Mind Association

Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction

Author(s): Paul Saka
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 107, No. 425 (Jan., 1998), pp. 113-135
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction
PAUL SAKA

Quotemarks,I claim, serveto select fromthe multipleostensionsthatare

producedwheneverany expressionis uttered;they act to constrainprag-
maticambiguityor indeterminacy. My argumentproceedsby showingthat
the profferedaccountfaresbetterthanits rivals-the Name, Description,
Demonstrative,andIdentityTheories.Alongtheway I shallneedto explain
and emphasizethatquotingis not simply the same thing as mentioning.
Quoting,butnot mentioning,relieson the use of conventionaldevices.
Quotation is one mechanism by which we can mention; as such, it is used
for attributingexact words and thoughts to others; for distancing oneself
from a given word choice (as in scare quotes); for indicating titles; for
expressing irony (Sperber and Wilson 1981, Jorgensen et al. 1984, Groen-
ing 1996); and for explaining truth (the disquotation theory), meaning
(truth-theoretic semantics), external negation (Horn 1989), and indirect
discourse (Cappelen and LePore 1997, Seymour 1994, and the inscrip-
tional theory of Carnap 1937 and others). Finding out how quotation
works, therefore, is highly important.
I shall suggest that every expression token (e.g. this particularinscrip-
tion: cat) ambiguously or indeterminately refers to itself and to various
items associated with it (including the inscription-type"cat",the pronun-
ciation /kat/, the concept CAT,and the extension of cats). Quote marks-
by which I mean double apostrophes as used in the USA, single apostro-
phes as used in Britain, double angles as used in parts of Europe, italici-
zation, or any like conventional device-help to disambiguate the
intended reference, although they are usually neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for doing so.
This approach to understandingquotation is supported by its intrinsic
plausibility and by the fact that it fares better than its rivals. In defending
it, therefore, I shall summarize the extant theories of quotation and argue
that they are inadequate. ? 1 and ?2 rehearse the Name and Description
Theories and their familiar flaws. ?3 recounts the Demonstrative Theory
of Donald Davidson and raises a new objection, that it cannot handle iter-
ated quotation. ?4 untangles the Identity Theory and raises an analogous
objection, plus two others: one charging circularityand the other concern-
ing the quotation of abstracttypes. ?5 expounds my own account of quo-
tation as the formal disambiguationof multiple ostension, and enumerates
the ways in which it improves on the preceding theories.

Mind, Vol. 107 . 425 . January 1998 C)Oxford University Press 1998

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114 Paul Saka

1. The Name Theory

You can referto anything,includinga linguisticexpression,by using its

name;and you can assign a nameto any objectpresentby exhibitinga
label alongwith an act of ostension.Forexample
(1) greeneggs andham
Thelabel"(1)"nowrefersto thephrase"greeneggs andham".Inthiscase
the label is well motivated.First-given the scholarlypracticeof using
parenthesesin the dubbingof expressions the parenthesessuggest(but
do not entail)that an act of dubbingis at hand.Second, the numeraln
withinparenthesessuggests(butdoesnotentail)thattheexhibitedexpres-
sion is thenthexpressionto be namedin thepresentpaper.Althoughthese
elements-the parenthesesandnumeral-possess mnemonicvalue,they
are arbitraryfrom the point of view of compositionalsemantics.The
meaningof "(1)"is not a functionof the "meanings"of "(...)" and "1".
"(1)"couldhavereferred,if my dubbinghadbeenmorehaphazard, to any
expressionat all. "(1)"is not a descriptionbuta name.
In like manner,accordingto the Name Theory,quoted expressions
nametheirreferents.Tarskiwrites
Quotation-mark
namesmaybe treatedlike single wordsof a lan-
guage ... the single constituents of these names ... fulfil the same
functionas the lettersandcomplexesof successivelettersin sin-
gle words. Hence they can possess no independentmeaning.
(Tarski1933,p. 159)
In the samevein Quinewrites
From the standpointof logical analysis each whole quotation
mustbe regardedas a single wordor sign, whose partscountfor
no more than serifs or syllables ... The meaning of the whole does
not dependuponthe meaningsof the constituentwords.(Quine
1940,p. 26]
ForTarski,Quine,andscoresof textbooksin logic, quotationsarenames.
Theforward productivityproblem
Of coursethe Name Theoryis an utterfailure,since the quotemarkis a
systematicallyproductivedevice thatcan be appliedto expressionsthat
we haveneverheardquotedbefore.This argumentis so obviousthatone
wonderswhetherTarskiandQuinecould haveseriouslymeantthatquo-
tations in naturallanguage functionjust like propernames. Richard
(1986) andBennett(1988) thinkthatthey used "name"in the sense of a
denotingphraseor singularterm,andI wouldtoo if it werenot forthe fact
thatTarskiandQuinearebothso clearaboutdenyingthatquotationscon-
tain meaningfulstructure.PerhapsQuinemeantthatquotationsfunction

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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction 115

like namesonly in so faras mathematical

logic is concerned,butthisposi-
tion does not appearto be Tarski's,who claims that the Name Theory
"seemsto be the mostnaturalone andcompletelyin accordancewith the
customaryway of usingquotationmarks"(1933, p. 160).
The reverse productivityproblem
Justas we can productivelygo fromknowingany expressionto knowing
its quotation,we can go fromknowingthe quotationof any expressionto
knowingthe expressionitself. ConsiderAnscombe'spuzzle, which gen-
eralizesbeyondpersonalnamesto all linguisticlabels
If I amtold"Thatman'snameis 'Smith"',his nameis mentioned,
not used, and I hearthe name of his namebut not his name ...
[Hence]It is impossibleto be toldanyone'sname[orthewordfor
anything].(Anscombe1957,p. 49)
The patent falsehood of the conclusion establishes the falsity of the
premise,thatto mentiona nameis to namethe name.
The simultaneityproblem
AnotherargumentagainsttheNameTheoryis thatexpressionscan simul-
taneouslybe usedandmentioned.Quine(1943) notesthatthementionof
"Giorgione"in (2) providesforthe interpretation
of "so-called"while the
use of the very samewordprovidesfor the interpretationof "hissize":
(2) Giorgionewas so-calledbecauseof his size.
(3) Giorgionewas called"Giorgione"becauseof his size.
This wouldpose a problemfor the Name Theory,which imposesa rigid
distinctionbetweenuse andmention,butQuinetriesto escapeby claim-
ing that(2) is ellipticalfor (3).
Quinenot only fails to describetransformational proceduresby which
statementsof type (2) mightderivefromstatementsof type(3), he fails to
give anyreasonfor supposingthatthe necessarykindsof principleseven
exist. Sufficeit to say thatother,moreproblematic,cases of simultaneous
use-mentionexist
(4) Quine says that quotation "... is weird".
As Davidson(1979) observes,andCappelenandLePore(1997) empha-
size, the materialinsidethe quotemarks(minusthe ellipsis, to be strict)
is mentionedin so far as I am attributingexact words to Quine.At the
same time, the words are being used in so far as they form a predicate
ratherthana nounphrase,singularterm,or name.
The generallyacknowledgedinadequacyof the Name Theoryleads to
the DescriptionTheory.

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116 Paul Saka

2. TheDescription Theory

Linguisticexpressionscan be describedin variousways:

EMPIRICALLY:The first sentence of Tale of Two Cities.
LEXICALLY:(with or withoutan associatedphrase structure):
The sentencebeginningwith "It",then"was",then"the",
ORTHOGRAPHICALLY: The sentence beginningwith I, then t,
then space, then w, then a, then s, ...
PHONOLOGICALLY: The sentence beginningwith /1/, then It!,
thenIw/, then/a I, then/z/, ...
The so-calledstructuraldescriptions-those basedon the formal(ortho-
graphic/phonological) elementsor thesubstantive(lexical)elements-are
used in differentversionsof the DescriptionTheoryof Quotation.
Accordingto the orthographicversionof the DescriptionTheory,the
quotationof anexpressiondescribes,letterforletter,whatis beingquoted.
Thus, "cat"= the expressionformedby cee followedby ay followedby
tee. (Tarski(1933) andQuine(1960)advocatethisapproachin additionto
.the Name Theory,and Richard(1986) in effect defendsit as well.) This
accountrelies uponnamingin so faras cee is the nameof "c", ay is the
nameof "a",andtee is the namefor "t",andso on for all charactersused
in the language.However,the DescriptionTheoryis not limited as the
NameTheoryis whenit comesto constructingandinterpreting quotations
of novel expressions.
Geach(1957, Sc. 18) holdsa lexicalversionof the DescriptionTheory,
accordingto which the quotationof an expressiondescribes,word for
word,whatis beingquoted.This improveson the orthographic versionin
thatit explicitlytreats"thecat in the hat"notjust as a sequenceof mean-
inglessmarksbutas a stringof language.At the sametime,it is less plau-
sible thanthe orthographicversionin so far as it postulatesa primitive
namefor everylexemein the language.
Problems revisited
Clearly,both versionsof the DescriptionTheoryfall to the same argu-
mentsthatdefeatedthe NameTheory.(i) The Descriptiontheoryfails to
explainhow simultaneoususe andmentionis possible.(ii) Althoughthe
DescriptionTheory,especiallythe orthographic version,canproductively
deal with some novel expressions,it still cannotdeal with foreign and
non-linguisticmarks.I can say "<x"is a Greekletter,andyou can under-
standme evenif you hadneverencounteredGreekbeforein yourlife. Fur-
ther,as Searle(1969, p. 76) notices,I can say "Thesoundof a California
jay is ..." and you can understand me even though "..." cannot be

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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction 117

describedby any namesfor phonic,orthographic, or lexical items in any

humanlanguage.Moreover,aproposthe lexical theory,I can quotenon-
sense, bothcomic (5) andtragic(6):
(5) "Twas brillig and the slithy toves/Did gyre and gimble in the
wabe ..."
(6) Upon expiring,he said "ggnnph".
Again,you wouldunderstand whatI havesaid.Disputingtherelevanceof
citednonsenseandanimalsounds,GeachandBennettrespectivelywrite:
Properlyspeaking, these are not quotationsat all; we cannot
quote sheernonsense,we canonly parrotit. (Geach1957, Sc. 18)
Onemightoccasionallyputa scrawlor doodlebetweenquotation
marks,andbe understoodto have referredto its shape,but only
as a joking extensionof conventionalquotation.(Bennett1988,
p. 405)
The formerresponsenakedlyassertsthatthere is a differencebetween
quotation and parroting,which is precisely the point in contention
betweenthe DescriptionTheoryandthe picturetheories(to be discussed
in the remainingsectionsof this paper).The latterresponserelies on the
intuitionthatcitationof scrawlsis fundamentallyhumorousor non-seri-
ous. WhileI do not sharethisjudgmentmyself, I can see why you would
wantto hold it if, like Bennett,you subscribeto a hybridtheorythatcom-
bines elementsof descriptionand demonstration. Accordingto Bennett,
everyquotation"X"meanssomethinglike
Thetypewhose everytokenresembles,in respectsRI ... Rn, this:
X.
RespectsR, ... R, arelanguage-relative.In English,the relevantrespects
for identifyingtokensas types involve(for instance)top-bottomorienta-
tion("u"versus"n"),butnot ink-color.Referenceto RI ... Rnprovidesthe
Bennettaccountwith descriptivecontent;referenceto "this:X" provides
content.The theoryavoidssome of the problemsof
it with demonstrative
the pureDescriptionTheory,butis susceptibleto the samecriticismsthat
applyto the "paratactic"
Demonstrative Theory.

3. The Demonstrative Theory

We can refer to materialobjectsvia deictic demonstrationor pointing.

Whenwe do thisto the ink or soundwavesthatmakeup linguistictokens,
we quote. This is the theory of Davidson(1979); his followers Partee
(1973), Goldstein(1984), Garcia-Carpintero (1994), and Cappelenand
LePore(1997); and, uncitedby them,Christensen(1967). Accordingto

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118 Paul Saka

Davidson'sversionof the theory,quotemarksreferto the shape of the

quotedmaterial.'Thus(7) is equivalentto (8).
(7) "Cats"is a noun.
(8) Cats.Thatcomplexof shapesis a noun.
pronoundoes the
In (8), cats is semanticallyinertwhilethe demonstrative
referring.2Likewise, in (7), cats is semanticallyinert while the quote
marksdo the referring.Thisapproachexplainshow quotationcanbe pro-
ductive,and it holds promisefor explaininghow simultaneoususe and
mentionis possible (a promiseon which Cappelenand LePore(1997)
beginto makegood).
Thepunctuation problem
Washington(1992) claims thatspokenquotationdoes not requirequote
marks,andthat(7) can be readwithoutsaying"quote-unquote", without
In
quotativeintonation,andwithoutfinger-quotegestures. effect, (9) is a
grammaticalandtruesentence
(9) Catsis a noun.
The pointcan be madeeven stronger,I mightadd.Quotemarksareoften
omittedin writingas well (contraReimer1996):it is downrightnormal,
outsideof scholarlywriting,to excludequotemarks,especiallyin con-
structionslike "Thewordcats is a noun";andeven in logic publications,
where one might expectthe greatestexactitude,it is commonfor quote
marksto be omitted.
If the quotedwordis semanticallyinertandthuscanbe takenout of the
sentence,andif the quotemarksaremerelyoptionalpunctuationwith no
realsemanticrole,then(7) oughtto be equivalentto (10).
(10) Is a noun.
Yet it is not. Therefore,accordingto Washington,(7) cannotbe analyzed
as the DemonstrativeTheoryclaims.
In response,Garcia-Carpintero (1994) grantsthe legitimacyof (9) and
he concurswith Washingtonand currentlinguistictheorythat (10) con-
tains no implicitsubject,demonstrativeor otherwise.None the less, he
says, somedemonstrative elementis understoodby contextand/orconver-
sationalimplicature.
'Washington(1992) criticizesDavidson'stheoryon the groundsthatquotation
may refer to size and other featuresaside from shape, and Garcia-Carpintero
(1994) concurs.Granted,I can truthfullysay "a" is smallerthan"a".However,
"shape"can referto all sortsof formalproperties,includingsize. Afterall, size is
a geometricalfeature,speakingin the strictest,mathematicalsense.
2 Forthe sake of clarity,I sometimesuse doubleapostrophes anditalicization
as interchangeable marksof quotation.WhenI put a wordin italicsand a set of
apostrophes,it is equivalentto beinginsideof twosets of apostrophes.

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 Quotationand the Use-MentionDistinction 119

Garcia-Carpintero's adversionto conversationalimplicatureis left

undeveloped,andI haveno cluehowit mightgo. Thereferenceto context,
however,is clearer.We often mix languagewith manifestcontextin our
attemptsto communicate.As Christensen(1967) says, for instance
Standingin frontof a Studebaker,thereis thusno needof saying,
"Thiscaris a Studebaker." We can simplypointat it andsay "A
Studebaker!" withoutuse of any name or description[or verbal
deictic].(Christensen1967,p. 360)
However, comparingquotationto contextualdeixis in this way goes
againstthe evidence.Onlya foreignspeakerwouldeverpointat a carand
say "is a Studebaker".If you were to omit the subject"this"you would
omitthe copula"is"as well. The sameprincipleshouldapplyto metalin-
guisticreference,absentany accountthatpredictsthe contrary.
As a matterof terminology,I would suggestthatquotationtautologi-
cally requiresquote marks.This is not to deny the existence of state-
ments like (9), wherementioningoccurswithoutquotemarks,but only
to insist that mentioningis not the same thing as quoting.An expres-
sion withoutquotemarks,even if it is being mentioned,is linguistically
distinctfrom an expressionwith quotemarks,and it will prove conve-
nient below in ?5 to reservea special term for the latter "quotation"
being the most appropriate.Of course, none of this underminesthe
thrustof Washington'spunctuationargumentagainst the Demonstra-
tive Theory.
The recursion problem
The DemonstrativeTheoryalso fails to accountfor iteratedquotation.
Justas we can referto the wordin (1 1), a verb,by meansof formingthe
metawordin (12), a noun phrase,we can refer to the word in (12) by
means of formingthe metametawordin (13), ad infinitum.(It is clear
that quotationsare noun phrases,as they functionas grammaticalsub-
jects.):
(1 1) Sit
(12) "Sit"
(13) "'Sit"'
Butthe Demonstrative Theorytranslatestheperfectlygood (14) into(15),
which in turntranslateseitherinto the uninterpretable(16) or else into
(17).
(14) "'Sit"'is a nounphrase.
(15) "Sit."Thatis a nounphrase.
(16) Sit. Thatthatis a nounphrase.
(17) Sit. That.Thatis a nounphrase.

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120 Paul Saka

The problemis that(17) fails undereverypossibleconstrual.(i) The sec-

ond"that"cannotreferto the first"that".Althoughthe first"that"-being
a pronoun-does in factconstitutea nounphrase,thismovegives all iter-
atively quoted expressionsthe same reference:"'sit"' and "'eat"' for
instancewouldeachdenotethe interiorquotemarks;(18) wouldwrongly
come out false while (19, 20) wouldwronglycome out true.
(18) "'Sit"'contains5 characters(includingtwo quotemarks).
(19) "'Sit"'contains2 characters(Justinteriorquotemarks).
(20) "'Sit"'is a pairof quotemarks.
(ii) Nor canthe secondthat in (17) referto the entirecomplex"Sit.That."
Forthis sequence,beingotherthana nounphrase,wouldcontradict(14).
(iii) Nor can the second "that"in (17) refer to the referentof the first
"that",to "Sit".Forthis verb,beingotherthana nounphrase,wouldalso
contradict(14). Besides, there is no linguisticreason for thinkingthat
sucha demonstrative in sucha positioncouldreferin this transitiveway;
and even if therewere, we would againend up havingto deny (18), this
time havingto say
(21) "'Sit"'containsjust 3 characters.
The only way thatI see for the DemonstrativeTheoryto avoid outright
falsehoodis for the recursivesemanticsof the languageto freezewhen it
reachesquotationswithinquotations.But this move is empiricallyunsat-
isfactory,for Englishdoes not distinguishbetweenexteriorquotemarks
andinteriorquotemarksexceptas a stylisticdeviceto remindthe reader
whenthereis a quotewithina quote;the interiorquotemarksdo not, intu-
itively,possess a sense distinctfromthe exteriormarks.Furthermore, this
move is theoreticallyad hoc, as thereis no independentmotivationfor
treatingquotationas the sole exceptionto the rulethatsyntacticallyrecur-
sive constructionspossess recursivesemantics.3

4. TheIdentity Theory

Frege (1892), Quine (1940, pp. 26, 40), Wittgenstein(1953, Sc. 16),
Tajtelbaum(1957), Whitely (1957), Searle (1969, p. 75), Washington
(1992), andReimer(1996) canall be takenas advocatingthe IdentityThe-
ory, accordingto which quotationis "autonymous"(not, as Davidson
(1979) repeatedlywrites,"autonomous"). Unfortunatelythe brevityand
3Cappelenand LePore(1997, p. 439) note the non-iterativityof quotation
withintheirDemonstrative Theory,thoughtheydo not recognizeit as a problem.
Grandy(1973, p. 106) notes an analogousrecursionproblemfor Davidson's
paratactictheoryof indirectdiscourse.

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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction 121

imprecisenessof these workspose problemsof interpretation. Washing-

ton,who gives a comparatively clearaccount,says:"inquotation,expres-
sions are used to mentionthemselves"(1992, p. 583). This is open to at
leastthreeconstruals.(i) It mightmeanthatwhenan expressionis a quo-
tationthen it refersto itself:(a) refersto (a).
a
"6cat"
b

The problemhereis thatit makesthe IdentityTheorycircular:it explains

quotation(a) in termsof quotation(a), whichwe cannotunderstanduntil
we alreadyunderstandwhat is being explained.(ii) AlternativelyWash-
ingtonmightmeanthat,insidethe contextof quotationmarks,an expres-
sion refersto itself:(b) refersto (b). The problemhereis thatalthoughit
explainsthe semanticvalueof (b), it does not explainthe semanticvalue
of eitherthe quotemarksor the quotation(a) as a whole. The claim that
(b) refersto (b) mightbe true,butunless it is conjoinedto some account
of the doubleapostropheit hardlycontributesto the theoryof quotation.
(iii) Finally,Washingtonmightmean that(a) refersto (b), and thatthis
countsas self-referencebecause(a) is the sameas (b), semanticallyspeak-
ing. This, I believe, is whatthe IdentityTheoristmeansto say and must
say:while quotemarksadda pragmaticflourish,theypossessno semantic
valueof theirown.
Whereasthe DemonstrativeTheoristregardsquotemarks(or context)
as referentialand the quotedmaterialas an inert adjunct,the Identity
Theoristconverselyregardsthe quotedmaterialas (self-)referentialand
the quote marksas semanticallyempty.Despite these differences,the
IdentityandDemonstrativeaccountscan bothbe calledpicturetheories,
for both claim thatquotationresemblesits referent,the quotedmaterial.
Picture theories are supportedby the prevalence of belief in word
magic.Wordmagiciansof whatI will call TypeI obscurethe distinction
betweenthe use of a wordandits referent.In bothpre-literateandmod-
em scientific societies, for instance, people commonly believe in the
potencyof "jinxes":referringto somethingbadwill makeit more likely
to happen.Wordmagiciansof Type II obscurethe distinctionbetween
the mere mention of a word and its use. Thus even the highly edu-
cated-teachers and editors-generally refuseto publiclyquoteobscen-
ities. They omit them altogether or else print ciphers like "f***". Now
what is the difference between "f***" and "fuck"? Whereas the
DescriptionTheoryis forcedto mistakenlyhold thatthereis little differ-
ence between the two, picture theories can explain why one is more

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122 Paul Saka

offensive thanthe other:the one picturesthe actualobscenitywhereas

the otherdoes not.4
Likethe Demonstrative Theory,the IdentityTheoryavoidsthe produc-
tivityproblemand(perhaps)the simultaneityproblem.But againlike the
Demonstrative Theory,it facesits ownversionof therecursionproblem-
plus problemsaboutspeech-actsandmultipleambiguity.
The recursionproblem
Since the IdentityTheory treats quote marks as semantically empty,
"'sunset"'musthavethe samemeaningandreferenceas "sunset".Dupli-
cating quote marks is like ending an interrogativewith two question
marks.It may add emphasis,but thatis all. Yet "'sunset"'and "sunset"
havedistinctreferents;thus,the IdentityTheorymustbe wrong.
The IdentityTheoristmay respondthat"'sunset"'and"sunset"arenot
equivalentsimpliciter;rather,the use of "'sunset"'is equivalentto the
mentionof "sunset".This claim may be rightso far as it goes, but it is
ratheranemicin two differentways. First,it hardlyseems characteristic
of the IdentityTheory;I doubtthatany othertheorywould deny it. Sec-
ond, it invites an explicationof the use-mentiondistinction,which the
IdentityTheorynevereven attemptsto give. Butthis pointanticipatesthe
next one.
The speech-act (circularity/vacuity)problem
Accordingto the IdentityTheory,"Kim"refersto itself, thatis to "Kim".
Butwe also knowthat"Kim"refersto Kim.Since"Kim"andKimarenot
the same, we are forced into concludingthat "Kim"possesses distinct
senses or uses. This leaves the IdentityTheoristwith the taskof giving a
theoryof use. It wouldbe nice to knowwhat"uses"are (even a pretheo-
retic characterizationwould be helpful); the criteriafor individuating
uses;therelationbetweena word'shavingmultipleuses andits beingpol-
ysemous;andso forth.
Consideringthe link betweenthe IdentityTheoryand the speech-act
tradition,we might wonderwhetherwe can find an answerin termsof
4'Whileit is clearthatwordmagic of TypeI is irrational,TypeII is a doubtful
case. In any event,I apologizeif I offendany sensibilities,andhope you see that
my pointmighthavebeenlost hadI stuckto ciphersandcircumlocutions.
PerhapsI oughtto clarifythat"wordmagic"is a standardanthropological term
(cf. OgdenandRichards1923),andI am not using it as an impliedad hominem
againstanybody.ObviouslyI am not tryingto taintthe Name and Description
Theoristsby this terminology,for they denythe existence,or at least the signifi-
cance,of wordmagic.Justas obviouslyI am not tryingto taintpicturetheorists,
for the picturetheory,or somethinglike it, is what I am advocating.WhatI do
wantto do is to emphasizesomerobustpropertiesof quotationthatget ignoredin
the philosophicalliterature.

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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction 123

illocutionaryforce.Unfortunatelythe prospectslook dim.To beginwith,

we cannotsimply distinguishuse and mentionby introducinga "quota-
tive"illocutionaryforce, as this move is eithervacuousor circular.It is
vacuous if the quotativeforce is left undefined,uncharacterized,and
unexplained;it is circularif mentioningis explicatedby the quotative
force, and the quotativeforce is explicatedby mentioning.At the same
time, we do not wantto contrastquotationsandnon-quotationsin terms
of the presenceor absenceof the familiarillocutionaryforces either.We
do not wantto say,for instance,thatwhereas(22) makesa genuineasser-
tion, (23) is a merelocution,lackingillocutionaryforce.
(22) The earthis flat.
(23) "Theearthis flat."
Althoughit is truethatI am not asserting(23), I am quotingsomeone-
perhapshypothetical,perhapsnot-as havingmade an assertionrather
thanqueryor command.Onlyby acknowledgingthatthe quotationcon-
tainsassertiveforcewithinit can we understandthat(23) calls for assent
or dissent,that(23) is trueor false. Besides which, if quotationslacked
illocutionaryforce, therewould be no way to treatiteratedquotation.If
(23) is a merelocution,distinguishedfrom(22) by lackof assertion,what
would distinguish(23) from(24)?
(24) "'Theearthis flat."'
In summary,neitherillocutionaryforcesnor anythingin the literatureof
IdentityTheoryprovidesmeansfor distinguishingbetweenquotationand
non-quotation.
The multiple ambiguityproblem
Tokensrefer(or areusedto refer);typesdo not (arenot).This is the case
for all sortsof words,but is most evidentfor indexicals:the tokenof "I"
in the abstractof this paperrefersto PaulSaka,whereasothertokensin
otherplacesandtimesreferto otherindividuals.Abstractedfromparticu-
lar speakers,"I"does not refer to anyone. If we accept this view that
tokensreferwhile typesdo not, andif we agreewiththe IdentityTheorist
thatquotedexpressionsreferto themselves,thenwe must concludethat
while expressiontokensmaybe quoted,expressiontypesmaynot. Toput
it anotherway: tokenshave the capacityto refer,hence the capacityto
referto themselves,hencethe capacityto be usedin quotations.Typesdo
not refer,hence do not referto themselves,hence cannotbe used in quo-
tations.
Yetthisis nothowquotationworks(cf. Garver1965,Christensen1967,
Goldstein 1984, Seymour 1994). Quotationis multiply ambiguousor
indeterminate: you can stick quotemarksarounda tokento referto that

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124 Paul Saka

very token(25); to referto some othertokenof the sametype (26); or to

referto its type (27).
(25) "I"refersto me.
(26) "I",as saidby you, refersto you.
(27) "I"does not referto anyonein particular;only tokensof it do.
Moreover,quotationscanreferto wordsunderstoodas form-contentpair-
ings (28); to lexemes understoodas words abstractedfrom theirinflec-
tionalparadigms(29); to forms,thatis spellingsor pronunciations(30);
andto contentbothimmediate(31) andtranslated(32).
(28) "Run"is used in the third-person pluralbutnot singular.
(29) "Run"refersto run, runs, ran, running.
(30) "Run"consistsof threeletters.
(31) The concept"premise"is the sameas the concept"premiss".
(32) Galileo(who spokeno English)said,"Theearthmoves!".
It is even possible for quotationsto "refer"to non-existentsgiven that
types, lexemes, and contentare all somewhatcontroversialtheoretical
entities.In the event that lexemes, say, do not really exist, "thelexeme
'air"'wouldreferto a certainlexeme,thatis to nothing;it wouldnotrefer
to air.Thus,examples(2&-32)showthattherereallyaredifferentkindsof
quotation,regardlessof whethertypes,lexemes,andcontentarereal.
Formostpurposesit is notnecessaryto distinguishbetweentoken-quo-
tationandtype-quotation,or betweenword-quotation andlexeme-quota-
tion, or between form-quotationand content-quotation;the intended
interpretationis eitherimmaterialor else obvious.When it mattersfor
scholarlypurposes,however,writerswill sometimesexplicitlystipulatea
system of distinctquote marks.Lyons (1977), Atlas (1989), and Horn
(1989), for instance,all prefacetheirworksby glossing doubleapostro-
phes, single apostrophes,italics,and small-capitalletters,each with one
or moredifferentfunctions.Whatthis againprovesis thatquotedtokens
can, contraIdentityTheorists,refernot only to themselvesbut to related
sortsof linguisticitemsas well.
Now the IdentityTheoristcould arguethatusing an expressionis like
using a hammerin thatit implicatesseveralparts,plus the whole, all at
once. Justas in hammeringyou use a hammer,its handle,yourarm,and
perhapsa nail, so in speakingyou use a wordtoken,a wordtype,a lexeme
token,a lexeme type, etc. By using a wordtokenin mentionmode, you
quotea wordtoken;by using a lexemetype in mentionmode, you quote
a lexeme type;and so forth.Any sortof linguisticitem at all can thusbe
referredto by quotation.
But in hammering,you simultaneouslyuse many implicatedcompo-
nents.By analogy,theuse of an expressionin mentionmodeoughtto col-

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 Quotationand the Use-MentionDistinction 125

lectively refer to types, tokens, forms, and content. This is not what
happens,of course;statements(25-32) must be read in highly specific
ways to be true,or evento be grammatical(eachis third-person singular).
Thereforethe IdentityTheoryfails regardlessof whetheror not it invokes
the hammermetaphor.5

5. Formal disambiguation of multiple ostension

My own understandingof quotationbegins with the notion of deferred

ostension(Quine 1968, Nunberg1978, Fauconnier1985; cp. Goldstein
1984, Reimer1996).Direct ostensionassociatesa termwith its referent
via immediateexperience,for instanceby deicticdemonstration or by the
simple exhibitionof an item. Deferred ostensionto an absentobjectX
may be securedby pointingat or describingsomethingpresentthat is
salientlyrelatedto X. For example,by pointingat a newspaperyou can
referto a newspaperoffice or a newspapercompany:
(33) [Pointingat paper]I've got to get over theretodayandplace my
ad.
(34) [Pointingat paper]Theywereboughtout by Murdoch.
Pointing is not necessary;you can also verballydescribeone thing in
orderto referto another:
(35) The school [meaningthe schoolbuilding]burneddowntoday.
(36) The hamsandwich[thecustomer]is waitingfor hercheck.
The "pragmaticfunctions"thatmapfromdescriptionto intendedreferent
are, as you would expect, squishy.None the less, researchby Norrick
(1981) identifiesa numberof recurringassociations,forexamplebetween
merchandiseandmanufacturer (34), institutionandphysicalinstantiation
(35), processandproduct,causeandeffect,partandwhole, containerand
content;while researchby Nunberggets at such generalprinciplesas
"recoverability".
I claimthateveryuse of languageis an actof multipleostension,partly
directandpartlydeferred,of at leastthe followingkindsof items.
5Boolos (1995) discussesanotherkindof ambiguity,one dueto scope.Forin-
stance,(i) denoteseither(ii) or (iii):
(i) "a"followedby "b"
(ii) ab
(iii) a"followedby "b
Incidentally,Boolos proposesa way of resolvingsuchambiguity:in an ideallan-
guage you could use subscriptsso thateach left quotemarkgets explicitlyand
uniquelypairedup with some rightquotemark.

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126 Paul Saka

(a) orthographic form:cat

(b) phonicform:/ket/
(c) lexical entry:<cat, /kat/, countnoun,CAT>
(d) intension:CAT
(e) extension:{x:x a cat}
First,exposureto the writtenlabel cat (a) or the spokenlabel /ket/ (b)
evokes the correspondinglexeme (c) in every competent speaker of
English,wherea lexeme is an arbitraryorderedn-tupleincludingortho-
graphicform,phonicform,syntacticcategory,meaning,register,etc.6This
evocationhappensautomaticallyandspontaneouslyas a resultof human
cognitivearchitecture trainedin English(see Fodor1983on thereflex-like
natureof language-processing).Second, the lexeme <cat, /kwt/, noun,
CAT> specifiesthe intensionCAT (d) accordingto the pragmaticfunction
WHOLE-PART.Third,CAT determinestheextension{x:x a cat} (e) accord-
ing to some mysteriousbutwidely assumedfunction.Thus,the utterance
of"cat"-which directlyostendsorexhibitsthephonictoken/kwt/-defer-
ringlyostendsthe corresponding formtype,the lexeme<cat, /kwt/,noun,
CAT>, theconceptCAT,thecustomary referent{x:x a cat}, etc.Theseitems
forma packagedealin whichyou cannotget the labelwithoutgettingthe
rest.
Withthis understanding of deferredostensionin mind,I proposethat
use andmentioncan be understoodas follows.7
(u) SpeakerS uses an expressionX iff:
(i) S exhibitsa tokenof X;
(ii) S therebyostendsthe multipleitemsassociatedwithX
(includingX's extension);
(iii) S intendsto directthe thoughtsof the audienceto the
extensionof X.
(m) Speaker S mentions an expression X iff:
(i) S exhibitsa tokenof X;
(ii) S therebyostendsthe multipleitemsassociatedwithX;
(iii) S intendsto directthe thoughtsof the audienceto some
item associatedwithX otherthanits extension.
For example,let X = the phrase"everycat".Then(i) S exhibitsa token
of Xby eitherwritingevery cat or uttering/Evrikwt/or even by pointing
6 simplicity I subsume the phonetic and the phonological under the
"phonic".
'I use "use"and "mention"in theirtechnicalsenses (to utilize an expression
with customaryreferenceversusto utilizeit in referenceto itself). It seems thatI
need to makethis clearbecausesome writersinsist that,in orderto mentionan
expression,you needto use it (Geach1950,Ziff 1960,p. 27, Garver1965,David-
son 1965 and 1979).The sense in whichthis is obviouslytrueis irrelevant.

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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction 127

at someoneelse's tokening,as happensin charades.(iia) Such an exhibi-

tion directlyostendsthe tokenformevery cat or /Evrikwt/;andit defer-
ringly ostends the types every cat and /Evri kxt/ and the noun phrase
sequence made up of the two lexemes <every, /Evri/, determiner,
EVERY>+ <cat, /ket/, countnoun,CAT>-that is the nounphrasestruc-
(iib) In addition it
catN]NP and its intension EVERY(CAT).
ture [everyDET
deferringlyostends, as reference,every cat. (iii) In the case of use, S
intends"everycat"to referto everycat;in the case of mention,S intends
"everycat"to referto some item thatis salientlyassociatedwith "every
cat"otherthanits extension,thatis to one of the itemslistedunder(iia).
AlthoughI have characterized the use-mentiondistinctionin termsof
extension,referentialistsemanticsis by no meansessentialto my account.
I myselfpreferthe anti-realist"internalsemantics"of Jackendoff(198313),
which construes "reference"as a solipsistic mental state; others are
invitedto adjust(u) and (m) accordingto theirown favoredtheoriesof
meaning.
The accountofferedpossesses a numberof virtues.To begin with, it
allows for the existenceof mentioningwithoutquotemarks.In addition,
it revealshow muchuse andmentionhavein common.Althoughthe ref-
erenceclauses(u-iii) and(m-iii) differfromeachother,this differenceis
madepossibleby the samebackgroundconditions:the existenceof a con-
ventionalizedlanguage(ii) andits exercise(i). Finally,it followsfromfor-
mulations(u) and(m) thatuse andmention,thoughdistinct,areperfectly
compatible:you can intendto directthe thoughtsof youraudienceto the
customaryreferenceof X while at the same time intendingto directthe
thoughtsof youraudienceto otherthingsas well, for exampleto X itself.
Thus,my accountopensa pathfortreatingsimultaneoususe andmention.
Withthe foregoingunderstanding of use andmentionin place, we are
now preparedto considerthe definitionof quotation.Syntactically,a pair
of quotemarksis a discontinuousdeterminer(a complexsymbolwhich,
appliedto an argumentexpression,producesa noun phrase).Semanti-
cally,a pairof quotemarksis a conceptor intension,QUOT,whichambig-
uously or indeterminatelymaps its argumentexpressionX into some
linguisticitem salientlyassociatedwithX otherthanthe extensionof X.
Althoughquotemarksgenerallydo not specifyamongtoken,type, form,
and concept,they still serve to partiallydisambiguate,for they rule out
customaryreferenceas the intendedinterpretation. Thus,the speakerwho
uses quotemarksannounces"Iamnot(merely)usingexpressionXbut am
mentioningit".
So far we have seen, in the explanationof (u) and (m), how use and
mentionwithoutquotationwork.To see how use andmentionwithquota-
tion work, supposeX = the singly quotedexpression"cat".8 Then (i) S

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128 Paul Saka

exhibitsa tokenofXby writing"cat" or by uttering/kwotkaet&nkwot/or

by uttering/kaet/with distinctiveintonationor accompanyingfingerges-
tureor by just uttering/kaet/.(iia) Suchan exhibitiondirectlyostendsthe
orthographictoken"cat" or some spokencounterpart; and it deferringly
the
ostends corresponding type, and the nounphrase structure["DET[cat]N"
DET]NPand its intension QUOT(cat).(iib) The latter ambiguously specifies
the extension:the tokencat, the type cat, the token/kaet/,the type /ket/,
the structure[cat]N,or the conceptCAT. (iii) In the case of use, S intends
"cat" to referto the extensionof "cat", namelyto one of the items listed
under(iib). In the case of mention,S intends"cat" to referto some item
salientlyassociatedwith "cat" otherthanits extension,namelyto one of
the items listed under (iia).
As a consequenceof my account,the mentionof X andthe use of "X'
quiteproperlysecurethe samereference.Further,whereasthe use-men-
tion distinctionis characterizedin termsof the speaker'sintentions,the
distinctionbetweena quotationanda non-quotation is a formal,grammat-
ical affair.Distinguishingbetweenuse andmentionin a languagewithout
quote marksis a purelypragmaticaffair,but in a languagewith quote
marksmentioningcanbe explicitlymarked(althoughsuchmarkingis not
obligatory).
Now supposeX= the doublyquoted"'cat"'. Then(i) S exhibitsa token
of Xby writing"'cat"'. (iija) Suchan exhibitiondirectlyostendsthe token
form "'cat"', and it deferringly ostends the type "'cat"' and the noun
phrase structure ["DET [ DET catN DET]NP DET]NP and its intension
QUOT("cat"). (iib) The latter ambiguously specifies as extension: the
token "cat", the type "cat', the structure["DET catN DET]NPS or the concept
QUOT(cat).(iii) In the case of use, S intends "'cat"' to refer to one of the
itemslistedunder(iib). In the case of mention,S intends"'cat"'to referto
some item listed under (iia). In short, the Disambiguation Theory correctly
handlesiteratedquotation.
My accountdiffersfromthe Demonstrative Theoryin thatI do not take
quotemarksas pointing.Rather,I comparequotemarksto the subscripts
you see on ambiguouswordsin dictionariesandsometimesin philosophy,
exceptthatquotemarkshelpus to steerarounda case of systematic ambi-
guity.Forexample,"warm"has a numberof sensesincludingPRODUCER
OF HEAT ("thisjacket is warm;it keepsme comfortable") andPRODUCT
OF HEAT ("thisjacket is warm;it has been sittingon the stove").If we
agreeto markthe instrumentalsensewiththe subscript"inst"thena num-
ber of consequencesfollow.First,"warmin,t"
meansPRODUCEROF HEAT;
8I myself am using two layers of quotation-a pair of double apostrophes plus
italics-to describe S's speech. In S's speech, however, only a single layer is being
used.

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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction 129

second,"warm"9 remainsambiguous(does it lack a subscriptbecausethe

speakerdeliberatelyintended"notin the instrumental sense",does it lack
a subscriptbecausethe speakerwas surethat"inthe instrumentalsense"
was so clear as not to requiresubscripting,or does it lack a subscript
becausethe speakerjust didnot stopto thinkaboutthe ambiguity?);third,
novel expressions such as "hottint"PRODUCER OF TOO MUCH HEAT
become unambiguouslyinterpretable.Quote markswork analogously,
functioningto single out (or rathernarrowdown) the intendedreading.
Theirpresenceindicatesa metalinguisticuse;theirabsencedoes not nec-
essarilyindicateanythingat all; andthey generalizeto new expressions.
But,you mightobject,in specifyingthatthe metalinguisticuse is oper-
ative,don'tthe quotemarksserveto pointat the quotedexpression?It is
easy to thinkso, becausethe quotedwordis alwayspresentduringthe act
of quotation.None the less, I do not thinkthatthe quotemarksfunction
deictically(andhence referentially).In the firstplace, it is possible for a
quotationto referto somethingthatis notphysicallypresent,as in the case
of wordmeaningsandwordtypes.Second,it is possibleto foregothe use
of quotemarksaltogether.
My accountdiffersalso fromthe availableversionsof the Description
Theoryin thatit does notuse namesforelements.Thequotemarks,when
they areused, do describewhich aspectof an ostensionis operative;but
the panoplyof ostensionis providedby picture(in so faras the exhibited
linguisticlabelresemblesitself)andby otherpragmaticrelations(in so far
as the formtokenevokesa type or associatedcontent,etc.).
My accountbearssomeresemblanceto the IdentityTheory:in bothuse
andmention,the speakerexhibitsthe sameform.However,therearecrit-
ical differences.To begin with, quotationmay refernot only to a given
word-formtokenbut also to the correspondingword-formtype, to other
tokens of that type, to lexemes, to concepts, and so forth. Thus, my
accountqualifiesas a picturetheoryin its analysis of the quotationof
forms (since the inscription"cat"reallydoes picturethe inscriptioncat).
But it is not entirelya picturetheory,as my analysisof the quotationof
contentinvolvesno iconicrelationat all (sincethe inscriptioncat does not
resemblethe meaningCATin anyvisual,acoustic,or otherphysicalman-
ner).Anotherdifferenceis thatmy accounttreatsan expressionas a quo-
tationor not dependingon its linguisticstructure,whereasthe Identity
Theorytreatsquotationas a matteroffunction (as the use-mentiondis-
tinction is for me). Further,on my account the quotationas a whole
(quotedmaterialplus quotemarks)is referential.For the IdentityTheo-
rist, the quotedmaterialalone refers,and for the DemonstrativeTheory
the quotemarksalonerefer.

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130 Paul Saka

The DisambiguationTheorydiffersfromthe Tajtelbaum versionof the

IdentityTheoryin particular. ForTajtelbaum (1957),a wordrefersto itself
because "we have the (tacit) conventionthat a name and its name are
denotedby the sameword."Accordingto the DisambiguationTheory,in
contrast,mentionis not a matterof convention.Whetherwe use single
apostrophesor double-indeed, whetherwe use any formal device at
all-is a matterof convention.Butthe factthatwe canuse a wordto refer
to itself or to associateditemsis a naturalresultof the factthatthe direct
ostensionof a formtokendeferringlyostendstype, content,etc. Thatis,
the exhibitionof a word formmakesthe correspondingwordtype, lex-
eme, sense, andreferentmanifestto anyhumanmindthatspeaksthe lan-
guage and is versed in the notions of word type, lexeme, sense, and
referent.
Some may objectthatthe DisambiguationTheorycountsas a version
of the IdentityTheory,or thatthe IdentityTheoryis at least compatible
withmy proposals,in spiritif not in letter.I do notknowhowtojudgethis
claim for I do not see any "spirit"in the IdentityTheorybeyondwhat it
actually says. At any rate, it makes no difference to me whether my
accountis regardedas a versionof the IdentityTheory,or distinctfromit,
so long as my substantivepointsareacknowledged,forexamplethatmen-
tioningis not the sameas quoting.
On this point, in fact, my accountdistinguishesitself fromall others.
For the Identity Theory, quote marks are but window dressing, and
deployingthem or removingthemchangesnothing.Forthe Demonstra-
tiveTheory,quotemarksareso crucialthattheyarepostulatedas logically
presentevenwhenphysicallyabsent.My theory,on the otherhand,treats
an expressionwithquotemarksas distinctfromthe sameexpressionwith-
out quotemarks.
Is thisreallya virtue,though?Somecriticshavedeniedthatit is, claim-
ing thatquotedmentionandunquotedmentionobviouslymeanthe same.
But this is wrong,for it is just false that(37, 38) meanthe same.
(37) Chicagohas seven characters.
(38) "Chicago"has seven characters.
The fact is that(37) and(38) areambiguousor indeterminate in different
ways. The full explanationof (37) is thatit has at leastthe followingtwo
readings,the firstone trueandthe secondone false.
(39) The word"Chicago"has seven characters.
(40) The city Chicagohas seven characters.
In contrast,(38) has the followingtwo readings,one trueandone false.
(41) The word"Chicago"has seven characters.
(42) The expression"'Chicago"'has seven characters.

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 Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction 131

While(39) = (41), thetotalrangeof possiblereadingsfor(37) differsfrom

the rangeof possiblereadingsfor (38). Thus,(37) and (38) demanddif-
ferentanalyses,andon this scoremy accountis indeedattractive.
Anotherdistinctivefeatureof my accountis thatit explicitlytreatscus-
tomaryreferenceas a speciesof ostensionon a parwith autonymousref-
erence.Use andmentionaretwo sides of one coin;althoughdistinct,they
implicateone another.You simply cannothave a languagewithoutthe
potentialfor both use and mention(althoughyou can have a language
withoutquotation).
Yet problemsremain.If you may referto whateveryou ostend,and if
the utteranceof a word-formdeferringlyostendsall of the associatedlin-
guistic material,thenwhy can't you quotea word in orderto referto its
associatedlanguageor dialect,as in (43)?
*(43) "Warshboard" is a stupiddialect.
(44) "Warshboard." Now there'sa stupiddialect.
The acceptabilityof (44) provesthatthe quotationof "warshboard" suf-
fices to ostend or makemanifesta certaindialect. So if ostensionwere
equivalentto reference,(43) shouldbe acceptable.
The solutionlies in rejectingany simple-mindedequivalenceof osten-
sion and reference.Sometimesone referenceis blockedby a different
priorreference.
*(45) The ham sandwich,whichwas inedible,left withouttipping.
Here"hamsandwich"ostendsbotha comestibleanda customer.Oncethe
expressionis establishedin the relativeclause as referringto the food, it
cannotlaterbe takenas referringto the person.Yet hard-and-fastrules
eludeus.
?(46) "Ghosttown" has morelettersin it thanpeople.
(47) Lee's dissertation,which weighs five pounds,has alreadybeen
refuted.
(48) A: Whatdialectdoes he speak?
B: "Tomahto".
Although(46) strikesme as somehowanomalous,as necessarilyjocular,
it doesnot seemas badas (45). In (47) "Dissertation"
ostendsbotha mate-
rial tokenandan abstracttype;referenceto the formerdoes not preclude
referenceto the latter(Fauconnier1985). And in (48) the citationof a
word does pragmaticallyrefer to a dialect. The general lesson is that
developmentsin the psychologyof associationand in the pragmaticsof
referencewill betterenableus to judge the thesisthatquotationformally
disambiguatesmultipleostension.

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132 Paul Saka

6. Conclusion

The DisambiguatedOstensionTheoryof Quotationconsistsof two com-

ponents.First,it assumesthatthecapacitiesforbothuse andmentionstem
fromthe same source,namelyfromthe factthatthe humanmindassoci-
ates a multiplicityof deferredostensionswith any exhibitedtoken,thus
givingrise to pragmaticambiguity.Thisthesisis a plausibleconsequence
of the findingsof Nunberg(1978) andNorrick(1981), and it is further
supportedby the factthatsurelyall languagescontaina use-mentiondis-
tinction.(Even formallanguagesthatofficially lack a use-mentiondis-
tinctionstill, in practice,possess it. This suggeststhatthe distinctionis
made not by particularlanguagesper se but ratherby what is common
acrossEnglish,Eskimo,thepredicatecalculus,etc.-namely, humancog-
nitive agency.)While this first componentallows for a pragmaticuse-
mentiondistinction,the othercomponentof the DisambiguationTheory
claims that quote marksformallyannouncethat mentioningis taking
place.This view too is plausibleif you thinkthatlinguisticelementsnor-
mally signify something,and it is furthersuggestedby the fact that(37)
and(38) areambiguousin distinctways.
Anotherconsiderationin favorof the DisambiguationTheoryis thatit
is more successfulthanrivaltheoriesin dealingwith the factswhich we
have seen any theoryof quotationoughtto respect.These facts are sum-
marizedandextendedbelow.
CONVENTIONALITY:Althoughthe capacityfor mentioninheres
in the naturalconnectionbetweena linguistictokenandits asso-
ciateditems,theexistenceof a deviceforexplicitlymarkingmen-
tion-for quoting-is conventional.Sucha device can be found
withinmostmodemwritingsystems,andin the grammaticalsys-
temsof a few languages(e.g. the indirectdiscoursemoodof Ger-
man), but it appearsto be absentthroughoutmost of historyin
most languages.Furthermore, sinceconventionrestsupona mar-
riageof formandfunction,anexpressionwithconventionalquote
markspossesses a rangeof possible significancedistinctfrom
that of an expressionwithoutquotemarks.This latterfact dis-
proves the Identity Theory.
PRODUCTIVITY:If you arepartyto the convention,thenknowing
any expressionwill enableyou to know its quotation;andknow-
ing any quotationwill enableyou to know what is quoted.The
fact ofproductivity rules out the Name and Description Theories.
ITERATIVITY:Quotationsarethemselvesexpressionsthatmaybe
quotedin turn,giving yet a differentreference.Iterativityrules
out the Demonstrative and Identity Theories.
PICTORIALITY:Belief in wordmagic is powerfulthroughoutthe
world,in both stone-ageandindustrialcultures the meremen-

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 Quotationand the Use-MentionDistinction 133

tion of an obscenityis oftentabooor at leastsomewhatshocking.

Furthermore, constructionslike "Pigsarecalled 'pigs"'possess a
sortof a prioritruth.Bothof theseobservationssuggestthatquo-
tation resembles what is quoted. Thesefacts rule out the Name
and Description Theories.
SIMULTANEITY:In somecontextsyou maybothuse andmention
an expressionat the same time. In some contextsyou may ana-
phoricallygroundan expressionfor both use and mention.The
fact of simultaneityposes a mortalproblemfor the Name and De-
scription Theories. It remains to be seen how itfares under other
theories.
MULTIPLICITY:With quotationyou can refer to both linguistic
expressionsandnon-linguisticvocalizationsandimprints;to both
formandcontent;to bothtypesandtokens.Ontherareoccasions
whenwe needto makethesedistinctionsexplicit,we takeadvan-
tage of the diversedevices for markingquotations:doubleapos-
trophes, single apostrophes, italicization, underlining ... Thefact
of multiplicity disproves the Identity Theory and, at least in
Davidson 's version, the Demonstrative Theory as well.
OMISSIONS: Philosophers,linguists, logicians, and lay writers
commonlyomit quotationalmarkingson mentionedexpressions
(sometimes with a statement to the effect that "I won't be
fussy")-for example"Diabetescomes fromGreek."Insteadof
treatingthis as an error,an outrightfalsehood,it would be more
charitableto take it as indeterminate/ambiguous between the
false "The disease diabetes itself comes from the Greek lan-
guage"and the true"Theword 'diabetes'comes from Greek".
Thefact that there are omissions rules out the Demonstrative
Theory.
Onall of thesescores,I haveargued,thetheoryof quotationas formaldis-
ambiguationof multipleostensionfares betterthan the alternatives.A
fuller understanding of it now awaits further research in psycho-
pragmatics.9

Department of Philosophy PAULSAKA

University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61801
USA
9'Mostof this paper was written under a University of Illinois University Fel-
lowship in 1995-96, and revisions were made while I held a Beckman Institute
Cognitive Science Fellowship in 1997. For reading and commenting on various
drafts, I gratefully acknowledge Steve Wagner,Tim McCarthy, Mark Sainsbury,
and an anonymous reviewer.

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134 Paul Saka

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