supervision
5. Provides space for supporting staff providing backup to the principals.
Image 12.7 Horseshoe Example

Six Negatives
1. Tends to encourage and generate increased noise levels if multiple

conversations are occurring simultaneously
2. Doesn’t effectively allow for cross-agency collaboration or subgroup
collaboration as it must occur outside the room
3. Shape limits optimal or preferred sightlines
4. Limited number of ESF positions
5. Not ideal for small-group collaboration
6. OPS room becomes longer, narrower as positions increase.
Stadium/Theater
The stadium/theater layout became popular with the advent of space

missions wherein multiple activities could be commonly displayed for use
by many participants. The rooms are generally stepped with tiers of consoles
to allow unobstructed sightlines to displayed information (Image 12.8). It fits
a command-and-control model influenced by military models.
Nine Positives
1. Visual focus of the room allows all participants to share in tangential

information used on an as-needed basis; messaging and pictorial
information displays are easily viewed
2. Minimizes excess noise generation due to people asking what’s going
on
3. Allows attention to be focused on the speaker who may address the
group
4. Incident managers positioned to oversee activity on OPS floor
5. Technology is fully deployed and tested so that startup is almost
immediate
6. Can be effectively used for multipurpose training without
reorganization
7. Adjacent or on OPS floor breakout area or mini-conference room
8. Tiered concept allows for executive management to have overlook but
be off the floor
9. Allows for designed acoustical and light control methods to be in place.
Six Negatives
1. Dedicated space with limited multipurpose use

2. Although positions can be reassigned quickly, it does not readily lend
itself to podlike clustering or grouping of responding agencies
3. Display size must increase with the overall depth of the room
4. Requires buffer area at the front of the room to maintain optimum
viewing angles
5. Room proportions dictated by display characteristics
6. Large group collaboration must occur in break rooms.
Image 12.8 Stadium/Theater Example

Collaboration Pods/Theater Variation
The pods/theater layout allows for the establishment clustering of ESF

functions while at the same time providing common focus to the displayed
information. Configuration establishes subgroup principals allowing direct
voice and visual interaction of the principals while still at their positions,
allowing assimilation of ongoing event data (Image 12–9)
Six Positives
1. Subgrouping or ESF clusters work well for 7–11 participants as

speaking levels can be held in check.
2. Provides all participants with the front of the room focus to view
displayed information
3. Stepped configuration allows for clear sightlines
4. Subgroup principals have direct eye-contact with team members and
information displays
5. Room for on-the-floor huddles between ESF subgroups
6. Breakout rooms can be located on either side as in theater/stadium
layout.
Three Negatives
1. Viewing angles are compromised for a portion of the group

2. Doesn’t easily lend itself to changing ESF populations without
migrating across POD structure
3. As the depth of room increases, display surfaces need to enlarge,
affecting optimal sightlines for those closer to display.
Image 12.9 Collaboration Example
Iris Example
The iris layout is patterned after a non-hierarchical structure where there is

no self-evident position of room leadership (Image 12.10). This deference to
equality can be seen in the UN Security Council layout.
Three Positives
1. Inward focus, not hierarchical

2. Acceptable sightlines but for a limited number of participants
3. Breakout clusters/teaming outside OPS room.
Four Negatives
1. Poor sightline angles due to needing to place display walls at an

elevated height
2. Limited single-point overview/observation opportunities caused by
multi-display walls
3. Single-level/flat OPS floor degrading sightlines
4. Less flexibility for routine (non-activation time) activities.
Summary
As the reader well understands, today’s emergency operations center’s
design is a complex problem requiring an understanding of functional
requirements, operational methodologies, and systems technologies.
Regardless of the direction taken, it is a workplace that must be adaptable to
meet ever-changing systems, management styles, and mission objectives.
This can be accomplished through a concerted team-planning effort by fully
engaging the emergency manager, architectural and engineering design
professional, and facilities management team to produce a flexible, reliable,
and maintainable complex. When this collaboration is implemented at the
outset with a broad-based needs assessment, programming, team-oriented
design, and continuing through to live performance evaluation, one can be
assured that everyone’s voice has been heard. Additionally, if a compromise
is dictated, the opportunity for buy-in is facilitated as all will be aware of
the constraints, which will enable acceptance and produce a successful
result.
Image 12.10 Iris Example

Chapter 13
Stress Management and Mental Health

Considerations in Emergency Contexts
Kammie Juzwin
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-15
Why Stress Management Is Important to Emergency Managers

Our world is experiencing a significant range of disasters requiring constant
response and mitigation. The aftermath of trauma on communities is much
concern in the professional literature across many disciplines, including the
emergency management, medical, mental health, and public health fields.
There is more recognition of attention to the needs of victims, survivors, and
responders as well. Resources related to policy and guidelines for best
practices continue to evolve. There are several formal strategies to mitigate
trauma in terms of risk reduction for trauma globally, for example, the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction adopted by the United
Nations in 2015 (Reifels, 2018). A recommendation from Reifels (2018)
advocated for the provision of appropriate mental health support and
identification of how to direct people to appropriate support, mental health
support strategies, and integration into disaster preparedness planning. The
recommendation was made that components from the foundational disaster
mental health perspective should be understood and in place within disaster
response strategies by including practitioners and experts in policy
development and disaster response. On the world stage, it is recognized that
mental health experts need to have a seat at the disaster and emergency
response planning, policy development, and translation into action of these
tenets. These recommendations appear to be fairly consistent among the
guidelines and literature in the field published in the area of disaster
planning and community response. They also set the important stage of
addressing the need for attention to supporting disaster responders to be an
important focus of disaster and responder response, not only in the context
of large-scale event involvement but across their careers. Attending to the
psychological well-being needs of the emergency responder workforce is a
topic that has gained significant momentum and has gained influence in
policy creation, evidence-based and legal/ethical support (Rutkow, Gable, &
Links, 2011; Umeda, Chiba, Sasaki, Agustini, & Mashino, 2020).
In crisis situations, community management has multiple populations to
attend to and manage: their civilian citizens and their employees, including
all paid and volunteer personnel. If the demand is great enough, there may
be mutual aid, state, and federal responders. That is a lot of moving parts
and lives to plan for, and the structure of response tends to include the
largest and most salient components to manage accommodating these needs
in this disaster environment. Here is where the small, subtle details
involving managing the needs of responders (people) becomes essential. This
is where the responders themselves can be protected, supported, and
experience critical incident stresses themselves. This chapter speaks to those
points by highlighting the psychological components that motivate human
beings and help bring these elements into consideration in planning. This
chapter offers emergency planners and community management
professionals a framework of important essential perspectives to consider
building into their emergency response plan in operational situations related
to the responders’ and staff’s needs. This chapter addresses the value of
including mental health professionals’ contribution to cultural competency
in every stage of disaster response and recovery. These professionals have
experience and expertise that can amplify the policy and procedures
developed for community recovery. They understand human needs and
behavior at skills that can strengthen the policy and procedures designed for
community recovery. They understand human needs and behavior a subtle
and powerful way. Attention to the need to recognize even subtle
components related to stress mitigation is vital to any disaster response plan
and workforce protection.
The foundations for emergency managers to anticipate events that meet
and exceed the scope of what they can manage within their municipality
jurisdiction, region, or state has been practiced. The mechanics of the
response structure appears well dictated, as evidenced by the trend to use
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) approach and the
protocol of various agencies mandating response within their service scope.
In the case of disasters, what happens?
On rare occasions, emergencies occur that are so large in scale and so severe that local responders
may not have the resources—people, equipment, expertise, funds—to effectively and safely
respond. Even in such cases, local responders do not hesitate to do what they have been trained to
do—go to the site prepared to save lives, protect property, and remove the threat.
(Jackson, Baker, Ridgely, Bartis, & Linn, 2004, p. iii)
These responders are resources very richly valuable and experienced and
come with their own set of resources, strengths, skills, and their own
experiences, exposures and traumatic injuries, and capacities for
compensation and cache of resiliency. The problem with resiliency is that we
are seldom aware of just how close we are to the bottom of that well and
that coping that was meant to be short-term is now a long-term habit. To
borrow a metaphor, one participates in a marathon at a sprinters’ pace and
mindset.
Related to disasters, the reference point continually changes in terms of
whatever the last one was, and efforts are made to learn from that
experience and plan for the next. In 2020, there has been the unprecedented
occurrence of a worldwide pandemic of a virus that has yet to be
understood, devastating forest fires, multiple hurricanes, and violent civil
unrest. Federal resources are being called upon by states at a constant rate.
In the writers’ home state, the mobile emergency hospital staffed by
volunteer teams couldn’t be activated because their medical personnel were
unable to leave their hospital and community assignments when the first
wave of COVID-19 hit the state. They needed to respond to their primary
occupational roles. And this was true in other regions and for a vast number
of responder groups. The demand for adaptation in how we live and
function changed immediately and became enormous in managing these
demands, which hit every aspect of our lives. The movement to quarantine
at home became the norm for the duration. Personal and professional
demands for adjustment of working, schooling, childcare, and trying to
secure necessities all became constant challenges and realities. For many
professionals, their PPE requirements, which are vitally important
equipment as elements of protection and safety precautions, are often not in
supply or readily available. The amount of dose-exposure is extraordinarily
high, and first responders, essential personnel, and general people are afraid.
The demands for managing the current disaster situations keep changing,
and society is torn between their fear and isolation, their rights, they do not
understand the situation, and information overload. The current climate
causes so much stress and trauma at many levels, personally, vocationally,
socially, financially, physically, psychologically, and emotionally. And there
appears to be no end in sight. The stress is magnified by the ongoing nature
of the situation and the vast number of unknowns and unpredictable threats.
As part of daily functioning, these events take a psychological toll that
cannot be seen. Still, cumulative stress-related injuries are real injuries and
must be respected similarly to physical and occupational injuries. A
common element of functioning as an emergency responder or essential
worker assumes that stress and critical incident stress and injury comes with
the job. People develop in their jobs around it, often with many battle scars
as their experience, coping, and resilience adapts. Their experiences are often
minimized or outright ignored by a narrow focus’s cultural attitude that
results in creating more stress and trauma-related injury problems for itself.
When these professionals say, “I’m fine,” that may mean that they are not
necessarily absent of stress or impact; it may mean they are focused on the
bigger, more urgent demand. They may be focusing on what is necessary, be
on-task using their resiliency, and actively compensating for the immediate
stress and demands. This means using their internal store of resiliency,
resources and relying on their training and experience to help them
compensate for the demands they are facing in their responding role.
With the ever-present stigma of mental health-related concerns, the
realities of the impact of responding in a critical incident environment must
be brought to the forefront and protection must be built in at all aspects of a
mission. The idea that mental health and stress-related impact issues exist
must be brought to the forefront of preventative and current situational
concerns and given the same attention as concern for physical well-being
and safety. But how can they be attended to when there are few resources
available to recognize and respond to them in the situation? Mental health,
wellness, stress-mitigation, critical incident stress management, whatever
term one wants to use, must be built into the response. It is time to recognize
that appropriately credentialled and experienced mental health professionals
should have a seat at the table, a voice in the conversation and participate in
developing policy and strategy.
Image 13.1 Mental Health Services at the TMOSA—Katrina 2005

Image 13.2 Kammie Juzwin, PsyD Licensed Clinical Psychologist Deployed to
COVID Pandemic 2020
Source: Image provided by Kammie Juzwin, Used with Permission
A very wise leader once advised that there are generally three major
types of problems that any plan must account for: systemic, personnel, and
interaction. The systemic involves a system that doesn’t work effectively or
needs recalibration. With personnel, it is either a person who is problematic
or has a problem and is very different. The last problem is when there is an
interaction between the system and the personnel who are having a
problem. The question is always to look at whether or not the person has
some valuable information about the system that would improve
functioning. There are several benefits to building these considerations into
this structure. The first is obvious: having a solid plan (i.e., system) ready to
put into place in a disaster or emergent situation helps optimize success in
response and recovery. The community benefits from a well-prepared plan,
and responders rely on the structure to bring order and direction for their
assignments. Adding a mental health perspective can allow for resources to
be built-in. Potential problems can be identified and addressed to help
calibrate the system in a highly demanding situation. Given that most plans
focus on strategy, safety, resources, and medical care, the addition of the aid
of human behavior and mental health should make practical sense. Their
knowledge of human behavior, adaptation, patterns, and systems are
significant elements of wisdom they can offer.
The second observation considers that if the organization focuses on
physical, mental, and emotional aspects of the long-term well-being and
force (i.e., personnel) protection, consideration of specific elements has been
shown to predict organization commitment (Gopinath, 2020), lower risks of
occupational-related complaints and have better outcome for the workforce
and community (Wise and Beck, 2015). Again, considering the important
human factors, which may seem minute or unimportant in the bigger
picture, is a vital function that someone using a mental health lens can
provide valuable input. For example, what happens when a responder has a
very unhealthy or maladaptive personality; despite the fact, they are
competent and qualified experts in their profession? How might their
activities and patterns present, and what impact might they have on the
temporary workgroup working long hours in arduous conditions? What if
the impact they are causing isn’t just about people “not getting along”?
Image 13.3 Three Types of Major Problems Plans Must Account For

Because no disaster scenario ever seems to fit what was anticipated or to
survive without significant adaptation and alteration, and human systems
issues are wherever there are humans, there will be issues that arise. Most
plans are and should be mission-focused. After-action reviews, complaints,
observations, and identified components often identify issues that may seem
minor but had a significant impact on the working environment and the
personnel who were impacted by these issues. This is where mental health
professionals can be invaluable. They understand human patterns, develop
patterns, and identify problematic concerns that may not be readily visible
to professionals in other disciplines. These issues should be taken seriously
and addressed daily to see if a resolution can be adapted to help ease the
workforce’s stress.
Commitment to significant causes and to improve the quality of their
community are often foundations of core beliefs of responder personality,
which creates an opportunity for committing to something as crucial as
helping during crisis events. To put it briefly, people care about
organizations that appear to care about them as much as they are concerned
about the work’s product or outcome. Organizational commitment has been
shown to directly relate to the perceived leadership style, especially where
the leadership defines personnel’s roles toward defined goals through
assigned tasks, using specific procedures, timelines, and communication
(Dale and Fox, 2008). Given those elements and the paramilitary operational
system, this is a critical consideration. When the leadership directly
communicates and integrates practices addressing force wellness as a
function of the mission, it benefits the overall mission. Further, research
demonstrates that planning for targeting the reduction of perceived role
stress and increasing or solidifying interpersonal factors benefits the
organization (Dale and Fox, 2008). Yet, how many times are mental health
professionals actively engaged in consultation with organizations? How
often are they given a seat at the table with all the other very important
functions? This seat is not to act as therapists, but to take a human behavior
specialists’ role, contributing to safety, task force protection, and stress
mitigation in a boots-on-the-ground function. This writer tells people that
my role is to help them get home as safely as possible and help them during
the process of responding during their deployment and staying intact and
healthy. Speaking more formally, just a few of the mental health officer’s
goals are mental health officers’ goals to mitigate stress, cumulative and
traumatic stress, and monitor for moral injury within the deployment. This
complements the work of the medical team and the safety officer.
Small details can become very significant to understanding how
seemingly inconsequential details can lead to additional stress, psychological
injury, and moral injury. Remember, perception creates reality. Humans’
perceptions are often colored by their experiences, emotional and physical
states, and expectancies.
Example 1: A response team working in a very hot, humid environment
were not given an option not to wear all-black uniforms during a 12-hour
shift over two weeks in the sun. Their hats were also black. Daily they had
concerns about the heat, direct exposure to the sun, etc. They were told to
stay hydrated. Understandably there were some visits to the medical tent,
and there were problems with heat exhaustion. Every day their team lead
was told that their group were complainers and that no one on this
deployment was comfortable. No one noticed that this team was wearing
black, while all others were in tan or lighter colors appropriate to the
climate. Given their relocation to the disaster location from their own home
in a different region of the country, the clothing color and weight provided
much distress to a group who couldn’t escape or lessen the environmental
conditions, until someone suggested purchasing white T-shirts for them for
the duration of their assignments. The idea was formulated nine days into
the rotational assignment and was met with a casual response permitting to
“try anything to stop their complaining.” White shirts were easily accessible,
and while they didn’t remain clean, the relief that was provided was
remarkable. The fact that the response team was taken seriously and
someone responded to them reflected compassion, respect, and
acknowledgment of something important to them in doing their job. Anyone
who has worked with emergency responders or in a disaster will see
examples of how thinking gets stuck on systemic lines of thought. Ideas die
in the system or from people higher up who may not understand the
importance of what front-line responders say their circumstances are like for
them, and then no solutions can be generated. The responder then often feels
unimportant, disrespected, or dismissed. Imagine if someone had suggested
lighter color T-shirts within the first few shifts?
Example 2: In one after-action review, many of the comments listed that
the women’s bathroom facilities were broken continuously and lacked
supplies. The water leaked constantly and at times, the entire facility was
closed until someone could come and address the problem. This meant that
the women would have to use other portable facilities outside of their work
zone: they had to walk across the perimeter, remove their PPE, use the
latrine while trying to keep their PPE from touching the floor or themselves
while using the facility, and then redress themselves inside the stall, and
then come out and use the washing stations. Then they had to return across
the perimeter to their work station, having been gone for about 20 minutes.
Several team leaders reminded people that going to the bathroom was not
the same as taking a break and reminded them to try to get back within ten
minutes. The other option was to have them remove their PPE, use the
facilities, and then again get into their PPE. There are several issues here in
this simple example. No one addressed the bathroom situation, planning for
additional women’s facilities to be available and convenient. There was no
consideration that women need to remove their PPE at least half-way to use
the facilities every time they use them. There was no accommodation for
their equipment, such as a place to set or hold it, except for the floor, in the
restroom area. The last point is that people commented that when women
use the bathroom, they get a nice break and get to walk and stretch their
legs. And when the women pointed out it was because of the issues listed
above, they were told that it was because women stuff the toilets with things
they shouldn’t. To some extent, that was true; paper towels were used
because the toilet paper supply, which was evenly distributed between
facilities, was more quickly used up by the women than the men. This is a
basic hygiene needs and supplies point. There were also comments about
how, if you were a smoker, you got the privilege of numerous breaks, and if
you were a female smoker, you had it made.
Mental health professionals recognize the multiple layers of human
behaviors and reactions in these examples. Had there been a consultation
with a mental health officer who was given those responsibilities, these
issues might have been dealt with much sooner. The responder’s anxiety and
frustration could have been much more easily recognized and addressed,
and the negative reactions and consequent stress over these issues may have
been alleviated. The administrators, who are trying to do a good job, are also
under pressure and have limited available resources. When they are faced
with certain information about systems problems, it creates stress. Human
nature is to find blame and pawn off the negative details as something the
other person owns. Imagine having the demands that these administrators
have, and in their minds, not understanding the impact of the concern
themselves, attribute the problem to the individual responders?
Organizational influence on the development of moral injury and work-
related traumatic event exposure in responders is well-documented and
discussed in the literature. Estimates reflect variance across the industry,
however show that first responders and professionals exposed to traumatic
events as a part of their responsibilities are estimated to be four to five times
more likely to develop PTSD than the general population, which contribute
to an increased disability, medical costs, and workdays lost (Wise and Beck,
2015). A significant problem is the lack of consistent recognition of incident-
related stress, cumulative incident-related stress, cumulative traumatic
stress, and post-traumatic stress-related and injury-related injuries. And
how systems themselves contribute to the development. The workers’
perception is that their job is to do their job, and the system, i.e., the
administration, has provided them with what they need. This extends to first
responders and extends to first responders and the medical, psychiatric, and
mental health professional field.
Let’s face it, the work of emergency and disaster responders is very
difficult even under ordinary circumstances. It involves both daily exposure
to things most humans avoid, and the effects can accumulate over time. The
impacts over time have physical, emotional, relational, behavioral, and
spiritual costs. Why should emergency management and administrations
pay attention to this? Part of the answer is because it is the right (ethical)
thing to do. Caring about one’s employees as members of the community
they serve is wise. Another reason is to manage risk. And it is good business.
Costs to the organization to recognize, address, and accommodate the
reasonable human needs at a basic level can save the organization down the
road. It also can positively impact the work environment and the individual.
Addressing human needs is vitally important in all three of these arenas,
especially as the career of first responding violates so many fundamental
mammalian biological functions (e.g., disruptions of sleep cycles, repeated
exposure to high-risk situations, etc.).
One important human health factor involves recognizing and addressing
human needs. Addressing the human needs components of Maslow’s
Hierarchy of Needs (Maslow, 1954), is a systematic way to optimize human
performance and protect the workforce. This approach conceptualizes
human behavior as being organized through a hierarchy of levels, where
each subsequent level is based on the need to meet the previous level’s
needs. When the basic foundation is compromised, the remaining levels of
need are potentially also then compromised. This helps explain why little
things may actually not be little, but may be foundational components of
safety to an individual. Considered from an anthropological framework, the
basic foundational needs of physical and physiological necessities are first
and foremost necessary for survival. The body must have certain things to
continue to function. When these needs aren’t met, the way the mammalian
body is wired allows for these needs to become paramount to continued
functioning and performance. The next level addresses the safety needs of
stability, security, and protection. The third level of needs involves
relationships, belongingness, and emotional inclusion into groups with other
people. The fourth level of needs involves self-esteem, self-definition, social
status and mastery, and independence. The fifth level of needs involves self-
fulfillment and self-actualization; the goal of constantly becoming the best
one can become.
Given that emergency responders are heavily values-based people, the
drive can be why they are willing not to have any other needs met and
continue to do their job. Their calling sends them into a chaotic traumatic
situation, at the cost of their needs being neglected. That is where and how
burn-out, cumulative stress, and traumatic stress injuries happen.
If recognizing “it” hasn’t been enough of a problem, knowing what to call
“it” has consistently been a problem in the discussion. A significant issue in
terms of consistent nomenclature is how then education and intervention
happens. This has a significant issue for first responders, essential workers,
and public service personnel. These problems can result in stress-related
health problems, career problems, burn-out, early retirement, workers’
compensation, and disability due to exposures to work-related duties. While
the push for mental health and wellness efforts has legal support with parity
legislation, this may not translate to consideration for career-associated
traumatic exposure and psychological injury with the same empirically
driven and supported protocol and practice as work-related physical injury.
An environmental disaster, human-made disaster, or pandemic calls for
responders from the first responder fields who are, by definition, carrying a
degree of traumatization and taxed resiliency. They will always find it
within them to respond and serve, right up to the day they burn out, get
fired, commit career suicide, die by suicide, quit, retire, or are forced out.
In the long run, responders and essential workers carry this back to their
career roles and personal lives, where the impact may be devastating. The
available support for those individuals who have experienced psychological
service-related injury may not receive the same support as those
compensations for physical disability or injury. Imagine the sense that a
responder has when exposed to traumatic events, performs their role
adequately throughout their career, and through the job’s challenges, with
the added scrutiny from media and public, to feel that their leadership has
failed to support them? Indeed, the vital influence for the onset of moral
injury occurs when a real or perceived betrayal of faith, connection, value,
meaning, or purpose to what they are doing. This weight obligates the
support that is part of what the organization bears in keeping their
workforce healthy: that the organization holds the responsibility to respect
and back their workforce in their psychological and physical roles and
duties. Leadership creates in their culture. This is important to leadership
because a moral injury has been tied to the line of duty performance, health,
well-being, and PTSD (Papazoglou, Bonanno, Blumberg, & Keesee, 2019). In
this author’s opinion, the grief and trauma associated with perceived failure
or lack of support from leadership and organization has, time and time
again, shown itself to be the insult, further compromising moral injury.
Although more supervisors and departments are beginning to include
wellness components, peer support, and critical incident stress management,
it may not be consistent.
Image 13.4 “It”
Another issue is that supervisors and administrators may not know if the
individual providing psychological intervention, assessment, evaluation for
workers’ compensation, or disability reviews in independent medical
examinations understand first responder culture and job demands. They may
not understand the difference between officer wellness intervention, officer-
involved consultations, or fitness for duty interventions. Many don’t know
where to find a properly credentialed professional for these services. Just as
a point of fact, there are guidelines for these available from the International
Association of Chiefs of Police—Police Psychologists Section and the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine.
Addressing the mental health elements that could benefit from having
additional attention focuses on planning to minimize the traumatic impact
on the responders during and after the deployment. It is important to
consider the workforce personnel’s well-being because they become victim-
responders when a disaster strikes in their community. Their commitment
will drive them to do what they have to do for their job and community.
Their minds and hearts will be preoccupied with their own families, homes,
and neighborhoods. It is important to note that there are findings (Galea,
2007) suggesting that the long-term severe, severe consequences of disasters
and mass trauma are most frequent in specific groups of survivors. The
survivors’ groups are categorized in the severity of consequences, the people
injured in the incident, rescuers, people who have lost their personal
belongings and homes, families of those injured, and then the general
population (Galea, 2007; Sheehan, Everly, & Langlieb, 2004). Many officers
face the double-bind of how to split their attention and focus when their
community and family are threatened all at once. In recent years in the
news of the devastating mass fires in the west, many stories are heart-
breaking about firefighters working in their communities as their own
homes are consumed along with the community, that they are responsible
for protecting.
The foundations for disaster planning must be built upon understanding
the individual responder’s normal daily functioning because they experience
the responder demands and culture daily. Active leadership involvement,
which has a foundation of awareness of the continuum of normalcy in daily
functioning, to the abnormal, to understanding the traumatic impacts of the
job, and the importance of insulation from moral injury is paramount in
emergency management planning. Understanding that they are bringing in
experts in emergency response has many benefits to disaster response. Still,
it brings with it some additional obligations in terms of managing force
wellness. Responders will bring their own skill sets and experiences into the
disaster response arena. They are included in that their level of personal
traumatic injury, compensatory abilities, and management style. It is
important to understand that the stigma of seeking or accepting mental
health support is very deep in the responder industry, which calls to
leadership and organizations to address it openly. The fear of acknowledging
the need for support or accepting it includes stigma, increase stress and
demands compensation, and compounds stress, including concerns about
being diagnosed, receiving medication, and any form of potential adverse
impact on their future career (Papazoglou & Tuttle, 2018). Building in a
mental health role as a commonly accepted set of responsibilities and
oversight helps recognize that critical incident and stress-related impacts
happen. There is a plan for oversight, a mechanism for intervention, and
response. A mental health role brings the awareness that just like physical
health and safety, attention to the workforce personnel’s protection is a vital
focus of the mission.
Strategic Planning Considerations

Success in these goals should be built in from the beginning if the goal is to
protect our workforce resources and build resiliency resources. Law
enforcement has built into its pre-incident strategic planning interventions
that add to its incident command approaches. Five components have been
identified as necessary to build into pre-incident planning (Sheehan et al.,
2004). This includes assessment and triage, specific crisis intervention with
individuals, and small- and large-group crisis intervention and strategic
planning. Within the context of workforce personnel management in an
emergency, the community manager will want to optimize the chance for
retention and the ability to return to function in a typical daily work
routine. Strategic planning should consider elements of the design of tasks,
management style, interpersonal relationships, work roles, career concerns,
and environmental concerns (Goetzel et al., 1998).
Suggestions to build upon these are as follows, addressing important
considerations relevant to this discussion. Specifically, each of these is
important to consider with regard to its contribution of stress for the
employee.
The design of tasks involves heavy workload, infrequent breaks, long

work hours, shifts, lack of ergonomic considerations that would
improve or ease the ability to do the job, or recover during breaks.
Awareness of physical and psychological impact of work conditions
and demands, and the resources needed and the adequacy and
availability of those resources.
Assign tasks with little personal meaning, underutilizing skills, and lack
of control in how these tasks are carried out, especially if the work
process is cumbersome, inefficient, or ineffective.
Management style where employees do not contribute in decision-
making, poor communication, and absence of individual or family-
friendly policies.
Poor social environment and interpersonal relationships among
coworkers and supervisors.
Work roles that have conflicting or uncertain job expectations, or too
much responsibility.
Job insecurity, lack of potential for advancement, or rapid changes for
which workers perceive they are unprepared contributes to career
concerns.
Unpleasant or dangerous physical conditions contribute to
environmental concerns, with little access to relief or downtime off-
task.
Shift schedule demands without time to recuperate physically and
attend to reasonable self-care concerns (i.e., laundry, personal care
needs).
Workgroups with personality characteristics emerging across shifts may
begin to show interpersonal differences, conflicts, inappropriate
affiliations and interactions, subgroups and/or scapegoating.
This chapter is written from the perspective of a mental health
professional with a long history of experience working with trauma, both
clinically and with first responders, who has responded to active events in
the field, and deployed during community events. This means being up close
and personally seeing the impact of traumatic events and their aftermath. It
also means that observations of how things initially seem benign become
very problematic and cause psychological injury. Further, the perspective
includes my reactions, interactions, and aftermath. Every responder and
essential responder accept that as a fact, whether they want to or not, and
struggle to accept that acknowledgment is not admitting weakness and
failure. Responders will work under all circumstances because that is their
assignment. They come into the perimeter with some level of personal
commitment, a set of coping and management beliefs and attitudes,
available resources, agendas, and history of trauma. They come in with their
own set of physical strengths and limitations. Given the circumstances, the
shift and the mission can play itself out in many ways.
Understanding human dynamics and watching them unfold is a critical
element in successful workforce response. In disasters where teams are
created for convenience, there may be limited cohesion, loyalty, or any form
of relationships or trust. Teams and individuals can pull together, or fall
apart, or blame or idolize certain members. Established teams have history
and relationships, which can be seen in their behaviors. New temporary
teams are often so task-focused that the resources’ human dynamics are
never addressed unless the problem is severe.
This can work out badly, especially if there are unhealthy relationships,
drinking/drugs, inappropriate sexual activity, special relationships, or
someone begins to become the scapegoat. Or, if members don’t respect their
team or team leader, the team leader doesn’t manage the entire team, but
only parts of it. Little things can build and impact performance.
This is mentioned because these are problems and situations observed
directly. This example comes from a recent one related to the current
COVID-19 pandemic response. There are a couple of caveats:
In this writer’s opinion, most people believe they are doing a good job
and came with “servants’ hearts.”
Most people will work and give as much as they can and contribute to a
worthy cause.
Most people don’t want to deal with drama or those people they see as
potentially problematic. Especially in the temporary and short-term
nature of the assignment, it is easier to let things pass.
Many people will recognize a complaint as whining and dismiss it,
missing an opportunity to consider whether or not the concern is valid
and can easily be acted upon to remedy the problem.
Most people will believe that if they are told their concern is valid and
important and that someone in leadership will attempt to resolve a
problem, they will believe it.
It might help to provide another example of being on deployment into a

disaster response in the current conditions for first responders and essential
workers. In hospitals, equipment and supplies are in high demand and low
supply. Under increasingly difficult psychological and physical challenges
while fighting a virus, no one understands, while practice parameters
continue to develop. One group of physicians described the experiences
culminating in this situation as being one of: “unique paradox of
simultaneous global digital interconnectedness and social and physical
isolation that mark this epidemic has shifted our normal systems of coping”
(Wong, Pacella-LaBarbara, Ray, Ranney, & Chang, 2020). We tend to seek
the most familiar form of coping behaviors and situations when we feel
stressed, as though we regress to a level of functioning to gather ourselves
together. We do what is familiar, and we know works. Today that isn’t an
option, and people are struggling that normal isn’t an available option.
Restoration isn’t an option either. And for first responders and essential
professionals, under it all, they are people with mammalian biology,
physiology, and instincts. Fear, exhaustion, and stress combine to make a
mixture that drives people to protect themselves.
Example 1: The story serves as an example of systems and dynamics and
how psychological stress and duress can happen. On one deployment, three
shifts (12 hours) were formed, with one shift overlapping with the first and
last shifts of a 16-hour day. This assignment was in a segmented area, and
involved constant walking, moving, lifting, and tracking activities, all while
wearing a heavy uniform and PPE in a setting without climate control. The
work location offered limited seating, maybe four or five places for about 15
people. The other possible option for seating caused potential infection
exposure or injury risk, and for all there was no relief from the heavy
sensory overload, and opportunities for breaks were problematic: while
water was provided, eating snacks was only possible by the portable toilets
provided just out of the work zone. Again, there was no resting facility. The
workers couldn’t often break because there was no one to relieve them: the
other float shift wouldn’t cover. This middle shift never really integrated into
either shift or respected the team lead. Consequently, they would float
around, assign themselves to various tasks, work for a short while, and then
go off to something else. To the first and third shifts, it was never clear what
their role entailed. The team lead brought a complaint to their supervisor
and the workers directly. In terms of dynamics, the team lead just wanted
the work done, and wanting to avoid drama and accepting that the lead
position was not one of authority over people; their focus was on the
members who came to work and did work their assigned duties. This was
very difficult for the first and third team members, who would have to pick
up the extra work because these individuals would not be present. The crew
was left to pick up the work and were so short-handed that they couldn’t
leave their posts for much more than a brief respite or their one meal—they
were not even able to take time for the team photo, adding insult to injury.
Some awkward moments happened when the regular shift member took a
break in the crew tent, only to meet up with the float shift complaining
about how bored they were, how there was no work for them to do, or some
offhand comment about how terrible the assignment was because of the
people on it. By the time the personnel issue was addressed, the deployment
was almost over. No one administratively noticed whether the members of
the crew wore the required protective gear, were at their posts, or worked on
assignment for the duration of their shifts, and yet they were paid the same
as the other members who did the work on their posts, and consequently got
no relief during their shift. After repeatedly asking for assistance with the
other crew and multiple requests for chairs or a bench and materials to help
do their work, the team felt defeated and disrespected. The work was done,
and it was a horrible situation; they felt honored to be there, but the
traumatic moral injury came from within—their team. Other teams,
providing other functions in other work assignments, had no frame of
reference for what these teams’ tasks entailed. All jobs had their exposure to
trauma, but they were different at the fundamental level of physical,
emotional, and physiological demands. Consequently, team attitudes became
frustrated, sad, and they were discouraged and exhausted. Surprisingly, this
was the group who was commented upon for their bad attitudes. The
afternoon when several members of the first shift missed their van ride back
to their dormitory, there were tears as these individuals, who’d worked 12
hours in full PPE, with a 30-minute break, on their feet the entire time,
would have to wait an hour-and–a-half for another ride. They would be
sitting on the ground for another hour in gear they’d sweated through; they
were hungry, physically exhausted, and sore. Coupled with this was the fact
that the restaurant and food store, where they would normally eat a meal
and get food for the next day, would be closed in their return. This meant
that they wouldn’t be able to prepare for the next shift adequately restocked
and rested, or even take care of their basic needs. The part that was the
hardest to hear was that the individuals were assigned to the specific van,
every other worker knew they were due on the van, and they chose to leave
15 minutes early because they were tired. No one attempted to come to the
assigned work location of these individuals because of the nature of the
work they performed, and because it was segmented off from the rest of the
response group. Further, no one attempted to reach any of the individuals by
phone to connect with them about transportation. This group felt
disrespected, disregarded, and betrayed. This is not a good combination
when exhaustion, overwhelmed, fear, isolation, physical discomfort, and
hunger are stacked across many days where frustration and resentment have
been building, and they had no chance to recover or take time back in terms
of breaks or time off.
Image 13.5 Taking a Break
This scenario has played out in all sorts of disasters and with all ranges of
responders. What are easy suggestions for mental health, resiliency, and
wellness for our responders? In the immediate aftermath of a disaster,
someone should be tasked with recognizing, addressing, implementing,
evaluating, and adapting to these needs on behalf of responders. Using
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs as a strategy to conceptualize and anticipate
what responders’ needs may include. This is where behavioral health
expertise can contribute immensely to the effective response during a
demanding mission. In the current set of disasters, all done within the
context of double disasters, where the massive fires demand a fire response,
but responding and functioning during potential exposure to COVID-19;
these considerations should be addressed with the same intensity safety and
resources needs. Borrowing from the recommendations made by Wong et al.
(2020), looking at these needs in understanding human needs and
motivations (see Wong et al., 2020 for a more comprehensive discussion: this
is loosely based on their work, which in turn is based on Maslow).
Level 1: Physiological Needs (sleep, food, physical and mental health
considerations). A common expectation is that responders will experience
stress related to disruption and challenges of maintaining their biological
constancy. This means assuring that they have access to healthy food
options, adequate rest and sleep opportunities, time out of service and out of
the perimeter, and access to mental health supports.
Be aware of the schedule of demands for shifts, the time to travel to and
from the site, and availability for responders to not only
psychologically and physically recuperate but also be aware of the time
demands necessary if they have to go out and fend for themselves for
food and personal supplies.
Consider the physical demands of the work stations. Are the
ergonomics conducive to doing the work? What about the variables
that together make up the work conditions, and what might the work
experience of that individual be compared to other work stations?
What accommodations might need to be made related to climate
control, fresh air, cleanliness, access to needed supplies, safety, and
reasonable comfort accommodations?
How is physical health being monitored and cared for by the
administration? How are fears of exposure being handled?
Consider the ages of your responders. In many groups, individuals may
be older than 50 years. While they meet the physical standards to be a
member of their team, having compassion for the demands of the
situation is genuinely not hard to do. Giving thought to seating for a
brief respite or adequate accessibility to working restroom facilities
should not be seen as an unreasonable request over a 12-hour
assignment with constant physical demands.
Consider sensory overload exposure. Everyone has limits. While
responding in the disaster morgue, the smell of death was everywhere;
it was pervasive. It followed and permeated everything. Give some
thought to helping responders anticipate the various exposures of each
situation they are entering. That cognitive plan can help one shift to
manage the natural reaction to the overwhelming.
Address the need for stress recognition, stress management, and stress
mitigation. This means more than inclusion in daily briefings that
mental health and stress management is essential. To actively attend to
it as safety is attended to in a disaster, oversight and support resources
are allocated and provided. Mental health professionals who
understand first responders and disaster culture must have a seat at the
table to address this and have these responsibilities.
Provide time for down-time between shifts and work-related duties.
Especially for 12-hour shifts, consider how transportation and time
needed for individuals to get meals, supplies, and attend to personal
needs consumes rest and recovery time. A 12-hour shift on top of an
hour of transportation ends up being closer to a 15- or 16-hour day
commitment. And if 12-hour shift days have no time off for recovery
over the deployment assignment, reassess concerns such as dose
exposure, and physical and emotional exhaustion.
For responders working in an environment where PPE or equipment is
necessary, consideration of the specifics related to job management is
essential. Wearing PPE for the long term, especially when trying to
conserve resources, so the suit is taken off and put back on repeatedly
brings with it a host of potential exposure concerns. Additionally, if
responders carry snacks on them as part of planning for managing their
hunger instead of leaving their post, doffing, going to the comfort tent,
eating and drinking, then going to the bathroom, then redonning their
PPE, then walking back to their assigned areas, which becomes
problematic for them because they are eating in a hot zone.
Observations of national guard responders provided a brilliant strategy.
These individuals worked in shifts of several hours, then took a
prolonged break out of the perimeter, then returned and repeated
throughout their shift. This pattern allowed them to work full-out for
several hours, then rest for a prolonged break. This strategy meant all
their basic needs had an opportunity to be addressed. They could
physically recover and predict their next several hours. Most
emergency responders in disaster scenarios are not given much
consideration. In the example above, the teams could have benefited at
every level of the hierarchy of needs from this approach.
Communicate options for health and relaxation related apps, exercises,
and indicators of critical incident stress management strategies. Talk
about the stress as expected, given the abnormal situation they are
actively experiencing. Normalize the human reactions, and provide
ways to address them.
Level 2: Safety and security needs. It is human nature to seek stability and
to feel secure. This allows us to shift our focus to other situations or issues in
our lives. When our home life feels shaky, it is hard not to be distracted and
anxious. One big issue around this is lack of communication and
information and understanding the bigger picture, time commitments, and
goals.
They are providing written and verbal communication about specific

information. This includes relevant names and contact information
about the command staff and team leads, transportation and shift
groups, and team leaders’ functions. Be clear about what work
expectations are in the assignments. Also, providing written and verbal
information about transportation access, work assignments, workgroup
members, and contact information is helpful.
Provide written information regarding local resources for meals,
personal supplies, banks/ATMs, and dry-cleaning services.
On-scene, provide resources for personal electronics charging and
places for people to use them. Many responders during the COVID-19
responses were also trying to work remotely and use their break or
down times for personal and work obligations.
Anticipate that the PPE needs will be significant. Closer exposure
means more protections and caution is warranted. Don’t expect that
the employee should provide their own.
Anticipate that responders will have worries about their risks and the
risk they pose to their family when they return from their assignments.
There should be the opportunity to discuss and plan these concerns
during the deployment and a resolution before returning home.
Communicate the plan of how an individual who becomes positive for
COVID-19 would be taken care of specifically. Knowing these details is
important to individuals. The same goes for physical injury.
One strategy might be where many people are in hotel settings to work
with the hotel and have an informational channel providing this
information for the teams during prolonged responses. Security for the
workforce should be considered, and respect to classified information
related to the mission should not be provided. Another strategy is to
provide links into a teleconference platform and provide updates and
informational meetings at scheduled times.
When a responder recognizes an issue or concern, hear it out. If the
information requires a response or follow-up, provide it. Give some
time and attention to concerns identified, even if they seem petty.
Provide information as is appropriate to help people understand the
context around their concerns.
Level 3: Belongingness and social connection. Individuals strive to be

connected and have a sense that they fit into the larger group. Physical and
emotional isolation is a huge problem and will compound problems where
the individual is physically and emotionally exhausted.
Consider that teams may not have cohesion and that the team lead
may not have a history with the team so that there is limited respect
from their team. In some situations, the team lead is a peer who has
more responsibility but no authority.
Isolation in terms of distance from home is compounded. Understand
the physical and social isolation is greater in the current situation.
Individuals can’t congregate after shifts, minimizing the opportunities
for the practice of camp-fire debriefing of the day. Providing
opportunities for people to socialize via teleconference can sometimes
work, although people first and foremost want to have contact with
their family and friends in off-times.
Provide resources for the individual to share with their family and
friends related to relevant information about self-care, anticipated
concerns from potential exposure to the virus, etc. This also may mean
providing a mailing address for personal mail. Also, provide helpful
information related to ways to stay connected and supportive during
the deployment. One responder received home-baked cookies every
couple of days, which became bigger batches each time once people
began to discover his treasure trove of goodies.
Provide opportunities for groups to form cohesion. The idea of having a
foundation for this is critical in the daily functioning of individuals
who work on shifts in acute settings. Think about how important daily
inter-shift or roll-call meetings are to the dynamics of the team. It
becomes a way to share information and a way to share information
and build relationships and the culture of the team. It is a way the
manager can monitor how their team members are doing as valuable
resources and people. Consider ways to have this translate to these in-
situ groups. The National Guard’s practices serve as an example.
Provide opportunities for social interaction and conversation. Plan
outings with groups if possible. Make sure that invitations are inclusive
of all team members whenever possible.
Level 4: Respect, self-esteem, status, self-determination/control, and
fairness. Repeatedly being overlooked or dismissed is another potential
compounding problem for individuals who feel disconnected, physically,
and emotionally exhausted.
Listen to suggestions about how to improve workflow and work

efficiency. Don’t be afraid to interrupt the imposed system’s
functioning to implement something that might have developed and is
more efficient. If this lessens error probability, it should be taken
seriously—welcome improvements in the system.
It is stressful to be given assignments with expectations to do the work
and not access the work resources. The information must come back to
the group that someone is working on their requests and that
administrative leaders understand that the job can’t be adequately
performed without certain supplies. If individuals develop a system to
do the job without these resources, give credit where it’s due, and
support their flexible and adaptive efforts.
If individuals don’t follow the protocol, find out why. Is it that they’ve
discovered a novel approach, are oppositional, haven’t been adequately
trained, or don’t understand the components’ importance in terms of
oversight and accuracy? Investigate, be curious.
Consider how teams are assigned and held accountable to their tasks.
When problems or issues are identified, take them seriously enough to
look into them. Problematic personality patterns do get acted out, and
they may be subtle, but they are still problematic. Address them.
Stress-Related Disorders
It is estimated that stress-related disorders will be the second leading cause
of disability by the year 2020, and is the primary strategic goal for the World
Health Organization’s Global Burden of Disease of the NIOSH Work
Organization and Stress-Related Disorders Program (Ray & Sauter, 2008). In
the United States, work-related stress is estimated to cost $171 billion
annually, which is the same as cancer and cardiovascular disease, and
greater than Alzheimer’s or HIV or AIDS. There is an estimated $300 billion
annual cost due to lost hours from absenteeism, decreased work
productivity, and cost of health expenditures (American Psychological
Association, 2004). These numbers don’t include disasters.
Organizations such as the World Health Organization and the National
Institute of Mental Health suggest that emotional health-related problems,
suicide, and mental illness account for over 15% of the burden of disease
costs to an economy. The number one cause, cardiovascular conditions,
contributes to more than 18% of the disabling conditions. However, when
alcohol and drug-use problems are factored into the emotional-problem-
based disabling conditions, this increases disability to more than 20%.
There have been copious studies and research findings that argue that the
responder industry warrants special consideration among this group. Due to
their training and experience, the culture contributes to maintaining the
work-related stress, traumatic, cumulative, and post-traumatic critical
incident-related stress. Research related to policing suggests that it is one of
the most stressful occupations that exist. In the Buffalo cardio-metabolic
occupational police stress study, Violanti et al. (2006) found that police
officer subjects showed significant stress-related biomarker changes
reflecting physiological and psychological markers which were different than
individuals in the general population. Other studies reflect similar findings;
for example, in another study, 11% of officers have a higher risk of sudden
cardiac death and other health-related severe problems, more than doubling
the general population’s risk (McCraty & Atkinson, 2012). Similar assertions
about the extent of occupational stress experience and the job’s impact have
empirical support in firefighter/EMS populations (Rodrigues, Paiva, Dias, &
Cunha, 2018). Researchers studying force wellness in first responders
advocate for mental preparedness training as officer health and well-being
elements as an extension of the tactical, legal, and academy preparation they
have from the academy throughout their career (Andersen, Papazoglou,
Arnetz, & Collins, 2015).
In a disaster situation, the rate of impact of work-related stress will be
greater. Research demonstrates that individuals without the benefit of prior
disaster training or experience are at greater risk for posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) (Perrin et al., 2007). In a study of PTSD post-World Trade
Center, the rate was 21.2% for construction, engineering, sanitation, and
unaffiliated workers, compared to a rate of 12.4% for rescue/recovery
workers (Perrin et al., 2007). The National Mental Health Information Center
(DeWolfe, 2005) stated several important considerations regarding people
who have any exposure to disaster situations. While all of these are
important, one is the most critical point. These points show the importance
of highlighting why it is important to consider primary survivors’ mental
health needs and secondary survivors and response personnel. Because that
is their life, their livelihood, and they live with direct and indirect
consequences of traumatic events. The responder culture is increasingly
aware of this but still slow to acknowledge or recognize it when it is
happening around them in the workplace in daily interaction patterns
between people, between the organization and individuals, and in formal
and informal ways.
No one who sees trauma is untouched by it. When that shift of reference
point shifts, it changes a person. In the long run, for those who respond to
death, injury, emergency events, and disaster, this changes them in ways
that civilians may never understand. Over time, cumulative trauma becomes
the baseline no one should have to live with as a norm without
understanding the psychological compensation, injury, and accumulation of
memories and experiences. There is absolutely one most critical point: no
one who works in emergency response is untouched by their experiences,
and no one who sees a disaster is untouched by it.
Understanding Stress along the Continuum

Stress occurs as a function of living. Stress can be motivating and positive,
or negative and destructive. Stress organizes our attention and actions. Stress
reactions are normal but occur across a continuum of adaptive or
maladaptive and short or prolonged. Stress can arise in the short term and in
response to immediate demands and is reasonable to expect as the situation
intensifies and grows. When they occur without an opportunity for
recovery, stress can become cumulative. When it happens in response to
events, the individual may experience it as a critical stress event or not. In
extreme situations, reactions can be viewed as “normal responses to
abnormal events rather than signs of psychopathology” (Rogers 2007, p. 3).
Awareness of critical incident-related stress is a very important
consideration in the responder community.
No one is immune from stress, but building a skill set of recognition and
management of stress, an expectancy mindset, and developing a response
plan can help avoid some of the destructive effects. Cumulative exposure to
traumatic events and stress changes physiological arousal, which impacts
physical health (Papazoglou & Tuttle, 2018; Violanti et al., 2005; Violanti et
al., 2006). The overriding cultural mindset that stress recognition and
management are as important as every other skill set responders possess
may help insulate and support responders and come from leadership and
permeate throughout the organization. This stress inoculation and stress
management awareness is a topic that should be introduced in the academy
and reviewed frequently in training as a normal reaction and coping of the
body and mind to the exposure and range of events faced by responders.
Typical stress symptoms can impact the body’s ability to be healthy and
interfere with fighting an illness or infection. It is the body’s cue to respond
to events in the world around it. At it’s extreme, stress is connected to heart
disease, cancer, respiratory problems, accidents, suicide, depression, anxiety
disorders, and alcohol-related problems. As discussed earlier, these
contribute to the largest debilitating illnesses and economic impact. This
impact has direct and indirect costs to the individual, employer, and society.
These costs include days off sick, paid/unpaid time off, shift or workload
coverage, treatment, recovery, and lost productivity to the employer.
When something happens outside the norm, the potential for problematic
stress occurs within all living creatures. This event can be a storm that is far
worse than usual, such as a damaging tornado, a significant fire or flood, or
another type of event that has a far-reaching impact regarding the length of
time, extent of damage, extent of response needed, and recovery from the
event. Exposure to these situations causes reactions that may include terror,
horror, and fear for one’s safety and well-being. This causes chemical and
physical changes in the body to respond to real and perceived threats. It
changes normal functioning within the body. The reaction to stress and
demands to respond are emotional and have severe physical implications to
the body. Reactions may be anywhere from mild to severe and impact
people in several different ways over a long time. Most reactions are
temporary, although these can be quite unnerving to the individual because
they are so out of the range of typical reactions. But the physical aftermath
to the body can include stress hormones and chemical reactions that last for
some time as the body tries to return to normal functioning. Emotional
aftermath symptoms are seen as well, with hypervigilance, fear, anxiety, re-
experiencing events, preoccupations, and dreams. Stress symptoms are
patterns of behaviors, reactions, feelings, thoughts, or problems that impact
how they manage their lives. They tend to be specific to the individual, and
so what one person might experience, others may experience other
reactions.
A framework that this writer often presents to responders looks at the
stress continuum as follows. First, everyone experiences stress; it is how it is
perceived and managed that is important. This is a conceptual reference
showing the evolution or progression that can develop in response to
stressful and traumatic exposure. It is important to note that the
development of stress-related injury isn’t necessarily linear, and this is not
like a disease progression. Sometimes, when teaching this, I have been
known to randomly squiggle lines between the boxes to reinforce the idea
that each person, in each exposure, can have a stress reaction. It doesn’t
necessarily make logical sense. A number of strategies can help decrease
stress and help provide some insulation from stress, and aid in recovery
from impact.
First responders and support personnel in emergencies performing rescue
and recovery work are exposed to stressors beyond their normal usual daily
emergency-task demands. Their “normal” emergency response is generally
above and beyond the situations that most of the general population ever
faces. However, when there is a situation outside of that “normal” or
“typical” scope, exposure to these events increases the risk of emotional and
physical trauma, cumulative traumatic stress, and PTSD. Whereas the
general population is considered to be at risk for PTSD at a prevalence rate
of about 4%, this increases upward of 32% for rescue and recovery service
personnel in the World Trade Center study, 25% for search and rescue, and
21% for firefighters (Perrin et al., 2007).
Stress Reactions
This chapter focuses on recognizing stress reactions and acute stress, as these
are important to monitor as part of safety and oversight for workforce
protection. Practical strategies to alleviate stress are highlighted.
Related to this is teaching responders to recognize the most prominent
stress reactions in the field. Many stress indicators and symptoms interfere
with emotions or feelings, physical health, or thinking. Because these
problems affect our thinking, feeling, and physical functioning, our
behaviors and the way we manage our daily lives can become problematic
and influenced in many ways. It is important to recognize these as cues that
the body is stressed and attempting to compensate. It is a normal physical
reaction that the body is responding to demands. To be aware that
increasing and prolonged demands cause the body to compensate and draw
from resiliency resources is essential. The reason is that the extent of
available resiliency resources is unknown to the individual until it is almost
too late to compensate safely. That state is burn-out.
Image 13.6 Stress Continuum
Most of us have a typical baseline for recovering from stress and stressful
events in our lives. We may be thrown off for a period of time, for example,
a couple of days. However, when these problems are not resolved, then
stress may be moving to distress or even cumulative stress levels. At worst,
these issues have a negative impact on physical health as well. These long-
term effects have metabolic, systemic, and psychological impacts and are
very real. Often the connection between stress demands and these physical
indicators is not made directly because the individual “survived” the
incident. For example, only recently are courts and disability panels
recognizing that PTSD and work-related traumatic stress might have
something to do with a career of emergency and disaster responding. Yet,
many departments and agencies don’t appear to recognize it as it builds and
becomes debilitating. Many professionals who conduct the evaluations for
these hearings may not be familiar with the culture or the job demands,
therefore producing reports of evaluations based on significantly important
missing foundations.
It is important to note that everyone handles and responds to stress
differently. Individuals possess different levels of resilience. Resilience is
described in many different ways. In discussing resilience using the
definition of Bonnano (2004, as cited by Andersen, Papazoglou, Arnetz, &
Collins, 2015), which considers the capacity of humans to flourish and
maintain a stable equilibrium in the face of catastrophic events and to
recover after exposure to extreme stress and trauma, however, Andersen et
al. (2015) challenge this construct in maintaining stability in the context of
potentially multiple disruptive events.
Some people have immediate signs of stress; others will not demonstrate
any. Sometimes, it is obvious, as some of the symptoms show dramatically
in physical complaints (see Table 13.1). Other people show only subtle signs
that can often be attributed to something else entirely. When these signs last
for more than a few days, it can be a signal that the problems may be more
than the typical stressor and that maybe some additional attention to
recovery and support might be needed. This should be normalized and
encouraged, and the stigma of indicating that an event has impacted
someone needs to be normalized in the industry. Too much shame about
“being weak,” “not suited for the job,” “being the weak link on the team,” and
other pejorative degrading comments should be viewed as harassment and
hostile workplace behavior. Yet, these are common within the industry
culture. So, not only is a responder exposed to traumatic events, which there
is a normal reaction to that abnormal set of experiences, the culture
compounds the impact, often adding insult to injury. Lip service within the
industry to offer support needs to end. Action and standardizing support
need to be as important as taking care of the department’s equipment and
physical resources. It often appears that recognizing critical incident
stressors as just as important as taking care of equipment and just as
important as taking care of equipment and the service animals used is a
primary issue.
Table 13.1 Common Symptoms of Stress

Emotional Cognitive
Physical Symptoms
Symptoms Problems
Feeling
overwhelmed or
Constant fatigue or lack of Feeling irritability
unable to manage
energy or short-tempered
demands in daily
life
Problems with
remembering
Inability to relax Sad, blue, or down
things and new
learning
Worry,
Sexual problems Forgetfulness
apprehension
Isolating self, Problems with
Weight changes
feeling isolated problem-solving
Difficulties
Cold sweaty palms Crying, tearfulness
concentrating
Lessened ability to
Changes in sleep patterns, Difficulties
relax or to enjoy
trouble falling asleep, poor making sense of
things; feeling
sleep or lack of restorative things; slowed
abandoned or
sleep thinking
targeted
Feeling out of it,
Difficulties with attention Rigid or obsessive
overwhelmed,
or poor concentration thinking
ineffective
Thinking of death as
Aches, pains, and muscle Problems with
an option;
tension word-finding
hopelessness
Reliving an event
Headaches Anxious, fearful
over and over
Emotional Cognitive
Physical Symptoms
Symptoms Problems
Grinding teeth, clenched Panic, terror,

Denial or blame
jaw hypervigilance
Stomach and
Compulsions,
gastrointestinal problems Difficult dreams;
checking, putting
such as upset stomach, denial/blaming;
things in order;
nausea, diarrhea, and suspiciousness
anger/rage
indigestion
Apathy, lethargy;
Loss of appetite Doubting faith
no energy
Racing heartbeat, shallow
disorientation,
breathing, tightness in the Numbness
confusion
chest
Increased startle response; Behavioral Easily
inability to relax outbursts overwhelmed
Source: Provided by Kammie Juzwin
Educating people on stress in terms of physical, emotional, or cognitive

signs gives them an opportunity to watch for changes in themselves and in
each other. Creating a culture of positive self-care and encouraging people to
practice stress management daily is a solid foundation for preventative care
for future situations.
Acute Stress
Acute stress reactions are generally very distressing to the individual, and
often the individual doesn’t recognize these reactions as connected to the
event. And in emergencies, everyone can be so consumed with responding
to the crisis that people may not realize that either they or their peers are
experiencing acute stress response. In the heightened focus of the moment,
people may not be aware of their reactions. There may be panic, shock,
disbelief, disorganization, or distress. Many people experience a sense of
being out of control or being numb.
One experience is described as feeling “disconnected” or feelings of
disorientation or that the individual is “going crazy.” Unfortunately, people
often also feel as though they are losing control or unable to manage, which
can be compounded when, in fact, their ability to manage is somewhat
compromised. It is important to make certain to connect the problems as
reactions to the event, and that when managed, they tend to be lessened.
People who experience this acute stress report a variety of problems and
changes in their behavior. These changes or problems occur in feelings,
thinking, physical functioning, and behaviors. These problems include those
listed in Table 13.1, and can be very intense and disturbing to the individual.
This is especially problematic if they are in the form of recurrent images,
smells, sounds, or thoughts about stressful events. These sensory memories
are how the body is trying to make sense of and process information and
hasn’t figured out how to encode it as information the brain can use in the
future. But until then, the body is primed to respond to these potential
threats to safety and security, which is why relaxation or quiet time becomes
almost impossible to attain.
Manager Responsibilities in a Critical Event

There are two levels of attention that managers must take into account
during a critical event. First is their responsibility in organizing and
implementing their crisis response plan. The second is their responsibility to
their people responding to and implementing the crisis response plan.
Without the second piece being managed effectively, the first piece may be
compromised. Each person involved in responding to a community plan will
have families, loved ones, friends, and property, and worries about each of
them. While they may be the emergency response team, they are also
human beings with human needs, personal responsibilities, and connections.
Understanding stress responses help insulate people and normalize stress.
It also allows them to recognize when stress demands and symptoms
become such that their compensating abilities are taxed too much. It is
important that when they recognize this over-taxing, they are encouraged
and supported to get the support or recovery interventions help they need
before they experience it becomes distress, burn-out, cumulative traumatic
or critical incident stress.
Several practical strategies can be integrated into responding during a
disaster scenario:
Communication. Communication on a published schedule with updates

as is necessary. Clarify updated information as well as status quo.
Communicate often, clarify corrections and revisions.
Provide opportunities for status briefings at the beginnings and ends of
shift. Provide feedback to them about progress towards mission goals
and the positive impact of their work.
Provide a physical place for reference of information. This includes the
address of the response site, contact names and information, the listing
of responding agencies (and photo of their patch if possible), internet
access codes, and status briefing information. Provide information
about local services (especially laundry services, bank/ATM, closest
general goods stores). Provide information about weather conditions
and forecasts. Provide relevant information about the community.
Post names and roles of administrative officers on shift.
When on rounds, ask questions, listen to their responses. Take notes
about concerns, with names. Get back to the individual when possible.
Have a system in place if people are being transported in and out of the
perimeter. Transportation should have some degree of planning and
oversight, so no one gets left behind, people know the name and
contact of their driver, and know where to and when to meet.
People in team leadership positions should be treated with respect and
have some authority for their obligations. Clarify the roles, duties, and
oversight responsibility they have to their teams. And whenever
possible, they should be compensated for their extra responsibilities.
Get people what they need to effectively and efficiently do their jobs.
This may mean small expenditures, meaning pens, markers, note pads,
clipboards, etc. It may mean a computer. It may mean chairs, tables,
and workspace. When management does not provide the bare
minimum for someone to do their job, the stress and duress start to
lead to a sense of built-in failure to complete their task.
Planning: Helping Take Care of Your Responders in Advance

The cornerstone of public health includes accessing local to international
resources to assure the health of the people. Preplanning and having all of
these elements in place may help alleviate some aspects of stress for
employees, knowing they have provided the best for their family as they
could, even in their absence from the family. This section offers a discussion
from a psychological perspective that helps build resilience and alleviate
stress for responders in high-demand situations. The key is that having a
resource who understands that this is an ongoing obligation as the scene
continues to evolve, and someone who can recognize when stress may not
just be stress but could be something more. If managers are truly invested in
having the most comprehensive plan, plan to include mental health
professionals at the table, in the discussion, and in the perimeter during the
response to help with the evolving system dynamics during the response.
Policy dictates and guides our eventual practice, like a blueprint dictates
the building of a house. Many administrators understand and accept the
need to move beyond the reactive. Traumatic stress experts advocate that
there should be representation at the policy-making level to offer guidance,
consultation, and ongoing collaboration (Fairbank & Gerrity, 2007). Using an
approach that includes an emphasis on psychological health, early
identification of psychological problems followed by early treatment and
intervention, and cultural relevance, and elements involving family and
community support is strongly recommended to be considered in public
health policy (Fairbank & Gerrity, 2007). Addressing traumatic stress
involving preventative and insulative measures is also important. Taking a
position that involves this continuum of attention to responders’ needs are
seen in the comprehensive Critical Incident Stress Management strategies
(Mitchell, 2003, 2020), resiliency programs (Mahaffey et al., 2020) and
wellness programs (Copple et al., 2019).
In the response plan, give attention to the family needs of responders and
essential staff. Offer resources and guidance in policy that can be used not
just as policy and procedure, but information that should be discussed as
part of planning how the family would cope during a disaster. There is at
least one way to help mitigate the stress incurred by responders in a disaster
situation: assure their families are as safe as possible because of anticipated
preparedness. The family is prepared to respond, and therefore in a more
secure position to react and be self-sufficient. Controlling those elements
that can be foreseen and pre-managed is the foundation of any good
strategic plan. This element includes emotional preparation. Families are
going to have to become fairly self-reliant in these situations. One element
which needs to be addressed is contact and interaction. Families want to
know what is happening and specifics about where they are and what they
are involved in and safe. The amount of time and means of contact via
personal cell phone, text, and social media should be addressed. An aside,
having clear parameters about what can and cannot be shared, should be
clearly delineated. This should consider that everyone has a cell phone with
a camera, which can quickly photograph and send out images of a sensitive
nature. In a mental health and safety context, constant use of personal
technology at the user’s discretion can become intrusive and distracting
when they are constantly engaged on their phone, not on their job
assignment. The expectation that these contacts can happen on demand
might be problematic because the responder is involved in two worlds, the
one at home and the one at work. This has become very different from
previous disaster or prolonged responses, where there was limited
availability for family interactions. This dual mindset can be tough to keep
switching back and forth from and sends a message that the individual has
responsibilities for day-to-day things that need attending to regardless of
their status. In this writers’ experience, this immediate availability has a
downside; if not addressed and planned for managing, the boundary
between work and home is blurred. For example, spouses may not have the
opportunity to talk on the phone to say good night because of shift duties,
and the escalating texts and phone messages that the responder can’t get to
are also stressful for them. This takes their attention off their duties, which is
potentially dangerous. Watching responders apologize and feel guilty for not
being there to put the garbage out or help with other family responsibilities
is difficult to see, and it can’t be dismissed either. The entire family system is
impacted, and discussions about these issues are critical to the whole family
system’s well-being.
In developing the community response plan, it is necessary to emphasize
that all employees also have emergency plans in their own homes for their
families that would include all the necessary general elements recommended
for all citizens. It is a general rule of thumb that citizens should plan to be
self-sufficient for up to three to four days (72 to 96 hours). If the disaster is of
severe enough scope, many elements will not be supplied for a longer, more
extended time.
What elements go into a family emergency plan? In these times, almost
every village or city has a website that directs its citizens to an emergency
plan. One of the most thorough is presented by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) at http://www.fema.gov.
A general family plan should at least have elements including:
Emergency planning for potential risks and specific hazards

Emergency financial planning
Emergency and alternative communication plan and contact numbers,
especially if in the event of mass communication disruption
Designated contact and meeting places and contact schedule
Disaster supplies kit for each family member
Disaster supplies kit for each pet, including kennel, leashes, litter,
bowls, water
Alternative shelter arrangements
Food and water
Sanitation needs
Cash monies and credit cards
Plan for communication, heat, light, power, and so forth, including
chargers, flashlights, emergency contacts, and meeting places
Anticipating the environmental risks and the elements, including
bugs/wildlife
Protective clothing, gloves, and hats, clothing for the weather
conditions; toiletries, household cleaners, and laundry items.
In addition to these components, the agency can provide suggestions to

encourage employees to have their crisis response plan in place, so if they
aren’t there to assure the safety of their families, their family members know
what to do related to:
Where to meet in the house, community, or out of the danger area

Who to contact about status, especially if separated
Important documents and money, access to it if necessary
Emergency supplies, resources, documentation, and identification
(emergency preparedness lists)
Resources within the community for contact
Household information (gas, electric, etc.)
Identification procedures and documentation
What the rules are, and that everyone knows the plan
Who is responsible for who and what during an evacuation
Who takes what with them and what gets left behind
When to evacuate
How to communicate the plan, with written information of contacts,
numbers, backup plan, identified people everyone will contact
Who to go to for help if necessary
A call-tree for resources and supports
When to leave and where to regroup and other backup plans
Identification, insurance, and vital records, inventory of home
possessions
Information related to utility shut-off and safety
Who is responsible for taking what, and who has responsibility for
what another person and/or pet?
Here are some ideas to build into the emergency plan: the following
elements that focus specifically on anticipating employees’ needs for their
families and homes.
Educate all employees about the specific agency policies and

expectations for their responses during a major incident or disaster.
Provide phone numbers and email information in written format, and
encourage personnel to log this information into their cell phones. By
informing them in advance that their jobs’ scope demands community
response, they can anticipate the conflicts that arise between the
professional and personal demands. If the agency has a specific plan,
put it in the succinct relevant information in bullet point formats, date
it (so there is always a time reference), and distribute it. The goal is that
this information can be put in the employee’s home disaster kit.
Encourage employees to have a disaster or emergency plan at home
and to talk about it in advance of any situation.
Include an avenue for communication and contact for employees and
their families. This can include an identified go-between responsible for
being the contact person and relaying information in a planned and
anticipated manner. Provide the contact mechanism for who this
individual is, and the reasonable range of time to respond to calls.
Establish a point of contact times and means, for example, 0800 and
1500 hours by text is a status check-in.
Assure the agency has current updated emergency contact information
and an identified person for each employee. This should be portable and
taken with the communications officer. It should be in electronic as
well as hard copy.
Identify a point of contact for the organization and how that contact
should be made for the employee and information for the agency for
those in the family trying to contact the organization.
Develop a system for communication of status that involves a backup
plan for this information to be conveyed in local communication
failure. Having times of contact established also helps people anticipate
when they will be able to expect contact.
Have a system to ensure that your responders can communicate with
their family members and support persons. Build in a mechanism, time,
and a place for employees to have status contact with their family
contact person. If they know their families are safe and routine contacts
are in place, they can focus on their job with more clarity and less
stress. There may be less distraction while working, walking off the job,
or quitting if responders can have information about their families’
priority status. There may also be some sense of relief that they know
when there is time to be able to have contact, which allows the family
and responder to anticipate and plan interactions.
Encourage employees to have as part of their disaster response strategy
an ability to connect with non-deployed employees or responders to
support families of deployed responders to assist them in assuring the
families’ welfare and safety in their absence. If this is not possible, have
the employees identify other neighbors or friends who can help out.
Everyone should have someone they are attached to and cooperate
with, get them through the immediate crisis and danger phases and
into the recovery phase. This is particularly important for prolonged
service and absence.
Encourage employees to develop a network of spouses/significant
others and families who can provide support, relief, and help to the
family during a deployment. Include a call tree or flow chart of who
can provide what resource to others. Many military spouses have
regular support group meetings and functions to offer one another
support and resources during their spouses’ deployment.
Identify resources within the community that would be available to
assist families in the event of an emergency. This may include church
organizations, other coworkers, service agencies, schools, and so forth.
Your plan might consist of developing support agreements among your
community agency and other community resources so that they know
to extend their support to these families. Additionally, encourage your
responders to establish relationships within their community, so there
are established connections before something happens. Identify who is
available within your community to act as a center for various supports
(family reunification, child services, or homeless).
Anticipate a centralized and accessible message board for responders
only, a place where information can be posted. This can include a
schedule of informational briefings, centralized posting of information,
and posted schedules of when updates will occur.
Educate families about the importance of mental preparedness, stress
management, and recognition of critical incident-related stress
reactions. Talk about this directly, especially recognizing and practicing
stress management techniques, especially recognizing symptoms and
strategies to manage stress and demands. Help answer questions and
concerns family members may have about these potential situations
and include them in the response planning to have a sense of
empowerment themselves.
Suggestions for Supporting Your Responders

There are several strategies to help your responders organize themselves and
attain their goals while lessening their stress levels during a critical event.
Communication is key. Have regularly planned briefings with your

personnel. This helps people anticipate when information is going to be
given. The briefing should occur at intervals that are known and
expected. Make it easy for your people to know who, who to go to for
what, and who the various entities are, especially across organizations.
Photographs might help. Also, the forum is important; make sure that
people can hear the information. Summarize important written
information.
As appropriate, post information in a centralized location for those who
cannot attend but need the information. Include relevant details,
including temperature, weather conditions, and forecasts. Ensure that
there is nothing in a posted brief that you would fear a reporter getting
a hold of and posting briefs in secure locations.
Ensure that during the briefings, and lines of communication are never
cut, put on hold, or sent to voice mail. Always be able to have your
command center accessible by a live person who can interact with the
caller.
You may want to have a meeting at the end of a shift or when people
go off duty to thank them for their efforts. End of shift summations of
the day can be helpful. When possible, use their names, shake hands,
pat them on the back and make eye contact. Ask about their family’s
well-being during this time. Tell them their efforts are appreciated and
noted.
End-of-shift check-ins also serves another purpose. It also helps to get
teams together and so transportation groups can happen smoothly. It
isn’t uncommon that individuals miss rides because the end of shift is
chaotic; people want to go off duty as quickly as possible.
Allow for clear lines of communication and responsibility. People
forget to communicate information about the whys and the specifics of
why things are and are not happening. Your plan might want to post
this information to demonstrate that requests for resources have been
acknowledged and that there is a legitimate reason why a supply may
not be here. Status reports are vital; they help people anticipate and
gain a sense of control. Include anticipated times, dates, and so forth
when you know them. When you don’t have that information, indicate
that information is, as yet, unavailable but will be provided when
received.
Allow for places for responders to sit and recoup between activities on
their assigned placement. Having the ability to sit and take a load off
their feet and body even for a few moments of rest is important. For
those assigned to specific locations, standing the entire time on their
feet is an inappropriate expectation. In many conditions, having the
first responders lying on the floor or resting on embalming tables is
unacceptable and compromises health and safety.
Have a place for your responders and workers to go to escape the
situation and rest and refuel. This may mean assigning someone to
make sure that there is nourishment available throughout the shift. This
can also be a role for a mental health clinician or chaplain who can be
available for status check-ins.
Consider having a mental health designated professional to be available
to make rounds to the various assignment sites. Allow individuals to
have time to sit and talk or to work alongside this individual. Over
repeated exposure, trust can be built, and interactions can become very
helpful in stress reduction.
For example, as a devastating crisis was unfolding, one hospital put out
sandwiches, cookies, coffee, water, and cold drinks. People would
gravitate there just to rest. People who worked there but were off-shift
showed up just to be there with their coworkers. The administration
blocked the media from the grounds and escorted people to and from
their cars. Hardly anyone spoke, a number of them sat there crying, but
the tacit support was there. The crisis responders walked around the
cafeteria, offering support, contact, and, when asked, a prayer. As the
days post-incident passed, the hospital chaplain and crisis workers
continued to be present, prayed with some people, sat, and talked about
anything with people. The agency’s loyalty increased, and the
organization’s morale pulled them through this challenging time, with
few people choosing to leave their jobs because of the incident.
Your command staff should watch for signs of stress, as discussed
earlier. Irritability, loss of temper, anger, withdrawal, and hostility are
significant cues that your team is stressed and potentially struggling.
Remind them to give people time down for a quick break, and if they
don’t take it, ask them to take it anyway. Acknowledge their desire to
stay focused, busy, and involved, but not at the expense of their health
or burn out. When someone loses their temper or their cool, give them
time to regroup. They’ve hit their wall and need a minute or two to get
it back together. Again, integrating the opportunity to sit and relax is
important.
It is important to monitor if any responders are becoming angry,
hostile, irritable, or acting out of their normal range of typical
responses. Managers need to see this as important information about
their stress tolerance, fatigue, or overload. Often emergency workers
can’t or won’t say they are scared, overwhelmed, and so forth because
they are too focused on their assignments. Many times, out of fatigue
and exhaustion, they can’t recognize it in themselves. If they had to
repeat their experiences to others of what they see or do, they wouldn’t
be able to be out there doing what they do. So, they’ve developed ways
of managing the awful stuff that overwhelms the everyday person. It is
important not to personalize their behavior or reactions but to
recognize it, people stretched even beyond their limits. Ask them what
they might need or want. It may be reasonable; it may not be possible.
Talk in private, give them some time to gather themselves and regroup.
Don’t retaliate or respond in anger. Give them a couple of minutes,
have some quiet time, and regroup. Check in with them later. They may
say nothing; they may have a lot to say.
Watch for responders’ reactions to one another. Make sure you don’t
have a scapegoat situation developing, where one person is the
identified target for the groups’ feelings of anger, helplessness, or being
overwhelmed. Encourage their teamwork; effort as a team is what
makes them the strongest they can be. If there is a personal overlap
with any of them in this situation, watch for that. Your young team
members may be very vulnerable, especially to the “suck it up” nature
of the culture. This is when you want to be aware of the groupthink;
the team bond around the stronger members and cull out the one that
is emotionally the one not like the rest. This groupthink behavior can
cause the best of teams to crash and not be able to do what they’ve
always relied on one another as a team to do.
Make certain your people have access to a routine and schedule.
Routine establishes some element of predictability during times of
uncertainty. Establish active and down routines.
Have a plan for removing someone from service in a dignified and
respectful way, if necessary, and plan to provide the assistance they
need.
Integrate support into maintaining team members’ ability to keep doing
their jobs, as a preventative and as a way for them to refuel and
recharge, and reconnect with their teams.
Make sure everyone has known time in and time out of service.
When they are out-of-service, they need to be out of the proximity of
the situation as much as is possible. Additionally, when setting up for
their space, taking physical characteristics of the location must be
considered before the tents get pitched.
Build a place for quiet and escape. Avoid constant access to media
coverage of the event.
Have a centralized place for communication and updates.
Interventions
In the first responder world, several intervention strategies can be used to
help mitigate stress. Psychological First Aid is a framework that can be used
to provide support in the field to people in immediate stress. It is a helpful
strategy for individuals working with victims, as it aims to help provide
resources and support. It is also a good strategy to use with first responders
and essential personnel because it is driven by their sense of what they need
to help them. Critical Incident stress management has developed to be a set
of intervention options to help first responder personnel by educating them
about stress responses, providing information and education and supportive
outlets to begin to process critical incident stress exposure.
Psychological First Aid

One resource is psychological first aid (PFA) (Ruzek et al., 2007), which
comprises eight core actions designed to reduce post-traumatic distress and
improve short- and long-term adaptive functioning for responders. The PFA
Field Operations Guide is available online through the National Child
Traumatic Stress Network (https://www.nctsnet.org). It is designed to be
used by disaster mental health responders who may need to provide
immediate support to survivors and in any situation necessary for both
individuals (Hobfoll et al., 2007; Ruzek et al., 2007) and small-group format.
The eight core actions, which will be discussed below, are based on the
following principles (Hobfoll et al., 2007) of promoting:
A sense of safety
Calming
A sense of self and community efficacy
Connectedness
Hope.
A sense of safety can be established through the provision of information.

This allows for a realistic appraisal of the current situation. Ongoing
information that is constructive and the directive is helpful. Structuring
information so people are clear about what can happen, what has happened,
and what they should do clarifies ambiguity. Another way might involve
removing individuals in a safe environment and allowing them to regain a
sense of biological and psychological “normalcy.” When this is possible, the
risk of anxiety and stress-related symptoms can be lessened. Further,
connecting individuals with their network of support in some capacity can
provide relief and a sense of having some control in the situation.
The promotion of calming is aimed at the biological and emotional impact
of trauma-related stress and anxiety. This can ultimately generalize to many
situations, potentially causing long-term effects on functioning. Teaching
that these reactions are reasonable or normal reactions to abnormal
situations can help reduce anxiety and some of the catastrophic thinking
that can happen when one feels overwhelmed (i.e., “I can’t manage this”).
Activities that teach stress management, relaxation, cognitive restructuring,
and deep breathing can be easily integrated into prevention and wellness
activities.
To help develop self-efficacy, individuals have some belief in their ability
to manage, cope, and have solid judgment and problem-solving in the
situation. It is that individuals have a sense of their capacity to manage
themselves and their situation. Helping set realistic and tangible goals can
help this become a data-based effort, minimizing the “I feel” aspect of
evaluation.
Connectedness and social support should be promoted, and research, as
discussed earlier, has repeatedly shown that there is a better outcome for
those with support than for those without support. This support should be at
an individual, family, and community level. Further, it provides a forum for
information exchange, problem-solving, norming of shared experiences,
emotional understanding, and acceptance. Connectedness builds bonds that
can rebuild communities and foster a common “we” necessary for mass
recovery.
Instilling hope is the final component, and the research for purpose,
meaning, and hope is vast. In this sense, the authors defined hope as a
crucial component due to the increased likelihood of improved outcome
because of their possessing qualities of optimism, retention of hope for the
future, feeling of confidence, the expectation of positive outcomes, and other
hopeful beliefs and definitions (e.g., God, religion, higher power). This allows
for a sense of predictability in one’s self and in life in general. Encouraging
positive coping and meeting challenges helps minimize avoidance,
withdrawal, and isolation.
The eight core-actions (Hobfoll et al., 2007; Ruzek et al., 2007) are:
1. Contact and engagement, which involve the rapid establishment of

contact and rapport by initiating contact that is non-intrusive,
compassionate, and supportive. It is important to ask if your presence
or contact is wanted.
2. Safety and comfort involve addressing immediate and ongoing safety
needs and providing for physical (including medical) and emotional
comfort. Providing fact-based information is important to mitigate the
impact of stress incurred because of false or inaccurate reporting.
3. Stabilization needs as warranted. This aspect involves calming and
providing containment and orienting emotionally overwhelmed
survivors.
4. Information gathering is related to current needs and concerns, tailored
interventions, and responses to those needs and concerns.
5. Practical assistance involves addressing the immediate needs and
concerns of the survivors and responders.
6. Connection with social supports by providing structured opportunities
for brief or ongoing contacts with sources of support.
7. Information on coping, management, and support related to stress
management, stress reactions, and coping strategies that prepares them
to mitigate the effects of the incident and recovery process.
8. Linkage with collaborative services allows for the survivor to have
resources available for the present or future.
Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)

Critical incident stress management (CISM) is defined by Everly and
Mitchell (1997, 2000) as a system of crisis interventions that encompass the
spectrum from the acute crisis phase into the post-crisis phase of stress
management and critical incident exposure. Although there has been debate
over its efficacy, when done according to the defined structure by trained
facilitators, it has been found to be very helpful, educational, preventative,
and supportive. There are many articles on this topic, and the reader is
directed to the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF) for
these. It has specific interventions that can be applied to individuals, small to
large groups, responders, families, organizations, and communities. It has as
its main objectives:
1. Mitigation of the impact of the event through decreasing stress
reactions
2. Acceleration of recovery process, by increasing normal recovery
processes, in those experiencing stress reactions
3. Restoring adaptive functioning.
The International Critical Incident Stress Foundation has many resources

available for reproduction and use with agencies and responders. The
literature has conflicted on the benefits of critical incident stress
management (Everly & Mitchell, 2000; Mitchell, 2003; Ruzek et al., 2007).
These criticisms were addressed very thoroughly and using a strict definition
of critical incident stress management debriefing and techniques by Mitchell
(2003) and Everly and Mitchell (2000). In his research analysis, Mitchell
clarified that many criticisms of the model came from situations where the
techniques were used by untrained individuals, misapplied to people for
whom the techniques were not designed, and by individuals who used them
in a psychotherapy context.
From a CISM perspective, critical incidents are sudden, often life-
threatening, and time-limited and may overwhelm the capacity to respond
adaptively. Inherent in this definition, the authors point out that
psychological homeostasis has been disrupted, usual coping mechanisms
have failed to reestablish homeostasis, and the resulting distress has caused
some impairment in functioning. In the CISM framework, crisis
intervention, as defined by Flannery and Everly (2000, p. 120) involves the
“provision of emergency psychological care to victims as to assist those
victims in returning to an adaptive level of functioning and to prevent or
mitigate the potential negative impact of psychological trauma.” Mitchell
(2003, p. 3) wrote, “the primary goals of the crisis intervention program
entitled CISM are to mitigate the impact of a critical incident and to
accelerate recovery processes of normal people who are having normal
reactions to abnormal events.”
Each component of the CISM crisis intervention model involves the
following premise:
1. Intervene immediately to minimize the risk of maladaptive coping or
responding.
2. Stabilize through mobilizing resources and supports to restore a
semblance of order and routine.
3. Facilitate understanding of what has happened. Gather facts, provide
information, encourage expression, helping them understand the
impact of the event and aftermath.
4. Focus on problem-solving as part of the effort at regaining control and
self-efficacy.
5. Encourage self-reliance to restore independent functioning, practical
solutions to handling the situation, and establishing a normal routine
and balance.
There are seven core components of CISM designed to be used in a

multiple pronged component approach, where each stage has a specific
desired outcome intervention, timing, activation point, and format (Everly
and Mitchell 1997, 2000):
1. Pre-crisis preparation. Planning at this stage is primarily preventative.

This stage involves stress-management training and education,
anticipating crisis/disaster response, and mitigation.
2. Disaster or large-scale incidents, where it is necessary to include larger
groups and types of groups (schools, churches, communities, etc.). These
interventions generally include demobilizations, town hall types of
meetings, informational briefings, and staff advisement.
3. Defusing intervention, which is a three-phased structured small-group
activity. The groups should include groups of people who have the
same exposure to the same event (i.e., all first responders on the scene).
This is generally provided within hours of the event. It can happen on
the scene or once the responders have returned to their home base or
quarters. It has the purpose of assessing distress, triaging response, and
potential for risk from stress and exposure, helping responders manage
their reactions and responses to the situation and mitigating further
development of problematic stress symptoms.
4. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD), which is a seven-stage
structured group discussion with homogeneous individuals who had
exposure to the same incident, designed at mitigating acute symptoms,
providing education, support, clarification of thoughts, reactions, and
physical responses that can occur as part of critical incident stress. This
usually takes place one to ten days post-incident.
5. One-to-one crisis intervention or psychological support can be offered
at any point during the full range of the critical incident spectrum.
6. Family crisis intervention, education, and organizational consultation
and support.
7. Follow-up and referral mechanisms for assessment and treatment if
necessary, for identified personnel or organizations.
Briefing and Debriefing

Be prepared in advance about critical incident stress management and
education about the response. Many agencies are writing critical incident
stress management services into their demobilization policies.
Be prepared to provide education, such as critical incident briefings,
defusing (CISM), and educational briefings as part of demobilization.
Demobilization is a process where the responders are provided with
information about stress symptoms and potential problems from the
deployment or service. It is also a brief and general education service. The
International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (www.icisf.org) has some
excellent handouts that can be used for this purpose.
Equally important, before debriefing, get your people back to their people.
Let them touch their people, rest in their home, be a person before you bring
them back as a responder, or to participate in a debriefing. To the best extent
possible, make sure they know when and where they are going back and
their people. When this is done, debrief them with the team they went out
with, so multijurisdictional planning may be necessary to coordinate this. In
the definition of CISM, the services are directed at groups that have had
similar experiences and exposure and are peer-led.
Before a disaster strikes, learn about any CISM teams in your region that
may be available to provide services. There are federal, state, and regional
teams that provide these services. In the true right CISM model, the teams
are comprised of volunteers who are also responders, so they can talk from a
peer perspective. Some employee assistance program (EAP) services are also
available, although their teams may not have peers, nor work from a
traditional CISM model. The ICISF website provides a list of registered
volunteer teams and their contact person.
Personal Experiences
During the COVID-19 response, I had the opportunity to deploy various
responses by teams providing support to the federal response. I will
maintain confidentiality out of respect to the situation, my team, and the
responder community. These emails reflect a very personal experience, and
how I tried to protect my audience reading the email should become pretty
apparent. What the email doesn’t reflect was, in some cases, I was very
emotional, mostly because I was exhausted, isolated, frustrated, and hungry.
I physically ached from the work assignment I had and the conditions I was
working in for 12 hours. I had great respect for the leadership and my
colleagues and have no doubt about their capacity and competency. I stand
in awe of them. These aren’t complaints. These emails are shared because
these are normal reactions to abnormal situations. An individual with a
mental health perspective would read this and look at Maslow’s Hierarchy
of Needs. Although the biological and physiological needs are generally met,
and the levels are worked up, increasing compromises happened.
Email 1: To the general family and close friends. Sent during the second
deployment. Spring 2020.
Hello everyone from CITY—SUBURB,
I am here with the RESPONSE TEAM as a mental health specialist in the disaster portable
morgue unit. Roughly a million and a half remains are being processed through here, and more
are coming every day (my numbers might be off a bit, but it sure feels like a million and a half). I
now know what people mean when they say that death has a smell. I can identify about 2,000
permutations of that smell now. And it stays on you. You absorb it and carry it. Today we estimate
we only have about a thousand more to go into long-term storage. So what does a mental health
specialist do in the emergency morgue? I work on the receiving and transfer platforms. Unlike at
my previous deployment, where I got to greet and interact with live subjects, monitor their
quarantine, and be outdoors in the most amazing sunny weather, they are much quieter and easier
to direct. I am grateful that I cannot view them as they are in protective bags (which I have
learned to help replace when needed). I never had any idea the extent of what medical examiners,
coroners, morticians, and funeral directors provided, and my respect for their skills is so profound.
Every individual in this place has a comfort level with the deceased, allowing each of these
individuals to be treated with reverence and honor. I have conversations with some of them as I
move them to the release tent and wish them peace on their journey’s final leg. None of them
responded, but I knew they heard me. The overwhelming vision of what I’ve seen up close has
been in the newspaper, and it honestly shows what we are trying to respond to and mitigate.
People don’t understand what goes on behind the scenes, and it brings to light the assumptions we
have that things just happen to fix themselves and that we won’t have to be bothered with details.
How easily every system can become compromised, fail, and then find out how important they
are. We are working 12-hour shifts in full PPE, and I am on my feet almost that whole time, and
clocking about 10–15 miles a day in my duties and work on a loading dock with no climate control
or airflow. And chairs, send them because we can’t sit on the floor—it is wooden or concrete and
hasn’t been washed or sanitized to my knowledge. We have a four-person bench for the 10-person
army team and two chairs. But we also have gurneys and embalming tables—but I just can’t bring
myself to do that. My MH job entails collecting case numbers from the ME’s office and going to
one of the hundred or so trailers to find said individual among the 40+ housed in the trailer or out
to the long-term freezers to relocate them. Then we drive back, transfer them from the gurney to
the transfer table and release them to the funeral home. Sometimes, we move bodies from one
trailer to another to consolidate them or move them from a trailer to the long-term storage freezer.
Yes, I’m helping lift bodies. Lots of bodies, all sizes, and ages of bodies, in lots of stages of decay. I
learned the disinfectant we use could cause insects to disappear. I scrub the hard surfaces down as
often as I can, and that includes the gurneys and the stretchers, and anything else I can. Because so
much of the structure is wooden, I just spray it. I’ve learned not to use vapor rub under your nose
because while it’s helpful to curtail the odor, it liquifies and doesn’t taste very good under the
mask. For about four days, I got to run the long-term storage platform. We clear between 40–100
releases to funeral homes a day and take in about a million each morning. You may be asking
yourself, hum, … that doesn’t sound like mental health work. I’ve been assured it is. We must have
gone to different schools. I am not complaining because it is important and necessary work. I get
to be someone who helps make sure that dignity and respect are delivered to individuals I’m
certain would rather not be in this circumstance. I have a lot of conversations while working with
people about their experiences and feel like I’ve got to be helpful somehow. I’ve taken to
repeatedly asking for office supplies we need to do our job in the manner they’ve asked us to
(which is highly redundant to minimize errors—I get it) and additional chairs. I ask daily; I ask
repeatedly. I can’t leave my particular station, so I don’t know how stressful other assignments
are. I think they get more downtime than we do, and they seem to have more time to walk around
outside and be in the comfort tent, some of them napping, others complaining their assignment is
slow. I listened as one person assigned to our work assignment complained that there wasn’t
anything to do, so they stayed in the comfort tent and got real work done until something
worthwhile. I looked at them and thought there must be another loading dock area that I am not
aware of … and I thought some unpleasant thoughts but dropped it because that wasn’t what I
was willing to make this experience about for myself. BUT I am pretty well hydrated, nourished,
and fed. I could use a haircut and some sleep. Have mastered the use of the latrine in full PPE. A
big step for the princess I am. We wear full PPE. Some of the supplies are running thin, so
consequently, I am wearing a surgical bootie over the hairnet on my head. I look like a lunch lady.
I wear the full PPE suit, which we decorate so we know who each other are, as well as double
gloves (duct-taped with the sleeve between layers one and two), booties over the bottom of our
PPE suit, a mask, eye shields, and head coverings. I spray my boots down every night before I
leave, and they remain at my door when I come in the room. Luckily, we have a dry cleaner to
send our clothes out to, almost every day a bag goes, and they deliver it back. Minimal downtime.
It takes a bit of time to get in and out of them. The day starts at 5, out the door by 600, and shift 7–
7, home by 8, but we arrive during the first responder shout celebration. It is like a parade in route
home every day. We run to the deli down the street to get something for dinner and order our
breakfast because the restaurant doesn’t open in the morning before we leave. That deli-dash and
van ride is about the only socializing we do except for the van ride. The evening involves prepping
for the next day, showering, eating while talking to my patients, then bed. Twenty minutes later, I
get up and start over. We work with the [numerous agencies] and the National Guard and the
Mortuary Services personnel from the Army. Holy cow, are they heroic! Never complain, and
work harder than anyone I’ve ever seen, and with such good hearts and spirit. They have seen
trauma, yet they believe they are doing important work, so it is worth it. We have a contingent
from 10th Mountain, who told me to tell our BPD Sgt. “to the top!” in response to his “Climb to
Glory.” I traded my DMORT pin for an NYPD patch. These folks are absolutely amazing and
energetic and like being busy. Many of them are barely out of their teens, and early on were out
collecting bodies and now this assignment, and many haven’t been home for three months. We
talk a lot about different things, mostly so we can distract ourselves from the terrible smell. On
their downtimes, they are in full PPE’s doing push-ups, pull-ups, and other physical challenges.
We did push-ups the other day, and, of course, they outlasted me. It was like Christmas when we
got a portable and wearable sprayer for the disinfectant we use, and they rigged a lever to make it
work (at the expense of a gurney—but hey, modify, adapt, innovate and overcome, right)? In some
of our few quieter moments, we play crazy 8s with an incomplete deck of cards. There is, of
course, graffiti, which has been painted over. They painted over the only bench on the platform
first thing one morning, and everyone sat on it anyway—we were all in white, and we were tired.
Ruined the paint job—oh well. They didn’t paint over the information I wrote about critical
incident stress management, and apparently, they missed all the quotes that say things like “Send
me Lord.” I wrote, “go army beat navy,” and a navy guy had fun removing that one! The
warehouse we are in is also inhabited by a family of ravens, who had babies when the mission
began. They are very messy and loud but provide endless entertainment, as the tents are right
below the nest. They seem to enjoy jumping out of the nest and onto the photography tent and
sliding down, just to fly up and do it again. Of course, everyone feeds them, so they have us
trained. This morning the baby is trotting along the floor and dividing screen structures after us
and attending our morning briefing with us. He added a few squawks for emphasis. The Mayor
has sent lunch over several times, which is nice. We don’t go out much, we’re too tired, and few
things are open and available. I anticipate being home May 20, and I will NOT extend and am
prepared to escape the city if I need to so I can come home. I’ve walked through my boots, and
used up almost all my supplies and don’t have any way to replenish them because I’m too
exhausted to walk the seven blocks to the open store, and I don’t have the time in the evening to
do that. I could order stuff online, but what a hassle. My body is so sore, and I am exhausted. I will
be quarantined at home for two weeks, but then again, so will most of the rest of the state, except
for folks like our amazing first responders and essential workers who are great backbones of the
community. John and I have to talk about what that quarantine will look like for me. I will be
tested and have the anti-body test done on my last shift day. I hope all of you are well. I wanted to
leave you with a view from the dock. I don’t know if my attachments will come through. People
ask if they can pray for us. Certainly, that’d be great. If you do, please ask for chairs. My dogs are
howling. These folks are amazing and professional. Be well, stay safe; hope to talk to you all soon.
Me
Image 13.7 Juzwin on Deployment during Pandemic 2020

EMAIL 2: From my daughter (who works in the legal field) responded:
Mom, this line is great and will be written on your tombstone (in many, many, many years). Also,
please include in your forthcoming book:
“People ask if they can pray for us. Certainly, that’d be great. If you do, please ask for chairs.
My dogs are howling. These folks are amazing and professional.”
I am attaching a video of the city of Denver cheering for you and all other essential workers. I
hope it comes through. If you listen closely, you can hear the horns honking as they drive by.
Happens every night at 8pm like clockwork. It was nice to chat with you today and see your face. I
am glad you are taking care and staying safe. I got to chat with Dad for a minute today, too.
Sounds like he is doing alright. He was sorry to have missed your call today by just a second.
[And then many paragraphs of normal daily happenings, that made my day better, and yes, I
did eventually get a chat with my husband, although because I was so fatigued, I barely spoke for
more than five minutes. He felt cheated.]
Conclusion
Stress is part of our daily lives. We can manage it while we live with it.
When disaster strikes, it impacts the core of our existence and perception of
safety and security. Different situations impact people’s lives and physical
and emotional health differently. It can have a long-lasting impact on
communities and the people within them. This not only affects people; it
impacts economics and resources within the community.
Considering the factors mentioned above in mind, it is essential to
develop plans that anticipate and plan for a wide range of possible
community disasters. Keeping this in mind, you can expect the needs of both
the community and your responders. Although critical incidents and
disasters are unpredictable, they can be planned for some degree of
anticipation of the factors discussed earlier. While we plan based on the
worst we’ve known, we need to plan for the worst we can imagine with an
impact more significant than we are afraid to contemplate. We also need to
think outside the box, reaching for resources we’ve not considered, and plan
to keep our personnel resources as healthy and supported as possible, not
only because we need their professional skills to help us through the
disaster, but also because we care about them as valuable community
members. Advocating to have mental resources in every element of a
cohesive response plan and response is a vitally necessary consideration. It is
time to take emergency response planning and response to the next level. If
mental health and wellness is truly a goal as part of force protection, then
bring in the support to do the work. Allow the mental health professional to
consult and collaborate to bring in elements that other disciplines may not
consider—not because of any problem—but because of perspective and
different understanding. These efforts complement and support the goal of
the mission. Protecting our disaster responders and essential personnel is
increasingly important in this time of overwhelming demands they meet
and contributes to the agency’s overall readiness to meet the community’s
demands.
Image 13.8 Inside Hanger at Travis AFB during Pandemic
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Chapter 14
Effective Leadership in Emergency

Management—A Research-Driven
Discussion
J. Howard Murphy
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-16
Introduction
In recent decades, public safety agencies, healthcare facilities, public health
departments, and emergency managers have been working to prepare for
disasters in their communities. Some communities have put their plans into
action when responding to incidents such as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods,
and infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics. While individual
organizations may be better prepared to respond to disasters, they must ask;
How prepared is our community to respond?
Presidential Policy Directive 8, issued in March 2011, emphasized a whole-
of-community response to disasters. This means having a unified focus and
plan to respond to community disasters. When a high-impact incident such
as a natural disaster, pandemic, terrorist attack, or mass shooting occurs,
response activities require integration of emergency management, law
enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical services, healthcare
providers, public health officials, school officials, and other agencies
operating within a community.
High-impact incidents are likely to overwhelm a community’s resources.
Isolated planning, training, exercising, and other preparedness methods fail
to consider the concept of the whole community. Traditional and non-
traditional stakeholders of the emergency management team must work
together to mitigate cascading system failures within their community.
Emergency managers should be aware of the essential role they play in
addressing the myriad of hazards threatening their communities and work
across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries to develop more
prepared and resilient communities.
In contrast to traditional emergency services responders, e.g., firefighters,
law enforcement officers, emergency medical technicians who “save lives,”
emergency managers “save communities” (S. Phelps, personal
communication, January 9, 2012). Professor Scot Phelps (2012) of the
Disaster Science Fellowship of the Academy of Emergency Management,
asserted emergency managers must be leaders in their organizations and
communities who possess extensive knowledge of their jurisdictions’
infrastructure, economy, culture, politics, emergency services capabilities
and limitations, and geography. Emergency managers must understand the
systems of systems (S. Phelps, personal communication, January 9, 2012).
They focus on hazard mitigation to prevent or reduce the impacts of
disasters, disaster preparedness, including emergency planning and training,
disaster response operations, and disaster recovery operations to restore
basic services within the community (Waugh & Streib, 2006).
Image 14.1 PPD 8
Source: Image Provided by Rick C. Mathews
Image 14.2 Fire Service Responding to an Emergency

Image 14.3 Fully Functional, Jurisdictional Level, EOC
Source: Image Provided by Howard Murphy
Emergency Management Challenges

The complexities in an era of uncertainty and the complexities of disasters
may motivate emergency and crisis management researchers to develop
leadership theories and approaches to effectively prepare for and lead during
disasters (Cwiak & Goss, 2014; Mardis, 2015; Schear, 2015). However,
emergency management remains an emerging discipline with few, if any
seminal theories of disaster management or emergency management (Ha,
2016; Murawski, 2011; Spearo, 2017; Steen, 2012). Also, a definition of
disaster management or emergency management continues to evolve, and as
a burgeoning field of study, emergency management primarily depends on
other theories for its foundations (Cwiak & Goss, 2014; Murawski, 2011;
Spearo, 2017). While recent literature searches revealed limited research on
attributes of the emergency management profession (Blanchard, 2005; Cwiak
et al., 2017; Drabek, 1987; Spearo, 2017; Urby, 2010; Wilson, 2000), the
author’s research also revealed an even greater scarcity of information on
characteristics identifying effective emergency managers. The identification
of characteristics or indicators of such leaders would be beneficial to the
emergency management profession (McEntire, 2015).
These realities, along with the complexities of disasters, require
emergency managers take up the difficult task of leading change across the
spectrum of emergency management agencies’ internal and external
stakeholders (Cwiak et al., 2017; Kotter, 2007; Rose-Smith, 2012; Waugh &
Streib, 2006). Therefore, emergency managers would need to possess the
agility and ability to build cross-cultural relationships; manage expectations;
lead up, down, and across; and convert strategic visions into executable
plans and actions (Cwiak et al., 2017; Marcus, 2016; Mardis, 2015; Ulrich &
Smallwood, 2009; Waugh & Streib, 2006). Emergency managers must
continuously deal with natural, technological, and human-caused disasters
(Cooks, 2015; Cwiak et al., 2017; Murphy, 2016; Reddick, 2007; Weinzierl,
2004).
The current and future roles of emergency managers will require them to
possess capabilities Ulrich and Smallwood (2009) enumerated as “talent,
leadership, agility, an outside-in connection, and strategic unity” (p. 16).
Given the complexities of emergency management and the integration of
sociology, economics, engineering, mental health, public health, theology,
and other professions within the emergency management enterprise, there is
an apparent need to identify, retain, and deploy competent professionals
who possess characteristics necessary for the development of strategic
leadership knowledge, skills, and abilities.
Emergency management leaders “seek to promote safer, less vulnerable
communities with the capacity to cope with hazards and disasters” (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2007, p. 4). In practice, emergency
management is defined as a
managerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce
vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters [by] coordinating and integrating all activities
necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to,
and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other [hu]man-made
disasters.
The terms “emergency manager” and “emergency management” beg the

question; Is an effective emergency manager a manager or a leader? Quoting
former FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate, in his comparison of an effective
emergency manager to a football coach, DeVoe (2018) provided, “You make
the game plan, practice that game plan, make adjustments, and on game day,
let the team go. You will make some changes but will not have tactical
decisions. You need to trust the team.” Fugate argued that emergency
managers must be leaders.
Image 14.4 “Leadership”
Many of today’s disasters require more resources than most local/state-

level and/or national-level government-centric systems can provide, which
suggests that these disasters are not government problems as much as they
are societal problems requiring societal solutions (Aniskoff, 2011; Cwiak et
al., 2017; Drabek, 1987; Forrest, 2011; Waugh & Streib, 2006). According to
Craig Fugate (2010), this is a perspective changer about stakeholders.
Emergency managers, by necessity, must serve as leaders who perceive the
public and non-governmental organizations as a resource as they collaborate
across the whole of the community within all phases of emergency
management (Aniskoff, 2011; Cwiak et al., 2017; Drabek, 1987; Forrest, 2011;
Waugh & Streib, 2006).
Success or failure of a disaster response in the first few hours and days
rests with the local emergency responders, “first receivers” in the healthcare
community, and the true first responders or “immediate responders” who are
the bystanders and survivors of the incident, indicating that the public
should be engaged as part of the solution (Fugate, 2010). Emergency
management, therefore, is more about communications and networking than
it is about tools and processes (Fugate, 2010). Such skills indeed appear to be
in the domain of effective leadership practices. This begs the question, “What
makes an emergency manager effective?” (McEntire, 2015). Moreover,
Rudestam’s and Newton’s (2007) position that “researchable questions
almost invariably involve the relationship between two or more variables,
phenomena, concepts, or ideas” (p.11) should resonate with those who seek
to determine the variables pertaining to effective emergency management.
Competencies of Effective Emergency Managers

A careful review of the principles of emergency management revealed the
importance of competencies. Ulrich and Smallwood (2001) asserted that
leaders would need to possess the agility and ability to build cross-cultural
relationships; manage expectations; and lead up, down, and across. Ulrich
and Smallwood (2001), Mardis (2015), and Peerbolte (2017) also asserted that
leaders will need to be able to convert strategic visions into executable plans
and actions. Mardis (2015) posited that researchers suggest that emergency
management leaders’ roles should now be more strategic than operational
due to the complexities of the crises in this contemporary era. The
convergence of a multitude of factors, including the changing dynamics of
globalization, the natural environment, transnational crime, terrorism, and
adversarial cyber-security-related threats and challenges, contribute
significantly to these complexities (Cwiak et al., 2017; Mardis, 2015). Quoting
Machiavelli, Van Maurik (2001) provided, “Those who wish to enjoy
enduring success should adjust their behavior to suit the times” (p. 20). Such
behavior, or performance, appears to be needed “across all phases of
emergency management; prevention, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010, pp. 1-8–1-10).
In the effort to provide the definition, vision, mission, and principles of
emergency management, several agencies, including FEMA, the
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), and the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA) defined emergency management as “the managed
function charged with creating the framework within which communities
reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters” (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, n.d., p. 1). While the vision statement is tied closely to
the definition of emergency management, the mission statement and
principles provide a revelation of the importance of highly competent
leadership within the emergency management community. The mission
statement reads as follows,
Image 14.5 Steering Emergency Management
Emergency Management protects communities by coordinating and integrating all activities

necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to,
and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other human-made
disasters.
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d., p. 1)
The principles of emergency management, based upon the emergency

management definition, vision, and mission include the following: 1)
comprehensive, consider all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders, and all
impacts relevant to disasters; 2) progressive, anticipate future disasters and
prepare for them; 3) risk-driven, use sound risk management principles in
assigning priorities and resources; 4) integrated, ensure unity of effort
among all levels of government and all elements of a community; 5)
collaborative, create and sustain trust relationships among constituents and
facilitate a team atmosphere with consensus building and effective
communications; 6) coordinated, synchronize the activities of all relevant
constituents to achieve a common purpose; 7) flexible, use creativity and
innovation in solving disaster challenges; and 8) professional, value a
scientific and knowledge-based approach drawing upon education, training,
experience, ethics, public stewardship, and continuous quality improvement
Identification of Star Performers in Emergency Management

Murphy (2019) added to the body of literature by providing scientific data
regarding key indicators of, and predictors of performance (Bar-On, 2018) of
effective emergency management leaders. His research assessed
differentiation between a group of 396 emergency managers surveyed and a
normative population group of 1,614 individuals not related to emergency
services or emergency management professions. The normative population
group was available within the Bar-On Test Developers database and
authorized for Murphy’s (2019) use by Reuven Bar-On, a world-renowned
expert on human performance. Using the Bar-On Multifactor Measure of
Performance™ (Bar-On MMP3™), Murphy (2019) identified key indicators of
effective emergency managers. The information yielded in Murphy’s study
may assist decision-makers in identifying star performers and developing
leaders by focusing on the core cluster of competencies of exemplary
emergency management leaders (Bar-On Test Developers, 2018; Murphy,
2019).
Such information can be used in the selection of high potential individuals
early in the dynamic and demanding emergency management profession
while directing scarce training resources in a more valuable and efficient
manner. This information aids in preventing leadership degradation by
recognizing possible problems and changing behavior early. Additionally, it
provides decision-makers and emergency management organizations the
ability to accept an evolving path necessary for their leadership development
programs while also providing proper guidance and feedback for future
leadership development.
Murphy (2019) used a quantitative research method using non-
multivariate parametric statistics (t-tests) and multivariate statistics
(analysis of variance) to assess the predictors of performance (Bar-On, 2016;
Salovey & Mayer, 1990) that significantly contribute to emergency
management leaders’ effectiveness. His non-experimental study evaluated to
what extent, if any, there are significant differences in key indicators of
emergency management leadership effectiveness between emergency
managers and a normative population group using the 23 scales available
within the Bar-On MMP3™ instrument.
Reliability and Validity of the Multi-Factor Measure of

Performance, Version 3™
The primary approach used to estimate the Bar-On MMP3™’s reliability was
to evaluate the internal consistency of its scales with Cronbach alphas. This
analysis revealed that all 23 possessed more than adequate reliability. This
finding was based on the assumption that reliability coefficients equal to or
greater than 0.70 indicate adequate reliability for scales and sub-scales (Bar-
On, 2018; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) while coefficients equal to or greater
than 0.80 are considered the minimum for composite scales (Bar-On, 2018;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Bar-On (2018) achieved these coefficients in his
study. Bar-On (2018) also used his findings to justify the creation of sub-
scales comprising as few as five items and assessed that relatively high-
reliability coefficients predict the scale’s validity will be relatively high as
well (Bar-On, 2018; Hill & Lewicki, 2006).
Bar-On (2018) examined discriminant validity and predictive validity with
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple regression analysis (MRA). In
the ANOVA evaluation of the Bar-On MMP3™’s discriminant validity, Bar-
On (2018) compared a sample of high performers and low performers for
possible significant differences based on their self-reported performance
ratings at work. High performers were those whose recent performance
ratings were self-reported to be equal to or greater than one standard
deviation above the mean (n = 304), while low performers were those whose
self-reported performance ratings were equal to or less than one standard
deviation from the mean (n = 292) (Bar-On, 2018).
Bar-On (2018) also evaluated predictive validity by applying MRA to
examine the ability of the Bar-On MMP3™ scores to predict self-reported
performance (n = 1,788). The results indicated that nearly all of the Bar-On
MMP3™ scales are capable of significantly discriminating between high
performers and low performers (Bar-On, 2018). The only scale that could not
significantly discriminate between high performers and low performers was
Self-Reliance for the population sample studied (Bar-On, 2018). Bar-On
(2018) assessed that while this finding might justify the exclusion of the Self-
Reliance scale in the Bar-On MMP3™, he decided to retain the scale based
upon numerous studies that support the importance of Self-Reliance as a
significant contributor to performance (Bar-On, Handley, & Fund, 2006).
While the results indicated that nearly all the Bar-On MMP3™ scales are
capable of significantly distinguishing between high performers and low
performers, Bar-On (2018) also found through his application of MRA to
examine the degree of correlation between scale scores and self-reported
performance at work (n = 1,788) that all of the scales, including Self-
Reliance, are capable of predicting performance (Bar-On, 2018). These
findings appeared to justify retaining the Self-Reliance scale in the Bar-On
MMP3™ questionnaire. Furthermore, the overall multivariate correlation
between the Bar-On MMP3™ scales and self-reported performance was 0.56
(F = 7.39, p < 0.001), suggesting the Self-Reliance scale possessed relatively
high predictive validity (Bar-On, 2018). Bar-On (2018) expected this finding
based upon the scales’ relatively high reliability.
Among the benefits of using the MMP3™ was that it contained nearly
twice as many factors as other survey instruments and analytical tools,
including the Emotional Quotient Inventory™ (EQ-i™). This characteristic of
the Bar-On MMP3™ provided a capability for examining more potential
contributors to and predictors of performance among emergency
management leaders. Although most definitions and measures of emotional
and social intelligence include at least one of the following EI meta-factors;
self-awareness, understanding how others feel, managing one’s own
emotions, problem-solving, and generating positive mood (Bar-On, 2016),
the Bar-On conceptual and psychometric model comprises all five.
Furthermore, the Bar-On MMP3™ includes 23 predictors of human
performance and overall well-being (Bar-On, 2018), far more than other
psychometric tools available. The 23 scales serve in predicting human
performance within the Bar-On Test Developers (2018) Bar-On MMP3™. The
23 scales include the following, with a detailed description of each contained
in Appendix 1.
1. Physical fitness and well-being

2. Discomfort tolerance and stamina
3. General cognitive competence
4. Situational awareness
5. Applying experience
6. Flexibility and adaptability
7. Resourcefulness and resilience
8. Decision-Making
9. Preparedness and readiness
10. Coping and endurance
11. Self-Awareness
12. Self-Control
13. Self-Reliance
14. Decisiveness
15. Courage
16. Social awareness
17. Connectedness
18. Responsibility
19. Finding meaning
20. Engagement
21. Self-Motivation
22. Determination
23. Perseverance
The Bar-On MMP™ is not a measure of personality or cognitive,

emotional or social intelligence, although personal traits and abilities may
indeed impact the key predictors of the model of performance, and
performance in general. Bar-On (2016) did not design the Bar-On MMP™ to
assess the ability to perform, but rather performance itself. The survey items
are phrased in such a way to encourage respondents to describe the way
they typically behave in various situations and not their ability to behave in
those situations (Bar-On, 2016). Also, in order to increase validity of results,
the Bar-On MMP3™ instrument was created with methods of sensing
attempts to “sabotage” the test by detecting overly elevated positive or
negative scores and through inconsistency and omission rate.
Indicators of Effective Emergency Managers

Research using the 23 Bar-On MMP3™ scales led to a correlational analysis
of the emergency managers group (n = 396) and a normative population
group (n = 1,614). Murphy (2019) conducted tests using a non-multivariate
parametric statistical method (t-tests) and a multivariate statistical
assessment tool (MANOVA). A significance criterion of α = 0.05 and medium
effect size (ES) of 0.30 along with power (β) value of 0.80 and One Tail was
followed. Murphy (2019) consulted Tabachnick and Fidell (2013), G*Power
software version 3.0.10, and Cohen (1992) to determine the final sample size
justification for multivariate analysis. Based on the different quantitative
analyses being conducted, including multivariate analysis involving four
dependent variable predictors and two groups, a minimum sample size of
312 (Cohen, 1992; G*Power v. 3.0.10) was required for the study. The sample
size of 396 within the emergency managers group and 1,614 within the
normative population group met the requirements for the study.
Table 14.1 contains the Bar-On MMP3™ results obtained from the 396
emergency managers (EMs) sample and the normative population sample,
which excluded individuals working in public safety occupations such as
emergency managers, law enforcement officers, firefighters, EMS personnel,
and hospital emergency department personnel. The differences were
evaluated with the non-multivariate parametric t-test followed by the more
accurate MANOVA. The Table shows p levels that warrant a very high level
of confidence concerning the differences between emergency management
leaders and the normative population group across all 23 Bar-On MMP3™
scales.
Table 14.1 Differences in Bar-On MMP3™ scale scores between emergency

managers and the normative population sample
t-test MANOVA
Normative
Bar-On MMP3™ Scale EMs [T value [F value
Population
(p level)] (p level)]
Physical Fitness & Well- 10.09 63.36

74.6% 65.0%
Being (<.001) (<.001)
Discomfort Tolerance & 15.23 144.00
86.1% 71.9%
Stamina (<.001) (<.001)
t-test MANOVA
Normative
Population
General Cognitive 18.12 209.40

88.4% 75.4%
Competence (<.001) (<.001)
19.66 224.80
Situational Awareness 85.5% 70.2%
(<.001) (<.001)
16.79 174.40
Applying Experience 91.5% 79.2%
(<.001) (<.001)
17.06 180.00
Flexibility & Adaptability 87.1% 73.8%
(<.001) (<.001)
Resourcefulness & 15.91 135.60
85.9% 72.9%
Resilience (<.001) (<.001)
18.43 194.60
Decision-Making 86.9% 72.1%
(<.001) (<.001)
18.04 190.10
Preparedness & Readiness 87.9% 73.3%
(<.001) (<.001)
17.88 192.60
Coping & Endurance 86.6% 70.4%
(<.001) (<.001)
15.35 124.50
Self-Awareness 87.0% 74.7%
(<.001) (<.001)
17.19 169.30
Self-Control 85.1% 70.8%
(<.001) (<.001)
7.67 37.07
Self-Reliance 78.0% 72.3%
(<.001) (<.001)
16.12 154.20
Decisiveness 79.5% 66.1%
(<.001) (<.001)
21.77 258.30
Courage 84.7% 66.5%
(<.001) (<.001)
t-test MANOVA
Normative
Population
9.64 78.87
Social-Awareness 79.9% 71.9%
(<.001) (<.001)
13.35 138.60
Connectedness 85.1% 74.6%
(<.001) (<.001)
11.89 83.84
Responsibility 91.1% 82.8%
(<.001) (<.001)
10.53 67.29
Finding Meaning 88.9% 81.0%
(<.001) (<.001)
14.98 129.00
Engagement 87.5% 73.1%
(<.001) (<.001)
11.92 104.20
Self-Motivation 86.8% 77.3%
(<.001) (<.001)
13.69 107.20
Determination 86.8% 75.7%
(<.001) (<.001)
13.63 124.90
Perseverance 88.0% 77.1%
(<.001) (<.001)
Total Bar-On MMP3™ 19.88 234.30
85.6% 73.4%
Score (<.001) (<.001)
The findings documented in Table 14.1 are statistically significant. All 23

Bar-On MMP3™ scale scores significantly differentiate between the
emergency managers group and the normative population group at the
p<.001 level. Of the 23 Bar-On MMP3™ scale scores, the ten strongest scales
that differentiate between the emergency managers group (n = 396) and the
normative population group (n = 1,614) include: General Cognitive
Competence, Situational Awareness, Applying Experience, Flexibility and
Adaptability, Decision-Making, Preparedness and Readiness, Coping and
Endurance, Self-Control, Decisiveness, and Courage. Regarding an
interpretation of the above findings, emergency managers (n = 396) appear
to be significantly more adept across all 23 Bar-On MMP3™ scales, and
particularly adept in the ten areas mentioned earlier, than those who do not
work in the emergency management field as represented by the normative
population (n = 1,614).
These findings contribute to the structural attributes pertaining to the
professionalization of emergency management by providing an assessment
of a wide array of contributors to and predictors of the performance of
effective leaders within the emergency management profession. The findings
establish a benchmark for the long-overdue conversation about performance
measures and indicators of effective emergency management leadership
within the profession. Leaders within jurisdictions and organizations may
use the key indicators to assist in developing emergency management
credentialing requirements, employee selection, and promotion criteria, as
well as formalized emergency management leadership training and
education programs. This research indicates that emergency management
leaders should consistently identify tools capable of assessing employee
performance as well as identifying and developing star performers. It
appears the Bar-On MMP3™ has demonstrated utility in meeting that need.
Implications for the Emergency Management Profession

An examination of the challenges faced by emergency management
decision-makers within jurisdictions and organizations in identifying key
indicators of effective emergency management leaders provides a baseline
from which to develop emergency management personnel development
endeavors. The findings contained within this chapter should serve to
further the professionalization of emergency management, while also
contributing to helping identify and profile what it takes to be a star
performer in emergency management.
Approaches to evaluating performance in emergency management have
historically focused more on organizational benchmarks than on
performance assessment at the employee and leadership levels. These
metrics serve primarily to describe organizational performance within the
emergency management sector(s). Unfortunately, these metrics appear to fall
short in addressing important personal and social factors such as self-
awareness, social-awareness, social responsibility, employee accountability,
and a personal commitment to one’s quality of work, which are essential
elements of effective emergency management programs. Also, the results are
frequently unclear. Individual performance is often evaluated more by
personality tests than by performance measures, and the interpretation of
the findings tends to be subjective more than objective.
Senior leaders have always needed good assessment tools to gauge
emergency managers’ performance, not only to meet external accountability
demands but to establish internal indicators of accountability as well. In
terms of performance assessments, senior leaders could, therefore, benefit
from sophisticated predictive models at the employee and leadership levels
to better identify, select, and develop “Star Performers.” An obviously
important question arises: What makes emergency managers star
performers, and what are their key characteristics? Some might rightfully
argue that star performance in emergency management is “in the eye of the
beholder.” This, once again, raises the issue of subjectivity versus objectivity.
Based on professional experience, others would confidently argue that the
key characteristics include the “Virtues and Values” thought to significantly
impact how emergency managers conduct themselves and perform, which
can also be used to accurately identify star performers in the field of
emergency management and other public services (Murphy, 2019). The
inevitable questions arise: What is (1) the best way to identify the key
predictors of and contributors to star performance, in order to know (2) how
best to hire and train the right people for emergency management jobs?
The idea of “Star Performer Modeling” was first described by the General
Accountability Office (GAO) when it was presented to the United States
Senate Committee on Armed Services in 1998 (General Accountability
Office, 1998). Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Dr Richard Handley, who was
serving in the U.S. Air Force at the time, and Dr Reuven Bar-On, the
developer of the first measurement tool for emotional intelligence, the EQ-
i™, developed and applied Star Performance Modeling for the first time
(Bar-On, Handley, & Fund, 2006). This model, which was specifically
designed to determine the most important characteristics of high performers
within an organization, was created by having its employees complete a
multi-factor measure of performance (Bar-On, Handley, & Fund, 2006), a
predecessor to the Bar-On MMP3™. Then, Bar-On and Handley used
statistics to establish which factors were the strongest predictors of
employees’ current performance as rated by co-workers using a 360-degree
assessment (Bar-On, Handley, & Fund, 2006). The statistical model that
emerged was then used to help select potential high (“star”) performers and
helped employees strengthen their abilities to perform at even higher levels,
after they were hired, through training programs that focused on the specific
factors identified (Bar-On, Handley, & Fund, 2006).
Emerging Leadership Best Practice—Meta-Leadership

A careful analysis of key predictors of and contributors to star performance
within emergency management as well as various leadership theories and
approaches revealed a best practice in emergency management leadership,
the practice of meta-leadership. Cwiak et al. (2017) asserted that the
complexities, interdependencies, and ambiguity facing future generations of
emergency management leaders in an ever-evolving global community
heighten the expectations and need for the competencies of meta-leaders.
The emerging concept and best practice in emergency management
leadership of meta-leadership is defined as the ability to provide “guidance,
direction, and momentum across organizational lines that develops into a
shared course of action and a commonality of purpose among people and
agencies that are doing what appears to be very different work” (Marcus et
al., 2012, p. 680). Meta-leaders are those who possess a distinct mindset, a
unique set of skills, and a network to encourage cross-agency thinking, risk-
taking, and productivity (Ashkenas, Ulrich, Jick, & Kerr, 2002).
Meta-leadership emerged from observations of leaders as they practiced
complex problem solving, and discoveries were linked to the relevant
academic literature in order to deepen understanding and refine practice
principles and tools (Marcus, 2016). The conceptual rigor pertaining to meta-
leadership is intended to be both theoretically sound and pragmatically
relevant and useful (Marcus, 2016). The developers of the meta-leadership
concept learned from research with leaders in the emergency management
field as they prepared for and responded to disasters, including the 2009
H1N1 influenza pandemic, the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, the 2014
Ebola outbreaks, and other major disaster incidents (Marcus, 2016).
Within disaster environments in which there are often transformations of
traditional organizations and organizational structures requiring the
transformation of traditional leaders (Ashkenas et al., 2002) one’s formal
position is but one component of leadership capacity (Marcus et al., 2012). In
these environments, leaders often find themselves challenged to use
influence as much as or more so than formal authority with a more accurate
definition and measure of leadership being “people follow you.” Authority
and accountability structures are often more reciprocal and relational
(Wagner, 2008) and organizations are often complex, emotional, networked,
and chaotic as organizational boundaries function more like semi-permeable
membranes rather than hard walls with the involvement of other internal
and external stakeholders (Green, 2007; Marcus et al., 2012).
The complexities of organizational structures demanding non-stratified
leadership are often hidden by the focus of traditional theories that
presuppose that leadership is a top-down leader-subordinate construct (e.g.,
Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Likert, 1967; Weber, 1905). Ancona and Backman
(2010) determined that approximately 85% of the existing leadership
literature assumed a hierarchical leadership structure. Yukl, Gordon, and
Taber (2002) asserted that many leadership theories dealt with a single level
of processes because of the inherent difficulties in developing a multi-level
theory. Marcus et al. (2012) and Cwiak et al. (2017) posited that multi-level
reality, community leadership, is what emergency management leaders face.
In describing community leadership, team building, and resources
management within their article Emergency Management Leadership in
2030: Shaping the Next Generation Meta-Leader, Cwiak et al. (2017) made
the following assertion:
The emergency management professional must lead boldly. Effective emergency management
leadership puts an emphasis on team building, collaboration, and collective leadership. This
leadership is enhanced and emboldened by informed decision making, strong management
techniques, communicating and fostering a shared vision, empowering others, establishing
communication capabilities across varied networks, and creating an outcome-oriented
environment for continual improvement.
(p. 84)
Indicators of Effective Emergency Management Meta-Leaders

Most leadership theories do not fully capture what occurs when emergency
management leaders must catalyze action well above and beyond their
formal lines of decision-making and control. Marcus et al. (2012) argued that
the best evidence of effective leadership in these situations is a unified
commitment among all stakeholders toward a common goal, termed
“connectivity.” To achieve this connectivity, emergency management leaders
must simultaneously lead down in the traditional sense, up to influence the
people or organizations to whom they are accountable, across to activate
peer groups and others within their organization with whom there is no
formal subordinate relationship, and beyond to stakeholders outside of their
organization or chain of command (Marcus et al., 2012). This concept of
meta-leadership addresses leadership challenges that cross inter- and intra-
organizational boundaries, as well as those existing within hierarchical
organizational structures (Marcus et al., 2012). Meta-leadership and meta-
leaders have their most profound impact in situations with high stakes and a
high number of stakeholders. Scope, scale, and complexity are perspectives
not generally addressed in theories primarily examining motivation, power
structure, or mission such as transactional versus transformational
leadership (Bass, 1990; Burns, 1978).
Achievement of a community’s preparedness goal, given current natural
and human-made threats, appears to require a heightened capacity for
effective cross-organizational coordination of effort. This objective is
hindered by the tendency of leaders to advocate the specific interests and
purposes of their narrow silo of activity (Marcus et al., 2012). Meta-leaders
think and perform differently. They recognize that achieving genuine
community preparedness demands a spirit of cooperation combined with
tangible inter-agency mechanisms that activate jointness (Marcus et al.,
2012). By intentionally linking and leveraging the efforts of many agencies,
along with corporate, non-profit, and community sectors, meta-leaders
galvanize valuable connectivity of effort (Marcus et al., 2012).
Meta-leadership serves to reframe the processes and practices of leaders.
Three functions within meta-leadership include: 1) a comprehensive
organizing reference to understand and integrate the many facets of
leadership; 2) a strategy to engage collaborative activity; and 3) a cause and
purpose to improve organizational or governmental functioning and
performance (Marcus et al., 2012). Marcus (2016) described meta-leadership
as “a holistic, three-dimensional framework for grounding leaders, decoding
the context in which someone leads, and then recruiting and motivating a
wide range of stakeholders to achieve shared objectives” (p. 2). Meta-
leadership considers leadership as an exercise in complex problem solving
with the meta-leader creating a “problem-solution” environment in which
problems are rapidly identified, and sustainable solutions are developed and
executed (Marcus, 2016).
The three dimensions of meta-leadership are The Person of the Meta-
Leader, The Situation, and Connectivity (Marcus, 2016). The Person of the
Meta-Leader pertains to meta-leaders understanding and expressing both
who they are and why they are leading. This involves high levels of
emotional intelligence, particularly self-awareness and self-regulation, with
both being critical in stressful environments (Marcus, 2016). By mastering
self-discipline, overcoming the “amygdala hijack” of the freeze-flight-fight
response by deploying practiced protocols essential to effective and efficient
response leadership, the meta-leader serves as a visible role model fostering
confidence, discipline, and order across the response enterprise (Marcus,
2016).
As depicted in Table 14.2, the definitions of the Bar-On MMP3™ scales
Flexibility and Adaptability, and Preparedness and Readiness correspond to
the description of the meta-leadership dimension The Person of the Meta-
Leader. Of the four indicators emerging as consistent across the majority of
articles reviewed during an extensive literature review, definitions of
adaptability (Bennett, 2011; DeVoe, 2018) and flexibility (Cwiak et al., 2017;
DeVoe, 2017; Drabek, 1987; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007;
Murawski, 2011) correspond to the Bar-On MMP3™ scale Adaptability and
Flexibility (Bar-On, 2018), while definitions of knowledgeable/prepared
(Chandler, 2017; DeVoe, 2017; Springer, 2009), professional (Cwiak et al.,
2017; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007), and
proactive/prepared (Bennett, 2011) correspond to the Bar-On MMP3™ scale
Preparedness and Readiness. The definitions of these indicators correspond
to meta-leadership’s The Person of the Meta-Leader.
Table 14.2 Dimensions of meta-leadership correspondence to the Bar-On

MMP3™ scales indicating effective emergency management
leadership
Dimensions of Meta-Leadership Bar-On MMP3™ Scales (Bar-

(Marcus, 2016) On, 2016)
Flexibility & Adaptability

The Person
Preparedness & Readiness
General Cognitive
The Situation
Competence
Connectivity Decisiveness
Note: As emergency management has evolved and grown as a discipline over the past
few decades (Drabek, 2007; Spearo, 2017; Steen, 2012; Waugh & Sadiq, 2011), many in the
field have seen the professionalization of emergency management as a priority (Cwiak &
Goss, 2014; Spearo, 2017; Waugh & Sadiq, 2011). The attributes that distinguish a
profession are structural as well as attitudinal. Structural attributes include the creation
of a full-time occupation, formalized training and education programs, and sustained
ethical standards (Spearo, 2017).
The second dimension of meta-leadership is The Situation, described as
the milieu that leaders confront (Marcus, 2016). The inherent challenge is
both to discern what is occurring and what must be done about it as every
emergency or disaster is composed of multiple situations involving multiple
systems (Marcus, 2016; Marcus et al., 2012). By mapping these situations and
systems, as well as the involved stakeholders’ independent and overlapping
motivations and interests, the meta-leader develops widely conceived
situational awareness (Marcus, 2016; Marcus et al., 2012). Equipped with this
wide perspective, the meta-leader is then able to identify patterns, generate
options, make decisions, take actions, and communicate to remain ahead of
rapidly developing events (Marcus, 2016).
The definition of the Bar-On MMP3™ scale General Cognitive
Competence most closely corresponds to the description of the meta-
leadership dimension The Situation. Of the four indicators emerging as
consistent across the majority of articles reviewed during an extensive
research process, definitions of critical thinking (DeVoe, 2017; Drabek, 1987),
awareness (DeVoe, 2017; Springer, 2009), and comprehensive (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2007) correspond to the Bar-On MMP3™
scale General Cognitive Competence. The definitions of these indicators
correspond to meta-leadership’s The Situation.
The third dimension of meta-leadership is Connectivity, described as the
linking and leveraging of people and organizations to create unity of effort
and amplify the collective impact of individuals’ activities (Marcus, 2016).
The meta-leader serves to shape connectivity, thereby optimizing the flow of
relevant information, decisions, and resources across the response enterprise
to increase the likelihood of and shorten the time to a positive outcome
(Marcus, 2016). By continuously improving the vertical and horizontal
communications and feedback loops, the meta-leader catalyzes productivity
in multiple directions simultaneously (Marcus, 2016; Marcus et al., 2008;
Marcus et al., 2012). These directional facets of connectivity include down to
subordinates, up to superiors, across to silos within the organizational chain
of command, and beyond to other stakeholders involved in the situation
(Marcus et al., 2008; Marcus et al., 2012). Each of these facets of connectivity
has distinct authority and influence dynamics, performance expectations,
and governance structures which the meta-leader skillfully negotiates
(Marcus, 2016; Marcus et al., 2008; Marcus et al., 2012).
The definition of the Bar-On MMP3™ scale Decisiveness most closely
corresponds to the description of the meta-leadership dimension
Connectivity. Of the four indicators emerging as consistent across the
majority of articles reviewed during an extensive literature review,
definitions of decisiveness (Chandler, 2017; DeVoe, 2017; Drabek, 1987), quick
thinker/decisive (Bennett, 2011), and inspire confidence/decisive (Drabek,
1987; Springer, 2009) most closely corresponds to the Bar-On MMP3™ scale
Decisiveness. The definitions of these indicators correspond to meta-
leadership’s Connectivity.
Conclusion
The content of this chapter should serve to contribute to the structural
attributes pertaining to the professionalization of emergency management
by providing an assessment of a wide array of physical, intrapersonal,
interpersonal, cognitive, and motivational contributors to and predictors of
performance (Bar-On, 2018; Murphy, 2019) of effective leaders within the
emergency management profession. This constitutes a benchmark for the
long-overdue conversation about and use of performance measures and
indicators of effective emergency management leadership within the
profession. The identification of key indicators may be beneficial for
jurisdictional leaders, organizational leaders, and other stakeholders who
have a vested interest in identifying star performing employees as well as
exemplary emergency management candidates.
Leaders within jurisdictions and organizations may use the key indicators
to assist in developing emergency management credentialing requirements,
employee selection and promotion criteria, as well as formalized emergency
management and emergency management leadership training and education
programs. These structural attributes will assist in developing emergency
management leaders who are able to effectively lead within the complex
environments of disasters (Bryant, 1997; Cooks, 2015; Cwiak et al., 2017; Ha,
2016; Marcus et al., 2012; Mardis, 2015; Murawski, 2011; Peerbolte, 2017;
Rose-Smith, 2012).
Emergency services leaders should consistently identify tools capable of
assessing employee performance as well as identifying star performers (Bar-
On, 1997, 2006, 2016; Conroy, 2017; Stein & Book, 2010; Turner, 2007). This
concept also makes theoretical sense and is applicable in the routine practice
of emergency management leadership as leaders conduct succession
planning that will be enhanced when their subordinates or mentees
identified as star performers are guided into leadership development
pipelines. Further, identification of star performing candidates early in their
respective careers will likely benefit organizational change tied to leadership,
teamwork, and employee mismatches.
The use of the Bar-On MMP3™ has demonstrated a potential for use of a
performance measurement tool(s) in more objectively assessing how
emergency managers will conduct themselves and perform, which can also
be used to accurately identify star performers within emergency
management organizations. The importance of Star Performer Modeling is to
enhance an organization’s ability to hire, train, and promote high
performers (Conroy, Turner, Javidi, & Bar-On, 2018). Such modeling
provides a sophisticated yet cost-effective approach to improve occupational
performance, teamwork, and leadership as well as overall organizational
effectiveness.
The meta-leadership framework is a best practice that facilitates star
performance as it provides tools that are conceptually and practically
rigorous so that emergency management leaders are better equipped to act
and direct others in emergency situations. Meta-leadership is currently
being used by leaders in the fields of homeland security, emergency
preparedness and response, and public health in the public, private, and non-
profit sectors (Cwiak et al., 2017; Marcus et al., 2012).
Appendix 1
Bar-On MMP3™ descriptive definitions for each of the 23 scales.
Table 14.3 Bar-On Multifactor Measure of Performance Version 3 Scale

Definitions (1–4)
Scale Definition
In addition to striving to obtain and maintain good

physical fitness, which contributes to overall well-
being, this factor is a combination of physical
Physical
(primarily) and emotional well-being. It is how
1 Fitness &
people feel in general about their physical fitness,
Well-Being
eating and sleeping habits as well as how energetic
they typically are in what they do.
In addition to the ability to temporarily suspend
everyday physical needs and comforts in order to
Discomfort
complete a task, this is the willingness to eat at
2 Tolerance &
irregular times, work longer hours with less sleep
Stamina
as well as to work on weekends in order to meet
deadlines and finish the work on time.
In addition to assessing one’s ability to learn new
information and apply learned knowledge, logic
and reasoning for the purpose of understanding
and solving problems, this Bar-On MMP3™ scale
assesses the capacity to learn more about the
General
challenges one is facing, to first understand them
3 Cognitive
and then think about a reasonable course of action,
Competence
to apply potentially effective solutions and weigh
conflicting evidence, as well as to take into account
the short-term and long-term consequences of
potential solutions being considered.
Scale Definition
In addition to being attentive to the immediate

situation, paying attention to detail and
understanding, clarifying and closing gaps between
the perception of subjective reality and objective
reality, this has to do with how attentive people are
Situational
to their surroundings and how well they size up
4 Awareness
the situation. This appears to be based on an ability
to update their assessment of situations in response
to changes in the immediate environment as well
as to filter out irrelevant information, in order not
to get distracted.

Definitions (5–8)
Scale Definition
In addition to appropriately and effectively

applying past experience in order to facilitate
current problem analysis, problem-solving and
decision-making, this is the ability to apply
experience in understanding and dealing with
Applying
current challenges and problematic situations.
5 Experience
This requires the capacity to effectively
combine past experience with new
information and approaches, which is an
important contributor to effective cognitive
functioning.
Scale Definition
In addition to coping with and adapting to

change, and dealing with unexpected,
unpredictable and confusing situations, this
Bar-On MMP3™ scale assesses the ability to
Flexibility & “think on one’s feet” and deal with the
6
Adaptability unexpected, finding ways to improvise and
adapt when the unpredictable occurs, and to
make the necessary adjustments to overcome.
This often requires one to reframe setbacks
and not to see them as personal or permanent.
In addition to the ability to be innovative and
consider different ways of coping with
situations, this scale appears to assess the
capacity of individuals to generate different
approaches to dealing with challenges and
setbacks as well as to recover from them
Resourcefulness
7 resiliently. If previous approaches are
& Resilience
ineffective, resourceful individuals typically
come up with alternative approaches that
work; and success often depends on
formulating an effective course of action
aimed at going from the current situation to a
better one.
Scale Definition
In addition to generating potentially effective

solutions to problems, weighing the pros and
cons of each possibility and deciding on the
best solution, this is the ability to make good
Decision- decisions in general. Moreover, it is the ability
8
Making to come up with a potentially effective plan
that requires coping with ambiguity and
exercising sound judgement even when
working under pressure and dealing with
potential risks.

Definitions (9–13)
Scale Definition
This is the ability of individuals to be prepared

and ready to cope with immediate situations that
arise and/or to execute some form of goal-
oriented action based on what they have learned.
Preparedness This includes immediately sizing up what is
9 & Readiness presently happening in the here-and-now,
deciding on the best course of action, and rapidly
implementing it, which appears to be what is
cognitively needed in dealing with emergency
situations.
In addition to managing one’s feelings in
stressful situations, this is essentially how well
Coping &
10 people typically cope and function under
Endurance
pressure. This includes how effective they are in
dealing with anxiety-provoking situations.
Scale Definition
This is the ability to accurately look inward at

Self- oneself in order to better understand and accept
11
Awareness oneself, including one’s weaknesses as well as
one’s strengths.
In addition to controlling emotions and
maintaining self-composure, this is essentially
“the ability of people to control their emotions so
12 Self-Control they work for them and not against them.”
Moreover, it is the ability to effectively deal with
challenges while maintaining outward
composure with emergency situations.
In addition to being independent from others and
being able to think things out alone, make
decisions and act independently when needed,
this is essentially the capacity to think and act
13 Self-Reliance
independently rather than depending on others.
Moreover, it is the ability of people to act alone
when need be, even though they might be open
to receive input and suggestions from others.
Table 14.6 Bar-On Multifactor Measure of Performance Version 3 Scale Definitions

(14–18)
Scale Definition
In addition to expressing oneself openly,

clearly and boldly as well as being able to
confidently convey feelings, beliefs and ideas,
14` Decisiveness this is the ability of people to be assertive and
decisive as well as to set firm limits with
others when necessary but without being
aggressive or hostile.
Scale Definition
In addition to being able to overcome one’s

apprehensions and fears to act courageously,
this is the capability of individuals to protect,
stand up for and support others even when
15 Courage there might be negative consequences for
doing so. Additionally, it is the extent to which
people are even prepared to risk their life to
save another person’s life.
In addition to being aware of others, their
feelings and concerns which helps one interact
with people and become a more cooperative,
Social-
16 constructive and contributing team player, this
Awareness
is the ability to understand nonverbal
communication, to know how others feel and
to be attentive to their needs.
In addition to being able to connect with other
people and to establish and maintain mutually
satisfying interpersonal relationships, this is
17 Connectedness the capacity to establish and maintain good
relationships with others, get along with
friends and colleagues as well as to enjoy
social interactions in general.
In addition to living according to a set of
principles, values and beliefs which guide
one’s decisions and ability to do the right
thing, this is also the consistency of one’s
18 Responsibility moral integrity when one is with family
members, friends and/or colleagues.
Fundamentally, this is based on the ability to
understand the difference between right and
wrong and to act accordingly.
Table 14.7 Bar-On Multifactor Measure of Performance Version 3 Scale Definitions
(19–23)
Scale Definition
In addition to finding meaning in what one

does as well as being passionately involved in
Finding meaningful pursuits that benefit others in
19
Meaning addition to oneself, this scale assesses the ability
to live a meaningful and rewarding life as well
as to follow one’s calling.
In addition to being committed to one’s work
which builds on feeling passionate about what
one enjoys doing that enhances overall
motivational drive, this is the degree to which
20 Engagement
people feel positive about what they do or have
done and understand the positive impact it has
or might have on others.
In addition to being positive, optimistic and
energized in doing what one does, this is the
degree to which people are capable of
Self-
21 motivating themselves. This enhances their
Motivation
drive to get as much as they can out of what
they enjoy doing and energizes them to perform
on an even higher level.
In addition to being committed to decisions that
are made and goals that are set as well as being
determined to follow through with them, this
scale assesses how resolute people are in the
22 Determination
choices and decisions they make. This requires
the resolve to begin what they decide to do and
to move into “action mode” after decisions are
made.
Scale Definition
In addition to persevering and following

23 Perseverance through with a task until it is completed, this is
the drive to pursue goals in general.
Note: Definitions for each of the 23 scales in the Bar-On MMP3™ instrument (R. Bar-On,
personal communication, June 15, 2018).
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Module Three
Chapter 15
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Management
Derek Rowan
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-18
Lessons Repeated versus Lessons Learned

Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy’s paper—“Lessons we don’t learn: A study
of the lessons of disasters, why we repeat them, and how we can learn
them” starts off
On February 23, 2006, in a press conference to release the White House report on lessons learned
from Hurricane Katrina, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Frances Townsend said “[The president] demanded that we find out the lessons, that we learn
them and that we fix the problems, that we take every action to make sure America is safer,
stronger and better prepared.” The lessons Townsend called out in her briefing concerning
planning, resource management, evacuation, situational awareness, communications, and
coordination. No one in the emergency response community was surprised. We know these are
the problem areas. We knew they would be before Katrina ever hit the Gulf coast. Why? Because
we identify the same lessons again and again, incident after incident.
(Donahue & Tuohy, 2006)
As a first responder for almost 30 years and an instructor and exercise

designer for 35 years, I’ve certainly seen this phenomenon, and I’m sure you
have as well. In the spring and summer of 2020, my company was asked to
assist with the COVID-19 pandemic by:
Providing staff to several EOCs—a federal Incident Management Team

(IMT) and providing consulting to another federal agency;
Providing training on how to write proper real-world After-Action
Reports (AAR) to a third federal agency; and
Writing the COVID-19 response AAR for two smaller agencies.
The federal IMT requested “order” to their recently established multi-

agency federal response to the pandemic. I went in one week after they
established the IMT (under the Incident Command System [ICS] structure)
and observed for a day. After five minutes, it was obvious what the root
cause of the lack of order was. They had a planning section in name, but
they didn’t have the proper functions or staffing. To rectify this, I became
the Planning Section Chief and made several major structural
recommendations—which they adopted—while also providing structure and
systems. The first item was getting management to determine the IMT’s
mission. What was the actual mission? Although this seemed like a simple
and obvious task, it took almost a week to get the mission defined,
documented, a delegation of authority developed, and integrating the
mission requirements into a formal incident action planning process on
which objectives were based, etc. My next question was whether ICS was
the proper structure for this mission and authorities. This project’s short
answer was yes, but it was implemented because it was the only system they
knew existed, not because it was determined to be the best model through
analytical rigor.
However, in some of our other deployments, we found that there was no
defined mission in three other EOCs. In fact, in one EOC, not only was there
no well-defined mission, but their structure was based on their normal ICS-
like model because that’s the way they always do it. There was no analysis
of what the proper model should be because there was no defined mission.
Staff were going through motions of creating documents and reports that no
one will read and no one was using to make decisions! People were just
mindlessly creating the proverbial “TPS reports” like they did in the movie
Office Space because that’s what they had always done. As we observed
their operations, it was clear that these reports were not providing the
proper value to make any difference in the coordination of the response. One
of the main functions of any command or coordination structure is to turn
information into intelligence for decision-making. While we didn’t do any
formal analysis on that EOC structure (as we were not asked), it was likely
that the best structure for what they were trying to accomplish was more
closely aligned with the Incident Support Model (ISM) than the ICS-like
model they were using.
In another example is a private-sector EOC that was operated from
headquarters. The emergency management staff had always determined that
they would be a true EOC, allowing each local facility of the organization to
have the command role. However, in this COVID-19 response scenario, it
created a fractured, disorganized approach. We’ve seen similar results during
cyber incidents that may have functioned better under centralized command
and control instead of a decentralized approach in which an EOC wasn’t
really required.
This brings up the question, can an EOC change its structure based on the
incident? Should it? Can it function under a departmental, ICS/ICS-like,
ISM, or even be an incident or area command post?
None of the EOCs that we were involved with did any sort of incident
complexity analysis. The Coast Guard has a very simple-to-use ICS form
(ICS 239-CG) that allows them to determine an incident’s complexity. We
recommend that emergency management agencies use a similar approach
with incidents to determine the mission and perhaps even what the EOC
structure should be in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, or
recovery scenario.
All of these real-world responses mirror what we have seen during
exercises as well. My company has developed hundreds of exercises for all
government and private sectors both in the USA and, as of June 2020, 27
countries worldwide. We have amassed thousands of recommended
corrective actions written in the hundreds of After-Action Reports produced.
We recently did some analysis on this data, and it turns out that it just
underlined something we all already know; we never fix the root cause of
the issues. At least from our data and our experience of the six main
capability elements: plans, policies, procedures, organizational structure,
types, and numbers of personnel, equipment, training, and exercises. The
two most significant issues and corrective actions are the lack of adequate
procedures and the lack of training. Those two capability elements represent
double the number of the other capability element corrective actions we
have written combined. A plan per se isn’t the issue. Everyone has a plan,
but we continue to see how few organizations truly have adequate, or even
any, procedures to go with the plan and how fewer still effectively train staff
in those procedures.
Image 15.1 ICS 239-CG Incident Complexity Analysis
Source: U.S. Coast Guard Public Information 2020

Image 15.2 EOC Corrective Actions from Ascenttra AARs by Capability Element
Source: Image and Copyright Ascenttra 2019, Used with Permission
For those that have neither, which is the vast majority in our experience,
the result is obvious and predictable. For example, everyone knows the
situation unit is responsible for developing intelligence out of information.
However, we see repeatedly that very few EOCs or IMTs have the staffing,
procedures, or training to do that.
It should be noted that these data findings are the same, no matter the
type of organization or geographic location. In my travels, I have found an
interesting constant that all of us in emergency management, first response,
healthcare, military, and law enforcement throughout the world stumble
with the same basic issues.
When we’ve asked these questions regarding procedures and training
before an incident, we often get the same answer of “well, we know what to
do” or “we’ll figure it out.” As famously stated by others, hope is not a plan!
Why does emergency management often rely on gut feelings, emotions, and
opinions and ignore data? Remember, some of the best leaders are those that
lead with humility.
Organization Structures
There are multiple ways of establishing an EOC. The 2017 version of the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) lists three common ways—
the ICS/ICS-like structure, the Incident Support Model (ISM) structure, or
the departmental structure. NIMS also suggests that an EOC may direct
tactical operations if it makes sense (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2017, p. 35). In other words, EOCs can and likely should have
different roles and structures depending upon the circumstance. My
observation is that your community or organization’s specific model is not
as critical as a need to have adequate “overhead” staffing. The most
successful EOCs are those that have a defined mission, disciplined structure,
situational awareness, battle rhythm, processes, and adequate staffing for
those items. In other words, the best EOCs have nothing to do with the
agencies that are present. That may sound controversial, but it’s not the lack
of incident or agency subject matter expertise that is our issue, it’s the “glue”
that holds that EOCs together that are the issue. Suppose the majority of our
findings are from a lack of processes and lack of training. In that case, both
of those are mitigated by a small, professional, trained cadre of emergency
management staff that make the system of EOC coordination amongst
subject matter experts (e.g., agency representatives) run smoothly. Using the
ICS or the ISM vernacular, it’s the planning section! Planning is often the
most understaffed function. It sounds like a correlation, doesn’t it?
Many EOCs are organized under an ICS or ICS-like structure due to their
familiarity with personnel. This structure works well if the EOC takes on a
command role of some sort (such as in a snow emergency, cyber-attack, or
long-term recovery operations, etc.). In a traditional coordination mission,
this structure may or may not be the best structure. For example, suppose
the incident support requires a lot of resource ordering and information
development for senior leaders. In that case, this ICS model can be difficult
as resource requests are sometimes fielded by agency representatives in the
operations section using existing resources within an agency, procured
through the logistics section, and/or financial aspects tracked through the
finance section, all while trying to keep the planning section in the loop. In
that scenario, the ISM structure may be the better model as it combines
resource ordering into a single section and separates situational awareness
into an elevated general staff position. Regardless, your EOC must have
trained staff on how the various processes and structures work and ensure
that they are maintained for the right reasons throughout your response.
Battle Rhythm
Many of us have heard the term “battle rhythm,” but surprisingly, not all
EOCs function with a defined, disciplined planning process. Many of the
EOCs we have evaluated have some sort of “Planning P” diagram or other
incident action planning process, but many of those same EOCs do not
adhere to the schedule. This is a mistake. Having a well-defined, consistent,
and disciplined action planning process is crucial to any well-functioning
team’s success. The military dictionary defines battle rhythm as “A
deliberate, daily schedule of command, staff, and unit activities intended to
maximize the use of time and synchronize staff actions” (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2020, p. 25). This concept is well established within incident
command posts and is common in some EOCs. Still, during our experience
with the COVID-19 response, some of the EOCs that had established
rhythms did not perform them, started and then stopped later on, or did
them just to “check the box” without actually performing and realizing the
intended outcomes.
What are the ways to make them more effective? One of the key items is
to write down the mission and authority of the EOCs functions for that
response and refer to it each time you go through the planning cycle to
ensure that each performed task or function is aligned with your mission. I
advocate a poster-sized mission statement if you have a plotter in your EOC.
If not, have one printed at an office supply store. These generally run $25 for
full color (2 feet x 3 feet). You can even print your own and then make the
poster by “tiling” regular paper together. Adobe Acrobat (and Reader) can
easily do this in the print selections. Just set your program (such as
PowerPoint) up to a page size you want, save as a PDF, and print from
Adobe using the “tiling” options. Then you can tape multiple 8½” x 11” pages
together into a poster. My point isn’t to get into arts and crafts during a
response but to ensure your planning process includes verifying that the
response is aligned with your mission.
The second critical item is ensuring a useful document that tracks the
various meetings and deliverables and sticking to it. The Coast Guard uses
the ICS-230CG form to track the multiple meetings. Web EOC has a timer
function within it, as do other similar programs. Whoever functions within
your “planning section” should also be tracking time to ensure that everyone
is working in unity. Having a working clock that counts down the various
deliverables and meetings enforces efficiency and discipline.
The third item that I see that sounds counterintuitive is that often we need
more meetings. What I mean is we need more smaller-team-focused
meetings. The “standard” meetings in the “Planning P” or other similar
processes are sufficient. Still, I have seen time and time again where the
organizational elements of an EOC are not exchanging information with
each other. For example, within the “operations section” (or however your
EOC is structured) I’ve seen very often where they start to work
independently and do not share information within the section. This leads to
duplicating efforts or making countering decisions or providing different
answers. With more and more EOCs starting to work in a “virtual” format,
I’ve seen this trend become worse. Unless you’re used to working with
remote teams, managers often don’t include those remote or overtask the
ones in person. Managers/supervisors must “over-communicate” throughout
their structure and team.
Image 15.3 Ascenttra’s Battle Rhythm—“Real-time clock system is used for both
exercises and real-world incidents to ensure we stay on time”
But what’s the point? Simple. Tracking your EOCs mission over time and
ensuring that you are delivering the most value instead of just “TPS reports.”
One of the four primary functions of an EOC is situational awareness. Their
job is to gather information and intelligence. But sending large amounts of
data that doesn’t allow for prioritization and sequencing by decision-makers
unnecessarily complicates the process and devalues the information. The
relatively new FEMA Lifeline constructs were developed in part to ensure
that decision-makers could make accurate decisions at the right time, to
ensure that resources and other items would be sequenced appropriately and
not just properly prioritized. It’s just another tool for the people in your
EOC that must synthesize all this information, assuming, of course that you
even have the “situation unit” staffed. This is one of the areas that we see
missing in many EOCs.
The Myth of the Common Operating Picture

One of the main tasks of the EOC’s situational awareness function is to
develop the “common operating picture.” However, any of us in emergency
management know that this is really a myth; there is no way everyone can
see all the information. Jeremy Greenberg in FEMA says it this way:
We spend too much time trying to develop a single Common Operating Picture for everyone to
use. It’s like interoperability; we don’t want everyone talking to EVERYONE. As a corollary, not
everyone needs or should see the same thing. The critical part is ensuring people have a common
operating platform to exchange and view critical information and have a shared understanding of
operational priorities.
The main issues we see in many EOCs is that there is no standardized

reporting process, no standard data collection elements (or Essential
Elements of Information [EEI]), no “triggers” for reporting various items,
and no predefined analysis processes for information. Additionally, even if
there was, we find no or insufficient staff numbers to process and analyze
this information. Third, the mechanics of distributing the information is
challenging at the best of times and is even more difficult as catastrophic
incidents may operate in more austere environments. In the most simplified
terms, does your EOC have predefined processes? (or at least processes to
develop):
1. EEIs
2. Data schema for storing and relating EEIs
3. Trigger thresholds for reporting
4. How unknown or zero data is reported
5. Collection methodologies and sources
6. Data chunking and dependent analysis
7. Report types by need/staff level/leadership
8. Display of information
9. Distribution of information and reports
I’m not suggesting that you can’t have an effective EOC situational
awareness function without these items. Still, I am suggesting it makes the
process much faster, smoother, and the data more accessible for decision-
making. As the Planning Section Chief for a federal IMT during the COVID-
19 response, I had to create all of these items from scratch during the first
few weeks in order to get better data, and fight for staffing to get it done so
that senior decision-makers could have access to information and that the
rest of the team was properly informed. The IMT had no processes and no
tools. I had to use the only tools I had access to: Excel spreadsheets, an
online survey system for data collection, and the Adobe Connect platform
for display and distribution. I also had to develop the job action sheets and
procedures for the Planning Section so that the staff I could get knew what
to do. Did it work? Yes, but it could have been a lot faster and smoother had
these processes been determined before the incident.
EOC Technology
This brings up the next item, technology. Technology is not a solution to the
common operating platform. I’ve seen many vendors selling software that
will “create” your common operating picture. Many of these are either text-
based applications or mapping applications. Some of these programs even
advertise how they can help automate the Incident Action Planning Process
and take the “pain” out of ICS forms. For those that are properly trained, the
process of incident action planning is not difficult. Forms are just tools to
assist in the process and, when done properly, are not a burden at all. The
EOCs that we have seen complain about the process generally when they
don’t have proper procedures and training.
This thinking, though, sometimes creates an even larger problem, trying
to circumvent the process by purchasing technology. One of the items we
regularly see in exercises is when an EOC gets new technology, their true
communication level decreases. Sure, the chat room and message board are
filled up, but without someone parsing that data, fewer communications
result. The truth is, I’ve seen more effective EOCs with no technology than
EOCs with the best technology. While technology and systems are an
integral part, it is not a substitute for the trained staff that can truly turn
information into intelligence for priority sharing and decision-making across
the spectrum of responders and senior leaders. Using the ICS model as an
example, many of these issues can be mitigated by a well-staffed and trained
“planning section” of which keeps the process on target, keeps everyone on
time, and ensures that information is turned into intelligence for all those
who need it.
Training and Exercises

EOC training is an area that is consistently listed as an area for
improvement in the many After-Action Reports that we have authored.
Specifically, the agency representatives that make up the main staffing of an
EOC are experts in their field and their agencies—but often they are not
explicitly trained on what, how, why, and the methodologies for the EOC
functions—especially if the EOC has a flexible structure which is dependent
on the incident. Are operators trained on how to turn information into
intelligence and share it appropriately within the EOC? Do they know how
to ensure and build a better picture from the information from other EOCs,
assuming a larger-scale incident? Are they well versed in the cross-agency
coordination to develop resource sequencing and not just prioritization?
Does every position have a job action sheet (or equivalent) that outlines
what the representative should be doing based on the current EOC structure
and what phase they are in the incident? Do they know their role in the
various meetings and briefings and are clear on deliverables and timelines?
One of the major issues we see is a large percentage of EOC members who
cannot even log in to their computer systems when they arrive. The fact the
EOC hasn’t done computer software updates means the computers all must
go through lengthy security patches. When we see these kinds of
information technology issues, it’s generally true that the agency
representatives were not adequately trained on their job inside the EOC.
But let’s be honest; training is hard. I don’t mean hard in the sense of
conducting it, I mean hard to get EOC representatives to attend! Unless
you’re in an area where you can mandate training, it’s hard getting people
to want to attend. Some of the more successful approaches I have seen are a
blend that includes requirements for certain amounts of refresher training
(and the agency head agrees to provide time to members as a priority),
training that’s easy and fun, and most critically training that is desired by
the participants. Training should be based on data and real-world issues and
continuously updated for the participants. This is called Evidence-Based
Training or EBT. As consumers going through life, we require some of the
vendors we use to practice EBT. How many of us would want to go to a
doctor that did not keep up with what current data suggests for treatments?
We want our medical professionals to practice EBT. Our EOCs and the
training within those EOCs should also practice EBT and incorporate them
in a continuous cycle of improvement, not only in the development of the
content, but in the delivery of the content. Our training should continuously
adapt and be easy to consume for our members. We also recommend that
combining training and exercises in different delivery mediums are a far
more effective way of training our EOC members by ensuring that our
training is activity-based and not just didactic. There is evidence to suggest
that training doesn’t have to be in-person to be effective. In fact, according
to a study by Dr Ruth Colvin Clark, “evidence from hundreds of media
comparison studies shows that learning effectiveness does not depend on the
delivery medium, but rather reflects the best use of basic instructional
methods” (Clark, 2015). Instructional methods include items like practice,
feedback, visuals, repetition, and good design such as chunking and
sequencing.
One of the common errors we see in EOC training is including too much
information. Often training for EOC members is developed by the
Emergency Management Staff. There’s always the temptation to include just
a little extra nugget or a small set of bonus information. While it certainly is
going to be interesting, resist the urge. Only have training required to meet
the objectives (you did create training objectives, right?). We want the
students to remember and apply skills. In job-based training—less is more,
especially since having recurrent training will reinforce those skills and
allow the opportunity to add additional smaller chunks of information.
The aviation industry (which is a big proponent of EBT) also practices
required recurrent training across various subjects. They realize that many
skills are fungible and that the best methodology is to have a continuous
learning cycle. One of their tools is the Recurrent Training Matrix.
Besides the evidence on how our learners absorb information best, we
also need the evidence to support changes and updates to our curricula and
content. This is where each documented challenge in any real-world item
finds its way into updated procedures and training. Larger fire departments
are another example where lessons learned are captured and relatively
quickly integrated into procedures and training. The fire service also
collectively shares these with other peers. Many fire department training are
named from where they were learned (in some cases tragically). Names like
the “Denver drill” or the “Cincinnati drill” invoke not only the memory of
the tragedy where it occurred but provide a reminder to firefighters on the
importance of the particular procedure and are taught around the country
and even internationally.
Training Matrix
The aviation industry is also big on the concept of the training matrix. The
training matrix isn’t anything new, it’s common in general Program Of
Instruction (POI) documents that outline who should take what training and
when. You can also use a training matrix to assist in a gap analysis review of
existing skillsets for staff at different levels. While there are quite a few
different ways of creating and maintaining these, the use of a simple matrix
is one that we find helps EOCs track the training requirements of the various
staff from the different partner agencies. In doing so, one can assess and help
ensure a better and smoother-running EOC during incidents, especially
when our number of real-world EOC activations may be limited. In its
simplest form, the training matrix uses a spreadsheet setup with core skills
as the individual rows and the different EOC roles as the columns. The
intersection cell is whether that role should have that skill (or course) and
the frequency (if any) that recurrent training should be performed. Using
this method, the EOC can determine and track different courses or skills and
currency. People may often use different tabs in the spreadsheet to track the
individuals assigned to each role and their status with the various classes. It
becomes relatively simple to track (after each training class, for example)
and visually see the individuals’ training status and whether they are
“current” by whatever standards your organization has established. The goal
is to have an easy-to-use and easy-to-update sheet that outlines various core
competencies that different roles require. The idea is that the sheet can be
easily updated based on real-world incident response and lessons learned.
You can get as granular as you feel necessary in the development of this type
of tool. We typically define it by the EOC structure down to the group level
(unless there are specific specialized units), and by overall role—generally by
agency representatives that do not function in the EOC often, those that
support the EOC such as emergency management staff, and other staff that
fill “overhead” and EOC support functions, and leadership.
Energizing Your Exercises

Exercises are a fabulous way to enhance and evaluate readiness. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, sometimes our exercises do not result in
rapid changes to either procedures or training. If this rings true within your
organization, then raise your right hand and repeat after me: “I promise to
update my EOC procedures and training courseware after each exercise!” If
your EOC is, to use a sports team analogy, in a “rebuilding year” in terms of
your procedures and training, then promise to at least start developing them.
Starting small is fine; make progress. But I digress.
Developing exercises is easy, assuming you’ve completely written a
couple. Let’s start with the ubiquitous tabletop exercise (TTX). They are easy
to write but are generally pretty boring. Make them more exciting with
activities. Have people do something during the TTX by comparing results,
requests, documents, outcomes, decisions, etc. One of the easiest ways to
spruce up your TTXs is to add the movement of information from one group
to another. For example, scenario data can come into the agency rep table,
and they must synthesize it and develop a simple (paper-based) situational
summary. This is analogous to an ICS-209 form but should be whatever form
or method your EOC currently uses. The public information table then
receives that report and develops a press release or a webpage update or
talking points. Which then gets transferred to the senior leaders for
approval. Each table has a facilitator who asks questions during the activities
to probe deeper into decision-making, analysis, etc. In other words, have one
table feed information to another. You’ve probably been involved in these
kinds of TTXs, and they are much more enjoyable than your traditional
plenary “talking head” style. Another way to spice up your exercises and
uncover a variety of issues that you may not have seen, is to invite your
field responders and have them set up an incident table. There, requests for
resources can be sent to the EOC and requests for information can be sent to
the incident. When you add a tactical component to an EOC exercise, you
can identify issues such as the EOC trying to make tactical decisions, or
flaws in your resource ordering process, etc.
We do these kinds of exercises quite often, especially in other countries.
It’s like the old-school “tabletop towns” that had the buildings or small
vehicles that were moved around. I’m not a fan of those because they are
not specific, difficult to transport, and limited in scope. When we work
internationally, we also have a language barrier, so we need simplicity and
something that the partner nations can easily replicate on their own. Cue the
music … in come the colored stickers, maps, and binder clips. For the tactical
scenario, we print out a map of the area. Generally, we get it printed at an
office supply store as a poster 60” x 40” for $50. If you have a large-format
printer, you can do it yourself. If it’s a hazmat scenario, we’ll use some sort
of string or other visual representation of a spill or cloud. We’ll have a small
piece of paper for wind direction and velocity if required. We’ll place these
on a table or multiple tables if we have more than one (such as if we have
multiple floors for the layout of a large indoor venue). We will give the
players “tokens” that represent resources related to their jurisdiction and the
scenario. In a simple form, a small binder clip with a red sticker is a fire
suppression vehicle, a blue sticker represents law enforcement, orange
represents EMS, etc. The main reason we use binder clips is: 1) they seem to
be available in every country and location we teach in; 2) they are
inexpensive; 3) they can also “hold” things such as small pieces of paper that
represent victim cards, other resources or commodities (such as cases of
water), or whatever we are simulating in that scenario. We’ve also used the
“handles” of the clips in different orientations to represent different statuses
if required, although that’s rare. If your EOC would need multiple incidents
to represent your coordination functions accurately, just add a second (or
third) incident table.
Image 15.4 ARABIC 5—Simple Incident Scene “adjuncts to enhance your EOC
exercises by having near real-time interactions”
As the tactical people are now working the incident, the rest of the EOC
coordinates as required. Here, we recommend using some paper to
coordinate messages between the command post(s) and the EOC. We’ve
used portable radios, ICS 213s, telephones (setup in a closed system), and
various other items as determined by how complex we needed
communications to be. If the EOC orders resources, then you can easily add
extra binder clips to represent the resources requested and deliver them to
the appropriate table at the most realistic time. We use our facilitation staff
to deliver messages and resources as required. If you add hospital players,
you can have patients transported to hospitals as well. It’s super simple and
generally results in a better evaluation of procedures and interoperability
than a traditional TTX does. It becomes interesting when you include senior
leaders or a policy table. Sometimes the expectation of their role is different
than you think. Give it a try.
Synthetic Newscast for $100

As a rule, all of our exercises include some sort of synthetic news. Until the
term was politically popular, we used to tell our friends and family that we
create “fake news.” However, synthetic media better describes newscasts and
social media development to enhance and drive exercise play. We all know
that these two types of information exchange by the public drive
requirements and other items within our EOCs in the real world. Thus, you
need to include them in your exercises. It wasn’t long ago that creating
realistic newscasts was prohibitively expensive. Luckily, this is no longer the
case. For the last few years, I’ve been teaching a class on making your own
synthetic media newscasts for less than $100. It will take you a few hours to
learn some new techniques, but you will find that they are super easy and
effective for your exercises once you have these simple tricks down.
How can you do it so inexpensively? Well, frankly, your phone is a great
camera. What it lacks is better lighting and a microphone that is close to the
person talking. The addition of a $20 lavalier microphone will make a huge
difference in your videos’ quality. Add some “soft light” and boom—you’re
in business. You can achieve soft light by using some sort of diffusion
between the light source and the person on camera. The easiest way to do
that is a frosted shower curtain for $10 from a home improvement store. Yes,
really. Get in front of a nice background or use a $10 green cloth from a
fabric store, and you have an instant green screen. Editing software these
days can be obtained for free. A highly rated editing software called Davinci
Resolve that is used in real movies has a free version. If you have an iPad,
get the iMovie app. Implementing synthetic media in exercises is easy and
will elevate your exercises to a professional level.
Image 15.5 ARABIC 5—Ascenttra’s Media Production List
How to Put the “Fun” Back into Functional Exercises

I’ve always said when I teach exercise design that functional exercises are
the easiest exercises to write … poorly. Since there’s no tactical level play, it
would seem simple. That’s exactly why they can be challenging. The most
realistic functional exercises consider the additional detail for all of the
elements that must be simulated in order to have realistic data, ground
truth, messaging, and the ability to develop the answers to requests for
information. There are three common errors I often see in functional exercise
design.
1. Lack of proper ground truth data for all simulated entities allows
simulators to answer questions without conflict or unrealistic answers
properly. This typically results from inadequate planning and mapping
of the “play/sim line” that determines which simulated entities would
be mapped with all playing entities. It also is an outgrowth of
understaffed simulation.
2. Injects (simulated messages by non-playing entities sent to players) that
are not the “correct level.” An example would be the proverbial police
officer contacting the president. Unless you’re Jack Bauer, this is an
unrealistic communication and results in players sometimes pushing
back as well as largely not getting to the evaluation data you’re
examining. This problem often occurs because of the reuse of an older
exercise and without proper customization.
Image 15.6 ARABIC 6—Simulated media and graphics can help players
visualize what they are unable to see in real life during exercise
play
3. In larger exercises, we also see the issues of injects that come from
playing entities. This generally results from many individual planners,
all creating injects independently. This is typical in a large exercise such
as a federal or national level exercise or in smaller exercises where the
planners have “extra help.”
Ok, now that we know some of the things to watch out for, how can we
make it more interesting and fun? Easy—better simulation. Better exercise
and scenario simulation results in functional exercises that are more
realistic, easier to evaluate, and frankly—more fun. Having a robust
simulation cell (SimCell) that truly can realistically engage players almost
always makes the scenario seem more real. This allows players to be
immersed in their role in the scenario. This results in a much more enjoyable
exercise. While they may be very busy, and perhaps even a bit stressed
during the exercise, you will almost unanimously receive reports of it being
enjoyable. Why? People like training—when it’s realistic, relevant, and they
are learning something new or are practicing something they don’t do often.
Developing a good SimCell is generally more work than you think. It’s not
hard, but it does take work. The results are well worth it because players will
want to exercise more! Most exercise comments we have seen when the
exercise went well (note—that doesn’t mean it was easy) said “we need to do
this more often” or “we need more exercises like this one.” Here’s our tried
and true methodology for determining SimCell size, expertise, and structure.
1. Read the plans!

This is numbered one since this is the most critical item of any exercise
design. You must read and know the plans, policies, procedures related
to the agencies, organizations for the scenario.
2. Determine the extent of play and simulation required.
Extent of play refers to who is playing, with what equipment, and for
how long. Determining which entities are playing is important. In a
typical EOC, this would be your agency representatives, emergency
management, etc. But it’s critical actually to determine which agencies
are playing. Every agency that plays will need the data that they would
normally be able to receive from their agency. Some of them may have
special equipment that they would use in that scenario, and each of
those may be required to be tracked in the simulation. In instances
where a special database or communications system would be used,
you must have a plan to determine how to ensure that information
flows across that system. Each agency that is also playing likely
communicates with other agencies or organizations. Those
communication links need to be determined whether those agencies are
playing or not. If they aren’t playing, those agencies will also have to
be simulated.
3. Determine scenario impacts against exercise objectives.
Each scenario will have different impacts and different missions for
each agency. The key in this step is to overlay those items with the
specific objectives of your exercise. This will focus on the simulation
items that are most important and minimize the research (and time)
required for the simulation items that are not as critical.
4. Determine agency expertise required.
When you look at the above, you should see which agencies and
organizations need to be simulated and what tasks those simulated
entities would perform, know, or communicate in that scenario. This
provides a level of what expertise is required to properly simulate
communications to players or provide answers to players’ questions.
5. Develop initial structure.
Now that you have an idea of the agencies and expertise required, you
can create an overall structure for your SimCell. This structure is best
defined in “groups” to make it easier to manage. For example, will you
need a group for the simulated Unified Command Post? Or a group that
includes various entities for sheltering or for the private sector?
6. Overlay existing ground truth products.
Ground truth is the detailed scenario information of the actual impacts
of the scenario. For example, if the scenario was a tornado, what houses
are actually impacted, how many people are trapped inside, or injured?
The level of detail will depend upon your exercise. But one of the
common mistakes is insufficient detail. Having enough detail is
designed to ensure that players have answers to relevant questions
during the exercise. This allows them to play and, most importantly
prevents the scenario from impacting the evaluation. If detailed
answers are provided, you can more accurately evaluate responses. If
you are missing detail, the players must “make up” the information or
worse; they don’t make good decisions because of it. In that case, you
can’t accurately evaluate decision-making. The ground truth detail will
provide additional insight into expertise requirements.
7. Overlay existing injects, Expected Player Actions (ExPAs),
Requests for Information (RFIs), and simulated entity reporting
requirements.
Now examine how many injects have been developed, how many
player actions are expected to be communicated to the SimCell, how
many requests for information are expected, and how many simulated
entity reports will be required. Adding these numbers up will
determine the number of expected communications to and from the
SimCell.
Image 15.7 ARABIC 8—Sample spreadsheet pivot table that calculates the
simulators required based on the expertise needed for a given
scenario
8. Determine ad-hoc contingency requirements.

Add the number of expected ad-hoc contingencies injected. If you have
a detailed Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) this could be less than
10, but if you have a limited MSEL and are expecting to provide “active
simulation,” then this number can be much higher.
9. Add your staffing formula.
This is the formula to determine staffing based on the number of
expected events to and from the SimCell against the hours in the
exercise to determine the number of events expected per hour. Then
divide by the number of events a specific simulator can handle (we
have found that an experienced simulator can perform approximately
6–10 communications per hour in a busy SimCell). While this number
may seem low, I’m confident that it’s accurate on average. If you
disagree, let’s meet up for a beer to discuss! I’m buying!
10. Cross-check with simulator staffing availability.
You should now have simulator numbers for each required knowledge
expertise. You can now recruit!
11. Finalize simulation structure and numbers.
Now that you have the final numbers, you can finalize the structure.
While it seems like it’s extra work for your traditional functional exercise,
I promise that putting this extra effort towards a realistic simulation will
result in not only exercises that are more fun but have a better and more
actionable evaluation. After all, isn’t that the point?
Virtual Training and Exercises

After COVID-19, many have been looking to establish methodologies for
performing training and exercise remotely. While conference calls have been
around for years, virtual exercises are relatively new. We’ve been doing
virtual exercises for longer than the vogue crowd. We’ve learned a few
things that may be helpful.
First and foremost, you cannot just take your TTX PowerPoint and share
your screen on a conference call and assume a good virtual representation. It
just doesn’t work well. You must design your virtual exercise to have
activities conducted by small groups. In our experience, this is the only way
to have people interact on a conference call. We’ve found that the sweet spot
in online group conversations is no more than ten or so people in a breakout
group. Each breakout group should also have some sort of activity to
collaborate on or tasks to accomplish. This ensures participants are engaged
and participate, which means objectives can be evaluated.
Activity development needs a combination of good design and a platform
that allows breakout groups to have their own interactive area and talk with
their own group. Several platforms support breakout groups, but your design
must allow for specific interaction within that group. For example, one
group may need to manipulate a map for shelter locations, while another
group may need to review social media and develop talking points. Each
group will have its own requirements to address its objectives. Your
platform must support this individual group activity and conversation.
To make this seamless for participants, it requires more staff than you
may think. Virtual exercises typically require more staff than in-person
exercises (assuming they have interactive breakout sessions). Not to
mention, there is also an element of technical support that may be required
for participants. But, if they are well designed and properly staffed, virtual
exercises can be very useful.
After-Action Reporting
The key to a successful training and exercise plan is changing behavior from
lessons learned and identified improvement areas. In our experience, many
jurisdictions’ After-Action Reports (AARs) merely sit on shelves and are not
constructively utilized. In addition, sometimes, a number of areas for
improvement are removed from the AAR during the After-Action Meeting
due to the perception that the areas represent an unrealistic improvement or
an incomplete or incorrect observation. Typically, these problems stem from
misidentifying the root cause of the issue or creating an impractical
corrective action that does not take into account real-world conditions.
One solution is to ensure evaluators provide detailed After-Action Reports
that identify high impact issues and that all observations are backed up with
objective references on why that observation exists. You should always
provide objective data supporting the observation, not just an opinion.
The real issue is translating the AAR into actionable steps and tracking
the implementation progress. An effective cycle of improvement planning
must have the ability to constantly fold in improvements within the training
and exercise plan both now and in the future. It is difficult to watch an
exercise that is attempting to validate a capability that has not been fully
improved. This usually results in a waste of precious resources.
Exercise evaluation plans created during the planning phase should
ensure that they represent an integrated approach rather than a last-minute
improvisation. For exercises validating specific capabilities, planners should
ensure that players have adequate plans, equipment, personnel, and an
adequate organizational structure with appropriate roles and responsibilities
prior to the exercise that players have been trained. If one of the capability
elements is not fully developed, you will have obvious issues develop that
could have been prevented.
This will hopefully allow your EOC mission to improve and transition
from lessons repeated to lessons truly learned.
References
Clark, R.C. (2015). Evidence-Based Training Methods (2nd ed.). ATD Press.
Donahue, A., and Tuohy, R. (2006, July) Lessons we don’t learn: A study of
the lessons of disasters, why we repeat them, and how we can learn them.
Homeland Security Affairs Journal. Retrieved from:
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/167
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2017, October). National Incident
Management System (3rd ed.). Federal Emergency Management Agency.
U.S. Department of Defense (2020, June). DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Retrieved from:
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf
Chapter 16
Role of Interagency Liaison

Patrick J. Jessee
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-19
Role of Interagency Liaison

An emergency manager is presented with many unique challenges
throughout their career. New emergency managers may find the beginning
of their career daunting as they adapt to the position for which they trained.
This chapter will focus on best practices to develop into a multifaceted
emergency manager who understands the profession’s dynamics and
succeeds in his or her career. These lessons will be employed to establish
tactics and strategies that will build a foundation of best practices critical in
developing their career. Highlights of this chapter focus on:
Interpersonal communication skills

Understanding the needs and abilities of invested agencies
Professional development
Team development during operational deployments
Mental resilience during operational deployments
Decision-making.
People are attracted to emergency management and public safety for a
variety of reasons. Some are called to a career of service, wanting to help
others in their time of need. Some seek the excitement, thriving in the chaos
and uncertainty. Still, others enjoy the challenges of working in an
untraditional work environment; out of the office, engaging in issues as they
arise; heat or cold, day or night.
Regardless of the motives, all individuals in these fields possess one trait
which threads persistently throughout their career; the call to be a problem-
solver in whatever challenge arises. It is through this common character trait
that success can result in a person pursuing this career.
Frequently, we are the last problem-solvers. We are not able to pass the
responsibility to another person or agency. We facilitate the solution. We are
the ones who cannot say “no.” This commitment to the care of others in their
time of need is vital in today’s world.
Just like the emergencies to which we respond, a clear path for success is
not always known. A roadmap is not available that tells you, the new
emergency manager, how to succeed. Sometimes we stumble upon our
success, being at the right place at the right time. Sometimes we can see
progress in the future but are always moving towards it. Sometimes it may
feel like we are Sisyphus, constantly rolling the massive boulder up the hill
for all eternity. Through persistence, we will find that while the acts are
laborious, they are not futile. Fortune favors the prepared. Be an active
learner throughout your career. Seek out learning opportunities, both online
and in person. Most importantly, they never quit. People depend on you in
their time of need.
Professional development in academics, workshops, and online training;
formal education can prepare you for a career in emergency management.
However, some skills, like interpersonal communication, adaptability, or
compassion, cannot be learned in a classroom. They are personal
characteristics requiring development. While a clear path for success does
not exist, that is the same for everyone; certain traits can be honed and
developed to put you in the most advantageous position to achieve success.
Throughout this chapter, we will address different categories, summarized
as follows; categories that will give you a pathway to success as an
emergency manager.
Professional development
Interagency understanding
Relationships
Leadership.
In the following pages, we will introduce you to the variety of ways that
exist to enhance your understanding of emergency management. We will
also discuss how leadership can establish relationships and ultimately build
successful tactics to achieve success in emergency management.
Professional Development
What is the difference between a profession and a job? It is not dependent
upon professional licensure (doctor, lawyer, nurse, etc.). Rather, it is the
individual’s attitude doing the work, not the nature of the work. It is the
difference between how you answer the question, “What do you do?” If the
answer is “I work at,” it suggests that it is only what you do, something that
is being done to pay bills. If the answer is “I am a … ” it implies the person
views it as a profession, a calling, something that defines who s/he is. Being
an emergency manager requires this type of attitude; an attitude of a calling
and commitment to helping others in their time of need. To achieve this, a
commitment to education and professional development is required to build
the knowledge base upon which to succeed.
Keeping a sharp mind and staying current with laws, regulations, and
tactics are important for the emergency manager. So much of an emergency
manager’s role is preparing and planning for emergency incidents,
functioning in the mitigation and preparedness phase of the emergency
incident cycle. To accomplish this, the emergency manager must stay
engaged in learning and in teaching others. Through this engagement, the
emergency manager will learn ways to enhance his career, discover ways to
engage learners, and have a more satisfying career.
As the variety of personalities drawn to the career of emergency
management, there is an equal amount of diverse ways to develop. Among
these ways are various educational outlets, some of which may be more
suitable than others, depending upon one’s individual educational needs.
These choices may also be driven by where you currently are in your life
and what time and energy commitment is. They all can educate you and can
serve as the starting point to building your emergency management career.
Some of these outlets are more formal, requiring full-time enrollment,
while others are free of charge. Some require you to be currently employed
in public safety, while others may be completed before employment. Your
decision regarding which of these courses and programs may depend upon
your status within the emergency management field. Regardless of your
situation, however, attending various courses will help develop you
professionally in the emergency management field.
Image 16.1 Problem-Solving

Image 16.2 Sisyphus
Educational outlets discussed in this chapter include:
Formal education
Online education
Seminars
Conferences
Exercises.
Formal Education
Professional development arises out of formal education. Through formal
education, the emergency management practitioner can learn the history,
laws, skills, and tactics for their specific discipline. It is essential to have this
understanding of “how we got here.” It will save a lot of time and energy if
the history and process are understood before embarking on a career. It will
also teach you the stories of those that have laid the foundation for the
critical work that you must perform in your career. Dependent on your
career path and jurisdiction, you may find numerous ways to progress
through this.
At an early age, before formal engagement in emergency management, a
high school student may be curious about public safety and emergency
management. Types of “Explorer” programs may exist for some high school
students, which will allow the student to learn about emergency
management and public safety. These may be after school programs that
meet once or twice a week. They may be part of a school curriculum or
extracurricular programs.
These programs may meet once or twice a week for a part of a year or full
year, dependent upon the program. Additionally, some of these programs
may grant the high school student course credit for high school or college.
Others may also instruct the student in a skill set, like an emergency medical
technician, creating a career path even before graduating high school. While
this is not part of a formal foundation for emergency management, it is
important to know the different paths that may lead to this profession.
Information on these programs can be found online or through local school
districts.
Formal colleges and universities have established programs to pursue
these degrees. Associate degrees, offered at community colleges, offer a
quick, flexible solution to obtaining a formal education in a discipline. These
programs are frequently flexible and scheduled, so the student can attend
these programs as a part-time student. Individuals may need this type of
schedule because of family commitments, employment issues, or even
simply because they are not a strong student and need to take a smaller class
load to succeed in the academic environment.
Traditionally, degrees in emergency medical service, fire science, and law
enforcement have existed at the associate degree/community college level
for years. Many smaller departments cannot sustain their academy because
of cost or a low number of new hires. This has led to the development of
geographically focused academies for law enforcement and fire. These
programs frequently also have emergency management components in their
curriculum, growing organically out of these programs.
One of the major benefits of community colleges is the relatively low cost
compared to four-year universities. It allows a quicker entry into the
workforce for younger students of emergency management. It is also
beneficial for non-traditional students seeking to change their career paths
and work around their home or work schedules to obtain this education.
Some programs for law enforcement and fire science do exist at four-year
universities. Suppose you wish to focus on one of these disciplines. In that
case, this advanced degree will be fundamental in your professional
development in your chosen career and may help you achieve management
positions within police and fire.
Since 2001, many universities have been developing undergraduate and
graduate programs for homeland security and emergency management,
similar to law enforcement and fire science. These programs have evolved
over the past 20 years, growing in response to the threats that the public
perceives, whether natural or human-made.
This growth has been important for many reasons. It keeps the programs
relevant and fresh, up to date with the new focus, and what the emergency
manager will likely be involved with. It also progresses the profession
forward, preparing the practitioner with the right skills needed in today’s
world, not yesterday’s.
Online Education
Online education is another great source of education. While not as rigorous
or formal as a traditional brick and mortar education, it is quickly becoming
a larger part of the educational system. This increases access for those who
have different challenges in their personal life.
When pursuing online education, consider the source of the course. Most
agencies require the National Incident Management System (NIMS) course
completion, for example. NIMS was the foundation of emergency
management when President George W. Bush established it in November of
2013 in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Having a
foundational knowledge of programs will give the new emergency
management practitioner a knowledge base to build on.
Many NIMS courses are available online. These courses can be obtained
online at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Independent
Study (IS) (https://training.fema.gov/is/), free of charge. As of this
publication, 210 courses exist online in different disciplines, including
foundational emergency management, professional development, and
discipline-specific programs, including EMS, fire, hazardous materials, law
enforcement, and public works. Most of these courses can be completed in a
few hours and introduce students to common issues associated with the
different disciplines.
Certain courses are generally required for all individuals involved with an
emergency incident (police, fire, EMS, Public Works, municipal leadership,
emergency response workers, etc.). This is not limited to “boots on the
ground” individuals who actively mitigate the emergency. It also includes
supporting the mission, such as financial, logistical, or leadership roles. The
most common required courses available at FEMA Independent Study are
the following:
IS-100 Introduction to the incident command system

IS-200 Basic incident command system for initial response
IS-700 An introduction to the national incident management system
IS-800 National response framework, an introduction
Completing these courses early in your career, perhaps even before

beginning your career, can enable you to start incorporating the language,
expectations, and history of emergency management into your education
and career. All these things can enhance your career and provide for a more
enriching experience.
Another series that exists within the FEMA Independent Study program is
the Professional Development Series. This series was developed to begin
rounding out the student with specific fundamentals to develop a career. The
FEMA Independent Study courses that are currently required for the
Professional Development Series, as of this printing, include the following:
IS-120.c An introduction to exercises

IS-230.d Fundamentals of emergency management
IS-235.c Emergency planning
IS-240.b Leadership and influence
IS-241.b Decision making and problem solving
IS-242.b Effective communication
IS-244.b Developing and managing volunteers
These courses are excellent free courses that teach fundamental skills for
an emergency manager. They genuinely do establish some skills which are
indispensable for the emergency manager. Some states require these courses
as part of their emergency manager designation.
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (http://www.teex.org) is
another source that has excellent programs for various disciplines. Unlike
the courses available at FEMA Independent Study, some of these courses
have a cost associated with them. Additionally, some of these programs are
only available as an in-person option.
After completing some of these foundational courses or the Professional
Development Series, you may consider taking more task-specific courses.
These can be courses that are of personal interest to you, specific to a
position you are applying for, or necessary for a specialized project that has
been assigned to you. You may be assigned to a particular radiation
emergency drill or task force, work with public works to look at roads and
considerations, be interested in exercise development for a preparedness
drill, or be responsible for gathering information for grant applications. All
these subjects and more exist within the FEMA Independent Study courses.
Take personal initiative, engage your mind, and go perform beyond what is
minimally expected. This initiative will reward you with a more enriching
experience throughout your career as an emergency manager.
One of the great aspects of these quick, inexpensive online courses is the
ability to gather information on a plethora of topics. As an emergency
manager, you will be working with a variety of different agencies. Some of
these agencies will not be familiar to you. That is understandable as you
cannot be an expert in every subject involved in an emergency incident.
Law enforcement, public works, fire department, emergency medical
services, military assets, contractors, construction crews, and road crews are
only a small sampling of entities that have a vested interest in an emergency
incident, particularly a large-scale one such as a natural disaster. That does
not stop you from being proactive and educating yourself in these other
disciplines to be more efficient on the scene of an emergency incident and
understand how your work with them can be beneficial to all organizations.
These courses allow you to begin understanding other agencies’ tasks and
responsibilities during an emergency incident. This can help you know how
they can work together with emergency management to complete the
necessary tasks. A professor of mine from the graduate school described his
course as “hors d’oeuvre” for science, a small sampling of the topic so that
you can handle yourself in a cocktail party with some knowledge of the
subject but not be an expert. You can hear the terms, have a small
understanding of what they are, but not be an expert. That is ok. Use that as
a common ground to implement these organizations into your response
plan.
Another activity commonplace in larger cities for emergency
preparedness is Civilian Emergency Response Teams (CERT). These
programs take civilians, who have other professions, and place them into a
volunteer organization that receives minimal training to aid in a local
disaster. While limited because of their volunteer status, these organizations
present a unique opportunity to bring diverse backgrounds into an
emergency incident.
Image 16.3 CERT Logo
Source: Image FEMA-CERT Logo
As an emergency manager, consider attending these programs to learn

about their capabilities, limitations, and understanding of the benefits they
bring to a disaster. Understanding this asset will help you prepare how to
utilize their abilities in an incident. You may find that these CERT Teams
have assets that can benefit the response in additional ways because of the
diverse background that makes up the team.
Seminars
Seminars allow a quick, focused course to address specific topics. They may
be a few hours or a few days long. Typically, these draw people together
who have a similar interest in a precise topic. This is an excellent
opportunity to network and engage others about the subject of discussion.
Use this opportunity to gather insights from other agencies and
perspectives you may not have access to previously.
Conferences
Like seminars, conferences create an opportunity to focus on particular
disciplines of interest to the emergency manager. These conferences may
grant specific topics, tactics, equipment, exhibitors, and training that would
not be available without attending. Networking events throughout these
events create another great benefit that cannot be as easily established in
courses or virtual environments.
Depending upon certifications or licensure levels that are possessed by an
emergency manager, conferences may provide continuing education units
for recertification of these licensures. It should be expected that an
emergency manager, once obtaining a level of certification, maintains all
educational levels obtained. You never know what you will need at any
point in your career.
Exercises
Exercises are another great way to gain experience that is as close to real-
world events as possible. If you find yourself involved with exercises, rotate
the positions, work in different areas that you are not accustomed to.
Consider changing roles to gather perspectives that you otherwise would not
have had. It is a great way to try things without a risk of failure as in
exercises; there are mentors and shadows to aid you in your position.
Do not limit your position to only be in specific leadership roles. Work
within different branches and at different levels. When you do this, you will
begin to see how the event’s totality and the process integrate with other
positions. Consider functioning as a role player as well. In this role, you can
experience the entire process and discover opportunities for improvement
that you may not have previously been able to see from a 10,000-foot
perspective.
Once you have gained some experience in exercises, change your
perspective again by being an exercise evaluator. In this position, you can
see the organization’s expectations and how it is designed to perform. You
can learn how the plans are developed, implemented, and executed. You
may begin to see challenges from this perspective that you would have
missed if you had not viewed them from this perspective.
Personal Development
While professional development can be measured and applied to positions,
personal development is equally important to grow as a leader. What does it
take to be a good emergency manager? Education is important, but other
personality traits are important. There is no one answer to that question.
While certain characteristics are favorable for a successful emergency
manager, there is no one description that fits the bill. It is important for the
emergency manager to be committed to the field and continuously pursue
personal development throughout your career, as you also do for
professional development. Without this, it is easy to fall into complacency
and routines. Challenge yourself! Expand your limitations, learn what you
are capable of. Look beyond where you are and see what else is out there for
you to conquer. Through this process, you will find that you can achieve
more than you thought was possible, both physically and mentally. Each of
us is capable of doing more than we thought was possible.
Personal development is driven from within you. Do you wish to be
assertive and be ready for when opportunities arise? Do you wish to be
prepared for any incident in which you find yourself involved in? Only by
continuously reassessing and preparing yourself for the challenges will you
see development. Don’t be afraid to reach beyond what is easily accessible.
Ask the difficult questions, ask for more to do. Become hungry for
knowledge and challenges.
In personal development, you may find that some of the tactics discussed
below don’t work for you the first time through. Different tactics will
produce different results, depending upon where you are in your career.
Consider this as you move forward. Don’t get frustrated if it doesn’t work
the first time. It may not be the right time for that tactic! Improvise, adapt,
overcome!
Building Bridges
Working with other agencies during an emergency begins much earlier than
when the incident happens. Understanding what their needs are during an
incident and how it can be mutually beneficial to complete the mission is
essential. Suppose you are just learning people’s names the first time you
meet in an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). In that case, you will have
limited success compared to working relationships before the event. When
developing partnerships, there are many factors to consider when
establishing these working relationships. This is true for both small-scale
and large-scale incidents. The emergency manager should not isolate himself
from the other agencies and build relationships together.
Build strong relationships between people, not just organizations. Interact
with individuals in other organizations on a personal level, not only
professionally. Learn about them as people. Learn about their commitment
to the organization. Doing this will give you intellectual intelligence and
understand what motivates them and the core values. If you approach a
person only when you need something, it will harm your ability to navigate
the bureaucracies during an incident successfully. It will also appear that
you have not genuinely considered them or their needs.
Speaking of bureaucracies, it is crucial to address them as an emergency
manager. You will be part of a bureaucracy. It is necessary. The political,
financial, and personnel backing is required to get the job done. You must
understand the bureaucracy and politics that you will be interacting with to
be successful. Understand that bureaucracies are slow to respond and have a
long reflex time to make things happen as you move through layers of
approvals and checks and balances to move a project forward. Plan and be
ready to enact projects before you need them. Work with the bureaucracy to
help them understand your job and how you need their support to be
prepared for the citizens.
Many organizations within the bureaucracy can support different
functions within emergency incidents. Having a foundational understanding
of the needs of the other organizations is critical for success. When building
these relationships, consider several factors that can help build these bridges.
Are there agreements, tasks, or objectives that can be completed during the
Preparedness stage, which will have massive gains during a Response or
Recovery phase? Can you plan events, exercises, tabletops, or meetings that
can bring people together before an event to establish a mutual
understanding of how important it is for everyone to work together?
Completing this before an incident is important, rather than after an
incident has already occurred. A term frequently used in military circles is
“Left of Bang/Right of Bang.” This saying arises from an active encounter
with the enemy on a timeline: Left of bang are planning, training, and
preparedness. Bang is the actual encounter. Right of Bang is the downstream
effects of the contact with the enemy; injuries, tactics employed to defeat
them, and solution to the problem after it has unfolded.
Translating this concept into emergency preparedness, we can easily see
parallels. Left of Bang is the Mitigation (actions are taken to reduce the
cause, impact, or damage from disasters) and Preparedness (planning,
training, and education cannot be mitigated) phases. These phases are where
most emergency managers spend their time, planning for the unplannable,
and developing answers to questions that have yet to be answered. Many
contingencies can be developed during these phases, which show a forward-
thinking emergency manager who has the organization he works for and the
people it provides for in his best interest.
Bang is the actual incident. This could be a known, expected event
(seasonal flooding, large festivals, etc.) or an unanticipated event (hurricane,
earthquake, protests/civil unrest, etc.). Each of these challenges an
emergency manager; some are similar; others are unique to the type.
Consider both the small scales and large scales of each of these events. Be
like a Hollywood scriptwriter. Think of the unthinkable. Start with a
probable but be able to develop for the improbable. Frequently, emergency
managers will develop plans for events that are siloed (separate from others).
While this modularity is good, understand the challenges that occur as it
develops and interacts with other disasters. For example, consider a flood.
You may easily plan for the flooding of a river. Evacuation paths,
sandbagging areas, etc. Now, how do you plan for a leaking fuel truck?
Equipment, access, hazmat recovery. Very simple solutions. Combine the
two? How do you plan for a leaking fuel truck in an area that is flooded? It
quickly becomes more dynamic and difficult to resolve. Consider these
planning activities by mixing event scenarios as you plan for the “Bang”.
Right of bang is the Response (immediate aftermath) and Recovery (return
to normal) phases. During the response phase, you will find that the events
may be frantic and rapid, extremely dynamic as the event progresses. Just
keep rolling with it. You will hit a point where you feel like you have your
arms around it. This is a good sign. Keep up with it.
The recovery phase is now the point where you can begin to analyze the
actions taken during the response phase. Were the actions the best that could
be obtained? Are resources mobilized still needed? This phase is where you
can start looking at demobilization, establishing routine work periods,
specific tasks to accomplish in a timeframe. During this time, you are
working to return to pre-incident conditions as much as possible.
This “left of bang/right of bang” analysis is a straightforward and simple
comparison for emergency management.
How can your organization help the other organizations achieve their
mission success?
When working with other organizations, consider how they view your
organization. Is your organization viewed as a welcome ally and an asset?
How can their organization help you achieve your goals?

What benefits arise out of helping each other?
What does success look like?
Field Leadership
Throughout emergency management, you will find that you work with a
variety of different types of people. Some will require little direction; others
will need explicit instructions on every minute task they are assigned. As
you progress through your career, your responsibilities will grow as your
position evolves. You may never receive a formal higher rank or promotion;
you may never receive a promotion but have more experience and be more
senior, therefore be looked to as a mentor for the new additions to your
organization. Consider all these aspects as you move throughout and
understand that your leadership will evolve.
Different leadership styles are needed at other times, depending upon the
criticality of the issue. In emergency management you can use a variety of
different styles to communicate effectively.
There are three components of communication. This is regardless of the
means of communication. They are:
1. Sender: The person who has formulated the statement.

2. Message: The actual component of communication.
3. Receiver: The person who receives the statement.
Understanding each of these portions is important in discussing field

leadership as communication is essential to effective leadership during an
emergency incident.
Sender
The sender (you in this example of field leadership) needs to understand
what message is being conveyed. It should be conveyed with confidence,
urgency, and deliberately. Take a moment to think about what you need to
say before speaking, especially during a time of chaos. This moment of
reflection before speaking can significantly impact the operation and have
downstream effects. Calm breeds calm. Use a measured tone, a confident
voice, hold eye contact (if applicable) when communicating the message.
Message
Consider the context of the message when you send it. You may have a clear
understanding of what you want to say but will the receiver? Is it possible
that the receiver will interpret the statement a different way? Can you use
the same terms interchangeably with other agencies? This was one of the
key points that was established in NIMS with the removal of the “10 Codes”
(“10–4” for example). The government realized the need to establish a
common language so that agencies from different disciplines or geographical
locations could work seamlessly at an emergency incident.
Take, for example, the term “ENDEX.” In many exercise developments,
public safety, or in the military, the term “ENDEX” is a truncation of the
phrase “End Exercise”, meaning that the exercise that was previously being
conducted is now concluded. Now, imagine the different ways that
“ENDEX” could be heard and understood by someone not familiar with the
term. It could simply be heard as “index” which could confuse others
involved in the process.
Craft your message carefully. Provide enough information to get your
point across but not too much to bog down your audience. Be sure that
enough information is given to get the desired result. This is a delicate
balance which you will get better at with experience. One simple example
that occurred to me in the firehouse was when a fellow firefighter told me to
“set up the grill” for lunch. I did what I thought was what was asked for. I
pulled the gas grill out from its storage space, hooked up the gas line into the
grill, opened the lid, scraped the grates so that they were clean. A pretty
good job of “setting up the grill”. Now, when he came to bring the chicken to
the grill, he found a “set up grill”. However, it was missing one key thing
that he was expecting … heat! I had not turned the grill on, so in his eyes, it
was a complete failure. In my eyes, it was a flawless success! So, when
giving directions to your team, consider the different ways they can
misconstrue your words and be certain that you get your message across.
Receiver
The receiver is the person that the message is intended for. The receiver
needs to actively engage in receiving the message to understand the context
and direction that is being conveyed. Without this, the message will be lost
within a few minutes. This is especially important in emergency
management as the incident dynamics can have things changing every few
minutes as the incident progresses. The receiver needs to have a clear mind,
keeping distracting thoughts out of his mind so that he can truly “hear”
what is being said. Focus on the words as you hear them and visualize the
outcome of the message.
Just like the sender, the receiver should also consider the context of the
message. Understand the sender’s discipline and consider what they are
likely to mean compared to what you think it means.
Closed Loop Communications

A good way to ensure that you have good communications and that your
message is understood is closed-loop communications. In closed-loop
communications, the message is repeated by the receiver verbatim to the
sender. This ensures that the receiver’s heard message is the actual message
sent by the sender. This type of communication is used with high efficiency
in the airline industry and the space program, where a single
misunderstanding can have catastrophic effects.
The benefits of using closed-loop communications is that it clearly can be
verified that the information sent is also the information received. Both the
sender and receiver hear and speak the information, a further opportunity to
verify the message being sent. Obviously, in high-risk situations, this type of
communication is essential to prevent failures.
Closed-loop communications do have drawbacks. It requires discipline to
use this for both the sender and the receiver regularly. It needs to be part of
a culture and a system that is used by all involved. If the sender or receiver
does not do this, it will be lost and result in frustration. It is also an
awkward communication style for face-to-face communication as so much
of our culture is used to responding to directions with an “ok.” Closed-loop
communications feel more natural over a radio transmission than a face-to-
face exchange. Additionally, closed-loop communications can be slow and
use a lot of airtime over a communications network.
Start with Why
In Simon Sinek’s book, Start with Why, Sinek highlights the strategy that
you can get more buy-in from those following the orders if you start with
why. Consider this scenario; you have flooding that is occurring near a
riverbank. Right now, you don’t have any major concerns because this space
has flooded before. However, you are aware that a few blocks away, an
elementary school is probably going to flood based on your weather reports.
You begin operating your teams to sandbag the area around the school by
simply stating, “Go sandbag the school.” Your teams may not understand
why you are focusing on this. They may believe that the flooding is expected
to crest before it is anywhere near the school. This can cause doubt and a
delay in response to the direction.
Conversely, if you start with why, you can immediately get more buy-in
from the team. “The information on the weather suggests that the river is
not going to crest for another week. I believe the school is going to be hit, so
go sandbag the school.” Obviously, a lot longer, but overall, the team has a
better understanding of the objectives and how they can complete the task
to fulfill the objectives without the doubt presented in the previous example.
This shift in leadership is difficult to integrate into an existing style, but it
can be completed if you keep analyzing and readdressing your style.
Awareness of your approach can help you become a better leader by
incorporating this process.
Operational Paralysis
Within the context of emergency management, there may exist a time that
you are afraid to decide a plan because of not knowing the outcomes. This is
a natural human instinct, especially for an analytical thinker who wants to
gather all the information possible, weigh the outcomes, and determine the
best cause of action. We are constantly gathering and processing
information from other agencies throughout an operation, those who are in
a Fusion Center, Emergency Operations Center, or Command Post. Radio
communication is coming in on multiple frequencies. Media outlets and
social media are constantly feeding information to us. The abundance of
information can make it difficult to decide when to commit to an action.
Meanwhile, as an emergency planner, you need to sift through the mental
noise and find the relevant information to your plans.
Avoid operational paralysis as much as possible. This occurs when you are
simply afraid to decide. Operational paralysis can derail a whole program
and can cause an operation to stagnate. Objectives are not met. Timeframes
are not obtained. The whole event can bog down. It is not uncommon for
this to happen, especially as you continue through a sustained operation.
Decide what actions will move your objectives forward.
General George S. Patton, the famous U.S. Army General who led the U.S.
Third Army in France and Germany after Normandy’s invasion, stated, “A
good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week.”
While emergency operations do not necessarily have a “violence”
component, the message still holds true. Once you have enough information,
act on it! Get the process moving forward again.
If you look at the totality of the event, you may become overwhelmed
with the incident’s scope. Consider the saying, “How do you eat an
elephant? One bite at a time.” Create small objectives along the path that can
be measured and met. Perhaps within a single operational period, perhaps it
is removing a certain number of patients, establishing a logistical support
line, completing a small task. Those tasks will add up, and you will start
seeing success—an important aspect for the emergency manager, leadership,
and the teams conducting the work. The workers will also see the
accomplishments they have achieved through their hard work and get more
buy-in for the program.
Lead from the Middle

Consider the entirety of the program that you are managing as a leader.
Visually picture this on a line with the leadership at one end of the line and
the “boots on the ground” workers on the other side. This linear path
illustrates the whole organization working during the emergency incident
and the various positions and management levels.
Functioning from the front with the workers provides a great perspective
on their physical space. You learn the intricacies of their experience and
understand their needs. You see the challenges as they face them, in real-
time. However, when leadership needs you, you have to move through their
space, physically back to where leadership is, perhaps an off-site Emergency
Operations Center (EOC). This takes time to move between the two spaces,
and you lose reaction time and perspective as you move back to leadership.
Conversely, if you are back in leadership on that same line, you do not see
what the boots on the ground are working through and lose perspective. The
tasks of the teams may be unachievable because of the challenges that you
are aware of. Your leadership is delayed as it works its way through the
chain of command to execute the mission as you order.
Now, if you are in the middle, you have a much quicker reflex. Movement
from the middle can be quickly back to the leadership or the front as needed.
This allows you a perspective from both sides and an understanding of how
the whole incident is unfolding. This can make you an extremely effective
leader.
In practice, this example is used to illustrate the principle of movement
between the spaces. Do not spend all your time locked up in the EOC or
down in the mud with the people doing the searches, rescues, or other tasks.
Move between the spaces and understand how the directions are being
executed. You can then make quicker changes at all levels, which will make
the entire process work more efficiently.
Leadership Pyramid
Frequently, organizational leadership is seen as a pyramid with the “leader”
at the top. This visual illustrates that orders and directions move through
each management level from the top down to affect the desired result. While
this is a traditional viewpoint, I believe that it is incorrect.
Instead, consider inverting that pyramid and putting the “leader” on the
bottom. This visual can illustrate a few important concepts. First, it
demonstrates that the leader is responsible for providing support for the
organization’s entirety, delivering directions, supplies, and support to
complete the mission. It also illustrates the ultimate responsibility for the
success or failure of the program lies with the leader. He does not get to say
that the program or mission failed because of the orders’ execution. It was
his vision and direction which moved the program forward throughout the
entirety of the incident. This paradigm shift can be disturbing for some but I
believe it is more of an accurate description of what leadership should be
responsible for during an emergency incident.
Mental Resilience During Emergency Operations

As an emergency manager, you may find yourself involved in operations
that may last as short as a few minutes or as long as years. You may
experience sensations, see images, or be overwhelmed by the gravity of the
situation. Moments of levity, humor, or happiness can occur throughout
these events. Sights, smells, and sensations will become part of the
experience and seared into your memory. These emotions are natural, and
people can all have different reactions to the stimuli they experience
throughout an event. Not everyone will respond the same.
Be aware that the impact of the events and experiences you witness
through your career can have a cumulative toll on your psyche. Each event
adds to the burden that you will carry through your life. Some will be
positive, filling you with fond memories. Other ones may be negative,
troubling you with images and questioning decisions that were made. Both
of these are important for you to experience healthily. They mold and shape
you as both a person and a responder, building kindness, compassion,
insight, and knowledge.
The positive memories will drive your career with sound judgment,
references to make good decisions for the workers’ safety, and the public.
They will give you more “tools” for your “toolbox,” giving you experiences
to draw upon. They will direct you to probable outcomes, other resources
that can help resolve the issue or actions that can save lives. These memories
and experiences must remain with you throughout your career. It will build
a strong foundation for good decisions and success. These are important as
you build your “toolbox” and fill it with ideas, solutions, and connections to
resolve incidents. The longer you are involved in emergency management,
the more references to solutions you will have, and the more confidence in
your decision you will gain.
However, some experiences can be dramatic and have a major impact on
your mental condition. The erratic work hours, disrupted sleep cycles, and
time away from family and friends can all cause mental stressors on even
the strongest minded individuals. Traumatic events, including death, may be
seen regularly depending upon the position. These can have a serious impact
on your mental health, either as a young practitioner who has not built up
coping mechanisms or as an experienced emergency manager that has
become overwhelmed with the totality of his career.
This does not make you weak. It does not make you incapable of work in
emergency management. It simply means you are human and need time to
decompress and process the experience of the event. Different people have
different capacities for what they experience. What impacts others may not
impact you; conversely, they could also impact you while others have little
to no impact. Neither is wrong, and the emergency manager needs to
develop healthy methods of resolving these incidents.
Sometimes, talking to others who have been through something similar or
who have a shared experience can be a way to work through the events.
Being with a fellow responder who has been through the incident with you,
or with a trusted friend who understands you and what makes you function,
can bring things into perspective. This casual conversation may be enough
to work through the events and make sense of things.
However, you may find that the incident’s compounding effects may
require speaking to a professional about the incident. Consider that the other
workers of the incident may also have a similar experience. Critical Incident
Stress Debriefing (CISD) has been continuously integrating into emergency
responses. There may exist a need to provide this for all involved, not just
law enforcement and fire. You may need it for the contractors who are there
or the CERT Team working alongside you.
A group professional CISD may not work for you, and you may find that
you will need to see professional mental health providers outside of the
workplace. These providers have been trained to help you work through
your issues with your involvement. It is entirely acceptable to seek that type
of help. It may take a few sessions with them to gain perspective, or it may
take longer. You deserve the peace of mind and happiness and should not
have to suffer unduly for what you are involved with as an emergency
responder.
How can you plan for the unthinkable so that you are mentally prepared?
Are there ways to prepare yourself before an incident occurs or during the
incident so that the event can have less impact on you? There are numerous
ways to build mental resilience, which can help provide you with the ability
to cope throughout your career as an emergency manager.
We are all mentally wired differently. Some of the tactics that I have
employed throughout my career are listed below. They may work for you,
they may not. Use these as suggestions for ways to make yourself mentally
healthy during emergency operations.
Take Time for Yourself

You are not selfish if you step back from the event and need time for
yourself. Throughout each operational period, it takes half an hour or an
hour to be alone. Step away from others, walk around away from your area
of work or the command post. Take this time to decompress and consider
what you have accomplished. Do not focus on what is still to be done. Look
at where you started and what you have achieved. Focus on the positive
issues and the good work that you are doing. Do not dwell on what you
have not done.
Perhaps during this time, you may find something that relaxes you.
Looking at the sky or some water feature, listening to the sounds of the
water on the rocks or as it cascades over a waterfall while you unwind.
Maybe listening to music will soothe you and relax you a bit, providing a
distraction from the noise around you. Perhaps religion and considering
scripture will give you a moment of peace during these hectic times. Others
may find meditation, focusing on breathing and clearing their mind. All of
these are positive ways to refocus during an emergency incident.
Disconnect from Electronics

Get your face out of your phone! We have evolved into a very electronically
connected society. Information is coming at us as fast as we can swipe our
phones, tablets, or computers. It takes mental energy and concentration to
sort through all that information. So much information is available at every
moment, especially during emergency incidents (the larger the incident, the
more information is available). To decipher the information and sort out the
signal from the noise simply is not what you should be doing during those
few moments; you are away from managing the incident. Take those
moments to find peace, not analyze the event!
Exercise and Nutrition

While they previously may have been doing the “heavy lifting,” emergency
managers are generally found in a more cerebral engagement, developing
actions, plans, tactics, and managing personnel. Over an operational period,
this can be extremely tiring on the body and create chronic aches, pains, and
fatigue that are very different from physical labor.
Make time to exercise and elevate your heart rate. Exercise releases
hormones that can help alleviate your mood, help with sleeplessness,
depression, and other mood disorders that you may experience during
emergency operations. It will also help address those aches and pains that
develop from your sitting or standing for long periods. This is important for
your overall health, especially through sustained operations. Develop a
pattern to create as much consistency as you can during an inconsistent
time.
What you eat and drink is also essential throughout an emergency
incident. Take time away from your responsibilities to eat an actual meal,
instead of sustaining on coffee and candy bars! Make sure that you eat
enough protein, vegetables, and carbohydrates. Pay attention to how your
body responds to various foods. Avoid the quick fixes that will hurt your
body. I have been the victim of this many times as quick food fixes and lots
of coffee have carried me through long operational periods.
A Fulfilling Career
Being involved in emergency management and public safety can be a calling
that is fulfilling for the dedicated practitioner. Work to evolve as an
emergency manager that is working to be prepared for any incident. Never
lose sight of who you are doing it for, the people your organization
represents, whether it be a municipality or a private organization. You have
been entrusted with a great responsibility to help those during their time of
need. Be responsible with that authority and work to serve them as best as
you can.
By doing this, you will find that your career will be rewarding in many
ways. Take time throughout your career to look at where you started and
how you got to where you are now. Provide mentorship to the next
generation and help them achieve success. We are only as strong as the
weakest person on the team. Work to build the knowledge, skills, and
abilities that you need to succeed in the world of emergency management.
All of this is within your grasp!
Chapter 17
Emergency Management and Public

Health Collaboration
Rick C. Mathews and J. Howard Murphy
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-20
Introduction
The Cambridge Dictionary defines collaboration as “the situation of two or
more people working together to create or achieve the same thing”
(Cambridge, 2020). Given that definition, this chapter’s title suggests a
condition or set of circumstances whereby emergency management and
public health personnel and organizations are working together to achieve
the same thing. The two sides of this collaboration effort are “emergency
management” and “public health.” In 2007, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) defined emergency management as “the
managerial function charged with creating the framework within which
communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters”
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007). The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) defines public health as “the science and art
of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting health through the
organized efforts and informed choices of society, organizations, public and
private communities, and individuals” (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2014). In so doing, the CDC adopted the definition as created by
Charles-Edward A. Winslow in 1920. Winslow has been credited with
establishing the Department of Public Health at Yale University.
At first blush, it would appear the two sides of the collaboration have
little in common, at least in terms of their respective definitions. On closer
examination, both include the reduction of vulnerabilities. The definition of
emergency management states such explicitly, while the definition of public
health consists of the phrase “preventing disease,” which is similar in
meaning. Frankly, on the surface, there is not a lot of common ground
between the two. This chapter intends to explore the collaboration or
potential collaboration between these two fields, particularly concerning the
emergency operations center (EOC).
Most readers of this text will likely range somewhere between “being
familiar with” to “expert” in the EOC operations. Most of this book deals
specifically with or at least relates to the design, staffing, and emergency
management functions occurring within EOCs. It is equally likely that many
readers of this text will be somewhat to significantly less familiar with EOCs
centered on public health. In the literature and practice, there are ample
examples or descriptions of the public health EOC model. To that end, most
of the examples discovered in the literature were at federal, state, or large-
city levels. An online search focusing on identifying public health-centered
EOCs resulted in many such identifications, with almost all operated by
federal and state governments, large cities, and relatively large counties.
There were several multi-county EOCs. Only one reference to a small
community health department EOC operation surfaced, although it is
conceivable there are more in that category. Most references to local health
department EOC operations related to emergency management partnered
situations.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Emergency

Management Operations
One way to develop a practical perspective on disasters and emergencies
from the public health perspective is to examine a dedicated public health
EOC’s functional organization. The starting model for this examination is
the CDC Emergency Operations Center. The Center for Preparedness and
Response’s Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) manages the EOC. In
describing the EOC, CDC states, “An EOC brings together highly trained
experts and state-of-the-art technology to coordinate resources, information,
and crisis and emergency risk communication” (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2020). To date (between 2001 and 2020), the EOC has
responded to more than 60 public health threats and disasters, foodborne
diseases, environmental emergencies, and disease outbreaks, including
COVID-19, and planned special events (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2020). In broad strokes, the EOC deploys scientific experts,
coordinates the delivery of supplies and equipment to incident sites,
monitors response activities, and provides resources to state and local public
health departments.
The CDC staffs its EOC on a 24/7 basis, 365 days a year. The facility is
24,000 square feet in size and can accommodate 230 people. Reports of
potential health threats reach the CDC via its EOC, and its Joint Information
Center (JIC) coordinates risk communication strategies used to develop
subsequent risk communications. CDC manages its responses with the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). The CDC EOC can activate
at one of three levels:
Level 3: Lowest level and includes CDC subject matter expert (SME)
deployments.
Level 2: This mid-level activation includes SMEs as well as staff from
various program areas. This activation can extend beyond CDC core
business hours.
Level 1: The highest level activation requires agency-wide staff support on
a 24/7 basis. The CDC (as of 9/18/20) has activated its EOC at Level 1 four
times (Hurricane Katrina 2005, H1N1 influenza outbreak 2009, Ebola
outbreak 2014, and the Zika virus outbreak 2016) (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2020).
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Operations Center (SOC) also serves as the primary EOC for HHS (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2019). The SOC operates on a
24/7, 365 basis (when required—across four activation levels—and maintains
a 24-hour steady-state watch function at other times) and is the “focal point
for public health and medical information collection, sharing, and analysis.
It also coordinates the HHS preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation
operational resource requirements” (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2019). The watch center provides situational awareness concerning
any emerging situation (nationally or internationally) that “require
coordinated health and medical federal disaster response” (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 2019). The SOC operates within a NIMS
framework and is staffed both physically or virtually across the command
and general staff functions.
It is necessary to look deeper than just the HHS SOC to appreciate the
many and broad authorities held by the Secretary of HHS, which helps to
describe the role of public health. The authorities held by the Secretary are
categorized by those that:
are available to him/her at any time with or without any declaration;

those that become available upon a Public Health Emergency (PHE)
declaration by the secretary (Section 319 of the public health services
act);
and those that become available should the president issue a
declaration of a major disaster or emergency.
At any time, with or without a declaration (either Public Health

Emergency or Major Disaster), the Secretary of HHS is authorized to take
actions including (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2019):
Developing and taking necessary steps to implement a plan to assist

states and localities in controlling epidemics and in meeting other
health emergencies or problems;
Enabling the centers for disease control and prevention director to
access the infectious diseases rapid response reserve fund (when funds
are so appropriated) to prevent, prepare for, or respond to an infectious
disease emergency when the emergency has significant potential to
occur imminently and to affect national security or the health and
security of US citizens, domestically or internationally;
Access “no-year” funds appropriated to the public health emergency
fund (when funds are so appropriated) to immediately respond when
the Secretary determines that there is a significant potential for a PHE;
Assisting and promoting research and studies into the causes, diagnosis,
treatment, control, and prevention of diseases;
Establishing isolation and quarantine;
Maintaining the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS);
Activating the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned
Corps and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), and
deploying select members of the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC);
Maintaining the safety of food, drugs, biological products, and medical
devices;
Providing temporary assistance to needy families and responding to the
needs of “at-risk” individuals;
Providing, through a separate declaration, immunity from liability for
activities related to supply, distribution, and use of medical
countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
pandemic and epidemic threats;
Providing, through a separate declaration, that FDA may authorize
medical products intended to prevent, diagnose, or treat a disease or
condition involving a specified biological, chemical, radiological, or
nuclear agent or agents, or intended to prevent, diagnose, or treat a
serious or life-threatening disease or condition caused by such a
product described for emergency use;
Waive certain requirements for drugs covered by a risk evaluation and
mitigation strategies;
Permit the dispensing of medical products intended to prevent,
diagnose, or treat a disease or condition involving a biological,
chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or agents, or intended to
prevent, diagnose, or treat a serious or life-threatening disease or
condition caused by such a product without a prescription for the
duration of an emergency;
Exempting (for 30 days, subject to one 30-day renewal) a person from
select agents requirements as necessary to provide for timely
participation of the person in response to a domestic or foreign public
health emergency that involves the select agent or toxin;
Waive requirements of the paperwork reduction act for voluntary
collection of information when necessary to prepare and respond to a
disease or disorder that is significantly likely to become a public health
emergency.
Should the Secretary of HHS declare a Public Health Emergency (PHE)

s/he is authorized to take additional actions (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 2019):
Consistent with regular authorities:
– Make grants to state and local agencies

– Provide awards for expenses
– Enter into contracts
– Conduct and support investigations into the cause, treatment, or
prevention of the specific disease or disorder.
Provide supplies, equipment, and services, and detail employees of the

department to the recipients of such awards upon request of the
recipient and subject to corresponding reductions in payments;
Access funds appropriated to the public health emergency fund (when
funds are so appropriated) to immediately respond to the PHE;
Enable the centers for disease control and prevention director to access
the infectious diseases rapid response reserve fund (when funds are so
appropriated) to prevent, prepare for, or respond to an infectious
disease emergency;
Grant extensions or waive sanctions related to deadlines for submitting
data or reports required under laws administered by the secretary;
Make temporary appointments of personnel (up to one year or the
duration of the emergency) to respond to the public health emergency;
Pay travel and related expenses of an HHS employee (or family
member) assigned to duty in an area in of the U.S. subject to a public
health emergency declaration to obtain medical care for an illness,
injury, or medical condition that cannot be adequately addressed in the
area at that time;
Enable the secretary of defense, in consultation with the secretary, to
deploy military trauma care teams (if established under grants awarded
by the secretary to eligible high-acuity trauma centers);
Modify the practice of telemedicine;
Allow State and local governments to access the general services
administration federal supply schedule when using federal grant funds;
Allow temporary reassignment of state and local personnel during a
public health emergency;
Limit liability of volunteer health care professionals during the first 90
days of the PHE to the laws of the state to which the professional has
been deployed to respond to the PHE and in which care is provided;
Adjust medicare reimbursement for specific Part B drugs;
Waive specific ryan white HIV/AIDS program requirements;
Grant an extension or waive application deadlines or compliance with
any other requirement of specific Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services (SAMHSA) grants;
Waive requirements of the paperwork reduction act for voluntary
collection of information when necessary to prepare for and respond to
the public health emergency;
Waive certain requirements of the Drug Supply Chain Security Act
(DSCSA).
Additionally: a) A public health emergency declaration may also be the
basis for the Department of Labor to award dislocated worker program
grants for disaster relief; and b) A declaration of a public health emergency
terminates after 90 days or when the Secretary declares that the emergency
no longer exists unless renewed by the Secretary.
If the President issues a Declaration of a Major Disaster or Emergency, the
Secretary of HHS is authorized to take additional actions:
Actions granted by or through the Stafford Act:
Issuance of warnings;
Mobilization of emergency support teams;
Authorization of federal use of state and local government services and
facilities;
Hiring temporary personnel;
Limiting liability of volunteer healthcare professionals to the laws of
the state to which the provider has been deployed to respond to the
disaster or emergency and in which care is provided;
Distributing food, medicine, and supplies;
Coordinating with private-sector disaster relief organizations;
Overseeing mass feeding;
Coordinating hazard mitigation;
Use, donation, or lending of federal equipment, supplies, facilities, or
personnel to state and local governments;
Provide crisis counseling (only in response to a major disaster).
Should the President declare a National Emergency under the National

Emergencies Act instead of the Stafford Act, the President specifies which
statutory authorities and actions are available to the Secretary (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2019).
Situations arise, resulting in both the President declaring a major disaster
or emergency and the Secretary declaring a PHE. In these circumstances,
authorizations make additional actions available to the Secretary, including:
Pertaining to section 1135 of the social security act, temporary waivers
of certain requirements relating to medicare, medicaid, and the
children’s health insurance program (CHIP) are available to “ensure
that sufficient health care items and services are available to meet the
needs of individuals enrolled in the respective programs including”:
– Certain conditions of participation, certification requirements,

program participation, or similar requirements for individual
health care providers or types of health care providers.
– Preapproval requirements.
– State licenses for physicians and other healthcare professionals
(this waiver is for purposes of medicare, medicaid, and CHIP
reimbursement only—the state determines whether a non-federal
provider is authorized to provide services in the state without state
licensure).
– Emergency medical treatment and labor act (EMTALA) sanctions
for direction or relocation of an individual to another location to
receive medical screening pursuant to an appropriate state
emergency preparedness plan or a state pandemic preparedness
plan for the transfer of an individual who has not been stabilized
if the transfer is necessitated by the circumstances of the declared
federal public health emergency. A waiver of EMTALA
requirements is effective only if actions under the waiver do not
discriminate on the basis of a patient’s source of payment or
ability to pay.
– Stark self-referral sanctions.
– Performance deadlines and timetables may be adjusted (but not
waived).
– Limitations on payment for healthcare items and services to
permit Medicare Advantage Plan enrollees to use out of network
providers in an emergency situation.
The Secretary may waive the health insurance portability and
accountability act (HIPAA) privacy rule sanctions relating to (provided
that the actions do not discriminate based on the patient’s source of
payment or ability to pay):
– Obtaining a patient’s consent to speak with family members or

friends.
– Honoring a patient’s request to opt-out of the facility directory.
– Distributing a note of privacy practices.
– Honoring the patient’s right to request privacy restrictions or
confidential communications.
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2019)
Throughout this text, there are numerous discussions about Presidential

Directives, laws, statutes, and regulations that concern emergency
management, disasters, preparedness, and so on. The Stafford Act
codification falls within public health law, which is an exception to the usual
emergency management and preparedness laws cited at the federal level. As
is now apparent, many authorizations and actions are potentially available
when the emergency manager considers the roles and capabilities of public
health authorities as delineated by laws, statutes, and regulations.
Emergency managers have organized their EOCs in a variety of ways.
Regardless of how structured, in practice, all EOCs must provide some way
to facilitate the incorporation of governmental and private-sector
capabilities as needed. The National Response Framework (see Chapter 2 of
this volume) provides a common grouping of critical functional capabilities
available from governmental and private sector organizations with the
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) Annex. The specific ESF that pertains to
public health is ESF 8, Public Health and Medical Services (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2019). The authorities available through
the Secretary of HHS, within or outside declarations, are vast, as described
earlier. However, there are many other public health and medical services
related needs and capabilities that are important to understand and
frequently needed during local and state-level emergency operations. Most,
if not all, of these capabilities, begin at the local level. Just as is the case with
grouping these under a standard functional capability heading, ESF 8 is the
typical group for local and state capabilities. Accordingly, ESF 8 provides
these core functional areas (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019):
Assessment of public health/medical needs

Health surveillance
Medical surge
Health/medical/veterinary equipment and supplies
Patient movement
Patient care
Safety and security of drugs, biologics, and medical devices
Blood and tissues
Food safety and defense
Agriculture safety and security
All-hazards public health and medical consultation, technical
assistance, and support
Behavioral healthcare
Public health and medical information
Vector control
Guidance on potable water/wastewater and solid waste disposal
Mass fatality management, victim identification, and mitigating health
hazards from contaminated remains
Veterinary medical support.
Emergency Support Function 8—Health and Medical Services

In the larger scheme of things, grouping the listed functional capabilities
makes sense compared with the other functions that are often necessary for
a large emergency or disaster incident. At the same time, most would argue
that there are multiple and significant differences among the listed
functions. It isn’t easy, at best, to find one or two persons possessing
expertise among all of the ESF functions. It might appear that in the
activation of an emergency management EOC, that many persons would be
required to “staff the ESF desk,” to provide the requisite expertise across all
of the functions. Is there a more practical approach? Indeed, if space permits,
one alternative is to bring all of the individuals into the EOC. Although this
is an option, it is not a good one; it is impossible in most situations. The
more viable solution is to use the so-called “reach-back” method in the
authors’ experiences. The health department activates its EOC, physical or
virtual, to the level it needs, augmented by SMEs available through
technology.
The emergency management EOC staffs its ESF desk with two or three
(perhaps just one in small jurisdictions) representatives (with authority)
from the health department who serve as liaisons between the two EOCs. In
many situations, these representatives are authorized to commit typical
resources based on availability and experience. If a problem exceeds their
authority or expertise, they “reach-back” to the health department’s EOC,
which works the problem, informs the ESF 8 representatives, who, in turn,
informs the emergency management EOC. Likewise, if the health
department’s team requires resources or assistance, they pass along the
request to the ESF 8 representatives at the emergency management EOC,
who request the EOC. Shared technology between the two EOCs makes this
process run with reasonable smoothness, in most cases.
The Role of Regional Healthcare Coalitions

A best practice for developing stakeholder relationships, preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from public health disasters and mass
casualty incidents is the concept and practice of regional healthcare
coalitions. Regional healthcare coalitions use federal funding to facilitate
and coordinate disaster planning and response among hospitals, public
health, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, and
other local and regional resources. They are intended to facilitate effective
and efficient information sharing and coordination of resources during the
disaster response.
Image 17.1 SMEs Available through TechnologyLogo
The healthcare coalition is useful for all phases of comprehensive

emergency management, but its primary mission should be to support
healthcare organizations during emergency response and recovery. An
element of this mission is promoting the integration of coalition member
organizations into the broader community response.
In emergency management, the response organization and its respective
roles and responsibilities are typically described in an emergency operations
plan (EOP). The comprehensive EOP incorporates a system description that
presents the response organization (including an organizational chart) and
how they are related to each other. This chapter presents a system
description for the healthcare coalition response organization based on the
multi-agency coordination system concepts summarized within the National
Incident Management System (NIMS).
Healthcare Coalition Response Objectives

A healthcare coalition’s specific objectives during emergency response and
recovery may vary from one coalition to another. It is up to the healthcare
system planners to establish what the coalition should achieve during a
response. Therefore, response objectives may be simple or complex
depending upon the individual coalition. Sample response objectives for a
robust healthcare coalition include:
Facilitate information sharing among participating healthcare

organizations and with jurisdictional authorities and emergency
management agencies to promote common situational awareness.
Facilitate resource support by expediting the mutual aid process or
other resource sharing arrangements among coalition members, and
support organizations with resource requests to local authorities as
needed.
Facilitate the coordination of incident response actions for the
participating healthcare organizations.
Facilitate the interface between the healthcare coalition and relevant
jurisdictional authorities to establish effective support for healthcare
system resiliency and medical surge, often coordinated through the
ESF-8 health and medical position of the responsible jurisdiction’s or
jurisdictions’ EOC(s) (Barth, 2019; U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, n.d.).
Healthcare Coalition Scope Coalition Participants

The healthcare coalition may include the full range of healthcare assets that
provide “point of service” medical care and other medically related services
during a mass casualty or mass effect incident. Depending on how a
particular healthcare coalition is constructed, this may include hospitals,
integrated healthcare systems, community health centers, home health
agencies, community mental health centers, private physician offices,
outpatient clinics, dialysis and other specialty treatment centers, and long-
term care facilities (nursing homes, other skilled nursing facilities), and
home care/hospice (Barth, 2019).
Image 17.2 Components of a Healthcare Coalition
Source: DHHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016)
Coalition Activities
During an emergency response, the coalition’s response organization
conducts a range of activities to achieve its stated objectives. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (n.d.) provides some examples of
possible activities for the coalition’s response organization are provided
below.
Provide notification to member organizations that an actual or

potential incident is developing. This allows for very rapid response
(i.e., within minutes) on a 24/7 basis. The notification threshold is set by
coalition member organizations such that if one member knows an
incident is happening, all learn of it rapidly.
Provide a mechanism to rapidly disseminate information from incident
command and other jurisdictional authorities to coalition member
organizations so that they can effectively and safely participate in
emergency response.
Rapidly disseminate information from coalition member organizations
to incident command and other jurisdictional authorities, at their
request.
Convene (often virtually) specific personnel (senior executives,
technical specialists, etc.) from coalition member organizations at the
request of incident command authorities to discuss strategic issues or
make policy recommendations related to the healthcare response.
Help coalition member organizations obtain incident-related
information that is not otherwise readily available. The coalition
response organization can serve as the official representative of
member organizations to seek incident details that are important to the
healthcare response.
Disseminate resource needs to member organizations and help match
organizations that request mutual aid or other assistance with
organizations that can provide the needed assistance.
Facilitate the coordination of response actions among member
organizations if this is requested by the coalition’s responding members
and/or by jurisdictional authorities.
Coalition Authorities
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (n.d.) provides a
healthcare coalition’s authority to operate based on its member
organizations’ voluntary endorsement and support and relevant
jurisdictional agencies in its geographic area. The coalition is primarily
responsive to its member organizations’ concerns.
The Healthcare Coalition’s member organizations are responsible for the
jurisdictional authority or authorities in the geographic area in which each
operates. Therefore, if the healthcare coalition spans multiple jurisdictions’
borders, the coalition’s response organization must coordinate closely with
all relevant jurisdictional authorities (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, n.d.). The coalition’s actions supplement the local and state
governments’ authority that are responsible for the geographic area covered
by the healthcare coalition (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
n.d.). In some situations, the jurisdictional authority may issue a “Delegation
of Authority” that authorizes the coalition on behalf of the jurisdiction to
address medical and public health-related response matters (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).
Because of these considerations, the healthcare coalition’s emergency
response and recovery authority may be limited, but this does not obviate
the importance of the coalition’s overarching mission.
Specific roles and capabilities may vary somewhat depending on the type
and extent of the disaster. During a mass casualty incident, the coalition
may serve as a coordinating center to ensure efficient communications
between facilities and emergency medical service(s) (EMS) and to oversee
appropriate distribution of patients to various facilities (Barth, 2019).
Case Studies
It is helpful to consider the relationship of the EOC with public health via
illustrative scenarios.
Scenario A: A three-vehicle crash occurs in a medium-sized community.
The crash results in two fatalities and eight injuries requiring at least an
emergency department (ED) evaluation or treatment. Would this situation,
as described, typically cause an EOC activation? Probably not. Vehicle
crashes are not rare in most communities and are usually handled efficiently
by the emergency responders employing the Incident Command System at
the scene.
Assessment: The assistance of the emergency manager or the EOC would
usually not be requested. Granted, eight injured patients arriving at the ED
at approximately the same time would, in most cases, cause a short-term
“medical surge” issue at that hospital. Mitigating measures routinely
employed by the agencies working on the crash include:
Transporting the patients to more than one hospital, thereby negating a
surge issue at any one facility.
If all eight patients are received, the hospital would likely employ in-
house surge mitigation measures to handle the relatively short-term
problem.
Scenario B: Assume the same situation as presented in Scenario A, except

one of the vehicles involved in the crash was transporting and is now
releasing a hazardous material. The incident commander determines that:
No additional evacuation measures will be required other than moving

people at the scene a short distance upwind.
The roadway will not be blocked or require detours other than would
have been needed in Scenario A.
The injured patients will not require decontamination.
Extraordinary resources for scene management are not be required.
Assessment: The same as for scenario A.

Scenario C: Assume the same circumstances as described for Scenario B
with the following changes:
The crash involved a hazardous materials transport tank truck

transporting vinyl chloride (ERG Guide 116). (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2020) The collision caused the tank truck to roll over
and to release (slowly) a hazardous gas into the air.
The hazardous materials team is not able to stop the leak at this time.
The incident commander orders a downwind evacuation zone of just
over ½ mile.
A downwind assessment reveals a large nursing home and an
elementary school is located in the zone (school is in session).
Detours are established ½ mile upwind and to the sides of the crash
site; 1 mile downwind.
The detours are expected to be maintained for at least 12 hours.
The evacuation is expected to be in place for 12 hours as the gas is
allowed to dissipate.
Responders are expected to be at the incident site for at least 12 hours.
Assessment: Although the number of vehicles, fatalities, and initial

injuries are the same, other circumstances are significantly different from
Scenarios A and B. It is easy to see that many communities would deem it
advantageous to activate the EOC at a low or moderate level. With that
activation, there would likely be a need for ESF 8 related assistance for at
least the following:
Coordinating the evacuation/patient movement of special needs

(medical or bedridden) patients/residents of the nursing home.
The anticipation of additional casualties from the exposure of the
hazardous material and their subsequent hospital care.
Risk communications with the public.
The three scenarios presented as examples are relatively related, yet only
one would likely require an EOC activation due to complicated
circumstances. Some of the functions grouped under ESF 8 are needed.
Scenario D (actually non-fictional, direct observation/participation
account and considered commentary): Hurricane Katrina, and later Rita,
presented significant problems needing real-time resolution concerning
public health and emergency management. Much has been written about,
discussed, and many have criticized the response to Katrina. A microcosm of
reflection applies to this discussion. The scenario is a real-world example
based on first-hand observations, participation in, and contemporaneous
notes made by Rick C. Mathews, an author of this chapter.
The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (LDHH) (as it was
known in 2005—now simply Louisiana Department of Health) had engaged
in significant planning and preparedness activities in the months and near-
term years leading up to Hurricane Katrina. In the spring and summer
months of 2005, the LDHH and others engaged in several training
workshops, exercises, and planning activities as the state prepared for the
annual hurricane season. In 2003–4, the LDHH determined a need to possess
the capability to quickly provide surge capabilities for community hospitals
across the regions of the state. In support of that effort, the LDHH accepted
the delivery of various mobile modules and materials designed to provide
for a rapid hospital surge solution at the community hospitals.
Additionally, the acquisition also provided the capability to better support
EMS and hospitals at multiple casualty incidents (MCI) anywhere in the
state. Further, the purchase also provided a response and management
capability for a moderate-sized mass fatality incident. To their credit, they
facilitated training and exercises related to the setup and use of the modules
and equipment (Mathews, 2005).
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall, impacting Louisiana
and other Gulf Coast states. A couple of weeks later, Hurricane Rita hit
Louisiana and Texas, even as these states were hard at work dealing with
Katrina’s consequences. As the hurricane approached land in Louisiana, the
state (government, private sector, and the citizenry) did what it always did
when major hurricanes came knocking. The public health, hospitals, and
EMS worked hard to evacuate special needs persons from the projected
target area to locations further north. This evacuation required hundreds of
ambulances and other special needs transport vehicles. Again, this was not
new to Louisiana. As the hurricane made landfall, the LDHH also decided to
take an additional measure that it had not taken before. Flooding in New
Orleans effectively closed hospitals there, with many patients and staff
evacuated by boats and helicopters. The determination made was the
creation of a large, acute care surge facility in Baton Rouge. Usually, the Pete
Maravich Assembly Center on the Louisiana State University (LSU) campus
served as a special needs shelter during hurricane evacuation times. It
started that way again as Katrina began to make landfall. After the decision,
the special needs shelter operations moved next door to the Field House,
facilitating the large basketball center’s transference, Pete Maravich
Assembly Center (PMAC) into the nation’s largest field hospital to that date.
It is important to note that this action had not been pre-planned; no
protocols were in place (Mathews, 2005).
Image 17.3 Rick C. Mathews’ Personal Notes of Katrina (Mathews, 2005)
As the hurricane made landfall, floodwaters rose, the levees broke, and all
the rest in the history books occurred. The state EOC was already in action.
A plethora of After-Action Reports (AAR), press and media accounts and
numerous other government and non-government reports provide details
and opinions concerning just about everything that occurred. Congress
would later pass special legislation intended to “fix” the many problems that
marred the response. For this chapter, however, the focus will be on one set
of circumstances, and consequences of the acute care field hospital (Baton
Rouge), the evacuation of people from the New Orleans area, scene/incident
management, and coordination—all impacting emergency management.
There is also a need to put this discussion into context. Consider the fact that
before the hurricane “hit” Louisiana or any other state, the President had
already issued a major disaster declaration, and the federal government had
facilitated the largest pre-deployment of assets in history. A few specifics (a
small sample of the total pre-deployment) of the deployment included:
Approximately ten disaster medical assistance teams (DMAT) and

other cadres from the national disaster medical system;
Image 17.4 EMS Delivering Patients from New Orleans Area to Pete Maravich
Assembly Center—Field Hospital/TMOSA
Disaster Mortuary Teams (DMORT);

Elements of the strategic national stockpile;
Elements of the public health service commissioned corps.
Most (except for DMORT) of these were staged in an area adjacent to the
PMAC. When the field hospital opened on August 29, these assets were
staged. In this instance, the term “staged” is not synonymous with
“deployed.” Multiple medical units and related assets were sitting near the
track outside the field hospital area (staged), but they were not operational
(deployed) to anyone looking around. In the early hours, up to a couple of
days in the life of the field hospital, there were increasing needs for staffing
inside the field hospital to help triage and care for the thousands of patients
being transported from New Orleans to the PMAC/field hospital. Requests
would flow from the field hospital through channels and presumably to the
state’s EOC. All the while, there were many dozens of medical professionals
staged and awaiting deployment only yards away from the field hospital.
Part of the PMAC was also used for the staging assets for restrooms, etc.
They could see the apparent need within the center but could not assist until
being deployed. At one point, the author was directly told that the staged
assets were being held in reserve if a critical need arose near New Orleans.
(You can’t make this stuff up … RCM.) Imagine the confusion and frustration
that emerged at the field hospital, the EOC, and just about anywhere else
(Mathews, 2005).
During the early days of the field hospital, another critical problem arose.
This problem dealt with communications between the originating transport
holding area in New Orleans, the field hospital, and the transporting units
(usually buses). Consider this situation:
Individuals with medical and special needs were evacuated from their
homes and other places in the greater new orleans area to a holding
area near the new orleans airport.
At the holding area, preliminary triage decisions made as to whether to
transport the individual to a regular shelter (could be in Louisiana,
Texas, Georgia, Arkansas, and elsewhere, depending upon available
space) or to the field hospital in Baton Rouge for secondary triage to
hospitals, special needs shelters, regular shelters, nursing homes, etc., or
to be kept at the PMAC.
A preliminary decision was made at the holding area. Still, if there was
no shelter available to accept the individual (in other words, no space
was open at the shelters contacted), then the person would be
transported to the PMAC in Baton Rouge.
A convoy of buses was loaded at the holding area, with the convoy
usually comprised between three and 40 buses. A radio message was
relayed from the holding area to the field hospital. (Note: Virtually all
cell towers were down, almost all landlines out, no direct radio
communications between the holding area and the field hospital; also,
there was no direct comms between the convoy and the PMAC.)
Frequently, once a convoy was loaded and began its 60-mile trip to
baton rouge, one or more shelters would be located somewhere in the
US that could accept some of the individuals in the convoy. When this
occurred, transport buses were diverted from the PMAC destination to
the distant shelter. Typically, no communication regarding this change
would be made with the field hospital. In one instance, the field
hospital was advised to convoy 50 buses en route to the facility
(Mathews, 2005). The field hospital began to quickly adjust space and
staff to receive this surge of approximately 800-plus individuals (in
about 45 minutes). When the convoy arrived, there were only a half-
dozen or so buses; the rest had been diverted to shelters in a nearby
state (Mathews, 2005).
Commentary: This is but a small snippet from the author’s (Mathews,

2005) notes, but it is sufficient for the point made. The reader might be
thinking that the intended purpose of this description is that the ESF 8
functional area failed its mission, and that would be correct. ESF 8, per se, is
the starting guidance on how the federal government intends to coordinate
support within the public health arena for disasters. However, in a broader
sense, ESF 8 captures the expected interactive relationship between the
public health and medical community with emergency management and the
EOC during a crisis. In a practical sense, ESF 8 describes the
desk/portal/liaison staff and system at the EOC, including the public health
needs/resources reach-back from that “desk.” Another way to describe it is
that, in times of EOC activation, the ESF 8 desk is where the EOC team
reaches out to the public health community for assistance within one of its
areas of responsibility. Any of the operations or resources within the public
health community reach up to the EOC for help should they need it. It is
also the information and reporting the flowthrough point among the same
players.
Back to our scenario, several assumptions are apparent:
The PMAC/acute care field hospital is an ESF 8 operation.

The holding area in new orleans was operated by law enforcement and
fire services, mainly, which would be ESF 4 (firefighting/rescue) and 13
(public safety and security) assets. The care and sheltering of the folks
staged there would arguably fall within ESF 6 (mass care and
sheltering) if the stays were relatively prolonged.
People’s actual transportation from the holding area to the PMAC
would generally fall under ESF 1 (transportation).
The communications needs among the staging area, the transporting
process, and the PMAC fall under ESF 2 (communication).
EOCs (initially) in play: state EOC in baton rouge, new orleans, and
several surrounding parishes local EOCs, the state public health EOC in
baton rouge, State police EOC in baton rouge.
Image 17.5 The PMAC Field Hospital Organizational Structure on September 1,

2005

Presumably, each EOC other than state public health would have all 15
ESF desks in operation; the state public health EOC was a department
operation EOC.
The ESF desks comprising the state EOC would, presumably, be open
and communicating with each other at all times. If an issue arose, it
should have been easily referred to whoever could assist.
It would seem clear that if the field acute care hospital at the PMAC
was having an issue with the communications between the staging area
and transporting vehicles, they could have contacted their initial
control point (state public health EOC) who would have worked the
problem through the state EOC. Both EOCs were in constant operation
throughout this crisis period.
In a properly functioning system, it would go without saying that the
ESF 8 desk would be checking with the field acute care hospital directly
or through the state public health EOC of a regular and frequent basis,
which would elicit issues at the hospital.
There were several points of critical failure in this scenario (Note: none
of these specific failures were at the federal level).
There was a general lack of effective communication and command

failures (both at the EOC and point-of-operations) to mitigate the problem
(Mathews, 2005).
Conclusion
This chapter intended to cause the reader to reflect upon the collaborative
relationship that ought to exist between the public health and emergency
management communities, one that should intensify during times of EOC
activations as a result of a major emergency or disaster. As the scale and
scope of a disaster increases, the likelihood of needing federal assistance also
increases. Fortunately, the federal government’s significant resources and
capabilities can be made available to state and local jurisidctions, much of
which can be made available without either a public health emergency or
presidential disaster declaration. Understanding the resources and
capabilities available at the local and state levels is essential; understanding
what is potentially available and how to request it from the federal
government is crucial for times when the need is greater than the resources
immediately available. Regardless of the incident’s scale or scope,
communications are critical, especially if assistance is needed.
References
Barth, B. (2019, September 26). Health care emergency preparedness and the
role of health care coalitions [PowerPoint presentation]. The Hosptial &
Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania. Retrieved from:
https://www.phca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/C1_Thurs26_815_Barth_All.pdf
Cambridge. (2020). Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved from:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/collaboration
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2014). Introduction to public
health. In Public Health 101 Series. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, CDC, Atlanta, GA.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020). CDC emergency
operations center (EOC). Retrieved from:
https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/eoc/eoc.htm
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2007). Principles of emergency
management. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2019). National Response
Framework. Retrieved from
Mathews, R. (2005). Personal contemporaneous notes of Rick C. Mathews
related to the Hurricane Katrina Response 2005 [unpublished manuscript].
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (n.d.). The healthcare
coalition overview. Retrieved from:
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/mscc/healthcarecoalition/ch
apter2/Pages/overview.aspx
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2016, January 11). National
Hospital Preparedness Programs (NHPP): Health Care Coalitions.
Retrieved from: https://slideplayer.com/slide/16678767/
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2019). HHS Secretary’s
Operations Center. Retrieved from:
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/soc/Pages/default.aspx
U.S. Department of Transportation (2020). Emergency Response Guidebook
2020. Retrieved from
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2020-08/ERG2020-
WEB.pdf
Chapter 18
Defense Support of Civil Authorities

(DSCA)
J. Howard Murphy and Lars Skinner
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-21
Introduction
Every year, citizens and residents in all regions of the United States are
threatened with the loss of life and property resulting from natural disasters
(DeMello, 2015; U.S. Department of Defense, 2010) as well as from
technological and human-caused incidents. In a period of only ten years,
between 2009 and 2019, disasters of considerable severity resulted in 1,301
Presidential Disaster Declarations (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
n.d.), an average of nearly 11 per month.
State and local officials are responsible for preparing for and coordinating
the provision of assistance to their populace for domestic emergencies and
disasters. Governors have the authority to deploy and employ the National
Guard (NG) forces under their control in response to domestic incidents. The
NG forces, in most situations, will be employed under their control prior to
requesting federal assistance. However, a governor may request federal
assistance in parallel, with that assistance often provided by the U.S.
Department of Defense (2018).
The United States Government (USG) maintains a wide array of
capabilities and resources that can be made available upon the request of the
governor of a state, or local civil authorities for immediate response or under
mutual aid agreements. When an incident occurs that exceeds or is
anticipated to exceed state, local, or tribal resources, both neighboring states
and the USG may provide resources and capabilities to support the response
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) developed a Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) as a
result of a dynamic set of variables. National security threats, hazards,
vulnerabilities, strategic guidance, and political and economic factors have
evolved since the first Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support was
issued in 2005, and the DOD assessed the need for the Total Force to address
these new realities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013). Building upon the
concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense
Strategy, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support constituted
the DOD’s vision for transforming homeland defense and civil support
capabilities. It fundamentally changed the Department’s approach to
homeland defense in a historic and important way (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2005).
Image 18.1 National Guard Bureau Logo
Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Image 18.2 Department of Defense Logo
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Image 18.3 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support Authorities
Source: Rick C. Mathews 2020
Under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, each state/territory of

the US has the primary responsibility to prepare for and respond to
emergencies and disasters occurring within its respective borders. The
Constitution establishes the sovereignty of the states/territories over many
aspects of government. Of particular importance to domestic operations are
the authorities granted by Congress to the states/territories. Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution, the Militia Act of 1903, and the
National Defense Act of 1916 provide the basis for the distinction between
National Guard forces and Active Component Title 10 forces. State and
Territory governors retain authority over their respective National Guard
forces whereas the authority over and control of Department of Defense
(DOD) Title 10 forces in both Active and Reserve Components are at the
discretion of the President of the US as the Commander-in-Chief (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010, 2018).
Within DSCA operations, the expectations of the DOD capabilities must
be effectively managed and communicated. The DOD’s goal is efficient
execution of emergency and disaster relief operations and successful
synchronization of military and civilian capabilities when local/tribal, and
state/territory level infrastructure may be overwhelmed (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010).
All disasters, whether they be small or large, are local, and incident
responses typically begin with first responders (bystanders) and emergency
responders at the local level (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011;
U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, 2018). Occasionally, local emergency
managers supporting the on-scene incident command operation(s) identify
or forecast resource shortfalls. In these situations, emergency managers
should consider requesting assistance from regional and/or state response
organizations, including the National Guard. If the incident being managed
escalates to the Federal level, requiring a Presidential-declared major
disaster or emergency declaration, DOD forces may be requested and sent to
the incident site(s) to support civilian responders’ efforts (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, 2018).
In order to develop an understanding of the the operational environment
presented by a major incident, emergency managers at the local, tribal, and
state jurisdictional levels should study roles and authorities pertaining to
DSCA and develop trust relationships with the commanders or officers-in-
charge (OICs) of military units within their communities.
In recent decades, the DOD has focused significant resources and effort in
training military leaders on the National Incident Management System
(NIMS), and the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of this
training has been to facilitate military leaders’ understanding of the civilian
incident management process so that they and their units can effectively
support civilian authorities should they receive requests and orders to do so
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). These preparations have resulted in the
effective integration of military assets in support of civilian response and
recovery efforts during multiple natural, technological, and human-caused
incidents.
Image 18.4 USAF Rescue Mission During Katrina 2005
Source: USAF Official Photo
Image 18.5 NY National Guard Rescue Mission During Hurricane Harvey
Source: Official U.S. Air National Guard Photo by Airman 1st Class Daniel H. Farrell,
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
Since 1999, the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Identification
Teams, later renamed Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams
(CSTs) have integrated on a frequent basis with civilian emergency
responders to carry out the deploy to an area of CSTs’ operations to assess,
advise and facilitate civilian responses (Favero, 1999). In 2017, National
Guard units from Texas, Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, New
York, and Oklahoma integrated with U.S. Coast Guard and civilian
emergency response and emergency management officials in response to
Hurricane Harvey that left approximately 1 million people homeless in
Texas (Panzino, Schogol, & Faram, 2017).
Homeland security and homeland defense are complementary
components of the National Security Strategy. Homeland defense is the
protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical
defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other
threats as directed by the President of the United States according to Joint
Publication (JP) 3–27, Homeland Defense. Missions are defined as homeland
defense if the nation is under a concerted attack (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2015).
The DOD leads homeland defense and is supported by the other federal
agencies. The DOD also supports the nation’s homeland security effort,
which is led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Homeland
security is the concerted national effort to: prevent terrorist attacks within
the US; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and
other emergencies; and minimize damage and recover from attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies described in JP 3–28, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015, 2018). A review of the
relationship among homeland defense, homeland security, and DSCA is
located in JP 3–28 and principally focuses on aspects associated with
homeland security: DSCA and National Guard Civil Support (NGCS) (U.S.
DSCA is the support provided in response to requests for assistance from
civilian authorities for domestic emergencies, special events, designated law
enforcement support, and other domestic activities. These types of activities
are often performed simultaneously depending on the requirements of the
incident(s) and the civil authorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). The
DOD units and organizations providing DSCA may include National Guard
forces performing duty under Title 32 (“Title 32 status”), Federal Active Duty
or Reserve Component forces performing duty under Title 10 (“Title 10
status”), DOD Civilians, and/or DOD Contractors.
Image 18.6 Examples of Duty Status and Command Relationships (ATP 3–28,2012)
Source: Image Provided by J. Howard Murphy and Lars Skinner
Three categories of duty status apply to domestic operations. These are

federal military forces (also referred to as forces in Title 10 status), National
Guard forces serving in Title 32 status (conducting DSCA), and National
Guard forces serving in State Active Duty status (conducting National
Guard civil support). Tactically, there is no distinction between National
Guard forces serving in Title 32 status or State Active Duty (SAD) status.
Forces in either status may be intermixed in a National Guard task force.
State National Guard units in either State Active Duty or Title 32 status
remain under the command of their governor. However, command authority
can change for National Guard units if they become federalized. All forces
under the command of the President, including federalized National Guard,
are federal military (Title 10) forces (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013).
According to DOD (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010) Directive 3025.18,
all requests from civil authorities and qualifying entities for DOD assistance
shall be evaluated for:
Legality (compliance with laws),

Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD Forces),
Risk (safety of DOD Forces),
Cost (including the source of funding and the effect on the DOD’s
budget),
Appropriateness (whether providing the requested support is in the
interest of the DOD), and
Readiness (impact on the Department of Defense’s ability to perform its
other primary missions) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
Military units in Title 10 status have limitations on how they may be used
in an emergency or disaster. The clearest limitation is the legal prohibition of
using military personnel in enforcing civil law. Proscribed by the Posse
Comitatus Act, this law applies to all Federal military forces, the exception
being the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) which is able to operate in Title 14, U.S.
Code (USC) status. Placed under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) on February 25, 2003, the USCG executes a variety of missions,
including Search and Rescue (SAR), maritime law enforcement, and defense
readiness (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). The USCG differs from the
other five Armed Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space
Force) in that its Active Duty component operates simultaneously under
Title 10 and Titles 6, 14, 19, 33, and 46. Because of its legal authority, the
Coast Guard can conduct military operations under the DOD or serve a law
enforcement function directly for the President in accordance with Title 14
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, 2018).
Image 18.7 Relationships Among Homeland Defense, DSCA, and Homeland
Security Missions, Levels of Response
Source: Retrieved from:

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_27.pdf
As asserted previously, disaster incident responses begin with first
responders and emergency responders at the local level since all disasters are
local. The jurisdictional levels of response may include local or tribal
government(s), regional governmental entities, state government(s), and/or
the Federal government.
As described in previous chapters, a Presidential Major Disaster
Declaration, in accordance with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act may trigger long-term Federal response assets
and recovery programs, some of which are matched by state programs and
designed to help disaster survivors, businesses, and public entities. An
Emergency Declaration is more limited in how it can help and does not
include long-term Federal recovery programs of a major disaster declaration
Local/Tribal
A local response is the first tier in the disaster management process, and it is
local responders who will determine a need for expanding response
operations. Emergency responders are local emergency and related public
safety personnel (e.g., public works) who respond to an incident. The DOD
can provide significant response capabilities at this level through pre-
established mutual aid agreements or through immediate response authority
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). More information on immediate
response authority is provided later in this chapter.
The U.S. recognizes the right of Native American tribes to self-govern.
Tribal governments are responsible for coordinating resources to address
potential or actual incidents within their jurisdictions. When local resources
are not adequate, tribal leaders often seek assistance from the state or
Federal government. The tribe can elect to deal directly with the Federal
government. Though the governor of a state must request a Presidential
declaration under the Stafford Act on behalf of a tribe, Federal departments
or agencies can work directly with the tribe within existing authorities and
resources (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011).
Regional
If local emergency responders are unable to contain an incident at the scene,
they may ask for assistance from their respective emergency manager(s)
located within the EOC. Emergency managers operating within the local
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), if activated, should maintain
situational awareness of local emergency response operations as well as
communications capabilities with internal and external stakeholders and
resources. This enables the EOC to request assets from throughout the
jurisdiction and/or region to facilitate effective incident response operations
managed by an on-scene incident commander(s) or unified command(s)
State
Every state maintains an EOC that is activated as needed to support local
EOCs and provide multi-agency coordination. When local jurisdictions
cannot contain an incident, the governor can declare a state of emergency
and invoke the state’s emergency operations plan to increase individual and
public resources as required. Under the Stafford Act, states are also
responsible for requesting Federal emergency assistance for community
governments within their jurisdiction (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
The State Coordinating Officer (SCO) plays a critical role in managing
state response and recovery operations. As an incident escalates and a
Stafford Act Presidential Disaster Declaration is provided, the SCO will
work with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to create a plan for state
requirements, including those that are beyond state capability (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010).
Should requirements exceed state response capabilities, the governor can
request resources from other states through the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC) (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
2011).
Federal
If requested resources are unavailable or requirements exceed capabilities,
the governor may request Federal assistance. When an emergency or
disaster incident causes damage or is of sufficient severity and magnitude to
warrant Federal disaster assistance and such assistance is requested, the
President may issue a Major Disaster or emergency declaration. If either
declaration is issued, assistance is then made available under the Stafford
Act (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011). A Presidential Major
Disaster Declaration triggers long-term Federal recovery programs and
response assets, some of which are matched by state programs and designed
to help disaster survivors, businesses, and public entities. An Emergency
Declaration is more limited in how it can help and does not include long-
term Federal recovery programs of a Major Disaster Declaration (Federal
Types of Military Response

The DOD provides support when requested by civil authorities and
approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). There are several separate
authorities whereby DOD resources may be provided without SecDef
approval. These are Immediate Response Authority (IRA), Mutual Aid
Agreements/Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs)/Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs), or in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) DSCA Execution Order (EXORD). DOD provides
DSCA when requested by civil authorities and approved by the SecDef (U.S.
Immediate Response Authority

DOD response at the municipal, county, or tribal level is provided under the
Immediate Response Authority (IRA). If requested, any commander can
provide resources to save lives, prevent human suffering and/or mitigate
great property damage (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, 2018). A request
for assistance from some civil authority (mayor, chief of police, fire chief,
sheriff, emergency management director, tribal authority, etc.) is required to
initiate the IRA. This request may initially be made verbally; however, for
mission assignment (MA) tracking and funding purposes, a follow-up in
writing is desired. There is a DOD doctrinal time limit of 72 hours for
immediate response operations. The 72 hours correspond with the time limit
for the response phase (focus is on life-sustaining functions) of a DSCA
operation. After 72 hours, the response is generally no longer considered
immediate and falls into the category of recovery/restoration. It is important
to note that no law enforcement activities involving DOD assets are
authorized under IRA (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). The DSCA
EXORD directs commanders to notify their respective Service headquarters
of IRA operations. The required time limits for notification are Service-
specific, but the Army and Navy have both directed that notification take
place within two hours (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). The DOD also
recommends that Title 10 commanders notify the Defense Coordinating
Officer (DCO) for their Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
region. The DCO may be able to assist in obtaining reimbursement for
support provided by local and state officials, as well as reimbursement under
Stafford Act or Economy Act (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
The DOD IRA does not apply to the National Guard forces in State Active
Duty (SAD) status. National Guard (NG) forces in SAD receive their
authority to conduct immediate response from state law (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, 2018). Upon approval of the governor, state NG forces may
support state agencies, including law enforcement agencies (LEAs), within
their respective states and within limits prescribed by state law. State NG
forces from another state in state active duty status, or Title 32, U.S. Code
(USC), operating under the EMAC or a MOA between the states may only
support civilian law enforcement as specified in a memorandum approved
by both governors. Once federalized, NG forces in Title 10, U.S. Code (USC),
status have the same restrictions with respect to performing law
enforcement functions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Some typical IRA
IRA missions include:
Search and rescue

Evacuation, decontamination, firefighting, medical treatment,
restoration of medical capabilities and public services
Removal of debris, rubble, or hazards to permit rescue or movement
Detecting, assessing, and containing a chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident (i.e., using the National
Guard’s WMD-Civil Support Teams (CSTs))
Collecting, safeguarding, and distributing essential food items and
supplies
Damage assessment
Communications
Explosive ordnance disposal (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
DOD units could provide IRA to civilian agencies on a cost-reimbursable

basis. However, requests for immediate response should not be delayed or
denied because of the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a
commitment to reimburse the DOD. Thus, funding for IRA may become the
unit’s responsibility. Commanders or responsible DOD officials will report
all actions and support provided through the appropriate chain of command
to the National Military Command Center and provide a copy to the
Combatant Commander (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, 2018).
Example of Immediate Response Authority
Active Duty (Title 10 forces) Response Immediate Response

Authority
On the afternoon of August 1, 1985, a storm passed through Cheyenne,
Wyoming that included tornadoes, hail, and over seven inches of rain within
three hours. Fortunately, the tornadoes did not touch ground in the
populated areas of Cheyenne. However, the effects of the hail and the rain
created flash flood conditions that led to the deaths of 12 people and washed
out roads and buildings (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011).
Under the provisions of Immediate Response Authority, airmen from F.E.
Warren Air Force Base (AFB) assisted in response to this disaster by
shoveling hailstones, pumping water out of basements and roadways, and
removing debris. A Presidential emergency was not declared for this
disaster, so the Active Duty military involvement was through the IRA
response. Because there was no Presidential Declaration, the F.E. Warren
AFB had to cover the expense of responding to the emergency (Federal
Mutual Aid Assistance Agreements

Mutual aid assistance agreements exist between emergency responders to
provide assistance across jurisdictional boundaries. Memoranda of
Agreement (MOAs) and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) establish
and arrange mutual aid assistance agreements. Mutual aid agreements
authorized under DOD Instruction (DODI) 6055.06, DOD Fire and
Emergency Services (F&ES) Program, are limited to emergency fire,
hazardous materials, medical and rescue services. These emergency services
are often provided on a reimbursable basis by F&ES personnel and
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel who are collocated in a DOD
installation fire department. In the absence of an agreement, the same four
types of assistance may be provided when the commander deems such
assistance is in the best interest of the United States and under immediate
response authority of DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.1 (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010).
The state or territory governor coordinates assistance from other states
through interstate mutual-aid and assistance compacts, such as MOAs and
MOUs, or through an EMAC. EMACs work in synergy with the federal
disaster response system by providing timely resources to states requesting
assistance from assisting member states. MOAs, MOUs, or EMACs can be
used either in lieu of federal assistance or in conjunction with federal
assistance, thus providing a seamless flow of needed services and goods to
an impacted state. These mutual-aid agreements further provide another
avenue for mitigating limited resources to help ensure maximum use of
those limited resources within member states’ inventories (U.S. Department
of Defense, 2018).
The EMAC evolved in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and is
administered by the National Emergency Management Association. It is a
non-binding, collaborative arrangement among its members that provides a
legal framework for states to assist one another in managing a disaster or an
emergency that has been declared by the governor of the impacted state. All
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands
are members of EMACs (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). During actual
or potential widespread disasters that affect multiple states, EMACs may
become exhausted more quickly, requiring a more urgent request for Federal
response.
An EMAC does not allow the use of armed National Guard forces from
one state to perform civil disturbance or other law enforcement operations
in another state. If this type of support is required, it must be approved
between states in a separate mutual aid agreement which includes:
command relationship, immunity, carrying and loading of weapons, law
enforcement authority, and training on state Rules on the Use of Force (RUF)
requirements (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
Example of a MOA/MOU response

An example of how a military fire department has shaped its MOAs around
these factors can be found in the agreement by Tinker Air Force Base (AFB)
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in providing mutual aid to the surrounding
communities. The Tinker AFB Fire Department will roll their water tanker
on an average of twenty times a year to assist local responders using their
equipment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). This support peaks in the late
summer when the vegetation is dry, and grass fires are common, and peaks
again in winter when numerous house fires break out due to faulty heating
systems in residences in the city (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). Tinker
AFB’s role is, for the most part, limited to the tanker capability so that the
local fire departments are the primary responders at the emergency.
DSCA Execution Order (EXORD)

The latest Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) DSCA EXORD, dated
14 August 2009, established the framework for resources and authorities
provided to the supported Combatant Commander (CCDR) to conduct
DSCA operations for actual or potential domestic incidents within the
CCDR’s area of responsibility. The two CCDRs with responsibilities for US
states, territories and protectorates are U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM) based in Honolulu, Hawaii. The authorities granted by
the EXORD are specified in four distinct categories of authorization:
Assigned forces
Pre-identified resources
Resources for internal use
Large-scale response categories (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
Example of DSCA EXORD resource

The military has many specialized teams that have been established and
assigned via a DSCA EXORD to meet the challenges presented by the use of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Within each state, territory, and
protectorate, the National Guard has at least one WMD Civil Support Team
(CST). Seventeen states have a CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package
(CERFP), and the National Guard also has ten Homeland Response Forces
(HRFs), one per FEMA Region, all providing a significant Title 32 CBRNE
response capability. In addition, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
established the Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) with a joint task
force (JTF) of 5,200 personnel, and two Command and Control CBRN
Response Elements (C2CRE) JTFs with 1,500 personnel each. The DCRF and
C2CREs are responsible for providing Title 10 military responders to support
civilian authorities.
Integration of Military Support
National Guard
The National Guard is typically the first line of military response to most
incidents. When the governor of a state mobilizes the National Guard, the
forces are in State Active Duty (SAD) status under command and control of
the governor. SAD forces conduct all missions in accordance with the needs
of the state and within the guidelines of state laws and statutes (U.S.
One of several examples of National Guard first line response is the
Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams (WMD CST). Each US
state, territory, and protectorate possesses at least one WMD CST with the
capability to rapidly respond within their assigned jurisdiction (i.e., state,
territory, etc.) or to another jurisdiction under EMAC in order to conduct
hazard characterization and assessments supporting local, tribal, and/or state
responders. The WMD CSTs were developed and funded under Presidential
Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, signed on
June 21, 1995 by President Clinton (The White House, 1995).
It is important to note that the WMD–CSTs and other National Guard
response assets typically operate under the authority of the respective
governor’s jurisdictions and their respective adjutants general. Emergency
managers should work to understand the command and control (C2)
relationships of National Guard response assets within their jurisdiction.
National Guard commanders may provide immediate response to a local
community, but under state laws. The local emergency managers may have
contingency agreements in place with local armories and nearby National
Guard training installations. An alert for the National Guard typically
begins with the activation of the alert roster, usually initiated by full-time
National Guard personnel (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). This alerting
message is the notification the Guard members receive to report to their
home station. The National Guard local commander is not normally a
permanent full-time member and is alerted by his or her alert roster (U.S.
The supporting commander assesses the situation within the larger
context of the likely state response. Soldiers committed locally in an
immediate response may be needed for a larger call-up of National Guard
forces by the governor. The local commander may limit the immediate
assistance in order to support higher priority missions. Frequently, National
Guard personnel gather at their units even before an official alert order since
their experience enables them to anticipate when they will be needed (U.S.
The National Guard response timeframe depends on multiple factors, such
as the size of state, location of unit, and transportation requirements and
assets. Typically, the National Guard responds within 12 to 24 hours, and
Civil Support Teams, respond within four to eight hours. If the response
requires military capabilities above those available to the National Guard
within the affected state, additional resources can be requested from other
supporting states. While these National Guard forces remain in SAD status
(Title 32), these forces, from supporting states, are placed under the control
of the supported governor (Murphy, 2011).
When any municipality or county activates an EOC, it usually notifies the
state emergency management director. The state emergency management
director then passes a situation report to the Joint Force Headquarters—State
(JFHQ-State) staff, and then to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) when
National Guard units may be or are actually required to assist civilian
responders. The adjutant general or a designated representative may deploy
a liaison team from the JFHQ-State to assess and monitor the situation. A
National Guard liaison team is likely to deploy if the situation is unclear and
has the potential to require additional resources. If the adjutant general
anticipates local authorities needing additional assistance, the JFHQ-State
deploys additional teams (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
There are advantages associated with employment of the NG in either
State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32, USC, status. Most notable is the ability
of the NG to assist law enforcement as the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) does
not apply to Title 32, USC, or SAD forces. To support operational continuity,
most, if not all, NG forces supporting a response would remain in State
Active Duty or Title 32, USC status throughout an incident or event. The
military response to situations that require DSCA will be a coordinated
effort between the NG in State Active Duty or Title 32, USC status and
military forces in Title 10 USC status, and/or Title 14, USC status U.S. Coast
Guard forces. When Federal military forces and the NG are employed
simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the U.S., appointment of a
commissioned officer as a dual-status commander (DSC) serving as
commander of Federal forces by Federal authorities and as commander of
state NG forces by state authorities should be the usual and customary
command and control arrangement (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
The lessons learned on improving interagency coordination and command
and control options from previous defense support of civil authorities
(DSCA) operations, such as Hurricane Katrina, paid tremendous dividends
during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. As Sandy made landfall, two of the affected
states, New Jersey and New York, established dual-status commanders
(DSCs) for response and recovery. Partnerships among FEMA, the National
Guard Bureau, the individual states, and U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) resulted in a swift and coordinated response, to include
prepositioned Title 10, USC, resources in the region along with the
immediate response of National Guard, state, and local resources. The U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and interagency partners executed
strategic and ground movements of DOD assets and thousands of short tons
of equipment, to include private/commercial power utility company trucks
and personnel (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The DSCs provided
critical leadership to achieve greater unity of effort between federal and state
military forces in preparing for and responding to the devastating effects of
this hurricane. The federal government learned the importance of
anticipation during Hurricane Sandy.
Image 18.8 Dual-Status Commander Command and Control Relationship (JP 3–
28, 2018), Example of the Use of Dual-Status Commanders
The year 2017 brought even greater challenges, as DOD responded to an

unusually high number of disasters. These included a trio of category 4 and
5 hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and Maria) and wildland fires, as well as an
earthquake in Mexico. The disasters of 2017 resulted in a thorough after
action review process to ensure DOD capabilities are used most efficiently in
complex disasters. Initial themes focused on enabling common pictures
across all levels of government for requesting, tasking, and understanding
the execution of DOD capabilities throughout the disaster response. It was
apparent the DOD recognition of DSCA as a key mission resulted in the
improved planning, training, exercising, and anticipation of key capabilities.
A common theme throughout DSCA operations was the importance of
partnerships and professional relationships that enabled enhanced unity of
effort for the accomplishment of DSCA missions (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2018).
Deployment of Military Resources—State Defense Forces

In addition to the National Guard, over twenty states authorize a state
defense force as allowed by Section 109, Title 32 (Tulak, Kraft & Silbaugh,
2004). These forces may be used to augment the state National Guard and
other civil authorities in an emergency. State defense forces are strictly state
entities and are not part of DOD. These voluntary forces are typically
trained in specialized fields such as law, administration, communications,
military police, aviation support, search and rescue, logistics, medicine, or
transportation (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011; Tulak, Kraft
& Sibaugh, 2004). State defense force members are authorized to wear the
military uniform assigned by The Adjutant General (TAG) of the state. They
are subject to the state’s military code and during an emergency, receive pay
according to state law (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
Federal Military Forces Disaster Response

Usually, the commitment of Federal military forces for civil support
operations follows a Presidential Disaster Declaration under the Stafford
Act. Federal military support may range from installation support up to
commitment of major portions of the military’s Title 10 Active and Reserve
Components’ forces (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
After the disaster declaration, a Lead Federal agency (usually FEMA)
coordinates with the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to prepare a
request for DSCA and submits it to the office of the Executive Secretary of
the DOD. This process is in accordance with the Stafford Act; Title 31, U.S.
Code (USC), Section 1535, or other authorities, with the exception of
requests for immediate response, and mutual or automatic aid, in
accordance with DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). However, a Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) may initiate the request, or another Federal
agency could request Federal military support. In addition, the President
may direct Federal agencies, including the DOD, to provide support (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
The Economy Act permits Federal agencies to provide resources and
services to other Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The Economy Act
is also the basis for the general rule that DOD will not compete with
commercial businesses (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). The DOD will
need to track all costs (expended resources to include personnel hours) in
great detail to ensure that the Department is reimbursed for costs associated
with the execution of approved Mission Assignments (MAs).
Reimbursement of cost elements varies depending on who declared the
emergency (President of Governor) and how it is resourced (Stafford or
Economy Act). Regardless of these factors, all units at the tactical level
would need to capture and track the following: Mission Assignments;
Personnel (deployed in support of MA); Travel of Personnel; Transportation
of Items (equipment and supplies); Service Contracts; Consumable Supplies;
Equipment and Reimbursable Flying Hours; Reimbursable Steaming Days;
Other Direct Costs (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).
Concurrently with the DSCA request, the appropriate Combatant
Commander (CCDR), either United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) or United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), develops
the concept of operations and support and submits a request for forces to the
Joint Staff. The SecDef designates the supported CCDR and any supporting
CCDRs. When validated, the request for forces becomes an order to the
supporting combatant commanders to provide the forces (U.S. Department
of Defense, 2010).
Example of the Integration of Title 32 and Title 10 Military Assets

During COVID-19 Operations
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump declared a US

national emergency on March 13, 2020, and on March 20, 2020, FEMA
assumed the LFA role in the Coronavirus Task Force in accordance with the
National Response Framework (NRF). On March 22, 2020, the President
authorized activation of National Guard personnel in New York,
Washington, and California under Title 32 U.S.C. §502(f), due to the severe
impacts being seen in those states by then (Congressional Research Service,
2020).
The coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic resulted in probably the
largest DSCA operation in US history. Over 63,000 DOD personnel
supported COVID-19 operations, including over 2,600 medical personnel.
Fifteen Urban Augmentation Medical Task Forces (UAMTFs) were deployed
to five states: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Michigan,
and Pennsylvania. The U.S. Navy deployed the USNS COMFORT to support
operations in the New York City area. The Navy also deployed
Expeditionary Medical Facility (EMF) Detachments in two states: Louisiana
and Connecticut. The EMF is designed to be a self-contained Role 3 medical
care facility, with the capabilities of a hospital including operating rooms,
medical lab and pharmacy. It is a scalable asset that can expand or contract
as needed to support either military or civilian (DSCA) requests for support,
with the following objectives (per NTTP 4–02.4):
Provide resuscitative medical care to support combat care management

across the full range of military operations,
Provide a deployable health service support (HSS) asset to support
deployed forces and combat operations globally, and
Provide hospital beds required for medical facility augmentations (U.S.
Navy, 2007).
The EMF Detachment is a scaled down version of the EMF.

As part of the DSCA mission the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
has the ability to construct Alternate Care Sites (ACS), which are facilities
temporarily converted to provide healthcare during a public health
emergency to reduce the burden on hospitals and other pre-existing civilian
medical facilities. Twenty-seven USACE ACS facilities were constructed in
12 states and the District of Columbia, including: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, and Wisconsin (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020).
In accordance with joint doctrine, the US NORTHCOM had previously
designated the Commander, 5th Army (U.S. Army North) as the Joint Forces
Land Component Commander (JFLCC), making them responsible for all
land forces assigned to an incident under a single, theater-wide commander.
The JFLCC had authority to subdivide the area of operations (AO) into
smaller components represented by the 10 FEMA regions, which aligned
military ground assets with the Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) and
Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) (Herold, 2009). To assist with
integration into the Inter-Agency (IA), over 100 Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officers (EPLOs) were mobilized and attached to FEMA teams as
advisors and military operations SMEs (Sauret, 2020).
Representatives in a Federal Response

Several individuals serve in critical roles in a Federal response. In particular,
the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) coordinates directly with the Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) who then, as necessary, coordinates with the
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). Keep in mind, the FCO works with all
Federal agencies, not just the DOD.
State Coordinating Officer (SCO)

The SCO is appointed by the governor to coordinate state response and
recovery operations with the Federal government. As an incident escalates,
the SCO plays a critical role in managing state response and recovery
operations and will work with the FCO to formulate state requirements,
including those that are beyond state capability (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)

The FCO is appointed to manage Federal response support activities for
Stafford Act emergencies and disasters. The FCO coordinates for DOD
support through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) in the Joint Field
Office (JFO) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The FCO also plays a
significant role in managing the financial aspects of DSCA.
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)

The DCO is the DOD single point of contact for domestic emergencies who
is assigned to a joint field office to process requirements for military support;
forward mission assignments through proper channels to the appropriate
military organizations; and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to
activated emergency support functions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
The DCO, a Title 10 active duty officer, is assigned to each FEMA region and
may work at the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), at the
FEMA regional office, or may pre-deploy to an incident command site. A
DCO will generally be involved in DOD’s response to DSCA. If Federal
military forces deploy, the DCO will normally deploy to the Joint Field
Office (JFO) location. The DCO coordinates DOD support to the primary
agency (PA) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Specific responsibilities of
the DCO (subject to modification based on the situation) include:
Subject matter expertise for all state and federal emergency response
plans
Coordinating with FEMA staff, state emergency responders, TAGs, and
JFHQ-State staff
Coordinating with the FCO and PAs for Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs)
Assigning military liaisons as appropriate
Coordinating with all military installations regarding base support
installation (BSI) operations (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
Defense Coordinating Element (DCE)

The DCO has a DCE of core staff and military Liaison Officers to facilitate
coordination and support to activated emergency support functions (ESFs)
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
DCO/DCE responsibilities include:
Representing DOD in the disaster area

Providing liaison to state, local, and other federal agencies
Reviewing/recommending validation of RFAs/MAs
Recommending the best military resource for the mission
Providing support of deployed DOD forces (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2018).
EPLOs are service reservists performing duties to help coordinate DOD

emergency resources and support the DCO. According to DODI 3025.16,
responsibilities of EPLOs include the following.
Establishing initial communication and coordination links between

DOD and civil authorities at the regional, state, and local levels
Assisting DOD forces in establishing connections with appropriate
local civil authorities
Conducting pre-emergency coordination with military and civilian
leaders within their region or state
Maintaining effective communication between the DOD components
and other state and/or federal governmental agencies
Promoting mutual understanding among various organizations tasked
with providing support in civil emergency situations
Coordinating and establishing relationships between the national guard
and DOD federal forces
Representing DOD federal forces in coordinating with civil authorities
at the state and regional level (U.S. Department of Defense, 2000).
Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (REPLOs) are Title 10

Service Reserve personnel assigned to the FEMA regions. State Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs) are Title 10 Reserve personnel who
perform duty in the state EOC. As subject matter experts in their states, they
serve as DOD liaisons for DSCA to state and Federal agencies and maintain
situational awareness within the state. On a daily basis, they build
relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2000).
Tribal Governments in Emergency Response

Tribal governments are responsible for coordinating resources to address
actual or potential incidents, and often have offices established with
responsibility for emergency management within their governments. Just as
in the case of local governments, tribal leaders will seek additional
assistance when local resources are not adequate. Unlike local governments,
however, tribal governments can elect to go to the State for assistance or
deal directly with the Federal government since federally recognized Tribes
have a unique and direct relationship with the Federal government (U.S.
Although a State governor must request a Presidential Disaster
Declaration under the Stafford Act on behalf of a tribe when requesting
Federal assistance, Federal departments or agencies can work directly with
the tribe within the existing authorities and resources (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010). The Tribal governments have direct contact with the Federal
government through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which is part of the
Department of Interior. Being sovereign entities, the tribes may also have
contact with other government agencies, such as FEMA (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010).
Image 18.9 Reporting Relationships Between the DCO/DCE and the DCE
Organizational Structure (ATP 3–28.1, 2015)
Source: Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO)
Request for Assistance/Mission Assignment Process

A request for assistance (RFA) is a request based on mission requirements
and expressed in terms of desired outcome formally asking the DOD to
provide assistance within the US or US territories to a local, state, tribal or
other Federal agency (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which coordinates the Federal
response to a disaster, uses mission assignments (MAs) to request assistance
from the DOD to task other Federal agencies, and to provide reimbursement
for direct assistance during emergencies and disasters. The MA is the vehicle
used by the Department of Homeland Security/Emergency Preparedness and
Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency to support federal
operations in a declared Stafford Act major disaster or emergency
declaration that orders immediate, short-term emergency response
assistance when an applicable state or local government is overwhelmed by
the incident and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the
necessary work (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
The RFAs/MAs can also be initiated by states and/or agencies through the
Executive Directorate at the Pentagon. Generally, DSCA requests originating
at the JFO are coordinated with and processed through the DCO. The DCO
coordinates with state emergency managers, the state National Guard and
FEMA to assist in the preparation and review of suitability for DOD to
perform an RFA/MA. The DCO then forwards suitable RFAs/MAs to U.S.
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM)—each are Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) - for validation
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The appropriate CCDR(s) may approve
the RFA/MA using assigned forces or with the authorities provided in the
CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
For DSCA operations, the SecDef designates a supported CCDR.
Ordinarily, this will be Commander, U.S. Northern Command
(CDRUSNORTHCOM) for the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska,
Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands and Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command (CDRUSINDOPACOM) for Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and
the Northern Mariana Islands (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The CJCS
may publish, if required, a SecDef-approved execute order (EXORD) to
further delineate support relationships, available forces, end state, purpose,
and SecDef-approved scope of actions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
The supported CCDR may elect to employ a Joint Task Force (JTF), lead
functional component command, or other command and control (C2)
structure IAW JP 3–0, Joint Operations. If a JTF is designated, consistent
with operational requirements, a C2 element, appropriate liaison, or
interagency planning cell (IPC) may be co-located at the JFO to allow for
coordination and unity of effort (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). A JTF
IPC provides timely coordination to the DCO staffs to help determine the
best use of JTF resources in fulfilling RFAs and developing mission
assignments. The IPC also provides operations assessments input to the JTF
headquarters. The collocation of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) C2
element does not replace the requirement for a DCO as a part of the JFO
coordination staff, and it will not coordinate an RFA from DOD. A JFC may
be required to provide communications support to civil authorities in the
impacted area (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
The Title 10, USC, response force could be formed from either a standing
JTF or one configured for specific missions to provide emergency assistance
across all lines of support. The Title 10, USC, JFC coordinates with National
Guard JFHQ-State, through a dual-status command (DSC) relationship, if a
DSC is established, to achieve unity of effort between federal and state
response forces. Designation of a DSC and/or JFC is not contingent on a
request from the primary or coordinating Federal agency (U.S. Department
of Defense, 2018).
Image 18.10 Summary of the Process Leading to Mission Assignments
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019
Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments

In recent years, FEMA has expanded the MA process to include Pre-Scripted
Mission Assignments (PSMAs). PSMAs facilitate a more rapid response by
standardizing the process of developing MAs. They specify what type of
assistance is required (personnel and equipment), identify a statement of
work, and provide projected cost. A PMSA is not an approved MA and use
of PSMA language does not preclude the use of the FEMA Action Request
Form (ARF) (FEMA Form 90–126) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). In
responses to disasters, all requests for DOD assistance are evaluated on a
case-by-case basis and are subject to the approval of the SecDef.
Developing a DSCA Emergency Support Function Annex

Success within the preparedness cycle, as described in the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), is based on emergency managers at all
jurisdictional levels developing and maintaining relationships and the
resulting capabilities to mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from
major incidents. The ability of the emergency management community to
achieve and sustain these capabilities requires engaging in capabilities-based
planning to achieve target levels of capability.
Relationships
While there are numerous sources available online and in databases that
may be available to provide emergency managers information on military
resources, the best practice remains emergency managers’ establishing and
developing relationships with commanders and/or emergency preparedness
officials within their respective communities. Emergency managers’
conversations with military personnel on local military installations,
National Guard armories/training centers, and/or Reserve Centers provide
the best opportunity to build relationships that could prove essential to
successful integration of military resources that may be tasked to support
civil authorities during disasters.
DSCA ESF Development Team Members

The critical step in the planning process is assembling a team of subject
matter experts to work together. Because no one team member is as smart as
all team members, the team should work together as much as possible
during the development of the DSCA/Military Support ESF. By working
together, the team will build relationships that are essential for effective and
efficient work together during disaster response operations.
As is necessary in any ESF planning process it is essential to identify
applicable internal and external stakeholders in the planning process.
Representatives (stakeholders) from multiple primary and supporting
agencies within a local jurisdiction should play a role in the DSCA ESF
development. These agencies’ representatives should be the subject matter
experts who will need to develop and maintain relationships throughout all
phases of emergency management operations. Requests for military forces’
representatives’ (e.g., National Guard, State Guard, Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer, etc.) participation is encouraged as they will provide critical
insights on military units’ capabilities and limitations as well as requests for
assistance processes and points of contact.
State-level DSCA ESF development teams may include additional military
representatives, including the FEMA Region Defense Coordinating
Officer/Defense Coordinating Element, as well as the State Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officer (SEPLO) and Regional Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer (REPLO).
Planning for a Maximum Disaster Incident

An important duty for emergency managers is to determine hazards and
threats that may impact their respective jurisdiction, and then determine
their jurisdiction’s response capabilities and limitations. Based upon the
requirements identified in a jurisdiction’s emergency operations plan (EOP),
emergency managers can identify resources available to support the
response and recovery operations.
In order to better understand and plan for military support that may be
available, it is important for emergency managers and their teams to plan
for the maximum credible disaster incident that may occur within their
jurisdiction. After developing a scenario that establishes a basis for planning,
emergency managers may assess their response resources’ capabilities,
capacity and availability at the local, tribal, regional and/or state levels to
respond to the incident. This assessment process facilitates emergency
managers’ ability to identify existing shortfalls and gaps in capabilities to
conduct sustained response and recovery operations for complex to
catastrophic disaster situations.
When emergency managers identify a credible disaster scenario that
would overwhelm their individual agencies and local, tribal, or state
authorities and necessitate a request for assistance that may include military
support, a Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) ESF, often titled
“Military Support” is needed.
The DSCA ESF should identify personnel and resources to support
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery operations, as well as how
those military resources are to be integrated into disaster response
operations. Emergency managers should identify and contact local, state
and/or Federal military planners and liaison officers available to their
respective jurisdiction. State and Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers (SEPLOs/REPLOs) are able to facilitate developing these
relationships and coordinating support for planning, training and exercising
with military assets. These and other military planners and liaison officers
could assist emergency managers as part of the military support ESF
development team, and then coordinate or direct (depending upon his/her
appointment of authority) the military units under their designated
authority during DSCA operations. The emergency manager should provide
the military planners and liaison officers situation reports as necessary, as
well as shortages and gaps that the military may provide support to fill, with
the military forces supporting as comprehensively as possible prior to and
during a disaster incident (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011).
Image 18.11 FEMA CPG 101 Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations
Plans
Example of ESF Primary and Supporting Agencies

ESF—Military Support
Primary Agency:
State National Guard
Support Agencies:
County emergency management agency

State guard
Military active duty installation disaster preparedness officer
County sheriff’s office
Municipal police departments
State police
American red cross
Civil air patrol
U.S. coast guard station representative
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO).
Military Support ESF Development Process

The primary agency for the DSCA ESF is typically responsible for obtaining
all information relating to ESF activities and requirements caused by the
disaster and disaster response. This information gathering will frequently
require the primary agency to step outside traditional information gathering
protocols. Within the local, tribal or state Emergency Operations Center
(EOC), requests for DSCA will be tasked to the DSCA/Military Support ESF
for completion. The primary agency will be responsible for coordinating the
delivery of that assistance to the disaster area.
Emergency Management Tools

Emergency managers typically establish a standardized format for
developing Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs), associated ESFs, and other
annexes and/or appendices. There are multiple tools and websites available
that may prove useful in developing emergency management documents, as
they provide a standardized format for the respective ESF development
teams to follow.
The FEMA comprehensive preparedness guide (CPG) 101, version 2.0:

developing and maintaining emergency operations plans
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) site.
FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Version

2.0
The Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Version 2.0 provides
general guidelines on developing Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs). It
promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of planning and
decision making to help emergency planners examine a hazard and produce
integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans. This Guide helps
emergency managers in state, territorial, local, and tribal governments in
their efforts to develop and maintain a viable all-hazard EOP. The CPG 101
also includes checklists for use in developing EOPs and their respective ESF
annexes.
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov)

The LLIS is the national network of lessons learned and best practices for
emergency response providers and homeland security officials. The LLIS.gov
is a secure, restricted-access information sharing website that is designed to
facilitate efforts to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism across all
disciplines and communities throughout the U.S. All LLIS.gov users are
required to be verified emergency response providers and homeland security
officials at the local, tribal, state and Federal levels (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, n.d.).
References
Congressional Research Service (2020). COVID-19: The basics of domestic
defense response. Retrieved from:
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11273
DeMello, J. (2015). Civil disaster operations [PowerPoint]. Peterson Air Force
Base, CO, U.S. Northern Command.
Favero, G. (1999). Flexibility of the incident command system to respond to
domestic terrorism [Master’s thesis]. Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (n.d.). Disaster declarations by
year. Retrieved from: https://www.fema.gov/disasters/year
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2011). IS-75: Military resources in
emergency management. Emergency Management Institute, Emmitsburg,
MD.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2019). Stafford Act, as amended,
and related authorities. Retrieved from:
https://training.fema.gov/is/coursematerials.aspx?code=IS-75
Herold, J.B. (2009). Emergency preparedness liaison officer command and
control alignment [U.S. Army War College Thesis]. Retrieved from:
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500824.pdf
Murphy, J. (2011). U.S. Department of Defense CBRN Response Enterprise
overview [PowerPoint]. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Panzino, C., Schogol, J., & Faram, M. (2017, August 28). Entire Texas
National Guard activated in wake of Hurricane Harvey. Army Times.
Retrieved from: https://www.armytimes.com/news/2017/08/28/entire-
texas-national-guard-activated-in-wake-of-hurricane-harvey/
Sauret, M. (2020). How the Army Reserve adapted to fight a new close-
combat foe. Posted April 21, 2020. Retrieved from:
https://www.army.mil/article/234787/how-the-army-reserve-adapted-to-
fight-a-new-combat-foe
Tulak, A., Kraft, R., & Silbaugh, D. (2004). State defense forces and homeland
security. Winter 2003–4, Parameters. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA.
U.S. Department of Defense (2000). DODI 3025.16—Military emergency
preparedness liaison officer (EPLO) program. U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense (2005). Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support. U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense (2010). GTA 90–01–020: DSCA Handbook:
Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit. U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense (2013). Strategy for Homeland Defense and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities. U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense (2015). ATP 3–28.1: DSCA Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA). Air Land Sea Application Center, Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense (2018). Joint Publication 3–28: Defense Support
of Civil Authorities. U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense (2019). ADP 3–28: Defense Support of Civil
Authorities. U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense (2020). COVID-19 response fact sheet. Retrieved
from: https://www.defense.gov/coronavirus
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008). Memorandum of agreement
between the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland
Security on the use of U.S. Coast Guard capabilities and resources in
support of the national military strategy. U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC.
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library. Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=450230
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Medical Facilities. NTTP 4–02.4 (August). Retrieved from:
https://flagsignalsorg.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/nttp-4-02-4-emf.pdf
The White House (1995). Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), U.S.
Policy on Counterterrorism.
Chapter 19
Managing Volunteers
Mark E. Chambers
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-22
Background
Helen Keller is quoted as saying, “Alone we can do so little. Together we can
do so much” (Lash, 1981). Most people agree and act on this belief in many
forms of civic duty, military, religious, and community service. As a
profession, emergency management has relied on volunteers’ services and
capabilities for a plethora of response disparities. The intricacies of seeking,
finding, and utilizing this type of assistance are at the heart of emergency
management and are often coordinated within the Emergency Operations
Center (EOC). Admittedly, each jurisdiction retains and traditionally uses
the ability to determine the most effective and efficient way to manage
volunteer assistance, so there are numerous successful methods from which
to choose. In times of need, especially in disaster situations, emergency
management needs to be prepared to utilize assets and resources sufficient to
mitigate the incident and initiate recovery as otherwise required. Since the
beginning of disaster response, the one resource man has called upon is
perhaps the most complex and diverse of all currently available resources.
Although our fellow man remains the most crucial resource in any disaster,
we sometimes struggle with how best to utilize this resource.
Managing volunteers can arguably be one of the most challenging tasks
for emergency management and EOCs. Failure to manage volunteers
appropriately can and will have detrimental effects on the success of various
missions as well as the outcome and associated recovery from disasters.
Emergency Management professionals must put forth the effort to engage
their communities to ascertain the capability and reliability of individual
volunteers as well as organized volunteer groups. Mismanagement or lack of
volunteer management can significantly affect emergency management’s
success, and management deficiencies will often be magnified in large-scale
events.
The effective management of volunteers can be directly attributed to the
overall success of many missions. Volunteers bring a host of positive
substance to disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery
operations. We will explore many of the pros and cons of various volunteer
management tactics throughout this chapter. We will also examine some of
the pitfalls of managing volunteers while looking at best practices and
successful techniques. There is no right or wrong way to manage volunteers,
but experience and history can often point us in the right direction and lead
us on a path with a high potential for success.
Image 19.1 A Volunteers/ESF-17 Work Area in a State-Level EOC
EOCs, as well as the plans that drive them, can be very diverse and
complex. You must choose appropriate tactics or methods to manage
volunteers that will be successful, given the existing plan or EOC structure.
In some cases, the plans must be changed to facilitate the best tactics to
manage volunteers. EOC managers and emergency management staff must
continuously evaluate the effectiveness of their plans for managing
volunteers and be willing to change them as needed. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (2010) published the Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide (CPG) 101 to help emergency planners and plan authors standardize
plans. This guide does not stipulate the planning structure or framework to
the point where no options are available to the authors. Still, it does provide
a framework that planners can utilize along with their own choices of
strategy, operations, and tactics.
FEMA breaks down planning into three types:
1. Strategic—policy, objectives, and overall guidance

2. Operational—roles and responsibilities, tasks, integration, and actions
3. Tactical—personnel, equipment, and resource management.
Image 19.2 FEMA’s CPG 101 Provides Guidance on Volunteers
The most successful volunteer management programs address all three

planning types and continuously update their guidance documents for
consistent current information. CPG 101 then allows several planning
approaches, such as scenario-based, functional, and capability-based
planning.
It is easy to see that planners retain many options for how to manage
volunteers. Volunteer managers should be familiar with planning principles
to devise and articulate management tactics appropriately. This is especially
true if these tactics are to be integrated into existing planning structures or
drafted to stand alone.
Image 19.3 Three Levels of Emergency Planning
Since volunteers are most often considered resources, a great deal of

volunteer planning occurs at the tactical level. Volunteer groups may
sometimes fulfill tactical and some operational-level planning goals and
objectives, leaving the volunteer managers to integrate these plans with
appropriate strategies. Regardless of the planning preference, volunteer
management must also incorporate into the jurisdiction’s EOC. The EOC
may also be set up in any number of ways, none of which would be
considered wrong. The jurisdiction’s preference dictates the layout and
responsibilities of any established sections or groups. A National Incident
Management System (NIMS)-compliant EOC will mirror the command and
general staff functions of the Incident Command System (ICS). It is essential
to study both the plans and the EOC design to achieve the highest degree of
functionality in managing volunteers from the EOC level. Volunteer
managers should consult with EOC officials and take advantage of any
opportunities to secure appropriate supplies, equipment, space, and access to
relevant EOC programs. As an example, some EOCs provide space for call
center operations specifically for volunteer management. Another successful
technique involves combining volunteer and donations management
functions, so similar management assets such as call centers and logistical
support can be shared and perhaps more effectively utilized (see Image 19.1
as an example).
EOCs are typically organized similarly to the emergency operations plan
that guides them. An emergency operations plan that utilizes emergency
support functions will likely reflect its parallel in the EOC design. Likewise,
an emergency operations plan that utilizes functional annexes instead of
emergency support functions could also be used by an EOC that utilizes
more traditional, strict functional sections. In rare cases, volunteer
management duties fall outside of emergency management. Depending on
the jurisdiction, senior officials may appoint volunteer coordinators outside
of emergency management and simply direct them to coordinate volunteers
with emergency management officials. In any case, managing volunteers is
not always about the volunteers themselves. The emergency management
system of plans and EOCs must be an integrated part of volunteer
management. Volunteer management must be integrated into these same
plans and facilities designated to support emergency management missions.
Volunteer Types
The word “volunteer” is frequently used to describe any number of separate
and distinct resources. It seems that the only common denominator is
financial. Volunteers are generally a pro bono asset and thus have a
profound positive characteristic as compared to other more costly resources.
Emergency managers that successfully recruit and utilize volunteer
resources often accomplish many significant tasks at little to no cost.
An obvious classification of volunteers is as “individuals” and “groups.”
When used and managed correctly, individuals are excellent resources for
shoring up other assets and resources where the workforce is weak.
Depending on the individual’s specific skill set, individuals can also serve in
critical roles such as command and general staff. The higher the degree of
skill, the more valuable an individual volunteer can be. A good example
would be public health and medicine. Highly trained medical professionals
can be precisely and individually placed in critical positions, thereby acting
as a force multiplier for various health and medical groups and teams. This
concept has been used across multiple disciplines. Individual volunteers
rarely respond prepared to manage their own logistical needs, so the EOC
that plans on utilizing individual volunteers should consider any logistical
support that may be needed.
Image 19.4 Single vs. Groups of Volunteers
Groups of volunteers tend to be useful in performing any number of

missions, depending on their makeup and capabilities. Organized groups
often respond with some level of logistical support. Volunteer groups may
specialize in one area of expertise or simply provide general human
resources and support to an existing mission or ongoing operation. As stated
earlier, for specific disciplines, volunteers can also be used as the force
multiplier, taking on other professionals’ non-specific support roles. In many
cases, highly credentialed professionals with unique skills are tasked in
support roles because there is not enough support staff to utilize these
individuals properly.
One successful approach has been to maintain a pool of deployable and
versatile staff to augment existing teams of professionals. The staff may be
subcategorized as needed, but for the most part, they remain flexible and
available for any non-specialized assignments. Some volunteer groups
contain various areas of expertise through its members but minimal
capability in any areas due to the small numbers of those individuals. In this
instance, and if possible, the tactic of group splitting may be of use. Group
splitting occurs when specific expertise is removed from one group to either
augment strength or strengthen another group’s weakness. The donor group
is primarily split apart to utilize its pieces because the whole did not fit a
needed capability. A more simple explanation may be placing the group’s
members into the volunteer pool. This technique can be difficult and require
a high level of coordination and understanding from the donor group. There
have been many instances where groups have been turned away because
their capabilities did not fit any existing missions or their logistical needs
outweighed their usefulness as a uniform group. Group splitting is one
method of utilizing volunteers in a current system while strengthening
existing teams and avoiding prolonged staging or lack of mission assignment
altogether. Again, this method requires a high level of cooperation, as
reassignment requires logistical alterations as well.
It is vital to maintain a significant amount of knowledge regarding
individuals’ skill sets in the labor pool, not to delay their assignment and to
ensure that it is appropriate. Volunteers tend to become frustrated when not
used in a reasonable amount of time. The crucial mistake of undervaluing
and underutilizing volunteers may be financially costly and even jeopardize
the overall mission’s timely success.
The EOC should be prepared to match both individuals and groups with
the appropriate missions to be successful. Since volunteers come in many
shapes and sizes, this task often proves tremendously tricky. In many cases,
emergency management may not have sufficient information or practiced
and proven techniques in place to properly categorize volunteers, much less
match them to appropriate missions. Volunteers for disasters often have
other commitments in their lives that preclude them from extended
missions. Therefore, volunteer time on a mission should be considered when
assigning individuals or groups to a task.
The specifics of managing volunteers make the process detail sensitive
and intensive. Ad hoc methods are rarely successful, so emergency
management authorities have developed many techniques to help gather,
analyze, and use the information to manage volunteers better. Numerous
systems include databases, spreadsheets, and software to help keep track of
this information. Still, all those systems require this data to be gathered,
entered, and kept current to be useful. The system should also be user
friendly. Often, volunteer management systems with extensive capabilities
are purchased to discover that they are too complicated to operate or require
extensive constant training to utilize.
Although it seems evident to the public that emergency management
should not forgo offering direction to would-be volunteers when help is
needed. Self-deployed volunteers come with the potential to make a positive
impact, but they end up making a negative impact more often than not.
Where volunteers are concerned, being unprepared to manage the self-
deployed versions can be just as detrimental as not having a system to
integrate them into at all. The EOC should be prepared to give direction to
those considering volunteerism or who have self-deployed at the time of
disaster. Successful methods of engaging this type of volunteer include
public information message maps for news opportunities prepared before the
event and various social media outlets. Specific news interviews regarding
volunteering have also been successful, but you must rely on the news
outlets to grant this opportunity. The occasion will only be offered under the
guidance of the news media as well.
Image 19.5 Providing Volunteers Direction
In recent times, social media such as Twitter and Facebook have shown
tremendous potential in communicating and updating the public on
volunteering and many other topics. Self-deployed volunteers often have no
information regarding the community’s actual needs or the common
operating picture for the event. They lack situational awareness and are not
privy to the intelligence that authorized official responders may know. For
these reasons and others, self-deployed volunteers can hamper existing
operations, offset the balance of needed services, and provide services in a
disaster-struck community. Examples include a group of volunteers
beginning debris removal before search and rescue operations are complete
or perhaps setting up a medical clinic where medical resources are adequate.
At the same time, another area goes without needed medical assistance. Self-
deployed volunteers often do not have the logistical support to sustain their
operation and therefore burden the community they are trying to help.
Emergency management and its partners should screen volunteer groups
to determine what logistical support is required upon activation. Volunteer
groups that are not expected or part of the emergency management system
can rapidly drain resources and hamper response and recovery efforts across
the spectrum. Self-deployed groups that request and need support from
emergency management may receive help if resources are not plentiful.
Emergency management and EOCs may find it very difficult to predict these
volunteers’ number or their impact on an incident. It can be assumed that
they will exist and that there must be a plan to communicate and manage
the self-deployed and official volunteers.
Volunteer Assessment
As you can see, managing volunteers is no easy task. The larger the event or
incident, the more difficult it becomes. Volunteer managers must have a high
degree of knowledge concerning the volunteers needed in a disaster
deployment. Acquiring and keeping this knowledge requires various
assessments. There is no formal model for assessing volunteers, but
generalized information relative to the corresponding operations plan should
be available and current. Volunteer managers should acquire this
information and update it on a schedule that keeps it current within reason.
In addition to knowing the plans, EOC structure, and types of volunteers,
volunteer managers must understand the various laws that govern
volunteers. There are federal and state laws that regulate the use of
volunteers. There are two specific areas of law that often hamper the
volunteer effort and the management of volunteers. The first one is the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), monitored by the U.S. Department of Labor.
The FLSA covers many wage-related issues but most often causes concern
when professionals volunteer their professional services (U.S. Department of
Labor, 2015). Specific instances of volunteering should be examined for
FLSA and other legal compliance by the entity authorizing the volunteer
action.
The other common legal hurdle involves one of the most complex pieces
of volunteer management. That hurdle is credentialing. Credentialing is a
vital part of a successful volunteer management program, mainly where
professional licenses and certifications are required. Often credentialing is
combined with the initiation of resource tracking. Depending on whether
the EOC is charged with this duty, credentialing can be carried out through
logistics and monitored by the planning section. Credentialing is an integral
part of any response system, particularly those with volunteers, and
especially where licenses and certifications are required for the individual
tasks assigned. Emergency management officials should be confident that
individuals and groups assigned to particular tasks retain the appropriate
credentials to do those tasks.
Image 19.6 Social Media
There are many approaches to accomplishing credentialing. Recently, one

of the most common tools used to aid the credentialing process is electronic
software systems. Electronic systems can be integrated with various boards
and credentialing agencies to verify credentials. These systems may be costly
to implement and require extensive support to remain functional and
current. When executing contracts or entering agreements with volunteer
agencies, emergency management officials should include language that
advocates credentialing and compliance with all applicable credentialing
bodies. Volunteers that are not part of an established and trusted group that
contracts with the authority having jurisdiction will need to be monitored
by an appropriate authority to ensure that proper credentials are present.
This may, or may not, be the ultimate responsibility of emergency
management and the EOC.
The medical profession offers a typical example. Separate authorities often
credential doctors, nurses, and emergency medical technicians/paramedics,
as well as other allied health practitioners. Authorities vary from state to
state. Furthermore, there are various credentials in each of these professions,
and none of them enjoy universal reciprocity. Different credentialing laws
and rules may be relaxed with the stipulation of certain declarations. The
volunteer manager may need to be familiar with these circumstances and
their limitations.
An unfortunately common occurrence in disaster response and volunteer
management is the presumption of relaxed rules and laws. Incorrect
assumptions regarding these rules and regulations may result in unnecessary
legal liabilities. Along those same lines, the legal status of liability insurance,
malpractice, and workers’ compensation are details often overlooked that
later cause immense legal difficulties during or after the response. The health
and medical functions of state-level emergency management often utilize a
federally subsidized program called the Emergency Systems for Advanced
Registry of Volunteer Healthcare Professionals (ESAR-VHP) (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). This system can typically
verify credentials for most healthcare professions in many states. Depending
on the software used for the system, even this robust program may have
limitations. In many cases, out-of-state credentials are not included in the
system’s database.
Image 19.7 Simplistic, Initial Credentialing—Sign-In for Medical Staff Volunteers
at TMOSA Following Hurricane Katrina
Another form of credentialing may be more simplistic but no less critical.

Any individuals or groups operating under appropriate authorities should be
readily identifiable. For paid-response organizations, this is standard
practice. For volunteers, emergency management may need to take extra
steps to secure proper identification for volunteers’ credentialing. As
perimeters are set up, and the disaster area is defined and secured, disaster
relief workers who are authorized to work in the protected area will need
appropriate identification levels. The use of standardized identification is a
valuable tool in managing volunteers. It will help steer unsanctioned self-
deployed groups toward integrating with the existing emergency
management-authorized volunteer management system.
Successful tactics for credentialing include establishing a centralized
check-in and staging point that can issue official credentials. Tactics such as
these may also be under the direction of an EOC. Credentialing support is
commonly a joint effort in the incident command structure and most state
and local plans. Jurisdictions that strictly follow the National Response
Framework (NRF) and its Emergency Support Function (ESF) system tend to
assign credentialing to ESF-7, which are logistics management and resource
support. Other models have the credentialing function in several other ESFs,
and in some cases, ESFs are added for volunteer and donations management
to include credentialing.
The EOC or its assigned partner agency should establish the capability to
catalog and type known volunteers and volunteer groups. Just as we
discussed this need for individuals and self-deployed volunteers, it is also
needed for known volunteer groups. To assign volunteers to an appropriate
mission, the authority responsible for assignments should know volunteer
capabilities. Volunteer groups come with numerous capabilities and levels of
those capabilities. Vague descriptions of these capabilities and limited
understanding of the volunteer group can be a recipe for shortcomings and
other inadequate resource assignments. Volunteer coordinators should make
a specific effort to develop and cultivate relationships with established
volunteer groups. There are many national volunteer groups with local
chapters that are well-versed in collaborating with emergency management
and jurisdictional volunteer coordinators. Some of these groups are larger
than others, but many have developed their niche and do specific work
rather well. These groups are typically non-profit, non-governmental
organizations (NGO), or faith-based organizations. Examples include the
well-recognized Red Cross, the National Voluntary Organizations Active in
Disaster (VOAD), and the faith-based services of various Southern Baptist
organizations (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.).
The National VOAD, for example, has a mission of sharing knowledge and
resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparation, response, and recovery
—to help disaster survivors and their communities. Members of National
VOAD form a coalition of non-profit organizations that respond to disasters
as part of their overall mission. Various Southern Baptist and Baptist
organizations are respected nationally for services that range from meal
provisions to childcare. Almost every well-established faith-based
organization participates in disaster relief to some degree. In June of 2018,
FEMA published a document specifically designed to offer guidance on
volunteers’ management. Their Engaging Faith-Based and Community
Organizations, Planning Considerations for Emergency Managers (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2018) guide is an excellent source for
developing solid management plans for volunteers. The document can be
found on the FEMA website and contains helpful items like capabilities
checklists, individual skills surveys, and a list of related resources.
Faith-based and community organizations offer a wide variety of human and material resources
that can prove invaluable during and after an incident. Engaging Faith-based and Community
Organizations: Planning Considerations for Emergency Managers guide provides a methodology
for emergency managers to engage with faith-based and community organizations in enhancing
the resiliency of our nation. By building partnerships with these groups, emergency managers can
provide training and technical assistance to strengthen their skills, connect them with existing
partners, and then integrate them into emergency management plans and exercises before an
event occurs thus increasing response and recovery capability.
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2020b)
Established volunteer organizations have proven to be valuable pieces in

the formula for disaster response success. If you have a trusted relationship
and current visibility on these resources, they can ensure success where
traditional response agencies often fall short. While cultivating these
relationships, it is also important to maintain consistent communications.
An occasional call or visit can yield a number of useful results. Volunteer
agencies, even the large ones, may have a high degree of turnover or
instability. It is essential to maintain good communications to monitor for a
change in capabilities or their ability to support themselves from a logistical
standpoint. One example would be food services.
In some cases, a volunteer group may retain the capability to establish a
food kitchen and feed disaster victims or even responders for a pre-
established amount of time. This capability may depend on donations, so
volunteer managers will need to make adjustments for logistical support or
mission assignments when donations wane. These actions can be undertaken
during an emergency, but it is far easier to maintain an accurate capability
picture than to manage large amounts of contingency actions.
Communications may also provide some precious insight should the need
for conflict resolution arise. Many volunteer organizations are not strictly
purposed to help during disasters. They have other missions that can, on
occasion, conflict with either the jurisdictions’ mission or, in some cases, the
beliefs or mission of another volunteer agency. A personal relationship with
the leaders of your jurisdictions’ volunteer groups can go a long way in
conflict resolution and getting back to your collective objectives approved by
the Incident Commander of the incident or event.
Another successful technique in making the most of your volunteer
resources is training. Although many programs are available, such as
Citizens Emergency Response Teams (CERT) or Medical Reserve Corps
(MRC), there are just as many organized and unorganized groups and
individuals who simply need direction to be a successful part of the
response. After examining existing plans and studying historical disaster
operations, the volunteer manager may want to develop just in time (JIT)
training for specific duties. JIT has proven useful in many disaster responses.
During Hurricane Katrina, thousands of self-deployed volunteers were given
JIT from hundreds of groups, which allowed them to be a useful part of the
response.
CERT and MRCs are two examples of organized volunteer groups
specifically formed to help during disasters. CERT is affiliated and sponsored
by FEMA. “The CERT program educates volunteers about disaster
preparedness for the hazards that may impact their area and trains them in
basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, light search and rescue,
team organization, and disaster medical operations” (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2020a). Interested volunteers and CERT members can
access CERT basic training materials like planning guides, slide decks, and
videos from the CERT website. Liability guides, as well as exercise guides,
are also available for interested parties. As with many successful emergency
management programs, CERT was born out of disaster response to the
Whittier Narrows earthquake in 1987. CERT became a national program in
1993 and is present in all 50 US states. As of January 2020, there are
currently more than 2,700 programs that have trained more than 600,000
volunteers.
Image 19.8 CERT
CERT didn’t stop there. There are specific programs and materials for the
workplace, school campus, and even teen CERT. Hopefully, your jurisdiction
has one or more CERT teams, but if not, they are easy to get started, and all
of the materials are available free of charge, thanks to FEMA.
The MRC is another quasi-government organization sponsored by the
Department of Health and Human Services but operated by local volunteer
officials. The MRC mission focuses on collaborative healthcare professionals
and “healthcare enthusiasts” as volunteers, specifically supporting medical-
related missions. These groups vary in capabilities and can be quite small or
extremely large. Some of these groups can staff large field hospitals on their
own or augment existing hospitals to help with patient surge or first receiver
fatigue. According to their website, “Many MRC volunteers assist with
activities to improve public health in their community – increasing health
literacy, supporting prevention efforts and eliminating health disparities”
(Medical Reserve Corps, 2020).
As technology is developed, management operations change. In some
ways, the scope of management capabilities is significantly increased
through technology and, in other ways, equally confounded. Technology
allows emergency managers to use electronic registries, do background
checks, communicate with large groups of people, educate, monitor essential
data, and the list goes on. Volunteer managers should avail themselves of
any technology they feel they can manage while also performing their
inherent duties as volunteer-manager. There are several common pitfalls to
acquiring technology for emergency management that goes along with
notable benefits.
In many cases, the technology requires more time and financial support
than initially anticipated. Volunteer groups and emergency management
agencies can encounter serious issues if adequate due diligence isn’t done
before purchasing software or hardware intended to make tasks easier.
Another potential problem tends to be time management. Sometimes
technology can create ample opportunities for improvement that require
significant more person-hours to achieve. Social media is one of the most
profound technological phenomena of the modern age. Social media
platforms have been utilized to crowdsource funding, resources, and human
capital, unlike any other tool in history. Entire volunteer organizations have
risen from ad hoc social media campaigns. Social media has also been used
as an operational tool to provide guidance, tasks, and real-time
communication with field assets and resources. As with any new device or
technology, social media doesn’t come without its potential issues either.
Without the confines of organization and agency oversight, social media can
also be a tool of misinformation, false information and severely hinder
volunteer management efforts. Social media is rapidly becoming ingrained
in our current society, and methods to harness its ability to help in disasters
and volunteer management will continue to evolve and improve.
Many emergency managers and volunteer managers underestimate the
positive and the negative economic and functional impact of volunteer
groups. Volunteer operations can infuse a disaster area with much-needed
spending. Volunteer groups that help restore either normal operations of
local businesses or patrons’ ability to reestablish business with them can
prove vital to the recovery effort. Non-traditional operations such as home
cleanup, small debris removal, childcare, food services, and even security
can rapidly jumpstart recovery operations far in advance of the work that
traditional emergency services provide. Volunteer services often provide
people’s initial actions to return to their homes and business after disaster
strikes. However, these services can outlast their need as well. The provision
of free services in place of paid services that pre-existed the disaster should
serve as a temporary bridge to recovery and not intentionally or
unintentionally supplant the services in place before the disaster. The art of
removing free or volunteer services at the appropriate time is challenging to
master. Volunteer managers and emergency managers should develop
assessment techniques and establish triggers to pull back free services to
permanently cripple businesses in their recovery process. Large-scale
disasters such as hurricanes may require a long-term response and recovery
services in the disaster area. In several instances, local businesses have been
forced out of business by similar services for volunteers. This is especially
true in the small retail and medical fields.
The demobilization of volunteers is an essential and intuitive process that
is often overlooked by emergency management officials. Admittedly,
emergency management may have little to no authority over volunteer
organizations. Still, excellent communication and guidance from emergency
management officials concerning a community’s economic and functional
stability may go a long way in protecting that community from being over
serviced. A good volunteer management plan should contain triggers for
mobilization as well as demobilization. These triggers should account for the
long-term effects of volunteer services that may have a profound economic
impact.
The management of volunteers is a complex and vital service that is
essential in all disasters. As with any asset or resource, preparing to receive
them and integrate them into a uniform and organized response can be a
formula for profound success in small- and large-scale events. Emergency
management and volunteer management officials should maintain a current
common operating picture of volunteer services cataloged and easily used
for mission tasking. Officials should also prepare to manage self-deployed
volunteers and continuously examine the short- and long-term effects of
volunteer services. Finally, knowing when and how to demobilize volunteer
services may prove just as useful in the long term as knowing how to use
them in the first place.
References
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2010). FEMA Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101. Retrieved from:
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2018, June). Engaging Faith-Based
and Community Organizations. Retrieved from:
8fa08bed9d957cdc324c2b7f6a92903b/Engaging_Faith-
based_and_Community_Organizations.pdf
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2020a). CERT. Retrieved from:
https://www.ready.gov/cert
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2020b). Strategic and Operational
Planning. Retrieved from: https://www.fema.gov/plan
Lash, J.P. (1981). Helen and Teacher : The Story of Helen Keller and Anne
Sullivan Macy. Amer Foundation for the Blind.
Medical Reserve Corps (2020). Medical Reserve Corps. Retrieved from:
https://mrc.hhs.gov/VolunteerFldr/AboutVolunteering
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (n.d.). National VOAD.
Retrieved from: http://www.nvoad.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=188
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (n.d.). Emergency System
for the Advanced Registry of Volunteer Healthcare Professionals.
Retrieved from: http://www.phe.gov/esarvhp/pages/default.aspx
U.S. Department of Labor (2015, August). Fact Sheet #14A. United States
Department of Interior. Retrieved from:
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs14a.pdf
Chapter 20
Emergency Management Facilitation of

Responder’s Health and Safety
David Stumbo, Christine B. Petitti, and Michael J.
Fagel
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-23
Section 1: Introduction and the Challenge
Introduction
By their nature, emergency response operations are hazardous, involving
fires, natural disasters, violence, biohazards, chemical releases, and others.
As chance might have it, several of these challenging situations may be
presented in combination in some cases. This chapter focuses on the hazards
faced by the personnel engaged in official response efforts, applicable
regulations and codes designed to provide protection to them, and the
mechanisms through which the occupational safety and health (OS&H) of
these essential employees can be safeguarded. This section considers the
SO’s responsibilities and difficulties offers suggestions on how s/he might
use personal influence to accomplish the mission of safety.
The Challenge
The role of Safety Officer (SO), Safety Liaison, Safety Manager, or such title,
carries with it a big challenge. The job is a great responsibility for any
individual. In addition to understanding the principles of hazard
identification and control and a multitude of applicable regulations and
codes, the SO must be capable of monitoring multiple-response operations
concurrently, relative to their implications for responder OS&H. The ability
to anticipate potential hazards is invaluable, especially since much
information is likely to be derived second-hand from the field.
The Safety Officer (SO) duty is not without its downsides. Consider that
for an SO, the absolute perfect day of a response operation is one in which
no injuries, illnesses, or fatalities (e.g., tragedies) occur among responders.
Afterward, the SO may not receive any particular recognition or reward.
When doing a great job, the situation is preventative, and tragedies that
didn’t happen aren’t often measured. It’s much the same for policing and
crime prevention. This is not to say that meaningful metrics don’t exist (i.e.,
near-hits/close calls, equipment failures, etc.) for OS&H, but from the
10,000-foot view of many, significant attention is given only to tragic
outcomes.
Image 20.1 Safety Officer
Making the Case

The SO may be challenged by what Wachter (2011) described as the burden
of “not being able to fully execute their perceived moral/ethical
responsibilities to provide a safe workplace” (p. 55). Indeed, the SO may be
compelled to make a vigilant case for safety amidst the chaos of multiple
response activities, in cramped quarters, against competing objectives, and
limited attention spans. Failure in this regard could result in dire
consequences for responders; tragedies. It may fall upon the SO to be the
dissenting voice in the room (Rebbitt, 2013), and he/she must be prepared to
make persuasive arguments on behalf of responders’ safety. It has been
suggested that a safety adviser’s ability to influence may be as important as
the quality of his/her organization’s safety and health management system
(Swuste & Arnold, 2003). A review of after-action and lessons learned
reports from major incidents would demonstrate the role that human
behavior and decision-making plays. The SO’s role is to serve as a subject-
matter expert on safety and provide advice in that regard. However,
providing advice must be thought of as an active endeavor, not simply
referencing technical details or quantifying risk.
Persuasion and Influence

In application, influential tactics employed by the SO can be thought of as
downward (e.g., on field responders), lateral (e.g., on other command staff),
and upward (e.g., on the IC), (Lee et al, 2017).
These parties are referred to at the target of the effort to influence (the
term “target” is used to mean several different things, depending upon the
context in which it is being used to refer to individuals upon which certain
safety measures or communications are being focused). For emergency
response scenarios, the SO will most likely be challenged by the need for
upward influence. Research by Madigan et al. (2020), suggests that the most
effective methods for influencing organizational decision-makers are
rational persuasion and inspirational appeal, while legitimating and the
exchange was least. These tactics are explained by Madigan et al. (2020) as
follows:
Rational persuasion—the use of logic and factual evidence to show

benefit
Inspirational appeal—the use of emotion linked to the target’s values,
hopes, and ideals
Legitimating—the use of references to a higher authority,
organizational policies, and rules
Exchange—the use of a reward if the target provides support or
approval.
Attempts at using guilt or hypocrisy are considered problematic, as

explained by O’Keefe (2002, p. 332): arousing guilt by drawing the target’s
attention to inconsistencies between the target’s conduct and his/her own
conduct can be counterproductive, as these methods are considered highly
likely to evoke adverse reactions in the target, and undermine the success of
the effort to influence.
Authority to Stop Work

The authority to stop response activities is a powerful means to ensure
responder safety. The stop-work order is analogous to the emergency brake
on the car. In some OSHA regulations, a designated competent person
authorized to take prompt action to eliminate employee exposure to hazards
must be available during operations (General Safety and Health Provisions,
1993). NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management
System and Command Safety (NFPA, 2020b) requires a SO within the
command staff unless the IC carries out this function. The SO is authorized
to alter, stop, or suspend any response activity that he or she determines to
pose an immediate hazard to responders.
However, circumstances may not always provide such authority to the
SO. NFPA 1561 requires that the SO work through the IC to take corrective
action for hazards that don’t constitute an immediate threat. It may also be
the case that the IC or other command staff are resistant to attempts by the
SO to control hazards if those efforts appear to compromise response efforts.
Here, the need for effective influence may arise.
Image 20.2 Authority to Stop Work

Risk Management
In making a case for OS&H, the SO can refer to risk management principles
found in well-known codes such as NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency
Services Incident Management System and Command Safety (NFPA, 2020b).
The three principles hold that: 1) no risk is acceptable when there is no
possibility of saving lives or property; 2) the risk inherent in routine
operations taken to save life and property is acceptable, but must be
accompanied with control measures; and 3) significant risk must be limited
only to situations that have the potential to save endangered lives. An
important provision of NFPA 1561, 5.3.19 (NFPA, 2020b) is that the response
must be limited to defensive operations whenever the risk to responders is
excessive.
These are important tenants with dramatically substantial implications on
responder safety. It is important for the SO to recognize that because some
ambiguity in the code exists (e.g., a definition of excessive risk is not
provided in the code, nor differentiated from significant risk), the SO could
seek to influence the IC tactical decisions. The SO is strongly cautioned here,
as tactical decisions such as defensive operations employment could result in
negative live safety consequences.
Also, it should be understood that NFPA 1561’s approach to risk
management applies only to emergency services personnel engaged in the
management of emergency Thus, non-emergency services
incidents.
personnel engaged in emergency responses and personnel engaged in non-
emergency operations should be assessed under a risk management
paradigm that provides a greater degree of protection.
The Threat of OSHA Inspections/Citations

This is a potential means for convincing an IC or others, especially if OSHA
representatives are on scene or are likely to be. A type of legitimating
influence, a drawback associated with this method is its low likelihood to
produce an intrinsically motivated commitment from the target (Madigan et
al., 2020). The SO’s challenge would be substantially easier if decision-
makers were intrinsically motivated towards OS&H, but the threat of OSHA
enforcement activities could nonetheless find success among the rule-based
culture of the EOC.
Image 20.3 Risk–Benefit Analysis
Ethical Arguments
Perhaps the most central ethical principle applied to preventing occupational
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities holds that the employee must be treated as a
human with dignity, not just as a means of production (Kapp & Parboteeah,
2008). This inspirational appeal might not seem applicable to the emergency
response operation, it is. The employee is the firefighter, EMT, police officer,
another responder, and the production is the response operation itself. The
need to protect human dignity is an underlying tenet of risk management.
Command staff or other key decision-makers may push back on an
ethically-based argument by citing the golden rule; do unto others as you
would have done to you. For example, a decision-maker feels that a situation
that might put responders at elevated risk is acceptable because, if the
decision-maker were a responder, then he/she would gladly accept the
greater risk. (Such arguments are often accompanied by reflective accounts
of how the decision-maker had encountered similar or even more dangerous
circumstances in the past, to build credibility to his/her argument.) An
option for responding to the golden rule is the platinum rule, which holds
that people should be treated the way they wish to be treated. In action, only
the platinum rule preserves human dignity (e.g., responder safety) because it
considers the individual.
Solutions Vs. Problems

Care should be exercised when voicing safety concerns that a decision-
maker might construe as the SO delivering bad news. It is best to take a path
that will present “achievable, practical solutions … not mistakes they may
have made” (Rebbitt, 2013, p. 60). Thus, the SO is cautioned not to
immediately fire off a list of applicable OSHA regulations, NFPA codes, and
technical details at the IC or other decision-maker, but rather first provide a
risk analysis and offer several options as a solution. This would approximate
a rational method of persuasion.
Section 2: Key Aspects of OSHA
OS&H Regulations
Decisions concerning the safety and health of personnel may be balanced at
times between what is legally mandated and what are referred to as best
practices. Mandates in this sense typically emanate from the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. This section will give
a brief review of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act,
1970), OSHA’s regulatory framework, and how it responds to significant
emergency events.
History of OSHA
OSHA was created by the OSH Act (1970), with the mission to “ensure safe
and healthful working conditions for working men and women by setting
and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, education, and
assistance” (OSHA, n.d.a, n.p.). The agency is housed within the U.S.
Department of Labor. It is perhaps most widely recognized for its role in
enforcing employers and employees’ rights and responsibilities under the
OSH Act. However, as detailed below, OSHA’s activities involving
consultative assistance and guidance play a significant role in emergency
response and disaster site operations.
Image 20.4 OSHA
The OSH Act sets certain limits on OSHA’s jurisdiction while other
authorities, legislation, executive orders, and agreements have resulted in a
patchwork of provisions for employee safety and health. OSHA’s jurisdiction
is limited to private-sector employers in the 50 states and some territories
and jurisdictions under federal authority such as the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and others. Self-employed
persons are exempt from the OSH Act (OSHA, 2018).
Under the OSH Act, OSHA allows states to operate their programs,
referred to as state plans. Such state plans must provide employee
protections that are at least as effective as those provided by OSHA. In some
cases, the state plan may carry more stringent requirements than those
required by OSHA. Some state plans provide coverage for both private and
public sector employees, while others cover only public sector employees
with OSHA providing coverage of the private sector (OSHA, 2018).
The complexity of jurisdiction is amplified by variations in coverage for
maritime, federal employees, employees covered under other legislation such
as the Federal Railway Administration, Federal Aviation Administration. In
some cases, coverage may depend on minutia, such as whether or not the
employer has an operational plan negotiated with the other Federal agency
in place which covers a specific working condition. Ultimately, it is
incumbent upon responding agencies to identify which agency has
jurisdiction for occupational safety and health over their activities
concerning location and activity to ensure compliance with applicable
requirements.
Along with OSHA, the OSH Act of 1970 created two other important
institutions: the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(2006). NIOSH is the agency responsible for scientific research and technical
aspects of occupational safety and health. Housed within the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), NIOSH conducts and supports
endeavors such as epidemiology, safety, psychology, engineering, and others.
The agency issues important notices and publications relative to many OSH-
related topics (NIOSH, 2020b) A program significant to emergency
operations is the National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory
(NPPTL), which conducts the approval program for respiratory protection
performance requirements defined under 42 CFR 84 (NIOSH, 2020c). The
NPPTL provides technical guidance on other types of PPE as well.
The OSHRC is an independent administrative court system which
adjudicates disputes between OSHA, employers, and employees. Under the
OSH Act, employers and employees may contest citations issued by OSHA.
The OSHRC provides adjudication first by an Administrative Law Judge and
then upon appeal to the three OSHRC Commissions. Appeal of OSHRC
decisions are possible through the U.S. Court of Appeals system. In states
where OSHA has authorized state enforcement of occupational safety and
health laws, a state-administered court system will take the place of the
OSHRC (OSHRC, 2006).
Data obtained from OSHA’s inspection database (OSHA, 2021) indicated
that from 2010 to 2020, a total of more than 7,470 inspections were
conducted in establishments under the North American Industrial Code
System (NAICS) 922160—Fire Protection. Search parameters for State was
All States and Fed & State; for Other Options: All Owner and Comp or Part.
Start Date was calendar year 2010 and End Date was calendar year 2020, and
NAICS was 922160. All other terms were default values.
Applicable OSHA Standards

OSHA standards most likely to apply to emergency operations fall under
several regulations broadly codified under 29 CFR Part 1910, General
Industry. It is also possible that OSHA’s standards under 29 CFR 1926,
Construction, might apply. This is because OSHA considers the specific
nature of the work activity when deciding of application; 1910.12(b) defines
construction work as construction, alteration, and/or repair, including
painting and decorating (Construction Work, n.d.). A common source of
confusion in this regard is maintenance work, which may be very similar.
Still, it has been considered by OSHA to fall under 29 CFR 1910, General
industry, rather than 29 CFR 1926, Construction standards.
Understanding application is important, as a number of general industry
and construction standards are exactly the same. For example: 29 CFR
1910.1200, Hazard Communication and 29 CFR 1926.59, Hazard
Communication are the same while others, like 29 191.1001, Asbestos and 29
CFR 1925.1101, Asbestos, are only similar in some respect but not others
(Title 29 Labor, 2020). It is recommended that for given work activity, both
versions, 29 CFR 1910 and 1926 be reviewed, as OSHA is known to issue
dual citations under both parts, a process known as “in the alternative”
(OSHA, 1994, n.p.).
Vertical Vs. Horizontal Standards

The determination of mandatory requirements found within OSHA
standards can vary from specific (vertical) industries, operations, and work
methods to broad (horizontal) and wide-ranging applications. OSHA policies
hold that if a given hazard is covered by vertical and horizontal standards
concurrently, the more vertical standard will be controlling in most cases
(OSHA, 2020). Example: OSHA regulates flammable and combustible liquids
under 29 CFR 1910.106. This standard applies to a wide variety of
applications (horizontal). However, for spray finishing operations involving
flammable liquids, 29 CFR 1910.107 applies (vertical).
General Duty Clause

A powerful legal mandate referred to as the General Duty Clause, carried by
Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act of 1970, has been applied to many
circumstances. OSHA may cite employers “if a recognized serious hazard
exists in their workplace, and the employer does not take reasonable steps to
prevent or abate the hazard” (OSHA, 2003a, n.p.). This is only possible if an
OSHA standard does not exist, which applies the particular hazard. Some
examples of recognized hazards for which OSHA does not have standards
include ergonomics, COVID-19, and anthrax.
The four elements required to support a violation of the General Duty
Clause are as follows (OSHA, 2020, n.p.):
a. The employer failed to keep the workplace free of a hazard to which

employees of that employer were exposed;
b. The hazard was recognized;
c. The hazard was causing or was likely to cause death or serious physical
harm; and
d. There was a feasible and useful method to correct the hazard.
The Safety Officer or other OS&H practitioner should know that many of
OSHA’s standards should be regarded as providing only a minimum level of
protection. Beyond OSHA’s legal mandate are best practices, diverse codes,
standards, and guidance publications. While too many to list, some of the
most applicable to responder safety include those published by the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA), American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), and the CDC. The greater level of protective measures afforded by
the application of best practices should be utilized whenever feasible. It is
also noteworthy that some codes may have been incorporated into law and
thus be made mandatory in some jurisdictions.
OSHA’s Response to Catastrophic Incidents

The National Response Framework (NRF) indicates that OSHA should serve
as the coordinator for worker safety and health technical support (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2019). For incidents that occur in state-
plan jurisdictions, the state would have primary response responsibility,
with OSHA working cooperatively to assist. The agency’s responses to
nationally significant incidents are specified in The National Contingency
Plan under the Worker Safety and Health Support annex (OSHA, 2003c)
(https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/gettingstarted_role.ht
ml).
While OSHA may dispatch personnel to the scene of an emergency and
the Emergency Operation Center (EOC), the agency has no authority over
the conduct of emergency response operations. It may not directly interfere
(OSHA, 2020). However, it has directed its Compliance Officers to monitor
and conduct inspections as needed to ensure employees’ safety and health.
OSHA policy and guidance documents which further detail its operations
and compliance procedures are found in
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/3356.html.
OSHA’s activities will vary according to the phase of an incident. Note
that during the active, initial response phase, OSHA operates in a
cooperative mode, but switches to enforcement once the recovery phase is
reached (OSHA, n.d.k). These are further detailed in Table 20.1, OSHA’s
Phased Response to Catastrophic Incidents, below.
OSHA’s response to recent disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma was to suspend most enforcement activities of heavily impacted
localities in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana (OSHA, 2006). The
agency provided technical assistance to clean-up and recovery employers
and employees while investigating employee complaints, catastrophic
accidents (at the time, defined as incidents resulting in the hospitalization of
three or more employees), and fatalities. OSHA developed a number of
Hurricane response-related training tools due to the lessons learned from
these disasters, including the Hurricane eMatrix that carries over 20 task-
specific guidance documents (OSHA, 2007b).
OSHA Inspections
Inspection of emergency response operations is likely to have occurred due
to OSHA (or state-level equivalent agency) being notified by a federal, state,
or local responding agency. The agency also monitors media outlets as well.
Relative to enforcement operations, after he/she arrives on site, the OSHA
compliance officer (CO) will present credentials, including both a
photograph and a serial number, and request to speak to the highest-ranking
management official available.
An opening conference is then held with an employee representative (e.g.
union steward), if any, during which the CO will explain the reason for the
inspection and explain the inspection process. After that, a physical
inspection of the worksite will be carried out to the extent possible, with the
observation of work procedures, review of documentation, and employees’
interviews. The inspection finishes with a closing conference, during which a
preliminary review of findings and potential corrective measures if
applicable (OSHA, 2016). In some cases, the CO may return on subsequent
days if appropriate to gather additional information. The inspection process
may vary significantly, as noted above, if the agency assumes a
cooperative/assistance role instead of enforcement.
CTA Acoustics Explosion

In 2003, a combustible dust explosion and fire at the CTA Acoustics
production facility in Corbin, KY killed seven and injured 37 employees.
Following the 9–1-1 call, the West Know fire crews arrived on the scene
within ten minutes, calling in three other departments upon seeing the
smoke plume. A county Emergency Management Director arrived and
became Incident Commander, established a command post, and began
seeking information on the production materials and processes.
A material safety data sheet for one of the key raw materials, phenolic
resin, was obtained from CTA Acoustics officials. The phenolic resin
manufacturer was contacted and informed the responders that the material
could produce trace amounts of hydrogen cyanide, ammonia, formaldehyde,
phenol, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide upon combustion. The initial
evacuation zone (e.g., the plant) was expanded to a 0.5-mile radius, requiring
the evacuation of schools, homes, and businesses. Miscommunications
among responding agencies led the evacuation zone to be expanded out to
1.5 miles, which involved shutting down a section of Interstate 75. Further
confusion resulted from news media reports that a 1.5-mile-wide cyanide
cloud had been produced (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board, 2005).
Kentucky operates a state plan, meaning that the Kentucky Labor Cabinet
carries jurisdiction in the state rather than OSHA (OSHA, n.d.i).
Table 20.1 OSHA’s Phased Response to Catastrophic Incidents
Initial Re-Occupancy
Recovery or
response or phase (following
Pre-Planning “consequence
“crisis any necessary
Phase management”
management” decontamination
phase
phase efforts):
▪ Proactive ▪ Operate in a ▪ Continue to ▪ The ultimate

reviews by cooperative operate within responsibility in
OSHA of mode with the established determining when
safety and other command it is “safe” to return
health agencies in system to to work lies solely
programs the support the lead with the employer.
developed by established agency by ▪ Only OSHA has
various command providing the authority to
response system; technical safety review the
agencies. ▪ Support the and health employer’s
▪ lead federal expertise; decisions related to
Identification agency by ▪ Continue to re-occupancy of
and resolution providing monitor the worksite.
of pertinent technical activities by OSHA will
safety and safety and employers, evaluate these
health issues health including decisions and
before an expertise; government provide assistance,
incident ▪ Identify and agencies and direction, and/or
occurs. resolve safety contractors, to enforcement as
▪ Increase and health ensure that necessary to assure
coordination issues appropriate a safe and healthful
and associated
Initial safety and Re-Occupancy
Recovery or
understanding response
with theor health phase (following
between response
“crisis procedures are any necessary
Phase management”
OSHA and management”
effort; being followed, decontamination
various ▪ Evaluate
phase and phase
providing efforts):
response activities to assistance, workplace for the
agencies. ensure that direction or returning workers.
employers enforcement as ▪ The employer
(including necessary; may rely upon
responders) ▪ Ensure that information,
follow the various guidance, and
appropriate employers and direction provided
safety and contractors by various federal
health develop and and local
procedures; implement governmental
and relevant Health agencies.
▪ Respond and Safety ▪ While employees
directly to Plans (HASPs) may never be
requests from according to exposed to
employers or applicable conditions that
workers. requirements of threaten their
the OSHA health or well-
HAZWOPER being, it may not
standard (29 always be possible
CFR 1910.120); or feasible to
▪ Continue to decontaminate the
respond directly worksite to pre-
to requests for event levels.
assistance from ▪ When
employers and determining
workers; and appropriate clean-
▪ Initiate up levels, the
enforcement employer may find
Initial actions as Re-Occupancy
Recovery or
response or necessary and phase (following
“crisis appropriate. any necessary
Phase management”
management” decontamination
phase
phase efforts):
it necessary to
implement
additional controls
such as personal
protective
equipment and
certain work
practices as a
supplement to
decontamination
efforts.
Section 3: OS&H of Field Personnel
This section begins with the hierarchy of controls and then moves on to
review a range of hazards that may be encountered during response
operations. While primarily considering the OS&H of responders in the field,
many of the hazards presented could apply to personnel working in the EOC
as well.
The Hierarchy of Controls

A key principle of OS&H is the hierarchy of controls. It is universally
applicable regardless of circumstances; staging areas, hot zone, ICP, EOC,
station house, office park. Any method used to prevent or minimize hazards
is referred to as a control. The various methods employed for controlling
hazards fall into a hierarchy with the most protective found at the top and
least protective at the bottom.
The categories of controls, ranging from most protective to least are:
elimination (removing the hazard from the work area); substitution
(replacing the hazard with a less harmful alternative); engineering controls
(isolating persons from the hazard), administrative controls (altering how
work is done); and personal protective equipment (protective equipment
which must be worn by employees).
While not all control methods may be feasible under all conditions, the
SO or other responsible person should seek to follow the hierarchy of
controls when prescribing control measures. The importance of the approach
is highlighted in numerous OSHA compliance directives, such as the
agency’s memoranda directing that compliance officers should determine
and document whether affected employers had “implemented a hierarchy of
controls for worker protection, i.e., engineering controls, administrative
controls, work practices, or PPE” (OSHA, 2011, p. 13).
Even though PPE is considered the least protective form of control, its
potential for providing a substantial degree of protection dictates that it still
be worn when appropriate. The practice of combining multiple control
methods (i.e., engineering controls and PPE, or engineering controls,
administrative, and PPE) if feasible is highly recommended. In some
regulations (i.e., 1910.1001, Asbestos; 1910.1027; Cadmium, or 1910.1047,
Ethylene Oxide) OSHA requires that if a hazard can’t be completely
controlled by the use of engineering and work practice controls, that the
employer nonetheless still use them to reduce employee exposure, while also
providing respiratory protection.
Some examples of controls are as follows.
Elimination: It is not lost on the author that many emergency situations

are in whole an effort at elimination (i.e., extinguish fires, seal leaking
chemical tanks). On a more practical level, an example of elimination
would be the use of aerial drones to inspect a rooftop, rather than have
an employee climb to heights.
Substitution: Use of electric power when available rather than
generator power. Generators typically produce noise and carbon
monoxide, so they are potentially more hazardous.
Engineering: Use of water with masonry saws to capture silica-
containing dust, rather than relying on PPE or local wind pattern.
Administrative: Requiring periodic rest breaks during periods of high
exertion to prevent employees from developing muscle strains and
other musculoskeletal disorders.
PPE: Use of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA) respiratory protection when air contaminants can’t be
controlled through other means.
When considering control method options, it is important to avoid a

pitfall referred to as creating a greater hazard. This situation can arise if a
control measure carries with it the unintentional effect of exposing an
affected employee to an even more hazardous condition than the hazard
originally sought to control against. More simply put, the cure is worse than
the disease. An example would be using a full-body harness-retrieval line
system in a horizontally accessed confined space where the internal
configuration (e.g., corners, poles, other obstructions) would bind and snag
an employee being retrieved. In such cases, the use of wrist or ankle
attachment points for the retrieval line, while typically not appropriate,
would present a lesser hazard (OSHA, 2004).
Image 20.5 Hierarchy of Controls CDC Graphic
Source: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/hierarchy/default.html
Key Hazards
Some hazards may have some degree of impact on emergency responders
and emergency management, and for which OSHA provides standards and
regulations. The following area discusses several of those considered “key
hazards” by the authors. In an effort to provide clarity, some degree of detail
is needed for each. Although not necessarily exciting reading, these key
hazard discussions are important.
Focus Four Hazards

Focus four hazards is a group of hazards composed of falls, caught-
in/caught-between, stuck-by, and electrocution. (Disregard that electrocution
more correctly constitutes an unfortunate outcome of an electrical hazard.)
Originally formulated by OSHA to address the four most common
occupational fatalities sources among construction workers, the focus four
paradigm applies to many emergency response activities (OSHA Training
Institute, 2011).
Falls
The most hazardous types of falls are referred to as falls from height. The
height in this sense varies among differing mandates and codes but should
generally be understood to be four (4) or more feet of vertical distance. Falls
at a lesser distance, referred to as falls at level, can be grouped along with
slips and trips. Lower-level falls can be dangerous and should not be
disregarded, but in this discussion, falls at height are considered due to the
increased likelihood of fatal results.
Provision of fall protection equipment is required by OSHA at varying
trigger heights depending on the nature of the work activity. Some of the
most common are as follows:
General industry work: 4 feet (Duty to have fall protection and falling
object protection, 2016).
Work from scaffolding is 10 feet (Scaffolds and rope descent systems,
2019).
Work above dangerous machinery or equipment requires fall protection
regardless of the working height (Duty to have fall protection and
falling object protection, 2016).
Fall protection equipment is considered to include all the various controls

available to prevent a responder from falling. It includes permanent and
temporary railing, barricades, netting systems, covers and doors, and
personal fall arrest systems (PFAS). PFAS are a form of personal protective
equipment and are discussed further below.
Ladders and Lifts
OSHA does not require the use of fall protection equipment while working
on portable ladders or most fixed ladders (OSHA, 2003b). Regardless, a
widely used best practice for employees working from any ladder is to tie off
to suitable anchorages or use a ladder safety device, if feasible.
Several OSHA’s ladder regulations at 29 CFR 1910.23 (Ladders, 2019) are
specification standards, meaning that they carry exact specifications (e.g.,
rung spacing, maximum runs for fixed ladders). Additional guidance specific
to fire department use of ground ladders can be found in NFPA 1931,
Standard for Manufacturer’s Design of Fire Department Ground Ladders
(NFPA, 2020c).
Of more concern than specifications are how ladders are used. Practical to
response operations is the guidance on use and maintenance found in NFPA
1932, Standard on Use, Maintenance, and Service Testing of In-Service Fire
Department Ground Ladders (NFPA, 2020d). Some of the commonly
encountered problems with ladder use involve the following.
Employees have the tendency to want to carry one or more items while
traveling up or down, which prevents the use of the preferred technique
of 3-points of contact. Items should be raised or lowered with a rope
after travel is finished.
The carrying capacity of ladders must not be exceeded. Two fully-
geared persons could overload type 1AA ladders, rated at 375 lbs.
(ANSI, 2018).
Caught-In/Caught-Between Hazards
These hazards include being crushed, compressed, pinched, and similar
actions between mobile objects such as firefighting apparatus, earth-moving
equipment, automobiles, and stationary objects. These hazards can also
result from smaller-scale events like being caught between rolling objects
and equipment such as beds or ladders moved hydraulically. Even smaller-
scale hazards are also presented by portable power tool operation.
Various measures are needed to safeguard responders from these hazards.
The use of backup alarms on trucks and other mobile equipment is essential.
Still, additional measures must be accompanied, such as the careful location
of mobile equipment relative to locations where individuals may be present.
Rest areas, muster points, and travel paths should be located away from
mobile equipment traffic areas. Individuals must also be routed and remain
clear from hazards presented by large moving parts such as the swing radius
of the rotating superstructure of a crane.
Finally, all persons in such areas should don high-visibility clothing.
Certainly, turn-out gear and many heavy-duty jackets are manufactured to
meet visibility requirements, but the SO should keep in mind that these may
be removed in warmer conditions. It may be advisable to have high visibility
T-shirts on hand. This PPE should comply with ANSI/ISEA 107, American
national standard for high-visibility safety apparel and accessories, type P
garment designation (ANSI/ISEA, 2015).
Hydraulic and pneumatic machinery movements and smaller-scale
hazards are presented by belts, gears, sprockets, and similar parts found on
portable power tools such as chainsaws, reciprocating saws, and power
shears, and guards from the manufacturer should provide protection.
Employees should be cautioned not to operate such equipment if they have
loose clothing and other gear that might be caught and pulled in.
Also in this group are the hazards posed by cave-ins from excavations and
buildings and structures collapse. Entrants must be protected from collapse
by a boxing or shoring system or sloping or benching the soil for trenches
five feet or greater in depth.
The potential for structural collapse must be subjected to an ongoing
evaluation that considers the conditions of the structure and environment.
The SO may need to consult with experts such as registered engineers to
ensure buildings’ integrity before and throughout entry operations.
Struck-By Hazards
Struck-by hazards can result in serious injuries and fatalities from being
struck by flying objects such as propeller blades or a crane boom. Craning
and other overhead operations require that a work zone be established, and
individuals kept clear of a crane boom’s swing radius. Suspended loads must
never be taken overhead of persons.
Image 20.6 Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices Federal Highway

Administration Graphic
Source: U.S Department of Transportation, Retrieved from: https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov
This category of hazards also includes being hit by faster-moving motor

vehicles and heavy equipment. Traffic control, in this sense, is hazard
control. Designated individuals or flaggers should direct traffic, and high
visibility shirts, jackets, or vests should be utilized to ensure that workers are
most easily seen by equipment and vehicle operators. The Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) should be reviewed for key
protective measures (Federal Highway Administration, 2020).
Electrocution
Hazards associated with electricity include burns, shock, and fatal shock
(e.g., electrocution). Other hazards that can result from uncontrolled
electricity include arc flash/blast, fires, and explosions. This discussion
considers circumstances limited to those presenting a risk of electrocution,
but this should not be taken to indicate that the other electricity-related
hazards may be ignored.
High-voltage transmission wires are likely to be the most common source
of potentially lethal electricity encountered by emergency responders as
overhead wires are ubiquitous in many communities. These wires can be
contacted by equipment like portable and mounted extension ladders and lift
buckets. Coming within close proximity can allow electrical arcing through
the air via water streams. Accordingly, approach distances required by
OSHA must be followed. A distance of 10 feet from vehicles and parts that
may be elevated must be maintained for voltages under 50 kV, with an
increase of 4 inches for every 10 kV increase (Selection and Use of Work
Practices, 1994).
Service lines brought down by damaged poles and fallen trees increase
electrical contact risk, and tree limbs can conduct lethal electricity
quantities. OSHA’s Hurricane eMatrix (n.d.d, n.p.) suggests the following
work practices:
All electrical power conductors should be considered as energized and

not to be directly or indirectly (e.g., through tools, branches, or other
equipment) touched
Assume that electrical lines are energized until proven otherwise. Lines
and other conductors may become re-energized without warning as
utilities are evaluated and restored after a disaster
Inspect the work area for downed conductors and do not go near, drive
over, or otherwise come in contact with them
Downed electrical conductors can energize other objects, including
fences, water pipes, bushes, trees, and telephone/CATV/fiber optic
cables.
Portable Generators
As many emergency operations require portable power, the hazards
associated with gas-powered generators should be considered. Key hazards
include shock/electrocution, carbon monoxide production (CO), and high
noise levels. Guidance (OSHA, n.d.j) on controlling these hazards includes:
Generators must be properly grounded and kept dry.

A transfer switch to prevent the uncontrolled and unexpected
energization of connected wiring systems should be installed by a
qualified electrician.
To prevent CO accumulation, generators should be located outdoors
and away from building windows, doors, and intake vents.
Minimize noise by locating the generator away from occupied areas
and placing it on a vibration-dampening pad.
Oxy-Fuel Cutting
The use of oxy-fuel cutting equipment presents a number of safety and
health hazards. Compressed gases are highly pressurized, and a damaged
cylinder, regulator, or hose can result in a dangerous release of pressure. A
broken value can produce a rocket-like projectile, propelling a cylinder over
a substantial distance. Also, intense heat and ultraviolet radiation by the
torch and metal cutting work are made, and fumes specific to the materials
heated. Some of the more dangerous species of fumes include manganese,
hexavalent chromium, and lead (from painted surfaces). Additionally,
carbon monoxide is produced from acetylene flame.
Control of hazards associated with oxy-fuel torch cutting work includes
adequate ventilation, PPE, and proper equipment handling. Fans could be
used to move fumes away from workers, while dilution ventilation could be
provided using forced fan air through flexible ducting with equipment
commonly used for confined space sewer entry. PPE may need to include
respiratory protection, welder’s hood, shaded eyewear, gloves, and other
protective clothing appropriate for molten metals and hot surfaces.
Cylinders should be transported in approved carts or storage racks, stored
with caps in place, and valves closed.
Confined Spaces
Confined spaces under OSHA’s (Permit-Required Confined Spaces, 2011)
definition are areas large enough to enter, have limited or restricted means
for entry or exit, and were not designed for continuous occupancy. Some
examples include silos, storage tanks, maintenance holes, ducts, and vaults.
Life-threatening hazards associated with confined spaces include
atmospheric hazards (i.e. oxygen deficiency, toxic gases and vapors) and
engulfment by fluids or solid materials. The nature of confined spaces can
function to produce what could be thought of as a hazard-amplifier. Less
dire hazards, such as slippery surfaces, can result in employees’ severe
conditions by the confined space itself.
Image 20.7 Oxy-Fuel Torch Cutting
Source: U.S. Navy Official Photograph,

https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnavy/16441739262/in/photostream
OSHA’s requirements include using a permitted entry system if serious

hazards are present and plans for rescue operations. Ventilation is typically
needed before entry and the use of controls (e.g., lockout/tag out of
hazardous energy sources) for other hazards that might be present.
Communication and retrieval equipment is also essential for entry
operations. If oxy-acetylene torch cutting is conducted in confined spaces,
additional layers of protection must be provided, such as locating
compressed gas tanks outside of the confined space.
Violence
The potential for violence directed at emergency responders is appalling but
readily evident. This hazard is perhaps most clearly highlighted by cases
involving firearms, such as:
Firefighters shot at in springfield, oregon (Deffenbacher, 2018)

Firefighters shot in texas county, oklahoma (Watkins, 2020)
The fatal shooting of a firefighter of appleton, wisconsin (Doom &
Gretzky, 2019)
The wounding of two and death of two firefighters in a shooting in
webster, new york (Dahl, 2012).
Instances of random violence are difficult to foresee, but circumstances

such as political tensions and civil unrest could predict an increased risk of
violence. Accordingly, response personnel (e.g., field and EOC staff) should
be provided accurate information on indicative conditions. Such cases
require that law enforcement be available on-site to provide security.
Extreme Temperatures
OSHA does not have specific regulation that addresses the hazards
associated with temperature extremes, so the agency relies on the General
Duty Clause (OSHA, n.d.b, n.d.d), typically regarding well-established
Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®) authored by the ACGIH which address
occupational heat and cold exposures. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
emergency operations are more likely to encounter heat stress-related
hazards, but responders’ exposures to cold temperatures should not be
discounted, and both are outlined here.
The TLVs® for both heat and cold take into account variables such as
temperature, clothing, and rest duration in calculating what is roughly
considered safe (e.g., levels that do not pose adverse health effects). When
using TLVs® it should be noted that several essential presumptions are used
in their calculations. For heat, these presumptions include that: there has
been adequate water and salt intake, that individuals are acclimatized, and
that no pre-existing health conditions exist among affected employees.
Best practices for cold or hot temperature extremes suggest using the
buddy system and direct supervision to aid with early detection of
symptoms. Responding agencies are also recommended to follow applicable
guidance provided in NFPA 1584—Standard on the Rehabilitation Process for
Members During Emergency Operations and Training Exercises (NFPA,
2015b). This code addresses rehabilitation measures for heat and cold stress
during emergencies as well as post-rehabilitation hydration.
Additionally, the effect that temperature extremes can have on PPE and
other response equipment should be considered. For example, NIOSH has
issued warnings regarding the use of SCBA in extremely cold conditions,
noting the risk of freeze-ups leading to out-of-air emergencies (NIOSH, n.d.).
Hot Conditions
The ACGIH sets a TLV for heat stress expressed goal to keep the body’s core
temperature within +1 deg. C of normal (e.g., 37 deg. C, or 98.6 deg. F)
(ACGIH, 2008). In evaluating heat exposure, factors such as the intensity of
work tasks, wet bulb globe temperature index, and work-rest regimen are
included in Image 20.8, which provides a rough indication of the duration of
work and rest cycles as a function of temperature, although it does not take
into account the effects of direct sunlight or humidity.
The circumstances present in many response operations (i.e., use heavy
personal protective clothing and gear, physical exertion, high temperatures
and humidity, direct sun exposure) mirror many risk factors for heat-related
illness (OSHA/NIOSH, 2011). The occurrence of heat-related illnesses such as
heat cramps, heat exhaustion, and potentially fatal heat stroke among
responders has been well-documented. For instance, a 2018 (Bach, Maley,
Minett & Stewart) study of fire departments found that 118 of the 119
agencies included in the study reported heat strain/illness to be a risk to
employee safety during occupational duties. The same study found that
responding organizations reporting one or more cases of heat-related illness
among personnel over a year were fire departments at 39%, hazmat teams at
23%, explosive ordnance disposal groups at 20%, and law enforcement
agencies at 18%.
Measures suggested by OSHA/NIOSH (2011) which may help to protect
responders from heat stress include:
Ensuring that workers have plenty of water before, during, and after
their work shifts
Providing water in convenient locations and keeping it cool (50–60 deg.
F) if possible
Monitoring weather reports daily and reschedule jobs with high heat
exposure to cooler times of the day
Reminding responders to drink small amounts of water, frequently,
before they become thirsty
Informing workers to check their hydration level by ensuring that their
urine appears clear or lightly colored
Ensuring that workers are aware that it can be harmful to drink too
much water, generally not more than 12 quarts (48 cups) per 24 hours
Encourage the use of lighter-colored, loose-fitting, breathable garments
and hats.
Image 20.8 Sample Work-Rest Chart for Hot Temperatures
Source: CDC Image, https://www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/mining/UserFiles/works/pdfs/2017-

127.pdf
Cold Conditions
The ACGIH sets a TLV for cold stress intended to prevent the deep core
body temperature from falling below 96.8 deg. F, and prevent cold-related
injuries to the body’s extremities (ACGIH, 2008).
Information provided by OSHA (1998) provides that hypothermia can
occur when ambient temperatures are above freezing and that the hazard is
amplified if conditions are windy and skin or clothing becomes wet.
Individuals are considered to be at increased risk of cold-related illnesses if
they have health conditions such as diabetes or hypertension, and
vulnerability is thought to increase with age (Zhao, 1993).
Low Temperature + Wind Speed + Wetness = Cold-Induced Injuries &
Illness (OSHA, 1998).
Image 20.9 provides suggested work and rest cycle durations that consider
factors such as temperature, sun exposure, wind, and need for emergency
operations.
Cold-related illnesses such as frostbite and hypothermia are foreseeable in
operations with low ambient temperatures and must be addressed
proactively. Equally, those responsible for responder safety must consider
the effects cold conditions can have on responder capabilities, such as
diminished manual dexterity, generalized clumsiness, and irrational and
confused cognition.
Measures recommended by OSHA (1998) which may help to protect
responders from cold stress include:
Require proper clothing for cold, wet, and windy conditions. Layer
clothing to adjust to changing environmental temperatures, and
wearing hat and gloves, in addition to underwear that will keep water
away from the skin (e.g., polypropylene) is recommended
Schedule work during the warmest part of the day
Don’t allow employees to work to exhaustion or fatigue, as energy is
needed to keep muscles warm
Provide warm, sweet beverages (sugar water, sports-type drinks).
Restrict drinks with caffeine (coffee, tea, or hot chocolate) and alcohol
Provide warm, high-calorie foods like hot pasta dishes.
Chemical Exposures
OSHA’s regulations set occupational exposure levels (OEL’s) for many
hazardous chemicals under Subpart Z of 29 CFR 1910. OSHA refers to its
mandatory levels as Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs). Chemicals that
might be inhaled are provided PELs in varying formats:
Ceiling limits: the quantity of exposure that cannot be exceeded at any

time during the workday. If instantaneous monitoring of the chemical
in question is not feasible, then the ceiling is set as a 15-minute time-
weighted average (TWA)
Acceptable maximum peak: the absolute peak level of exposure, above
a ceiling concentration, during an 8-hour work shift. (Air contaminants,
2016). For this OEL, the factors of concentration and maximum
duration vary depending on the chemical
Short-term exposure limit (STEL): the average exposure for a substance
not to be exceeded over a short time, usually 15 to 30 minutes (OSHA,
n.d.a).
Eight-hour TWA: the average exposure for a substance not to be
exceeded for any 8-hour work shift of a 40-hour workweek.
As shown in Table 20.2 (see Table Z-1, 2017), a PEL is set for Acetone at
1000 parts per million (ppm), alternatively expressed as 2400 milligrams per
cubic meter (mg/m3). These limits are all set as eight hour TWAs. Note also
that for certain chemicals, such as Acrylamide, a skin designation indicates
that dermal exposures are hazardous.
Image 20.9 Work/Warm-up Schedule for a Four-Hour Shift
Source: https://www.osha.gov/dts/weather/winter_weather/windchill.html
Table 20.2 Portion of Table Z-1 of 1910.1000

Unfortunately, OSHA has not set PELs for many hazardous substances
that may be encountered by emergency responders. Accordingly, the agency
would rely on the general duty clause and reference other published
NOVELs to substantiate a violation (OSHA, 2003d).
Other OEL’s specified by OSHA (n.d.a) include:
ACGIH® TLVs®
California division of occupational safety and health PELs
NIOSH recommended exposure limits (RELs)
RELs provided by chemical manufacturers.
Flood Waters
Agencies responding to flood emergencies should be aware that floodwaters
can carry unknown chemicals and biohazards. Data collected from the New
Orleans Fire Department and New Orleans Police Department personnel
who were involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina indicated a
substantial number of illnesses involving skin rash, upper respiratory
symptoms (i.e., head/sinus congestion or nose/throat irritation), and
gastrointestinal symptoms (i.e., nausea/vomiting, diarrhea, or abdominal
pain) (NIOSH, 2006a, 2006b). As a result, NIOSH issued recommendations
that responders avoid contact with floodwaters when feasible. If not
possible, then efforts should be made to minimize contact time with
floodwaters, and responders should use appropriate personal protective
equipment to minimize skin contact and goggles to prevent eye contact.
Ergonomics
Term ergonomics is used and misused in various ways, but here will be
thought of as the potential means for leading to an employee’s development
of a musculoskeletal disorder (MSD), but could just as well be involved in
preventing an MSD from occurring. MSDs are injuries and illnesses that
affect the muscles, ligaments, tendons, joints, cartilages, or/and nervous
system. MSDs of most concern occur in the arms, neck, and back and
include injuries that result from one event, such as a back strain while lifting
a heavy object, and illnesses that develop over time, such as shoulder
tendonitis (DiNardi, 1998). Many ergonomic risk factors, also referred to as
ergonomics hazards known to cause, contribute, or exacerbate existing
MSDs are provided below in Table 20.3.
OSHA does not have a standard in effect for controlling ergonomics
hazards. Controls for ergonomics hazards are difficult to set specific because
of the significant variations in individual worker susceptibility and work
tasks’ natures. However, OSHA (n.d.a, n.p.) provides generalized guidance
that adheres to the hierarchy of controls in Table 20.4.
Fatigue/Rehabilitation
Fatigue is an accepted consequence of many of the physically demanding
work faced by responders. However, long work shifts and multi-day
deployments are associated with elevated injury rates. For instance, NIOSH
(2020a) found that one out of three U.S. Coast Guard members reported
getting five or fewer hours of sleep each night during the response to
Hurricane Katrina. In turn, this resulted in these employees having a three
times greater risk for experiencing slips, trips, and falls.
Table 20.3 Ergonomic risk factors
Risk factor Examples
Hand-arm vibration
Vibration
Whole-body vibration
Air temperature
Cold conditions
Direct contact with cold surfaces
Heavy or frequent lifting
Forceful exertions Forceful gripping
Pushing or pulling
Risk factor Examples
Reaching
Twisting
Awkward or static postures Stooping
Kneeling or squatting
Static postures
Using equipment controls
Repetitive motions Using hand tools
Computer use
Source: (NIOSH, 2008)
Table 20.4 Examples of Controls for Preventing MSDs
Control Type Examples
▪ Use a device to lift and reposition heavy objects

to limit force exertion
Engineering
▪ Reduce the weight of a load to limit force
exertion
▪ Require that heavy loads are only lifted by two
people to limit force exertion
▪ Establish systems so workers are rotated away
from tasks to minimize the duration of continual
exertion, repetitive motions, and awkward
Administrative postures. Design a job rotation system in which
Controls employees rotate between jobs that use different
muscle groups
▪ Staff “floaters” to provide periodic breaks
between scheduled breaks
▪ Properly use and maintain pneumatic and power
tools
Control Type Examples
▪ Use padding to reduce direct contact with hard,

Personal sharp, or vibrating surfaces
Protective ▪ Wear good fitting thermal gloves to help with
Equipment cold conditions while maintaining the ability to
grasp items easily
OSHA has not set a limit on the number of working hours, and the
relatively few federal laws in existence are narrow in the application
(OSHA, n.d.g). However, guidance on NIOSH’s rest cycles (2020a) during the
Deepwater Horizon response provided specific recommendations. These set
regular rest periods of at least ten consecutive hours of protected off-duty
time, rest days comprising one or two full days of rest following a 40-hour
work period, and consideration of workload. Motor vehicle accidents are
associated with extended work shifts (Caruso, 2014), so as response
operations wind down, a rest period may be appropriate before responders
who are at risk of fatigue are released to leave the scene.
Psychological/Mental Stress
Modern OS&H practice includes efforts to control mental/psychological
stress that may affect employees during and after work activities. Long work
hours, limited personal privacy, separation from family, and other factors
common to longer-term deployments are associated with feelings of stress,
depression, short-tempers, and frequent mood swings (NIOSH, 2010). The
SO should consider the effects of psychological stress on responders’ safety,
such as their ability to stay cognizant of safe work practices. Equally,
responders involved in high-stress experiences, such as body recovery
activities, or who become engaged in gunshot incidents may also have a
posttraumatic stress disorder and require post-incident evaluation and
treatment (NIOSH, 2006a).
A group of workers at the Deepwater Horizon response was subject to a
health hazard evaluation conducted by NIOSH (2010) that included
psychological stress. The survey covered workers involved in offshore work
(i.e., dispersant release, oil burning, oil skimming) and onshore work (i.e.,
wildlife and beach clean-up, decontamination and waste management)
work. The findings revealed that nearly 25% of some workgroups surveyed
reported one or more symptoms associated with psychological stress. These
stressors included: “Confusion and frustration due to multiple, conflicting
directives from various areas of the chain of command and issues related to
poor communication concerning decision‐making” (p. 14).
Focus: 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency Response (HAZWOPER)
The next few paragraphs will focus on 1910.120(q), which applies specifically
to emergency responses to hazardous substance releases. Provisions
applicable to hospital-based first responders are also covered under
1910.120(q) but are not addressed here. Much of the standard applies to
hazardous materials at hazardous waste disposal sites and uncontrolled
waste sites and are not substantially important in this chapter’s context, so
those provisions are also not considered here.
OSHA (2007a) considers the most important provision of 1910.120(q) the
implementation of an emergency response plan (ERP). As HAZWOPER is
mainly a performance-oriented standard, elements such as the ERP will vary
considerably as employers institute compliance methods that are suitable to
their particular operations. The ERP must address the potential for releases
caused by natural phenomena (i.e., hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes,
floods) as these are reasonably anticipated occurrences in some locations.
OSHA does not consider terrorism to be reasonably expected, so such events
are not required to be included in the ERP under 1910.120(q). Still, employers
are strongly encouraged to do so plan for incidents resulting from terrorism.
As a function of the employer’s particular circumstances, their ERPs may
include elements such as roles and lines of authority, training, recognition of
an emergency, site security, evacuation routes and procedures,
decontamination, medical treatment, PPE, and others. Organizations that
choose to operate their own hazmat teams may have substantially different
information in their ERPs. However, the standard allows emergency
response organizations to use a local emergency response plan, state
emergency response plan, or both as part of their ELPs to avoid duplication
(OSHA, 2007a).
Beyond the ERP, HAZWOPER mandates several procedures that should
be familiar to most responders: the use of an ICS, the designation of an IC,
characterization of hazards, use of appropriate control measures to ensure
responder safety (i.e., PPE, SCBA, etc.), use of the buddy system, having
medical aid (e.g., basic life support, at a minimum) and transportation on
hand, the designation of a safety officer (SO), decontamination, and others.
While only mandatory for emergency responses covered under 1910.120,
the standard provides that the SO must have the authority to stop work as
follows: “1910.120(q)(3)(viii) When the safety officer judges activities to be an
IDLH and/or to involve an imminent danger condition, the safety officer
shall have the authority to alter, suspend, or terminate those activities”
(Hazardous Waste and Emergency Response, 2013, n.p.).
HAZWOPER sets out minimum levels of requisite capabilities and
training for responders based on their roles. Training required for the roles
of skilled support personnel and specialist employees is performance-
oriented and the least technical. The roles of first responder awareness level,
first responder operations level, a hazardous materials technician, hazardous
materials specialist, and on-scene incident commander must each have
received specific training and possess knowledge and skills particular to
their role. The person(s) who provide such training, Trainers, must have an
appropriate competency level. The essential functions prescribed for each
role is provided in Table 20.5: HAZWOPER Responder Levels.
One particularly important aspect of the 1910.120(q) is the requirement for
a PPE program that will address the limitations of PPE use during
temperature extremes and heat stress, issues of concern discussed elsewhere
in this chapter. Other key PPE provisions for responders under HAZWOPER
are as follows:
Table 20.5 HAZWOPER Responder Levels
Role Essential response functions
Skilled Skilled in the operation of certain equipment and are

support needed temporarily to perform immediate emergency
personnel support work.
Trained in the hazards of specific hazardous
Specialist
substances and who provide technical advice or
employees
assistance to the individual in charge.
First
Initiate an emergency response sequence by notifying
responder
the proper authorities but take no further action
awareness
beyond notification.
level
Respond to releases or potential releases of hazardous
First substances as part of the initial response, in a
responder defensive fashion without actually trying to stop the
operations release. Their function is to contain the release from a
level safe distance, keep it from spreading, and prevent
exposures.*
Respond to releases or potential releases for the
purpose of stopping the release. They assume a more
Hazardous
aggressive role than a first responder at the
materials
operations level in that they will approach the point
technician
of release in order to plug, patch or otherwise stop
the release of a hazardous substance.
Duties parallel those of the hazardous materials
Hazardous
technician, however, but require a more directed or
materials
specific knowledge of the various substances they
specialist
may be called upon to contain.
On scene
Assume control of the incident scene beyond the first
incident
responder awareness level.
commander
Note:
*OSHA allows firefighters who are trained to the operations level to take some offensive
actions, but those are limited to releases involving gasoline and propane. In such cases,
responders must have first received appropriate training specific to the chemical,
procedures, equipment, and PPE use (OSHA, 2007a).
PPE selection criteria—selection must be based on an evaluation of the

PPE’s performance characteristics relative to the site’s requirements
and limitations, the task-specific conditions and duration, and the
hazards and potential hazards identified at the site
Chemical protective suits—protection equivalent to Level A protection
must be used in conditions where skin absorption of a hazardous
substance may result in a substantial possibility of immediate death,
immediate serious illness or injury, or impair the ability to escape
Respiratory protection—positive pressure SCBA use is required while
engaged in emergency response, until the IC determines through air
monitoring that a decreased level of respiratory protection will not
result in hazardous exposures to employees
PPE program – the program must carry provisions for selection, use,
maintenance, decontamination, training, fitting, donning and doffing of
PPE, and include an evaluation of program effectiveness.
1910.120(q) also carries requirements for providing medical surveillance

for responders who are members of a hazmat team before assignment to
response duties. Ongoing surveillance includes medical examinations and
consultations at least once every 12 months (or at least every 24 months, if
approved by an attending physician), at termination or reassignment (if an
examination has not occurred within six months), and more frequent
intervals if deemed necessary by the examining physician. Hazmat members
and other responders who become injured, ill, or develop signs or symptoms
due to exposure to hazardous substances associated with an emergency
response must be provided a medical examination as soon as possible
following the incident or developing signs or symptoms.
Finally, post-emergency operations are also addressed by HAZWOPER.
Generally, it is the IC’s responsibility to determine the point at which a site
is under control and conditions no longer constitute an emergency. However,
OSHA notes that, “As long as an emergency response team is still in control
of the site and a safety or health hazard exists, an emergency classification
continues to be in effect” (2007a, p. 50). In turning over the site, the IC must
convey all information regarding remaining hazards to those involved in the
clean-up operations.
Image 20.10 Hazmat Responders
FOCUS: 29 CFR 1910 Subpart I: Personal Protective Equipment

OSHA has issued a number of PPE standards under 1910 Subpart I, 1910.132
to 1910.140.
The most horizontal (e.g. broadly applicable) is 29 CFR 1910.132, General
requirements. This standard applies to all types of PPE that might be used as
protection from occupational hazards (General requirements, 2016). Some of
the more important aspects of 1910.132 involve the following:
Hazard assessment – The employer must assess the workplace to

determine if hazards exist that might require the use of PPE. This
should take the form of a job hazard analysis (JHA) also referred to a
job safety analysis (JSA). In the JHA, employees’ potential hazards are
considered, and appropriate PPE types are prescribed for each.
Suitability for use – PPE used must of safe design and provide adequate
protection.
Employee-owned equipment—If an employer permits employees to
provide their own PPE, then the employer is responsible for that PPE’s
adequacy, maintenance, and sanitation.
Requirements for the various types of PPE are each set for under
respective sections. Table 20.6 provides the specific sections of OSHA’s PPE
standards that are most applicable to response operations. There are no
specific provisions for body PPE, so suitability for use would be evaluated
using applicable codes or standards (i.e., ANSI, NFPA). Some of the job tasks
typically faced by responders along with potential hazards, and appropriate
PPE types are provided in Table 20.7.
Focus: 29 CFR 1910.134, Respiratory Protection

Respiratory protection is arguably the most important PPE type because the
respiratory system’s large surface area and efficiency of transfer can quickly
lead to serious illness or death when exposed to some commonly
encountered atmospheric hazards. OSHA’s respiratory protection standard
seeks to ensure that exposed employees are protected by setting forth
requirements that address elements such as when and how respiratory
protection must be worn minimum levels of protection afforded equipment
specifications, and program management.
Table 20.6 OSHA PPE Standards Applicable to Response Operations
OSHA PPE
Notes
Standards
OSHA PPE
Notes
Standards
1910.95 -
Occupational
Exposures that could lead to hearing loss
noise
exposure.
1910.133 -
Eye and face Exposures to the eyes and face
protection.
1910.134 -
Respiratory Exposures to airborne respiratory hazards
Protection.
1910.135 -
Head Exposures to the head
protection.
1910.136 -
Foot Exposures to the feet
protection.
1910.137 -
Electrical
Exposures to the body from electricity
Protective
Equipment.
1910.138 -
Hand Exposures to the hands
Protection.
1910.140 -
Personal fall
Exposures to falls
protection
systems.
OSHA PPE
Notes
Standards
Exposures to the hazardous substances through the

1910.120(g)
skin that may result in a substantial possibility of
(3)(iv) -
immediate death, immediate serious illness or
HAZWOPER
injury, or impair the ability to escape
Source: David Stumbo
Table 20.7 Typical Job Tasks with Associated Hazards and Types of PPE
Job tasks Hazards PPE Types
Hot surfaces, molten Hand

Torch cutting metals (sheet
metals, production of Face
metal, automobile parts,
toxic gasses and Body
rebar, etc.)
fumes Respiratory
Abrasive wheel/saw cutting Hand
Flying sparks, flying
metals (sheet metal, Face
debris, hot surfaces
automobile parts, rebar, etc.) Body
Hand
Cutting, jackhammering, or
Respirable silica, Face
drilling concrete and other
flying debris Body
masonry materials
Respiratory
Dependent on
Dependent on
Exposure to toxic airborne hazardous
hazardous material
contaminants material
properties
properties
Personal fall
Working at heights over 4 ft. Falls protection
system
Personal fall
Working above hazardous Contact with
protection
processes, chemicals, etc. processes, chemicals
system
Job tasks Hazards PPE Types
Fall debris,
Working in areas subject to
moving/swinging Head
overhead hazards
equipment
Working in areas subject to
Electrical
unguarded electricity Shock, burns,
protective
(damaged service panels, electrocution
equipment
downed lines)
Hand
Contact with sharp,
Disaster site clean-up Face
jagged objects
Body
Hand
Working in cold ambient Cold – frostbite,
Face
temperatures hypothermia
Body
Lightweight
Working in hot ambient Heat – heat stress,
clothing,
temperatures heat stroke
cooling vests
Using hand-held power tools Vibration Hand
Working in areas with power
tool use, heavy equipment
Noise Hearing
running, portable generators,
etc.
Working in areas subject to High visibility
Struck-by or run
vehicle and mobile clothing or
over
equipment traffic vest
Heat, combustion Turn-out gear;
Firefighting
products SCBA
Hazardous materials Level A suit
Hazardous chemicals
response SCBA
Source: David Stumbo
Employers are reminded of the hierarchy of controls, as the first
paragraph of 1910.134 requires the use of engineering controls as the
primary means to control air contaminants when feasible. Then, they fall
back on the use of respirators when engineering controls are not feasible, or
while they are being instituted.
Under the classic hazard identification and control method, an employer
would seek to conduct a workplace hazard assessment, often referred to a
job hazard assessment (JHA) would identify actual or potential atmospheric
hazards that employees might foreseeably be exposed to in the workplace.
Engineering controls would be then implemented, if feasible. Respiratory
protection would then be used if engineering controls were not feasible,
during their installation or if they were to not be completely effective. A
PPE hazard assessment, as required by 29 CFR 1910.132(d), would serve to
determine and document the types of respiratory hazards and respiratory
protection needed (General Requirements, 2016).
Following a determination that respiratory protection is needed, the first
step should be developing a written respiratory protection program with a
designated administrator. The program should be developed prior to
operations that require the use of respirators and contain worksite specific
details on the respirator use by employees. Respiratory protection programs
will differ somewhat as a function of the types and manners of use at the
particular worksite.
Provisions of a written respiratory protection program may include
(Respiratory Protection, 2011, n.p.):
Procedures for selecting respirators for use in the workplace;

Medical evaluations of employees required to use respirators;
Fit testing procedures for tight-fitting respirators;
Procedures for proper use of respirators in routine and reasonably
foreseeable emergency situations;
Procedures and schedules for cleaning, disinfecting, storing, inspecting,
repairing, discarding, and otherwise maintaining respirators;
Procedures to ensure adequate air quality, quantity, and flow of
breathing air for atmosphere-supplying respirators;
Training of employees in the respiratory hazards to which they are
potentially exposed during routine and emergency situations;
Training of employees in the proper use of respirators, including
putting on and removing them, any limitations on their use, and their
maintenance; and
Procedures for regularly evaluating the effectiveness of the program.
Whether respirators are used for protection against toxic particulates (i.e.,
asbestos, silica), gases (i.e., carbon monoxide, chlorine), biohazards (i.e.,
influenza virus), oxygen deficiency (e.g., below 19.5% oxygen), or other
atmospheric hazards, the type of respirator selected and provided to
employees is essential. Certainly, the respirator must be appropriate to the
type(s) of hazards, as well factors that could affect the equipment’s
performance and reliability. In cases where the nature of the atmospheric
hazard(s) are unknown, potentially lethal, or exposure measurements or
estimates can’t be made with certainty, then conditions must be treated as
immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Respiratory protection for
IDLH atmospheres is discussed below.
Also key to selection is that respiratory equipment must be NIOSH-
certified and used per its certification. This certification is required under 42
CFR Part 84 and administered through NIOSH’s National Personal
Protective Technology Laboratory (NIOSH, 2018). Respiratory protection
equipment is approved for use as a unit, meaning that the make of a
respirator and its components are approved as a package. While some
approvals allow for interchangeability, this is typically within the same
brand or manufacturer. Caution should be exercised before swapping parts
between respirators, as this may void the NIOSH approval. Documentation
available from the manufacturer should be reviewed to ensure that this does
not occur.
For operations involving IDLH atmospheres encountered in firefighting,
hazardous materials responses, confined space rescue, and similar situations,
only two types of respirators are permitted:
Full facepiece pressure-demand self-contained breathing apparatus

(SCBA) certified by NIOSH for a minimum service life of 30 minutes
Combination full facepiece pressure-demand supplied-air respirator
(SAR) with auxiliary self-contained air supply.
Related provisions detailed in 1910.134 include the one in one out rule for
IDLH atmospheres and the two in two out rule for firefighting operations
(Respiratory Protection, 2011), as well as requirements for SCBA use and
other safeguards.
The types of respirators used in non-IDLH atmospheres depend on two
factors: the assigned protection factor (APF) of the respirator type (e.g., a
half-mask, air-purifying respirator has an APF of 10), and the maximum use
concentration (MUC). The MUC is calculated by multiplying the APF and
the OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) for the hazardous substance.
Example:
Calculate the MUC for a half-mask, air-purifying respirator (APF 10)
when used to protect an employee from exposure to toluene (PEL = 200
parts per million; 8 hour-time weighted average).
MUC = APF * PEL

MUC = 10 * 200 parts per million (ppm)
MUC = 2000 ppm
This means that an employee can use a half-mask, air-purifying respirator

only if toluene concentrations do not exceed 2000 ppm at any time. For
situations where exposure exceeds 2000 ppm, a respirator type that provides
more protection (e.g., has a higher APF) must be provided. See Table 20.8 for
a listing of APFs for various types of respirators.
Other OSHA’s exposure limits, such as a short-term exposure limit (STEL)
must also be evaluated using the same MUC calculation. For hazardous
chemicals which do not have OSHA has not established limits, then the
MUC calculation should be made on other relevant data, such as other
OEL’s discussed above: ACGIH® (TLVs®), Cal/OSHA PELs, NIOSH RELs,
chemical manufacturers’ RELs, or professional judgement (OSHA, n.d.a).
Another requirement for the respiratory protection program is that
respirator users must be provided a medical evaluation prior to use, to
determine the employee’s ability to safely work while wearing a respirator.
For employees who are to use respirators that require fit testing, the medical
evaluation must occur before fit testing. Fit testing is required for all
employees using a tight-fitting facepiece respirator prior to use and at least
annually after that. Some situations (i.e., dental changes, cosmetic surgery,
obvious change in body weight) may require additional fit testing.
Requirements pertaining to the use of respiratory protection include
provisions for the maintenance and care of respirators to ensure that the
PPE provides reliable protection. Failure to follow cleaning procedures can
result in skin conditions such as dermatitis (Rhoden, 2011).
Table 20.8 Assigned Protection Factor5
Loose-
Full
1,2
Quarter Half Helmet/ fitting
Type of respirator face
mask mask hood face
piece
piece
310 … …. … … ….
1. Air-Purifying Respirator 5 50
…. … ….
2. Powered Air-Purifying … …. …
50 1,000 425/1,000 25
Respirator (PAPR) ….
3. Supplied-Air Respirator
… …. …
(SAR) or Airline Respirator … …. … … ….
….
▪ Demand mode 10 50 …. … ….
… …. … 4
▪ Continuous flow mode 50 1,000 25/1,000 25
….
▪ Pressure-demand or other 50 1,000 … …. … … ….
… …. …
positive-pressure mode …. … ….
….
Loose-
Full
1,2
Quarter Half Helmet/ fitting
Type of respirator face
mask mask hood face
piece
piece
4. Self-Contained Breathing
Apparatus (SCBA)
… …. … … ….
▪ Demand mode 10
…. 50 50 … ….
▪ Pressure-demand or other … ….
… …. … 10,000 10,000 … ….
positive-pressure mode (e.g., … ….
…. … ….
open/closed circuit)
Notes:
1. Employers may select respirators assigned for use in higher workplace concentrations
of a hazardous substance at lower concentrations of that substance, or when required
respirator use is independent of concentration.
2. The table above’s assigned protection factors are only effective when the employer
implements a continuing, effective respirator program as required by this section (29
CFR 1910.134), including training, fit testing, maintenance, and use requirements.
3. This APF category includes filtering facepieces and half masks with elastomeric
facepieces.
4. The employer must have evidence provided by the respirator manufacturer that testing
of these respirators demonstrates performance at a level of protection of 1,000 or greater
to receive an APF of 1,000. This level of performance can best be demonstrated by
performing a WPF or SWPF study or equivalent testing. Absent such testing, all other
PAPRs and SARs with helmets/hoods are to be treated as loose-fitting facepiece
respirators, and receive an APF of 25.
5. These APFs do not apply to respirators used solely for escape. Employers must refer to
the appropriate substance-specific standards in that subpart to escape respirators used in
association with specific substances covered by 29 CFR 1910 subpart Z. Escape
respirators for other IDLH atmospheres are specified by 29 CFR 1910.134 (d)(2)(ii).
Finally, a number of requirements exist for tight-fitting respirators by the

face-to-facepiece seal, which prevents the entry of air contaminants, such as:
Users must perform a seal-check each time the respirator is donned
Users may not have facial hair growth in the seal area
Other PPE (i.e., safety glasses) must be worn in a way that will not
interfere with the seal.
Section 4: OS&H Considerations for the EOC and ICP
Both the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Incident Command Post
(ICP), in terms of occupational safety and health (OS&H), should be
considered as consisting of the personnel who occupy the EOC, the physical
facility itself, and the work processes which are conducted. An EOC and its
staff are typically situated in a fixed location within an established office-
type building supplied with elaborate communications infrastructure and
supported by a team member’s staff. Accordingly, OS&H hazards associated
with EOCs might be thought of as being similar to traditional workplace
hazards. Some likely hazards include:
Musculoskeletal disorders resulting from poor ergonomics associated

with long work hours at computer workstations
Exposure to EOC staff to emergency situations (i.e., fire, inclement
weather, violence) which necessitates appropriate measures such as
unhindered egress, fire protection, etc.
Hazards associated with exposure to electricity (i.e., shock,
electrocution, fire) from building and communications systems
electrical wiring and components
Mental/psychological trauma due to stressful response work
Secondary effects (trip/fall, automobile wreck) resulting from physical
fatigue from long work hours. See NFPA 1584 Standard on the
Rehabilitation Process for Members During Emergency Operations and
Training Exercises (NFPA, 2015b) for additional guidance on addressing
physical fatigue.
The ICP is likely to present that much the same potential hazards as those
noted for the EOC, but may also pose more immediate OS&H hazards to
personnel. Typically, mobile ICP’s will require electricity from portable
generators, so the potential for carbon monoxide (CO) build-up, especially in
areas with multiple idling vehicles, is substantial. The SO should conduct
periodic CO monitoring of occupied areas if continuous monitors are not
available. Calibration and bump testing of all CO monitors are essential to
ensure accurate readings per the manufacturer’s directions.
Another concern is the potential for the contamination of the ICP, either
by local conditions or inadvertent contamination of the ICP by staff. A study
by Navarro et al. (2019) identified elevated levels of naphthalene,
phenanthrene, and retene at the ICP for a woodland fire. The authors
recommended the use of HEPA filtration for tents and trailers and better
positioning of the ICP. An earlier study of a base camp for a woodland in
California found peak carbon monoxide exposures in excess of several OEL’s
(NIOSH, 2011).
Contamination is also foreseeable as a scenario in which staff who have
come from the hot zone and who may have not adequately decontaminated
first. Ironically, it is the SO, whose role requires him/her to recon an incident
and then report back to the IC, who may have the most potential for
contaminating the ICP. Failures of proper decontamination can be found in
the literature, such as NIOSH’s 1997 account of firefighters who experienced
skin irritation from PPE that had not been fully decontaminated following a
warehouse fire involved hazardous chemicals. Other studies suggest that
field decontamination procedures (e.g., soap, water, scrubbing) of turnout
jackets removed a median of 85% of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon
contamination (Fent et al., 2017).
In accordance with NFPA 1561 (2018), the ICP must be situated in the cold
zone of the incident. However, uncontrolled events can directly involve the
ICP, such as the 1996 response by Indianapolis Fire Department and Perry
Township Fire Department to a fire at a warehouse facility owned by UCR,
Incorporated. During the response, an explosion rained fallout on personnel
at the ICP. Chemicals thought to be present included copper cyanide,
sodium cyanide, methanol, propanol, and corrosives. Following the response,
some firefighters experienced various acute health problems (NIOSH, 1997).
Thus, the SO or another person responsible for OS&H must be cognizant
of the potential for changes in response conditions that could affect the
safety of the ICP. Suppose the ICP should need to be moved with haste. In
that case, many of the hazards addressed under Section 3—OS&H of Field
Personnel, especially those involved in the relocation (i.e., struck by vehicles,
ergonomics, fatigue) are likely to come into play.
Section 5: Infectious Diseases and Viruses, Including COVID-19
With the increasing ease of international travel and population movement
trending from rural to urban areas, episodes of infectious disease outbreaks,
by no means rare currently, are likely to become more frequent. EOC staff
should monitor reports on emerging infectious disease outbreaks as reported
by authorities like the World Health Organization and CDC. These agencies
often issue pathogen-specific guidance, which is tailored to occupational
groups with elevated exposure risk. A recent example is the CDC’s (2020)
“Interim Guidance for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems and 911
Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) for COVID-19 in the United States,”
which applied to first responders, including law enforcement, fire services,
emergency medical services, and emergency management officials. Likewise,
OSHA often issues guidance information on control measures drafted to
apply to occupational settings. Some OSHA documents on infection control
also carry information on how the agency intends on enforcing employee
protections. NFPA 1581, Standard on Fire Department Infection Control
Program (NFPA, 2015a) provides a comprehensive approach to infection
control that could be useful to many responding agencies.
Bloodborne Pathogens
Three decades prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, OSHA’s Bloodborne
Pathogens standard at 29 CFR 1910.1030 was implemented in response to the
HIV/AIDs epidemic. It specifically addresses Hepatitis B, as well as provides
protections against exposure to other pathogens carried in human blood and
other potentially infectious materials (OPIM), such as human tissues and
some body fluids. One of the key approaches of the standard is the use of
universal precautions, which is a work practice control that requires treating
all human blood and certain body fluids (cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid,
pericardial fluid, amniotic fluid, etc.), as if it is known to be infectious with
HIV, HBV, and other bloodborne pathogens (Bloodborne Pathogens, 2012).
Image 20.11 PPE for Infectious Diseases and Viruses
Image 20.12 Biohazard Warning Logo
Source: https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.1030
The standard also requires that covered employers implement a written

Exposure Control Plan, with documentation that they have considered (or
implemented) other safer medical devices to controlling exposures on an
annual basis. That solicitation from affected non-managerial employees has
been sought regarding the engineering and work practice controls
alternatives. Other provisions include using engineering and work practice
controls, e.g., safer medical devices, sharps disposal containers, hand
hygiene; personal protective equipment; housekeeping, including
decontamination procedures, and removal of regulated waste.
Influenza Pandemics
In 2007, OSHA provided comprehensive guidance on protecting workers
from pandemic influenza exposures amid concerns of the highly pathogenic
(H5N1) strain of avian influenza spreading to humans. This guidance
included precautions against other pathogens, such as severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), measles, varicella, and tuberculosis (OSHA,
2007a). In addition to preparedness measures and work practice controls,
OSHA noted that employees should be protected from airborne exposures by
the use of engineering controls (e.g., ventilation) first, and then with the use
of respiratory protection (under 29 CFR 1910.134) only when engineering
controls are not technologically or economically infeasible, or during the
implementation of engineering controls. Additionally, compliance with its
other PPE standards (eyes, face, head, and extremities) would be required
when engineering controls, work practices, and/or administrative controls
would not provide adequate protection or were infeasible. The agency also
noted its contention that employers who did not take reasonable steps to
abate such recognized hazards would be cited for violations of the General
Duty Clause.
In response to the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 and subsequent national
emergency declaration by President Obama, OSHA issued a compliance
directive that closely followed the CDC’s guidance (OSHA, 2009). While
limited to inspections involving employee contact with patients and
contaminated material in a healthcare or clinical laboratory setting, OSHA
presented its intention to enforce this issue according to the standards
specified in its Pandemic Influenza guidance, discussed above.
Ebola
An outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa reached the United State
in 2014. Two healthcare providers contracted the disease but, fortunately,
later recovered. Because the Ebola virus is spread through blood (as well as
other body fluids), OSHA’s Bloodborne Pathogens standard at 29 CFR
1910.1030 is directly applicable. OSHA notes that its requirements for
respiratory protection and other forms of PPE must be followed to protect
employees from exposure to Ebola (OSHA, n.d.c).
COVID-19
The World Health Organization (WHO, 2020) designated the outbreak of
COVID-19 virus infection a pandemic on March 11, 2020, with President
Trump declaring a national emergency on March 13, 2020 (White House,
2020). OSHA’s response was to issue guidance that advised employers to
classify workers’ risk of exposure and provide them with protection
appropriate to risk level. Concerning mandatory requirements, since no
OSHA standard specifically addressed COVID-19 exposure, the agency
noted that its PPE standards, found under Subpart I of 29 CFR 1910, along
with the General Duty Clause were the most relevant for protecting
employees from the hazards associated with the COVID-19 virus (OSHA,
n.d.h).
Enforcement memoranda issued by OSHA for the pandemic delineated
the methods by which the agency would use the General Duty Clause to cite
employers for not protecting employees from the hazards associated with
exposure to COVID-19. The directive indicated that feasible means of
protecting employees, a key prerequisite for citation of the General Duty
Clause, existed in the form of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC’s) guidance on infection control for COVID-19.
Applicable CDC guidance included prescriptions for the use of engineering
controls such as airborne infection isolation rooms, among other controls to
protect employees determined to be at very high risk (OSHA, 2020). A
significant takeaway from these events was OSHA’s reiteration that it would
use the CDC’s guidance to substantiated General Duty Clause violations.
Section 6: Relevant Reflections of Two Authors and Safety
Officers
The reflections of Christine B. Pettiti, MPH, CIH, as told by Michael J. Fagel:
Please listen and learn from my colleague and friend, the late Christine B. Pettiti. I met Christine
while she was a student of mine in our MPH program. We began talking about OSHA, of course,
as part of the disaster deployments. She was an avid student, hungry for knowledge of the disaster
site safety mission from my perspective. Christine was a compliance officer for OSHA, but had
never been on a really extended site such as the Oklahoma City bombing or the World Trade
Center attacks like I had been. After she graduated from our program, she became a trainer for the
OSHA training institute, then on to DC to head the disaster response program at OSHA. We
regularly talked about safety and how we could make the responder and safety a part of the
command staff’s way of thinking. She tried to develop policy and doctrine across OSHA, and later
on to Health and Human Services (HHS) when she became the head of safety and health. We
talked about the COVID-19 response and planning regularly.
Even as she was slipping away in her valiant fight against cancer, she wanted to make several
points abundantly clear to the readers of this book. I have done my best to capture her thoughts,
and they are impactful. The following eight bullet points are recollections from my discussion
with my longtime friend, student, and recent safety professional involved in the COVID-19
response.
MJF December 18, 2020
Christine’s Key Points for All to Remember:
Safety has to be foremost in everyone’s mind.

It cannot be an afterthought.
Consider safety and health as important as the mission.
Never let politics get in the way of safety for all.
Consider that the longer the shift, the more dangerous it gets for the
worker and everyone around them: 12 hrs should be a maximum.
Understanding that the mission may require longer hours.
When we think of safety, we must think of mental health as a
component as well.
People will use the word “fine” when they’re not.
Notes from the Point of View of a Safety Officer at Ground
Zero in the Weeks following the 9/11 Attack on the World
Trade Center (Michael J. Fagel)
In my time serving as a safety officer at the World Trade Center in New
York City on September 11, 2001, following the 9/11 attack, safety was a
huge concern. I served a 100-day deployment as the liaison officer for the
FDNY (Fire Department New York) Incident Command Staff to the various
agencies and departments engaged in the rescue and recovery efforts.
Throughout this very fluid and ever-changing landscape, we focused on
safety and health. I was assisted by various Incident Management Teams
(IMT) from around the country. I worked with their safety officers, and
together we focused on site safety.
We would deploy an asset (safety officer) to each quadrant during each of
the operational periods. The taskings changed daily. Each evening, when the
Incident Action Plan (IAP) was created for the 6 a.m. briefing, safety was
ever-present in the document. Safety was a key part of everything we did
on-site. Some specific thoughts I formed based on the deployment:
As you create your objectives for your event, consider what we used as
a guideline.
We required that SAFETY was to be an ongoing objective, and so
should you.
In every single IAP we developed, safety was the very first item on the
list.
We made sure that it was not just mentioned in passing but discussed
among everyone.
In every IAP we have participated in producing, we never failed to
effectively look back at the past periods, events, and issues, as a starting
point to looking forward to the next operational period.
As part of a team, you must weave safety into every document you
can. For example, you can add brief messages as headers or footers in
many documents. Items such as:
– Safety-EVERYONE’S RESPONSIBILITY.
– PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) is only effective if you wear
it properly.
– Make sure you change your mask cartridges daily.
– Do not throw your respirator away; see safety.
– Hard hats are required; wear yours properly.
The above are just some examples of what we did daily, and they can
be used by you at almost any event or incident as well.
This entire chapter is devoted to the safety and health of all involved.
When I served on the command staff at numerous Federal Responses, safety
was always a part of the command team, with a voice that was critically
important to all. At Ground Zero, the mission changed daily, so my role as
safety, logistics, and anything else was in a constant state of flexibility. The
safety officer must be a resource. Not just reciting standards, but being a
useful and important part of the mission.
I tried to keep as many persons safe and healthy as I could. We tried to
keep people wearing the appropriate respirators—not paper or cloth masks.
We trained many people on how to use masks, filter changes, and fit testing.
Our colleagues from OSHA were there helping us every step of the way.
This was not an “enforcement or citation” event, but a team effort.
During any event, supplies (if not from your own stockpiles) will flow in
for use. Some items will be useful, while others may not. You may have a
respirator from Company A, and cartridges from Company B that are not
compatible. This has happened to me at many events. Some parts are not
universal and will not fit other PPE brands that you may have or need.
Create a stockpile list before the event occurs. Do it today, while the sun is
shining—a blue sky day. Try to ensure that all of your response staff has
been tested and equipped properly before the incident.
Each night, I represented the fire chief at the Pier 92 Command Post
Meetings as his safety Subject Matter Expert (SME). When the Federal
OSHA representative and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) representative began talking in code, in legalese or using unfamiliar
terminology, the chief often asked me to take over. During an event such as
this, there is a time and a place for most everything. During a planning
meeting for the next day, don’t talk about “citable events”; talk about
cooperation, education, and training. At one particular meeting, the two
above-mentioned officials began talking in each of their agency’s legalese,
and the fire chief would have none of it. He said for me to take them both
outside, talk with them, and I could only come back with one of them!
Image 20.13 Safety Supplies being Inventoried and Deployed, With Fit Testing
Source: Photo by Michael J. Fagel

Image 20.14 View as a Safety Officer from Above the Site
Take a look at this site image, and see where you begin.
Please take a look at the image. Look at it closely and see if you can
“hear” the noise from the event happening. Look up, look left, look right,
look down … now turn away from the image and look back at it.
Where do you start as the scene safety officer? You need to focus on all
areas, but you can’t. Pick one, pick two, pick three. Where do you go to first?
You are looking at numerous mini-incident cites just within that field of
view. Expand your perspective and start ticking off each thing you see that
involves safety. You won’t have time to dwell; you must act on what you
see. Grab your notebook and jot some quick notes and start to work. Site
and scene safety must be intuitive. You will be pulled in many directions at
the same time. Buckle up and get ready to multi-task, meet many changing
goals and objectives, keeping in mind that safety is not always everyone’s
first thoughts.
Now, refocus on the next picture. What do you hear, smell, see?
Think about what you saw in the first image, now dive in a bit closer. You
had cylinders visible in the first picture. Do you have them here as well?
Heavy equipment? Equipment such as what you see here poses more
challenges as well. You must be flexible and understanding. You must be able
to react to changing conditions, policies, and objectives at a moment’s
notice. The entire site, no the city, had a pallor of smoke overhanging it. If
you have ever smelled a clutch or brake burning, that was in the air. If you
have ever smelled a tire or fan belt burning, that was in the air.
Our role in safety is 24/7. It does not stop at 5 p.m.
When I was on-site, or even trying to sleep on the hospital ship USNS
Comfort, I was thinking about the site.
Image 20.15 Imagine What Is in the Air, Smoke, Hazardous Materials
Image 20.16 Fagel at Hospital Ship
Source: Photo by Randall Duncan
In the image of the hospital ship above, it was comforting to see that
marvelous ship in the harbor. Armed marines guarded it at every step of the
way. We slept (or tried to) on that vessel for four-hour shifts. Grab a quick
bite, then head out again. While I was in the bunk room, I could still hear
the noise, smell the smells. It was here where I tried to spend some time in
my notebook, gathering some of my thoughts, gathering supplies before
heading out to the site again.
You have a great chapter in this text about mental health, and stress. Pay
attention to that, and understand that with stress, we have more accidents.
Stressors and safety go hand in hand. Never forget that. Safety is important
today at the mission and years later as well. Follow all protocols. Keep up
with who, what, when, where, and how long people are on-site.
I was on-site for over three months. I went home in December. I was
physically healthy, but mentally exhausted (see Chapter 13 by Dr Juzzwin
on stressors).
Eight years later … eight years after I left the site physically (mentally, I
never left), I was at my physician’s office undergoing a routine physical. The
doctor found an abnormality with my kidney on X-ray. Five days later, I was
having cancer surgery to remove my cancerous kidney. I was one of the
very, very lucky ones. My disease was found. To this day, many responders
have died or become seriously ill from attending at Ground Zero.
Since that physical, I have been treated by the World Trade Center Health
Program, and my 9/11 related illnesses have been certified by the World
Trade Center Health Program. My medicines and treatments are all being
provided by them. My condition was found and treated, but we all know
many responders who have succumbed.
Did I fail in my role as a safety officer? I tried my best to keep as many
people in masks and appropriate PPE. Some chose to wear it; others chose to
hang it around their necks.
This image was typical of many scenes. Many people wore appropriate
gear. But, some did not wear it appropriately. When we went on-scene, we
tried to make sure we had appropriate safety equipment to deliver each day.
We would have small “gators” to gear up, stock up, and deliver the best we
could. We would have larger safety briefings and explain what was expected
in specific areas. It was a constant education and training effort. When you
have a large site, some people you see are not under your organization’s
purview with many agencies. Try to understand that. On the other hand,
you do not want anyone getting hurt, regardless of the uniform they wear or
the agency for which they work. That is a huge difficulty and a learning
curve at any major site.
Image 20.17 Fagel On-Site Wearing Appropriate Safety Equipment
Source: Photo by Randall Duncan
In closing, remember:
Understand your roles and responsibilities

Safety MUST start at the beginning and never take a back seat
Do your best, and remember, safety is an ongoing process
Be fair, be firm, be consistent
You are part of a team
Be a part of the solution
It is not about you
It is about the people we serve.
Be well, be safe,
Mike
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Module Four
Emergency Management Specialized
Applications
Chapter 21
Planning for Terrorism

Michael J. Fagel
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-25
Every terrorist attack and (an unraveled plot) hits the “reset button” for
safety and security personnel. Given the creativity of those committed to
carrying out these acts and advances in technology and weapon delivery
platforms such as drones, it is more important than ever that jurisdictions
are prepared and equipped to respond to terrorist events. Planners must
consider a broad range of incidents, including assaults on infrastructure and
electronic information systems that could result in consequences affecting
human life, health, and safety. In the ever-changing security environment,
they also must keep informed about emergent targets, tactics, and goals of
bad actors. Security procedures and responses to threats can no longer be
static and uniformly applied; instead, they must be tailored. Furthermore,
planning and exercising for the worst-case scenario ensures readiness for
any attack.
State and local governments have the primary responsibility in planning
for and managing the consequences of a terrorist incident using available
resources in the critical hours before federal assistance can arrive.
The Planning Process

The process of developing a terrorism annex to your Emergency Operations
Plan (EOP) is similar to that used to create other EOPs. As is the case for
these other plans, the terrorism response planning process must be ongoing
for organizations and begin well before any planned special event that could
be subject to a terrorist attack.
Traditionally, the planning process consists of six phases:
1. Initiation
2. Concept development
3. Plan development
4. Plan review
5. Development of supporting plans, procedures, and materials
6. Validation of plans using tabletop, functional and full-scale exercises.
However, given the unusually intense and multifaceted nature of terrorist

attacks, a seventh phase is recommended: Thorough coordination of plans,
internally and externally.
Image 21.1 Clarifying Discrepancies and Unclear Plans among Agencies

Regarding CT Response Functions

You should carefully compare plans for the various response functions
within supporting agencies and revise them, if necessary, to address or
resolve discrepancies. This will prevent disconnects between vital functions
that support one another and ensure that each does what the others expect
on a timely basis during a crisis. Similarly, the various departments and
agencies within a local jurisdiction should also compare their plans, focusing
on consistency and coordination issues.
Such reviews are critical in planning for response to a major terrorist
incident since local jurisdictions are likely to be aided by neighboring
communities, its own and neighboring counties, and its own and possibly
neighboring states.
Terrorism Hazards
The terrorism annex to your EOP should identify and discuss the nature of
the terrorist hazard. The hazard may be a weapon of mass destruction
(WMD), including conventional explosives, secondary devices, and
combined hazards, or it may be another means of attack, including low-tech
devices; attacks on infrastructure; and cyberterrorism.
WMD Hazard Agents

A WMD is defined as any weapon designed or intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic
or poisonous chemicals, disease organisms, radiation or radioactivity, or
explosion or fire.
WMDs are defined in US law as any of the following:
A destructive device, such as an explosive or incendiary bomb, rocket, or grenade;
A weapon designed to cause death or serious injury through toxic or poisonous chemicals;
A weapon containing a biological agent or toxin; or
A weapon designed to release dangerous levels of radiation or radioactivity.
(18 USC § 2332a)
Image 21.2 CBRNE (WMD)
Although we worry about al-Qaeda, their splinters, and ISIS affiliates

using WMDs, these weapons are also on the table for domestic terror
groups. There are three important considerations distinguishing these
hazards from other types of terrorist tools. First, in the case of chemical,
biological, and radioactive agents, their presence may not be immediately
apparent, making it difficult to determine when and where they have been
released, who has been exposed, and what danger is present for first
responders. Second, although there is a sizable body of research on
battlefield exposures to agents, there is a limited scientific understanding of
how these agents affect civilian populations. Finally, there is a lack of
education and training regarding WMDs in all organizations, especially by
those responsible for facility and event security.
Chemical Agents
Chemical agents are intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people
through physiological effects. A terrorist incident involving a chemical agent
will demand immediate reactions from emergency responders—fire, police,
hazardous materials (hazmat) teams, emergency medical services (EMS), and
emergency room staff—who will need adequate training and equipment.
Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be
introduced via aerosol devices (e.g., munitions, sprayers, or aerosol
generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. Such an attack
might involve the release of a chemical warfare agent, such as a nerve or
blister agent or an industrial chemical, which may have serious
consequences.
Image 21.3 Detectable Effects of a WMD Release Image
Table 21.1 Indicators of possible Use of Chemical Agent

Indicators of Possible use of Chemical Agent
Indicator Examples of Indicator
▪ Stated Threat to Release a

− Printed or verbal threat
Chemical Agent
− Lack of insects,
▪ Unusual Occurrence of
− Dead birds
Dead or Dying Animals
− Sick or diseased livestock
− Multiple victims
− Surge of similar 911 calls
− Serious illnesses
▪ Unexplained Casualties
− Nausea, disorientation, difficulty
breathing, or convulsions
− Definite casualty patterns
− Droplets, oily film
▪ Unusual Liquid, Spray, − Unexplained odor
Vapor, or Powder − Low-lying clouds/fog unrelated to
weather
− Unusual metal debris
▪ Suspicious Devices,
− Abandoned spray devices
Packages, or Letters
− Unexplained munitions
Source: Michael J. Fagel
Table 21.1 lists some indicators of the possible use of chemical agents.
Early in an investigation, it may not be evident whether an outbreak was
caused by an infectious agent or a hazardous chemical; however, most
chemical attacks will be localized, and their effects will be evident within a
few minutes. There are both persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents.
Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-
persistent agents have high evaporation rates, are lighter than air, and
disperse rapidly, thereby losing their ability to cause casualties after 10–15
minutes. However, they may be more persistent in small, unventilated areas.
Biological Agents
Recognition of a biological hazard can occur through several methods,
including identifying a credible threat, discovering bioterrorism evidence,
diagnosis, and detection.
When people are exposed to a pathogen, such as anthrax or smallpox,
they may not be aware of exposure or feel sick for some time. This delay
between exposure and onset of illness, the incubation period, is
characteristic of infectious diseases. The incubation period may range from
several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen.
Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals,
the initial detection and response to a biological attack on civilians are likely
to be made by direct patient care providers and the public health
community.
Terrorists could also use a biological agent to affect agricultural
commodities over a large area (e.g., wheat rust or a virus affecting livestock),
potentially devastating the local or even national economy. The response to
agricultural bioterrorism should also be considered during the planning
process.
Table 21.2 Indicators of possible Use of Biological Agent
Indicators of Possible use of Biological Agent

Biological Agent
− Lack of insects,
▪ Unusual Occurrence of Dead
− Dead birds
or Dying Animals
− Sick or diseased livestock
− Unusual illness for region/area
▪ Unusual Pattern of Casualties − Definite pattern inconsistent
with natural disease
Indicators of Possible use of Biological Agent
− Spraying;
▪ Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor,
− Suspicious devices, packages,
or Powder
or letters
Table 21.3 Indicators of possible Use of Nuclear or Radiological Agent
Indicators of Possible use of Nuclear or Radiological Agent

Nuclear Agent
▪ Presence of Nuclear or − Spent fuel canisters
Radiological Equipment − Nuclear transport vehicles
− Unusual illness for region/area
▪ Unusual Pattern of Casualties − Definite pattern inconsistent
with natural disease
▪ Nuclear Placards/Warning − Placards indicating nuclear or
Materials radiological material
Responders should be familiar with the characteristics of biological

agents. Table 21.2 lists some indicators of the possible use of biological
agents.
Nuclear/Radiological Agents
The nature of radiation itself compounds the difficulty of responding to a
nuclear or radiological incident. In an explosion, the use of radioactive
material may or may not be obvious, depending on the nature of the
explosive device used.
The presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain unless the
responders have the proper detection equipment and have been trained to
use it properly. Although many detection devices exist, most are designed to
detect specific types and levels of radiation and may not be appropriate for
measuring or ruling out the presence of radiological hazards.
Table 21.3 lists some indicators of the possible uses of nuclear or
radiological agents. The scenarios constituting an intentional
nuclear/radiological emergency include the following:
Use of an improvised nuclear device includes any explosive device

designed to cause a nuclear yield. Depending on the type of trigger
device used, either uranium or plutonium isotopes can fuel these
devices. Although “weapons-grade” material increases the efficiency of
a given device, the material of less than weapons grade can still be
used.
Use of radiological dispersal devices (RDD) includes any explosive
device utilized to spread radioactive material upon detonation. Any
improvised explosive device (IED) could be used by placing it in close
proximity to radioactive material.
The use of a simple RDD spreads radiological material without the use
of an explosive. Any nuclear material (including medical isotopes or
waste) can be used in this manner.
Conventional Explosives and Secondary Devices

The easiest to obtain and use of all weapons is still a conventional explosive
device, or improvised bomb, which may cause massive local destruction or
disperse a chemical, biological, or radiological agent. The components are
readily available, as are detailed instructions on constructing such a device.
IEDs are categorized as being explosive or incendiary, using high or low
filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Explosions and fires
also can be caused by projectiles and missiles, including aircraft used against
high-profile targets, such as buildings, as was the case for the September 11
attacks.
Bombs are cheap and easily constructed, involve low technology, and are the terrorist weapon
most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be outfitted with timed or remotely
triggered detonators and can be designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio
transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing incidents in single or multiple
municipalities.
The connection between bomb threats and actual bombings should be considered in planning.
Historically, an extremely low percentage of actual or attempted bombings were preceded by a
threat.
Image 21.4 Potential IED Suicide Vest
Consider the three most devastating bombings in the U.S. in the last fifty years—Bath, Michigan,
school attack (1927); the first World Trade Center attack (1993); and the Oklahoma City bombing
(1995): none of these attacks were preceded by a threat. The annual Explosives Incident Report
(EIR), an informational product prepared by the United States Bomb Data Center (USBDC) of the
ATF, further illustrates the relationship between bomb threats and bombings. Naturally, some who
make threats do pose a threat. Many who make threats do not pose a threat. The important
takeaway—most bad actors who are a bombing threat will never make one.
To illustrate the importance of planners ever-scanning the threat landscape, terrorist and
criminal bombings often target evacuees and first responders. Devices, if they exist, are generally
small and ineffective. Therefore, instead of planning to evacuate upon receipt of a bomb threat,
sheltering in place, in the protection of a hardened building, maybe a better course of action than
evacuation. Also, planners should also consider treating a bomb threat as a possible dry run, with
the attacker watching the evacuation to identify vulnerabilities.
(Hesterman, 2019)
Combined Hazards
WMD agents can be combined to achieve a synergistic effect—greater in
total effect than the sum of their individual effects. They may be combined
to achieve both immediate and delayed consequences. Mixed infections or
toxic exposures may occur, thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis.
Casualties of multiple agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from
multiple effects, such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which may
exacerbate the likelihood of agent contamination.
Attacks may be planned and executed so as to take advantage of the
reduced effectiveness of protective measures produced by the employment
of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the potential exists for multiple incidents
in single or multiple municipalities.
Other Terrorism Hazards

Planners also need to consider the possibility of unusual or unique types of
terrorist attacks previously not considered likely. For example, prior to the
attacks of September 11, 2001, the use of multiple commercial airliners with
full fuel loads as explosive incendiary devices in well-coordinated attacks on
public and private targets was not considered a likely terrorist scenario. On
October 1, 2017, Stephen Paddock committed the largest mass public
shooting in the United States when he opened fire on the Route 91 Harvest
Festival in Las Vegas, Nevada, killing 58 people and injuring more than
851,422 by gunfire. Prior to this event, a hotel room as a shooting platform to
attack a public event was unimaginable.
Although it is not realistically possible to plan for and prevent every
conceivable type of terrorist attack, planners should anticipate that future
terrorism attempts could range from simple, isolated attacks to complex,
sophisticated, highly coordinated acts of destruction using multiple agents
aimed at one or multiple targets. Therefore, the plans developed for terrorist
incidents must be broad in scope yet flexible enough to deal with the
unexpected.
These considerations are particularly important in planning to handle the
consequences of attacks using low-technology devices and delivery, assaults
on public infrastructure, and cyberterrorism. In these cases, the training and
experience of the responders may be more important than detailed
procedures.
Low-Technology Devices and Delivery

A variety can deliver explosives of methods. Most explosive and incendiary
devices used by terrorists would be expected to fall outside the definition of
a WMD. Small explosive devices can be left in packages or bags in public
areas for later detonation at a time and place when and where the terrorist
feels that the maximum damage can be inflicted, the tactic used by the
Boston Marathon bombers in 2013.
The relatively small size of these explosive devices can also be brought
onto planes, trains, ships, or buses, within checked bags or hand-carried.
Although major airport security procedures minimize the possibility of
explosives being brought on board airliners, planners will need to consider
the level of security presently employed at smaller airports, on ships, trains,
and buses within their jurisdictions.
Larger quantities of explosive materials can be delivered to their intended
target area via car or truck bombs, the tactic used in the devastating attack
on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 1993. Planners need to consider
the possible need to restrict or prohibit vehicular traffic within certain
distances of key facilities identified as potential terrorist targets. Planners
may also need to consider the possible use of concrete barriers to prevent
vehicles’ forced entry into restricted areas. With all attack scenarios, it is
important to consider the threat of nefarious insiders, who have the access
and knowledge to carry out or assist with an attack. Insiders who are lone
actors are the deadliest threat. Education, training, and creating a culture of
safe reporting should be part of the planning process.
Image 21.5 Inert IED (Pipe Bomb) being used as a Prop on a CCTA Training
Course
Infrastructure Attacks
Potential attacks on elements of the nation’s infrastructure require protective
considerations. Infrastructure protection involves risk management actions
taken to prevent the destruction of or incapacitating damage to networks
and systems serving society.
Infrastructure protection is more often focused on security, deterrence,
and law enforcement than emergency consequence management
preparedness and response. Nevertheless, planners must develop
contingencies and plans if critical infrastructures are degraded due to a
terrorist incident.
Cyberterrorism
Cyberterrorism involves the malicious use of electronic information
technology to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life or
against a nation’s critical infrastructures to intimidate or coerce a
government or civilian population to further political objectives. As with
other infrastructure guidance, most cyber protection guidance focuses on
security measures to protect computer systems against intruders, denial of
service attacks, and other forms of attack, rather than addressing
contingency and consequence management planning issues.
Emergency Operations Plan: Situation

The situation section of a terrorism annex to your EOP should discuss what
constitutes a potential or actual terrorist incident. It needs to present a clear,
concise, and accurate overview of potential events and discuss a general
concept of operation for a response. Any information already included in the
EOP need not be duplicated in the terrorism annex but should be referenced.
The situation overview should include as much information as possible that
is unique to terrorism response actions, including the suggested elements
listed in Table 21.4.
Image 21.6 Countering Cyber-Related Attacks

Table 21.4 Situational Report Elements
Situational Report Elements
▪ Use detailed, current maps or charts.

▪ Include demographic information.
▪ Use natural and human-made boundaries and
structures to identify risk areas.
Maps
▪ Annotate evacuation routes and alternatives.
▪ Annotate in-place sheltering locations.
▪ Use geographic information and analytical tools,
as appropriate.
▪ Determine response routes and times.
▪ Include bodies of water with dams or levees (these
Environment could become contaminated).
▪ Specify special weather and climate features that
could alter the effects of a WMD.
▪ Identify those most susceptible to WMD effects or
otherwise hindered or unable to care for themselves.
▪ Identify areas where large population
concentrations might be located, such as sports
arenas and major transportations centers.
Population ▪ List retirement communities.
▪ Note locations of correctional facilities.
▪ Note locations of hospitals, medical centers,
schools, daycare centers, or any other locations
where multiple evacuees may require assistance.
▪ Identify non-English-speaking populations.
Situational Report Elements
▪ Identify multijurisdictional perimeters and

boundaries.
▪ Identify potentially overlapping areas for a
response.
▪ Identify rural, urban, suburban, and city mutual-
Regional risk areas.
▪ Identify terrorism-specific or unique
characteristics, such as interchanges, choke points,
traffic lights, traffic schemes and patterns, access
roads, tunnels, bridges, railroad crossings, and
overpasses or cloverleaves.
▪ Identify mutual aid resources.
Resources
▪ Identify terrorism-specific resources.
As a state or local emergency manager or planner, you need to consider

the possibility of unusual or unique types of terrorist attacks, in addition to
those occurring in the past. Plots detected by federal law enforcement often
provide insight into emergent tactics, as do the online publications of
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. You need to think creatively about
possible scenarios and response needs. The plans developed for terrorist
incidents must be comprehensive in scope yet flexible enough to deal with
the unexpected.
Terrorism emergency response planning should include provisions for
working with federal crisis and consequence management agencies. The key
to successful emergency response involves smooth coordination among
multiple agencies and officials from various jurisdictions regarding all
aspects of the response.
Due to the need to interact with a wide range of organizations and
individuals within these organizations, up-to-date directories of the points of
contact must be maintained in the planning process. It is essential to update
directories, reflecting changes in personnel and office and cell numbers.
While federal agencies’ assistance will be provided in the event of a
terrorist incident, planning by state and local jurisdictions should take into
account the difficulty routinely experienced in incorporating the federal
resources into the initial local response. Coordination among state, local,
and federal officials should take place well in advance of public events and
mass gatherings. Hence, all response organizations clearly understand each
organization’s responsibilities and how they will be integrated.
Potential Targets
In determining the risk areas within your jurisdiction, the vulnerabilities of
potential targets should be identified, and the targets themselves prepared to
respond to a WMD incident. In-depth vulnerability assessments are needed
for determining a response to such an incident.
Several factors may determine areas of vulnerability:
Population
Accessibility
Criticality
Economic impact.
It may be beneficial to discuss vulnerabilities with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI).
Table 21.5 gives you an idea of which vulnerable areas in your jurisdiction
to include in the planning process.
Table 21.5 Potential Areas of Vulnerability
Potential Areas of Vulnerability

▪ Roads, tunnels, or bridges carry large volumes of

traffic.
Traffic ▪ Points of congestion that could impede response or
place citizens in a vulnerable area. Note time of day
and day of the week.
Trucking ▪ Hazardous materials (HazMat) cargo loading and
and unloading facilities.
Transport ▪ Vulnerable areas such as weigh stations and rest
Activity areas this cargo may transit.
▪ Pipelines and process or treatment facilities (in
addition to dams).
▪ Berths and ports for cruise ships, roll-on/roll-off
Waterways
cargo vessels, and container ships.
▪ International flagged vessels conducting business
in the area.
▪ Carriers, flight paths, airport layout, and types of
aircraft using this facility.
▪ Air traffic control towers, runways, passenger
Airports terminals, and parking areas.
▪ Airport acreage, fence line, and adjacent land and
structures
▪ Natural features on the property such as rivers
▪ Rails and lines, interchanges, terminals, tunnels,
Trains / and cargo/passenger terminals.
Subways ▪ HazMat that may be transported via rail.
▪ Subway stations and ventilation control systems.
▪ Federal, state, and local government offices.

▪ Post office, law enforcement stations, fire/rescue,
town/city hall, and local mayor/governor’s
Government
residences.
Facilities
▪ Judicial offices and courts.
▪ Monuments, memorial structures, and prominent
governmental symbols.
Recreational ▪ Sports arenas, theatres, malls, special interest group
Facilities facilities, and locations of special events.
Symbolic ▪ National monuments, internationally well-known
Buildings facilities and locations.
and ▪ Potential areas of congestion connected with such
Locations buildings and locations.
▪ Financial institutions and business districts.
▪ Shopping centers, open markets, or heavily
Other populated downtown areas are congested at certain
Facilities periods.
▪ Special events facilities with national importance.
▪ Prominent high-rise buildings.
Military
▪ Any type of military installation.
Installations
HazMat
Facilities,
Utilities, ▪ Facilities, such as electricity generating stations, oil
and refineries, spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, etc.
Nuclear
Facilities
▪ Water supply intakes from lakes or rivers.

Water
▪ Water supply pipelines and holding areas, such as
Supply
reservoirs and tanks.
Facilities
▪ Water supply treatment plants.
▪ Key agricultural facilities, such as large grain
Food and
elevators and livestock concentrations.
Agriculture
▪ Food processing and packaging facilities.
▪ Governmental and business-related computer
systems located within the jurisdiction and ascertain
their level of protection against terrorist cyber-
Computer attack.
Systems ▪ Bluetooth-enabled devices connecting to the
network by employees and facility users such as
personal fitness devices, smartphones, and
Bluetooth-enabled medical equipment.
Various criteria may be used in determining the vulnerability of facilities

to a terrorist attack. In evaluating the vulnerability of facilities, state and
local planners need to consider the existing security measures in place and
the need, if any, to upgrade security.
Also, the FBI has a standard vulnerability assessment paradigm that can
be used for evaluating the vulnerabilities of potential targets. Note this
document must be safeguarded as it spells out all of your vulnerabilities. If
the organization’s total score exceeds 256, and if local law enforcement was
not involved in the assessment, notify them at once. Hand-deliver the
document; do not email or send it through a postal service. Do not make
copies and consider very limited distribution. Careful decisions must be
made based on applicable state and federal law regarding confidentiality and
public information. Even when laws do not require strict confidentiality, you
should use common sense regarding the protection of vulnerability
information that would be useful to terrorists and nefarious insiders.
Initial Warning
While specific events may vary, the emergency response and protocol
followed should remain consistent. In the event of an overt WMD incident,
the initial call for help will likely come through the local 9–1-1 center. This
caller may or may not identify the incident as a terrorist attack and relay
only an explosion, a major accident, or a mass casualty event. Information is
relayed through the dispatcher before the arrival of first responders on scene
and the initial assessment will provide first responders with the basic
information necessary to begin responding to the incident. Additional
considerations related to terrorist attacks are the possible presence of
secondary and tertiary devices, a multi-staged attack occurring in several
locations, and treating the area as a crime scene.
With increased awareness and training about terrorist incidents, first
responders should recognize the occurrence of a terrorist incident. The
information provided in this chapter should educate responders and planners
to identify an incident was intentionally perpetrated to harm people,
compromise the public’s safety and wellbeing, disrupt essential government
services, or damage the area’s economy or environment.
You need to be aware of the likely occurrence of false warnings. Since
these cannot be ignored, they must be investigated, resulting in wasted
resources and psychological stress. You should develop procedures and
training to deal with such threats.
Initial Detection
The initial detection of a WMD terrorist attack will likely occur at the local
level by either first responders or private entities (e.g., hospitals,
corporations). Consequently, first responders, the business community—both
public and private—should be trained to identify hazardous agents and to
take appropriate actions.
State and local health departments and local emergency first responders
will be relied upon to identify unusual symptom occurrences and any
additional cases of symptoms as the effects spread throughout the
community and beyond. Don’t overlook the public; often, social media posts
and crowdsourcing apps give the first indication of trouble, even before a 9–
1-1 call is placed. Consider that during the strong earthquake on the Eastern
seaboard on August 23, 2011, citizens in New York City saw the Twitter
alerts about an earthquake originating in Virginia 15–20 seconds before
seismic waves struck the city. According to Facebook, the word “earthquake”
appeared in 3 million users’ status updates within four minutes of the quake.
Twitter said users were sending as many as 5,500 messages (“tweets”) per
second. The State Departments of Transportation monitor apps such as
“Waze” for early indication of traffic accidents and congestion. Planners and
responders can use keyword alerts and other tools to receive information
about an event as it is unfolding.
The detection of a terrorism incident involving covert biological agents
and some chemical agents, will most likely occur through the recognition of
similar symptoms or syndromes by clinicians in hospital or clinical settings.
Detection of biological agents could occur days or weeks after exposed
individuals have left the site of the release. The detection will occur at public
health facilities receiving unusual numbers of patients, the majority of
whom will self-transport. Similarly, a biological attack aimed at agricultural
assets might first be detected by veterinarians or agricultural inspectors.
First responders must be protected from the hazard before treating
victims. Planning for a response to terrorist acts must include provisions for
appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) for emergency responders,
specifically first responders. This equipment should include protective
clothing and respirators, with high-efficiency particulate air filters.
Detection equipment for chemical, biological, nuclear, or explosive materials
will assist in identifying the nature of a potential hazard.
You need to determine the present availability of this protective and
detection equipment within your jurisdiction, determine if additional
resources would be required to protect your first responders adequately, and
identify the funding needs to upgrade your resources, if needed.
Release Area
Standard models are available for estimating the effects of a nuclear,
chemical, or biological release, including the area, affected, and
consequences to population, resources, and infrastructure. Some of these
models include databases on infrastructure that may prove useful when
developing your terrorism annex.
Analogous to the area affected by a nuclear, biological, or chemical release
is the area impacted by an explosive device. Models are also available for
estimating the blast effects at various distances for various quantities of
explosive materials.
These models can be useful in preparing your terrorism annex, especially
regarding determining minimum setback distances from a potential vehicle
bomb to a vulnerable facility or structure. Suppose a specific minimum
distance cannot be maintained. In that case, the planning effort may need to
consider the cost and effectiveness of facility hardening to mitigate the
effects of an assumed blast impact. You may also want to consider the
removal or modification of window areas.
Investigation and Containment of Hazards

Local first responders will provide initial assessment or scene surveillance of
a hazard caused by an act of WMD terrorism. The proper local, state, and
federal authorities capable of dealing with and containing the hazard should
be alerted to a suspected WMD attack as soon as first responders recognize
the occurrence of highly unusual symptoms or of an unknown cause.
Consequently, state and local emergency responders must assess the
situation and request assistance as quickly as possible.
Emergency Operations Plan: Assumptions
Although situations may vary, planning assumptions remain the same.
1. The first responder or health or medical personnel will, in most cases,

initially detect and evaluate the potential or actual incident, assess
casualties and determine whether assistance is required. If so, state
support will be requested and provided. This assessment will be based
on a warning or notification of a WMD incident that may be received
from law enforcement, emergency response agencies, or the public.
2. The incident may require federal support. To ensure that there is only
one overall lead federal agency, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) is authorized to support the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Also, FEMA is designated as the lead agency for consequence
management within the United States and its territories. FEMA retains
authority and responsibility to act as the lead agency for consequence
management throughout the federal response. In this capacity, FEMA
will coordinate federal assistance requested through state authorities
using standard National Response Framework mechanisms.
3. Federal response will include experts in the identification, containment,
and recovery of WMD (chemical, biological, nuclear/radiological, or
explosive).
4. Jurisdictional areas of responsibility and working perimeters defined by
local, state, and federal departments and agencies may overlap.
Perimeters may be used to control access to the affected area, target
public information messages, assign operational sectors among
responding organizations and assess potential effects on the population
and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by
different authorities, which will impede the overall response if adequate
coordination is not established.
5. Response activities may continue for an extended period of days or
weeks. Early emergency responders may be pushed beyond their
capabilities, and regional and federal resources may be needed. The
incident will be covered extensively by the media. There may be many
volunteer responders and donations of food and material that will
require management.
Emergency Operations Plan: Concept of Operations

Your terrorism annex should include a concept of operations section to
explain the jurisdiction’s overall concept for responding to a WMD Incident.
Topics should include division of local, state, federal, and any intermediate
inter-jurisdictional responsibilities; activation of the EOP; and other
elements outlined in State and Local Guide 101.
Direction and Control

Local government response organizations will respond to the incident
scene(s) and make appropriate and rapid notifications to local and state
authorities. Control of the incident scene(s) most likely will be established
by local first responders from either fire or police.
To ensure continuity of operations, the Incident Command Post must be
established at a safe location and a distance appropriate for a response to a
suspected or known terrorist incident. Also, in severe terrorist attacks,
response operations may last for very long periods, and there may be more
leadership casualties because of secondary or tertiary attacks or events.
Therefore, planning should provide for staffing key leadership positions in
depth.
The Incident Command System (ICS) should be used by all responding
local fire, police, EMS, and emergency management organizations. All
relevant responder personnel should be trained in ICS to prevent security
coordination problems in a multi-organizational response.
The initial ICS likely will transition into a Unified Command System as
mutual-aid partners and state and federal responders arrive to augment the
local responders. It is recommended that local, state, and federal regional
law enforcement officials develop consensus “rules of engagement” early in
the planning process to smooth the transition from ICS to Unified
Command. The Unified Command structure will facilitate both crisis
management and consequence management activities.
The Unified Command Structure used at the scene will expand as support
units, and agency representatives arrive to support crisis and consequence
management operations. The site of a terrorist incident is a crime scene and
a disaster scene, although the lives, health, and safety remain the top
priority. Because of these considerations, as well as logistical control
concerns, it is imperative this incident site and its perimeter be tightly
controlled as soon as possible.
State and local planners must realize integrating the federal response into
the local response efforts can be a difficult and awkward process. Whenever
possible, each entity should involve the others in its planning process to
facilitate a better understanding by all parties of each organization’s
anticipated actions and responsibilities.
Federal response to an urban setting will be different from a rural setting.
There will be substantial human and equipment resources in an urban area
and the control of the emergency response. The rapid influx of federal
resources can be a sensitive issue unless properly coordinated. The federal
response should not overwhelm the local emergency response organization
but should provide resources, as needed (Image 21.7).
It is assumed that normal disaster coordination accomplished at state and
local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) and other locations away from
the scene would be addressed in the EOP. Any special concerns relating to
state and local coordination with federal organization should be addressed
in the terrorism annex.
Image 21.7 Incident Command from the Federal Level Down
Source: Image by Michael J. Fagel
Response to any terrorist incident requires direction and control. The

planner must consider the unique characteristics of the event, identify the
likely stage at which coordinated resources will be required, and tailor the
direction and control process to merge these resources into an ongoing
public health response.
With many organizations involved, there is the danger of key decisions
being slowed down by too many layers of decision-making. Planners should
be aware of the need to streamline the process to enable quick action on key
decisions and authorizations regarding public health and safety.
A primary EOC is necessary to properly coordinate response actions
within the jurisdiction and to liaise with other jurisdictions and federal
agencies. The EOC of the City of New York’s Office of Emergency
Management, a new state-of-the-art facility, was located at the World Trade
Center, and destroyed during the attack of September 11, 2001. This
necessitated the establishment of an alternate EOC. Therefore, planning
should address the possibility of shifting operations to an alternative EOC or
even a secondary location.
When considering direction and control, as well as continuity of
operations, planners must determine the availability of usable alternate EOC
facilities that can be brought to operational levels within a reasonable period
of time. In a large-scale terrorist attack, the local EOC might become
uninhabitable, especially if it is not a hardened facility. In identifying and
evaluating alternative EOC locations, planners must consider the availability
of communications systems, space to accommodate key staff, materials and
supplies, backup power, kitchen, bathrooms, and the overall capability to
maintain around-the-clock operations for an extended period of time.
Local, state, and federal interface with the FBI On-Scene Commander is
coordinated through the Joint Operation Center (JOC). FEMA will
recommend joint operational priorities to the FBI on the basis of
consultation with the FEMA-led consequence management group in the
JOC. The FBI, working with local and state officials in the JOC command
group, will establish operational priorities.
Communications
In the event of a WMD incident, rapid and secure communications are
important to ensure a prompt and coordinated response. Strengthening
communications among first responders, clinicians, emergency rooms,
hospitals, mass care providers, and emergency management personnel must
be given top priority when planning. Planning should include adding 9–1-1
resources when an event requires an extraordinary response.
Besides, terrorist attacks have overloaded non-dedicated telephone
hardlines and cellular systems. In these instances, the internet was a more
reliable communication tool, although it introduced vulnerabilities such as
hacking, phishing attempts, and viruses. Response organizations should
establish relevant internet platforms accessible by all coordinating
emergency response organizations, formalizing them in plans and practice
during training, drills, and exercises.
Responders with different functions within or outside of a jurisdiction
may use different radio frequencies and/or equipment, hindering
communications. The use of 800 MHz radios may alleviate this problem.
Therefore, a backbone communications system to interconnect local, state,
and federal responders is recommended.
The establishment of mutually agreed upon communications protocols
during the planning and exercise stages is necessary so that all responding
organizations will understand each other’s codes and terminology during a
response to real events.
Image 21.8 Interagency Electronic Communications
Source: Image and Copyright Brian R. Burt, Used with Permission
Planning should also consider the need for an integrated communications

system for all key state agencies and local emergency response
organizations. The interoperability of such a system would facilitate the
integrated response to a terrorist incident. Another important consideration
is a reliable backup communications system for emergency responders.
Terrorist incidents may result in the loss of radio transmission capabilities,
and telephone landlines and cellular phone systems will likely be
overwhelmed. Satellite telephones, which can operate when cellular and
non-dedicated landlines are overloaded, are another option for backup
telephone systems. Also, consider various smart device apps that turn them
into two-way radios, such as Zello, which was extensively used by citizens
and responders to coordinate rescues during flooding from Hurricane
Harvey in 2017.
State and local planners should consider the distribution of priority
emergency access telephone cards to their emergency workers. Planners
should determine the current status of their emergency communications
systems and identify the funding for upgrades.
Warning
Every incident is different. There may or may not be a warning of a
potential WMD attack. Factors involved range from intelligence gathered
from various law enforcement or intelligence agencies to communication
from the terrorist organization or bad actor. Therefore, open but secure
communication among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies
and emergency response officials is essential. The local FBI Field Office must
be notified of any suspected terrorist threats or incidents.
Similarly, the FBI may inform state and local law enforcement officials
regarding potential threats. Building relationships with local and federal law
enforcement is critical for information exchange. Your regional FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is a good place to plug in. An integrated
intelligence gathering and analysis systems would expedite the
dissemination of warnings about suspected terrorist threats.
The interoperability of such a system would eliminate the need to switch
back and forth between different communications systems for different
organizations. Understand that in ongoing terrorism investigations, the FBI
and other federal agencies may not share information with local agencies.
Therefore, planning and preparation for the unexpected is paramount.
Pre-Event Readiness
The FBI operates with a four-tier threat level system, which can be used as a
basis for initiating precautionary actions when a WMD terrorist event is
anticipated.
Level 4 (Minimal Threat): Received threats do not warrant actions

beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets or resources on a
heightened alert.
Level 3 (Potential Threat): Intelligence or a verbal threat indicates the
potential for a terrorist incident; however, this threat has not yet been
assessed as credible.
Level 2 (Credible Threat): A threat assessment indicates that a potential
threat is credible and confirms the involvement of a WMD in a
developing terrorist incident. The threat increases in significance when
the presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a
significant destructive event.
Level 1 (WMD Incident): A WMD terrorism incident resulting in mass
casualties has occurred that requires immediate federal planning and
preparation to provide support to state and local authorities. The
federal response is primarily directed toward the safety and welfare of
the public and preserving human lives.
Emergency Public Information

Terrorism is designed to be catastrophic. A terrorist attack intends to cause
maximum destruction of lives and property; create chaos, confusion, and
public panic; and stress local, state, and federal response resources. Accurate
and timely information, disseminated to the public and media immediately
and often throughout the response, is vital to minimize the accomplishment
of these terrorist objectives.
Crisis research and case studies show that accurate, consistent, and
expedited information calms anxieties and reduces problematic public
responses, such as panic and spontaneous evacuations that terrorists hope
will hamper response efforts. Many citizens will post photographs and
narratives from and in the vicinity of the attack location. To control the
message, there must be a practiced and ready communications plan. The
military communication plan includes having canned, approved statements
on the shelf and ready to go in the event of a plane crash or terrorist or
criminal event on base. They establish the first contact with the press and
issue immediate and recurring statements, controlling the message. This is a
model planners and responders should take into consideration for their
communication response efforts.
The news media will likely be the public’s primary source of information,
from both official sources and other non-official sources, during the incident.
Ensuring that the media will receive accurate, consistent, and expedited
official information from the outset and over what may be rapidly changing
and lengthy responses requires careful planning and considerable planning
and considerable preparations. It is vital to build and maintain a strong
working relationship with the media, even with a specific reporter who can
be your mouthpiece during the crisis. This relationship should include a
clear commitment to providing government representatives immediately
and throughout the emergency.
You may want to have Twitter and Facebook shell accounts established to
transmit information about the response, or could warn others of danger, the
placement of cordons, need to shelter in place, etc. Naturally, do not
transmit any information about law enforcement activity, or which
responders are on-site, numbers, and plan. In many cases, such as the al-
Shabaab 2013 Westgate Mall siege in Nairobi and the 2015 Paris ISIS attack,
the terrorists may monitor social media, television, and radio to assess law
activities enforcement outside and alter their operational planning. Also,
never transmit the number of injured or fatalities or any photos that bad
actors may use as propaganda or may disturb family members of victims.
Local plans should reflect responsibility for emergency information
operations during the crucial initial response until state and federal
personnel and resources can arrive to provide support. Planning should also
reflect:
A mechanism for sharing and coordinating information among all
responders’ agencies and organizations
Development and production of information materials
Dissemination of information through various methods
Monitoring and analysis of news media coverage with rapid response
capabilities to address identified problems.
A strong and ongoing public education program for terrorism response,

built upon outreach and awareness programs for other types of emergencies,
can enhance the response organization’s credibility and benefit both
members of the public and first responder efforts in the event of a terrorist
attack.
Protective Actions
Evacuation may be required from inside the scene perimeter to guard
against further casualties from contamination by the primary release of a
WMD agent, the possible release of additional WMDs, secondary devices, or
other attacks targeting emergency responders.
Temporary in-place sheltering may be appropriate if there is a short-
duration release of hazardous materials or if it is determined to be safer for
individuals to remain in place. Protection from biological threats may
involve coercive or non-coercive protective actions, including isolation of
individuals who pose an infection hazard, quarantine of affected locations,
vaccinations, use of masks by the public, the closing of public transportation,
limiting public gatherings, and limiting intercity travel.
As with any emergency, state and local officials are primarily responsible
for making protective action decisions affecting the public. Protocols should
be established to ensure persons make important decisions with the proper
decision-making authority. A planning best practice is to identify the
position (Fire Chief) vice the person (Chief Jones) to preclude delay or
confusion in the absence of the primary. The terrorism annex should include
provisions for coordinating protective actions with other affected
jurisdictions. Planning should also address ways of countering irrational
public behavior that can hinder protective actions.
Planning for evacuation should be flexible to account for complex
situations. After the attack on the Pentagon, federal buildings in
Washington, DC, were evacuated as a precautionary measure. The
evacuation was hampered by roads in the federal area being under the
jurisdiction of several federal agencies and the roads in the rest of the
District being under the authority of the District government. On the other
hand, the Pentagon is located in Arlington County, Virginia, near a route to
those fleeing from Washington, DC was used to evacuate. This caused a
situation where some evacuees were routed towards the incident site rather
than away. Also, due to heavy traffic in the Pentagon’s vicinity, fire vehicles
had difficulty reaching the incident site. These types of challenges are easily
addressed and practiced in realistic, complex tabletop exercises.
Mass Care
The location of mass care facilities will be based partly on the hazardous
agent. Decontamination, if necessary, may need to precede sheltering and
other needs of the victims to prevent further damage from the hazardous
agent to either the victims themselves or the care providers.
The American Red Cross, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), and the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) should be actively
involved with the planning process to determine both in-place sheltering
and mobile mass care systems for the terrorism annex.
A midpoint or intermediary station may be needed to move victims out of
the way of immediate harm. This action would allow responders to provide
critical attention (e.g., decontamination and medical services) and general
life-saving support, then evacuate victims to a mass location for further
attention. Some general issues to consider for inclusion in your terrorism
annex:
Location, setup, and equipment for decontamination stations, if any

Mobile triage support and qualified personnel
Supplies and personnel to support in-place sheltering
Evacuation to an intermediary location to provide decontamination
and medical attention
Determination of safety perimeters (based on the agent)
Patient tracking/record keeping for augmentation of epidemiological
services and support.
Health and Medical

The basic EOP should already contain a Health and Medical Annex.
Terrorist incidents may introduce other challenges and should be addressed
in the terrorism annex, including:
Decontamination
Safety of victims and responders
In-place sheltering and quarantine versus evacuation
Multihazard and multiagent triage.
Planning should anticipate the need to handle and screen large numbers
of people who may or may not be contaminated but who are fearful about
their medical well-being. The terrorism annex should also identify the
locations and capacities of medical care facilities within the jurisdiction and
in surrounding jurisdictions. The terrorism annex should also include a
description of these medical care facilities’ capabilities, especially
concerning trauma care. Depending on the nature and extent of the terrorist
attack, the most appropriate medical care facility may not necessarily be the
closest facility.
Additionally, first responders may be entering an environment rife with
biological or chemical agents, radioactive materials, or hazardous pollutants
from collapsed buildings, or collapsed buildings might be imminent. Other
incidents may pose environmental or physical risks to responders. Examples
may be a structurally damaged and potentially deadly pipeline, tank car,
tank truck, bridge, or tunnel. Training and simply discussing these
possibilities will go a long way towards preparation for the unknown.
Image 21.9 Typical Pre-Hospital MCI Triage Tag
In planning, address the need for first responders to perform a risk

assessment and to modify standard protocols (e.g., establish plans for
inoculating first responders) if the risk assessment indicates. The planning
should also address how such assessments are made and what resources they
may show are needed. The assessment may indicate monitoring and
sampling resources before federal resources can arrive.
Responders will also need appropriate PPE, including respirators. The
planning process needs to address the availability of regional monitoring
and sampling capability and PPE Since filters, and other equipment may
need routine servicing or replacement, add this to the plan for quarterly or
monthly review.
A bioterrorism incident raises several other special issues. Such an
incident may generate an influx of patients requiring specialized care. If an
infectious agent is involved, it may be necessary to isolate the patients and
use special precautions to avoid transmitting the disease to staff and other
patients.
State planning should also consider the need to obtain and integrate
supplementary medical professionals and technicians who may respond to a
terrorist incident. In addition to physiological health consideration, planners
should consider the need for mental health considerations in the
consequence management planning. Support must be provided not only to
those directly affected by a terrorist attack but also to those surviving family
members experiencing emotional stress.
Planning issues to consider should include:
Immunization and prophylaxis for biological agents

Notification to and receipt of information from doctors and clinics
Augmentation of medical facilities and personnel
Management of medical supplies and equipment
Patient tracking and record-keeping for augmentation of
epidemiological services and support
Analytical laboratory support, including memorandums of
understanding (MOUs), specifying special considerations, as
appropriate
Mental health support services, including clinical psychologists,
psychiatrists, social workers, etc.
Resources Management
The following considerations are highly relevant to WMD incidents and
should be addressed, if appropriate, in one or more appendices to your
resource management annex:
Nuclear, biological, and chemical response resources available through

interjurisdictional agreements.
Unique resources available through state authorities (e.g., National
Guard units).
Unique resources available to state and local jurisdictions through
federal authorities (e.g., the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, a
national asset providing delivery of antibiotics, antidotes, and medical
supplies to the scene of a WMD incident).
Unique expertise available through academic, research, or private
organizations.
Managing trained and untrained volunteer resources and unsolicited
donated goods that arrive at the incident site.
Recovery
The basic EOP should already contain a Recovery Annex. However, different
issues may arise during a WMD incident and should be addressed in the
terrorism annex. A WMD incident is a criminal act, and its victims and their
families may be eligible for assistance under your state’s crime victim’s
assistance law if one exists. Therefore, state crime victim’s assistance staff
should be included in the planning process. Also, injured victims of a
terrorist attack, those put at risk for injury, and the families of these persons
may have suffered psychological trauma due to the attack and maybe in
need of crisis counseling.
In an incident involving chemical or biological agents or radioactive
materials, large areas or multiple locations may become contaminated.
Decontamination may be required before buildings can be safely reoccupied.
While decontamination is taking place, or until damaged areas are repaired
or replaced, persons must be relocated from residences and offices, and office
equipment must be relocated from office buildings. Consider a plan for the
recovery of personal items left behind during evacuation such as purses,
backpacks, briefcases, desk items, computers and office equipment, and
proprietary information.
Relocation after a terrorist incident tends to be of longer duration and
entail more significant costs than relocation following a natural disaster. You
need to consider these factors and make appropriate arrangements.
Urban Search and Rescue

Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) involves a rapid deployment of task forces
to provide specialized life-saving support to state and local authorities,
including locating and extricating and providing on-site medical treatment
to those trapped in collapsed structures.
There are several US&R task forces throughout the country. They can
deploy within six hours and to sustain themselves for 36 hours. Currently,
deployment plans rely on commercial air transport. Consequently, in
incidents where air traffic is curtailed, the arrival of remote US&R task
forces may be delayed.
These US&R task forces’ capabilities are being enhanced to operate in a
collapsed building environment contaminated with biological or chemical
agents or radioactive materials. These enhanced task forces will have
additional hazmat specialists and medical personnel and more monitoring
and detection equipment.
Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

As with hazard-specific emergencies, the organization for the management
of local response will probably need to be tailored to address the special
issues involved in managing a terrorist incident’s consequences. This
organization should be defined in the terrorism annex or your EOP
The consequences of a terrorist attack, especially a multi-stage or
prolonged event, can overwhelm local resources, and may require assistance
from state or federal governments. The response by state and local
governments and the types of support and assistance from the federal
government may be different from the response and support received for a
natural disaster.
Because of this, not only must the plans be upgraded to include response
to a terrorist incident, but training and exercising must also be expanded to
ensure unique aspects of the response to a terrorist incident can be carried
out in a coordinated, effective manner.
Training needs to be planned for local, state, and federal staff involved in
the response. You should identify their training needs, budgets, and
resources. Conduct periodic integrated exercises to ensure the emergency
response at the local, state, and federal levels can be adequately coordinated.
The following response roles should be articulated in your terrorism annex.
Local Emergency Responders

Local fire departments, law enforcement personnel, hazmat teams, and EMS
will be among the first to respond to terrorist incidents, especially those
involving WMDs. In incidents associated with public transportation,
workers and officials from these transportation organizations may be among
the first responders. As response efforts escalate, the local emergency
management agency and health department will help coordinate needed
services.
Interjurisdictional Responsibilities
The formal arrangements and agreements for an emergency response to a
terrorist incident among neighboring jurisdictions, state, local, and
neighboring states (and those jurisdictions physically located in those states)
should be made before an incident. When coordinating and planning the
Risk Assessment and Risk Area sections of the terrorism annex, inter-
jurisdictional responsibilities should be readily identifiable.
State Emergency Responders

If requested by the local officials, the state emergency management agency
can support local emergency management authorities and the Incident
Commander.
Image 21.10 Example of Large Trauma Center/Teaching Hospital
State and Local Public Health Authorities

State laws grant the state and local public health authorities emergency
powers to combat communicable diseases. The powers available and
procedures for enforcement vary from state to state. Typical powers include
the power to isolate or quarantine persons and places and compel
vaccination and other preventive measures, such as wearing masks. In some
states, these measures may be taken whenever there is a threat of
communicable disease; in others, the powers apply to only one or more
specific, named diseases.
Medical Service Providers

Hospitals generally perform emergency planning, both to protect their own
facilities and patients and to respond to disasters in the community. State
licensing and accreditation standards require hospitals to meet certain
criteria for emergency preparedness, which often include participation in
local or regional medical planning for disasters. Hospitals accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations must be
prepared for a variety of disaster scenarios, including facilities for biological,
radioactive, or chemical isolation and decontamination, where appropriate.
Local Emergency Planning Committees and State Emergency

Response Commissions
These entities are established under the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) Title III, and implementing the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Local Emergency Planning
Committees (LEPCs) develop and maintain local hazardous materials
emergency plans and receive notifications of releases of hazardous materials.
State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) supervise the operation of
the LEPCs and administer the community right-to-know provisions of
SARA Title III, including collection and distribution of information about
facility inventories of hazardous materials, chemicals, and toxins.
LEPCs will have detailed information about industrial chemicals within
the community. It may be advisable for LEPCs and SERCs to establish
MOUs with agencies and organizations to provide specialized resources and
capabilities for response to WMD incidents.
Federal Emergency Responders

Upon determining a credible terrorist threat, or if such an incident occurs,
the federal government may respond through the appropriate departments
and agencies. These departments and agencies may include FEMA, the DOJ
and FBI, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the HHS,
the EPA, the Department of Agriculture, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and possibly the American Red Cross and Department
of Veteran Affairs. Understanding each organization, its culture, resources,
and method of communicating and engaging is paramount.
Administration and Logistics

Many factors are making a consequence management response to a terrorist
incident unique. Unlike some natural disasters, the administration and
logistics for a response to a terrorist incident require special considerations.
For example, there may be little or no warning, and because the release of a
WMD may not be immediately apparent. Caregivers, emergency response
personnel, and first responders are in imminent danger of becoming
casualties before identifying the crime.
Incidents could escalate quickly from one scene to multiple locations and
jurisdictions. Scared citizens naturally flee an attack scene, possibly taking
contaminants with them to other areas or on subways, buses, and trains.
The types of supplies needed to respond to a terrorist incident may differ
from those needed for a natural disaster or other technological emergencies.
For example, the responders to the September 11 attacks incident needed
hats, steel-toed shoes, respirators appropriate for the hazards, and other PPE.
These were not stockpiled and had to be purchased. If responding while the
scene is “hot” meaning the attack is still underway, there may be a
requirement or need for tactical gear such as body armor or even weapons
issuance.
Your planning should address administrative protocols to ensure that
proper purchasing procedures are followed, and duplicate purchases are
avoided.
On September 11, and the days immediately following, commercial
airlines and civilian aircraft were grounded. The shutdown delayed the
arrival of supplies and federal responders from distant locations. To avoid
the inefficiencies of ad hoc purchasing of supplies and delays in the arrival
of supplies related to air traffic curtailments, you need to consider regional
warehousing of supplies and equipment for emergency responders,
including equipment for the use of US&R task forces.
One of the key logistical problems in the initial stages of emergency
response to a terrorist incident is establishing an Incident Command Post to
direct response activities. In a “routine” emergency, such as fire, small
hazardous materials releases, or police actions, the Incident Command Post
is established at a point close enough to observe the incident, but far enough
away to maintain an overview perspective and a safe distance from the
immediate hazards. Because of the unique nature of the terrorist activity and
the incident’s inherent unpredictability, planners and emergency responders
may need to rethink the protocol for locating the Incident Command Post.
One of the key administrative and logistical challenges in managing the
emergency response to a terrorist incident is the successful integration of the
federal response into the initial response by local and state emergency
response organizations.
The very nature of a terrorist attack assumes a federal response.
Depending on the extent of the terrorist incident, the federal response could
be swift and massive. The application, integration, and coordination of the
federal resources into the existing local command and control structure can
be sensitive. Federal resources should not overwhelm the local response but
should be made available as needed and requested.
You should involve federal agencies in your planning, to the extent
possible, to develop a better understanding among all parties regarding the
nature and extent of the federal response, including the logistical support
needs of the federal agencies.
Terrorist incidents are more likely to occur in urban areas than in rural
settings. Urban centers have significantly higher numbers of emergency
personnel and material resources, and they routinely deal with emergency
response. Local emergency response organizations will likely want to
maintain the emergency response’s direction and control to a terrorist
incident. Planning for terror attacks in rural areas requires more
consideration regarding the delay in state and federal resources arriving on
scene to assist. Some scenarios could be a forced train derailment, aircraft
crash, attack on critical infrastructure such as bridge, tunnel, dam, power
station, or agricultural and food processing contamination. Keeping a
detailed log of all activities before the arrival of other responders, quickly
getting them up to speed and integrated into the response, is a helpful best
practice.
As a planner, you should be aware of the potential logistical problems
caused by the unsolicited influx of volunteers and donated goods, as
experienced at many attack locations.
The site and perimeter control are significant to avoid responder
casualties and prevent emergency operations from being disrupted by well-
meaning volunteers’ uncontrolled movement.
In developing plans, identify potential staging areas for personnel and
equipment and warehouses for materials, equipment, and supplies. Although
these may not be needed for small-scale incidents, an inventory of available
warehouse space and potential staging areas would assist in responding to a
large-scale incident and/or a prolonged consequence management response
and recovery effort.
References
18 USC § 2332a. Use of weapons of mass destruction. Retrieved from:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2010-
title18/pdf/USCODE-2010-title18-partI-chap113B-sec2332a.pdf
Hesterman, J. (2019). Rethinking bomb threat response. Journal of Business
Continuity and Emergency Planning, January, 13(2), 160–73.
Chapter 22
Complex Coordinated Terrorist

Attacks
J. Howard Murphy
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-26
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (CCTAs) signal a need for a

paradigm shift in emergency management and emergency response
operations. CCTAs are unlike an active shooter incident which involves “an
individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a
confined and populated area”. Implicit in the definition of an active shooter
incident is that the subject’s criminal actions typically involving the use of
firearms (DOJ, 2013). The United States Department of Homeland Security
defines CCTAs as
acts of terrorism that involve synchronized and independent teams at multiple locations
sequentially or in close succession, initiated with little or no warning, and employing one or more
weapon systems: firearms, explosives, fire as a weapon, and other nontraditional attack
methodologies that are intended to result in large numbers of casualties. These attacks represent
an evolving and dynamic terrorist threat, shifting from symbolic, highly planned, and structured
Al Qaeda-style attacks (terrorist-directed) focused on high-visibility targets to threats that are
more diffuse, difficult to detect, and less costly to implement (terrorist-inspired).
(2018, p. 2)
Both active shooter and Complex Coordinated Attack incidents will result
in mass casualty incidents in which medical resources are overwhelmed by
the number and/or severity of injuries. While numbers of casualties may be
similar, there are some more obvious differences between an active shooter
incident and a CCTA provided within this chapter.
Unlike an active shooter/armed assailant or even more typical incidents
which a conventional emergency response can manage, a CCTA is an
incident that requires a greater number of resources, specialized resources,
and strategic thinking to successfully counter the threat(s). Countering a
CCTA requires emergency response agencies to effectively and quickly
coordinate their response operations. Additionally, this requires
development and maintaining relationships throughout the preparedness
cycle of planning, organizing/equipping, training, exercising, and
evaluating/improving processes and plans. The more effort put forth before
the CCTA, the more effective the response to counter the CCTA will likely
be.
While there is not an agreed-upon definition of a CCTA, there are
recognizable characteristics that allow for definable triggers for levels of
emergency response operations. It may become best practice for
communities to characterize and define a CCTA based upon their respective
emergency response capability and capacity, much as they do in defining
mass casualty incidents (MCIs).
CCTA differs from an Active Shooter Incident:
1. CCTAs involve active shooter incidents, though there will be multiple

attackers with preplanning and coordination often only discovered after
the attack during the investigation;
2. CCTAs require responders to maintain situational awareness that
focuses on a larger area than the initial or apparent target; and,
3. CCTAs possess a “bigger picture” aspect, as strategy is involved to
effectively stage and deploy emergency response assets and capabilities
in accordance with the current and forecasted threat(s).
In contrast to CCTAs, characteristics of an Active Shooter incident

include:
1. Single location;
2. Shorter duration (than many CCTAs);
3. Contained;
4. Narrow threat;
5. Selective goal (criminal, instead of terrorist);
6. Not coordinated; and,
7. Typically, involves a single assailant at a single location.
From emergency management and emergency response management

perspectives, a CCTA is a dynamic incident with little to no warning by
multiple attackers and/or involving multiple locations involving the use of
atypical tactics, techniques, procedures, and weaponry. Such incidents
require emergency responders to suspect the initial incident as a precursor
to another attack or other attacks.
There currently exist eight generally agreed-upon characteristics of
attackers involved in CCTAs. Based upon studies of multiple CCTAs or
swarm attacks—discussed in detail later in this chapter—these eight
characteristics include:
1. Number of attackers: An incident involving more than one attacker

should immediately raise concern and awareness among emergency
responders and emergency managers, as two or more attackers
conducting an attack is evidence of planning and a conspiracy. Initial
responders should immediately alert each other and communicate to
follow-on emergency responders that more than one attacker is
involved. While the involvement of two attackers itself does not
immediately indicate a CCTA, it is one of the strongest indicators of
the possibility of a CCTA. All responders should adopt a posture
appropriate for facing an aggressive, well-armed, and trained attack
force whose only objective may be the discriminant or indiscriminate
killing of as many people as possible. The involvement of three or more
attackers almost certainly constitutes a CCTA as coordination is
presumed, as is complexity of the attack operation.
Image 22.1 Simulated CCTA for Training
2. Attacker attire: The attire worn by attackers may provide some insight
as to the level of their preparedness and training. Emergency
responders should be aware of the following considerations pertaining
to attackers’ attire:
– Similar attire;
– Use of camouflage or other tactical colors (e.g., black) and gear;
– Use of hoods or balaclava; and,
– Evidence of the use of body armor.
These indicators reflect the level of planning and coordination by the

attackers. For example, the more similarly the attackers are dressed,
especially if in paramilitary attire, the higher the level of suspicion
among emergency responders of a CCTA.
3. Body armor: The use of body armor is important information. Initial
responders should immediately alert each other and communicate to
follow-on emergency responders that the attackers are using body
armor. Law enforcement responders should consider using weapons
and ammunition that are most appropriate for confronting an attacker
who is wearing body armor. Until proven otherwise, law enforcement
responders should assume that attackers are using the most protective
body armor available.
4. Weapons: The types of weapons used by attackers is also an indicator of
a CCTA. Attackers using assault weapons should raise the suspicion of
a CCTA. Emergency responders should consider attackers using
multiple weapon types, especially grenades and improvised explosive
devices, as an extremely dangerous adversary. Initial responders should
immediately alert each other and communicate to follow-on emergency
responders that attackers are using assault weapons. To the extent
possible, law enforcement responders should arm themselves with
assault weapons rather than relying only on their department-issued
sidearms. Emergency responders should emphasize the necessity of
working in organized contact teams, avoid single-officer entries, and
attempt to avoid single-officer contact with attackers.
5. Aggressiveness: It is difficult to describe the concept of attacker
aggressiveness in a meaningful way without stating that emergency
responders will recognize it when they see it. Attackers demonstrating
no fear or hesitation in confronting responders, moving aggressively, or
even using advanced tactics against emergency responders, should be
considered extremely dangerous adversaries. Initial responders should
immediately alert each other and communicate to follow-on emergency
responders that attackers are using aggressive tactics. Emergency
responders should emphasize the necessity to work in organized
contact teams, avoid single-officer entries, and attempt to avoid single-
officer contact with attackers.
6. Declarative statements: Attackers’ statements made to survivors, media,
emergency responders or others may provide insight into the attack.
Declarative statements alone are not a good indicator of a CCTA.
However, declarative religious, ethnic, or terrorism-related statements
in conjunction with other elements previously described strengthen the
indications of a CCTA. These declarative statements may take the form
of yelling religious phrases as they kill, asking victims to identify their
religion, or even stating outright to victims or survivors that they are
part of a terrorist organization. A key differentiator with declarative
statements is insight into the mindset of the attackers. For example, are
the attackers likely to take hostages and negotiate a settlement, or is it
more likely that hostage taking would be a stalling tactic with the
intent of fortifying positions or continuing the killing of people?
Declarative statements may help incident managers in their decision-
making process when contemplating entries or counterattacks. Initial
responders should communicate declarative statements to on-scene
incident commanders.
Image 22.2 Firearm Examples of Those Used by Terrorists in Attacks

Image 22.3 Inert Grenade Used in Simulated IED Boobytrap in CCTA
Training
7. Tactical movements/behavior: Observed attacker behavior can also

provide strong indications of a CCTA. Emergency responders should be
observant for tactical behavior by attackers, such as (but not limited to)
coordinated movements, simultaneous or near simultaneous attacks on
multiple targets, use of cover, bounding overwatch (leapfrogging), cover
fire, delaying or denying entry and exit to survivors and emergency
responders, deployment of diversions to slow public safety responders,
conducting secondary attacks on emergency responders and evacuation
routes, and other combat tactics (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2018). Emergency responders observing attackers using
tactical behavior should consider them extremely dangerous
adversaries. Initial responders should immediately alert each other and
communicate to follow-on emergency responders that attackers are
using tactical movements. Emergency responders should emphasize the
necessity to work in organized contact teams, avoid single-officer
entries, and attempt to avoid single-officer contact with attackers.
8. Remote command and control: Initial responders should be observant
for indications that attackers are communicating with some remote
command and control entity directing the attack. Indications may come
from direct observation of attackers communicating on cell phones,
satellite phones, or other means; or, they may come from witnesses and
survivor statements. Remote command and control is a significant
indicator of a CCTA. Initial responders should immediately alert each
other and communicate to follow-on emergency responders that
attackers are communicating with each other or other entities. Efforts
should be taken to disrupt attackers’ communications. And, emergency
responders should emphasize the necessity to work in organized
contact teams, avoid single-officer entries, and attempt to avoid single-
officer contact with attackers.
Sound tactical practices are appropriate in a CCTA response. The tactical

differences for consideration lie in recognizing the much higher threat risk
that is posed by the attackers who are perpetrating a CCTA. Emergency
responders should assume that the attackers are well trained, skilled in
weapons and tactics, and not afraid to die. More importantly, perhaps,
responders should assume that attackers will be prepared to not only engage
law enforcement, but also to make an effort to inflict heavy damage and
even repel counterattacks.
Emergency responders should consider and provide themselves of all
tactical advantages possible. These tactical advantages will vary from agency
to agency but may include equipment carried in a patrol car, such as Level
IV body armor, assault weapons or rifles, shotguns, and sufficient
ammunition. Responders should make every effort to form and work in
contact teams. Larger teams of four to six officers are preferred over smaller
teams of two to three officers. Responders should engage with multiple
contact teams and coordinate their counterattack and movements against
the attackers. Maximizing tactical use of the environment for cover and
concealment should be a priority. Consideration might be given to
containing attackers or limiting their ability to move to a more target-rich
environment. Most importantly, clear communication among contact teams
about position, movement, and actions is paramount.
Emergency responders must also consider the behavior of the attackers as
it applies to mindset and objectives. It is extremely unlikely that initial
responders will know the mindset or objectives of the attackers they face.
Nevertheless, these factors should be considered, as they may relate to
traditional practices and decision-making when facing shootings and
hostage situations. Terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated a commitment
to and acceptance of death as a result of their actions, and they have
repeatedly shown a commitment to killing. Unfortunately, there is little
information to guide decision-making in CCTAs. Incident Commanders
must make the best decisions they can based on the information they have
at the time.
Image 22.4 Considering Terrorist Mindset and Concerning Behavior (Image of

Role Player Used in CCTA Training)
Attackers’ Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

The CCTA tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) allow attackers to
perpetrate multiple or mass casualty incidents; obtain news coverage; and, to
inflict considerable damage prior to the neutralization of the attackers
(Sullivan & Elkus, 2009). In some cases, multiple attack methods have been
combined by attackers, with one set of attackers undertaking shooting sprees
and hostage-taking, while another group becomes involved in simultaneous
barricade siege incidents (Dolnik, 2010). CCTAs present other challenges to
the emergency response community, including:
1. Creating a multi-hazard incident (i.e., direct fire, hazardous materials,

IEDs, conflagrations/fires, etc.);
2. Overwhelming available resources such as personnel, equipment,
communications systems, and other essential emergency response
assets;
3. Perpetrating a tiered or parallel incident(s) requiring
multijurisdictional, multidiscipline responses and coordination; and,
4. Presenting potential cascading system failures within a community
(i.e., transportation, medical, power, economic, etc.).
The concept and terminology pertaining to CCTAs involves an integration

of the terms “complex” and “coordinated” in order to develop a “CCTA”
term. One possible definition of a CCTA is derived from two separate terms
and definitions, provided below (Jacobson, 2011).
Complex attack: an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which
employ at least two distinct classes of weapons against one or more targets.
Coordinated attack: an attack that exhibits deliberate planning conducted
by multiple hostile elements, against one or more targets from multiple
locations.
Complex attacks differ from coordinated attacks in that they lack any
indication of a long-term planning process or prior preparation. These
hybrid operations, such as the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, the
Nazran raid in June 2004, the September 2013 Westgate Mall attacks in
Nairobi, Kenya, the November 2015 attacks in Paris, the March 2016 suicide
bombers attacks in Brussels, Belgium at the Maelbeek Metro Station and
Zaventem International Airport, and the April 2019 attacks on churches,
hotels, a housing complex, and a guest house in Colombo, Sri Lanka
highlight the devastating impact that trained, mobile groups of attackers can
cause. These attacks lasted multiple days, generating a considerable amount
of news coverage, especially given the 24-hour international news cycle. The
Mumbai attackers are known to have had lines of communication to
external groups, which appeared to compound the barricade siege situation
that followed the initial assault, while groups of attackers in the other
aforementioned attacks are suspected to have had such lines of
communication (Dolnik, 2010).
While an attack like the one perpetrated by al-Qaeda on September 11,
2001, across a large geographic region of the United States, and one
perpetrated within a local jurisdiction like Mumbai or Nazran can certainly
be classified as CCTAs, the difference between them is one of scale and
scope. The economic costs and impacts related to the aforementioned attacks
differed significantly, and the scope related to geographic area (e.g., entire
US airspace and Eastern Seaboard versus the city of Mumbai or Nazran).
What Differentiates a CCTA from an Active Shooter Incident or

a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI)?
Different Outcomes
CCTAs are “asymmetric” operations (often referred to as swarm attacks), in
which there is a mismatch existing between the resources and philosophies
of the combatants, and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing
military or paramilitary (e.g., law enforcement) force and striking directly at
cultural, political, or population targets, is a defining characteristic of fourth-
generation warfare. CCTAs, therefore, may be considered “asymmetric” or
fourth-generation warfare. Just as coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
have faced decentralized, non-state actors (perhaps supported by a rogue
nation or two) who understand just how big an impact attacks on
economies/markets, infrastructure, communications, and cultural icons can
have on the Western psyche, US law enforcement, and other emergency
response and emergency management entities are likely to face similar
asymmetric tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).
Much of the information on CCTAs and the asymmetric tactics used
within such attacks originates from the study of swarm attacks. Swarm
attacks are high-risk, coordinated assaults sometimes directed against
multiple targets or building complexes, using mobile groups to circumvent
security measures, allowing attackers to inflict casualties, garner news
coverage and, in recent years, to inflict considerable damage prior to the
neutralization of the attackers. The term “swarm attack” has appeared
relatively recently, primarily in a military context (Dolnik, 2010). The CCTA,
like a swarm attack, is designed to overwhelm the defenses of the target
using an attacking force often smaller and with less armament than the
opposing force (i.e., law enforcement, security force). Attackers use a
decentralized force against their opponent, emphasizing mobility,
communications, unit autonomy and coordination (Edwards, 2000).
One aspect of a CCTA is that it moves away from the traditional model of
a rigid chain of command and control (Alberts, 2007). CCTAs, by necessity,
rely upon agility, focus, and convergence. Agility is the critical capability
that organizations need to meet the challenges of complexity and
uncertainty. Focus provides the context and defines the purposes of an
endeavor, and convergence is the goal-seeking process that guides actions
and effects (Alberts, 2007).
Countering CCTAs, like countering other threats requires doing two
things: finding targets and hitting targets while avoiding being hit. CCTAs
involve large numbers of relatively small weapons; which, with
synchronized actions allows the attackers to react faster than their opponent,
resulting in defeat—a “successful” CCTA. Senior opposition leadership,
whether virtually, in person, or through agents release resources (attackers)
to conduct a CCTA(s), but do not control them once released. CCTAs require
autonomous or semi-autonomous operating agents, with effective
synchronization and communications among them.
CCTAs appear to tie in well with the theories of military strategist, John
Boyd’s concept of quick action (Hightower, n.d.) based on the repeated
application of the following steps:
Observe: make use of the best sensors and other intelligence available;
Orient: put the new observations into a context with the old;
Decide: select the next action based on the combined observation and
local knowledge; and
Act: carry out the selected action, ideally while the opponent is still
observing your last action.
Emergency managers and emergency responders must prepare themselves

for the next threat or incident, as forecasting a threat and preparing for it is
the first step to resiliency. This preparation could involve improving the
security plans for critical infrastructure and obtaining resources necessary to
effectively counter a forecasted threat. Referring to the OODA Loop,
emergency managers and emergency responders must make decisions
quickly using the information they have available from their initial
observations, as decisions must be made and actions taken even when
information may be unclear, confusing, or absent.
The first 10–15 minutes of a CCTA—and, often much longer—are going to
be volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA). Emergency
managers and emergency responders need to be prepared to make decisions
even in this VUCA environment. And, the first arriving responder on scene
needs to take charge of the scene, regardless of rank, and make the decisions
during that first phase of emergency response operations with those
decisions often being beyond the responder’s typical level of decision-
making.
During a CCTA, emergency responders need to:
Make the best possible decisions from the outset using available
information;
Make decisions using little information and information that may be
difficult to prioritize;
Be prepared to make decisions in a chaotic and stressful environment;
and,
Be mindful of future implications (second- and third-order effects) of
decisions and consider the overall response.
As quickly and as accurately as possible, emergency managers and

emergency responders should obtain both situational awareness and domain
awareness. The U.S. Coast Guard (2014) provides that situational awareness
is created by identifying, processing, and comprehending critical elements of
information that are relevant to the immediate situation. Of course,
emergency responders work to obtain and use situational awareness on a
daily basis in their response operations. Domain awareness, however,
involves understanding what is occurring throughout all areas of
responsibility. For incident or area commanders and their respective staffs,
their responsibility should include taking the big view, the entire jurisdiction
or sector of a jurisdiction considered their area or domain of responsibility.
Situational awareness is a subset of domain awareness, and although
there is a relationship between the two, a major distinction exists. While
situational awareness pertains to what is happening at a specific scene,
domain awareness involves many of the same concerns but on a larger level.
That is, domain awareness focuses its attention not only on the individual
situation that responders are handling but also on the common elements
among multiple scenes. While line-level responders are managing individual
situations, commanders generally are less interested in the particulars of
each situation and are more interested in the cumulative effect of multiple
situations.
The relationship between those responsible for managing situations and
those responsible for domain awareness is interdependent; each relies on the
other to share information in order to be successful. Emergency responders
can develop situational awareness based on information that is passed on to
them by those who are responsible for domain awareness, such as command
personnel, dispatch, or others. Conversely, domain awareness is developed,
in part, by responders in the field sharing information with command
personnel through dispatch or direct communication with the command
post.
Area Command, the command structure often used in major incidents,
relies heavily on information gleaned from situational awareness to
establish context, meaning, and patterns; or, in other words, to develop a
sense of the bigger picture. Domain awareness is not only created by
relaying critical information from the scene; information from the scene has
to be assessed and analyzed. The goal of those who provide domain
awareness is to not just pass on information but to pass on the right
information at the right time. The right information at the right time is
actionable information, or what is commonly referred to as intelligence.
Emergency responders in all disciplines rely on accurate and appropriate
information to avoid potential dangers at the scene, determine the necessary
and appropriate equipment, allocate personnel necessary to manage a scene,
and identify appropriate response actions. Although this information is
largely gathered based on the emergency responder’s or emergency
responders’ observations and assessment(s) of the scene upon arrival,
information is sometimes given to the responder while he or she is en route
to the scene. Emergency responders will generally perform better and more
safely when they have information prior to arriving at a scene.
In the context of a CCTA, emergency responders need to have awareness
of the situation to ensure safety and to determine the best course of action.
In addition to the information based on their personal observations and
scene assessment, responders also rely on those who have domain awareness
to forward information that may be pertinent in effectively managing the
situation with which they are dealing.
Once an incident is identified as a CCTA, although it may not be
immediately apparent, it is critical to ensure that the proper command and
management structure exists to coordinate a response. Most emergency
responders are familiar with establishing an on-scene command structure
using the basic elements of the Incident Command System (ICS) and either a
single Incident Commander or a Unified Command. In most incidents, this
is a sufficient command structure; however, in the case of a CCTA, it is
critical to establish a higher level of command that includes agency
administrators and senior elected officials. This action ensures a command
structure is in place that is able to view the incidents, and their impacts,
from a broader perspective, and to respond accordingly.
As a CCTA unfolds, no single on-scene command will be able to direct
and control the response resources necessary to cope with what is occurring.
Furthermore, it is likely that the on-scene command will not have the proper
authority to enact and respond to a rapidly escalating incident that may
span multiple jurisdictions. Activating a Department Operation Center
(DOC), Emergency Operations Center (EOC), or other multi-agency
coordination (MAC) facility should be considered immediately. It is also
important to ensure that these facilities are staffed and managed with senior
agency and elected leaders who have broad authority to initiate actions
based upon statutory or constitutional provisions.
Multiple Responses
CCTAs pose considerable problems for law enforcement and other
emergency response agencies seeking to develop countermeasures within
evolving counterterrorism doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
CCTAs also pose problems within counterterrorism policy-making circles.
The scale of such attacks and the range of targets, which are often attacked
simultaneously, means responders will need to remain mobile themselves,
while those negotiating or responding from law enforcement agencies will
also have to be highly trained and well-coordinated to manage short-term
fluid incident dynamics. The more substantive and permanent effects of such
attacks are likely to be the political ramifications that come with acts of
terrorism. It is operationally and strategically important, therefore, to
develop countering CCTA policies, as well as tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) as part of the community’s emergency preparedness cycle
of planning, organizing/equipping, training, exercising, and
evaluating/improving.
Indicators and Characteristics

Given the aforementioned descriptions of CCTAs, one could convincingly
characterize many historical attacks as CCTAs, including: the September 11,
2001 attacks; the Mumbai attacks in 2008; the Beslan School attacks in 2004;
and, by strict interpretation of the definition, the recent Charlie Hebdo
attack in Paris in January, 2015, and the December 2015 San Bernardino
attack. The following characteristics are typically present within CCTAs and
were certainly present within each of these attacks and other attacks
described later in this chapter:
Designed to overwhelm responder resources;

Various types of weapons used;
Involved multiple locations (targets) within a jurisdiction or a large
facility (e.g. university, mall, factory, large school, etc.);
Asymmetric—a smaller group attacking a site secured by a much larger
force; and,
While attack groups may be initially coordinated by a command
hierarchy, individual attack elements had autonomy to respond and
adapt to changing counterattack contingencies.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, CCTAs like the aforementioned

attacks, also present the following challenges to the emergency response
community:
1. Creating a multi-hazard incident (i.e., direct fire, hazardous materials,

IEDs, conflagrations/fires, etc.);
2. Overwhelming available resources such as personnel, equipment,
communications systems, and other essential emergency response
assets;
Image 22.5 Preparedness Cycle
Source: Image and Copyright Rick C. Mathews, Information Provided by J.

Howard Murphy
3. Involves tiered or parallel incident(s) requiring multijurisdictional,

multidiscipline responses and coordination; and,
4. Presents potential cascading system failures with a community (i.e.,
transportation, medical, power, economic, etc.).
Designed to Overwhelm Responder Resources

Evolving CCTA tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) have increased
the capacity of the attacks to overwhelm tactical responses and security
measures designed to react to attacks directed against single targets. As
documented in a Nazran attack, the attackers also used a variety of methods,
such as diversionary attacks, roadblocks, attacks on security infrastructure
and targeted assassinations (Ibrahaev, 2004). Although hostages were taken
in Nazran, this was neither a direct aim nor an improvised aspect of the
attack, as it appears the attacking units needed to remain mobile to
maximize their impact. The Nazran attackers, like other perpetrators of
CCTAs, overwhelmed law enforcement and other emergency responders
resulting in significant damage to infrastructure and numerous casualties—
hundreds of casualties in the cases of Nazran, Beslan, Mumbai, and Paris.
Image 22.6 Simulated Attack by Terrorist with Assault Weapon (Training Image)
CCTAs can be directed against multiple targets in coordinated operations,

challenging the ability of law enforcement and other response agencies to
respond. In rare cases, groups of attackers and networks demonstrate a
capacity to learn, tactically and strategically, while engaged in operations,
thus requiring continuous evolution of counterattack TTPs within the
emergency responder community.
Involve multiple locations (targets) within a jurisdiction or a large facility
(e.g. university, mall, factory, large school, etc.). Each of the following
attacks, with the exception of the Boston Marathon bombings, involved
attackers converging onto or into a large facility. Examples include the
following:
1. Nazran 2004: Interior ministry building and police

buildings/headquarters;
2. Beslan 2004: Multiple areas and floors of a large school building;
3. Mumbai 2013: Multiple hotels and transportation centers;
4. Nairobi 2013: Multiple areas of the large westgate mall; and
5. Paris 2015: Multiple restaurants and cafes, a stadium and a concert hall
in a metropolitan area.
6. Brussels 2016: International airport and a metro station.
7. Barcelona 2017: Multiple streets and walkways with attackers driving
vehicles into pedestrians and stabbing bystanders.
8. Colombo 2019: Multiple churches, multiple hotels, a housing complex
and a guest house.
Asymmetric—A Smaller Group Attacking a Site Secured by a

Much Larger Force
Each of the following attacks were designed to overwhelm the defenses of
the target using an attacking force smaller and with less armament than the
opposing force (Edwards, 2000). Each of the attacks involved relatively small
groups of attackers with large numbers of relatively small weapons, which,
with synchronized actions allows the attackers to react faster than their
opponent.
While attack groups may be initially coordinated by a command
hierarchy, individual attack elements are given autonomy to respond and
adapt to changing counterattack contingencies. Attackers used a
decentralized force against their opponent, emphasizing mobility,
communications, unit autonomy and coordination (Edwards, 2000). Senior
opposition leadership, whether virtually, in person, or through agents release
resources (attackers) to conduct the attacks, but do not control them once
released.
Examples of Complex Coordinated Attacks
While these examples do provide typical characteristics of a CCTA, they
cannot possibly provide every possible indicator, characteristic, or type of
target of future CCTAs. However, they are useful in developing a general
understanding of the nature of CCTAs, which will assist course participants
in anticipating and recognizing indicators and targets within their respective
communities.
The Nazran raid was a large-scale attack (or raid operation) conducting in
the Republic of Ingushetia, Russia, on the night of June 21–22, 2004, by a
large number of mostly Chechen and Ingush militants. Everything started
June 21 at 10 p.m. (local time), when the first rocket-propelled grenade
exploded in the building of Ingushetian police administration (Interior
Ministry). Simultaneously, battles started in several cities and towns of the
Republic of Ingushetia (Ibrahaev, 2004).
A large unit of Ingushetian Armed Forces, consisting mainly of
Ingushetian fighters (Mujahideen), attacked the positions of Russian
invaders, police and Russian FSB (Federal Security Service). The battles took
place in Nazran, Karabulak, Troitskaya, Sleptsovskaya, Orjonikidzevskaya,
as well as on the Rostov–Baku arterial highway, which invaders are calling
the Caucasus Motorway (“Kavkaz Motorway”). During the first hours of the
battle, Ingushetian attackers took control of the police headquarters of the
Republic (Ingushetian Interior Ministry). The attackers set the building on
fire shortly thereafter. Sources in Ingushetia reported that Ingushetian pro-
Russian police chief, Interior Minister Kostoyev, was killed (Ibrahaev, 2004).
Ingushetian Armed Forces (the attackers) took control of a pro-Moscow
police checkpoint on the Rostov–Baku Highway near the village of Yandare,
Nazran District, as well as a number of checkpoints on the approaches to
Nazran, and on the road leading toward the city of Magas. Eyewitnesses
reported that they spotted armed persons wearing green headbands at the
checkpoints. The attackers were reportedly stopping and inspecting vehicles
(Ibrahaev, 2004).
Image 22.7 The Nazran 2004 Attack
Source: Image and Copyright Rick C. Mathews 2020, Information Provided by J. Howard
Murphy
The Ingushetian Armed Forces attacked two police checkpoints in Sunzha

District. Attackers burned district police stations and other facilities
belonging to pro-Moscow police and to Russian “invaders” in
Orjonikidzevskaya and in Karabulak. In Nazran, the attackers destroyed the
entire pro-Russian police department with 30 policemen in the barracks.
Dozens of special police commandos (Russian OMON) were killed and
wounded in Karabulak. Local Ingushetian sources also reported that the
attackers partially destroyed or burned a Russian military base in Troitskaya,
as well as the base of Russian border guards in Nazran (Ibrahaev, 2004).
Local sources claimed to have seen dozens of Russian corpses and FSB
agents in various districts of the Republic. While a confirmed casualty count
is unknown, the Kavkaz Center’s source assessed that there may have been
hundreds of killed and wounded among the attackers and the pro-Russian
forces and police. At some point in the battle, reports came in that the
attackers were planning to move towards Magas. However, at about 3 a.m.
(local time) the attacker’s units started withdrawing from the cities and
villages in an organized manner and moving towards southern parts of the
Republic (Ibrahaev, 2004).
While the exact number of attackers who took part in the Nazran raid is
unknown, the Russian forces’ command stated that there were
approximately 100 attackers. Given the scope and scale (broad geographic
coverage) of the attack, it appears the attacked was conducted by hundreds
of attackers, not dozens (Ibrahaev, 2004).
Characteristics:
Overwhelmed responder resources;

Involved multiple locations (targets) within the jurisdiction;
Asymmetric—a smaller group attacked a site secured by a much larger
force; and,
Individual attack elements had autonomy to respond and adapt to
changing counterattack contingencies.
Beslan, Russia School Massacre (2004)

On September 1, 2004, a large group of students, teachers, and parents, was
taken hostage by Islamist terrorists in Beslan, North Ossetia, at a school in
an agricultural and industrial community of approximately 40,000 (Giduck,
2005). The number of terrorists was assessed to be at least 32. The situation
eventually resulted in a mass murder.
The incident lasted three days and eventually culminated in hundreds of
deaths and injuries (Baker & Glasser, 2004). There were over 370 deaths at
Beslan during the three-day period; 331 were civilians; 317 hostages
including 186 children were killed. Over 700 civilians and over 50 security
forces and military personnel were injured (U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 2007).
As early as eight to ten days prior to the assault, the Russian government
had developed some intelligence that an assault might take place in a school
somewhere around Chechnya. However, no specific intelligence on where
the attack would occur was available (Giduck, 2005). The attack occurred on
the first day of school, also known as the “Day of Knowledge” when a large
number of family members were present at the school (National Public
Radio, 2006).
On this day, a group of some 30 masked individuals, dressed in
camouflage, athletic, and civilian clothing drove onto the school courtyard.
The group was well trained and knew the layout of the school from previous
surveillance. The attackers jumped from their vehicles, began barking orders,
and then began firing their assault rifles into the crowd (Uzzell, 2004). The
attackers were well armed with assault rifles, vests laden with ammunition,
40-mm grenade launchers, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and
protective masks to counter debilitating gas or chemicals (Borisov, 2004). The
attackers acted quickly by isolating the hostages and neutralizing hostage
ability to attempt resistance, escape or contact with anyone outside the
school (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007).
Image 22.8 Managing Multiple Casualties from CCTA (Training)
The school had poor security, with one security guard and a police officer
who happened to be in the crowd, equipped only with his sidearm. The
security guard and police officer engaged the terrorist and killed one
attacker; however, they were outnumbered and outgunned. Both were killed
within seconds of the attack (Giduck, 2005). The terrorists searched the
school and seized people hiding in some classrooms on the first floor. Most
of the hostages were taken to the gymnasium and sat on the floor, while
some of the female students were dragged into the gymnasium by their hair
where they were brutally raped (Giduck, 2005). All mobile or cellular
telephones were confiscated and the hostages were threatened with death if
anyone was found with a phone (Giduck, 2005).
The attackers then barricaded the school, in a manner that appeared to be
rehearsed. The attackers were divided into operational teams with specific
duties. Some attackers focused on preparing defenses for an assault from
local police and military personnel; some started assembling bombs and
tripwires; and, a small number of terrorists contained the hostages. Snipers
were positioned at key locations in the school building complex (U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, 2007). Once inside the gymnasium,
explosive devices were set at the doorways to prevent the hostages from
escaping and prevent anyone from entering. The terrorist group had brought
improvised explosive devices (IED)—plastic bottles packed with nails, bolts
and screws as shrapnel and homemade dynamite. It was later determined
that the terrorists had 66 pounds of explosives, in addition to hand and
rocket-propelled grenades. The terrorists made it clear that they were
prepared to die and that anyone who moved would be killed (Giduck, 2005).
After the attackers seized the hostages and secured the school, they began
demanding the release of prisoners captured during the Nazran raid and the
complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. Local police and
other security forces gradually cordoned the school area off by establishing a
perimeter (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007).
After the third day, Russian security forces used heavy weapons (tanks)
and fired into the school to kill and facilitate capturing the attackers.
Eventually, the Russian forces breached the school walls with small
explosives. The Russian Federal Security Service initially reported that 32
terrorists were involved in the Beslan hostage-taking and mass murder
incident. Intelligence gleaned from a captured attacker indicates that the
Beslan attack was intended to create an expansion of fighting across the
Caucasus region, and to incite religious and ethnic hatred based on a
compulsion for revenge (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007).
Evidence suggests that additional terrorists were involved beyond those
killed or captured and that the group may have been as large as 70 terrorists.
Some of the attackers likely escaped, and approximately 20 were killed. The
Chechen terrorists used this incident to gain international attention and to
seek political concessions from the Russian Federation concerning Chechnya
(U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007).
Characteristics:

Involved multiple locations (targets) within the facility;
Asymmetric—a smaller group attacked a site with limited security,
initially, but created significant destruction and death even when
countered by a much larger force; and
Mumbai (2008)
On November 26, 2008, a well-planned and coordinated terrorist attack took
place in Mumbai conducted by ten attackers/operatives trained by Lashkar-
e-Taiba (LeT). The attackers killed 172 people and wounded hundreds of
others with firearms, improvised explosive devices, and grenades during an
attack lasting three days (Jones, 2012). The terrorist group had boarded a
small boat in Karachi at 8 a.m. on November 22, then sailed a short distance
before boarding a bigger carrier. From the larger vessel, the ten attackers
seized an Indian fishing boat, killed the crew members with the exception of
the captain, who was later beheaded as they neared the Mumbai shoreline
(U.S. Senate, 2009). They then sailed 550 nautical miles along the Arabian
Sea, arriving on the shores of Mumbai on November 26 (Sengupta, 2009).
The ten attackers are divided into four teams. After arriving by sea, the
teams split up and each team attacked separate locations. Team one took a
taxi to Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, also known as Victory Terminus,
Mumbai’s main train station. Each man carried a weapons pack, containing
an AK-56 rifle, a 9-mm pistol, ammunition, hand grenades, a bomb
containing a military-grade explosive, and a timer with instructions
inscribed in Urdu (Sengupta, 2009). Once inside the train station they took
out their automatic assault AK-56, a Chinese version of the AK-47 assault
rifle, and opened fire (U.S. Senate, 2009). The attackers began walking
through the terminal, killing indiscriminately for 90 minutes before police
officers arrived and forced the terrorists to leave. This team then went to
Cama and Albless Hospital, where they again began firing indiscriminately
at innocent victims. The terrorists moved to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel and
continued to fire at victims along the way. The attackers had a detailed
diagram of the hotel’s layout. This team was responsible for approximately
30% of the 172 fatalities (Rabasa et al., 2009).
Image 22.9 LE Special Unit Training Dealing with CCTAs
The second team walked into the Nariman House, a commercial-

residential complex that was run by the Jewish Chabad Lubavich. The
Nariman House attackers killed six of the occupants, including Holtzberg
and his wife (Chabad emissaries who established the Nariman House as the
Chabad synagogue), who was five months pregnant. The third team of
attackers went to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel where they began killing
indiscriminately. One of the terrorists was heard involved in a conversation
on his cell phone, “Everything is being recorded by the media. Inflict the
maximum damage. Keep fighting. Don’t be taken alive” (Sengupta, 2009).
The battle in this hotel lasted for 17 hours before the terrorists were killed,
and resulted in the death of 30 victims (Rabasa et al., 2009).
The fourth team of attackers entered the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, after
briefly entering the Leopold Café where they killed ten people with
automatic gunfire. Eyewitness accounts from the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel
indicated that the terrorists knew their way through the hotel, including the
hidden doors and back hallways. The terrorists had a detailed diagram of the
hotel’s layout (U.S. Senate, 2009). Once the terrorists were inside the hotel,
they shot at the occupants as they walked from floor to floor. The siege of
the Taj Mahal Palace hotel lasted 60 hours and ended after Indian
Commandos killed these last four terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2009).

Asymmetric—a smaller group attacked a site secured by a much larger
force;
changing counterattack contingencies; and
Handlers monitored live television broadcasts to gather intelligence.
Paris (2015)
The attacks in Paris in 2015 were a textbook CCTA. While Paris’s emergency
response and counterterrorism capabilities and capacity are generally robust,
as the metropolitan area has extensive CCTV and electronic surveillance,
and its emergency responders train and prepare daily for incidents of a
significant magnitude, the November 13, 2015 attack emergency responders
were initially overwhelmed (Aisch et al., 2015).
A group of nine attackers killed 120 people, wounded nearly 400 others,
and inflicted massive damage to a major European city within three hours.
The attackers combined suicide bombs, diversionary attacks, active shooter
tactics, and hostage taking in such a synergistic fashion that even France’s
best responders were initially overwhelmed (Aisch et al., 2015).
The attacks began around 9.20 p.m., when a suicide bomber detonated an
explosive belt outside of Gate D of the Stade de France during a soccer
match. The explosion took the life of only one victim, but numerous
emergency responders were brought in to respond to the blast and
investigate the damage. Spectators inside the stadium were told nothing and
assumed the blasts were fireworks. The French president, François Hollande,
and the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, were among the
crowd (Aisch et al., 2015).
At approximately 9.25 p.m. shooting attacks occurred at two restaurants
in the central city area, in which 15 people were killed and a further ten
were injured. The attackers were reported to be mobile, driving a black SUV
and carrying assault rifles with one shouting “Allahu Akbar” when firing.
Witnesses on the scene reported that the assailants used short, controlled
bursts from their weapons and fled quickly but not in a panic, signifying
calm and/or practiced attackers. At 9.30 p.m. there was another explosion
outside of Gate H at the Stade de France, killing one person. Emergency
responders already on the scene responded but concerns of another planned
blast began to rise (Aisch et al., 2015).
Around the same time (and lasting for another ten minutes), men with
machine guns emerged from black SUVs and attacked a series of restaurants
with small arms fire. These attackers killed 24 people and wounded 17. On
average, the attacks lasted three to five minutes each and targeted a busy
Friday night dinner location. As emergency responders attempted to stop the
shooters and render aid to the victims, a suicide bomber detonated an IED at
another café. Reports of the gunmen began to come in from the different
locations but also sounded remotely similar. One witness at the last
restaurant attacked described the shooter as such:
He was standing in a shooting position. He had his right leg forward and he was standing with his
left leg back. He was holding up to his left shoulder a long automatic machine gun—I saw it had a
magazine beneath it. Everything he was wearing was tight, either boots or shoes and the trousers
were tight, the jumper he was wearing was tight, no zippers or collars. Everything was toned
black. If you think of what a combat soldier looks like, that is it—just without the webbing. Just a
man in military uniform, black jumper, black trousers, black shoes or boots, and a machine gun.
(Boffey & Zeffman, 2015)
Reports began circulating about an attack on the Bataclan Concert Hall

where an American band was playing to a sold-out crowd of nearly 1,500
people. The Bataclan attack began when three gunmen stormed the front
door and spanned out across the floor of the viewing area. They fired into
the crowd while also using grenades to inflict higher morbidity. Patrons not
directly affected by the initial attack did not know what was happening until
the entire crowd began to move, running for alternate exits and even
climbing to the top and out of windows (Aisch et al., 2015).
The Bataclan attackers also made statements about Iraq and Syria and
shouted “Allahu (Allah) Akbar.” Eventually, they switched from the active
shooter tactic to a hostage siege. For the next two hours, police attempted to
contain the attackers inside the hall but realized, through social media
contact from inside, that the attackers continued to kill innocent civilians,
forcing the police to storm the location. When challenged, the attackers
detonated their suicide vests. Within approximately 20 minutes, 40 people
were killed and 28 were injured (Aisch et al., 2015).
The Paris attacks involved four suicide bombings and shootings at four
locations within the span of three hours. The perpetrators were mobile and
somewhat fluid in their attack, allowing them access to a series of soft
targets. In total, 130 people were killed and nearly 400 were injured. Most of
those wounded were in serious condition because of the type of weapons
used (high-caliber ammunition and explosives).
The medical services of Paris activated their White Plan, which involves
the total recall of all medical personnel and releasing of hospital beds to
prepare for the surge of casualties (Aisch et al., 2015).

Overwhelmed responder resources (initially);
Asymmetric—a smaller group attacked a site with limited security,
initially, but created significant destruction and death even when
countered by a much larger force; and,
Conclusion
Emergency management, law enforcement and other emergency response
agencies must continuously learn from the CCTAs occurring around the
world in order to improve their respective tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs) for effectively deterring, preventing and responding to CCTAs. The
accumulated evidence gathered thus far clearly indicates that law
enforcement personnel must be prepared to engage attackers rapidly and
effectively, lest the attackers cause a significant loss of life in a short period
of time. Law enforcement officers and other emergency responders should
anticipate preemptive diversionary attacks prior to main attack, and also
expect secondary and tertiary attacks during CCTAs.
A way to prepare for these low-probability high-consequence incidents
(or, rarely occurring incidents with disastrous consequences) is to analyze
similar past incidents in order to identify patterns inherent in CCTA
incidents, along with identifying the mistakes that were made. By gaining a
better understanding of these incidents, and by learning from tactical
deficiencies and mistakes of the past, the likelihood of repeating the same
mistakes and suffering consequences of those mistakes will be lessened.
The CCTAs described earlier in this chapter demonstrate the challenges
faced by law enforcement when attacks are well organized and launched by
trained and dedicated attackers. While it is almost impossible to completely
stop every CCTA with zero casualties, speedy and effective law enforcement
response integrated with other emergency response agencies, e.g., EMS and
firefighting, is critical to reducing the number of fatalities and injuries.
References
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P.J., Wallace, T., Watkins, D., White, J., & Yourish, K. (2015). Three hours
of terror in Paris, moment by moment. NY Times.com Europe. Retrieved
from:
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shooting-attacks.html?_r=0
Alberts, D. (2007). Agility, focus, and convergence: The future of command
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M., Jones, S. G., Shestak, N., & Tellis, A. (2009). The Lessons of Mumbai.
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Chapter 23
Facility Vulnerability and Security

J. Lawrence Cunningham
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-27
The Key to Effective Security Surveys: Accounting for Human

Factors
This chapter supplements the compendium of emergency management
perspectives in this book. It is intended to assist in the preparation of
response personnel to a variety of emergencies, both human and natural.
The goal is to help the responder understand the gap and, in some instances,
the gulf between the state of security preparedness and the reality of what is
understood by people, and the resources identified to respond to and manage
a given emergency. In brief, this chapter hopes to give you the insight to
answer the questions: do the security plan and resources we are relying on
match the reality of what is realistically available for the emergency? Are
the jurisdictions and personnel concerned integrated and realistically able to
commit to participating in the emergency planning process and crafting the
Emergency Operation Plans (EOPs).
The security preparedness challenges facing our nation in this era are
misunderstood, daunting, and multifactored. There are numerous proactive
measures, if implemented, which could significantly mitigate, if not prevent
many of the associated problems in emergency responses. Critical among
them is the integration of human factors and resources at every level. This
needs to be recognized and implemented at the foundation level—the
emergency planning phase.
The ultimate goal of this chapter is to offer insight into the security
assessment and emergency planning process in an effort to develop effective
plans that are collectively understood, rehearsed, and adopted by all
concerned.
Identifying vulnerability and security planning continues to undergo
analysis, scrutiny, and change since the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, the
Virginia Tech shootings, Hurricane Sandy, the Sandy Hook elementary
school shootings, houses of worship attacks, and numerous lesser-known
emergencies. Why do we continue to miss cues, misunderstand and/or
underestimate the threat(s), fail to harness the right amount of resources,
and be less effective than our experience would indicate? Where or what is
the disconnect? Traditional security models utilized a “perimeters of
protection” model that is structured to identify and respond to threats at the
outer or middle perimeter before the threat reaches the inner perimeter
containing the asset. This model on its face is inadequate! It only gives us a
visual that generally depicts our protective security goal(s). Unfortunately, as
we have tragically experienced since 9/11 and continue to, these threats are
far more complex, multi-factored, and extremely difficult to pinpoint. As the
adversary becomes more sophisticated as we are experiencing with the
evolving terrorist organizational and lone wolf threats, our protective
security strategy, plans and implementation models need to be far more
detailed and nuanced to identify and anticipate the evolving nature and
specific tactics being used by our adversaries. This will take a laser-focused,
integrated effort on the part of everyone.
Image 23.1 Perimeters of Protection
Source: Image Provided by Essential Security Strategies, LLC
Before the 9/11 attacks, the nation’s security posture and response
philosophy were primarily reactive. That is to say, many, if not most of the
nations’ security plans, as well as those in the private sector, were structured
to be implemented after an attack, during or after a storm or even after an
alert.
Far too little attention was paid (and sadly to this day) to integrated,
proactive security response planning. Much more work to help integrate
response planning and deployment efforts is critically needed. Historically,
both the public and private sectors’ security philosophy subscribed to a
parochial security perspective utilizing a perimeter approach to security
planning and resource allocation. Indeed, most of the security response
training focused on the immediate effects of the emergency and the
resources required. Strategic planning to include planning involving
contiguous jurisdictions, joint resource allocation, and assignment of roles—
in advance—has historically not been provided for in the most effective way.
Despite all the focus on this in recent years—we are still missing far too
many dangerous queues. Basically, we (planners, leaders, policy-makers,
responders) prepared and trained to respond to emergencies almost
exclusively. The prevailing thinking was as long as we have our borders
patrolled, our defenses alert and ready, and doors locked, we would be safe.
By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail …
Benjamin Franklin
In March, 2001, The Carnegie Endowment of International Peace

published a fascinating and portentous treatise, Strategic Warning, in which
they identify numerous potential failings of our nation’s preparedness
philosophy. It cites the unfortunate lack of integration and structure to
proactively prepare for most attacks, especially the ones festering beyond
our borders. It predicted in an uncanny, almost ominous way that as a
nation, we were ill-prepared to accurately identify festering threats, assess
their capabilities, and impact and effectively harness an efficient integrated
response. This was before the al-Qaeda attacks! This ominous warning has
not been heeded effectively. Countless attacks showing the same lapses and
oversights by emergency planners and the responder community have been
repeated.
In this post 9/11 era, the concept of sectors of security has been refined to
include a more visionary approach. That is to say, security measures, if they
are to be truly effective, must anticipate dangers and threats. One needs to
look beyond the immediate security sectors and thousands of miles beyond
our borders both literally and figuratively to identify and assess developing
and/or imminent threats to take effective protective action. Instead of
looking at the potential business and resource value of the world’s
potentially volatile regions, why not pay closer attention to festering
threats? Why not try to understand the culture in other contexts? This
visionary philosophy is being continually refined due to a greater
understanding of the terrorists’ asymmetric views of engagement and goals
to inflict mass casualties on targets of interest (especially those that appear
to be “soft targets”) their long-term surveillance methods. This visionary
philosophy has extended to response preparedness to natural disasters,
violence on campuses and the workplace, and other sectors.
As most of you reading this are aware, the nation’s state and local
response community were tasked and mandated by the government to
implement the Incident Command System (ICS) to standardize the
organizational structure of response with the implementation of the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) following the in-depth
studies of the emergency response to the 9/11 and other historical attacks
and emergencies.
Along with this, the philosophy in the security assessment arena has
changed to recognize how vital it is to recognize that each organization
(public or private) is a unique entity with a unique culture with specific
security concerns and needs that cannot be addressed with “a one size fits
all” solution in the security planning process. In the context of the ICS
structure, the mandated categories of Finance, Logistics, Operations,
Planning and the recent addition of Intelligence (sharing useful and timely
information among responders), it is recognized that every jurisdiction
needs the flexibility to adapt this structure to their people, culture, resources,
and experiences. Other factors unique to a given geographical area, which
impact NIMS’s application, are demographics, training capabilities, response
history, size, and political structures.
One must remember that the most effective security is security
implemented at a level that the organization needs, understands, and is
willing to buy into.This, in simple terms, means that everybody needs to
know the plan and plan implementation structure.
Image 23.2 ICS Diagram
All members of any organization, especially management (policy-makers

and the check writers) need to be included in the developmental process,
take ownership, and become part of the security network. In other words,
for security to be effective, security awareness is shared by all personnel and
integrated with local responders.
One underutilized way to lessen this “disconnect” between management
and front-line members is to empower local jurisdictions beyond the
National Response Framework’s general level. The DHS has correctly
assigned immediate emergency response responsibilities to local
jurisdictions to prepare for and manage their emergency preparedness. The
directive encourages local and state jurisdictions to identify potential
hazards and prepare for them with their experiences, culture, response
structure, and “playbooks” they successfully used in the past. The contention
is that the locals know their houses, neighborhoods, cities, and regions better
than outside response entities, so they are ultimately best suited to respond
to and manage human-made and natural disasters.
For this to work, each organization, facility, and responder jurisdiction
needs to share and vet their respective response plan, with all who will be
involved in the response to ensure its effectiveness.
The local authorities have institutional knowledge and experience with
their own response organizations and structures and, importantly, “know
their own people.” This element is probably more important than anything
else, and has and will continue to make the crucial difference with success
and failure. Relationships nurtured by working together over the years; that
special “esprit de corps” that can only be developed with working with one
another for years is the magic ingredient. Much like any team worth its salt,
regardless of its record, team members practice their plays endlessly and
develop a deep level of communication, enabling them to anticipate players’
moves instinctively, almost without thinking. Many of us are avid sports
fans and can relate to the critical need to develop winning strategies and
plays with everyone involved, buy into, and work on … incessantly. Do our
responders train this way?
The Kennedy School of Government’s Executive Session on Domestic
Preparedness discussion paper, Winning Plays, aptly identifies the sports
arena as a useful metaphor to explain how we as responders should prepare
for emergencies—identify threats and train! What does prepare really mean?
What does train really mean? Is it enough to train based on our institutional
practices or do we train with as many departments that would be involved
in the response? Do we have a system that affords planning before the
disaster? Do we have the organizational structure and political will to
include these entities? The answer most jurisdictions would give you is yes,
we do train and prepare. But how do we effectively prepare?
Why then do we still see delayed responses, inaccurate assessments of the
disaster, less than efficient resource allocation, poor communication among
agencies/responders, and inaccurate or incomplete information disseminated
to the public? Many of you reading this will say that there are systems out
there that prevent this or are supposed to minimize this. Namely, NIMS, ICS,
UCS, etc. were instituted and refined since 9/11 that should take care of
these missteps. The problem or the solution is human factors. How are these
system protocols understood, structured, and applied? Is the biggest
department or the loudest voice making these determinations?
I am reminded of the comments of the Postmistress of the Harvard
University Post Office while conducting a security assessment for the
university in 2002 after the 9/11 attacks. Part of the assessment included a
review of the mail handling procedures for potential anthrax and ricin
contamination. The Postmistress’s first comment (after I introduced myself)
was: “I hate consultants!” to which I responded: “fair enough.” She went on
to explain her painstaking efforts to compel the neighboring police
departments to come together and collectively devise a mutually agreeable
and doable plan for these and related threats. She shook her head and
related how the command level officers were apparently too busy to attend
themselves so junior representatives were sent. She said they would happily
drink her coffee and eat her donuts, devise reasonable plans, and leave. Her
frustration was piqued when no official commitment, follow-up, or plans
were formalized after the fact. Her final comment: “I don’t need a disjointed,
boiler-plate plan … so I made my own plan!”
Recognizing the vulnerabilities is the first step in this proactive process.
Understanding the rationale, structure, and how to apply the elements of an
effective security survey is next. Integrating the human factors with the
tailor-made elements and structure will make the critical difference.
Responders need to be aware of and to whatever extent possible, influence
the security assessment and planning process to ensure the less obvious
aspects are considered in security surveys. Their perspectives need to be
considered. The assessment process is the key … the relationships that
develop, vulnerabilities identified, test integration mechanics and the “team”
spirit that is fostered—these critical pieces prepare all concerned for the
knowns and provides a foundation for adapting to the unknown.
Terrorists, criminals, and would-be attackers, especially those that
conduct pre-operation surveillance exercises, test, and assess their targets’
weaknesses and make decisions based upon the target’s perceived strengths.
The presence of organized security personnel, technology, and security
procedures is a deterrent. Arthur Bremer, in his book An Assassin’s Diary,1
mentions stalking President Richard Nixon in Canada but abandoned the
idea because of the threatening presence of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP). He wanted to become famous but settled for “lesser prey.” He
chose Presidential candidate Alabama Governor George Wallace and shot
him five times in Laurel, Maryland in 1972.
This is a dated example but this basic strategy to exploit weaknesses of those targeted by a
criminal or terrorist is timeless. The very process of conducting an integrated security survey
serves as a deterrent to those conducting pre-attack planning to include target selection. When
recent attacks (2001–present) are studied in detail, we find the attack plans are focused on targets
most accessible, vulnerable and easily exploited. In the target selection process, these factors are
carefully studied. Context is the primary factor—goal, where, when, why, and expected results.
The Elements of an Effective Security Survey

We are all familiar with the frustration of going to the doctor seeking relief
only to find out that the diagnosis is unclear or, worse, the cure is uncertain.
Typically, the medical practitioner will listen to the patient, assess
symptoms, and try to fit it into a known array of conditions in the hopes to
hit upon the right diagnosis and recommend a treatment. This process is
often labeled a differential diagnosis,2 essentially a process of elimination
using a template, coupled with the practitioner’s experience and ability to
assess the patient’s unique physiology, environment, culture, and mental
state in an effort to arrive at an accurate diagnosis. Herein lies the critical
piece—the individual’s uniqueness. The template may give you 50% of the
picture … but the part you really need is the integration piece … the piece
that will consider all of the unique factors that impact the individual and
his/her ailment(s). So how can this be effectively done? I would offer—a
carefully considered tailor-made approach identifying and accounting for
important impacting factors is a good start.
The security assessment process, the development of appropriate
recommendations, and the effective implementation of remedies are no
different. There are countless versions of security survey templates out there
with impressive detail and logical structure that purport to make you and/or
your organization feel safe and protected. The reality is that many
emergency plans are not accurate. The typical problems found in many
emergency plans are as follows:
Identified security goals are defined by too few with limited knowledge
of the vulnerabilities and poorly prioritized;
The security strategy and plan to get there are too narrowly focused;
Vital pieces of information are missing;
Contains obsolete information (wrong names, wrong numbers, expired
policies, etc.);
Relies on capabilities and resources that are simply not available (or the
same resources are committed to other organizations during the same
emergency);
Not being shared or open for discussion with the rank and file;
Lack of common understanding of the emergency plan among the
entire staff;
Lack of validation and integration with other likely participants and
responders in the community.
A classic example of this was found in 2002 during the security
assessment of the corporate offices of one of the largest sporting
organizations in America (see Image 23.3). The survey parameters included
the elements identified in the template appended at the end of the chapter.
Important security elements to include technology, lighting, emergency
response considerations, and employee guidance were included in their
existing plan.
Despite the good intentions of their security department, significant
emergency planning lapses and security vulnerabilities were found as
follows:
Security plan locked in the security director’s office;

Security plan not vetted or validated with responders identified in the
plan;
No corporate-wide awareness of the plan among the employees;
Police department identified in the plan did not have primary
jurisdiction at the office address;
Police department was unfamiliar with the corporate office’s location;
Police department response plan identified the sports track as the
response location instead of the corporate office;
Access, lighting, and notification system were out of date and rendered
ineffective due to lack of policy adherence;
Evening and night-shift personnel were not aware of the plan’s security
procedures.
Many of the necessary security elements were in place; however, the

problems found were due to a lack of effective configuration,
communication, and understanding of how to effectively implement the
plan. Any effective plan needs to be continually reevaluated; it is living and
breathing. It needs to be supported and evaluated by management, the
security staff, and vetted by the responders identified in the plan.
Management
Management plays a pivotal role in the security process of any organization.
They set the tone, shape policy, write checks, and set the example. Several
important areas where management can influence security policy and
adherence include the following:
Giving the security department the authority and backing required to

enforce security policies;
Support employee hiring and security training of new and existing
employees;
Image 23.3 NASCAR Corporate Offices (Previous Facility)
Actively formulating, endorsing, and supporting new security policies;

Setting the example by adhering to security policies (wearing ID,
signing out equipment, enforcing security policies);
Following technology and intellectual property best practices;
Avoid assigning “extraneous” non-security duties to security staff, for
example, vehicle maintenance, building maintenance, general
answering service tasks, and so on;
Duties to security staff, for example, vehicle maintenance, building
maintenance, general answering service task, and so on;
Supporting staff security meetings and policy changes.
The following categories highlight the inherent risks organizations take
when security planning and policies are not shared and integrated.
Organizational Structure Dysfunction

The organization chart in many organizations reflects the structure of the
organization and the relative interaction, by virtue of the respective
division’s or office’s position (high or low) often dictates its power and
financial resources and control. The position of the division and/or office
(particularly in the private sector) that is responsible for security will have a
bearing on its ability to establish and enforce security policies and protocols.
Security resources will suffer if the security office is under the control and
supervision of an administrative or planning arm that does not prioritize
security for a variety of reasons.
An example of this dysfunction is seen here; due to security personnel
budgeting, security positions suffer. Positions such as manning images from
surveillance cameras, zone patrols, and so on are reduced or eliminated.
Note the monitor with 12 images (see Image 23.4). The capture of any
suspicious images required a decision by a security guard. This room was
locked. This security device only serves as an archive of activity. This does
not qualify as a proactive security measure yet many organizations with this
type of “security monitoring system” classify it as such.
Image 23.4 Unattended 12-Image Monitor
Other examples of this have been documented at oil companies, major

banks, universities, governments, and hospitals.
Note the unattended 12-image monitor being projected in the rear of the
security command/dispatch center of a hospital in the photograph to the left.
An example of proactive security, actively monitoring closed-circuit
monitors, is demonstrated in Image 23.5.
Access Control
Access control is fraught with potential security lapses due to the
multipurpose functions of the entry and exit points. Much of the problem
lies in management’s and the staff’s lack of common understanding of the
purpose and security role.
The defense contractor facility, in this example before a security survey
had seven active employees and two visitor entrances. Pictured in Image 23.6
is one of the employee entrances staffed by a summer aide with no
institutional authority to enforce the company sign-out and verification
policy of proprietary documents and storage devices. The survey found that
this “path of least resistance” was used most often by employees.
In this example, the guard desk and camera console at the main entrance
to this large facility obscures the entrance view, placing the guards at risk
and in a reactive position (see Image 23.6). The survey also found these
guards became the after-hours answering service taking general information
calls during their evening shifts. It was determined that more than 5,200 calls
were answered by security guards yearly. In addition, they were tasked with
the maintenance of the executive fleet of limousines.
This chapter comprised and set forth the basis for rethinking typical
security survey approaches being applied to both public and private facilities
in the United States as of this writing. The questions raised here serve as the
impetus to explore significant paradigm shifts in how security surveys
should be conducted in the future.
Image 23.5 Proactive CCTV Monitoring

Image 23.6 Obscured Security Guard Desk
Notes
1. An Assassin’s Diary (Harper’s Magazine Press, 1973) is based on part of the diary of Arthur
Bremer, the would-be assassin of Alabama Governor George Wallace. Bremer shot Wallace at the
Laurel Shopping Center in Laurel, Maryland, while Wallace was making his third campaign for
President on May 15, 1972.
2. A differential diagnosis (sometimes abbreviated DDx, ddx, DD, D/Dx, or ΔΔ) is a systematic
diagnostic method used to identify the presence of an entity where multiple alternatives are
possible (and the process may be termed differential diagnostic procedure), and may also refer to
any of the included candidate alternatives (which may also be termed candidate condition)
(Wikipedia).
Chapter 24
The Future of Emergency Management

Stephen Krill with J. Howard Murphy
DOI: 10.4324/9781315118345-28
In New York’s Central Park on Monday, July 25, 1966, the temperature
reached 770F, and the wind nearly stood still, blowing at 2–3 mph. Ten miles
away, I was born.
I remember nothing about that day, and my earliest memories blur over
time.
What I do recall, looking back over my 54 years of life, is how I came to
the field of emergency management. It started with a cookie and was
emboldened by my father, who served in our hometown’s rescue squad as a
volunteer paramedic.
To think, even back to this memory, that I would eventually respond to
the Pentagon as an American Red Cross volunteer the day after the 9/11
attacks occurred or help the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
recover its emergency management capability as Ground Zero smoldered
and forensics teams tirelessly searched for remains still surprises me. A few
years later, being recalled from my family’s beach vacation, I served as the
national lead for transportation at the U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) National Response Coordination Center for Hurricane
Katrina. From 1,100 miles away, I did what I could and an army of other
professionals to help the people of New Orleans and hundreds of other
towns across the Gulf Coast, survive this disaster. American philosopher
George Santayana warned the world “Those who fail to learn from history
are doomed to repeat it” (Safety Wise, n.d.).
Emergency managers are thoughtful students of history. We test disaster
plans through drills and exercises, and after a disaster occurs, we study our
response to find shortfalls, diagnose root causes, and make improvements.
Our “lessons learned” get documented in after-action reports. Those lessons
identified from catastrophic events, such as Hurricane Andrew (1992), the
sarin gas attack in Tokyo (1995), the Mexico City earthquake (1995), and the
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004), among many others, are
scrutinized by the media, summarized in journals, discussed at conferences,
taught in classrooms, debated in our legislatures, codified into law, and, of
course, incorporated into disaster plans.
What about the future?
These lessons learned, these improvements in emergency management are
intended to prepare us for future disasters better. To help us build a more
resilient society. To save more lives and to recover more quickly from the
next disaster.
As I write this chapter, our entire planet of nearly 7.7 billion people
(Worldometers, n.d.) faces a pandemic, the likes of which we have not seen
in more than 100 years. While the world responds to the coronavirus
identified as SARS-CoV-2, many people are already writing lessons learned
so that, to the extent possible, we are not doomed to repeat history.
What if we had a crystal ball? What if we could glimpse at humanity’s
future? What if we could see the risks the world would face in ten years? 50
years? 100 years? What should emergency managers consider today to better
respond to global disasters tomorrow?
Predicting the Future—Estimating Risk

W. Timothy Garvey (n.d.) shared, “Knowledge is telling the past. Wisdom is
predicting the future.” What wise predictions can we make about the future
of emergency management?
Most, if not all, of the planning we do as emergency managers begin with
risk or, specifically, a risk assessment. We consider the types of threats facing
our communities, the likelihood of these threats occurring, and the
consequences of these threats should they occur. Risk assessment itself is a
prediction, albeit one generally grounded in data and estimated using
defensible calculations and models.
Predicting the future should start with risk, and risk starts with likelihood
or frequency.
Likelihood/Frequency
Many people suggest future catastrophes will occur more often. That is, the
likelihood or frequency of a disaster will increase.
If this is true, we should also understand why.
Thirty years ago, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters (CRED) launched the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT),
which aims to rationalize decision-making for disaster preparedness by
providing an objective base for vulnerability assessment and priority setting
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, n.d.). EM-DAT
contains frequency and impacts data for natural disasters—geophysical,
meteorological, hydrological, climatological, biological, and extra-terrestrial
—and technological disasters—industrial, transport, and miscellaneous—
occurring each year since 1990.
The database includes disasters that meet at least one of these four
criteria:
a. Ten or more people dead

b. 100 or more people affected
c. The declaration of a state of emergency
d. A call for international assistance.
CRED collects the data from the United Nations (UN) agencies, non-
governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes, and
the media.
CRED acknowledges data quality issues for disasters happening before
1990. Most of these data quality issues concern reporting, specifically,
obtaining information about a disaster-related to the four EM-DAT criteria.
Two criteria, (a) number of deaths and (b) number of people affected by a
disaster, are greatly influenced by the world’s growing population and the
proximity of our population to known hazards. We will return to this subject
shortly.
The other two EM-DAT criteria consider whether the disaster area was
declared a state of emergency and/or called for international assistance.
These criteria are greatly influenced by a disaster area’s capability and
capacity to respond alone or to signal for help. That is, the disaster impact
exceeds the local community’s capability and/or capacity to respond. As
with population, we will return to capability and capacity shortly.
In the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) captures and reports environmental information
around climate and historical weather. In 1996, NOAA began recording data
on the climate change occurring within the United States through its
Climate Extremes Index (CEI). This index quantifies observed changes in
climate within the contiguous United States to inform climatologists,
decision-makers, and the public on the scientific basis around the changing
climate (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, n.d.). The CEI
helps answer questions, such as how has the climate changed in the past 50
years? In what ways did it change and by how much?
The CEI aggregates the following set of indicators:
a. Monthly maximum and minimum temperature

b. Daily precipitation
c. Monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI)—a measurement of
dryness based on recent precipitation and temperature
d. Landfalling tropical storm and hurricane wind velocity.
The index is based upon a calculation of these indicators with a value

range between 0% to 100%. The lower limit (0%) indicates that no portion of
the period of record was subject to any of the extremes of temperature or
precipitation considered in the index. The upper limit (100%) means the
entire United States experienced extreme conditions. NOAA considers the
upper limit a virtually impossible scenario. Observing any variances in these
percentages over time can indicate an increase, a decrease, or no change in
US climate. Image 24.1 presents the CEI from 1910 through 2019.
As done with EM-DAT, what can we infer from the CEI figure? First, the
actual percentage stayed mostly above 20% since 2000. Second, except for
2013, no other 19-year period shows an actual percentage above 20%.
Between 1960 and 1979, the actual CEI percent was the lowest recorded
since 1910.
Finally, each year since 2010, the World Economic Forum (WEF) publishes
its Global Risks Report, which asks global experts and decision-makers to
rank their biggest concerns in terms of likelihood and impact (World
Economic Forum, 2020). For the first time ever, the 2020 report found that
the top five global risks were all environmental:
1. Extreme weather events with major damage to property, infrastructure,

and loss of human life
2. Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation by governments
and businesses
3. Human-made environmental damage and disasters, including
environmental crime, such as oil spills, and radioactive contamination
4. Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse (terrestrial or marine)
with irreversible consequences for the environment, resulting in
severely depleted resources for humankind as well as industries
5. Major natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions, and geomagnetic storms.
Regardless of the individual or relative ranking of risks, all of them

require investments in and action toward prevention, protection, mitigation,
response, and recovery.
Image 24.1 ICS Diagram
Source: Image Provided by NOAA
While we could examine other sources to assess whether disasters are

occurring, or not occurring, more frequently, the EM-DAT and CEI
databases, as well as the World Economic Forum, suggest the likelihood of
disasters is increasing.
What can we expect with respect to the consequences caused by
increasing frequency?
Consequence
While no single definition of consequence exists in emergency management,
we often consider factors such as fatalities, non-fatalities, and economic
losses when assessing the damage caused by disasters.
Much like our investigation of likelihood or frequency of disasters, and
whether we can expect to see more disasters/more frequent disasters in the
future, we will examine the consequences of disasters to predict what the
future holds.
Fatalities
We can assess the historical consequences of disasters based on fatalities.
The EM-DAT provides numbers for global deaths from natural disasters,
1900 to 2019, which can be found on the Our World in Data website (Ritchie
& Roser, 2019). According to Our World in Data, prior to the mid-1960s, the
annual death toll from disasters was high, with several periods, including
consecutive years, reporting fatalities exceeding 1 million per year. In the
past 20 years, the number of annual deaths is relatively small in comparison
to the annual totals before the mid-1960s. On average, over this period,
approximately 60,000 people died from natural disasters each year. Further,
the death toll has never exceeded 500,000 since the mid-1960s.
That said, the number of deaths from natural disasters is highly variable
between years.
One might expect to see a high number of deaths given the higher
number (frequency) of natural disasters. While for low-frequency, high-
consequence events, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami,
there were substantial losses of life; overall, the modern world has reduced
the number of disaster deaths through investments in protection, prevention,
mitigation, response, and recovery. We are building resiliency in our
communities from the risks of disasters.
The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are far from over. As of
July 4, 2020, the World Health Organization reports nearly 11 million
confirmed cases of COVID-19 globally, including 523,011 deaths (World
Health Organization, n.d.). In comparison, the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that 500 million people were
infected with the virus associated with the 1918 pandemic, which caused 50
million deaths worldwide, including 675,000 in the United States alone
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, n.d.).
Non-Fatalities
While the number of deaths associated with any event, especially large-scale
disasters, gain nearly immediate attention, we also need to consider the
consequences facing survivors. This is especially true for emergency
management.
Once again, EM-DAT provides us with historical data associated with the
number of people globally impacted by natural disasters—injured, affected,
and homeless.
From the mid-1960s, the number of deaths caused by natural disasters was
relatively small compared to those that occurred in the first half of the 20th
century, despite an increasing number of disasters from 2000 to 2019.
However, the number of people impacted by disasters since the mid-1960s
was substantially larger two- or three-fold when compared to the first half
of the 1900s.
For disasters with little or no warning, such as earthquakes and floods, we
immediately provide life-sustaining aid in the form of shelter, food, water,
and medical care. We often provide such care for hurricanes and typhoons
before the storm makes landfall. Once it does, emergency managers must
substantially increase the amount and length of aid provided for larger
disasters. Our life-sustaining support transitions over time to long-term
recovery—actions taken to help survivors rebuild their lives and
communities. When considering the number of people globally impacted by
disasters needing help, the criticality of immediate response and long-term
recovery become paramount as the number of disasters are expected to
increase along with their consequence.
Economic Losses
The UN estimates the economic losses associated with total or partial
destruction of physical infrastructure from disasters. Since 2005, the total
direct disaster losses exceed $30 billion (US dollars) (United Nations, n.d.).
From 1990 to 2017 the global economic losses from disaster as a share of
gross domestic product. Economic losses differ from direct losses in that they
consider secondary and tertiary effects (Pielke, 2018).
For example, the Fukushima earthquake (2016) that devastated this
prefecture caused losses beyond property damage. Businesses closed, supply
chains stopped, and commerce halted.
Pielke (2018) reveals that for the 27-year period from 1990 to 2017,
disasters caused economic losses of at least 0.1% of GDP and ranging up to
0.6% GDP.
As seen with the COVID-19 pandemic, the closing of businesses and the
loss of jobs caused adverse impacts on the economy (local, regional,
national, or global). This decline economically can lead to reductions in
taxes, putting massive pressure on governments to fund programs.
Emergency managers realize the need to accomplish more with limited,
competing resources. Losing funds to purchase equipment and supplies and
pay salaries puts added pressure on preparing for and responding to
disasters, compounded by the higher number of survivors requesting
emergency services.
In 2011, the National Research Council found that:
Natural disasters are having an increasing effect on people’s lives in the United States and
throughout the world. Every decade, property damage caused by natural disasters and hazards
doubles or triples in the United States. More than half of the U.S. population lives within 50 miles
of a coast, and all Americans are at risk from such hazards as fires, earthquakes, floods, and wind.
The year 2010 saw 950 natural catastrophes around the world—the second highest annual total
ever—with overall losses estimated at $130 billion.
(National Research Council, 2011, p. 5)
By examining the components of risk—likelihood/frequency and

consequence—the data suggest that in the future:
1. Disasters will occur more frequently

2. The number of fatalities caused by a disaster will remain low, although
it could be substantial for low-probability/high-consequence disasters
3. The number of people impacted by disasters will increase and demand
an expanded set of life-sustaining resources
4. The economic costs of disasters will increase, putting downward
pressure on budgets while likely resulting in even higher demand for
disaster support.
Managing for the Future—Reducing Risk
Although it is no longer considered a direct quote, people still credit Albert
Einstein for this gem, “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but
no simpler.” When thinking about future risk, the concept of disasters
becoming more frequent with even greater consequences can become
overwhelming. Any idea advanced to reduce risk can get easily sidetracked
when one thinks more broadly—How much will it cost? Can it be
operationalized? Will it make a difference?
To best manage risk, keeping things simple makes it easier to assess and
plan, and a simple way to assess and plan is to look through the lenses of:
1. People
2. Process
3. Technology.
As we develop and test our plans in emergency management, we often

consider the people who need and will use the plans, the processes by which
these plans come together and get implemented, and the technology
available to accelerate plan development and drive operational success.
We will consider each of these factors—people, process, and technology—
as we look at managing the increased risk of future disasters.
People
Emergency management as a profession and emergency managers as
professionals continue to evolve, especially over the past few decades as
organizations become more mature, learn to better coordinate and
collaborate with partner organizations, and follow standards, such as the
incident command system and the emergency management accreditation
program.
Twenty years ago, emergency managers in the United States could not
earn a college degree. Today, students can choose from among 80 different
bachelor degree programs, 59 master degree programs, and seven doctoral
degree programs (Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d.). Continued
focus on education, including training and professional certifications,
becomes a must for future emergency managers given the importance of
continual learning and the profession’s complex issues.
Hiring future emergency managers also becomes a critical piece of our
future. Not only is the overall population “graying,” many of our most
experienced emergency managers are nearing or will soon near retirement.
Recruiting new emergency managers to the profession will require making
the job (or career) attractive to candidates, especially young people.
According to the Harvard Business Review, young people want growth
opportunities, great managers, and jobs that are well-suited for their talents
and interests (Rigoni & Adkins, 2016).
Process
As threats and consequences increase, the ability of any one organization or
community to prepare for and respond to a disaster decreases. Established
pacts, such as mutual aid, the U.S. National Response Framework, or the
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) program,
pull together different organizations to address disaster risk effectively and
better coordinate resources.
Concepts like “whole community” recognize that emergency management
must include a cross-section of groups—government, business, and non-
government organizations—with shared interests and involvement to plan
for and respond to disasters. The need for multi-sector involvement is
especially great today, because many disaster scenarios—such as a volatile
hurricane season, an influenza pandemic, a large earthquake, or a terrorist
strike—hold the potential to produce catastrophic, cascading impacts that tax
the social, economic, and political resources of a region (Himberger & Krill,
2007).
Northeastern University lecturer Captain Tiffany Danko (2019)
encourages tomorrow’s incident management workforce to focus on
building collaborative partnerships.
These partnerships will work to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen
community capabilities, and engage with essential businesses partners to
build community resilience. Combined with intergovernmental cooperation
at all levels, this enhances the strategic planning and resource identification
required to meet the needs presented by catastrophic disasters while
reducing the impact on our communities. These partnerships further ensure
that the needs of under-represented or vulnerable members of the
community are addressed and that emergency management departments are
effectively serving all parts of our communities.
Emergency managers understand systems, and “whole communities” are
exactly that: a system that interconnects two or more organizations. When
we think about disasters, whether we recognize it or not, emergency
managers examine them as systems. There is a threat, a likelihood or
frequency, and a consequence. Relating these items is a systems-based
approach to disasters. Given that we plan for all hazards, this system gets
extended to plans, organizations, equipment, training, and exercises.
Emergency managers use information technology systems to collect,
analyze, share, and store data. We use systems to acquire, store, transport,
deliver, and use supplies. When our supply runs low, emergency managers
use our systems to procure more items to ensure the right product gets
delivered at the right time to the right place to save lives and protect
property.
Given the complexity of future disasters, emergency managers need to
understand better and utilize systems thinking—the art and science of
making reliable inferences about behavior by developing an increasingly
deep understanding of underlying structure (Senge, 2014). Peter Senge, the
author of The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, defines systems thinking as:
a way of thinking about, and a language for describing and understanding, the forces and
interrelationships that shape the behavior of systems. This discipline helps us to see how to change
systems more effectively, and to act more in tune with the natural processes of the natural and
economic world.
(2014, pp. 74–5)
Systems thinking is beginning to make its way into emergency
management. In its National Emergency Management Executive Academy,
FEMA addresses systems thinking as a core competency for future
emergency management leaders. FEMA’s Executive Academy brought in
Derek Cabrera from Cornell University, a world-renowned systems thinking
expert, to teach the students how to apply systems thinking to emergency
management. The key concepts of systems thinking include:
Inter-connections: All systems are composed of interconnected parts,

and these connections cause behavior of one part to affect another. A
change to any part or connection affects the entire system.
Behavior: The structure of a system determines its behavior. To
understand a system’s behavior, understand its structure. To change a
system’s behavior, change its structure.
Emergence: System behavior is an emergent phenomenon. How a
system behaves cannot be determined solely by inspecting its parts and
structure. When you realize how complex the behavior dynamics of
even a simple system really is, you will never again assume you can
look at a system and predict how it will behave.
Feedback: Feedback loops control a system’s major dynamic behavior.
A feedback loop is a series of connections causing output from one part
to eventually influence input to that same part. Feedback loops are the
main reason a system’s behavior is emergent.
Complexity: Complex systems exhibit counter intuitive behavior. The
problems of such systems cannot be solved using intuition and our
everyday problem-solving methods. Only analytical methods using
tools that fit the problem will solve difficult complex social system
problems (see Cabrera & Cabrera, 2015).
A thorough description of Cabrera’s key concepts of system thinking are

contained within Cabrera’s and Cabrera’s (2015) book Systems Thinking
Made Simple: New Hope for Solving Wicked Problems. Becoming familiar
with systems thinking is an important consideration for the future of
emergency management. This approach truly reflects the complexity that
our profession faces as disasters become more frequent and cause greater
consequences. The systems we need to build to lessen the risk of future
disasters greatly depends upon our ability to properly model and analyze
them.
It is the difference between knowledge and wisdom.
Speaking of systems, the Strategic National Stockpile is one such system
used by the United States to supplement state and local supplies during
public health emergencies. The supplies, medicines, and devices for life-
saving care contained in the stockpile can be used as a short-term stopgap
buffer when the immediate supply of adequate amounts of these materials
may not be immediately available (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, n.d.). The stockpile drew global attention and criticism at the
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic because of concerns about its
inventory, especially around insufficient quantities of supplies and their
efficacy given the novel coronavirus.
Accessing needed disaster supplies is crucial to life-saving (immediate)
and life-sustaining (long-term) response. How does tomorrow’s emergency
manager look at resources when future disasters may occur more frequently
and with greater consequences? Use systems thinking to model and analyze
interconnections, behaviors, emergence, feedback, and complexity.
Technology
Science fiction writers from Jules Verne to Arthur C. Clarke envisioned
futures in which technology took humankind to the stars and even provided
an explanation for the origin of life. Trying to predict what technology will
do for us is like seeing the first telephone call made by Alexander Graham
Bell and imagining that just over 100 years later nearly every person on this
planet would use an iPhone or Android mobile device (and that these
devices would connect to the internet, take and transmit photographs,
remote start and drive your car, and purchase goods from around the world
for next-day delivery!).
Still, the growing influence of technology and social media use in
emergency management must be addressed by our profession. We
professionals must develop strategies to effectively communicate with the
public before, during, and after disasters by almost any electronic means
possible. We also need contingency plans in the event the disaster destroys
the communications infrastructure, takes down the power needed to operate
the infrastructure, or the infrastructure gets attacked by malicious code and
either no longer operates or gets exploited to disseminate misinformation.
Data
Data and data analytics are essential to making accurate, valuable, and
crucial decisions during times of crisis so that people can react to emergency
situations with confidence and develop ongoing successful emergency
management strategies.
As the COVID-19 pandemic showed, emergency managers need the
ability to track and analyze real-time data to monitor developing situations,
to properly plan for response, and to adjust as priorities shift. Ronald Van
Loon (2020), an advisory board member of Simplilearn, examined data and
data analytics in emergency management and made these three strategic
recommendations:
1. Develop accurate solutions for emergency management

2. Leverage machine learning to classify and make predictions
3. Mine cloud data for emergency management support
Van Loon continued that data and analytics help to fill the gaps where
existing emergency management systems are lacking and need support.
In its 2018–2022 Strategic Plan, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (2018) set three goals for achieving a prepared and resilient nation:
Strategic Goal 1: Build a culture of preparedness

Strategic Goal 2: Ready the nation for catastrophic disasters
Strategic Goal 3: Reduce the complexity of FEMA.
Table 24.1 Natural Disasters from January 2015 to August 2020
Our Growing Population
In 1966, the world population was an estimated 3.4 billion people.

In 2020, the global population will reach 7.8 billion, and by 2055
will surpass 10 billion.
Of the 10 largest cities in the world today, Tokyo (38 million),
Delhi (28 million), Shanghai (26 million), Mexico City (21
million), Osaka (20 million), Mumbai (19 million), and New York
(18 million), are all located in high risk areas for earthquakes.
All of these cities are expected to see increased populations. For
example, by 2030 Delhi is projected to gain 10 million people (38
million projected) and exchange places with Tokyo, becoming the
world’s largest city.
If a large-scale earthquake were to hit any of these cities, the
ability to respond and recover would require global resources and
the loss of life and the economic consequences would be
substantial.
In Strategic Goal 3, FEMA recognizes it must be a modern agency that

can adapt to the public and the government’s priorities, while creating and
using innovative solutions for the emergency management mission (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2018). Within this goal, FEMA included
improving its data analytics capability and acknowledging the agency
requires consistent, reliable, and high-quality data analytics to inform
decision-making and risk management before, during, and after disasters.
FEMA’s (2018) Strategic Plan continues, “Consistent data management
and improved infrastructure can reduce delays and decrease costs in mission
delivery” (p. 34). FEMA looks to advanced analytics to improve grants
programs, provide greater transparency, and to cultivate greater
accountability, consistency, and trust.
The future emergency manager must continue to capitalize on the very
best ideas, ingenuity, and innovation—from across the whole community—to
meet the needs caused by more frequent and complex disasters than ever
before. Anticipating and understanding how hazards will change and what
these changes mean for emergency management will go a long way to
reducing risk. Hiring and retaining a dedicated group of professionals,
giving them the best tools to successfully do their jobs, and helping one
another gain important, and perhaps early, insights through advanced
analytics will turn information into knowledge and knowledge into wisdom.
References
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for Solving Wicked Problems. Cabrera Research Lab.
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who-fail-to-learn-from-history-are-doomed-to-repeat-it
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Appendix 1 Pandemic-Ready EOC
Design Considerations
Nicholas Staikos
Editor’s Note: Nicholas Staikos AIA is an expert and experienced professional

architect with an extensive practice in designing EOCs and public safety-
related facilities. Mr Staikos is a co-author of Chapter 12 in this book,
entitled “EOC Design,” which provides an excellent resource for EOC design.
We asked Mr Staikos, based on his expertise and extensive experience, to
discuss how he would recommend modifying the traditional EOC to meet
emergency management’s future demands for a highly functional EOC that
would operate in a pandemic environment. We realize that during the
COVID pandemic, emergency managers adapted quickly and effectively to
EOC-related needs, primarily through some level of virtual operations. The
request to Mr Staikos was to consider design adaptations that would likely be
required to enable the emergency management team’s physical presence at
the EOC with less reliance on virtual operations. In the old days, we would
call our request of Nicholas a “blue sky” approach to such an operation’s
design requirements. The result is as presented here. Mr Staikos did an
excellent job of future-thinking. The route he chose to meet our request was
to modify the core parts of the co-authored “EOC Design” chapter meaning
much of this chapter mirrors the other but with Nicholas’ “blue sky”
thoughts about pandemic adaption. The result is a chapter that will cause
the reader to think, ponder, and to cuss-and-discuss the future of EOC design
and operations. His expert thinking and this chapter were not restricted or
molded by the editorial team.
Where We Are
The recent months of the explosive growth of COVID-19 and the potential
for subsequent waves have become a real-time reality check for emergency
planners, first responders, and other institutions. Critical components of our
society, such as the health care system, food supply networks, educational
institutions, business, and yes, of course, John Q Public, have all been
impacted. First-hand, we have seen what it means to be caught off guard
and can’t afford to relive these past mishaps from our first steps.
So what does this mean for Emergency Operations facilities? Traditional
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) with their operations room, having
been developed as a communication hub activated in response to disasters to
coordinate resources and provide decision-makers the benefit of subject area
experts to formulate a response face a conundrum. The facility could be
rendered inoperative due to quarantine or severely restricted as a result of
social-distancing measures required due to potential contagion spread from
just one individual.
Image A1.1 Modern EOC
Source: Image Provided by Michael J. Fagel
Mitigating Measures
To mitigate this possibility, measures must be implemented, such as a cloud-
based data management and communications infrastructure supporting the
Emergency Response operation. Currently available and rapidly improved,
they offer highly diverse access points through the internet to applications
and data. Assuming that reliable data links exist, access can be made
available to anyone anywhere with authorization and a quality data
connection. With proper end-to-end encryption facilitating cybersecurity,
response teams can consult and communicate with jurisdictional leadership
as a response is formulated. Remote data linkage from the various EOC team
member’s principal home networks or mobile networks would be required
for integration into the stand-alone system.
While internally housed systems potentially offer a higher security level,
these would require physical access to be utilized and thus become
problematic.
The remote locations of participants who connect must be mapped out,
ensuring that they and support staff have robust and diverse data
communications linkages such as high-capacity fiber connection, wireless
reception enhancements, and radio infrastructure to support
communications isolation in the event they can’t enter the EOC.
Of course, the cloud facility that houses the servers must also be
maintained by staff who can be at risk to the contagion’s effects; however, it
can be assumed that fewer people will be needed and thus can be supported
with the appropriate PPE should it be necessary. Cloud-based facilities and
their applications being somewhat autonomous systems should be designed
to push key data collected from responding agencies and push it to
responders via dashboards based upon a predetermined priority system
utilizing AI algorithms. In this manner, immediate action or high priority
data can be distributed. Immediate data updates and situational awareness
imagery would be sorted and pushed through the distribution network
without massive oversight. In this manner, there will be a reduced reliance
on the traditional large format display systems, which provide a broad
overview of concurrent activities. With higher and higher screen resolution
capabilities, a miniature version of the data wall utilizing this capability can
be located at each position. This would be the first step toward practical
virtualization of EOC operations and potentially reducing the facility’s scale
to support activation.
Additionally, these cloud-based services would be mirrored continuously
locally in the event that the data interconnects are cut. Operational and
technical support documentation must be immediately remotely available or
in hard copy, or removable digital media for the respective Emergency
Support Function (ESF) responders should the center need to be shut down
because of the internal spread of contagion or physical threat. These features
should be part of a biosecurity preparedness plan for the EOC.
Event Complexity
Imagine having a biological event coupled with a widespread natural
disaster like a Superstorm Sandy or a spring snowstorm or other such events
typical of the geographic area in question. Resultant power outages would
affect a county or state’s broad area, thus limiting access to the cloud? Just
as diversity in systems increases reliability, the same is true in this scenario;
electrical and data systems need to be maintained through portable
generation, and alternative communication means. With a virtual network’s
capability, you could stand up multiple warm backup centers, which could
be silently up and running, ready to become hot. They would be positioned,
so if responders can’t get to the primary center, they can function from the
alternate sites. While similar approaches are occurring currently, I think it
will need to be more robust and better distributed. Further, even though
agencies have been using mobile communications vehicles helping to restore
connectivity of infrastructure lost or damaged along with some basic
support during past events, they can only accommodate a fraction of a large
facility’s responders. Use of mobile facilities verses maintenance of warm
sites becomes a budgetary issue particularly when this capability is pushed
down to smaller jurisdictions.
In the event that should the alternate be unavailable or unable to handle
the full contingent, a portion of responders would either connect from their
agencies’ home centers or their residence tied into their respective networks.
Home deployment would require backup equipment such as portable
generators and a means to resupply, reliable communications, data, and
voice. The supporting equipment would need to be redeployed when
designated personnel are changed. Managing the constant equipment churn
would be by the respective agency, whereas communications, whether
landline or radio, would be coordinated by the central EOC management.
While it is fairly common to designate certain municipal centers to serve
as operational backups to the state/regional center. Most likely the secondary
will be constrained having to absorb populations from two sites should the
primary be forced to operate at reduced capacity due to social distancing or
quarantine. There will be a shortage of space under each scenario that would
push some staff/responders to their private residences. These logistics need
to be fully worked out in advance. In either case, the potential exists where
everyone is confined to private homes, and then all of the communication
and power redundancies would be necessary.
Interim Measures
While we all would wish for a speedy return to business as usual, it is fairly
clear that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to usher in a
potentially new normal, specifically in the way that society will be
approaching our return to daily activities and a resumption of the affected
economies.
In the interim, what does this mean for traditional operations rooms and
supporting functions in today’s EOC? First, a decision will have to be made
concerning whether external conditions will allow the center to operate and
at what capacity. Some concepts discussed include bubbling, wherein
responders, once admitted and cleared of the disease, will be able to move
about with minimum PPE. On paper, this seems quite doable; however, if
receiving multiple agency personnel, the bubble has to extend outward and
develop procedures for when personnel are rotated in or out. A more
middle-of-the-road approach would be to perform all of the admittance
procedures and then practice social distancing measures, which will dictate
the maximum percentage of responders that can be admitted. Increasing
physical separation at high-density console areas by alternating occupancy
and various PPE levels will result in a loss of operational capacity.
The use of transparent guards similar to those seen in supermarkets,
pharmacies, and other retail points of sale can be a method to help protect
from the airborne spread of the virus by providing a barrier between
positions where alternating occupancy is problematic, because too many
positions are lost. The science determining the actual effectiveness is still
evolving. Installing transparent dividers will allow visual communication
between positions to be maintained. When the need for close contact
conversation between positions is required, each participant can use face
coverings that had been removed to facilitate speaking/hearing
comprehension, whether on the telephone, radio, or one-to-one. Of course,
participants could choose to wear their face coverings throughout the day
only to be removed when eating. The experience will tell us when these
coverings will impede communication.
In the OPS room with positions frequently spaced at between 36” and 42”
apart, meeting social distancing requirements will typically produce a 50%
capacity loss. By performing some functions remotely via group video
conferencing such as Zoom, Webex, Skype, etc., would help minimize the
impact of a reduction in responder capacity. You could also retask training
and breakout rooms to accommodate reductions in positions due to social
distancing. Of course, how many EOCs do you know of that have space that
is not already used during a major event? These displaced activities would
have to be done remotely.
Image A1.2 Commonly Seen COVID Information Signs in Upstate NY
Alternatively, suppose good operating practice dictates maintaining

maximum occupancy. In that case, the immediate solution depending on the
contamination is to require at a minimum a N95-type respirator, face shields
or goggles, and perhaps external protective gowning plus partitioning.
Certainly, there will be the requirement of identification to not only demark
function performed but also the person’s name/picture/organization perhaps
pinned on the smock’s front in addition to an ID card on a lanyard. Clarity
of voice communication will become an issue and could be addressed by the
use of throat mikes. Of course, there will have to be ongoing attention to
sanitizing surfaces at the console and at all common high-touch areas such
as restrooms, break rooms, supply areas, conference rooms, doorknobs, light
switches, etc. Some facilities may choose to invest in localized upgrades for
hands-free fittings for the restrooms, occupancy sensors for rooms, and
automatic openers for high-traffic doors.
The problem that EOCs face, regardless of the jurisdictional level, is that
they, by definition, have been programmed to be able to handle staff surges
during an activation. This preplanned surge capacity is also affected by the
sizes of full-time staff and the type of event occurring. In larger centers, staff
who would typically report to the operations room would operate from their
work station with a robust virtualized program.
Where Does Containment/Separation Start?

Redesign of existing space is a team endeavor, starting with experienced
architectural and engineering professionals in conjunction with engaged
staff and other supporting disciplines familiar with protective procedures.
Too often EOC staff attempt to go it alone and at times with less than
satisfactory results. The big picture and relevant space allocation details can
be explored by building consensus by taking an interdisciplinary approach.
The protection of the personnel and facility starts beyond the front door
of an existing facility. Procedures driven by the specific event need to be
established in order to determine if entry is advised and to monitor the
condition of entering personnel and following up with them when home
awaiting their shift. In some centers where available space is not adequate,
mobile facilities positioned in parking/sidewalk areas can address some of
the pre-entrance screening activities. Depending on the space situation,
some of the activities will be internal, others external.
In dealing with a highly communicable disease, it is my opinion that we
may need to return to the Cold War and civil defense days, where
permanent decon stations and change rooms are part of the entry process to
keep the facilities from being contaminated.
Space programming needs to allow for:
No-touch thermal scanning (self-scanning is problematic unless proper

equipment is at hand)
Standardized surveillance questionnaires with data logging upload
Identity verification
Data logging/recording
Credentialing new responders
Point of care/service testing
Gown/ de-gowning areas with negative pressure/local filtration
Exiting data logging
Service support entry for systems maintenance, food service,
housekeeping
Maintenance access, trash removal.
Ideally, interior circulation needs to be set up so that there is a one-way

flow, much like managing gown and de-gown facilities in pharmaceutical
environments.
With increased sanitizing procedures, oversized dispensing capability and
accommodation of secure biohazardous waste need to be available.
Part of the intake process will require the accommodation of outerwear,
umbrellas, etc. and space allocation for personal items’ secure storage.
Breakout rooms and restrooms will need some form of occupancy-
accounting mechanism to keep from being overpopulated without resorting
to stationed personnel accomplishing this task. If the facilities are limited to
one occupant, a simple door slide sign will suffice keeping in mind that the
idea is to reduce common touch-points. It is possible that access control
systems already in place in the larger centers can be expanded and
programmed to provide this type of control by adding wireless readers. In
situations where contagion spread is through surface contact staff will most
likely need to be assigned to provide frequent disinfecting cleanup of high-
touch areas unless it is self-policed. As scientific awareness of specific
attributes of a virus become known, national agencies like the CDC or local
health departments should be instrumental in offering protocols to follow. It
is conceivable that duty staff will do this themselves with periodic deeper
clean performed by traditional service staff or outside contractors in smaller
facilities. As before, there has to be security oversight, which can be
burdensome during the height of an extended activation.
Generally speaking, the modern high-performance EOC is already
equipped with HEPA filtration for outdoor makeup air and can button up
and isolate from the external environment through these high-efficiency
filters. However, as the current experience shows, accommodation for higher
percentages of outside air will need to be made. This can affect the capability
of the existing equipment leading to additional expenses to supplement the
intake capacity. This is important as it has been found that disease spread
appears to be enhanced in current environments with inadequate air
exchange (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). For new
facilities, consideration of once-through systems should be given and other
decontamination forms that neutralize the pathogens before returning via
the HVAC system to the occupied space, thus helping reduce internal spread.
Technologies that can provide localized decontamination will help reduce
spread at the source. Ultraviolet light baths are under development as they
pose risks as well as benefits (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, n.d.).
They could be incorporated at entry portals when protective measures can
be easily implemented or in interior spaces where high levels of interaction
are expected, and shielding can offer protection to the occupants in
conjunction with social distancing measures.
New Facility Planning

The following planning narrative would be applicable both in the
development of a new purpose-built facility or renovation of existing space
to accommodate responders. The variations of the operations room design
discussed later in this chapter takes into consideration the programmatic
bent of the entity commissioning the work.
American architect Louis H. Sullivan aptly said: “Form ever follows
function” in his 1896 essay “The tall office building artistically considered”
and this phrase was subsequently shortened by modernists such as Mies van
der Rohe to “Form follows function” (Sullivan, 1896). It is important to be
aware of the underlying operational function of the emergency management
entity. That being said, wherever you plan for a mission-critical facility and
no matter how few people may respond due to a system’s virtualization
capabilities, the selected site must still meet certain minimum standards to
ensure its survivability to fulfill its mission. This would apply even if you
subscribe to the hypothesis that officials will be able to be connected
remotely and will never have to leave their base installations or even their
homes because of technology.
Design Process
If we agree that the “New Normal” still involves a physical location where
staff and supporting responders will typically report to, then we should be
aware of the following, It cannot be stressed enough that most successful
projects begin with the assembly of experienced design professionals best
led by an architect well versed in the many nuances of this building type. A
multidisciplinary team comprised of architect, structural, mechanical,
electrical, plumbing, special systems, and specialty subconsultants are
needed to be on board from the outset of planning in conjunction with the
various agency stakeholders. There will be times during the process that key
private-sector participants and non-governmental agencies may be drawn in
to weigh in on issues specific to their participation or activation support.
Managing the process of establishing goals, needs, and direction will be a
challenging but rewarding experience, whether developing a new or
renovated facility, for either a singular operations room converted from old
warehouse space or a new facility from the ground up. Part of the education
process includes “lessons learned” from the experience of similar
jurisdictions planning and reflection after occupancy.
The physical design response will be broken into two development paths,
one for smaller municipal agencies with a smaller staff. These situations will
most likely tilt towards software technologies and minimal facilities while
larger institutions with their significantly larger permanent staff, will
embrace a purpose-built space. They will integrate software solutions
providing for some form of virtualization. This will give them maximum
flexibility with dynamic incidents by pushing information down to the real-
time response level.
Site
Planning for pandemic-related incidents would not impact physical site
design issues such as parking layouts. Good practice would require adequate
staff capacity and any anticipated surge envisioned by the operational
program. If the operational program anticipates providing for external
screening for pandemic occurrences rather than dedicated built space for
what might be viewed as extraordinary circumstances, it would be
recommended that a mobile facility be provided. Power and
communications hookups should be located proximate to the building
entrance and covered access to the building entrances.
These locations could be utilized for parking until needed; they would be
reserved in the same manner as handicap accommodation is done. They
would be located at all principal building entrances—both staff and public.
Also it is my opinion that prudent planning should take into account
precautions for blast. Therefore parking areas should be placed outside of the
standoff criteria establish by the risk analysis, which would be conducted
during programming. It is recommended that at least a 50’ standoff distance
be integrated into planning for car parks and 150’ or more for media vehicles
such as satellite trucks and any external service vehicle.
Site access should be divided into secure access for staff, service, and
authorized visitors like equipment maintenance and support. These external
support entities should, in turn, be isolated from service yard compounds
accommodating equipment such as emergency generators, cooling towers,
water supply storage, electrical substation or transformers, communications
towers, etc. In addition to access control with audit capabilities, CCTV
surveillance with high-quality day/ light cameras with motion activation
and other analytics be deployed with suitable historical storage as well as
provisions for remote access.
Bollards or other such devices need to be placed at vulnerable entry points
where a targeted strike with a car bomb or other such conveyance could
cause internal damage or disruption.
CCTV coverage should be laid out to avoid blind spots coupled with
intelligent analytics that bring anomalies to the facility’s security staff.
While EOCs are considered mission-critical, it is less likely that dedicated
staff will be programmed to provide constant supervision of such systems.
As such these systems will not only provide evidentiary record but through
software analytics will also push anomalies to the duty officers as an urgent
notification thus taking priority over standard duties.
Site selection is a game of which comes first. Once a programmatic
evaluation of need has been completed, a determination of the property’s
size to accommodate the intended functions can be made. As always,
provisions for the potential growth of exterior support areas such as parking
for surge and vehicular storage, response supply storage outbuildings, etc.
need to be planned from the outset. Keeping in mind that while there will be
a tendency to centralize such pertinent supply, diversity of location will
mitigate risks associated with a focused catastrophic event. Loss of supply or
delivery capability could impact a jurisdiction’s response.
Nonetheless the site and core facilities need to meet the following basic
parameters:
1. Must be easily accessible to those identified that will occupy it on a

full-time basis or those who will be reporting.
2. Must manage the risks and vulnerabilities specific to its location or
access to it.
3. Not located adjacent to high-risk enterprises such as industrial
complexes.
Before COVID- 19, I believe that the average person on the street would
consider natural disasters to represent the highest percentage of the most
impactful threats to US society save for world war or the 9/11 attacks. For us
in the US pandemics have not really been a part of our everyday awareness
even though if you study the history of major events worldwide, pandemics
have truly had an impact on global society. The Spanish Flu of 1918 had an
economic impact on the US economy of 11% of GDP. The referenced article
discusses this and other more recent events such as MERS, SARS primarily
affecting other countries around the globe. For the US, according to the
authors, notable recent impacts the 1957 Asian Flu pandemic and the Hong
Kong Flu of 1968 had economic impacts in the billions (Madhav et al., 2017).
Given COVID-19’s unimaginable worldwide impact both in terms of loss of
life and economic hardship everyone’s attention has now been focused. I
believe that prudent planning when evaluating new sites being considered
need to take into account all hazards, all risks—which would include natural,
biological, terroristic, human-made, as well as pandemics which for the
purposes of this discussion would be included under biological impacts.
While table-top exercises for the above threats and others may be routinely
practiced, I believe that we need to extend our planning to the very site and
facility where these exercises are or will be held.
Some site selection considerations:
1. Should be well above 200-year flood events whether mapped or not.

2. Not have an exceptionally high water table; seasonal fluctuation needs
to be explored.
3. Soil characteristics should be evaluated for the effects during potential
seismic action—an example of this is if a structure is built on filled land
proximate to water bodies where the soil’s liquefaction could occur,
such as in the San Francisco quake of 1989, which caused severe
damage to all structures built upon the filled area.
4. Relationship to wind-blown debris from scrap metal yards or other
manufacturing facilities that are not constructed to rigorous standards,
thereby shedding siding, roofing, etc., in the advent of a tornado or
hurricane with debris becoming puncturing projectiles.
5. Identify external influences that pose a risk to structure or access.
6. Proximity to airports—need to be at least five miles from takeoff and
approach patterns of all runways.
7. Proximity to main arterial highways, taking into account of types of
cargo that could be transiting; industrial gases, etc.
8. Building air supply systems need to have the appropriate filtration
systems to keep harmful substances from entering the building.
9. Proximity to rail lines—presents similar concerns only magnified as
there could be many tanker cars that become involved in a derailment
carrying hazardous materials and volatile fuels, which in aggregate can
produce a substantial fire hazard, deadly chemical clouds, and toxic
smoke.
10. Proximity to industrial and chemical facilities, where external factors
would necessitate facility evacuation.
11. Proximity to pipeline transmission routes and future implementation
through previously granted rights of way.
12. Proximity to Nuclear Emergency Planning Zone—stay at a minimum
outside of the ten-mile EPZ, regardless of prevailing winds.
13. Location of collapsible structures like transmission line towers,
communications towers, where collapse could impact or sever
communications and power lines.
14. Sources of power reliability and redundancy need to be evaluated for
delivery system reliability as well as system redundancy.
Conventional wisdom over the years has been that mission-critical

facilities need reliable, redundant power. As such, knowledge of the service
network of the electrical supply needs to be traced to determine if there are
any single points of failure. Similarly forward-looking, facility managers
look for two independent sources of utility power but often neglect to see
whether these two sources share common distribution and, therefore, could
deal with an interruption by a single incident.
All communications networks, whether over copper, fiber, or satellite
systems, need to be evaluated for end-to-end reliability and redundancy.
Quite often, because wired telecommunications utilizes the same right of
way structure, i.e., sharing the same pole lines, single points of failure can
affect both power and communications.
Water supply is an often overlooked critical resource; without it, the
facility’s occupancy is compromised. While bottled water can provide a
backup for personnel, mechanical systems are dependent on cooling,
restrooms need it for sanitation, and fire protection capability must be
maintained for either wet or dry sprinkler systems. On the output side,
sanitary sewer service can be affected by downstream interruption caused
by the blockage. Earthquakes could sever the line, in which case outflow
would continue creating its issues, but continued input into the line would
not be affected. But supposing the seismic event creates a blockage after
residual capacity in the pipe is consumed, there will be backups in the
nearest facilities. Granted, this may take some time, but if a lift station
serves the facility and flooding renders the pumps inoperable, blockages
would eventually occur.
Communications, being an integral part of the EOC functionality, require
redundancy for landline copper or fiber, cell service, and radio
interoperability. External influences such as RF interference could affect
radio communications and must be evaluated. Accommodation for remote
positioning of media satellite trucks with communications and power
stanchions is available if an event is long-term, reducing unnecessary
refueling or vehicle movement adding to the facility’s risk exposure. Social
distancing may affect the number of press representatives admitted to
briefing rooms. Therefore, pool coverage and or direct feed to the remotely
parked vehicles would allow increased media coverage. Prearranged access
protocols need to be in place rather than developed on the fly.
Reliability and self-sufficiency durations need to be established based on
reasoned judgments of risk and past events. Still, at some point, resupply for
both building services and support will need to be initiated.
Building Characteristics and Systems
EOC security
EOC facility security encompasses many facets, starting with appropriate
site selection, minimizing hazards, and external risks. Evaluations need to be
conducted concerning influencing floodplains, access to highway networks,
end-to-end redundant communications service, independent power grids, if
near airports outside of taking and landing approach zones, proximity to
power plants both conventional and nuclear-powered. Rail lines and
highways could mean trains/trucks carrying hazardous cargo, which in an
accident could send plumes of toxic smoke or gas across the facility,
hampering access even if the building has advanced air filtration.
Physical protection from potential terroristic attacks, with natural or
human-made barriers, allows for controlled access to provide the
appropriate standoff distances. This access can be controlled at the site’s
perimeter and public building access at the front door; it all depends on
internal requirements. CCTV surveillance with intelligent monitoring will
help minimize staff to provide full-time oversight. While security concerns
are always forefront, the facility must not feel like a prison as, generally
speaking, it is a high-tech office building, and occupant comfort is equally
important.
Physical Facility Hardening

Location-specific measures need to be evaluated as part of an overall system
study with the maintenance of the secure perimeter either through standoff
protections by either fencing or natural features such as berming and other
vehicular traps. Blast resistance, just like force/ballistic protection of glazing
systems and walls, is a challenging design issue, as to how strong is strong
enough because there can always be a bigger device. One of the best
mitigation measures is to increase the standoff distance, since the dissipation
of a blast’s shock wave is a function of proximity to the structure.
Parking lots and vehicular access roads need to be laid out hierarchically.
Consideration should be given to locating trash/recycling dumpsters remote
from the building. This should be considered a vulnerability to a terrorist
bombing event as the vehicle is large, and it is easy to conceal a large
amount of explosives in the truck. Outdoor equipment such as generators,
cooling towers, water tanks, and fuel storage containers should be protected
from projectiles created by tornadoes, hurricanes, or blast that can cause
damage.
Electronic surveillance of internal communications is considered a low-
level threat. However, there may be instances when consideration needs to
be given, as bad actors may take advantage of being able to disrupt the
government’s response (FBI, 2021). An inadequate response can amplify the
impact of an event. The embarrassment through cyberintrusion,
disinformation, etc. or the sowing of doubt can have a significant impact,
although not as identifiable as a natural or technological occurrence.
Virtual Technologies
As mentioned earlier, Louis Sullivan famously famously said, “Form ever
follows function” (Sullivan, 1896), therefore new facilities should be planned
and designed with all stakeholders actively engaged in establishing a vision
of their operational needs of the present as well how they foresee the future.
In the era of pandemic awareness, I believe that technology will help the
emergency manager effectively respond to future pandemics’ challenges.
This is especially true when the primary focus of public health measures to
curb disease transmission while awaiting vaccine development will fall back
to proven methods of social distancing, personnel hygiene, and avoidance of
large concentrated gatherings, which presents challenges for the traditional
operations center.
Development and subsequent rollout of implementing virtual measures
can be stood up as a trial by creating a backup center operating in parallel.
This will allow experimentation with emerging virtual technologies without
affecting the ongoing capability to manage events.
While the backbone of a virtualized system is the development of software
and the supporting hardware systems, all of the issues raised for the bricks-
and-mortar facility are present and must be addressed. Issues of redundancy
and diversity may, in certain instances, require an even more thorough
degree of planning than a centralized self-supporting facility
Building Access Design

Whether an activated facility is housing a regular contingent of responders,
which can be upwards of 75 to 100 people for a medium-sized state facility,
or a downsized and streamlined contingent that is relying on remote/virtual
access, the same entry procedures need to be followed in times of a highly
contagious disease. Current CDC protocols at the time of this writing
require quarantining of all contacts of a positive individual, thus admission
of just one infected individual could shut down the entire facility by
requiring everyone inside to go into isolation/quarantine restrictions
depending on the situation’s nature (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2020). It is vital to maintain a strict and structured admissions
protocol.
As such, a center needs to allocate internal space for admissions
screening. The entry process would adhere to the following generalized
scenario. Credentialed responders would enter via card access most likely
with a proximity card to avoid high-touch areas. Exterior vestibule doors
would be on automatic openers with a sally port design maintaining
environmental buffering. Non-credentialed responders would go through the
same entry; however, credentialing would be done manually by staff in an
adjacent room and then rejoins the workflow. Technology will soon allow
for a specific prescribed set of personal health monitoring metrics, taken by
a personal electronic device such as a cell phone or wrist appliance. The
responder would be directed to an anti room adjacent to the entrance where
storage space for outerwear can be placed, including rain gear, umbrellas,
boots, etc. One could imagine that special eyewear could be dispensed and a
person could be bathed in UV light (U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
n.d.), twice, once with outerwear and then with indoor clothing. Of course,
safeguards need to be developed so that the decontamination process does
not do more harm.
Image A1.3 Mix of N95 Respirators and Other Related PPE
Here visual confirmation of identity with ID printed out based upon

access credential will be made by staff isolated from the entry vestibule.
Additionally, I believe follow-up temperature scans may be made by
personnel in PPE to validated biometric data provided by a personal
electronic device. Supplemental surveillance questions will be given to the
responder and logged. It is imagined that at this time, instant action or near-
instant response testing could occur with the responder in a reception booth.
Assuming a negative test result, the responder would then pass through an
exit door into a gowning area where prescribed PPE levels will be provided
depending on operational procedures and protocols established. This could
be an area where self-dispensing face coverings (mask, surgical, or N95-
type), face shields and even full-blown gowning, booting, etc. would occur
in the next anteroom. Wash stations for hands would be provided. All
fixtures would be hands-free, either with booted foot operation or an
infrared sensor.
Once a negative test is recorded, internal facility access is granted, an
internal access control badge would be issued, or the access control system
would validate the responder’s access parameters. Exiting would be the
reverse in a separate suite of rooms. It is important to note that procedures
need to be developed in parallel to the actual building design so that the
facility and operations are complementary.
During the planning process, an experienced architect/engineering team
can support facility management by marrying multiple issues and assist in
making value judgments on which protocols or design features to
incorporate. Providing input of course would be appropriate team members
with specific expertise in technical issues of decontamination, personal
protection etc. as appropriate to the event being dealt with.
Building Organization
Regardless of the extraordinary procedures outlined above, a hierarchical
building layout needs to be adhered to, meaning that less-secure functions
will tend to be at the perimeter or near the main entry path. Commonly
used facilities can be reached without having to transit higher security
levels. The aim is to have a layout that doesn’t solely rely on electronics to
maintain security control and reinforce the security protocols. In the end,
access to critical spaces should be on a need-to-be-there basis.
At a minimum, the planning team must program space for measures to
monitor incoming responders as outlined earlier and standard components.
The burden of the additional space for isolation, testing, and storage of
personal items, while costly, will become part of the new normal and should
be considered even if convenience dictates a return to less cumbersome
admittance procedures until such time the next pandemic arises. In my
experience and observation, there is another ongoing conundrum for
Emergency Management; when there are no incidents, our leaders looking
for cost savings will cut budgets. When a threat eventually presents itself,
they are asking why the response is inadequate. The COVID-19 response is a
living example of this attitude’s results, which has hampered preparedness
because pivotal agencies have been subjected to budgetary cuts and now the
system is having to play catch-up.
Building Support Systems
Structural
The building frame and skin should be designed to meet the challenges of
natural risks such as a tornado, hurricane, and earthquake, specific to the
locale being served. Studies early on should focus on efficient space
utilization weighing the benefits of larger bay spaces, which offer internal
layout flexibility versus costs associated with meeting the typically higher
load requirements and deeper structural sections. Large gathering spaces like
Operations Rooms and multipurpose areas, because of their need for
unobstructed viewing angles, should be located in such a manner as not to
have built space above. This is particularly pertinent to an Operations Room
having over 30 positions.
Since the typical center is akin to a robust high-tech office building, there
probably will not be a need for in-depth vibration analysis other than to be
aware of mechanical and electrical equipment that could create comfort
issues with the occupants. The requirement should be established based
upon criteria agreed during the programming phase. The development of the
structural design parameters will go hand-in-hand with determining the
blast criteria level needs to be implemented. The planning team needs to be
careful not to make assumptions that if blast protection has been
implemented, then tornadic protection is built-in. Each risk affects the
building and its skin differently, and just because you have one, you may not
have the other.
How far one goes with some of these extraordinary measures will be
influenced when budgeting becomes an integral component of the equation.
Mechanical
Mechanical Systems should employ diversity factors so that an air handler

has to be taken out of service, the remaining units can carry a significant
portion of the load. The redundancy level directly relates to cost and has to
be considered in any cost–benefit analysis. In general, space should be
served by at least two units, and if any one unit is taken out of service, the
remaining units should be able to accommodate at least 60% of a design day
load.
The latest ASHRAE standards (ANSI, 2019) combined with local building
codes such as the International Mechanical Code and FEMA guidelines
should be a baseline for criteria development with careful attention to
specialty spaces and specific needs. Attention to ventilation standards will
probably need to be updated due to experience with COVID-19.
Depending on the project’s climate zone, one must be careful to avoid
oversizing cooling equipment in that its operation would become
intermittent because space can be rapidly cooled and therefore be off more
than on. This can affect humidity levels in that there could be big swings in
these levels, which would be detrimental to equipment and environmental
comfort for the occupants. The dynamic nature of occupancy levels, systems
such as VAV (variable air volume) should be considered.
Incorporation of economizer cycles and night setbacks needs to be
carefully considered as humidity levels can build during these periods,
affecting printing and other such functions. The installation of
dehumidification systems on outdoor intakes needs to be monitored to
ensure proper operation and function.
CRAC Computer Air Conditioning Units should serve computer and
communications rooms with a higher density loading with piping
distributed in the underfloor space. Wet piping should be isolated from cable
infrastructure with bulkheads constructed to contain any underfloor leaks of
piping. Depending on the piping’s density and use of sprinkler suppression
system, utilized floor drains should be considered in the underfloor space.
In my opinion the Building Automation System (BAS) needs to be placed
upon secure networks so that alerts can be sent out during off-hours of
regular operation so that service personnel can troubleshoot or dispatch
repair technicians without fear of manipulation by hacking. Remote access
for troubleshooting by equipment suppliers may also need to be managed to
a higher level than is traditionally done.
Electrical
Full-time available power is one of the basic life-bloods of a mission-critical

facility. Even with redundant service provisions, the inclusion of motor
generator backup should be included at N+1. Suppose two smaller
generators are envisioned to reach a design load. In that case, load shedding
to allow for critical electrical/communications systems plus the support of
essential mechanical equipment, cooling, pumps, etc. should be incorporated
as routine maintenance is an ongoing activity take units out of service.
Electrical systems need to be designed with load diversity in mind taking
into account potential population surges. Isolated ground systems need to be
carefully considered and circuit diversity provisioning, particularly in
computer rooms and network centers. Fully redundant service feeds would
allow for A B circuiting for computing devices or network hubs. Power
Distribution Units (PDUs) are an effective mechanism for access to localized
electrical distribution.
Convenient access to cable distribution networks should be incorporated
for ease of communications wiring. This can be accomplished through
overhead or underfloor cable tray. Whichever system is preferred, the
planners must consider the ease of utilization as there can be a tendency to
abandon cabling in place when running a new service. This will lead to loss
of capacity, restriction of airflows, etc. particularly in underfloor
environments
Even with shielded communications wiring, care should be taken not to
position electrical wiring in close proximity and parallel with
communications wiring. Category 6 wiring should be utilized to support the
ever-increasing demand for data transmission.
The use of solar cells for alternative power sources needs to be carefully
evaluated when being considered for generalized service. Collectors are
subject to potential damage due to wind blow debris.
UPS Systems
Generally, a Tier III or IV approach, as defined by the “Uptime Institute”
(Stansberry, 2014) should be the goal in order to meet the electrical needs of
critical equipment. A trend toward smaller distributed UPS modules will
need to be weighed against larger centralized systems. A cost analysis will
consider costs of space allocated maintenance reliability etc. Redundancy
will also be a key factor. UPS systems are installed to bridge between an
outage and such time that alternative power generation spins up to take over
loss of utility service. They are not meant to be a replacement for stand-by
power, as this is a very costly approach.
Lighting Systems
Lighting systems should be designed to the latest IES (Illuminating

Engineering Society) Standards (IES, 2011) and those of the International
Building Codes along with that of the local jurisdiction. Keep in mind that
standards are a departure point and should be adjusted per the needs of the
specific space. In operations rooms and other high-density screen utilization
areas, indirect lighting and user-adjustable task lighting are essential in
avoiding reflection and glare on screens, leading to operator discomfort and
stress, particularly during long periods of activation. When adapting to
existing space, care must be taken when utilizing current lighting systems. It
is recommended that lighting control systems make adjustments in light
levels through zoning and dimming methods. Occupancy sensors will aid in
achieving controlling operational costs.
Acoustical Control
In a communications center there is constant chatter. As the noise level

builds, the natural tendency is for the speaker to respond in kind; soon, it
almost becomes uncontrollable. There needs to be attention to the utilization
of absorbing surfaces and the design orientation of walls to reduce reflected
sound instead of amplifying. It is important to acoustically isolate sensitive
conference areas to allow for frank high-level conversation without fear of
rumor generation. Strategic placement of furniture pods for on floor
breakout areas all to control ambient noise should also be a strong
consideration.
Special Systems
Security/Access Control
Should be incorporated for audit trails of sensitive area access. Anti-pass-

back features to curtail tailgating will enhance the overall level of security.
As mentioned earlier, biometric data can be attached to the card monitoring
key indicators and the prescreening of those wishing to enter facilities. With
the trend to avoid high-touch areas, dual technology proximity cards would
probably be the most appropriate interface. Electronic systems, however, are
not a substitute for staff awareness and adherence to protocols.
Card access locking systems will need to be fail-safe and, in certain
instances, fail secure. Two factor credentialing should be considered in key
access areas. Key override should always be available as well as egress
allowing exiting for life-safety situations. CCTV systems need to have the
intelligence to relieve the burden of constant monitoring. With integrated
virtual systems, alerts either by motion tripwire or other such means would
be pushed directly to the responsible person’s desktop and backup team
members.
Communications Support Systems
Some level of ElectroMagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection should be considered

and can be localized to harden specific communications equipment. Public
address systems should be incorporated for all hands announcements.
It is unlikely that building shielding will be required for these facilities to
guard against eavesdropping; however, cellular coverage will need to be
internally amplified with localized antennas providing the major carriers’
service. Depending on the facility size, televised broadcast areas with
appropriate lighting and links for all communication reception forms such as
cable satellite, etc. should be incorporated.
Plumbing/Fire Protection
Plumbing systems redundancy provisions revolve around having enough on-

site potable water to accommodate building population surges and to sustain
mechanical equipment makeup and cooling requirements. Roof drains need
to be positioned with emergency relief should blockages occur at the drain
or in line.
The potable water storage supply drawdown should be physically limited
to maintain minimum fire protection requirements of a recommended cross-
zoned pre-action sprinkler system. When supplies are drawn down to these
limits, resupply via water buffalo or other type of external water supply
system. Bottled water for consumption should be prearranged.
The building should be protected by sprinkler systems, preferably cross-
zoned pre-action dry systems in any water-sensitive areas. In the interest of
redundancy, a fire pump should be provided even if water pressure at the
street is suitable to serve the facility’s needs.
Operations Room Design
Origins
The operations room, where internal and external responders report, is the
nerve center of today’s EOC. As the field of emergency management, its
evolution is ongoing, driven by the continually changing technological
landscape and the adoption of new practices derived from lessons learned. It
was initially conceived as a space where key public and private agency
representatives came together to collect, evaluate, and disseminate
information. These multipurpose spaces were born out of the context of civil
defense. They were somewhat similar in layout and typically created with a
bunker mentality as survivability was paramount.
The accommodations were spartan, and the facility was used for other
purposes until escalating threat levels warranted activation. While their
principal function was to provide the responding agencies a seemingly
protected place to maintain communications with their respective
organizations’ operational structures, they were also viewed as a place of
refuge for governing authorities, thus ensuring government continuity. It
wasn’t unusual to find these centers located in the lower basement levels of
a municipal building or at times as a stand-alone underground facility.
Interestingly these presumed-to-be-well-protected locations were held
hostage by external events outside of their control such as plumbing failures
from above or flooding via backed up drainage systems from below. Further,
by being collocated with many other users, any form of building evacuation
such as a fire alarm or other such alert would mandate exit from the
occupied space, not to mention the impact of sprinkler discharge seeking the
lowest level.
As the Cold War tensions defused, officials soon realized that the threats
from natural disasters would be more likely to occur and could have
significant consequences on government’s day-to-day function and affect
the lives and welfare of a large proportion of the jurisdictions’ population.
This growing awareness produced the need for enlarged staff to administer
recovery programs and focused support during the crisis and drove the need
for more capable facilities (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004).
In my view the September 11 attacks shifted the public’s and emergency
management’s focus from an all-hazards approach to one that was biased
toward homeland security and counterterrorism. The emergency
management community raised the concern over the short-sightedness in
this shift in emphasis. Then, the impact of Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm
Sandy, and the other storms of the period reminded everyone that
emergency management and response demands a broad base of
preparedness found in an all-hazards approach. Now the COVID-19
pandemic is driving a whole new dynamic as fast-moving contagion which
has shuttered business has impacted entire countries’ economies. Operations
centers are not immune to the exclusion of staff due to quarantine
procedures. While this certainly impacts the near-term utilization of existing
facilities, I believe that in the longer term interim social distancing measures
will fall away, and there will be a return to intended occupancy levels.
Existing and new facilities, having incorporated a preponderance of the
interim measures related to procedure and facilities provisioning, the basics
in planning will remain the same until practical virtualization is perfected.
Thus the following actions apply with modification.
This transitional awareness helps drive a new mindset among community
leaders that EOCs and their operations centers should ensure government
survivability and facilitate continuity of operations for the private sector by
quickly returning to normalcy. It is my belief that leaders should recognize
that this is even more important now that globalization and
interdependency are no longer academic concepts but a reality. The linkage
between suppliers, manufacturers, producers, and consumers is one of the
key threads that bind a nation together. Having a robust economic base has
come to represent a key component of a country’s strength. I believe that
COVID’s currently sustained impact on our society will place pressure on
governments to craft a plan to help us as a society return to normalcy even if
it is a new normal. As a result, the EOC and its operations room play a
pivotal role in managing a crisis in its peaks and troughs. The EOC has
become a sophisticated communications hub to fulfill its mission during the
cycle of mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery rather than just a
command-and-control center during a crisis.
Today’s Focus
Regardless of the scale of an emergency, the success of a coordinated
response almost always depends on several key factors:
1. Redundant and interoperable communications systems, which are

balanced vertically and horizontally
2. Comprehensive ability to quickly determine and coordinate asset
utilization
3. Organizational flexibility to accommodate a variety of responding
entities, which are driven by event type
4. In-depth situational awareness
5. Access to all supporting resources to formulate alternative response
scenarios.
One must also recognize that because of the speed at which events can
unfold and the need to engage a myriad of supporting players, a well-crafted
plan should be in place. To be effective, it should target the most likely types
of events for the locale and be tuned due to multiagency exercises to be fully
effective. The plan—the tools—are the baseline of preparedness, for as we
have often seen, events never follow the script, and scenario adaptation will
be necessary.
Another reality that our political establishment can sometimes forget is
that all disasters are local. Even during a widening crisis, organizational
effectiveness starts with the local responders and then gradually draws upon
the next level of support. Having said this, we have all seen situations where
the local entity failed to quickly recognize that events were spiraling beyond
their capabilities and were unable to request support fast enough. This is
where the value of the EOC’s operations room is leveraged. For a while, the
incident command focuses on the ground’s primary issues, focusing on the
ground’s immediate problems. The EOC professionals with a theater-wide
view can implement and guide a strategic response measured by the needs
coming from the field.
Additionally, we must further recognize that staffing realities dictate that
no matter the jurisdiction’s size, support during an event’s initial stages will
come from a 24/7 watch component. This on-duty team acts as the tripwire
providing the vital linkages in the response chain. They will do so until the
facility reaches full staffing wherein interface with each supporting agency’s
organization will be handled by their responding entity. Therefore, this
watch staff will need to have all the skills and tools to capably manage the
initial response until the appropriate representatives of the activated
agencies are dispatched to the EOC to provide real-time coordination within
their respective infrastructure.
Can Organizational Structure Impact Room Design?
The short answer to this question is a definite yes. Our experience has
shown that the responsible agency’s management structure most definitely
influences the OPS room layout. Predictably, it will tilt either toward a C2
(command and control) or to a C4 (which I prefer to refer to as
communicate, collaborate, coordinate, and, to a more limited degree,
control) setup. The determining factor is often dependent on whether the
agency has a public safety or emergency management heritage. There is a
clear chain of command in public safety environments as in the military. The
room layout will focus its attention on either a common information display
wall or command structure. Those agencies from an emergency management
lineage will tend to tilt toward a collaborative or clustered environment. In
many jurisdictions, hybrid models have begun to be implemented.
Regardless of the layout, the reality is that a fundamental shift has
occurred. The modern EOC’s success will be dependent on its ability to
foster the coordination and disseminating of information to the appropriate
consumers. These activities will be coordinated through the event managers
and the emergency support function (ESF) personnel in the operations room.
And even as advancements in technology lend credibility to the notion that
the future will be in creating a virtual EOC, recent events continue to
suggest that while virtual video conferencing will bridge the impacts of
lockdowns, face-to-face collaboration is a more efficient and effective form
of problem-solving. This reality, I believe, extends to all levels of
government.
Design’s Role in Supporting the Evolving Mission

One must keep in mind that developing a comprehensive design for an EOC
and its operations room must consider a wide range of considerations that
will affect internal and external features. These items encompass issues such
as responder accessibility, hazard zone proximity, availability of redundant
services, and maintenance of secure operations, leveraging natural
hardening through siting to physical hardening of both structures and
systems. All of these factors and others must be considered when developing
the facility’s design criteria and programmatic requirements. The degree to
which a facility is hardened is primarily influenced by the risk analysis
generated from the threat and hazard assessment. This discussion will focus
on the various design options for the internal organization of the operations
room of the modern EOC to create a well-conceived and functional center.
Management studies have shown that design does indeed have a
significant impact on workplace effectiveness. Repeatedly, environmental
comfort for the occupants’ physical and psychological needs has been shown
to play a significant role in mitigating the detrimental effects of high stress,
which accompany crisis situations. Of the many factors that form the basis
of an integrated design, the following are a few key components:
Ergonomics
– Console design
– Visual display design
– Seating comfort
– Technology integration
– Adaptability to a diversity of user body types
Environmental comfort
– Variable glare-free lighting control

– Acoustical control
– Thermal comfort and control
Space allocation
– Operator positions
– Supporting services
– Breakout areas
– Policy room
– Strategic response planning
– Quiet rooms
– Resource management
– Extended stay accommodation
– Self-sufficiency
– Social distancing provisions
Circulation and access control
– Structured intake and health monitoring

– Hierarchical circulation system
– Electronics used to augment physical security design
– Layout supports workflow
Relationship to support spaces
– Ease of accessibility
– Ability to be serviced while in operation
Sustainable utility systems
– Redundant services
– Diverse routing
– Resupply capability
– Flexible cable management system
By adequately considering these and other requirements, the workplace

environment designers will significantly impact the operational
effectiveness, thus shaping the quality of an entity’s response. When
implemented properly, these features and concepts will become transparent
to the user as they will not be a source of discomfort. This will improve
performance dramatically as fatigue and frustration play a prominent role in
degrading operational effectiveness.
The impact of design becomes even more apparent as the scale of an event
escalates as these challenges become more complicated due to the effects of
their potential consequences. Time and time again, we read of the failings of
response efforts, such as with Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Haiti,
and the hurricane in Puerto Rico when events of a catastrophic nature can
overwhelm the system. Logistical entanglements, lack of communication, or
conflicting requests produce chaos and unacceptable results. Whether
physical or virtual, facilities without a well-coordinated plan and effective
communications and logistical support will not produce the needed result.
Fundamentals
Each jurisdiction needs to have a solution tailored to its needs. The following
narrative and accompanying diagrams illustrate several of the fundamental
ways in which the focal point of an EOC, the operations room, can be
configured to optimize a jurisdiction’s response’s effectiveness. As the reader
reviews the concepts, it is crucial to keep in mind that operation efficiency
improves when the functional space is purposefully built yet affords the
flexibility to adjust to refine the process. At times this may seem to be an
unreachable goal, but it is achievable. This discussion deals primarily with
the space and big-picture issues of technology integration and not its
deployment nor optimal position assignment for the responding entities.
Additionally, each of the plans presented can support the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), some better than others.
One should also remember that many of these requirements, including
situational awareness, asset control, and collaborative problem-solving, are
scalable to all jurisdictional levels. Further, the need for this capability and
attendant sophistication increases as the jurisdictional landscape and
physical area encompassed growth due to increased political complexity.
Regardless of the many variations of layout currently in use, the operations
room’s design can be characterized by six basic configurations, each of
which can be applied to all response levels. For the purposes of this analysis,
we will describe them as follows:
Traditional multipurpose
Cubicle cluster
Horseshoe
Stadium/theater
Collaboration pods, theater-style
Iris.
Virtual centers will utilize similar organizational structures for the
network control center.
Although they may be referred to by other names, these are the basic
configurations for today’s modern operations room. As previously
mentioned, the preference of one design form over another is often
influenced by the branch of government in which the agency finds itself.
This, in turn, affects the management style of the leadership and whether the
organization’s roots are from public safety, which favors a C2 Command and
Control arrangement, or from emergency management, which tilts toward
what I call a C4 Command, Control, Communicate, and Collaborate. Of
course, this doesn’t mean that you can’t have a collaborative environment
with a central focus context.
The operations room’s internal arrangement design is a well-thought-out
concept of the supporting spaces for functions such as policy-making,
strategic planning, breakout rooms, quiet rooms, sleeping areas, equipment
rooms, locker rooms, and break rooms must be implemented. These
interrelationships play a significant role in establishing an effective center
and greatly influences the center’s success during periods of activation.
Review of Layouts
Multipurpose
The multipurpose layout was traditionally used in smaller jurisdictions
where dedicated space for response activities was not available. This
template featured a simple room with a flat floor, which could serve a
multiplicity of uses from conference space to community meetings (see
Image A1.4). Because of its multipurpose nature, conversion to a full-fledged
OPS room/EOC required setup time for furniture configuration, technology
deployment, communications installation, and so forth.
Positives
1. Multipurpose
2. Flexible configuration.
Negatives
1. Time required for physical setup

2. Technology deployment can be challenging; use of floor boxes can
reduce set up time
3. Need storage space to store supporting equipment
4. Challenges in lighting control when layout changes
5. With flexibility comes lack of focus
6. Acoustics generally are substandard.
Cluster/Pod
Positives
1. Allows for reconfiguration to enhance collaboration of responding

entities
2. Allows for reassignment of cubes to entities having a higher level of
interaction
3. Demands uniformity of technology to be conveniently flexible
4. Allows adoption of a hoteling concept with user logins to redefine
occupant
5. Can adjust to variable numbers of related responder personnel.
Negatives
1. Does not provide a central focus for the disseminated or displayed

information
2. On-the-fly reconfiguration is not as simple as it would seem and,
therefore, not typically done until after an event, on lessons learned
basis before the next event
Image A1.4 Traditional Multipurpose
Source: Image and Copyright Staikos Associates Architects 2010, Used with
Permission
3. Reconfiguration based upon specific event experience may not apply to

a different type of activation
4. Use of cube positions even with seated height walls are more
challenging to reorient than simple desking
5. Conflict between dedicated services and storage capability versus
flexibility.
Image A1.5 shows a cluster/pod example.
Horseshoe
The development of the horseshoe layout allows the participants to view
commonly displayed information yet maintain eye contact with their fellow
responders (see Image A1.6). This arrangement is typically geared to a
smaller room so that some direct conversation can occur across the room.
When arranged on a stepped floor, supporting associates of the principals
seated at the primary table can be positioned in close proximity.
Positives
1. In a smaller room environment, eye and voice contact can be

maintained so that each speaker can follow the body language of the
other principal
Image A1.5 Cluster/Pod Example
Permission
2. Opportunity for tiered or level OPS floor

3. Opportunity for centrally focused display wall
4. Allows for OPS floor breakout area or mini-conference room, close-at-
hand supervision
5. Provides space for supporting staff providing back up to the principals.
Negatives
1. Has a tendency to encourage and generate increase noise levels if
multiple conversations are occurring simultaneously
2. Doesn’t effectively allow for cross-agency collaboration or subgroup
collaboration as it must occur outside the room
3. Shape limits optimal or preferred sightlines
4. Limited number of ESF positions
5. Not ideal for small-group collaboration
6. OPS room becomes longer, narrower as positions increase.
Stadium/Theater
The stadium/theater layout became popular with the advent of space
missions wherein multiple activities could be commonly displayed for use
by many participants. The rooms are generally stepped with tiers of consoles
to allow unobstructed sightlines to displayed information (see Image A1.7).
It fits a command-and-control model influenced by military models.
Image A1.6 Horseshoe

Source: Image and Copyright Staikos Associates Architects
Positives
1. Visual focus of the room allows all participants to share in tangential

information used on an as-needed basis; messaging and pictorial
information displays are easily viewed
2. Minimizes excess noise generation due to people asking what’s going
on
3. Allows attention to be focused on the speaker who may address the
group
4. Incident managers positioned to oversee activity on OPS floor
5. Technology is fully deployed and tested so that startup is almost
immediate
6. Can be effectively used for multipurpose training without
reorganization
7. Adjacent or on OPS floor breakout area or mini-conference room
8. Tiered concept allows for executive management to have overlook but
be off-floor
9. Allows for designed acoustical and light control methods to be in place.
Negatives
1. Dedicated space with limited multipurpose use

Image A1.7 Stadium/Theater Horseshoe
Permission
2. Although positions can be reassigned quickly, it does not readily lend

itself to podlike clustering or grouping of responding agencies
3. Display size must increase with the overall depth of the room
4. Requires buffer area at the front of the room to maintain optimum
viewing angles
5. Room proportions dictated by display characteristics
6. Large group collaboration must occur in break rooms.
Collaboration Pods/Theater Variation

The pods/theater layout allows for the establishment clustering of ESF
functions while at the same time providing common focus to the displayed
information. Configuration establishes subgroup principals allowing direct
voice and visual interaction of the principals while still at their positions,
allowing assimilation of ongoing event data (see Image A1.8).
Positives
1. Subgrouping or ESF clusters work well for 7–11 participants as

speaking levels can be held in check
Image A1.8 Collaborative
Permission
2. Provides all participants with the front of the room focus to view
displayed information
3. Stepped configuration allows for clear sightlines
4. Subgroup principals have direct eye contact with team members and
information displays
5. Room for on-the-floor huddles between ESF subgroups
6. Breakout rooms can be located on either side as in theater/stadium
layout.
Negatives
1. Viewing angles are compromised for a portion of the group

2. Doesn’t easily lend itself to changing ESF populations without
migrating across POD structure
3. As depth of room increases, display surfaces need to enlarge, affecting
optimal sightlines for those closer to display.
Iris Example
The iris layout is patterned after a non-hierarchical structure where there is
no self-evident position of room leadership (see Image A1.9). This deference
to equality can be seen in the UN Security Council layout.
Image A1.9 Iris
Source: Image and Copyright Staikos Associates Architects 2010, Used with Permission
Positives
1. Inward focus, not hierarchical

2. Acceptable sightlines but for a limited number of participants
3. Breakout clusters/teaming outside OPS room.
Negatives
1. Poor sightline angles due to needing to place display walls at an

elevated height
2. Limited single-point overview/observation opportunities caused by
multi-display walls
3. Single level/flat OPS floor degrading sightlines
4. Less flexibility for routine (non-activation time) activities.
Summary
Can Virtualization and Virtual Reality Replace the Need to

Gather Responders?
Yes, these soft solutions will advance out of necessity in light of a fast-
spreading disease compressed timelines and costs associated with new
facility development. The explosion of teleconferencing for routine business
meetings and education during the current COVID experience is testimony
to this. Keeping abreast of newly developed technologies response to
implement robust security controls will be especially critical.
These interim virtualization measures, such as cloud-based programs and
hybrid virtual reality, can be applied directly to the existing infrastructure
and makes good sense. Teams can quickly develop a decentralized virtual
network. As the COVID-19 experience has shown through technology
advances, it is anticipated that the development of apps will continue to
advance the capabilities of all forms of communications devices. Wearables
will monitor responders’ vital statistics; record results upload data in real
time to maintain constant surveillance. It is expected that instant blood tests,
much in the way that glucose levels testing is self-administered, will be an
important benchmark in gaining admittance to a facility. It is even
conceivable that with enhanced connectivity, they will document and
upload these results and facilitate recording surveillance responses to
questions before the responder even shows up to the facility, thus keeping
medically borderline respondents from spreading disease. With this real-
time biometric monitoring, it is imaginable that this information could even
be integrated into the access control system to reinforce and manage access
control.
Normal development of a greenfield bricks-and-mortar facility from
planning, budgeting, bidding, building, and technology fit-out has ranged
from two to three years. Depending upon the envisioned operational style of
the jurisdiction, these new facilities can reflect the more traditional models
outlined in sections of this chapter, or they may become hybrids choosing to
forgo large-format situational awareness displays opting to bring the
theater-wide display to the position utilizing 60–80” monitors at high
resolutions allowing multiple displays to be on screen simultaneously. Due
to the space allocation requirement of these displays, static social distancing
spacing will be built in. Room capacity will be reduced and will most likely
accommodate flat-floor environments, as maintaining sightlines to a room-
sized video wall will be difficult unless the positions are on exaggerated
theater steps. The visual appeal to a large-scale video wall will probably be
incorporated, but the real work is done at the desktop.
Opinion: What Does the Future Hold?

An entirely virtual EOC where everyone works from home or their office is
not envisioned as jurisdictions will always need permanent quarters to
engage in ongoing event response preparation. They perform their regular
duties of response planning, development of mitigation strategies, training,
etc. Dedicated space to accommodate full-blown surge during an event can
be minimized as only the core team would need to be adapted. These mini-
operations rooms will have the full-blown capability with redundancies,
such as backup power, water storage, multiple communications modes, etc.
Eventually, as communication bandwidths increase and algorithms are
further developed to accommodate higher and higher video loads with
decreasing bandwidth efficiently. I anticipate that the utilization of a higher
level of virtual response will be enabled. While the benefits of traditional
face-to-face interaction will be compromised, it will allow responders to
carry on their duties. Over time, I believe that just as has been demonstrated
by concerns raised by students in higher education that online instruction is
not a substitute for the face–to-face interaction of campus experience, the
same will happen within the ranks of Emergency Management.
Last Words
As the reader well understands, today’s emergency operations center’s
design is a complex problem requiring functional understanding
requirements, operational methodologies, and systems technologies.
Regardless of the direction taken, it is a workplace that must be adaptable to
meet ever-changing systems, management styles, and mission objectives.
This can be accomplished through a concerted team-planning effort by fully
engaging the emergency manager, architectural and engineering design
professional, and facilities management team to produce a flexible, reliable,
and maintainable complex. When this collaboration is implemented at the
outset with a broad-based needs assessment, programming, team-oriented
design, and continuing through to live performance evaluation, one can be
assured that everyone’s voice has been heard. Additionally, if a compromise
is dictated, the opportunity for buy-in is facilitated as all will be aware of
the constraints, which will enable acceptance and produce a successful
result.
References
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ANSI (2019). ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standards 90.1–2019. The American
Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers.
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airborne transmission, October 5. Retrieved from:
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cov-2.html
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September 10. Retrieved from: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/if-you-are-sick/quarantine.html
FBI (2021). Malicious cyber activity threatens the public’s safety and our
national and economic security. Retrieved from:
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Stansberry, Matt (2014). Explaining the uptime’s tier classifications system.
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classification-system/
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https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/coronavirus-covid-19-and-medical-
devices/uv-lights-and-lamps-ultraviolet-c-radiation-disinfection-and-
coronavirus
Appendix 2 Vulnerability Assessment
Greg Benson and Alexander Feil
A certain level of risk and vulnerability is associated with all structures and
events. Harm to occupants, the structure, or business systems may result
from natural or human-caused events resulting from intentional and
accidental actions. The desirability of a facility, associated assets, or event is
a primary consideration of criminal and terrorist actors. Insider threats
should also be considered in the risk and vulnerability process. Assessing
vulnerability to reduce the attractiveness and increase hardening may
reduce the threat levels while increasing resiliency. Emergency service
leaders are responsible for assessing facilities and events to limit and
manage risk levels through a dynamic process of vulnerability assessments.
Risk management is designed to mitigate vulnerabilities from threats and
reduce consequences. The level of protection or security posture is dictated
by a combination of physical, organizational, and cultural support of
security and safety needs. Threat intelligence will assist in identifying both
vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor may leverage as well as mitigation
opportunities to reduce risk levels.
Vulnerabilities are any weakness that can be exploited, making assets
susceptible to damage or disruption. Development of mitigation strategies is
intended to reduce vulnerability to one or more threats from natural or
human-caused actions. To be successful, mitigation efforts need to align the
physical and procedural aspects of a structure or event. Conducting a
vulnerability assessment and not engaging staff in the results or training for
mitigation and response actions is often referred to as assessment theater.
Aligning policy, procedures, training, and operations is essential in
successful mitigation efforts. Organizational leadership’s overt prioritization
of safety and security is essential to build a culture in the system. Reducing
risk is a combination of physical changes, procedural actions, and common
sense. Having a fenced, secured facility but having staff leave doors and
gates open and accessible is an example of common sense failure. Recent
history has shown that human beings are often the weakest link within any
given physical or cybersecurity infrastructure. This awareness creates the
need for ensuring that all personnel are trained and feel empowered to take
appropriate action in the event of a threat from external or internal systems.
Conducting a vulnerability assessment requires a systematic and
methodical approach to consider physical, cyber, digital, and organizational
vulnerabilities. The vulnerability assessment process should consider not
only today’s threats but anticipate tomorrow’s as well. The COVID-19
pandemic is an example of short-term memory. Previous pandemics
required operational changes to ensure the health and safety of personnel.
Many of their previous actions and plans have been forgotten, creating an
environment of chaos in recreating plans and taking needed actions.
Assessment of vulnerabilities must include the following systems:
Structural systems
Building envelope
Utility systems (gas, fresh water)
Mechanical systems: heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
and plumbing
Electrical systems
Fire, chemical sensor, and security systems
Communication and information systems (IS)
Maintenance and operations
Each system can be exploited to create single or multiple vulnerabilities

without a strategic view being applied. Interactions in systems to determine
critical components and the effect of damage must also be evaluated. A
multidisciplinary team to review all components from the team member’s
expertise will create a lower vulnerability level through a cohesive
assessment process. Team members can consist of building engineers,
architects, security members, information technology (IT), law enforcement,
fire/EMS, and Emergency Management personnel. A unified team will
define functions, identify critical systems, evaluate interactions, and identify
vulnerabilities. Establishing survivability of people, critical system, and
recording the process are outcomes of the process. Utilizing tools to conduct
assessments and prepare plans is valuable. Tools can be either digital or
paper-based. Digital tools may assist in providing a systematic assessment
framework, commonly recommended mitigation options, references, and the
ease of generating and formatting a professional and actional assessment
report. EasySet is a well-known tool to support a comprehensive assessment
process. Other tools exist and will continue to evolve, making digital tools
valuable resources for assessing and sharing results.
Open Source Intelligence, or OSINT, is a vulnerability that can be
leveraged by bad actors to gain information about the facility, operations,
and people. A plethora of online information, from detailed imagery, social
media profiles, public records, and infrastructure, may help a criminal or
terrorist actor carry out a successful physical or cyber-attack.
Image A2.1 Assessing Access Points
Source: Image Provided by EastSetGo.com

A systematic method to conduct assessments must be established and
followed. It is generally recommended to follow a depth in the
security/safety process from outside to inside. Considerations for evaluation
includes:
Area
Perimeter
Building
Interior
Equipment
Personnel
Policies/procedures
General
New threats.
The following are considerations for vulnerability and is not intended to

be an all-inclusive list.
Area
The area consisting of miles or blocks is a starting point. Vulnerabilities can
be increased due to area hazards such as transportation corridors,
infrastructure, and other facilities. Free online Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) imagery tools are readily available and provide a valuable tool
for identifying and assessing area vulnerabilities from various vantage
points. An area vulnerability assessment can also be conducted using a tool
such as Google Maps, Google Earth, Apple Maps, Bing Maps, Yandex Maps,
etc. All of which provide snapshots at different points of time in some cases
from different angles. Locating your facility and drawing a series of rings
will provide you with a visual of potential vulnerabilities and risks to your
facility with a method to evaluate the potential impact. A chemical
manufacturing plant that is located ¼ mile away can create a collateral
vulnerability. An event at that facility could easily impact your facility’s
operations. Considering topography is also valuable. Being in low areas in
flood-prone zones may cause additional vulnerability. Installing mission-
critical computer equipment below grade in an area subject to flooding is a
special invitation for problems.
Perimeter
Is there a clearly defined perimeter?

What types of perimeter and barrier controls are in place?
What are the site access points to the site or building?
Is there a clear line of sight through any perimeter control devices such
as fencing?
What is the standoff distance from public parking to the facility?
Are there anti-ramming devices installed near building access points?
Does site circulation prevent high-speed approaches by vehicles?
Is there offsetting of building entrances to vehicle paths to force a
reduction of speed?
Does landscaping provide any areas for concealment?
Are all exterior areas adequately lighted?
Do loading docks contain access controls?
Are flammable/combustibles such as dumpsters or products stored near
the facility?
Are fuel tanks stored on the property, and what is access availability?
Is any utility infrastructure such as electrical transformers, water
mains, etc., located above grade in the parking area?
Does interior configuration allow people to see entry points, parking,
and any streets from a distance?
Do the site and architectural designs incorporate strategies from a
crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) perspective?
Are public and private access points separated?
Are there trash receptacles and mailboxes in close proximity to the
building?
Are parking spots for the CEO, mayor, etc., marked as such?
Are all access points and critical areas covered by lights and cameras?
Building
What is the construction of the building?

Is access control provided through main entrance points for employees
and visitors?
Is access to private and public space clearly defined through the design
of the space, signage, use of electronic security devices, etc.?
Is access to elevators distinguished as to those that are designated only
for employees and visitors?
Do foyers have reinforced concrete walls and offset interior and
exterior doors from each other?
Do circulation routes have unobstructed views of people approaching
controlled access points?
Where are utility points of access located?
Is incoming water located in a secured location?
Image A2.2 Identifed Vulnerabilities in Perimeter Control
What is the source of water for fire suppression systems?

Is the fire suppression system adequate, code-compliant, and protected
(secure location)?
Do fire suppression water pumps have redundant power systems?
Where are fire hydrants and water supply connections for
sprinkler/standpipe connections located?
Do all exterior doors have an intrusion system installed?
Where is the regular source of electrical service location for the site or
building?
Are there redundant power supply systems?
Are electric power supply, telephone, and data communications access
points secured?
By what method is an alarm signal sent?
Where are air intake and exhaust areas located and secured?
How is roof access controlled?
Interior Configuration
Are critical assets (people, activities, building systems, and

components) located close to any main entrance, vehicle circulation,
parking, maintenance area, loading dock, or interior parking?
Are high-value or critical assets located in the building’s interior and
separated from the building’s public areas?
Is visitor track routed away from critical assets?
Are assets located behind access-controlled doors?
Are utility areas located away from visitor areas and controlled?
Does the mailroom examine/screen incoming packages?
Are hardened areas of refuge identified along with exit routes from the
facility?
Equipment
Are air intakes monitored or have sensors for chemical or biological
agents?
Are air intakes and exhausts closed when not operational?
Are air systems zoned?
Is the air supply to critical areas compartmentalized?
Do air handling systems support plans for sheltering in place or other
protective approaches?
Are any smoke evacuation systems installed?
How is fresh water distributed?
How is domestic water heated?
How is natural gas distributed?
How is the distribution system protected?
Is there redundancy to the main piping distribution systems?
Are electrical transformers or switchgears located outside the building
or accessible from the building exterior?
How are transformers and switchgears secured?
How are the electrical rooms secured?
Is the building fire alarm system centralized or localized?
Is the alarm monitored off-site or locally?
Are critical documents and control systems located in a secure
location?
Where is the main telephone distribution room, and where is it in
relation to higher-risk areas?
Is the main telephone distribution room secure?
Is an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) installed on the telephone
system?
Has the UPS been operationally tested for the duration under load?
How often is the UPS tested?
Are there redundant communications systems available?
Where are the main telephone and IT components located, and are they
secure?
Where is the backup tape/file storage located?
Does the mass notification system reach all building occupants?
Do control centers and their designated alternate locations have
equivalent or reduced capability for voice, data, mass notification, etc.?
(emergency operations, security, fire alarms, building automation)
Do the alternate locations also have access to backup systems,
including emergency power?
Where is the disaster recovery/ mirroring site?
Is there an adequate O&M program, including training of facilities
management staff?
What type of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras are used in the
interior and exterior?
Are they monitored off-/on-site and recorded 24/7/365?
Are they analog or digital?
Are CCTV fixed, wireless, or are pan-tilt-zoom cameras used?
What is the age of the CCTV cameras in use?
Are the cameras programmed to respond automatically to perimeter
building alarm events?
Do they have built-in video motion capabilities?
Are panic/duress alarm buttons or sensors used, where are they located,
and are they hardwired or portable?
Are intercom call boxes used in parking areas or along the building
perimeter?
What type of camera housings are used, and are they designed to
protect against exposure or tampering?
What access control system equipment is used?
Image A2.2 Vegetation, Limiting the View from CCTV Cameras
Is there a capital replacement program funded for maintenance service

costs and routine replacements?
Are panic/duress alarm sensors used?
Are magnetometers (metal detectors) and x-ray equipment used?
Are physical and security computer systems integrated with security
computer networks (e.g., in place of or in combination with user ID and
system passwords)?
What is the backup power supply source for the access control systems?
(battery, uninterruptible power supply)
What type of interior intrusion detection system (IDS) sensors is used?
Are mechanical, electrical, gas, power supply, radiological material
storage, voice/data telecommunication system nodes, security system
panels, elevator and critical system panels, and other sensitive rooms
continuously locked, under electronic security, CCTV camera, and
intrusion alarm systems surveillance?
What security controls/sensors are in place to handle the processing of
mail and protect against potential biological, explosive, or other
threatening exposures?
Is access to the security room in a secure area with limited, controlled,
and restricted access controls in place?
Is a log maintained on problems experienced with these and other
electronic security systems?
Is there a computerized security incident reporting system used to
prepare reports and track security incident trends and patterns?
Who reviews security incidents, and how are follow-up actions
reported?
Personnel
What is the onboarding process?
Is a comprehensive background check required?
What type of system exists to identify employees and visitors?
Are new staff trained in security/safety policies and procedures?
How often are all staff collectively trained and involved in exercises?
What is the disciplinary/termination process?
Is training on first aid, CPR, and stop the bleed provided to all staff?
Are people trained in cybersecurity?
How often are exercises and drills conducted?
Do leaders/managers/supervisors have a go-bag to support business
continuity?
Are staff empowered to report suspicious actions from fellow
employees?
Policies/Procedures
Does a written security plan exist for this site or building?

What frequency is the security plan revised?
Who is responsible for preparing and reviewing the security plan?
Does a policy exist on social media posting of the facility and
operations?
Is access to building information restricted?
Has the security plan been communicated and disseminated to key
management personnel and departments?
Has the security plan been communicated to local public safety
agencies?
Has the security plan been tested and exercised with revision based on
feedback?
Has the security plan been benchmarked or compared against related
organizations and operational entities?
Does the security plan define the mission, vision, and short- and long-
term security program goals and objectives?
Are threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks adequately defined and
security countermeasures addressed and prioritized relevant to their
criticality and probability of occurrence?
Is there a security operating and capital budget to support the plan?
What regulatory or industry guidelines/standards were followed in the
preparation of the security plan?
Does the security plan address existing security conditions from an
administrative, operational, managerial, and technical security systems
perspective?
Does the security plan address the protection of people, property,
assets, and information?
Does the security plan address the following major components: access
control, surveillance, response, building hardening, and protection
against CBR and cybernetwork attacks?
Has the level of risk been identified and communicated in the security
plan through the performance of a physical security assessment?
When was the last security assessment performed?
Vulnerability analysis: does the security plan address other areas in the
area that can be taken advantage of to carry out a threat?
Risk analysis: does the security plan address the findings from the asset,
threat/ hazard, and vulnerability analyses in order to develop,
recommend, and consider the implementation of appropriate security
countermeasures?
Is there a policy for employees to report suspicions of potential threats
from internal sources?
General
Is a periodic review conducted for online open-source information that

has been posted?
Is there a defined process for any employee to forward potential
vulnerability or threat concerns to management?
Is the development of a culture of safety/security a priority?
New Threats
Is there a workgroup to monitor, recommend, and implement new

safety and security policies and protocols based on current events?
Does a workgroup collaborate with public safety, including emergency
management and public health agencies, in planning?
All structures and events possess levels of risk and vulnerabilities.

Intentional or accidental damage resulting from human-caused or natural
events will harm occupants, the facility, and business systems at different
levels. Conducting threat and vulnerability assessments is a proactive means
to reduce risk levels through a systematic process. Resiliency is increased
due to threat and vulnerability assessment, leading to the development and
implementation of programs to enhance safety and security through
employee engagement. Management of risk is addressed through physical,
organizational, and cultural integration to support enhanced safety, security,
and preparedness. The process of assessment should be conducted
continually with cultural support from both leaders and employees.
Appendix 3 A Chief Elected Official’s
View on Emergency Management
Ron Hain
A chief elected law enforcement officer must be able to effectively interact

with the public as well as other members of elected and appointed bodies
(politically aware or astute). Being a newly elected official as the chief law
enforcement officer presents a myriad of challenges. Even when shortly into
a term, I am confronted with severe public safety concerns such as the
Henry Pratt shooting, a pandemic, and rioting over police-involved deaths.
These events thrust extreme stress onto local police chiefs in general, and
onto me as the new sheriff, at a time when I should be getting my sea legs
and building strong bonds with those chiefs for the proper pillars of support.
Knowing that I needed to be there to work alongside them, while respecting
their jurisdictional authority, and being recognized as the top public safety
official by the press and public, placed me in precarious environments with
police, correctional, and media responses. These challenges provide
opportunities to foster collaborative relationships as we collectively meet the
public safety needs of all jurisdictions.
My primary mission was to ensure that the sheriff’s office was on course
with operational planning and proper equipment to protect our staff and
serve the public. Also, that the corrections center was building reformative
programming to reduce recidivism (which directly affects public safety), and
respond to the media, public, and local elected officials with honest and
relevant messaging.
Public safety is often slow to adjust to crime trends and public needs. Lack
of routine training, walled-off administrators, and government procurement
bureaucracy slow the ability for front-line law enforcement to keep ahead of
problematic fires. One of my goals as the chief law enforcement officer is to
ensure a transformation from self interest to the good of the area we serve.
Enacting programs to provide vision, supportive leadership and enhance
communication will provide support to deputies in the field as they conduct
business on a daily basis. It is my commitment to develop a team that is
capable of providing the law enforcement skills needed for protection while
ensuring that the department establishes trust within communities. My
obligation as the sheriff is to seek development of an organizational culture
that is authentic, collaborative and values relationships to meet current
public safety needs while balancing the occupational perception of law
enforcement within communities.
Having the internal control and agility of an elected office holder, a sheriff
can appoint staff to design modern training platforms, can work closely with
all levels of the office, and make expeditious purchases to place staff in the
best position to respond. It is my mission to be acutely aware of all incidents
my deputies respond to and to be in front of our jail leadership to ensure we
are doing all we can safeguard our correctional facility. Being accountable
and transparent when management of incidents does not go according to
expectations or plans is a commitment in my role as chief law enforcement
officer. My staff and I are dedicated to continually learning and improving as
we serve the community.
At the end of the day, all liability of public safety falls at my feet and it is
my sworn duty to accept that burden from the beginning to the end of my
term as sheriff.
Manage Resources
It is crucial to have command-level operators who can execute on
specifically designed missions. In 2019 we enveloped the county’s office of
emergency management under the sheriff’s office. Integrating law
enforcement and emergency management creates a win-win situation for
both agencies and the community. Organizational ties are strengthened with
an increase in information-sharing. The benefits of partnerships include
more efficient use of resources and risk management. Conducting joint
training and exercises enhancing skills and knowledge of all involved,
increase confidence and provides realistic expectations of levels of expertise.
The process of risk management is improved resulting in a higher level of
resilience within the organizations and community. My decision to integrate
law enforcement and emergency management was based on a desire to
demonstrate public value, establish a team and efficiently manage fiscal and
physical resources.
In 1992 it was recommended by the then civil defense director that the
emergency management function be folded under the umbrella of the
sheriff’s office. It proved to be invaluable to have that team under our wing
in 2019 and in the future.
At the time, it was a measure to provide that unit of county government
with additional support and resources, as well as combine emergency
response resources under one office to support public safety operations.
When the pandemic struck the region, the partnership proved crucial to
our response. The sheriff’s office, through Emergency Management, became
the collection and distribution point for all PPE in Kane.
This set a model as we roll into the vaccine acceptance and distribution,
where all facets of the sheriff’s office now work seamlessly together for that
agile and appropriate execution of public safety and health. Meeting future
challenges in my term and those in the future will benefit from the actions
taken to integrate emergency service planning and response capability.
Engage Stakeholders: Public, Private, and Elected/Appointed

One critical role of our office is that of community involvement and
responsiveness. Our mission has been to make sure that we have adequately
responded to the needs of our diverse operational requirements. Our various
county departments and agencies were able to integrate under our
Emergency Operational Plan (that was constantly adjusted) for their own
roles. We also engaged the other public agencies in our region, as well as the
private enterprises that were indeed true partnerships. We built on our
motto of “cooperation in a crisis” will serve all comers.
At times, we had to be cognizant of each agency’s purview, but quickly
learned that we were able to remove many barriers to communication by
having open and honest discussions with as many leaders that we could.
Our role was to help bring all to the collective table. As I indicated earlier,
we had many groups walled off, and we had to build bridges and take down
walls. The collaborative approach that I am committed to is founded on
communication and information sharing among all stakeholders to avoid
gaps that decrease public safety. Developing decision-making competencies
at all levels will provide stakeholders the best outcome in crisis that will
occur. I remain devoted to a community-oriented law enforcement approach
that challenges legacy paradigms to transform the role of law enforcement
to one of partnering with communities to meet shared needs based on
respect and non-judgment.
Provide Leadership in a Crisis as Well as in Education and

Training
In my almost 25 years of serving the public in law enforcement, I have
learned that we must be prepared for any eventuality, and that cooperation
goes a long way. During my tenure as sheriff, I have made sure that our
team gets the best available training and resources for their mission at hand.
Our command staff has been empowered to use their knowledge, skills and
abilities to serve as well. I have worked side-by-side with my command staff
before being elected to this office, and I have faith in our team’s forward-
looking attitude when it comes to serving the public.
Our staff here at Kane County have been offered many unique
partnership training opportunities locally, regionally, and federally. This
helps to build a cohesive unit that can flex and move as needed. We are not
bound by old walls and barriers, but as a team; we move together to serve. A
key element of our leadership process is that of helping to strengthen our
organization from within. We build leaders and empower them to function
without having to “look over their shoulder” at every step of the way. My
job is to give my team the tools to succeed, and we have done just that. We
are always looking ahead to make sure we are prepared for the next event.
Training Is Valuable for Reacting to a Known Incident

During the COVID-19 crisis, we still must maintain our daily services and
operations to the community, while taking on extra roles. We found that by
relying on our past collective experiences, we were able to garner support
and efficiency in the process. One of my cornerstones of my administration
is that of both training and education for our team. Training without the
required education may fall short. I have relied upon my staff here to
provide both. We also use outside trainers that serves as educators and
facilitators for collective success. Our members have decades of valuable
training and education to help us be better at what we do. The public looks
to us to provide support on almost any subject. With our skill set, we are
able to function more efficiently.
Critical Thinking Assists in Decision-Making

Critical thinking requires thinking outside the box, the walls, the silos that
have been built. Critical thinking is not criticism, but it is a unique skill set.
It comes with looking at multiple elements of a situation, and using the best
judgment to help resolve it. There is not always an easy answer, but, we try
to look without filters and bias, to resolve and maintain our community.
Maintain Readiness
Through effective direction, able to provide group development of the threat
and hazards that affect the county and the region, therefore having an
effective process well established to protect the county and the citizens we
serve. We must always remain able to support all of the members with
effective training, education and tools to work their missions.
During this unprecedented time that has engrossed our county, state and
nation with COVID operations we stand ready. Our members have been
involved in response, recovery, and vaccine distribution while maintaining
cohesive operations to our citizens.
Conclusion
We are still writing this chapter in our nation’s history. I am proud of the
flexibility and professionalism of our members. Our ability to stand with our
partner agencies in this unprecedented time is both rewarding and
exhilarating. We learn from each other every day. When Mike asked me to
write this chapter for the textbook (before COVID-19), I never would have
thought that we would be where we are at today. We have used our skills
from working with the H1 rollout years ago to today. We are learning and
moving forward.
I leave you with this:
Trust your training and education

Trust your people
Provide resources to the best of your ability
Be fair, firm and flexible.
As an elected official, you must be visionary, not reactionary.
I am proud to serve.
Ron
Ron Hain, Sheriff, Kane County, Illinois

Afterword
We live in challenging times. The year 2020 has brought about a tsunami of
once-in-a-century simultaneous occurrences: a devastating coronavirus
pandemic, widespread civil unrest, natural disasters of extraordinary
magnitude, and severe economic dislocation. These events have seriously
tested the capabilities of emergency managers in public organizations across
the United States.
Carefully planning for an emergency situation can literally mean the
difference between life and death. The speed with which emergency
managers can operationalize their plans can have an enormous impact on
outcomes. The second edition of Principles of Emergency Management and
Emergency Operation Centers has been organized by Dr Mike Fagel, Dr J.
Howard Murphy, and Professor Rick Mathews to assist EOC managers in
successfully planning for and meeting today’s challenges.
Dr Fagel is one of the nation’s leading experts in emergency planning,
response, and preparedness. Mike has more than five decades of public
service in his career. He has worked in fire service, emergency medical
service, public health, law enforcement, emergency management, and
corporate safety and security. He has been actively assisting with Homeland
Security operations, and has also served in roles with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Justice, the Department of
Defense, and the Department of Energy. He has served in leadership
capacities with the International Association of Emergency Managers
(IAEM), and has authored numerous books and collections on emergency
management, crisis management, and planning.
It has been my privilege to work with Dr Fagel over the past decade. He
and Professor Greg Benson have been sharing their knowledge with our
cadre of students at Illinois Institute of Technology for the last decade. Fagel
has been an outstanding instructor in the Master of Public Administration
program at the Illinois Institute of Technology Stuart School of Business,
teaching a variety of courses to first responders and others in emergency
preparedness, public safety, cybersecurity, and terrorism. I have been
impressed by the depth of knowledge he possesses and the wealth of
firsthand experience he has in these topics. He has always been at the
forefront of emergency preparedness issues.
The new edition of Principles of Emergency Management and Emergency
Operation Centers significantly updates and expands upon the widely
praised first edition by providing essential information on best practices and
cutting-edge techniques and strategies from leading experts in the field for
effective emergency operations center management. It addresses the full
range of issues that emergency managers need to understand to deal with
our rapidly changing world.
It is important to know how current emergency management practices
evolved and how EOC management works today to develop plans that
ultimately will be successful. The book provides that critical context in its
first module, “Introduction and History of Emergency Management,”
discussing the development of federal, state, and local government laws and
policies.
The next two modules, “Facilitation of Effective Emergency Management”
and “Multiagency Coordination,” provide expert, practical guidance on
important practical aspects of emergency operations management. Effective
leadership in this field requires a thorough understanding of how to evaluate
threats and risks in order to design and implement plans to deal with those
challenges. Managers need to know how to work with the media to inform
the public and combat disinformation. They also must understand how to
coordinate emergency management efforts with the complex, often
overlapping mix of public agencies, civil authorities, and volunteer
organizations involved in emergency management in the US.
The final section of the book, “Emergency Management Specialized
Applications,” addresses how to deal with emergency situations that require
specialized responses: terrorist attacks and attacks on higher education
campuses. These events usually involve firearms, may occur with little or no
warning and can lead to a large number of casualties. Due to their
unpredictable nature, planning for these types of events can involve
synchronized and independent teams at multiple locations sequentially or in
close succession.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the need for emergency management
professionals has grown rapidly. Disasters both natural and human-made
disrupt thousands of lives every year and have a major impact on property.
Planning for emergencies and working to mitigate their impact has become
imperative. Consequently, there is a pressing need for emergency
management professionals to be well trained and well prepared for a wide
variety of emergency situations at all levels of government. The second
edition of Principles of Emergency Management and Emergency Operation
Centers provides emergency management professionals with a wealth of
practical knowledge and a contemporary understanding of how an EOC
should operate within the guidance of various federal and national
programs. It is a key resource that every emergency management
professional should own.
Roland Calia, PhD
Associate Dean
Director, Master of Public Administration Program
Stuart School of Business, Illinois Institute of Technology
Chicago, Illinois
Index
Entries in bold refer to tables; entries in italics refer to images.
24/7 watch 205, 506
AARs (after-action reports and reviews) 51–2, 159–60; and COVID-19 pandemic 281–2; effective use of
296; for exercises 166, 174–6; from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 325; responsibility for 162; and
stress mitigation 221–2
access controls 65, 203, 207, 474; in EOC design 494, 496, 500, 503, 507, 516; in vulnerability assessment
522
access points, assessing 520
ACGIH (American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists) 378, 388, 390, 393
acoustical control 206, 503, 507
ACS (Alternate Care Sites) 345
active shooter incidents see shooting attacks
ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) 80–2
adaptability: in EOC operations 58; and leadership 265
ad-hoc contingencies 295
Adjutant General 344
administration, in EOPs 152
administrative control 381, 394, 405
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 80–1
agency-focused format 156
all-hazards approach 26; after 9/11 204, 505; and mission areas 123–4; planning 28, 37, 103, 144–7;
prevention/mitigation 3; to stakeholders 121
American National Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs
36
American Red Cross 95, 147, 353, 440, 445, 477
Annual Campus Security Report 102
ANSI (American National Standards Institute) 36, 378, 384, 398
anthrax 4, 33, 378, 423, 470
AOPs (Advance Operational Plans) 43–4
APF (assigned protection factor) 401, 402
approval page 150
ARABIC 5 290–1
ARABIC 6 292
ARABIC 8 294
Area Command 455
ARF (Action Request Form) 351
asbestos 13, 377, 381, 400
ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers) standards 501
asymmetric warfare 453, 456, 458–60, 462–3, 465, 469
Attractive Nuisance Doctrine 77
authorities and references, in EOPs 153
authority to stop work 373, 396
background checks 65, 368, 525

“bang”, left and right of 305–6
Baptist Street Church bombing of 1963 13
Barcelona terrorist attacks of 2017 458
Bar-On model 263–8, 266, 270–2, 271; scale definitions 273–6
Base Plan 33, 39, 41–2, 44
basic plan 149, 155–7
battle rhythm 284, 285
Beslan School attacks of 2004 456–8, 460–2
biodiversity loss 479
biohazard warning logo 405
biological agents 138, 423, 432–3, 439, 441–3; indicators of possible use 424
Black Lung Benefits Act 84
blast resistance 498
bloodborne pathogens 404–6
body armor 8, 445, 449, 451
body fluids 405–6
body types, of users 206, 507
Boston Marathon bombings 36, 427, 458
Boyd, John 454
break rooms 208, 212, 493, 509, 513
breakout areas/rooms 206, 208, 213, 493–4, 503, 507, 509, 514
breaks, taking 69, 203, 222–3, 226, 228, 229
Bremer, Arthur 471, 476n1
briefing 248
Brussels terrorist attacks of 2016 453, 458
BSI (Base Support Installation) 346
BTRA (Biological Terrorist Risk Assessment) 138
buddy system 388, 395
Building Automation System 502
building emergency action plans 16
building envelope 520
bureaucracies 79, 305, 529
burn-out 224, 235, 238, 244
Bush, George W. 301
Business Continuity programs 15–16, 153
BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) 65
C2 see command and control

C3 (Command, Control, and Communications) 127
C4 (communicate, collaborate, coordinate, control) 506, 509
cable management system, flexible 207, 507
Cabrera, Derek 484
calming 245–6
capabilities-based planning 24, 29, 149, 351, 359
capability: elements of 282; use of term 68
carbon monoxide 379, 381, 386, 400, 403
Carnegie Endowment of International Peace 469
Carter, Jimmy 93
CARVER Assessment Tool 136, 137
caught-in/caught-between hazards 383–4
CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive) 18, 125, 421; and DSCA 339;
preparedness for 49; release area of 433; risk assessment 138; and vulnerability assessments 137; see
also WMDs
CCTAs (Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks) 447–8; as asymmetric warfare 453–4, 458–9;
characteristics of attackers 448–51; emergency responders in 454–6; examples of 459–65; simulated
for training 449; tactical practices in response 451–2; training for 458, 461, 463; TTPs of 452–3, 456–
8
CCTV (closed-circuit television) surveillance 473, 474, 475, 524, 525; in EOC design 496, 498, 503
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention): Emergency Operations Center 314; and infection
control 404–6; and NIOSH 376–7; and public health 313; Strategic National Stockpile 49
CEI (Climate Extremes Index) 479–80
Center for Preparedness and Response 314
CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act) 153
CERFP (CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package) 341
CERT (Community Emergency Response Team) 201, 302, 303, 311, 367–8
CFR (Code of Federal Regulations): 29 CFR 1910.120 395, 397–8(see also HAZWOPER); 29 CFR
1910.134 398–400, 402 (see also respiratory protection); 29 CFR 1910.1030 404, 406 (see also
bloodborne pathogens); applicable to OSHA 377; Title 44 98, 153

chain of command (CoC): in DSCA 50; and meta-leadership 270–1; in NIMS 36, 101
change drivers 60
chemical agents: see hazardous materials, in terrorism; indicators of possible use 423
chemical exposures 390–3
CHIP (Children’s Health Insurance Program) 317
CIKRs (Critical Infrastructure Key Resources) 137–8
CIMS (Critical Infrastructure Modeling and Simulation) 138
circulation system, hierarchical 207, 507
CISD (critical incident stress debriefing) 248, 311
CISM (critical incident stress management) 220, 225, 231, 239, 245, 247–9, 251
Citizen’s Preparedness Corps 49
civil law 74
Civil Rights Act 80–2
civil unrest 7, 13, 168, 218, 305, 387, 533
Clery Act 102–3
climate change 479
climate control 228, 230, 250
Clinton, Bill 21, 341
cloud-based systems 71, 490, 516
Coast Guard see USCG
COG (continuity of government) 39, 47
cognitive competence, general 265, 267, 271, 273
cold stress 388, 390
Cold War 21–2, 204, 493, 504
collaboration, use of term 313
collaboration pods 208, 213, 508, 513, 514
Colombo terrorist attacks of 2019 453, 458
Colvin Clark, Ruth 288
Combatant Commander (CCDR) 339, 341, 344–5, 349
command and control 127, 506; and CCTAs 454; in EOPs 151, 154; and operations room layout 506, 509
command and coordination 99–100
command relationships, examples of 335
command structure, in EOC design 206
common operating picture 50, 286–7, 363, 369
communication: closed-loop 308; components of 306–7
communication nets, universal 128
communication strategy 186
communication types, standardized 101
communications: emergency manager’s role in 189–90, 261; with emergency responders 238–9, 243; in
EOPs 152, 154; integrated 36, 100; redundancy of 497–8
communications and information management 99–101
communications plans 101, 128, 152, 186, 438
communications systems: interoperable 70, 205, 505; and terrorist incidents 436–7
communications wiring 502
community colleges 300
community facilities, critical 128–9
community lifelines 35, 194–6, 195
community management 218
community resilience 30, 60–1, 70, 192, 483
community resources, for emergency responders 242
community response plan 240
community vulnerability plans 16
community-based planning 146
compensatory damages 78
complex attacks 453
concept of operations 151, 434
conferences 202, 303
confined spaces 386–7
connectedness 245–6, 265
connectivity, and meta-leadership 269–72
CONPLAN (Concept of Operations Plan) 33–4, 39, 41
consensus building 263, 493
console design 206, 507
Consumer Credit Protection Act 80, 85
continuity of operations 151, 434, 436; and EOC design 201–2; see also COOP
contract law 78
controls, hierarchy of 381–3, 382, 393, 400
COOP (continuity of operations planning) 16, 36, 39, 47, 97
coordinated attack 453
coping, in leadership 265, 267
coping behaviors 227, 246–7, 310
core capabilities 27, 29–32, 30, 35, 43, 47, 190–1, 192, 194
counterterrorism 204, 420, 505; and CCTAs 456, 463; in PDD-39 25, 341; planning documents on 44; see
also terrorism
courage, in leadership 265, 267
Course of Action (COA) estimates 39
COVID-19 pandemic 3–4; commonly seen information signs 492; consequences of 481; and EOC
design 489, 492, 496, 501, 505, 516; and EOC management 281–2, 285, 287; federal response to 51;
impact on emergency responders 218–19, 227–31, 249–52; military assets during 345; as national
emergency 26; and ORM 138; and OS&H for emergency responders 404, 406; and public health
EOCs 314; Ron Hain on 530–2; and SNS 485; television coverage of 181; and vulnerability
assessment 519
CPG (Comprehensive Preparedness Guide) 34, 41–4, 52
CPG-101 47, 149, 154, 352, 354, 358, 359
CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) 130–2, 131, 140, 522
CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters) 478
credentialing 36, 99, 364–6, 365, 493, 499
crime logs 102
criminal law 74
crisis counseling 317, 442
crisis intervention 226, 247–8
critical incident-related stress 218–19, 223, 226, 233–4, 237–8, 242–3, 248; see also CISM
critical infrastructure 118; aging 68; drones around 88; protection 25, 98, 122; sectors mentioned in
PPD-21 125–6
CRM (Crew Resource Management) 69
cross-cultural relationships 259, 261
crowdsourced information 71
CSAs (Campus Security Authorities) 103
CSG (Counterterrorism Security Group) 34
CSTs (Civil Support Teams) 334, 339, 341–2
CTA Acoustics explosion of 2003 379
cubicle cluster configuration 208–9, 210, 508–10, 511
CVAMP (Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program) 137
cyanide 379, 403
cyberattacks 13, 28, 40, 284, 428, 521, 526
cybersecurity, of EOCs 65
cyberterrorism 20, 145, 420, 427–8
damage assessment, in EOPs 154–5
Danko, Tiåny 483
data analytics 485–6
Davis-Bacon Act 85
DCE (Defense Coordinating Element) 50, 346–7, 348
DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer) 33, 50, 338–9, 344–9, 348
debriefing 232, 248; see also CISD
debris, wind-blown 497
debris removal 97, 339, 363, 369
decision-making: centralized and decentralized 59; as competency 63; in leadership 265, 267
decisiveness, in leadership 265, 267, 272
declarative statements 450–1
decontamination, at terrorist incidents 440, 442
Deepwater Horizon 4, 269, 394–5
Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) 341
defusing intervention 248
delegation of authority 282, 322
deliberate plan alignment 45
demobilization 100, 248, 306, 369
Department of Defense (DOD): and civilian incident management 333–4, 337–8, 343–4; and DSCA
331; Fire and Emergency Services program 340; levels of operation 41; logo 332; Planning Process
41; requests from civil authorities for assistance 335; and terrorism 445
Department of Energy 84, 445, 533
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 18; creation of 23, 33; and DOD 334; and FEMA 37;
guidelines on exercises 159; levels of operation 41; and National Planning Scenarios 24; and
national-level plans 33; and PKEMRA 39; planning process 41; Preparedness Directorate 24; and
presidential directives 26–7; risk calculation formula 137; specific guidance/doctrine 48
Department of Justice (DOJ) 23
Department of Labor (DOL) 82–3, 184; dislocated worker program grants 316
Department of Veteran Affairs 440, 445
Department Operation Center 456
departmental structure 284
determination, in leadership 265
differential diagnosis 476n2
direction and control see command and control
disabilities: accessibility of public information 193; and duty of care 76; legislation on 81–2; workers’
compensation for 79, 84
Disaster Act 1974 93
disaster management 53, 102, 259, 337
Disaster Relief Acts 37, 92, 94
discomfort tolerance, and leadership 265
disorientation 237–8, 423
DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Teams) 325, 328
DMORT (Disaster Mortuary Teams) 326
domain awareness 454–5
Domestic Readiness Group (DRG) 34
Donahue, Amy 281
downtime 135, 226, 230, 250–1
DPDP (Department Plan Development Process) 47
DREAD risk assessment 138, 139
drones 87–9, 381, 419
DSC (Dual Status Commander) 50, 342, 343, 349, 351
DSCA (Defense Support of Civil Authorities) 50, 331, 333–5, 338, 342–4; and COVID-19 345;
emergency support function annex 351–3; homeland defense and homeland security 336;
representatives in 346–7; requests for 349–51

DSCA EXORD (Execution Order) 338, 341, 349
duplication of effort 128
duty of care 76–8
duty status, examples of 335
EAP (employee assistance program) 249

Ebola outbreaks 269, 314, 406
EBSA (Employee Benefits Security Administration) 84
EBT (Evidence-Based Training) 288
economic recovery plans 16
Economy Act 339, 344
education for emergency managers: formal 298, 300–1; online 300–3
EEIs (essential elements of information) 286
EEOICPA (Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act) 84
Einstein, Albert 482
electrical power supply 523–5
electrical systems 10, 502, 520
electrocution 383, 385–6, 399, 403
elimination, in hierarchy of controls 381
EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact) 49, 152, 189, 338–41
EM-DAT (Emergency Events Database) 478–81
emergency functions, in EOPs 149, 154
emergency incident cycle 298, 305–6
emergency management: changing landscape of 18–19; chief elected official’s view on 529–32;
definitions of 313; foundational aspects of 14–16; future of 477–8, 483–6; general principles 144;
levels of attention in critical event 238–9; non-traditional roles 19; principles of 261, 263; as
profession 3; professional development for 297–304, 483; stakeholders in 147; state and federal
support in 333
emergency management cycle 122, 140, 178
emergency management laws 91–3, 104
emergency management leadership: competencies of 261–3; effective 257–61, 269–70; identifying star
performance in 263–8; see also meta-leadership
emergency management phases 120–4, 143–4
emergency management tools 353–4
emergency planning: general principles 143–8; and senior leadership 147; tiers of 46, 148, 149, 358, 359
emergency planning working groups, community-based 58–9
emergency preparedness information 98
emergency responders: accessibility of 206, 506; and emergency managers 3; health and safety of 373–
5, 378, 381, 390, 395; hierarchy of needs 230–3; job-related stress on 218–26, 228–30, 233–4; key
hazards for 383–95; strategic planning for health of 226–7; support for 243–5; taking care of 239–
42; at terrorist incidents 440–1, 443; training for 470
EMF (Expeditionary Medical Facility) 345
EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) 503
Employee Polygraph Protection Act 85
EMS (emergency medical services) 109, 130; CDC guidance for 404; communication with 128;
education on 301–2; in EOCs 201; and mutual aid 340; in PPD-8 257; in public health 323–4; in
regional healthcare coalitions 320; and terrorist incidents 421, 434, 443
EMTALA (Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act) 317
end-of-shift check-ins 243
endurance, in leadership 265, 267
engagement, in leadership 265
engineering controls 381, 400, 405–6
environmental comfort 206, 502, 506–7
environmental crimes 479
EOC (Emergency Operations Centers) 17, 21, 57, 58, 126, 259; activation of 190, 193; assessments and
exercises 161; battle rhythm 284–5; building access design 499–500; building organization 500–1;
building support systems 501–3; and CCTAs 456; and change in communities 60–2, 61; command
and control 151; communications plans 128; communications support systems 503–4; competencies
62–3, 65, 67; corrective actions from AAR 283; and COVID-19 epidemic 281–2; electrical systems in
502; exercises in 168; funding 71–2; hardening 126–8, 498–9; incident complexity analysis 282–4;
insider threats to 65, 66; jurisdictional issues 139–40; lighting systems 503; in Louisiana hurricane
disasters 327–8; mechanical systems in 497, 501–2, 520; and NIMS/ICS 36, 101; OS&H
considerations for 403–4; plumbing and fire Protection 504; podium in 60, 127; and public health
see public health EOCs; reporting process 286–7; risk-based planning in 68; rooms converting into
202; security of 63–5, 64, 498, 503; site selection for 496–7; state-level 337; structures of 284;
technology 59–60, 287; and terrorist attacks 436; UPS systems 502–3; virtualization of 206, 491, 495,
499, 505–6, 515–16; volunteers in 358, 360, 362
EOC activation 58, 289, 323–4, 327, 329
EOC design 214–15; criteria 201–3; developing strategy 199–200; examples of 200; modern 490;
pandemic-ready considerations 489–517; space requirements 203; support for mission 206; team
200–1; see also operations room design
EOC fatigue 69
EOC operations 58–9; complexity 68–9; contemporary challenges 70–1; coordination 67–8;
performance indicators 69, 70; section chief’s desk 59, 127; see also operations room design
EOC training 123, 287–9
EOP (emergency operations plans) 16, 193; annex structure of 154–6; and change 60; and community
146; content and structures 149–57; COOP and COG in 47; development of 112, 143, 157; formats of
155–7; and maximum disaster incidents 352; and public health 320; public information in 190; SLTT
42; and SOPs 148–9; in Stafford Act 97; standardized format for developing 353; state and local 37;
terrorism annex to 18, 419–20, 428–30, 433–4, 436, 440, 443; and volunteers 360
EPA (Equal Pay Act) 80–1,
EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) 110, 408, 444–5
EPLOs (Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers) 345, 347, 348, 353
equipment rooms 203, 208, 509
ergonomics 206, 230, 378, 393, 394, 403–4, 507
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) 84
ERPs (emergency response plan) 218, 395
ESAR-VHP (Emergency Systems for Advanced Registry of Volunteer Healthcare Professionals) 366
ESF-7 154, 366
ESF-8 154, 318–20, 324, 327–8
ESFs (Emergency Support Function) 35, 43; Annexes to FRP 33; Annexes to NRP/NRF 33–4; and
DACA 346; and DSCA 351; and EOC operations room 206; in EOPs 149, 154, 156, 157; and NRF 194;
and planning guidance 42; primary and supporting agencies 353; and public health 318
essential service facilities 129
EURACOM (European Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning Methodologies) 138
evacuation: and DSCA 339; in hazardous materials release 324, 379; in public health response 324–5;
and resource locations 129; at terrorist incidents 426, 439
evacuation planning 13–14, 16, 39, 97, 103, 146
evaluations: of exercises 173–4; incidents to consider for 124, 125; use of term 160
event complexity 491
exercise delivery team 168
exercise documentation 171
exercise evaluation 166, 296
exercise injects 161, 163, 165, 168–70, 292–4
exercise noise 165
exercise scope 166
exercise timelines 167
exercises 159–60; conduct or delivery 171–2, 173; contractors for 173; development considerations 162–
5; for EOCs 289–95; expectations and assumptions 164; professional development through 304;
purpose and use of 160–1; purposes and parameters 165–6; scenarios 166–70; types of 162–3;
virtual 295; see also TTX
ExPAs (Expected Player Actions) 294
experience: applying 265, 267; shared 311
explosives, conventional 425
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) 87–9

Facebook 177, 187
facility support 203
Fagel, Michael J. 410–11, 533; at Ground Zero on 9/11 407–12
failure, in exercises 170, 173
failure risk 68, 304
faith-based organizations 147, 201, 366–7
fake news 177, 178, 291
fall protection equipment 383
Fallout Protection Guidebook 22
falls 383
families, of emergency responders 225, 231–2, 238–42, 395
Family and Medical Leave Act 82, 85
family crisis intervention 248
family emergency plan 240–1
fatigue 207, 244, 312, 390, 393–4
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation): and counter-terrorism 25; and planning guidance 44; and
terrorism 430–1, 436–8, 445; and WMD incidents 49
FCO (Federal Coordinating Officer) 33, 37, 95, 337, 344–6
FDNY (Fire Department New York) 14, 35, 407, 413
federal agencies 57; in legislation 92, 95, 97; in national-level plans 33; in planning guidance 37, 39; in
presidential directives 29; roles and responsibilities of 132
federal assistance: and DSCA 331, 338; and FRP 32; legislation on 92, 97; representatives in 346–7; and
terrorist attacks 434–5, 445–6
Federal Aviation Administration 87, 376
Federal Civil Defense Act 1950 37
Federal Disaster Relief Acts 91–2
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act 84
Federal Strategic Plan 41
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency): after Hurricane Katrina 37–9, 50; “Best Practice
Stories” web page 104; definition of emergency management 313; and DHS 18; Emergency
Management Cycle 140; and EOP format 155; Independent Study 301–2; logo 15, 93; and national-
level plans 32–3; and NIMS 36; origins of 15, 22–4, 93; phases of emergency management 120; and
planning guidance 43–4; and Presidential Directives 25; Regional Plans 42; specific
guidance/doctrine 48; in Stafford Act 95; Strategic Plan 485–6; and systems thinking 484; and
terrorism 434, 436, 445
FEMA Lifeline constructs 286
FEMA Risk Management Series 50
financial records policies 152
FIOPs (Federal Interagency Operational Plans) 29, 44, 46
FIRESCOPE (Fire Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergency) 35–6
flexibility, and leadership 265, 267, 270
floodwaters 393
flooding 5–7, 125, 130, 145, 324
Floyd, George 7
FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) 80, 83, 364
focus four hazards 383–6
food security 65
food services 367, 369, 494
form following function 202, 494–5, 499
FPDP (Federal Plan Development Process) 43, 47, 52
FRERP (Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan) 33, 153
frostbite 390, 399
FRP (Federal Response Plan) 23; and EOPs 37; and PDD-39 25; see also NRP
Fukushima earthquake of 2016 481
Functional Planning Guide 43
function-based planning 149
Garvey, W. Timothy 478

General Duty Clause 86, 378, 387, 393, 405–6
generators, portable 386, 399, 403, 491
GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence) 120
GINA (Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act) 80, 82
GIS (Geographic Information Systems) 49, 61, 521
Greenberg, Jeremy 286
grenades 8, 420, 449, 450, 459, 461–2, 464
ground truth data 292
Ground Zero 163, 292, 294, 407–11, 409–10, 477
group cohesion 232
group splitting 362
H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009 269, 314, 406

Haiti, earthquakes in 207, 508
Handley, Richard 268
hard hats 408
hazard analysis 37, 144, 155, 157
hazard assessment 166, 206, 398, 506
hazard mitigation 3, 16, 93, 97, 145, 258
hazard zone proximity 206, 506
hazardous materials 35; community lifelines for stabilization 194; courses on 301; DOD responses to
340; exercises about 323–4; and heat-related injuries 388; OSHA on 390, 393, 395; planning team
and 109–10; release of 146; responders to 397, 440; in terrorism 421–3, 439–40, 444–5, 452; see also
HAZWOPER
hazards, types of 145
hazards-based planning 149
hazard-specific annexes 156
hazard-specific plans 16, 97, 149, 443
hazmat see hazardous materials
HAZWOPER (Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response) 395–8; responder levels 396
healthcare, emergency preparedness for 58, 103–4
healthcare coalitions: activities 322; authority of 322–3; components of 320, 321, 325–6; response
objectives 320
healthcare professionals, credentialing 365
heat stress 388, 396, 399
heatstroke 388, 399
HEPA filtration 403, 494
Hepatitis B 405
HHS (Department for Health and Human Services): authority held by Secretary of 315–18; Operations
Centre 314; and terrorist incidents 440, 445
high school students, interested in emergency management 300
higher education, security laws for 102–3
high-impact incidents 257
high-visibility clothing 384
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) 84, 318
historical data 134, 146, 481
HIV 233, 404–5
homeland defense 331–2, 334, 336
homeland security: and DSCA 336; vulnerabilities 118–19; see also Department of Homeland Security
hope, instilling 246
horizontal standards 377
horseshoe configuration 208, 210, 211, 508, 510–11, 512
Hospital Preparedness Program 49
hospitals, and terrorist incidents 429, 432, 436, 444
hostage situations 167, 451–2, 457, 460–2, 464
hot zone 231, 381, 403
hotwash 173–4
HRFs (Homeland Response Forces) 341
HSA (Homeland Security Act) 23, 37, 153
HSC (Homeland Security Council) 24
HSEEP (Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program) 159–60; and documentation 171; on
preparing and developing exercises 153, 162–4; on purpose and scope of exercises 165–6; on
scenarios 166, 169
HSPD (Homeland Security Presidential Directives) 25, 28, 99
HSPD-5 23, 25–6, 39, 41, 99, 301; and NIMS 36
HSPD-7 25, 44
HSPD-8 24–30, 29, 34, 39, 41
HSS (Health Service Support) 345
human dynamics 227
human resources policies, in EOP 152
human space, three functions of 131, 132
human-made disasters 14, 121, 135, 140, 143, 224, 263
HUMINT (Human Intelligence) 120
Hurricane Agnes 92
Hurricane Andrew 4, 340, 477
Hurricane Harvey 6, 334, 437; National Guard rescue mission 334
Hurricane Katrina 4; assessments and revisions after 38; dangers to responders during 393; and DSCA
342; and emergency management planning guidance 36–9; and EOC design 203–4, 505, 508; federal
response to 24; JIT during 367; lessons of 50–1, 281; NRCC for 477; and NRP 34; and OSHA 379;
and public health 324; and public health EOCs 314; USAF rescue mission 333
Hurricane Maria 6, 51
Hurricane Rita 324, 379
Hurricane Sandy 4, 11; DSCA response to 50, 343
Hurricane Wilma 379
HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) 203, 494, 520
hypothermia 390, 399
IAPs (Incident Action Plans) 43–4, 46, 52, 101, 287, 407
IC (incident command) 67; from federal level down 435; and Safety Officer 372–4
ICISF (International Critical Incident Stress Foundation) 247–9
ICP (Incident Command Post) 18, 35; OS&H considerations for 403–4; in terrorist incidents 434, 445
ICS (Incident Command System) 24, 26, 35–6, 334, 469; and CCTAs 455; complexity of 68; and DOD
333; early development timeline 38; and NIMS 99; in response phase 123; and security assessment
469; structure of 188–9, 281–2, 284; and technology 287; and terrorism 434–5; and volunteers 360
ICS-209 form 289
ICS-230CG form 285
ICS-239CG, Incident Complexity Analysis 282, 283
IDLH (immediately dangerous to life or health) atmospheres 396, 400–2
IDMP (Incident Decision-Making Process) 39–41, 40
IEDs (improvised explosive devices) 40, 425, 427, 449, 452, 456, 461–2, 464
IEMS (Integrated Emergency Management System) 35
IES (Illuminating Engineering Society) standards 503
IFG (Individual and Family Grant) 93
IHEs (Institutions of Higher Education) 18–19, 152
images, alt-text for 186
Immigration and Nationality Act 83
Improvement Action Plans 16
improvement plans, for exercises 175
IMTs (Incident Management Teams) 18, 281–3, 287, 407
incident action planning see IAPs
incident annexes 33–4, 46
incident command structure 149, 366
incident complexity analysis 282
incidents, categories of 124–5
incident-specific annexes 156
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004 477, 481
industry-specific laws 102
infectious diseases 404, 423; see also COVID-19
Infectious Diseases Rapid Response Reserve Fund 315–16
influences, downward and upward 372–3
influenza pandemics 269, 405, 483
information: disconnecting from 311–12; emergency public 438–9; obsolete 472; online open-source
526; physical place for reference of 239, 243; proprietary 175, 442; and sense of safety 245; see also
public information
information collection, in EOPs 152, 155–7
information display wall 206, 210, 506, 511
infrastructure attacks 428; see also critical infrastructure
INRP (Initial National Response Plan) 33
insider threats 65, 124, 519
Instagram 177, 187
Integrated Preparedness Cycle 160
intelligence 455; and threat and vulnerability assessment 119–20
intelligence fusion center bulletins 146
intentional torts 75
interaction problems 220, 221
interagency coordination 49, 199, 202, 270, 342
interagency electronic communications 437
interagency liaison 297, 304–5
Interagency Plans 33
interior circulation 494
internal agencies 201
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) 261, 533
interpersonal relationships 226
introduction documents 150
intrusion detection system 525
IPC (interagency planning cell) 349
IPP (Integrated Preparedness Plan), and exercises 165–6
IPS (Integrated Planning System) 28, 39–42
IRA (Immediate Response Authority) 337–40
IRAM2 (Information Risk Assessment Methodology 2) 138
iris configuration 208, 214, 508, 514, 515
ISIS (Islamic State) 10, 421, 429, 439
ISM (Incident Support Model) 282, 284
isolation, for emergency responders 219, 229, 232
ISP (Incident Strategic Plans) 43–4
ITRA (Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment) 138
JCAHO (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations) 103, 444

Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act see Clery Act
JFHQ (Joint Force Headquarters)-State 342, 346
JFLCC (Joint Forces Land Component Commander) 345
JFO (Joint Field Office) 33–4, 37, 51, 346, 349
JIC (Joint Information Center) 62, 101, 188–9; types of 189
JIS (Joint Information System) 101, 187–9, 193
JIT (just-in-time) training 367
JOC (Joint Operations Center) 436
JP (Joint Publication) 3–28334; see also DSCA
JSA (job safety analysis) 398
JTF (joint task force) 341, 349
JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force) 50, 437
jurisdictional boundaries 50, 257, 340, 434, 443
Juzwin, Kammie 220, 249
Keller, Helen 357

Kennedy School of Government 470
labor law 79–85

labor unions 84
ladders 383–5
law enforcement 18, 109; at 9/11 35; formal education for 300–1; in recent US disasters 8–11; and stress
233; use of drones 88
law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 140, 339, 388, 437, 456
laws: clarification of 73, 74; types of 75
LDHH (Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals) 324–5
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) 25, 44, 344–5
leadership: in a crisis 531; in EOC 59–60, 67; in the field 306–8; from the middle 309; pyramid of 310;
word cloud 260
leadership skills 63
leadership styles 208, 221, 254, 306
leadership theories 259, 268–9
leaks, of AARs 175
learning, Bloom’s taxonomy of 174
legal counsel: and criminal law 74; and labor law 79–80; and new technologies 86; selecting 73; tort
law 75–8
LEPCs (Local Emergency Planning Committees) 444–5
LFO (Large Fire Organization) 35
liability guides 367–8
lighting control 206, 208, 507, 509
limited duty rule 76
LLIS (Lessons Learned Information Sharing) 354
LMRDA (Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act) 84
local/tribal emergency responses 333, 337
local/tribal partnerships 193–4, 196
locker rooms 208, 509
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 83–4
Louisiana, during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 324–8
low-technology devices 420, 427
MACCs (Multi-Agency Coordination Centers) 35, 151

MACS (Multiagency Coordination System) 26, 34–6, 54, 100, 320
major disaster declarations see Presidential Major Disaster Declaration
management styles 215, 225–6, 508, 517
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) 385
marijuana 87
MAs (mission assignments) 338, 344, 349; pre-scripted see PSMAs; process leading to 350
MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) 120
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 223–4, 229–30, 249
mass care: after terrorist attacks 440; in EOPs 149, 154; and NGOs 201
mass notification systems 69–70
mass torts 75
mass traumas 225
matching funds 95
maximum disaster incident 352
MCIs (multiple casualty incidents) 324, 448, 453
McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act 85
MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process) 39, 47
meaning, finding 265
media: political bias of 181–2; role of 183–4; and terrorist incidents 438–9; use of term 177; and
volunteers 363; what it wants 184–5
media partnerships 183–4, 187
Medicare 103–5, 276, 317
meeting space 203
mental health professionals 218, 220–3, 227, 230, 239, 249–53
mental health support 217, 219, 220–1, 225–6, 442
messaging, consistent 62, 188
meta-leadership 20, 268–72, 271
Mexico City earthquake of 1985 477, 486
military trauma care teams 316
mission areas 24, 27, 29, 30, 44, 190–1
mission statement 41, 261, 263, 285
mitigation phase 122, 143, 298; public information in 191
mitigation plans 95
MMP3 (Multifactor Measure of Performance) 263–8, 266, 270–2, 271; scale definitions 273–6
MOAs (Memoranda of Agreement) 338–40
mobile internet users 187
modeling, predictive 133
moral injury 222–3, 225, 229
MOUs (Memoranda of Understanding) 152, 338, 340, 442, 445
MRC (Medical Reserve Corps) 315, 367–8
MSDs (musculoskeletal disorders) 381, 393, 403; controls for preventing 394
MSEL (Master Scenario Events List) 163, 165–6, 168–70, 169, 172, 295
MSRAM (Maritime Security Risk Assessment Methodology) 138
MUC (maximum use concentration) 401
multi-agency coordination (MAC) 18, 67, 337, 456; see also MACCs; MACS
multi-hazard incidents 452, 456
Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 453, 456–8, 462–3
Mutual Aid 18, 34–5, 49
Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs) 100; in EOPs 152; and federal response 331, 338, 340; local 193, 337
NAICS (North American Industrial Code System) 377

naphthalene 403
NASCAR (National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing) corporate offices 473
Na-Tech (Natural-Technological) incidents 64
National Emergencies 26, 317, 345, 406
National Guard 251; and COVID-19 345; and emergency management 331, 334, 341–2; employment
rights of those called up from 85; in Hurricane Katrina 37; logo 332; state authority over 333; stress
management and mental health 231–2
National Institute of Mental Health 233
National Integration Center 39
National Intercollegiate Mutual Aid Agreement 152
National Planning Frameworks 28–9, 44, 46
National Planning Scenarios 23, 24, 28–9, 34, 39, 40
National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund 95
National Preparedness Goal 24, 29–32, 31, 190–1; mission areas 121, 121–3; and planning guidance 39,
43
National Preparedness Guidelines 24, 27, 28, 30, 34, 41
National Preparedness System 29, 31, 32
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) 34, 36, 51, 477
National Security Strategy 334
National Strategy for Homeland Security 28, 41
National Terrorism Advisory System 191
National Wildfire Coordinating Group 35
national-level plans 24, 32–5, 34
Native American self-government 337
natural disasters: consequences of 204, 331, 480–2; costs of 92; and debris removal 97; federal response
to 23–4, 443; frequency of 134, 478–9; leadership in response to 257, 260, 263; managing risks of
482–3; and phases of emergency management 121–2; relocation after 442; resp 470; response
preparedness for 469; in United States 5–7
Nazran raid of 2004 453, 457–60, 459, 462
NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center) 34
NDAs (Non-Disclosure Agreements) 162, 168, 175
NDMS (National Disaster Medical System) 49, 315, 325
negligence, law of 75–8
NEMA (National Emergency Management Association) 261, 340
networking 63, 188, 261
New Orleans, during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 326–7
news: inverted pyramid of 179, 180; see also media
newspapers 145–6, 177–80, 183–4, 250; what they want 180, 185
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 261
NFPA Standards 50, 378, 398; 1561 373–4, 403; 1581 404; 1584 388, 403; 1932 384
NGB (National Guard Bureau) 342–3
NGCS (National Guard Civil Support) 334
NGOs (non-government organizations): and EOC design 201; and ICS 189; partner guide for 34;
planning 44–6; preparedness 49; and risk assessments 117, 139; and volunteers 366
NICC (National Infrastructure Coordinating Center) 34
NIMS (National Incident Management System) 23–4, 35–6, 51, 98–101; and CDC 314; course
completion 301; and DOD 333–4; and EOC design 207, 508; and EOC structures 284; in EOPs 151,
153; establishment of 26; and healthcare 103; and healthcare coalitions 320; and IPS 41; and NRF
194; and NRP 33–4; and planning guidance 39, 43; and public health 49; and security assessment
469; and stress management 218
NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) 376–7, 388, 393–4, 401, 403
NIPP (National Infrastructure Protection Plan) 138
NMCC (National Military Command Center) 34, 339
NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 479
NOC (National Operations Center) 34, 39
normalcy, continuum of 225
Northern Illinois University Valentine’s day shooting of 2008 14
notionalizing 167
NPES (National Planning and Execution System) 39, 41, 55
NPPTL (National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory) 377
NPR (National Preparedness Report) 29, 32, 39, 47
NPS (National Planning System) 24, 43–6, 52
NRF (National Response Framework) 33–5, 194, 318, 483; and COVID-19 345; and credentialing 366;
and emergency management planning guidance 41–2; ESF format in 154, 156; local jurisdictions
under 470; OSHA in 378; and public health 49
NRP (National Response Plan) 23, 33; Catastrophic Incident annex and supplement 39; and HSPD-5 26;
and NIMS 36; and NRF 33–4
NSP (National Support Plans) 43
NSSEs (National Special Security Event) 44
nuclear and radiological agents 424–5, 440, 442–3; indicators of possible use 424
nuclear devices, improvised 40, 424–5
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 445
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act 22–3
Obama, Barack 406

occupancy-accounting mechanism 494
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970 83, 375–8
ODP (Office for Domestic Preparedness) 23
ODP Emergency Responder Guidelines 22
OELs (occupational exposure levels) 390, 393, 401, 403

Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 4, 22, 35, 426–7
OLMS (Office of Labor-Management Standards) 84
OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop 454
operational budgeting 71
operational exercises 165, 167, 172
operational paralysis 308–9
operational planning 148
Operational Planning Manual 44, 52
operational space 203
operational thinking 63
Operations Plans (OPLANs) 34, 39–41
operations room design 203–8, 495, 504–9; layouts 207–14, 508–15
operator positions 206, 507
OPIM (other potentially infectious materials) 405
organizational commitment 221
organizational flexibility 205, 505
organizational structure: Command and Coordination in 99–100; and EOC design 201, 205, 208; in
EOPs 151; of ICS 188; and meta-leadership 269
organizational structure dysfunction 473–4
ORM (Operational Risk Management) 138
OS&H (occupational safety and health) 371–2, 374–5, 381, 403–4
OSH Act see Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) 78, 83; applicable standards 377–8; and
catastrophic incidents 378–9, 380; and concealed weapons 86; on confined spaces 386–7; and
employee protection 85; enforcement activities 374–5; and HAZWOPER 395–8; history of 375–7;
Hurricane eMatrix 385; and infectious diseases 404–6; inspections 379; regulations relevant to
emergency responders 381–4; respiratory protection standard 398–401; and Safety Officers 373; on
temperature extremes 390
OSHRC (Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission) 376–7
OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) 120, 520
OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) 137
OWCP (Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs) 83–4
oxy-fuel cutting 386, 387
oxygen deficiency 386, 400
Paddock, Stephen 9, 426

panic/duress alarm 524–5
PAPR (Powered Air-Purifying Respirator) 402
paradigm shifts 310, 447
paramilitary attire 449
Paris terrorist attacks of 2015 439, 453, 456–8, 463–5
parking areas 203, 430, 495, 498, 522, 524
Patton, George S. 309
PBGC (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) 84
PCA (Posse Comitatus Act) 335, 342
PDD (Presidential Decision Directive) 25
PDD-39 25, 341, 355
PDD-62 25
PDSI (Palmer Drought Severity Index) 479
PDUs (Power Distribution Units) 502
PELs (Permissible Exposure Limits) 390, 392, 393, 401
perimeters, in vulnerability assessment 521, 522
perimeters of protection model 467, 468
perseverance, in leadership 265
personal care 311–12
personal development 304
personal space 203, 204
personnel problems 220, 221
PFAS (personal fall arrest systems) 383
PFO (Principal Federal Official) 26, 33, 37
Phelps, Scot 257–8
phenanthrene 403
phenolic resin 379
physical fitness, and leadership 265
PIOs (Public Information Officers) 172, 189
PKEMRA (Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act) 28–9, 39, 52
plan development 16, 69; in national planning guidance 40–1, 44
plan development and maintenance, in EOPs 152–3, 155–7
planning: in emergency management 16–17; levels of see emergency planning, tiers of
planning assumptions 33, 150, 156–7, 433
planning guidance 36–47; and planning levels 47; source documents for implementation plans 47
planning levels and relationships 42
planning methodology 149
“Planning P” 44, 284–5
planning process, phases of 419
planning team: bringing together 111–12; characteristics of effective 114, 115; membership of 109, 110,
111; operation 112–13; roles 113, 114–15
platinum rule 375
PMAC (Pete Maravich Assembly Center) 325–8; Field Hospital Organizational Structure 328
POI (Program Of Instruction) 288
policy room 206, 507
population, global 486
post-disaster recovery plans 16
post-emergency operations 397
PPD (percentage of permanent disability) 79
PPD (Presidential Policy Directive) 25, 125
PPD-8 26, 28, 29, 31–2, 39, 43, 46, 47, 257, 258
PPD-21 26, 125–6
PPE (personal protective equipment) 51, 219, 500; decontamination of 403; Fagel on 408; at Ground
Zero on 9/11 411; and HAZWOPER 396–8; in hierarchy of controls 381; high-visibility 384; for
infectious diseases 404, 405; and job tasks 399; OSHA Standards 398; and oxy-fuel cutting 386; and
respiratory protection 402; and stress on emergency responders 222–3, 228–31, 251; and
temperature extremes 388; and terrorist incidents 433, 441, 445; use in EOC 492, 500
PPRs (Pre-Planned Responses) 140
pre-crisis preparation 248
preemptive measures 121
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) 80–1
preparedness, in leadership 265
preparedness cycle 351, 456, 457
preparedness phase 144, 298, 305
prequel to exercises 167
Presidential Directives (PDs) 24–32, 25–6
Presidential Disaster Declarations 37, 93, 97; and HHS 317; requesting 96, 100; and state/federal
response 336–8, 344
Presidential Emergency 97
Presidential Major Disaster Declaration 92, 97, 325, 337–8
prevention phase 121, 143; public information in 191
privacy 75, 88–9, 395
private-sector organizations: communication with 186; and EOC design 199, 201; and ICS 189; and risk
assessment 138
problem-solving 299; in CPTED 130; in emergency management 297–8; in EOC design 206–7; and
leadership 265, 269–70, 273; in planning teams 112, 115; and self-efficacy 246
Professional Development Series 301–2
promulgation documents 150
protection phase 143; public information in 191
PSAPs (Public Safety Answering Points) 169, 404
PSMAs (Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments) 351
Psychological First Aid 245–6
psychological injury 222, 224–5, 227
psychological stress 228, 395, 432
psychological trauma 247, 255, 442
PTEE (planning, training, education, and exercises) 3
PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) 223, 225, 233, 235–6
public health 4, 109; and care for emergency responders 239–40; definition of 313; in disasters 327–9; in
EOPs 18, 147, 154; in NRF and NIMS 49
Public Health Emergency (PHE) 315–17, 329, 345, 484
public health EOCs 313–14, 319; case studies 323–4; functional organization 314
public health law 318
public information: in EOPs 18, 149, 154–5, 190; and JIS/JIC 187–9; knowing the audience for 185–7;
and the media 183; and National Preparedness Goal 190–3; partnerships for 193
Puerto Rico: and Hurricane Maria 6, 51, 508; in Stafford Act 98
punitive damages 78
purpose, of EOP 150
al-Qaeda 421, 429, 447, 453

quick action 436, 454
quiet rooms 207–8, 507, 509
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act 84

radio 177, 180, 183–4; what radio news wants 181, 185
radio communication 128, 309; and terrorist incidents 436–7
RAMCAP (Risk Analysis Methodology for Critical Asset Protection) 138
RDD (radiological dispersal devices) 425
readiness, in leadership 265, 267
real-time, exercises in 167
real-world events 32; in exercises 165–6, 175–6, 304
reasonable prudent person test 77
record of changes 150, 155–7
record of distribution 150
recovery phase 124, 144; public information in 193; and response phase 60, 63
Recurrent Training Matrix 288
Red Cross 201, 366; see also American Red Cross
redundant services 206–7, 498, 502, 506–7
Regional Environmental Assessments 130
regional healthcare coalitions 319–20
Rehabilitation Act 82
reimbursement of costs 339, 344, 349
RELs (Recommended Exposure Limits) 393, 401
remote command and control 451
REPLOs (Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers) 347, 352
res ipsa loquitur 77
Rescorla, Rick 13–14
resilience 3; and EOCs 58–9, 61, 68, 70–1; in leadership 265; of local response 193, 218; mental 310–11;
in National Preparedness Goal 190; in NIMS 101; in presidential directives 28, 125; in risk
management 138; and stress 236; and vulnerability assessment 519, 526–7
resource locations 129
resource management: in EOPs 154; in NIMS 100
resource tracking 17, 364
resource tracking systems 71
resourcefulness 265
respiratory protection 381, 386, 397–8, 400–2, 405–6
respondeat superior 77
response phase 63, 123, 144; of DSCA operation 338; public information in 191; right of “Bang” 306
response structure 218, 470
responsibilities, organization, and assignment of 151
responsibility: clear lines of 243; in leadership 265
restrooms 326, 493–4, 497
retene 403
RFA (request for assistance) 338, 347, 349, 352, 380, 433
RFIs (Requests for Information) 294
risk: assumption of 78; estimating 478; reducing 482, 486, 519; use of term 68
risk analysis 526
risk and vulnerability assessors 119–20
risk assessment 16, 137–40, 478; in CEPTD 130; in EOC design 201; for healthcare 103; raising new
questions 133–4; at terrorist incidents 441; working with community stakeholders 139
Risk Assessment Models 134, 138
risk management: in homeland security 119, 124; in NFPA 1561 374
risk management modeling 133
risk management principles 263, 374
Risk MAP (mapping, assessment, and planning) 130
risk-based planning 68
risk-benefit analysis 374
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 91, 94, 95–8, 153; and DSCA 336–7,
344; governors requesting assistance under 37; and HHS 317; and tribal governments 347
role stress 221
routing, diverse 207, 507
RRCC (Regional Response Coordination Center) 346
RSS (Recovery Support Strategies) 44
Rules on the Use of Force (RUF) 340
Ryan White HIV/AIDS program 316
safety, sense of 124, 245

SAMHSA (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services) 316
San Bernardino attack of 2015 456
Sandia’s Risk Assessment Methodology 137
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) 405, 496
SCBA (self-contained breathing apparatus) 381, 388, 395, 397, 399, 401–2
scheduling, flexible 112, 115
SCO (State Coordinating Officer) 337, 346
scope, of EOP 150
Search and Rescue (SAR), in EOPs 18, 154
seating comfort 206, 507
sector-specific agencies 132
security assessment 467, 469–72, 526
security guard desk 475
security personnel 168, 172, 419, 471, 473
security planning 104, 467–9, 525–6; and management 472–3
security surveys 467, 471–4
security systems 65, 203, 520, 525
self-awareness, in leadership 265, 267, 270
self-control, in leadership 265, 267
self-discipline 270
self-motivation 265
self-reliance 240, 247, 264–5
self-sufficiency 207, 240, 498, 507
seminars 303
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 217
Senge, Peter 484
senior leadership: briefing 41; buy-in for emergency planning 147–8; jurisdictional issues with 140
sensory overload exposure 230
SEPLOs (State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers) 347, 352–3
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 4, 13, 19; and CCTAs 453, 456; and emergency management 204;
evacuations after 439–40; impact on security planning 467–71; and NIMS/ICS 35; PPE needed at
445; safety officer at Ground Zero 407–12; television coverage of 181
SERCs (State Emergency Response Commissions) 444–5
SGS (Strategic Guidance Statement) 34
sheltering, in-place 429, 439–40
sheltering plans 16
shooting attacks 14, 426; against emergency responders 387; and CCTAs 447–8, 453; PPD-8 on 257;
recent with more than ten victims 8–11
SHSGP (State Homeland Security Grant Program) 39
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) 120
silica 13, 84, 400
SimCell (Simulation Cell) 162–3, 166, 172, 293–5
Sinek, Simon 308
SIOC (Strategic Information and Operations Center) 34
Sisyphus 299
situation overview, of EOP 150, 155–7
situational awareness 60–1, 183, 281; and CCTAs 448, 454–5; in EOCs 205, 207, 284, 286, 505; and
information sharing 320; and leadership 265, 267; and public health 314; and regional assistance
337; of volunteers 363
situational report elements 429
skill lanes 173–4
SLG (State and Local Guide) 37, 42, 434
SMEs (subject matter experts): available through technology 319; in EOCs 67, 69; in exercises 159, 163–
4, 167; in public health EOCs 314
SNS (Strategic National Stockpile) 49, 315, 326, 484–5
SO (safety officers) 371, 372; authority to stop work 373–4; designation of 395; ethical arguments for
375; at Ground Zero at 9/11 407–9; and hazardous materials 395–6; and hierarchy of controls 381;
influential tactics of 372–3; and key hazards 384; and OSHA 378; and stress 395
social awareness 265, 267
social distancing 491–4, 498–9, 505, 507, 516
social media 70, 177, 485; and EOC operations 60–1; information on terrorist attacks 432, 439; and
news 183–4; public information via 186; and volunteering 363, 364, 368–9
social responsibility 67, 267
Social Security Act 80, 317
soft targets 64, 465, 469
SOPs (Standing Operating Procedures) 140, 148–9, 151–2, 190
Southern Baptists 366
sovereign immunity 78
space allocation 206, 494, 507
space programming 493–4
space requirements 202–3
SPR (State Preparedness Reports) 47
stadium/theater configuration 208, 211, 212, 508, 511–12, 513
staffing formula 295
Stafford Act see Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
staging areas 100, 327–8, 381, 446
stamina, and leadership 265
standard operations procedures/standard operating guidelines 16, 148, 151–2, 154, 189
Star Performer Modeling 263, 267–8, 272
State Active Duty status 335, 339, 341–2
state defense forces 344
state laws 101–2; and concealed weapons 86; criminal 74; and DSCA 339, 341–2, 344; labor 79, 84; and
terrorist incidents 444; and volunteers 364; and workers’ compensation 78
STEL (short-term exposure limit) 390, 401
stigma, of mental health 219, 225–6, 237
stockpiling 98, 408
strategic planning 121, 148, 208, 226, 468, 483, 509
strategic response planning 207, 507
strategic visions 259, 261
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 331, 332
STRATINT (Strategic Intelligence) 120
stress: acute 235, 238; interventions for 245–8; OSHA on 395
stress continuum 234–5, 236
stress management 217–18, 222, 252–3; see also CISM
stress reactions 234–8, 242, 245–7
stress recognition 230
stress symptoms 234–5, 237, 244, 248
stress-mitigation 220
stress-related disorders 233
stress-related injuries 219, 226
strict liability 75
struck-by hazards 384–5
substitution, in hierarchy of controls 381
subtitles 186–7
suicide 9, 11, 224, 233–4
suicide bombings 453, 464–5
suicide vest 425
Sullivan, Louis 494, 499
Super storm Sandy 491, 505
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act 1986 444
supplied-air respirators 401–2
supplies, in EOC design 203
Support Annexes 33–4, 157
supporting services 206, 507
suppression systems 523
survivors’ groups 225
swarm attacks 448, 453
synthetic news 291–2
systemic problems 220, 221
systems thinking 484
table of contents, in EOP 150, 155–7

tactical movements/behavior 451
tactical planning 148
TCL (Targeted Capabilities List) 24, 29
team building 63, 269
team expectations 112, 115
TECHINT (Technical Intelligence) 120
technical space 203
technological disasters 3–4, 14, 140, 478
technology, shared 319
technology integration 206–7, 507–8
television 177, 181–5, 439, 504; what television news wants 182, 185
temperature extremes 387–90, 389, 391, 396
temperature scans 500
terrorism 4, 18, 419; DOD role against 334; and drones 88–9; emergency public information on 438–9;
FEMA guides on 50; and LLIS 354; in National Preparedness Goal 190–1; OSHA on 395; threat
assessment for 138; US government responses to 22–6, 28–9; use of term in EOP 428–9; see also
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks

terrorism hazards 420–8; investigation and containment of 433
terrorist incidents: administration and logistics 445–6; communication in 436–7; direction and control
of response 434–6; firearms used in 450; health and medical issues 440–2; initial detection of 432–3;
organization and assignment of responsibilities 443–5; planning process for 419–20; potential
targets for 430–2; protective actions after 439–40; recent with 10 or more casualties 7–11; resources
management at 442; warnings of 432, 437–8
terrorist mindset 452
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service 302
thinking: critical 271, 531; cross-agency 268
THIRA (Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment) 43, 47, 111, 117, 118, 146, 150
threat and hazard identification 16
threat assessment models 134
threat assessments 65, 117, 119, 134–5, 139–40, 438
Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station 93
time loss 79
Tinker Air Force Base 340–1
Title 10 status 50, 333, 335, 338–9, 341–7, 349
Title 32 status 50, 335, 339, 341–2, 344–5
TLVs (threshold limit values) 388, 390, 393, 401
Tokyo Subway sarin attack of 2005 4, 13, 22, 477
tort law 74–5, 76, 86
Townsend, Frances 281
traditional functional format 154, 155
traditional multipurpose layout 208, 209, 509, 510
training, recurrent 288
training matrix 288–9
transitional awareness 204, 505
trauma, cumulative 234
trauma center 444
traumatic events, emergency responders exposed to 223, 225
Travis AFB 253
triage 226, 328, 441
tribal governments 336–7, 347, 354
tropical cyclones 480
Trump, Donald 26, 345, 406
TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) 140
TTXs (tabletop exercises) 69, 163, 289, 291
Tuohy, Robert 281
TWA (time-weighted average) 390
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 345

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 37, 341, 343–5, 349
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 341, 345, 349
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) 343
UA (unmanned aircraft. UAV, UAS) 88; see also drones
UAMTFs (Urban Augmentation Medical Task Forces) 345
UASI (Urban Area Security Initiative) 39
UNDAC (United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination) 483
Unified Command 36, 99; and DCO 50; in NIMS 26, 101; in NRF 34; in terrorist incidents 434–5
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 85
United States: emergency management-related legislation in 21–4; human-made incidents in 7–11;
natural disasters in 5–7; technological hazards and incidents 12
United States Constitution, Tenth Amendment 333
unity of command 36, 100
Universal Task List 24, 31
UPS (uninterruptible power supply) 502–3, 524–5
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 39
urban areas, terrorist threat in 435, 446
USACE (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) 345
USBDC (United States Bomb Data Center) 426
USCG (United States Coast Guard) 138, 335; assisting civilian emergency management 335; and ICS
282; meetings and deliverables document 285
US&R (Urban Search and Rescue) 442–3, 445
utility systems 203, 520; sustainable 207, 507
Van Loon, Ronald 485

VAV (variable air volume) 502
ventilation 386–7, 405, 430, 501
versioning controls 170
vertical standards 377
veterans’ preference 85
VETS (Veterans’ Employment and Training Service) 85
violence: against emergency responders 387; in exercises 167; reporting 103
virtual centers 208, 508
virtual reality, hybrid 516
visual display design 206, 507
VOAD (Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster) 366
volunteer groups 357, 360, 362–3, 366–9
volunteer healthcare professionals 316–17, 366
volunteers: assessment of 364–5; individual and groups of 360–2, 361; managing 302, 357–67, 369;
providing direction to 363; self-deployed 362–3, 366–7, 369
VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity) 60–1, 454
vulnerability, use of term 68
vulnerability assessments 60, 135–7, 139–40, 519–27; in counterintelligence 134; for EOCs 64, 126–7;
and hazard analysis 146; risk and threat in 117, 119–20; for terrorism 430–1
wages, garnishment of 85
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act 85
warning systems 97, 191
water supply 12, 431, 496–7, 504, 523
weapons, concealed 86–7
wearables 516
weather monitoring 17, 388
WEF (World Economic Forum) 479–80
Westgate Mall, Nairobi, terrorist attacks 439, 453, 458
Whittier Narrows earthquake of 1987 368
whole-of-community response 257, 483
Winslow, Charles Edward A. 313
wireless information networks 50
WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) 122, 125; countering 22–3; detectable effects of release 422; and
DSCA 334, 341–2; terrorist incidents featuring 23, 420–6, 430, 432–4, 436–9, 442–3, 445
work hours, long 226, 395, 403
work stations, physical demands of 222, 230
workers’ compensation 78–9, 82–4; and concealed weapons 86; and stress 224–5
work-related traumatic event exposure 223
work-rest chart 389
work/warm-up schedule 391
World Health Organization 233, 404, 406, 481
World Trade Center: EOC in 201, 436; see also September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
World Trade Center bombing of 1993 4, 22, 426; evacuation plans 13–14
World Trade Center Health Program 411
Zika virus outbreak of 2016 314

EOC Management

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“Dr Michael Fagel has assembled a group of experts in a variety of areas of emergency

Emergency operations centers (EOCs) are a key component of coordination

The past and future of emergency management, detailing the evolution

Edited by Michael J. Fagel, PhD, CEM

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2022 Taylor & Francis

The right of Michael J. Fagel to be identified as the author of the editorial

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

First edition published by CRC Press 2011

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 978-1-4822-3503-6 (hbk)

Typeset in Adobe Garamond Pro

1 Introduction: Why Is This Book Important to You? What’s in It for

2 The Evolution of Federal Emergency Management and Planning

4 Disaster and the Law

5 Emergency Management Laws and Mandates: What Drives

6 Developing a Planning Team

7 Assessing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Risks within the Community

8 Developing Your Emergency Operations Plan

9 Exercises and AARs in Emergency Management

10 Current Media Environment

11 Successfully Navigating Media for the Emergency Manager

13 Stress Management and Mental Health Considerations in

15 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management

16 Role of Interagency Liaison

17 Emergency Management and Public Health Collaboration

18 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

20 Emergency Management Facilitation of Responder’s Health and

21 Planning for Terrorism

22 Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks

24 The Future of Emergency Management

Appendix 1: Pandemic-Ready EOC Design Considerations

Over 30 years ago I had the privilege of meeting Dr Michael Fagel at an

Robert J. Coullahan, MS, CEM, CPP

Erin M. Fisher, MS, Assembly Editor, has been involved in advanced

Lucien G. Canton, MBA, CEM, CBCP is an independent management

Mark E. Chambers, NRP (ret), CEEP, CHEC-II is a an internationally

Stephen Combs, MSEM, SCCEM, MPIO has served as a Public Information

J. Lawrence Cunningham, MS is a highly experienced security consultant

Randall C. Duncan, MPA, CEM (ret) represented local governments as an

Richard J. Hughbank, DM is a retired U.S. Army Military Police officer

Robert D. Hughbank, PsyD is a professor in the Political Science

Kammie Juzwin, PsyD is a licensed clinical psychologist and holds a

Christine B. Petitti, MPH recently retired from the Department of Health

Derek Rowan, the President of Ascenttra, brings a unique and extensive

Nicholas Staikos, AIA, principal of Staikos Associates Architects has over 35

Emergency Management has emerged as a profession with its practitioners

Source: Image and Copyright Rick C. Mathews 2020

Table 1.1 Natural Disasters (January 2015 – August 2020)

Natural Disasters (January 2015 – August 2020)

Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

Some argue that this

Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

$1.3 billion in damages;

Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

Natural Disaster Damages, Deaths,

$10.9 billion in damages;

Note: Data from (NSDS, 2020)

Man-Made Incidents with 10 or More Casualties (January 2015 –

Man-Made Deaths &

Riots occurred nationwide in