SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the

Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET
AL., respondents.

Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines.
Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents. aisadc

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN

REFORM LAW; LAND ACQUISITION; SECTION 16(e) THEREOF; CONSTRUED. —
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: "Sec. 16. Procedure for
Acquisition of Private Lands — . . . (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR
shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit
must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can
it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that
should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed.
In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE
BASIC LAW AND AN IMPLEMENTING RULE OR REGULATION; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. — The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by
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 the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either
the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law
into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former
that prevails. In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No.
9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not
commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null
and void.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAIR AND IMMEDIATE COMPENSATION MANDATED. — The

ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of
the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation
from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized
payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule
that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the
expropriated property is transferred. The attempt to make a distinction
between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To
withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already
been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive
exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR
rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private
respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association"
case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private
respondents, which the Court must rectify. Hence, we find it unnecessary to
distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 of purposes of exercising the landowner's right
to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same,
the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which
he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the
cardinal rule that: ". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of
eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the
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 land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss."

DECISION

FRANCISCO, J : p

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and
the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice
to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As
eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz: cdasia

". . . social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his
hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to
tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly
extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer
the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and
rich alike, according to the mandate of the law." 2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated

principles be applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the
petitions were ordered consolidated. 3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus and ruled as follows: cdtai

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari

and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is

declared null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of
trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit
— not merely 'earmark', 'reserve' or 'deposit in trust' — with an
accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of
the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in
government financial instruments — within the parameters of
Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657: cdt

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 P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago

P15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;
c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the
petitioners to withdraw the above-deposited amounts without
prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the
proper authorities; and
d) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the just
compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the
petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence
and to 2) decide the cases within 30 days after they are
submitted for decision." 4
aisadc

Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18,
1995, 5 denying their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by

the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved
by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the
valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for
Certiorari a n d Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and
sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative
proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and
the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. cdta

Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994,

this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper
determination and disposition.
As found by respondent court, the following are undisputed:
"Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that '(o)n 4 September 1992 the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally
cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in
the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of
the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of
P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner
Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and
6283 respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562,
respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES 'C' & 'D')
without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the
requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation
in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.' (Rollo , p. 6).
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 "The above allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.
"Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of
Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur,
NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-
60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name
of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990,
without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the
beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX 'B') to
pay rentals to the Landbank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to
at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR
Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the
amount of P135,482.12; that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank
reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago.
(ANNEX 'E'; Rollo , p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to
the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of
Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the Landbank
(Rollo , p. 133).

"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents

except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent
DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed
of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank,
although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental
from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo , p. 99).
cdasia

"Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development

Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges — with respect to its
properties located in San Francisco, Quezon — that the properties of
AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another
parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares;
that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation
of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the
DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision
was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX 'F') fixing the
compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an
area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the
Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the
name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of
P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December
1991 (ANNEX 'G'). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in
Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco,
Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay
with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares; that emancipation patents were
issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on
15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix
the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account
in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of
P12,247,217.83, three notices of acquisition having been previously
rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo , pp. 8-9)
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 "The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents
except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to
participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due
notice to it (Rollo , p. 100)." 8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of

1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of
depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR,
the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled
as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9 Private respondents also
assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked,"
"deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10 cdtai

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is

a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of
Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e)
of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , G.R. No.
78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). 12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and
54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited"
were also used. 13
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed
decision in favor of private respondents. 14 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but respondent court denied the same. 15
Hence, the instant petitions. cdt

On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the

petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is
merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The Court,
however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file
their comments. 17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null
and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in
bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of
right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in
trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word
"deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of
depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of
deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable
form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not
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 commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to
promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA
6657. aisadc

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

"SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — . . .
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash"
or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a
"trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can
be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of
the term "deposit." cdta

The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute.

Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter
or the spirit of a legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed
that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect.
The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law
or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to
enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There
is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner
as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section
16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash"
or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos.
29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the
clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error
in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are

entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the
final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties,
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 petitioners assert the negative. cdasia

The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the

deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of
final compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law.
According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount
deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by
the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no
reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e)
in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only
provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property
pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the
following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in
the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform ." 22
"The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is
divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of
just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle of
eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
"The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either. cdtai

xxx xxx xxx

"Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due
process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for
must also be rejected."

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in

discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:
". . . despite the 'revolutionary' character of the expropriation
envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of
Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that 'payments of the
just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money' —
even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case 'that the
traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and
no other' — the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the
'recognized rule . . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass
from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied.) aisadc

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the

"Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation
from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized
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 payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled
rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to
the expropriated property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just
compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's
valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the
possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was
painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by
withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange
for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however,
misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the
Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18
for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same.
The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is
deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be
fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule
that: cdta

". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent

domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment
of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property
owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."
24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove
all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But
despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog
the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of
totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due
time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective,
vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because
social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners,
who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. 26
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. cdasia

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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 Narvasa, C.J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
1. Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 615 (1992), quoting Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy.
2. Ibid., p. 616.

3. Rollo, p. 7. cdtai

4. Rollo, pp. 122-123.

5. Rollo, p. 149.
6. which provides formulas for valuation of land expropriated under RA 6657.
7. which provide for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of
depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for
land expropriated by the DAR.
8. Rollo, pp. 109-111. cdt

9. Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For the purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following shall be followed:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession
of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.

10. Rollo, p. 111.

11. Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations. — The PARC and the DAR shall have the power
to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry
out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10)
days after the publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
12. Rollo, pp. 111-112.
13. Rollo, p. 112. cdasia

14. Rollo, p. 107.

15. Rollo, p. 149.

16. Rollo, p. 63.
17. Rollo, p. 67.
18. Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425, 432 (1992).
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 19. Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission , 202 SCRA 507, 54 (1991) citing Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration,
33 SCRA 585, 589 (1970), citing Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 (1960);
Animos vs. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224.
20. Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines , 162 SCRA 628 (1988).
cdtai

21. Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate
the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and
the DAR and LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16
and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.

22. 175 SCRA 343.

23. Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 14. cdt

24. Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals , 190 SCRA 207, 213 (1990) citing
Cosculluela vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 393, 400 (1988);
Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, 302
(1987).
25. 175 SCRA 343, 392.

26. Mata vs. Court of Appeals , 207 SCRA 748, 753 (1992).

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