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Chapter 10 Analyzing Privately Held Companies
Chapter 10 Analyzing Privately Held Companies
Companies
Maier’s Law: If the facts do not
conform to the theory,
they must be disposed of.
Exhibit 1: Course Layout: Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Other
Restructuring Activities
Part I: M&A Part II: M&A Process Part III: M&A Part IV: Deal Part V: Alternative
Environment Valuation and Structuring and Business and
Modeling Financing Restructuring
Strategies
Ch. 1: Motivations for Ch. 4: Business and Ch. 7: Discounted Ch. 11: Payment and Ch. 15: Business
M&A Acquisition Plans Cash Flow Valuation Legal Considerations Alliances
Ch. 2: Regulatory Ch. 5: Search through Ch. 8: Relative Ch. 12: Accounting & Ch. 16: Divestitures,
Considerations Closing Activities Valuation Tax Considerations Spin-Offs, Split-Offs,
Methodologies and Equity Carve-Outs
Ch. 3: Takeover Ch. 6: M&A Ch. 9: Financial Ch. 13: Financing the Ch. 17: Bankruptcy
Tactics, Defenses, and Postclosing Integration Modeling Basics Deal and Liquidation
Corporate Governance
9%
72% 19%
Family-Owned Firms
• 89% of U.S. businesses family
owned
• Not all family-owned firms are
small (e.g., Wal-Mart, Ford,
Motorola, Loews, and Bechtel)
• Major challenges include:
– succession,
– access to capital
– lack of corporate governance,
– informal management
structure,
– less skilled lower level
management, and
– a preference for ownership
over growth.
Governance Issues
• What works for public firms may not for
private companies
• “Market model” relies on dispersed
ownership with ownership & control
separate
• “Control model” more applicable where
ownership tends to be concentrated and
the right to control the business is not fully
separate from ownership (e.g., small
businesses)
Challenges of Analyzing and Valuing
Privately Held Firms
• Assume discount rate is 8% and firm’s current cash flow is $1.5 million. Multiples
are in brackets.
– If cash flow expected to remain level in perpetuity, the implied valuation is
[1/.08] x $1.5 = 12.5 x $1.5 = $18.75 million
– If cash flow expected to grow 4 percent annually in perpetuity, the implied
valuation is [(1.04) / (.08 - .04)] x $1.5 = 26 x $1.5 = $39.0 million
Note: 12.5 and 26 represent the capitalization multiples for the zero and constant growth models, respectively.
Step 3: Select Appropriate Discount
(Capitalization) Rates
• Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
– Estimate systematic risk by calculating firm’s beta based on
comparable publicly listed firms or historical data1
– Adjust for nonsystematic risk2
• Weighted Average Cost of capital
– Cost of debt based on what public firms of comparable risk are
paying3
– Weights reflect management’s target debt to equity ratio or
industry average ratio4
1
Assuming private firm leveraged, estimate private firm’s leveraged beta based on unlevered beta for comparable
publicly firms adjusted for private firm’s target debt to equity ratio and marginal tax rate. Alternatively, use industry
average ratio assuming firm’s target D/E will move to industry average (See Chapter 7).
2
Difference between junk bond rate and risk-free rate, return on OTC small stock index and risk-free rate, or
Ibbotson’s suggested firm size adjustments
3
Assuming firms with similar interest coverage ratios will have similar credit ratings, estimate what private firm’s
credit rating would be and base its pre-tax cost of borrowing on a comparably rated public firm’s cost of borrowing.
4
Dividing D/E by (1+D/E) converts D/E into a debt to total capital ratio, which subtracted from one gives the equity
to total capital ratio. Using the industry average debt-to-equity or-total capital ratio implies the firm’s goal is to
achieve and sustain the industry average ratio.
Alternative Ways to Estimate Discount Rates:
Total Beta
• CAPM betas measure systematic risk of the marginal investor (buyer) in a firm,
with such investors diversifying away nonsystematic risk.
• Empirical evidence suggests that CAPM understates financial returns on small
companies
• Small firm owner’s net worth often primarily their ownership stake in the firm.
Because of the difficulty in attracting new investors, the current owner can be
viewed as the marginal investor in the firm. Therefore,
– They are not well diversified and are concerned about both systematic and
nonsystematic risk (i.e., total risk)
• Total betas (βtot), unlike market betas (β) estimated from comparable public firms,
measure total risk to the business owner and can be estimated as follows:1
β tot = Market β / √R2
where R2 is the coefficient of determination estimated for comparable
public companies and √R2 is the correlation coefficient
• Total betas are larger than CAPM betas2
1
In a linear regression of the return on the ith stock against the return on diversified market index of stocks, β = Cov(i,m)/ Ϭm2 and may be rewritten as
(Ϭi/Ϭm)R, since (Ϭi/Ϭm) x Cov(i,m) / (Ϭi x ϬM) = Cov(i,m) / Ϭm2, where Ϭi standard deviation (volatility) of a ith security, Ϭm is the standard deviation of the
overall stock market, and R is the correlation coefficient between the ith security and the overall stock market. The correlation coefficient indicates
direction of the relationship between the ith stock and the overall market and the covariance measures the volatility of the ith stock versus the overall
market.
2
Market beta β = (Ϭi/Ϭm)R, where 0 ≤ R ≤ 1. Dividing by R to calculate βtot eliminates R resulting in βtot > β.
Alternative Ways to Estimate Discount Rates: The
Build-Up Method
• Represents the sum of risks associated with a particular firm by adding to
the CAPM’s estimate of the firm’s cost of equity (for which the firm’s market
beta is assumed to be one)1 an estimate of firm size, industry risk, and firm
specific risk.
• The build-up method could be displayed as follows:
ke = Rf + ERP + FSP + IND + CSR
where ke = cost of equity
Rf = risk free return
ERP = Equity risk premium
FSP = firm size premium (measures risk of default)
IND = Industry risk premium (measures operating risk)
CSR = Firm specific risk premium (e.g., excessive dependence
of a single customer, narrow product focus, limited access to
capital)2
1
Assumes factors causing the firm’s beta to deviate from one are captured by firm size, industry and firm specific risk adjustments.
2
Data for firm size and industry risk premiums available from Morningstar’s Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills & Inflation and Duff &
Phelps Risk Premium Report. Firm specific risk often obtained through management interviews and firm site visits.
Step 4: Adjust Firm Value for Liquidity Risk,
Value of Control, or Minority Risk
Discount Applied to Firm Value
• Liquidity risk: Reflects potential loss in value when an
asset is sold in an illiquid market
• Minority risk: Reflects lack of control associated with
minority ownership. Risk varies with size of ownership
position
Premium Applied to Firm Value
• Value of control: Ability to direct activities of the firm (e.g.,
make key decisions, declare a dividend, hire or fire key
employees, direct sales to or purchases from preferred
customers or suppliers at other than market-determined
price levels)
Liquidity Discount
• A liquidity discount is a reduction in the offer price for the
target firm by an amount equal to the potential loss of
value when sold due to the lack of liquidity in the
market.1
• Recent studies suggest a median liquidity discount of
approximately 20% in the U.S. Varies by country.
• The size of the liquidity discount will vary with
profitability, growth rate, and degree of risk (e.g., beta or
leverage) of the target firm.
1
The offer price can be reduced by either directly reducing the target firm’s valuation as a standalone business by an
estimate of the appropriate liquidity discount or by increasing the discount rate used in valuing the firm by an
amount which reflects the perceived liquidity risk.
Control Premium
• Purchase price premium represents amount a buyer pays seller in
excess of the seller’s current share price and includes both a
synergy and control premium
• Control and synergy premiums are distinctly different1
--Value of synergy represents revenue increases and cost savings
resulting from combining two firms, usually in the same line of
business
--Value of control provides right to direct the activities of the target
firm (e.g., change business strategy, declare dividends, and
extract private benefits)2
• Country comparisons indicate huge variation in median control
premiums from 2-5% in countries with relatively effective investor
protections (e.g., U.S. and U.K.) to as much as 60-65% in countries
with poor governance practices (e.g., Brazil and Czech Republic).
• Median estimates across countries are 10 to 12 percent.
1
Control and synergy premiums may be interdependent since the ability to achieve synergies may require a controlling
ownership stake.
2
Control can be achieved at less than 50 percent ownership if other shareholders own relatively smaller stakes and do not
band together to offset votes cast by the largest shareholder.
Minority Discount
• Minority discounts reflect loss of influence due Control Minority
to the power of controlling block shareholder. Premium Discount
(%) (%)
• Investors pay a higher price for control of a
company and a lesser amount for a minority 10 9.1
stake.
• Large control premiums indicate high
15 13.0
perceived value accruing to the controlling
shareholders and significant loss of influence
for minority shareholders
20 16.7
• Increasing control premiums associated with
increasing minority discounts
• Implied Median Minority Discount = 25 20.0
1– 1_______________
(1 + median control premium paid)
Where
PV = Present value of projected target firm free cash flows
FCFF = Free cash flow to the firm
ke = Cost of equity excluding liquidity and minority discounts and value of control
TV = Terminal value
1
Alternatively, PV could be adjusted by increasing the discount rate to reflect the liquidity discount.
2
Multiplicative to reflect interaction between LD% and CP%, i.e., for a given CP%, a higher LD% increases the PV of the firm to the controlling investor.
3
Multiplicative to reflect interaction between LD% and MD%, i.e., for a given MD%, a higher LD% reduces the value of a minority investment in the firm.
Generalizing Adjustments
to Target Firm Value
Question: What is the maximum amount an acquirer should pay
for an ownership interest in a firm?
PVMAX = (PVMIN + PVNS)(1 + CP%)(1 – LD%) and
PVMAX = (PVMIN + PVNS)(1 – LD% + CP% – CP% x LD%)
= (PVMIN + PVNS)(1 – LD% + CP%(1 – LD%))
LGI wants to acquire a controlling interest in Acuity Lighting, whose estimated standalone equity value
equals $18,699,493. LGI believes that the present value of synergies is $2,250,000 due to cost savings
generated by combining Acuity with LGI. LGI believes that the value of Acuity, including synergy, can be
further increased by at least 10 percent by applying professional management methods. To achieve these
efficiencies, LGI must gain control of Acuity. LGI is willing to pay a control premium of as much as 10
percent. LGI reduces the median 20% liquidity discount by 4% to reflect Acuity’s high financial returns and
cash flow growth rate. What is the maximum purchase price LGI should pay for a 50.1 percent controlling
interest in the business? For a minority 20 percent interest in the business?
To adjust for presumed liquidity risk of the target firm due to lack of a liquid market, LGI discounts the
amount it is willing to offer to purchase 50.1 percent of the firm’s equity by 16 percent.
1
Alternatively, the maximum purchase price could be estimated as follows: (6 x $150,000 x 1.3) x (1 - .2) x .501 =
$468,936. Note also that the problem states that recent comparable transactions were believed to contain a
control premium, therefore eliminating the need to include a control premium in the calculation of the maximum
purchase price.
Things to Remember…
• The U.S. M&A market is concentrated among small,
family-owned firms.
• Valuing private firms is more challenging than public
firms because of the dearth of reliable, timely data.
• The purpose of recasting private company
statements is to calculate an accurate current profit or
cash flow number.
• Maximum offer prices should be adjusted for a
liquidity discount and control premium If the market
for the firm’s equity is illiquid and a controlling interest
is desired
• Maximum offer prices for a minority interest in a firm
should be adjusted for a minority discount.