3 3 Re vie w of M.

Ha rtim o, Husserl and

Ma the ma tics (Cambridge University
Pte ss 202 1 )
Gabriele Barate/li

1 Over view

.\tiirj
. . a Hart irno 's rnost recem b oo k repre sents a furthe r succe
cnnc. a l en°a ssful step in her study and
& geme m v,ith
. phe nome no Iogy app 1· d
1e to t h e ph1lo
· soph y of math emat ·
text is corn pose d of e1ght relatively indep ende nt chap ters 1cs. T he
and a brief conc lusio n. Chap ters
fro~ 2 to 6 f~llo w a rathe r defin ite chron ological seque
nce since each is devo ted to one
speci fìc st~~e m H usserl" philo soph ical trajec tory, from che
Philo soph y of Arithmetic up
to the Cn.sts o f European Sciences. T his resea rch does not
only show that the prob lem
?f the_ "'ma them atica l - is a recur ring conce rn far him bue
also that che different ways
in wh1c h he has addr essed it have alwa
ys shape d the genera i frame work of his philoso-
phy. Chap ters 1, 7, and 8 are dedic ateci to mo re gener ai
themes that embr ace Huss erl's
philo soph y of math emar ics in its enri rery, as they regar d,
respectively, che chara cteriza-
tion of his reflec ti\'e meth od in oppo sition to che limited
" scientific attitu de" typic al of
math emat ician s, an assess ment of Huss erl 's posit ions in
the light o f rhe main theories
avail able today conc ernin g che natur e of math ematics
and math ematical objects, and
the clarif ìcaci on o f his trans cend enta l point of view in relari
on, and in contr ast, to Kant .
Hart1 mo's appr oach is nor a mere ly histo rica l recon struc tion
that fights to find a privi-
leged piace for Huss ert ·s phen omen ology in che gallery of
past philo sophi es. Her rheor eti-
cal and exeg etica l analy ses have insre ad the merit of maki
ng Huss erl 's contr ibutio n vivid
and valua ble fo r today 's deba ted quest ions in vario us fie
lds . T his is of cours e specifically
rrue for che phen omen ologi cal resea rch, whic h has to
a certa in exten t fargo tten che
impo rtanc e o f a priori scien ces fa r rhc <lerer mina tion of
its ultim ate goals , and fa r che
philo soph y of marhemar ics, whic h has so fa r neglecte<l rhe
poten tial benefit that Huss erl's
meth ods and inves rigar ions cou l<l bring imo play . Harr imo's
cffor t has che ambi ti on to
impr ove che fruitf ul dialo gue berw ecn thcsc rwo, in truth
intim ately affin e, world s.
Inas m uch as phen omen ology is conc crnccJ, Hart imo provi
des a detai led readi ng of
Huss erl's publi shed boo ks as wel l as o f the archi pelag o of
materials comi ng from lectu res,
perso na! notes , etc. belon ging to his imme nse Nachlas~ .
By rakin g im~ accou ~t also _the
rechn ica l logic al resul ts of his rime and the most prom ment
math ematical-p hilos ophic al
work s chat were flour ishin g arou nd them especially dur ing
the 1920 s, she furni shes a new
and more comp lex view of Huss erl's cultu ra! back grou nd
. The addit ion of an accur ate
and imer estin g study of Huss erl's hand -writ ten mark s and
no tes in his perso na! copies of
chose w orks (rhe auth ors consi dered are Beck er, Hilbe rt,
Weyl , amon g other s) comp letes
che pictu re and supp orts some specu lation s abou t rhe hidde
n reaso ns behin d the trans for-
mati ons of his trans cend ental ideal ism in his more matu re
perio d.
 6 0() ( ,'11/Jriclc 13aratelli , .
. . . . ric..:s Harrirn o comparcs I lusst: rl -; cl a1m~ with a kw
111 IIH· pl11losophy of 1~arhc.1_11,' 1 . ~ 'The analysis <lcmo nstratcs how profitablc it woul
wcll-.,sscsscd cortrl'lllPOra, Yposrtior_i. · . . hc <liscussion. lkca usc hc has anticipatc<l ma <l
. . . ·I ,·t s. •·1 r,•fcn:11cc
Iw ro I,a ve 11 11sst:1 " pornt "' .t h , J ·hatc h'1s p1,·1I osop h y shows that · 1· ny
'J I . . -rc11t
r 1escs :111lI I cas t iat arL cur . moncy inf t e he·matics
I '
has facc<l aftcr his <lcath rtA rvt, h
LIJ) tn rhe challc11gcs t Iiat t 1c P I os
·I . h I 'Ot"'hY
' o mat e I' . h'I . tt t
. . , . . . . e how Husscr s p I osop y cannot e reduct<l. h . h
samc time, l-fart11110 s argumcnts lfl d'icat . f h · ,, h
.. .
to rm e pos1t1011, as 1t 1.s rathcr a. .. com , bination vicw o rnat ernat1cs, t at 1•.s, a syncre-
. . ·
t1st1c account capah1e o f com 6lfllflg
. . . • "·onstruct1v1sm, vanous k'md so f. structura11sm ·
and
e · . , d b- · . ' .
•. ,, ( ,) Sh. mak,·s it clea r that th1s does not nee
pIaco111s111 p. 17 , 1 • e
. . that-..has becn d'isp elle<l by successive · to h'l e mterpreted as a srgn
h' J
of conceptual confus1011 . p
. · I osop 1ca progres . s.
Rathcr it rcvcals that Husscr I transcends t he current philosoph1ca . . . . l framework since 1,·
1s.
' .
analyscs are much ncher than w at t e curren h h e scholarly d1stmct1ons are able to capture
. .
· 1t
Bue · 1s
· prcc1scly
· h ·
bccausc 1s p I osop Ymar h · I h ks a di 11erence by cross mg the fì
eld from on e,
Il'
po int to che other that it is interesting.

2 The phenomenolo gical difference

In a certain sense, che entirc text is an attempt to characterize this difference. The first
chapter suggests that Husscrl 's exceptional position with respect to today's philosophi-
cal landscape is not due to a dogmatic difference, that is, to a different "theory" that is
supposed to be a better account of what numbers are and what mathematic~ is ali ~bout.
Phenomenology is at fìrst metaphysically neutra!: " Husserl does not take 1t as h1s task
co defend any particular metaphysical view about the existence of mathematica l enti-
ties. lnstead, his focus is on mathematicians' practices and their genuineness [Echtheit]"
(p. 22). We see that the difference is methodical, it concerns the " philosophica l atti-
tude" more than the actual doctrine. The shift from objects to subjects underlines the
fact that the focus is on the way of being of numbers and other mathematica l entities
within determinate and continuously evolving (theoretical) practices, and on how we
origina lly (i.e., with evidence) encounter them. Disputing about their alleged "existence"
or " inexistence" without having accomplished this preliminary clarification on the mo-
dality of their specific objectivity (for example, in contrast to the objectivity the external
objects of sensuous experience) is, from a Husserlian standpoint, useless. Husserl's chal-
lenge consists in constructing a rigorous philosophical method that investigates first of
ali how we speak about ideai objectualities and the limits of their givenness. This attitude
ca n be then labeled as "transcenden tal" (since it takes into account the subjective condi-
tions for the "constitution " of objects) and " criticai" (since it does not take for granted
the results of science). Yet, this Kantian demand is not fulfilled by a rationalistic a priori
" philosophy-fìrst " account but rather through the exercise of w hat Husserl calls " radical
~esinnu~g.:: It is defined as t~e " understandin g of the purpose of the activity or cheory
~n quest1on (~. 2 ~). As Hart_1mo ex?lains,_ "instead of focusi ng on 'nature,' Besin.nung
1s a human sczenttfìc theoretzcal att1tude, mvolving as it d
, . .. f 'd . . o es an e ffort t o u nderscand
ot hers act1v1 t1es 6y way o 1 ent1fymg their goals corr tl h
. h h ,, . ec y, t roug h empat I1er·IC enga
-
0 e-
_ti
ment w1 t t ern (p. 35). The target 1s not a specific doct • •
· · h I rme, nor certam ma chemancal
pract1ces m t emse ves, but rather some spurious pse d h 'I h' I · retations
that are superim posed on it without any meth d' I u o-p I osop tea mterp
o 1ca awareness. Hu sserl
sta rts cxamining evi<lences tha t are sought fo • h f I , . . d chen
mo vcs on to cxam inc thc va rious , . ·. r m t e o rma sc1ences, an .
pres upposit1ons assumed in these sciences. This
 J<eview o( li
ns for example, uncoverin usserl an<l M
rn~~ h 'often are realist about mat~ ma~hemat icians' rn , arhernarics 60 J
w ic emat1cal enti ties. ctaphysical cornmitrnc nrs,

rhe chief mistake is that of "ob·Ject1v1sm. . (p . 22 /

In fac,t . " d
·rs aJwgether the o 6Ject from any pract·ice what ' un ersrood as a gross . ,'real · " h·
spl1 . •
obJect. lt is at th1s pomt t~at the epistemolo i ~oev_er and transforms it inca':~ bw ich
Insofar as much of the ph1_losophy of mathe!ac t enigmas and pseudo-problem: it.r~ct
·nherited by the natural ob1ectivism of mathem i_c~ presupposes this tendency, arg ua ccbulr.
J
l difference " m1g· h t h e1p m · eh anging the . at1c1ans th emse 1ves, the "phenom I .y
ea . B f . ent1re pers . . eno og1-
che collect10n. y ocusmg on the sub·Ject1ve . . pect1ve w1thout adding a new -1sm .
to side of h .
rhat is, before t he unwarran ted separation of 0 b' t e subiect-object correlation
. I ·
romises to d1sc ose a senes of new proble h Jects has I
taken Pace, phenomenology'
P .. 1 Th' th eoretical step ismsnot atf are usuali I
che trad1t10na ones. 1s . Yneg ected, and to dissolve
has a few advantages, as Hartimo highlights It t ~ course immune to ambiguitie s bue it
of mathematical manifestations in different th. a. ows dus to make sense of the pluralities
. d . eones an epochs Smce · • d .
can be severa1k m s of ev1dence each hav· . 1t a m1cs chac rhere
In fact, ' mg ICS own proper sense and legicimization.

nothing in Husserl's approach precludes new evid ences and new goals, and hence
. .
new mecho d s, from surfacmg m machematics • Cons·d · of a11 of them and
1 erat1on
1ate to each other and the transcendencal sub'Jec r·1v1ty · a um·fi ed
· g1ves
· theyf re 1 1· ·
how .
·
· un derstan d'mg 1ts
p1cture· o a pl'fura 1st1cally g1ven mathematics and should hel P m
pIace m our 1 e.
(p. 174)

A corollary is that it is pointless to look after an a-subjective, definitive, "essence"

of numbers: they can manifest themselves as determinate groups of icems in ordinary
experience or as symbolically represented positions in "abscract" (Husserl would say
"formai") structures . The criticai phenomenological mechod invices us co describe
those forms of manifesta tion, avoiding any unnecessary objeccificacion of chose objeccs
or any preference of one manifestation over the other. Husserl 's greac ceaching is co
seek "to ensure that the methods and concepts used agree with che goals, chac is, che
evidences sought in the theory" (p. 186). Accordingly, one cannoc cake for granced
the results of modero mathema tics while ignoring che past experiences by precending
that they do not bring along philosophical problems. Husserl's "hiscorical-intencional"
research is not to be understoo d as a faccual investigacion. The inceresc on correcc
purposes makes it necessary for him to go back to see "how individuals' goal-direcc ed
1
actions, in a historical situation, have shaped the subsequen~ dev~lopment" (p. ,7!,
and how the subseque nt development has threatened the d1stort1on ~f these ong1-
nI • • d che shifts of meanmg chat occur
a purposes. The criticai invest1gat10n mu st emen ·
. h. h I
che ocher - sh1fts w tc h are a· -soI
w· h' • . f
it in h1story in the passage from one generatwn to
responsible for the foundatio nal paradoxe s - by recollecting thhe ls_en_ecss oof emx:tcte;~1i:~~::
rna ·t • . h ceeds even t ed 1m1 ·
ni estat1ons in one synthet1c movement t at ex . ntal phenomenology
As H · . . . Il assmg transcen e
h artimo ntcely puts 1t: "It 1s an a -encomp d the transcendental subjec-
wt. _ere ali aimi ngs, attainmen ts, and failures are refilatde hto. piace
in che unicy of !ife"
v1cy d h .
1 , an ence ultimately relative pomts O VI • f ·ew n t etr
(p. 185).
602 Gabriele Baratl'lli
. . . .
In condus1o n, l-brrtmo s prl'scnr:11.·10 11 I,hccs ' . ·.
thl' ,,hc11omt·11ological diff .
. . l rl' ll l l ' 111 ti .
. .
acri rude roward tlw sub1ccttvc • · · , 0 r,111f/S of 11uHhc111:111cal ohJt'Cl s I 1
cn11st 1rut1Vt . l', . · , w 1nv:1 ,
l
h('
. I I •I . frofl\ rc:1dy-111:1 1
1·
usua I a pproac Il sra rts frolli t ll' CllL , I \ ,I s,,· ·
. d<: 111:11 ht·111:11 re-il
' U. li ·11 Il'',
• ;i 11d
theories, anJ rries ro apply ro rhcm an :icccssory , ulrnn:Hdy posihu,no iis, l lllts 1io 11 i ~\ .
11

3 Husserl and Skolem's theorcm

Regardin g Husscrl's scholarsh ip, I woul<l __likc ro fon,s ~rn I larri,_no's '.~-H~~-r cliallc11gi ng
historical thesis, which is JcvclopcJ in Chaptcr 6, tcllmgly cntttk:J <,oJcl , Skoi<.:
111
and the Crisis of the 1930s." Hcr contribut ion corn.:crns the much-Jeh atcd cffccts of th~
metamath emarical resulrs (mosr of which achicvcd wlwn Hus scrl was olJ or cvc11 :1ftc r
bis death) on Husserl's conceptio n of marhcmar ics. So far, thc Jiscussio11 has hcc11 ccn-
tered on the impact that Godel's incomplerencss rheorems woulJ havc on thc H11sserlia
11
notion of definite multiplici cy, whose ddìnition (alrcady devclopcd in thc late 1890s ) has
certainly many similaritie s with Hilbert's concept of complete formai systcm . J\ga inst a
tradition that craces back to .Jean Cavaillès, Harrimo argucs that these tcchnica l n:sults
do not affect the generai conceptio n since Husscrl "alrca<ly haJ some such vicw of thc
inexhaust ibility or incomplet ability of the formai charactcr ization of thc worlJ. " Fur-
thermore , "he held che axiomatic ideai as an ideai, as somethin g that rcgul a tcs thc coursc
of thinking, not somethin g necessaril y reachable " (p. 148).
On the contrary, she claims that the so-called Lowcnhci m-Skolcm rh corcrn on
categoric ity was ''devastat ing to many of Husserl's basic belicfs" (p. 148). Thc theorcm
states that if a (first-orde r) system has an infinite model, then it has a model for cvcry
infinite cardinalit y. lts importanc e lies in the fact that it puts into question the ca pacity of
formai systems to univocally capture a determina te domain (for example, that of natural
numbers) up to isomorph ism. Hartimo's interestin g hypothesi s is that this rcsult is not
only relevant for Husserl's specific notion of definite multiplici ty but has great consc-
quences for his philosoph y overall. This new thesis is based on two argument ative stcps:
(1) she claims that Husserl's philosoph y undergoes to a radical change in the last period
of his life, a change that is particular ly visible in the Galileo-se ction of the Crisis, written
in 1936. She interprets the famous statement in §9h, according to which " we take for
true being what is actually a method," as addressin g a merely instrumen tal account of the
mathema tical method, which is no longer considere d capable of giving us any substantial
truth about the real world. Thus, "whereas earlier Husserl viewed definite manifolds as
the guiding ideal for mathemat ics and for physics, he now seems to regard such a view
as an unjustifie d presuppos ition of modern science" (p.147). This is clearly a destructi ve
judgment because if the "axiomat ic ideai is now a mere method," the criticism "extends
to the whole normative ,!ramewo rk [of science], and the Ienses through which Huss~rl,
too, had seen the world (p. 156); (2) she accounts for this radical change by refernn?
to Skolem's result, as it challenge s many of Husserl's fundamen tal ideas. In fact, (a) ",e
shows that there no unique character ization of natural numbers or real numbers, rhat is,
no axio~atic ally deter~ine d 'essen~es of numbers, "' (b) it " repudiate s H usserl 's ~rguj
ment agamst psycholog1sm by showmg that categorica l theories do not demarcate ,Jea
s~ructures that a~e independ ent of ~ny acts by human beings, " (e) "it shatters Hu~scr! ':
v1ew about the ideai structures gmdmg m a thematics and h ' , ·d of ma themancs a
.d. h . 'd I I
provi mg t e~ normat,v~ 1 ~a t1at guides physics" (p.' 148). is t ea .w
Now, desp1te thc fascmatm g account, I find both t h bi macic fora fe
. f Il . . t·k s eps ra t er pro e . li eJ
reasons. F1rst o a , tt 1s un I e Iy that Husserl has t 1· · I Il d bout chrs a eg
- • , no exp 1c1t y ta <e a
 /\) {; IJ/.{! fl) ()1·,, ..
.
rmation, d esp1te t he huge impacr 011 I11. , . ti ssl'rl . I M I
· · ,lfl( , ::i r 1<·111::1 1ir, 11rn
ans fO
f · 1 · s cnt1rc l11·1
rr ·t0sophy O . Arttnnettc
ph1 h . hup to thc carly E, .10s. 1n con tr·P, osophic . il rcst~ . ·l f
. , f L l ::i l <:r t 111·
al J11-vesti~at1011s, w e1e e harshly criticizcd himsclf fo,~1~t. wnh wlia1 ht: diJ in rht: l ,,,J<i-
c his prev10us work, Husserl apparently docs not . . a ving cmbrn ccJ psycholc1gi'>rn
111 · · ev en tho ug h' as Harti·mo notes H · mcnt,on
. concepnon I .su e,
·I a new J rarnatic 'ìhi fr i11
h1S •ew "that I1e I1e Id tn · Formai and Transcend · , usscr
.. I wou Id h· ave rciecrcJ . in this way
·1 v1 7) -r I 'd
' l'er" (p. 14 . 1 extua evi ence shows on th . enta Lor,1c bi . h J
o , pu 1s e onl y sevcn ycar-,
ear 1 . I . e contra ry rh t h H
. jous books 111 re at1on to mathernatical t . . I a w en usserl rcfcrs ro his
pi ev f I op1cs, 1e does s0 h
. account ( or exarnp e, when he refers to ld d · to stress r e conrinuiry of
I11s · eas an Form / . d T:
complete che sketchy characterization of th _ , · a a~ ranscendental Logie
ro C .. ) e concept of defìrnte manifold in rhc §9f of
rhe rists . .
Moreover, Harumo neglects to consider in h . 1
. .
ural way of interpreting that passage wh1'cl1erd ana ys1s wkhat is arguably the most
nat . , oes nor as for th · d · f
such a strong assurnpt1on. The criticai point does t . . Ie mtro uct1on o
· · · /f b h · no seem to mvo ve the merhod of
axiomatizatzon ttse , ut rat er tts misunderstand· 1 d . .
· · f H l' mg. n accor ance w1th Hart1mo's
own charactenzatlon o usser s methodology rh . · d d' .
. I f d . . ' e m1sun erstan mg anses once the
authentic goa s o a eterrnmate theoret1cal . practice are someho w bet rayed, so that, for
l f h
example, the. resu ts b'o t • e rnathernat1cal technique applied to na t ure are ob1ect1 · ·fi ed
d
whereas or mary su 1ect1ve experience is undervalued as pre-scientifìc and th 1· '
b . · l If H I' . . , us a 1en
to a~y o iective va ue. usser s cnt1cal target is this unjustifìed objectifìcation, then
one 1s not forced to d~duce that, _for the late Husserl, "there is no objective actual and
true nature, or t~ue bemg, to be ~1s~losed by the Euclidean method" (p. 147), but rather
that the authenttc sense of what 1s d1sclosed is threatened by concealment and confusion.
Husserl's philosophy is rneant to provide a solution to reveal and correct this type of tacit
conceptual shifts without denying ipso facto the normative status of axiomatization for
natural and formai sciences.
Husserl is equally silent with respect to an alleged influence of Skolem's theorem on
his thought. By looking at his persona! library, Hartimo has shown that he was certainly
aware of this result from Waismann's book Einfuhrung in das mathematische Denken
published in 1936. While it is highly possible that Husserl could have found some sig-
nificant reasons to reinforce his traditional distrust toward the outcomes of an excessive
formalization of thought, it is nonetheless rather unplausible that this reading had con-
vinced him in "giving up" forrnalization (or, as Hartimo says, "Dedekind abstraction" )
as an authentic source of knowledge altogether. Since Husserl is now "instrumentalist
about the 'Dedekind' abstracted structures" (p. 165), Hartimo argues, he "comes to view
eidetic variation as the only legitirnate access to abstract concepts" (p. 13''.). Thi_s would
imply, it seems tome, the collapse of his entire philosophical framework, mcludm? b~th
his decades-long battle against psychologism to give to formai_ ontology a~ ?61ect1v_e
status and, quite paradoxically, the possibility of t?e,,over_cori:ung of the cns1s ?f sc1-
ences itself, since the project of a "transcendental log1c, wh1ch is supposed _t~ clanfy the
au.th ent1e · sense of the operat10ns . of the se1ent1sts,
· · presu pposes the recogmtton of such
0 biectivity
B ·· l h · gency and deserve attention
. e as 1t may Hartirno's rernarks do not ose t eir co . h d H , ·I
ind ' . h · I It rnight have a on usse1
. ependent/y of the influence that certam tee ~1ca_ res~ s h radical way at rhe end
h1mself Th ·
(.i f h.1s l'f· ·at 1s, even I'f Husser I never e hanged h1s v1ews h m h sue a
h should have chang·ed h1s.
• I . .
1e, 1t stil rernams undec1de t e ques _1011 d h t' of w et er e ·
. .,d ·r In Chaptcr 7 shc also
Ph1.1osoph f . . H t O has escn 6e 1 ·
d
· .
Pr .d Yo mathemaucs m the way ~r ,rn . I13. t Husscrl's instru111cntalis111
ovi es a negative answer to this quest1on by saymg t ·
 604 Gabriele Barate/li . f the importance of thc Lbwcnhcim-~kol.
. k v1eW o . 1· . <l l:rr,
b bly resulted "from a mista . en problem that is not 1m1tc to H u11\c:rl -
f:~o~m" (p. 1~5). Thi~ is clearly :~ ;~:~ kind of I~gical n?tions he empl<Jy<.:<l in hi,
and which implies the d1scernment . gical regimentat1on that occurrt <l aftc:r hi,
. I nd termino1O . .
writmgs before the conceptua a the current d1scuss1on.
death - but that can have a relevance on

4 Concluding remarks
h H · , book is an originai and tho ught-provoking
I hope to ha~e shown wl' Yh.l art1~0 ~f mathematics whose scope is never restricte<l
engagement w1th Husser s P 1osop Y . h h ·
. . h'I • I h as it always finds m t et eoret1ca l consequences lt">
·
to h1stonca 1or p 1o1og1ca t eses, , . h b .
the St udy of Husserl s philosop y ecomes an occa<;1on
deeper sense. That means that . h f
far usto find a new orientation for our questions and ~os 5ibly topa ~e t e way or a ~ew
philosophical exploration. This is precisely what Harttmo_ sugge 5rs_ in ~he end by askmg:
"what would phenomenological philosophy of mathemattcs look hke m the ~ enty~hr5t
century?" (p. 189). As she characterizes it, it seems that the "pheno_~enolog1cal d1ffer-
ence" brings in two great innovations with respect to the more trad1t1onal approaches.
Because "its task is to describe how, through their practices, mathematicians constitute
an open-ended and possibly pluralistic mathematical reality" (p. 190), it is ~exible,
as it can "capture the values guiding different mathematical practices" (p. 189 ) not
only in the current situation but even in the past. This is the condition to make sense
of the difficult problem of the historicity of a priori disciplines, that is, of the radical
transformations to which they undergo through the ages and that cannot be easily in-
serted into the comfortable scheme of linear progression. Second, it is not prone to the
uncond~tion~l aut?o_ri9: o~ mathematical results, even if it does not oppose an equally
do~m~t!c rat10~ahst1c ~~tl?s~phy-first" account: "Husserl 's transcendentally clarified
lo~1c _is first phtlosophy ;_ 1t 1s first' ?ut not o~ the basis of some a priori philosophical
prmc1ple~ but on th~ bas1s of reflect1on on sc1entific practices" (p. 18 8). Philosophical
freedom 1s here. .ach1eved by means of the "divis1'on of la b or " b etween p h'l 1 osop hers
d h
an mat emat1cians that precludes philosophy's seduct·ton b y t h e ca 11 o f t h e s1·rens of
· If
h
mat ematica ormai exactness Their I
Thus instead of embracing b·l. d "f ~oha ~ are complementary but essentially distinct.
'
foundation to mathemati'cs u ·
a m
h
a1t m formul " b
h
· · ·11 ·
as Y try1ng to g1ve an 1 us10nary
smg t e mat emat' 1 h d .
understand the goal as one of reco . . . . ic~ . met o , the ph1losopher has to
1
evidences. In this way the philoso nhci mgkits ob1ectivity with the plurality of subjective
. . p er ta es ma th . b ' d. .
PIme, wh1eh has to be complemented b . ematics to e 'an autonomous 1sc1-
p henomen oIogical dar ifica ti O n" (pp. [~ ;~~
5 5
bui It upo n, descr ip ti ve, psyeho Iogica I, 0 r