IAN H.

SUSVILLA REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW October 5, 2023

Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991

Facts: The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The
complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served
with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"Motion To Strike Out Some Portions Of The Complaint And For Bill Of Particulars Of
Other Portions" dated Nov. 3, 1987. The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the
movants, a reply to the opposition. The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the
movants, a reply to the opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a" motion
for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the
PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the
Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the
Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution. Tantoco and Santiago then filed an
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed
with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on
August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of August 25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories.
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the
second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended
interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG). Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: (1) Whether petitioner can object to the interrogatories served on it in

accordance with rule 25 of the rules of court.

(2) Whether Sandiganbayan erred in ordering for the production and inspection of
specified documents and things allegedly in the possession of PCGG.

Ruling: On the first issue, the court held in the negative. The State is, of course,
immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent.
But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character
and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The
PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming
to represent or act for the State. The suggestion that the State makes no implied
waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts in, or in matters
concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts
a distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary, the consent of
the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given
when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract.

On the second issue, the Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other
principal contention, of the nullity of the Sandigan bayan's Order for the production
and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its possession. The
Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced
and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as
PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered
objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret
or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be
presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those
documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial
for any purpose allowed by law. The PCGG says that some of the documents are
non-existent. This it can allege in response to the corresponding question in the
interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently
established that the denial is false. The claim that use of the documents is
proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt with. The PCGG is
however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other
privilege, constitutional or statutory. The Court finally finds that, contrary to the
petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of the
documents subject of the motion.

Security Bank Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 135874, January 25, 2000

Facts: The case was instituted by Petitioner in a Civil Case No. Q-97-30330 for
injunction and damages with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs Spouses Agustin P. Uy and
Pacita Tang Sioc Ten sought to enjoin Security Bank Corporation (SBC for brevity)
and the Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City from proceeding with the extra-judicial
foreclosure of a mortgage over a piece of property registered under the respondent
spouses' names.
A temporary restraining order was issued but subsequently lifted when the Judge
resolved to deny the spouses' application for a preliminary injunction. This denial
prompted the said plaintiffs to file a motion for the inhibition of the Judge and the
case was re-raffled to another branch. The parties filed their answers and reply with
compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim while defendant Domingo P. Uy before
filing his answer to defendant SBC's cross-claim, filed an Omnibus Motion
(Production of Documents and Suspension and/or Extension of Time to File Answer
to Cross-Claim) on the ground that all documents, papers and instruments made and
executed by SBC on the evaluation, processing and approval of the loans of Jackivi
Trading Center, Inc., the real estate mortgages (REM) and the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) themselves must first be produced before he could prepare and file
the answer to SBC's cross-claim. The trial court issued an Order denying the motion
and moved for the reconsideration of denial. On the other hand, plaintiffs also filed
the same Motion which the defendant SBC opposed the motion and so with
Domingo Uy's motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued the first assailed
Order granting the motions and to be done during usual business hours and day
after at least three (3) days notice in advance. SBC filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the Order, claiming that said order did not explain the basis for
requiring it to produce the requested documents, and that there was no good cause
for their production, hence, it cannot be compelled to produce the same. The Motion
for Partial Reconsideration was denied. The case reached the Court of Appeals and
affirming the trial court‘s decision. Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it sustained the Orders of the Respondent Regional Trial Court which granted
the respective Motions for Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents of
Respondents Spouses Agustin P. Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten and Domingo Uy.

Ruling: The Petition is bereft of merit. Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court
provides: Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which
an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection
and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in
the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party
to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or
any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time,
place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. The significance of the various
modes of discovery aims to enable the parties to inform themselves, even before the
trial, of all the facts relevant to the action, including those known only to the other
litigants. It not only eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby shortening them
considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table
so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. The
papers executed by the petitioner bank in evaluating and processing the real estate
mortgage are manifestly useful in his defense against its cross-claim. So also, the
additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi are material to the present action.
Because a witness of petitioner admitted in court that there was a third mortgage
contract between Jackivi and the bank, fair play demands that herein respondents
must be given the chance to examine such additional mortgage contracts. In so
doing, they can determine why petitioner was going after their property which was
invalidly mortgaged by Respondent Uy, while the properties of the actual borrower,
Jackivi, have not been touched or foreclosed by the bank. All in all, petitioner failed
to show any reversible error on the party of the Court of Appeals. The Motions of
respondents were for a good cause, and the documents sought were material to the
action pending before the trial court. Petition was denied and the assailed decision is
affirmed.

Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 108229, August 24, 1993

Facts: American President Lines, Ltd. (hereafter simply APL) sued Dasmariñas
Garments, Inc. (hereafter, simply Dasmariñas) to recover the sum of money as well
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In its answer, Dasmariñas specifically
denied any liability to the plaintiff APL, and set up compulsory counterclaims against
it. At the hearing, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that
it intended to take the depositions of its witnesses H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in
Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be
issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines in Taipei." Days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the
Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China
policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently
occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was
necessary and it therefore prayed" that commission or letters rogatory be issued
addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, to hear and take the oral deposition of the
aforenamed persons." The motion was opposed by Dasmariñas. It contended that
(a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek that a foreign court
examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was
unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;"
and (c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be
taken orally in open court and not by deposition." Extensive argument on the matter
thereafter followed, through various pleadings filed by the parties, in the course of
which APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its counsel from
Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., advising that "this
Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from the Department of
Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative
Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests through the
Department of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by
a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting information
inter alia of the mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or
an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained. The
Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL. The Court opined that "the Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may
take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only
upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses by serving cross-examination." Dasmariñas sought reconsideration by
motion but was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of
arguments already passed upon. The court then ordered APL "to take the necessary
steps to implement the order authorizing the deposition-taking of its witnesses not
later than the end of this month, otherwise the Court will consider inaction or lack of
interest as waiver to adduce additional evidence by deposition." Dasmariñas then
instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders
of the Trial Court just described. Said Appellate Court restrained enforcement of the
orders in order to maintain the status quo and to prevent the infliction of irreparable
damage and injury upon the petitioner. After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment denying Dasmariñas petition for certiorari and upholding the
challenged orders of the Trial Court. Once again, Dasmariñas sought reconsideration
of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Hence, the instant appeal
in the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Whether a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its
witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.

(2) Whether taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of

before the action comes to trial.

Ruling: On the first issue, the court held that depositions are chiefly a mode of
discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the
knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding
in court. Depositions are principally made by law to the parties as a means of
informing themselves of all the relevant facts. They are not therefore generally meant
to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. However,
depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness
stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes.
These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of
Court. The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is
dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is
consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. The deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the
Philippines or abroad.

On the second issue, the court held that depositions may be taken at any time after
the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that
limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking
of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a
Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further
proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the
process of execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40
SCRA 521, 544). Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure
from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open
court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure
is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits
such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and
testimony of the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying
eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is
taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the
existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness if out
of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of
trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition; or that the witness is unable to attend
to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4 Rule 24,
supra, emphasis supplied) — is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v.
Maceren, 95 Phil. 754). The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the
depositions of the witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing the
proponent's option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and
actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers and
observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. The imposition of such a
limitation, and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the
Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the condition —
that the deposition be taken "only upon written interrogatories" — is "so as to give
defendant (Dasmariñas) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving
cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will
not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral
examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be
taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to
cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there
conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination
merely by serving cross-interrogatories.

Fortune Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108119, January 19, 1994

Facts: An action for breach of contract was filed by Fortune Corporation against
Inter-Merchants Corporation, before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. After
respondent corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the former with written
interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories were
answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.
The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled. However, petitioner then served
upon private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of
Juanito A. Teope, in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private respondent filed
an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff's Notice to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging inter alia that : (a) herein petitioner
has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories
which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b)
there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral
deposition; (c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression
upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of
leaving the country; and (e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open
court if required during the trial on the merits. The trial court thereafter issued an
order that the requested deposition shall not be taken. Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the
Supreme Court which was referred to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
adjudication on the merits. Ca affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court
disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito S. Teope. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether absent the requisite element of "good cause", a trial court has
unbridled discretion to forbid the taking of deposition upon oral examination.

Ruling: The court held no, Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served
for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any
party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown,
the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the
deposition shall not be taken. This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to
order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the authority to
exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the
discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily,
capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the
spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained. Section 16 of Rule 24
clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause that the court may order
that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined
by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial
reason - one that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is
for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for determining the
question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause shown." The availability of
the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute “good cause” to justify
the court’s order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to
attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used
in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to
prohibit the taking of his deposition. The right to take statements and the right to use
them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in
taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is
accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the
facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a
substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of
the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the facts to the parties before
trial, drops out of the judicial picture. Under the concept adopted by the new Rules,
the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery - with use on trial
not necessarily contemplated - and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly,
no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of
depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the
use of oral testimony wherever practicable.