A.M. No. 801 June 27, 1978 CESARIO ADARNE, complainant,vs.ATTY. DAMIAN V.

ALDABA, respondent.

Facts:
The record shows that sometime in 1958, Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo
Cumpio, filed an action for forcible entry against herein complainant Cesario Adarne ,
Aning Arante, and Miguel Inokando with the Justice of the Peace of Alang-alang, Leyte.
The case was docketed in the said court as Civil Case No. 96. Atty. Isauro Marmita
represented the defendants who raised the issue of ownership of the land in question.
After hearing the parties, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Consequently, the plaintiffs therein appealed to the Court of First Instance
of Leyte and the case was assigned to Branch VI of Carigara, where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 556.

At the hearing of the case on August 7, 1961, the herein complainant Cesario Adarne,
one of the defendants in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 632, noting that his
attorneys had not yet arrived, prevailed upon the respondent Atty. Damian Aldaba,
who was then present in court to attend the trial of an electoral case, to appear as
counsel for them and ask for the postponement of the trial.

The respondent, who is a third-degree cousin of the complainant, agreed, and entered
a special appearance. Upon noticing that the plaintiffs and their counsel were not also
present in court, the respondent, instead of asking for a postponement, moved for the
dismissal of the case.

His motion was granted and the case was again dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, to which the respondent filed an
opposition in behalf of the defendants, and the motion was denied.

Whereupon, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. After appropriate

proceedings, the appellate court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the
case to the lower court for further proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or Not the lawyer is liable for pitching in for another lawyer
Whether or not it is right for him to be blamed by the client he represented since the
court’s decision did not favor them

Decision:

The administrative complaint was dismissed.

The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be attributed

to the respondent attorney. The blame lies with the complainant for having engaged
the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the
authority he had given to them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility
upon the respondent. To add to the confusion, the complainant had also requested the
clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that he (complainant) be furnished
with summons and subpoena accorded to him. He also filed a motion by himself, thus
implying that he was handling his case personally.

It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof. In the instant case,
there is no sufficient proof to warrant the disbarment of the respondent attorney.
Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify his suspension.

Besides, the respondent honestly believed that he had appeared for the
complainant only for a special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact
his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing of October 23, 1964, so that
he did nothing more about it. It was neither gross negligence nor omission to have
entertained such belief. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence,
but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the
business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is not
answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly
and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

Legal Basis:
It is the notary public’s duty to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to
certify, and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person
who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his
duties as notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. A member of the bar
who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be
held to account by the courts even to the extent of disbarment. (Panganiban vs.
Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367).

A dmission to the Bar being an essential requirement for judgeship, one who fails
to submit proof of due admission to the Bar will not be permitted to stay on as a judge.
(In re: Rosalie L. Paraguas, 72 SCRA 11).

Court counsels should be aware that in the pursuance of their duty, owed to the
courts as well as to their clients, they cannot be too casual and unconcerned about the
filing of pleadings; it is not enough that they prepare them; they must also see to it that
the pleadings they file are duly mailed. (People vs. Rosqueta Jr., 55 SCRA 486).
An honest and mistaken interpretation by an attorney of the resolution of the Supreme
Court may excuse him from failure to comply therewith. (People vs. Estebia, 48 SCRA
356).
A lawyer who hardly did anything in the case and who, furthermore, did not
render an unimpeachable accounting of moneys received from his clients may be
admonished and warned to be more conscientious in his duties to his clients. (Ballos
vs. Balasabas, 75 SCRA 112).

The failure of the complainant to show a prima facie case that will warrant a full-
dress investigation of a lawyer who allegedly neglected to file the complainant’s
appellant’s brief despite receipt of funds for “expenses in the appeal of his case” will
result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint. (Requoi vs. Dy-Liacco, 75 SCRA
118).
Substitution of attorney requires a written application for substitution and a written
consent of both the client and the attorney to be substituted (Ramos vs. Potenciano, 9
SCRA 589).

The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to

be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer.
The inherent power of the Court over its officers cannot be restricted. (Royong vs.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859; Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439).