Synthese (2022) 200: 340

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03823-7

ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Know-how-first anti-intellectualism: Williamson against

Williamson

M. Hosein M.A. Khalaj1,2

Received: 31 December 2021 / Accepted: 21 July 2022 / Published online: 8 August 2022
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022, corrected publication 2022

Abstract
Inspired by Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology, I propose a position on
practical knowledge that can be called the ‘know-how-first view’; yet whereas Wil-
liamson is one of the pioneers of the new intellectualism about know-how, I em-
ploy the know-how-first view to argue against intellectualism and instead develop
a know-how-first version of anti-intellectualism. Williamson argues that proposi-
tional knowledge is a sui generis unanalyzable mental state that comes first in the
epistemic realm; in parallel, I propose that know-how is a sui generis unanalyzable
power that comes first in the practical realm. To motivate this suggestion, I put for-
ward two arguments: (1) drawing on dispositionalist ideas, I argue that the practical
component of know-how is unanalyzable; (2) based on an investigation of the na-
tures of intentionality and intelligence, I argue that know-how is prior to intentional
and intelligent abilities in the order of explanation of agential action. Deploying
this know-how-first anti-intellectualism, I then set out know-how-first solutions to
two challenging problems for anti-intellectualism: the sufficiency problem and the
necessary condition problem.

Keywords Know-how-first · Knowledge-first · Anti-intellectualism · Disposition ·

Intentional ability · Intelligent ability

M. Hosein M.A. Khalaj

mhmakh@gmail.com

1
Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Azadi St., Tehran,
Iran
2
Department of Science Studies, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, No. 6, Araklyan St.,
Neauphle- le-Château St.,Vali-Asr Ave, Tehran, Iran

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340 Page 2 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

1 Introduction

Famously, Williamson (1995, 2000, 2014) argues that knowledge is a sui generis
mental state that comes first in the epistemic realm and cannot be analyzed into
other epistemic notions such as belief, evidence, justification, etc. With Jason Stan-
ley, Williamson is also co-author of the most influential recent work on knowledge-
how, Knowing How (Stanley & Williamson, 2001), which seeks to revive what Ryle
(1949) called intellectualism: the view that knowledge-how1 is simply a kind of
propositional knowledge. In this paper, I am inspired by Williamson’s knowledge-
first epistemology in order to argue against his intellectualism about knowledge-how.
When Williamson and other proponents of the knowledge-first view claim that
knowledge is unanalyzable and comes first in the epistemic realm, what they have in
mind is primarily theoretical propositional knowledge. However, there is no obstacle
to applying the knowledge-first conception to other types of knowledge, such as so-
called know-how. And this is what I want to do. Williamson argues that propositional
knowledge is unanalyzable and comes first in the theoretical realm; in parallel, I pro-
pose that knowledge-how is unanalyzable and comes first in the practical realm. Put
differently, I suggest an account that can be called a know-how-first view of practical
knowledge.
Intellectualists maintain that knowledge-how can be defined as a kind of propo-
sitional knowledge; anti-intellectualists, in contrast, deny that knowledge-how is a
kind of propositional knowledge, proposing to think of knowing how to do some-
thing as a matter of an ability or a disposition to do that thing. In the present paper,
I want to develop a know-how-first version of anti-intellectualism. As an anti-intel-
lectualist, I begin with the thesis that know-how is a kind of disposition.2 However,
in the same manner as Williamson, who describes propositional knowledge as an
unanalyzable, sui generis kind of mental state3, I argue that know-how is an unana-
lyzable, sui generis kind of power. Moreover, inspired by Williamson’s definitions
of belief and evidence in terms of propositional knowledge, not vice versa, I suggest
that anti-intellectualists should explain intentional and intelligent abilities in terms of
know-how, not vice versa. Accordingly, I seek to provide two arguments for a know-
how-first version of anti-intellectualism:

1. An argument based on dispositionalism about know-how, according to which

there are instances of real unanalyzable powers and know-how is among them
(Sect. 2).
2. An argument based on the idea that know-how is prior to intentional and intel-
ligent abilities in the order of explanation of intentional action (Sect. 3).

1
I use the terms knowledge-how, know-how, and knowing how interchangeably.
2
I don’t dispute that there may be an intellectualist version of the know-how-first view. However, as an
anti-intellectualist, I develop an anti-intellectualist version of it.
3
For the claim that knowledge, on Williamson’s view, is a sui generis mental state, see Williamson 1995,
2000: 21–49. Other commentators endorse this interpretation of his view: “Williamson holds that knowl-
edge is a sui generis mental state” (Kallestrup & Pritchard, 2017: 216).

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Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 3 of 30 340

In Sect. 4, I take a look at what new solutions (or dissolutions) the know-how-first
view can provide for some of the most pressing problems facing anti-intellectualism.
More specifically, I introduce the know-how-first solutions to the so-called sufficiency
problem and what I call the necessary condition problem for anti-intellectualism.
Finally, as concluding remarks, I mention some opportunities and some challenges
for proponents of know-how-first anti-intellectualism, which are to be the object of
future research.
Before discussing my arguments, one preliminary point needs to be made, con-
cerning my reason for proceeding with a modest claim. Proponents of knowledge-
first accounts, following Williamson, argue that knowledge resists reductive analysis,
suggesting instead a non-reductive account of knowledge. In a similar vein, I claim
that know-how resists reductive analysis, and try to give a non-reductive account
of know-how. However, there is a crucial difference in the backgrounds to these
two non-reductive projects that is worth addressing. When Williamson argued that
knowledge is unanalyzable, the long-term project of analyzing knowledge already
showed signs of being a degenerating research program, and some epistemologists
were starting to doubt whether any reductive account of knowledge could work. Yet,
I must admit, a similar pessimism about reductive projects has not yet formed in the
literature over know-how. Many anti-intellectualists still believe in the prospects for
a reductive account of know-how. Moreover, the current literature is vast, contain-
ing various reductive anti-intellectualist strategies for analyzing know-how, and the
present paper surely cannot argue against all of them. In addition, although taking
a non-reductive position, as I argue, resolves (or dissolves) some old problems of
anti-intellectualism, it may create new challenges for it, which I don’t have space to
address here. Given all of these considerations, I prefer to proceed with a more cau-
tious claim: the suggested account in what follows is not a comprehensive account of
know-how, nor do I claim that I can show that the know-how-first view is the most
plausible version of anti-intellectualism. Rather, while admitting that the research
program of giving a reductive anti-intellectualist analysis of know-how is still alive,
I sketch what an alternative research program, that is, a know-how-first anti-intellec-
tualism, amounts to, and provide arguments in support of engaging in this alterna-
tive anti-intellectualist research program. Therefore, the present paper should be seen
merely as a starting point for further work in a new research program.

2 An argument based on dispositionalism

Inspired by Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology, then, an essential aspect of

the version of know-how-first anti-intellectualism I want to motivate is that know-
how is an unanalyzable, sui generis disposition. My argument for this claim has two
steps: the first step is to show that there are unanalyzable dispositions, which are
called powers. The second step is to argue that know-how is a kind of power. There-
fore, know-how would be an unanalyzable, sui generis disposition. In what follows,
I discuss each premise in turn.

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2.1 The first premise: in support of dispositionalism

To take the first step, we need a detailed introduction and justification of the view
concerning the metaphysics of properties called dispositionalism. Most philosophers
tend to individuate a disposition in terms of a manifestation and a stimulus condition.
Consider the fragility of glass as a standard instance of a disposition. The stimulus
condition of the fragility of the glass is, for example, being struck or striking the
floor; and its manifestation is, for example, breaking or shattering. Views concerning
the metaphysical nature of dispositions divide into two general classes: categorical-
ism and dispositionalism. Roughly speaking, categoricalists believe that all kinds of
dispositional properties are analyzable into non-dispositional so-called categorical
properties; while according to dispositionalism there are real, unanalyzable disposi-
tional properties (so-called powers) in the world, and it is not the case that all kinds
of dispositions can be reduced to non-dispositional, categorical properties.
There are several motivations for adopting a dispositionalist view. For example,
Martin argues that the fact that there are instances of unmanifesting dispositions (for
instance, the fragility of a glass which never manifests) provides evidence for dispo-
sitionalism. In his terms, categoricalists.

frequently state their account of dispositionality in terms of manifestation. …

[However] this leaves a gap at the crucial (and most commonly occurring)
unmanifesting disposition occasion. (Martin 1996: 163)

This is a motivation for rejecting categoricalism and adopting dispositionalism.

In addition, in recent years, philosophers have begun to pay more attention to the
explanatory power of real dispositions, and accordingly dispositionalism has become
a new trend in metaphysics providing novel accounts of various phenomena. For
instance, Bird (2007) proposes a dispositionalist account of laws of nature, Mumford
& Anjum (2011b) develop a dispositionalist account of causation, and Vetter (2021)
seeks to explain modality in terms of dispositionality. Moreover, dispositionalists
have suggested new explanations for mental powers such as agency (Ellis, 2013), free
will (Lowe, 2013), consciousness (Yates 2020), affordance (Vetter, 2020), and mind
in general (Vukov & Lassiter, 2020). Given these novel dispositionalist accounts, it
would be reasonable to say that the explanatory power of real dispositions is another
motivation for adopting dispositionalism.
However, the strongest and most influential motivation for dispositionalism
remains the patent failure of the analysis of dispositional ascriptions in terms of
non-dispositional ascriptions. The most famous reductive analysis of dispositional
ascriptions is the simple conditional analysis originally suggested by Ryle (1949),
according to which a dispositional ascription is reduced to a counterfactual such that
its antecedent is the satisfaction of the stimulus condition of the disposition and its
consequent the satisfaction of the manifestation. For example, ‘to say that sugar is
soluble is to say that it would dissolve, or would have dissolved, if immersed in
water’ (31). However, it is widely accepted that the simple conditional analysis faces
clear counterexamples, the standard ones being the cases of finks, masks, and mim-

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Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 5 of 30 340

ics.4 For reasons of space, I here discuss only first two. For an instance of a finkish
disposition, consider a live wire. According to the simple conditional analysis, the
wire is live iff: if it were touched by a conductor, it would conduct electricity. Now
imagine that there is a device, an electro-fink, such that if the wire were touched by
a conductor the device would remove the wire’s property of being live. Although the
wire is now live, the simple conditional analysis falsely predicts that it is not live,
since if the wire were touched by a conductor, the electro-fink would prevent it from
conducting electricity.
For masks, consider a fragile glass that is carefully packed and protected by pack-
ing material. The glass is fragile, and therefore is disposed to break when struck;
however, due to the packing material it would not break if struck. Thus while the
glass has the disposition of fragility, the simple conditional analysis falsely implies
that it does not have that disposition. If dispositional ascriptions cannot be analyzed
in terms of conditionals, then we have a strong motivation to hold that there are unan-
alyzable, real dispositions. In Martin’s terms: “if, as we have seen, counterfactuality
or strong conditionality cannot explain dispositions, then there is no place to turn but
to actual first-order dispositions or powers” (1994: 7).
Of course, the proponents of a reductive analysis of dispositions do not give up
here, but seek to refine the analysis of dispositions in various ways; yet every refine-
ment faces either new problems or new versions of the old. An extended discussion of
these refinements and their problems is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is
instructive to take a brief look at the dialectic between the proponents and opponents
of the reductive analysis of dispositions. Lewis (1997), for example, suggested that
we can rescue the conditional analysis by adding the condition that, roughly speak-
ing, the causal base of the disposition is not removed when the stimulus condition
obtains. The case of the fink clearly does not satisfy the additional condition, since
if the wire is touched by a conductor, the electro-fink removes the causal base of the
wire’s conductivity. However, as Bird (1998) shows, Lewis’s diagnosis of the fink
problem cannot prevent the problem of masking from arising: the causal base of the
fragility of the packed glass is not removed when something strikes it. Seeking to
avoid the problems with Lewis’s account, Malzkorn (2000) and Steinberg (2010)
develop different sophisticated conditional analyses, appealing respectively to the
constraints of normality and ceteris paribus conditions to avoid cases like finks and
masks. Thus, the situation in which there is an electro-fink operating on the wire is
not a normal standard situation for examining conductivity; or, in a similar vein, if
the glass were struck, then ceteris paribus it would break, although not when packed
by packing material. Arguably, however, these revised conditional analyses face a
dilemma (Mumford & Anjum, 2011a: 383; Cross 2012; Choi & Fara, 2018): if propo-
nents of these revised conditional analyses leave their suggested qualifications bare,
they risk circularity, since an attempt to exclude all interferers without appealing to
the disposition itself seems doomed; but if they flesh out the qualifications into a
substantive proposal by a finite list of interferers, there remains the risk of further
counterexamples in new varieties.

4
For the standard cases of finks, masks, and mimics, see respectively Martin 1994, Johnston 1992, Smith
1977.

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Given these difficulties, some theorists set aside the conditional analysis and
develop a non-conditional semantics for dispositions. For example, Fara (2005) sug-
gests that we should analyze dispositional ascriptions in terms of generic sentences,
considering cases of finks and masks as permissible exceptions. Just as the generic
fact that a lion has four legs does not entail that every instance of lion has four legs,
the generic sentence that glass breaks when struck does not entail that glass breaks
every time it is struck. There are permissible exceptions, and the cases of finks and
masks are among them. However, Fara’s move faces its own problems. For example,
Yli-Vakkuri (2010) argues that in determining the instances of permissible excep-
tions, Fara must invoke something similar to the ceteris paribus condition, which
we saw is itself problematic. Wasserman (2011), meanwhile, shows that unmanifest-
ing dispositions are counterexamples to the generic account since, for example, if a
glass is never struck and never breaks, it is not true to say that it breaks when struck.
In addition, all of these analyses fail to explain the gradability of dispositions; and
the more sophisticated analyses that have since emerged raise more sophisticated
problems which there is no space here to discuss.5 Based on this quick review, then,
it seems safe to say that every project for providing a reductive analysis of disposi-
tions faces severe problems; and this is a good reason to think that dispositions resist
reductive analysis, suggesting that dispositionalists are right to think that there are
instances of real, unanalyzable dispositions.
To make the above line of argument clearer, it may be helpful to draw an analogy
between metaphysicians’ attempts to solve problems of masking and finks for analyz-
ing dispositions and epistemologists’ attempt to solve the Gettier problem for analyz-
ing knowledge. Noting that the main concern of post-Gettier epistemology has been
“to analyze knowledge in terms of belief, truth, and non-circular further conditions”,
Williamson (2014: 2) remarks that

The increasingly gerrymandered definitions were obvious signs of a degener-

ating research program. Most of them, if correct, seemed to make knowledge
too grue-like to be worth analyzing. But in any case they succumbed one after
another to counterexamples.

.Williamson thinks that this is a good reason to consider knowledge to be unanalyz-

able and so adopt a knowledge-first view. In a similar vein, various kinds of reductive
accounts are employed to analyze dispositions, but all face severe problems. Though
this is not enough to establish with certainty that the research program to give a
reductive analysis of dispositions is degenerating, it is surely enough to provide a
motivation for an alternative research program which takes dispositions as real, unan-
alyzable powers and tries to explain other relevant phenomena in terms of dispo-
sitions. As a result, the analogy between the knowledge-first stance regarding the
analysis of knowledge, and dispositionalism regarding the analysis of dispositions,

5
For example, Manley & Wasserman (2008) and Vetter (2014) develop analyses of dispositions by focus-
ing on the their gradability. For some difficulties these sophisticated accounts face, see Choi & Fara 2018.

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suggests that if Williamson’s position that knowledge is not analyzable is reasonable,

the same may go for the dispositionalist position that dispositions are not analyzable.6

2.2 The second premise: applying dispositionalism to knowing how

Now we are ready to turn to the second stage of the argument and argue that know-
how is a kind of power and should be considered as an instance of unanalyzable
dispositions. To do so, at first, I want to briefly address some general motivations for
describing know-how as a kind of disposition. Then I seek to show that know-how is
not only a kind of disposition but also an unanalyzable kind of disposition.
Many anti-intellectualists, following Ryle, think that knowing how is a kind of
disposition.7 There are clear motivations for this suggestion. Consider, again, fragil-
ity as the paradigm example of dispositions and knowing how to ride a bicycle as the
paradigm case of know-how. As Ryle (1949: 22) teaches us, both dispositions and
knowing-how have a “covert nature” and “overt operation”. We cannot see the fragil-
ity or the knowing how to ride a bicycle themselves; rather, we can see manifestations
of fragility and knowing how to ride a bicycle. In other words, we speak of “manifest-
ing know-how”, whereas we do not use a similar locution for non-dispositional prop-
erties. Another structural similarity between dispositions and know-how is that both
provide their possessor with a kind of potentiality. Just as the fact that the vase is frag-
ile entails that it can break (at least in some sense of ‘can’), the fact that I know how
to ride a bicycle requires that I can ride it (at least in some sense of ‘can’). Moreover,
another Rylean heritage for anti-intellectualism is that knowing how and dispositions
both have to do something with counterfactuality. The fact that the vase is fragile
does not require that it breaks right now. Similarly, the fact that I know how to ride
a bicycle does not entail that I manifest it right now.8 The fourth similarity between
dispositions and knowing how is that both can be a matter of degrees. For example,
the vase is more fragile than the glass; likewise, I know how to ride a bicycle better
than my brother. These quick surveys of some structural similarities between disposi-
tions and knowing how provide good motivations for describing knowing-how as a
kind of disposition.
Now let us see what evidence supports the claim that know-how is not only a
disposition but also an unanalyzable disposition. Recall that the most influential argu-
ment in defense of dispositionalism according to which there are unanalyzable dis-
positions is that analyzing dispositions faces the problems of finks and masks. The

6
By opting for dispositionalism, we propose in what follows a dispositional explanation of know-how.
However, there is an objection to all forms of dispositional explanation raised, for example, by Arm-
strong (1973: 16), according to which dispositional explanation commits what might be called the virtus
dormitiva fallacy, meaning it is not an informative, non-trivial explanation. Unfortunately, I do not have
space to discuss this charge here. For a strong response to various versions of this objection, see Mumford
(1998: 128–141). As Mumford has shown, at least some versions of this objection presuppose an anti-
dispositionalist metaphysics for dispositions and cannot accept that, by ascribing dispositional properties
to a thing, we ascribe real properties to them.
7
See, among others, Williams (2008), Markie (2015), and Constantin (2018).
8
Of course, as dispositionalism shows us, while dispositions and knowing how both have an intimate
connection with counterfactuality, none of them can be analyzed in terms of it.

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key point is that, like the analysis of dispositions, the analysis of know-how faces the
problems of finks and masks.9 Here I borrow just two examples from the literature.
Lowenstein (2017: 168) describes the following case originally designed by Hawley
(2003: 25) as an instance of the finkishness of knowing how:

It looks as if knowledge-how may be finkish: Sylvia knows how to get home

from the city center, but if she were in the city center she would have a panic
attack and forget how to get home. If she were to try to get home from the city
center she would not succeed.

While Sylvia has knowledge-how of getting home from the city center at the moment,
if she were to try to manifest it, the panic attack would remove her knowledge-how
and she would fail to get home from the city center. Therefore, although Sylvia has
the relevant know-how at the moment, the simple conditional analysis of knowing-
how falsely predicts that she does not have it.
As an instance of the masking of know-how, consider the following case originally
due to Snowdon (2003: 8–9):

Susan, having spent a lifetime in the Royal household, knows how to address
the queen. She can tell you that the rule is ‘Ma’am to rhyme with spam, not
Ma’am to rhyme with harm.’ She is, however, unable herself to address the
monarch correctly, (or, indeed, recite the rule in the monarch’s presence) since
being of a nervous disposition, she develops a speech impediment when in the
royal presence, and cannot pronounce any word beginning with ‘m’.

Although Susan has knowledge-how of addressing the queen, if she were to try to
manifest it, she would fail due to her being nervous. Accordingly, while Susan has
the relevant know-how, the simple conditional analysis of knowing-how delivers an
incorrect verdict that she does not possess that know-how. This is a case of mask-
ing rather than finkishness, since that Susan becomes nervous does not remove her
know-how, but is rather an obstacle for manifesting the know-how that she has. Thus
know-how, like dispositions, can be masked and finkish.10 We saw that the most
influential motivation for the dispositionalist idea that dispositions resist reductive
analysis is that their analysis faces the problems of masking and finkishness, and
now we observe that the analysis of know-how faces the problems of masking and
finkishness too; therefore, we have a good reason to suppose that know-how resists
reductive analysis too. With this motivation to hand, the first idea to be offered in
defense of a know-how-first view is that (just as propositional knowledge is a sui
generis, unanalyzable mental state) know-how is a sui generis, unanalyzable power.

9
Other motivations for dispositionalism can be employed to argue that know-how is unanalyzable too.
For example, it would be plausible to think that there are plenitude instances of unmanifesting knowing
how, and since they cannot be reduced to their manifestations, it would be plausible to think that they
are not reducible.
10
For other instances of masked and finkish know-how, see Carter & Poston 2018: 101–102, Setiya 2012:
296, Khalaj & Shirazi 2020, Khalaj, 2021.

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Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 9 of 30 340

One might object that by appealing to the normality constraint we can avoid
the problems of masking and finkishness of knowing-how, and, following Hawley
(2003), some intellectualists and anti-intellectualists do in fact appeal to this strategy
to explain the practicality of knowing-how. For example, Stanley (2011: 128) writes:
“Knowing how to ski requires only (as Hawley would put it) counterfactual success
under normal circumstances”. I agree with Hawley and Stanley that knowing-how
requires counterfactual success under normal circumstances. This entailment is the
case because knowing how has a practical component. However, as dispositional-
ists have shown in criticizing the strategy of employing the normality constraint to
avoid the problems of masking and finkishness for dispositions, it is doubtful that
we can define the normality constraint in non-circular terms. There are countless
ways of preventing the counterfactual success from manifesting, and what they have
in common is that they are not normal circumstances of manifesting the relevant
know-how. Consider, again, the case of Susan’s addressing the queen. In addition to
being nervous, there can be countless interferers which prevent her know-how from
manifesting. For example, someone may distract her and she fails to pronounce the
words correctly, or she may not be sober, or perhaps an earthquake occurs, and so
forth. There is no end to the series of interferers, and to exclude all of them it seems
that we must say that the situation should be normal for manifesting Susan’s know-
how. Therefore, the counterfactual success under the normality condition that is the
practical component of know-how is to be explained by know-how itself, and there is
no reductive, non-circular analysis of the practicality of know-how. I suggest that this
is a good reason to adopt a know-how-first view. Knowing-how surely has a practical
component which can be formulated in counterfactual success under the normality
condition; however, as we have seen, its practicality and counterfactuality themselves
are to be explained by appealing to know-how itself, and this suggests that know-how
comes first in the practical realm. Thus dispositionalism provides a reason for adopt-
ing a know-how-first view.11
If my argument is on the right track, we have a general reason in support of the
claim that know-how is unanalyzable. This argument can be employed against those
trends in the literature which would give a reductive analysis of the practical compo-
nent of know-how. In the first place, my argument refutes Ryle’s counterfactual anal-
ysis of know-how. More recently, one of the most influential accounts of know-how
has been Hawley’s counterfactual analysis. Several intellectualists accept versions of
Hawley’s analysis, such as Stanley (2011: 128) and Pavese (2021: 1597), as well as
many anti-intellectualists, such as Williams (2008), Kumar (2011: 148 − 49), Carter
& Navarro (2017), Habgood-coote (2019: 97), and also some authors who want to
remain neutral between these two camps such as Silva (2017).12 If my argument is

11
To give a translation of know-how-first, namely the idea that know-how comes first in the practical
realm, in dispositional language, we can say that know-how (as a disposition) is conceptually prior to its
manifestation which is an action. Given this priority, we should define an action in terms of a manifestation
of know-how, not vice versa. Thanks to a reviewer of Synthese for turning my attention to this translation
of the know-how-first view into dispositional language.
12
As an example, Silva (2017: 400) writes “Hawley (2003) has done a great bit of work elucidating the
general structure of know-how”. As another example Carter & Navarro (2017: 672, fn. 27) claim that
“what really matters [for having know-how] is the agent’s capacity to succeed in the right circumstances—

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correct, it shows that Hawley’s counterfactual analysis is not tenable, and therefore
these trends in the literature which are inspired by her analysis will face difficulties.13
As a result, based on applying dispositionalism to knowing how, we have an argu-
ment in support of the know-how-first idea that know-how resists reductive analysis,
and this is an argument which is directly relevant to parts of the current literature on
know-how.

3 Know-how before (intentional or intelligent) ability

One might think that the fact that know-how is unanalyzable does not show that it
comes first in the practical realm; rather, the ability to do an act is a more fundamental
notion. In fact, classic anti-intellectualism, unlike know-how-first anti-intellectual-
ism, holds that the right order of explanation is to explain knowing-how in terms of
ability. If we understand the notion of ability as a mere power, which can be located
at a sub-personal level, I would agree with the claim that the notion of ability is more
fundamental than know-how.14 However, if, following philosophers who work on the
nature of ability, we understand the notion of ability at the personal, agential level, I
would claim that know-how is the more fundamental notion. In the present section,
I consider two kinds of personal, agential ability, that is, intentional ability and intel-
ligent ability, seeking to show that, unlike what classic anti-intellectualists think,
know-how comes before both of these in the order of explanation of agential action.

3.1 Know-how before intentional ability

In what follows, I develop four lines of argument in support of the claim that know-
how is prior to intentional ability in the order of explanation of intentional action.
The first argument is that intentional action is best explained in terms of the mani-
festation of know-how. This thesis is widely endorsed within the contemporary phi-
losophy of action.15 The key observation is that we are not inclined to describe a
successful action which is highly accidental as an intentional action. The standard
examples in this regard are winning a lottery and rolling a six on a die: neither of
these events is an instance of intentional action, and this observation demands an
explanation. Philosophers of action think that it can be best explained by appealing

a point that, as Hawley (2003) has insightfully shown, should be considered as a common ground for all
contenders in this debate.”
13
Of course, I don’t have space to show that my argument can be directly applied against each of these
specific accounts; however, I hope that what I have said suffices to show that Hawley’s account, which is
the touchstone of these views, is problematic.
14
The fact that mere power is a more fundamental notion than know-how is not inconsistent with a know-
how-first view, just as the fact that mere mental state is a more fundamental notion than propositional
knowledge is not inconsistent with a knowledge-first view. These notions come first in the relevant realms,
that is the philosophy of action and epistemology respectively.
15
For example, Anscombe (1963: 88), Mele and Moser (1994), Stanley & Williamson (2001), Stanley
(2011), Hornsby (2017), Small (2019), Pavese (2021), Pineros Glasscock (2021), among others, acknowl-
edge this thesis.

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Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 11 of 30 340

to the idea that to do an intentional action F requires manifesting knowing how to

do F. Someone who wins a lottery does not manifest knowing how to win a lottery;
it is a matter of sheer chance that she wins. Similarly, someone who is successful
in rolling a six on a die does not manifest knowing how to roll a six on a die; it is
an accidental success. Therefore, to exclude such accidental successes, philosophers
explain the intentional action F in terms of the manifestation of knowing how to do F.
If we consider that the intentional ability to do F itself is defined as an ability to do an
intentional action F, it follows that the intentional ability to do F should be explained
in virtue of knowing how to do F. Therefore, knowing how is prior to intentional abil-
ity in the order of explanation of intentional action.16
The second argument, which is close to the first, is that we can account for cases
of action involving causal deviancy by appealing to know-how. In the following pas-
sage, Hornsby puts forward such an argument. Consider a would-be assassin who
may accidentally run over and kill the man he intends to kill, without intentionally
killing him.

Indeed, it could be that the explanation why the would-be assassin did not inten-
tionally kill his intended victim is that the knowledge how he exercised when
he accidentally ran him over was not knowledge how to kill him. (2017: 101)

This is another reason to adopt the thesis that an intentional action F is best explained
by reference to the manifestation of knowing how to do F. The assassin does not
intentionally kill the man since he does not manifest knowing how of killing in that
instance. By appealing to know-how, we have an explanation for why we can exclude
controversial cases involving causal deviancy in explaining the nature of intentional
action. This is another piece of evidence that knowing how is a more fundamen-
tal notion than intentionality, and so the latter should be explained by appeal to the
former.
The third argument is drawn from work on the nature of ability. Concerning abil-
ity at the personal level, namely, the ability to do intentional action, philosophers
distinguish between general ability and specific ability. The specific ability is a kind
of ability that we have only when the enabling conditions of doing an action are
satisfied, whereas the general ability is a kind of ability that we retain even when
the enabling conditions of doing an action are not satisfied. For example, I retain the
general ability to play football even when there is no ball around me; however, when
I am on the field and have access to a ball, I have the specific ability to play football.
As Clarke (2015: 894) writes: “It is common to regard specific ability as less fun-
damental than general ability. On this view, an account of specific abilities might be

16
One might object that this line of argument does not establish the explanatory priority of know-how
over intentional action; rather, it just shows that know-how is a necessary condition for intentional action.
Perhaps, know-how is a mere enabling condition of intentional action and not a constitutive component
of it; or maybe, the notion of intentional action is more fundamental than know-how. In reply, notice that
this necessity claim can be thought of as a piece of evidence for the explanatory priority claim. This claim
is supported by further pieces of evidence in the second and third lines of argument. Moreover, in what
follows, I suggest a normative definition of intentional action in terms of know-how to show that the latter
is a more fundamental notion than the former.

13
340 Page 12 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

couched (at least partly) in terms of general abilities and opportunities.” The crucial
point is that general ability, as the most fundamental kind of ability, is defined by
appealing to know-how. In Clarke’s terms: “I have the motor skill, competence, and
know-how needed to ride a bike. This fact might be said to suffice for my having a
kind of ability to ride, what is often called a general ability” (ibid., 893). This is an
intuitive idea, and it is to be found in the writings of other philosophers, for example
Williamson (2018: 245), who writes: “The standard reason for being unable to ride
a bicycle is not knowing how to ride a bicycle”. I am able to ride a bicycle because I
know how to ride a bicycle. Therefore, the most fundamental notion of personal abil-
ity is the general ability, and the general ability itself is defined in virtue of knowing
how. Again, it follows that knowing how is a more fundamental notion than ability.
Thus there are at least three lines of argument that support the know-how-first
thesis, that know-how comes before intentional ability in the order of explanation of
intentional action.
Let’s turn to a crucial objection. Based on the cases of winning a lottery and rolling
six on a die, I take it as a given that intentional action F requires knowing how to do
F. However, some philosophers seek to provide a counterexample to this claim. For
example, Setiya (2008: 404) writes:

I am trying to defuse a bomb, staring with confusion at an array of colored

wires. Which one to cut? In desperation, not having a clue what the wires do,
whether they will trigger the bomb or not, I disconnect the red wire—and the
timer stops. Even though I did not know how to defuse the bomb, and managed
to do so through dumb luck, I count as having defused the bomb intentionally.

The first line of argument, being based on the claim that intentional action F requires
knowing how to do F, is vulnerable to this counterexample. In a similar vein, the
objector may continue that the person who defuses the bomb in the above case has a
kind of specific ability which is not based on the general ability of defusing the bomb.
This poses a problem for the third line of argument, that the specific ability should
be explained in virtue of the general ability which itself is defined by knowing how.
A proponent of know-how-first anti-intellectualism has two ways to resist this
objection, as well as an entirely different argument which is not vulnerable to it. The
first is to deny that, in the above case, the person defuses the bomb intentionally.
Some philosophers argue that because the case of defusing bomb has a structural
similarity to the cases of winning a lottery and rolling a six on a die, and we obviously
don’t ascribe intentionality in the latter cases, we should not ascribe intentionality in
the former case too.17 The second way is to follow Setiya in recognizing a weaker
relation between knowing how and intentional action. To exclude cases like the case
of defusing the bomb, Setiya suggests the following principle:

(K) If A is doing f intentionally, A knows how to f, or else he is doing it by doing

other things that he knows how to do. (Ibid.)

17
For this line of argument, see Pineros Glasscock 2021: 6.

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Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 13 of 30 340

Even if we endorse the above principle, we are explaining intentional action in virtue
of knowing how, and this suffices to provide a piece of evidence for the thesis that
know-how comes first in the order of explanation of intentional action.
But there is a fourth argument in favor of the priority of know-how over inten-
tional ability which is not vulnerable to the above objection. The key idea of this
argument is to give a normative definition of intentional ability in terms of know-
ing how. To develop his knowledge-first position, Williamson (2000: 47) suggests
a normative definition for belief in terms of knowledge: “Knowing is in that sense
the best kind of believing. Mere believing is a kind of botched knowing. In short,
belief aims at knowledge (not just truth).” Inspired by this idea, a proponent of the
know-how-first view can similarly define intentional action in terms of know-how:
the manifestation of knowing how is the norm and the best kind of intentional action;
in other words, intentional action aims at manifestation of knowing how (not just
successful action).18 Consider again the case of defusing the bomb. The agent’s inten-
tional action can be examined from this normative point of view: it would surely be
preferable that the person knew how to defuse the bomb. The action is not the best
kind of intentional action because it falls short of the manifestation of knowing how.
Therefore, it is an intuitive idea that the manifestation of knowing how is the norm
of intentional action.
As a result, even if someone rejects the basic intuition that intentional action
requires knowing how, we still can define intentional action as something that aims
at the manifestation of knowing how, and in this way support a know-how-first view.
One might think that if the above objection is restricted to cases of basic actions,
none of my fallback strategies, including the fourth argument, can work. There are
several members of both the intellectualist and anti-intellectualist camps who think
that basic actions are actions which one performs intentionally without knowing how
to perform them (Katzoff 1981, Snowdon 2003, Lowenstein 2017). In fact, the objec-
tion continues, it is not plausible to think that there is a kind of know-how at the basic
level, neither as a necessary condition nor as a normative condition. In reply, notice
that, regarding this problem, philosophers are divided into two groups. There are also
many members of the intellectualist and anti-intellectualist camps who do think that
basic actions require knowing-how. As an example of the intellectualists, Stanley
& Williamson (2001: 441, ft. 46) write: “We think that basic actions can be mani-
festations of knowledge-how. For example, one can sensibly ask a brain-damaged
patient whether she still knows how to raise her arm.” As a representative of the
anti-intellectualists, Small (2019: 2–3) writes: “I can raise my arm, sign my name, tie
my shoelace, or play a C major scale on the piano ‘just like that,’ … these are things
I know how to do.”
To the extent that the problem depends on intuition, a proponent of the know-
how-first view can side with the second group of philosophers to reject the objector’s

18
The idea that know-how is the norm of intentional action has already been suggested by Habgood-coote
(2018).

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340 Page 14 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

assumption that one can do basic actions intentionally without knowing how to do
them.1920
As a result, in support of the know-how-first thesis that know-how comes before
intentional ability in the order of explanation of intentional action, we have three
pieces of evidence for the explanatory priority of know-how over intentional ability
and a normative definition of intentional ability in terms of know-how.

3.2 Know-how before intelligent ability

Turning to intelligent ability, we should first deal with an objection to the above line
of reasoning. Classic anti-intellectualists might distinguish between intelligent abil-
ity and intentional ability, arguing that the kind of ability that is prior to know-how in
the order of explanation of agential action is intelligent ability instead of intentional
ability.2122 One can possess an intelligent ability to do F without having knowing how
or intentional ability to do F. To see how, consider the following case which is drawn
from Carr (1979):
A famous dancer performs a dance to which he has himself given the following
title:

(1) A performance of Improvisation No. 15

Suppose, also, that a member of his audience who is an expert on communication

recognizes that the movement of the dancer resembles an accurate semaphore ver-
sion of Gray’s “Elegy”, though the dancer is quite unaware of this fact. Therefore, the
audience can call the performance as follows:

(2) A semaphore recital of Gary’s ‘Elegy’.

The standard intuition regarding knowing how in the present case is this: “Although
we can describe the dancer as knowing how to bring about [(1)] we cannot reason-

19
In addition to Stanley & Williamson (2001) and Small (2019), several intellectualists and anti-intel-
lectualists, like Stanley (2011: 188 − 89), Hornsby (2017), Setiya (2008, 2012), Pavese (2015: 14), and
Pineros Glasscock (2021), endorse that basic actions require know-how.
20
Of course, the problem does not entirely depend on intuition; there are also several lines of argument
in support of the claim that basic actions require knowing how. As an example, relying on a regress argu-
ment, Small seeks to show that if we deny that there is a kind of know-how of basic action, we are not able
to explain the know-how of non-basic actions either, since “the practicability of derivatively practicable
know-how … depends on directly—i.e., non-derivatively—practicable know-how [of basic actions]”
(2019: 5). As another argument, given that the phenomena of control and guidance are typically explained
by appeal to know-how, if we deny that basic actions require know-how, we face difficulties in explain-
ing how we control or guide our performance during a basic action. Unfortunately, I do not have space to
discuss these arguments in support of the claim that basic actions require knowing how.
21
For example, concerning contemplating a proposition, Fridland (2015: 7) suggests that anti-intellectu-
alists “can admit that contemplating a proposition is not intentional, but insist that it is still intelligent.”
22
This objection can be strengthened by recalling the fact that Ryle (1949), the pioneer of anti-intellectu-
alism, thought of intelligent ability instead of intentional ability as the basis for explaining knowing how.

13
Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 15 of 30 340

ably suppose that he also knows how to bring about [(2)]” (ibid., 407).23 Similarly,
the dancer can perform (1) intentionally whereas since he is unaware of the crucial
fact, he cannot intend to perform (2), and therefore cannot perform (2) intentionally.
Accordingly, the dancer possesses neither knowing how nor the intentional ability
to do (2). However, there is surely a sense of personal, agential ability in which the
dancer has the ability to perform (2). Since he can perform (2) intelligently, we can
describe his ability to do (2) as an intelligent ability. This is a case of possessing intel-
ligent ability without having either knowing how or intentional ability. Therefore, the
notion of intelligent ability is more fundamental than knowing how and intentional
ability, or at the very least it is not the case that the notion of intelligent ability can be
defined in terms of knowing how or intentional ability.
To defend know-how-first against this objection, I suggest that there is a sense of
knowing how that is even more fundamental than intelligent ability. This sense of
knowing how is knowing how to do this movement when we refer to the relevant
action. Let’s call this sense of knowing how direct knowing how.24 Given that ‘this
movement’ refers to a perfect instance of the mentioned performance, I take the fol-
lowing sentences to be intuitive:

● The dancer has the ability to do (2) intelligently because he knows how to do this
movement.
● The dancer manifests the ability to do (2) awkwardly because he does not know
how to do this movement quite well.
● The dancer does not have the ability to do (2) intelligently because he does not
know how to do this movement.

I suggest that the fact that the above sentences are intuitive is a piece of evidence
for my claim that intelligent ability is best explained in virtue of what I called direct
knowing how. Therefore, even if we consider non-intentional intelligent ability, there
is a kind of knowing how (that is, direct knowing how) that comes first in the order
of explanation of agential, personal action.
Let us turn to another objection: a reductive anti-intellectualist might object that
the above argument is not enough to show the priority of know-how over intelligent
ability since the claims mentioned are also true in the converse direction; for example:

● The dancer knows how to do this movement because he has the ability to dance
intelligently.

The objector may accept that there is no case in which someone has intelligent ability
without knowing how, but still insist that know-how should be explained by intelli-

23
Of course, intuition in this case does not by itself suffice to establish the view that the Anscombean
practical knowledge of what one is doing is a necessary condition for knowing how to do that. In what
follows, I return to this view and argue against it.
24
To solve a very similar problem, Steel (1974: 49–50) claims that it is possible that “someone … knows
de re how to [do something] and does not know de dicto how to”. The kind of know-how I called direct
know-how is identical to what Steel calls ‘knowing de re how to do’. See also Carter & Czarnecki (2017)
for a similar idea.

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gent ability, not vice versa. From a classic anti-intellectualist point of view, she may
strengthen the objection by appealing to Ryle’s account of intelligence which intro-
duces a set of features for intelligence, claiming that these features together provide
a reductive analysis of the notion of intelligence. Given this analysis, reductive anti-
intellectualist can argue that know-how is reducible to intelligent ability.
To respond to this new version of the objection, first let us consider three members
of the set of features that Ryle thinks are essential for intelligence. According to him,
intelligence is the manifestation of a multi-track disposition. As he (1949: 43) puts it:
“intelligent capacities are not single-track dispositions, but are dispositions admitting
of a wide variety of more or less dissimilar exercises.” In addition, intelligence has
an essential connection with training and learning through practice:

It is of the essence of merely habitual practices that one performance is a replica

of its predecessors. It is of the essence of intelligent practices that one perfor-
mance is modified by its predecessors. The agent is still learning. … We build
up habits by drill, but we build up intelligent capacities by training. (Ibid., 30)

This learning through practice requires dealing critically with performances:

You learn as you proceed, and I too learn as you proceed. The intelligent per-
former operates critically, the intelligent spectator follows critically. (Ibid., 42)

With these three features of intelligence to hand, a proponent of reductive anti-intel-

lectualism might claim that know-how as intelligent ability can be reduced to some-
thing like this: a multi-track disposition to do a performance which requires learning
through practice and dealing critically with the performance.
In reply, to defend a know-how-first view against this objection, I want to argue
for three claims:

● Each of these features is too demanding to be considered as a necessary condition

for know-how.
● None of these features can be explained without appealing to know-how.
● These features form levels of intelligence which need to be defined by appealing
to kinds of know-how.

The upshot of the discussion will be that the definition of knowing how in terms of
the three suggested features for intelligence is not a successful reductive analysis.
To defend the first claim, it is enough to consider very simple instances of know-
ing-how, such as knowing how to clench a fist or knowing how to raise a hand. As
said above, I side with several members of both the intellectualist and anti-intellec-
tualist camps who think that there are such instances of simple knowing how. They
surely don’t manifest in “a wide variety of more or less dissimilar exercises”; and
therefore, are not multi-track dispositions. Moreover, at least in adult persons, they
don’t require training or critical operation. Another counterexample to the neces-
sity of dealing critically with performances for know-how is habit-based unreflec-
tive action. Suppose I ride a bicycle while my attention is totally engaged with a

13
Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 17 of 30 340

mathematics problem: I don’t take a critical perspective on my performance, but isn’t

this performance a manifestation of knowing how to ride a bicycle? I think that the
answer to this question is obviously ‘Yes, it is’.2526
Let us turn to the second claim, according to which the three mentioned features
have to be explained in terms of knowing-how, not vice versa. I start with the notions
of training, learning by doing, and dealing critically. As Pineros Glasscock (2021: 2)
has recently argued, learning by doing has a puzzling nature; it seems that acquiring
know-how through practice is impossible:

To learn to do a pivot turn, for instance, the novice dancer practices by doing
pivot turns; but then she seems to already know how to do pivot turns. For if she
doesn’t know how to do this, how does she make the turn?

Pineros Glasscock (2021: 8) suggests that “the best solution to the puzzle is to accept
that know-how comes in degrees”. Given this idea, it would be plausible to say that
a novice has a low degree of knowing-how, sufficient to be able to practice, and
does not have a high degree of knowing-how, yet she can acquire that higher degree
through practice. What is relevant to our purpose here is that investigating the notion
of learning by doing shows that we may not be able to explain this notion without
appealing to (gradable) know-how itself. Moreover, I argue that learning by train-
ing is itself a distinct kind of knowing how. Consider two novices who know how
to do an action but not well. One of them can improve her performance by training
and another cannot. The difference between these two novices can be best explained
in terms of the fact that only the novice who improves her performance knows how
to learn from practice.2728 Moreover, this novice knows how to improve her per-

25
This was an example of habit-based unreflective know-how. See below for an example of an expert’s
exceptional unreflective know-how, which, like the former, does not include a critical perspective.
26
It is well known that Ryle puts know-how and habits into two distinct categories. Even if we accept
that this is the best way of interpreting Ryle, there are different anti-intellectualist traditions, such as phe-
nomenologist anti-intellectualism and pragmatist anti-intellectualism, which consider habit-based actions
as clear cases of knowing how. For an example of considering habit as an instance of know-how from the
first tradition, see Merleau-Ponty (1945: 166 − 67), and for an example from the second tradition, see Legg
& Black (2020).
27
One might think that if we assume that acquiring know-how by practice requires know-how to learn
from practice, this will lead to a regress of knowing how to learn from practice. However, I don’t think so.
There are two kinds of regress-stopper available here: (1) know-how which is acquired by ways other than
practicing (Dickie, 2012: 741); (2) innate know-how (Elzinga, 2020: 7). Various versions of know-how to
learn from practice can be of one of these two kinds.
28
One might object that there are clear examples of learning by doing without knowing how to learn by
doing. Consider the following variation of an example from Hawley (2003: 27). Sally does not know how
to escape from an avalanche, nor does she know how to learn to escape from an avalanche. When an ava-
lanche occurs, she decides to make motions like swimming. She is lucky enough to escape the avalanche,
since, unbeknown to her, the right way of escaping an avalanche is to make motions like swimming. After
this success, she learns from doing how to escape from an avalanche without having known how to learn
to escape from it when she did escape. In other words, when escaping, Sally does not know that this is a
good way of escaping and does not describe her doing as practicing well. Therefore, we have a case in
which someone learns by doing without knowing how to learn by doing. In response, depending on two
opposite intuitions regarding this case, I follow two different lines of resistance: if we consider this learn-
ing by doing as a manifestation of intelligence, then we are right to attribute to Sally a kind of knowing

13
340 Page 18 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

formance by training since she knows how to deal critically with her performance
and learn from her mistakes. Of course, knowing how to deal critically with per-
formance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowing how to learn from
practice. One may be a good critic without knowing how to employ the criticism to
improve one’s action. Therefore, the ability to learn from practice and the ability to
deal critically with performances are themselves two distinct kinds of knowing how.
Manifestations of simple knowing how (such as clenching a fist) and unreflective
know-how (such as riding habitually) do not require these two kinds of ability. If
someone explains knowing how to do something in terms of these kinds of ability,
not only will she exclude simple and unreflective instances of knowing how, but also
she will explain knowing-how in terms of abilities which are themselves distinct
kinds of knowing how. Therefore, this explanation would not be a reductive analysis
of know-how.
So far, I have attempted to explain learning by practice, training, and critical deal-
ing in terms of knowing how. What can be said about the idea that know-how is a
multi-track disposition? While I disagree with the claim that simple knowing how
such as knowing how to raise one’s hand is a multi-track disposition, I admit that
sophisticated knowing how (such as knowing how to perform a dance) is of this kind
of disposition. It can be manifested in a wide variety of dissimilar performances.
Concerning this point, I want to suggest that multi-track manifestations are marks
of intelligence when agents manifest a level of creativity.29 For example, a creative
dancer can perform a dance in a crucially different way than previous performances.
We attribute to her a higher level of intelligence than someone who can perform a
dance only in a uniform way and without creativity. However, what is important is
that creativity itself seems to be a kind of knowing how. The difference between
someone who does something in a creative way and someone who does it without
creativity is that the first person has a distinct kind of knowing how which the sec-
ond lacks. The first person, unlike the second, knows how to do an action in a way
that is novel and different than previously. Again, if someone explains knowing-how

how to learn to escape from the avalanche. For example, consider a context in which we contrast Sally with
Tommy, who, unlike Sally, cannot learn the way to escape the avalanche the first time he does it; rather,
he requires to repeat it twenty times if he is going to learn. In such contexts, it would be plausible to say
that Sally is more intelligent than Tommy since she knows how to learn the task quicker. However, on the
other hand, one might think that the right intuition concerning this case is that Sally’s learning by doing is
the manifestation of her luck (and not her intelligence). It is an accident that she learned this knowing-how.
In which case, this kind of learning by doing is not also a manifestation of knowing how to learn. But this
is not a threat to my suggestion since I try to explain intelligence in terms of knowing how, and this kind
of learning by doing is not a manifestation of intelligence. This objection helps me to put my claim about
learning by doing more carefully: to the extent that learning by doing is the manifestation of intelligence,
it is the manifestation of knowing how to learn too.
29
Unfortunately, I don’t have space to give a detailed argument for this claim. To provide an initial moti-
vation for the claim, compare these two persons: the first person possesses a single track disposition and
therefore manifests it in a uniform way. The second person has a multi-track disposition and therefore
manifests it in a wide variety of dissimilar ways. However, imagine that both persons perform their acts
automatically, mechanically, and based on their habits. Does the first person manifest a higher level of
intelligence? I think that the answer to this question is ‘No’. Therefore, multi-track manifestations by
themselves are not marks of intelligence, and I suggest that they can be thought of as a reason for a higher
level of intelligence only when they are produced based on a level of creativity.

13
Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 19 of 30 340

in terms of multi-track manifestations which require creativity, not only does she
exclude instances of simple knowing how, but she also explains knowing how in
terms of a capacity which itself is a candidate for being knowing how. Therefore, this
explanation would not be a reductive analysis of know-how too.30
I do agree with Ryle that having the three mentioned capacities (i.e., capacity to
learn by doing, capacity to deal critically, and capacity for multi-track manifestation)
are characteristics of intelligence. What I tried to show is, firstly, that these capacities
are not necessary for all kinds of knowing how, and, secondly, that they should be
explained in terms of distinct kinds of knowing how, not vice versa.31 This brings us
to the third claim by which I want to employ Ryle’s insights to suggest a definition of
levels of intelligence in terms of kinds of knowing how.
Consider a novice who can do a task, say riding a bicycle, but not well and without
any clear de dicto knowledge of the task. The person surely manifests a degree of
intelligence that many people cannot manifest. This minimum level of intelligence
can be explained by what I called direct knowing how. For the second level of intel-
ligence, consider another novice who not only can do a task but also is able to deal
with it critically and identify her mistakes. This person manifests a higher level of
intelligence than the first person, one which is explained in terms of knowing how to
deal critically with a performance. The third level of intelligence is the level at which
a person not only can do a task and deal with it critically, but also is able to improve
in the task by learning from her mistakes in practice. This higher level of intelligence
is accounted for by what I called knowing how to learn from practice. Finally, the
fourth and perhaps highest level of intelligence is the level in which a person not
only can do a task, deal with it critically, and learn from doing it, but also is able to
do it in a wide variety of dissimilar exercises. As we saw above, this manifestation of
intelligence is best explained in terms of knowing how to do a task in a creative way.
I am fully aware that this sketch of the notion of intelligence is not a comprehensive
account, and that intelligence may have further aspects. However, to the extent that
is relevant to our discussion, I have tried to show that a proponent of know-how-first

30
Montero (2016: 240) has recently provided a new account of creativity in which she underlines the
role of intellectual states (such as thought and cognition) in creative performances. However, there is a
longstanding tradition in philosophy and psychology which has provided anti-intellectualist accounts of
creativity. (See, for example, Dreyfus & Dreyfus (2000) and Csikszentmihalyi (1996).) As an example,
Dreyfus describes the creative motions of an expert chess player as an “immediate intuitive response to
each situation”, claiming that “they must depend almost entirely on intuition” (Dreyfus, 1987: 27–28),
whereas he “shall use ‘intuition’ and ‘know-how’ as synonymous” (Dreyfus-Dreyfus 2000: 28).
31
A caution regarding multi-track dispositions and learning by doing: I didn’t argue for the absurd claim
that every kind of multi-track disposition should be explained in terms of knowing-how. Rather, I argued
that when multi-track manifestations are marks of intelligence, they should be explained in terms of a kind
of knowing how, that is, knowing how to do an action with creativity. Similarly, as I argued in details in
fn. 28, to the extent that learning by doing is the manifestation of intelligence, it is the manifestation of
knowing how to learn too.

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anti-intellectualism can employ the Rylean heritage to provide an initial definition of

levels of intelligence in terms of kinds of knowing how.323334
Thus, in the present section I have followed several lines of argument to defend a
know-how-first anti-intellectualism, according to which know-how is prior to both
intentional and intelligent abilities in the order of explanation of agential action.

3.3 Defending know-how-first against a version of non-standard anti-

intellectualism

What parts of literature are relevant to my arguments in the present section? Many
anti-intellectualists think that know-how can be reduced to either intelligent ability
(Ryle, 1949, Noe 2005, Fantl 2008, Poston, 2009, Wiggins, 2012, Fridland, 2015)
or intentional ability (Hawley, 2003; Williams, 2008; Markie, 2015).35 If the present
arguments in defense of the know-how-first view are correct, they pose a problem for
these views which I suggest we call standard anti-intellectualist views. However, in
recent years, various non-standard alternative versions of anti-intellectualism have
been proposed. These proposals are not the main target of my argument in this paper,
and a full examination of them from a know-how-first point of view requires another
essay. However, let us briefly consider one of these different versions of reductive
anti-intellectualism, namely Setiya’s account (2012) according to which know-how

32
Focusing on Ryle’s account of intelligence, Kremer (2016) and Lowenstein (2017) have recently pro-
vided novel Rylean accounts of know-how. Both consider a high level of intelligence as a necessary
condition for know-how. Therefore, they reject the claim that there are kinds of simple know-how, such
as knowing how to raise a hand. Kremer (2016: fn19) provides a piece of evidence in favor of this rejec-
tion by appealing to a Google search. As I said above, I side with philosophers who think that there are
instances of simple know-how of basic actions. However, I admit that there is a need for more research to
determine the judgments of ordinary folk regarding this issue. It is also worth mentioning that Lowenstein
addresses the problem that if we explain knowing how in terms of competence of dealing critically with
performance (or in his terms, competence of conceptual assessment of a performance), our account may
be circular and therefore non-reductive. Lowenstein (2017: 140) responds to this problem by claiming that
“an assessment competence is self-reflexive”. From a know-how-first point of view, I am inclined to say
that while this suggestion is true, it is still non-reductive since being self-reflexive is the manifestation of
the assessment competence which cannot be understood without mentioning the competence itself. How-
ever, defending this claim against Lowenstein’s reductive project requires another essay.
33
My concern in the present paper is not interpretive at all. I also admit that, clearly, what I suggest is
not the standard interpretation of Ryle. However, perhaps we can interpret Ryle, when, for example, he
(1949: 34) suggests that “Knowing how, then, is … not a single-track disposition”, as having in mind the
best version of knowing-how (which contains a high level of intelligence) and not a necessary condition
for every instance of know-how.
34
In this section, I have suggested a new account of levels of intelligence and know-how. The classic
anti-intellectualist account of levels of know-how comes from Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s (2000) account of
expertise. While my suggestion has something in common with their account, there are also some crucial
differences and thus I am doubtful that the two accounts are entirely parallel. For example, what is key
for Dreyfus & Dreyfus (2000) is that acquiring a higher level of expertise leads us to do skillful actions
more unreflectively. My suggestion, on the other hand, does not have this commitment. Determining the
similarities and differences between these two accounts is a task which for reasons of space I cannot carry
out here.
35
There are also anti-intellectualist views that propose reducing know-how to mere ability or pure dispo-
sition (Devitt, 2011). The standard complaint against these views is that they cannot distinguish between
knowledge-how and knacks. For a version of this objection, see Bengson & Moffett (2011).

13
Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 21 of 30 340

should be reduced to neither intentional ability nor intelligent ability, rather to “the
capacity for [Anscombean] practical knowledge” (Setiya 2012: 304). Is this account
a successful reductive analysis of know-how? In my view, there are reasons to answer
this question with ‘No’. In fact, this suggestion presupposes the view that Anscom-
bean practical knowledge is a necessary condition for knowing-how, and therefore
suggests that we can explain the latter in terms of the former. However, I argue that
this claim is vulnerable to counterexamples. To see how, note that Brownstein (2014)
discusses several cases of agential skilled unreflective actions whose agent does not
have the Anscombean practical knowledge. In his terms, “experts frequently say that
they don’t know what they’re doing or why” (555). Here is an example of his cases:

Larry Bird, the great Boston Celtic, purportedly said, “[A lot of the] things I
do on the court are just reactions to situations… A lot of times, I’ve passed the
basketball and not realized I’ve passed it until a moment or so later.” (Ibid.)

In this case, the agent manifests knowing how to do something without manifest-
ing knowledge of what he is doing; thus, this is a case of manifesting knowing how
without manifesting the capacity for Anscombean practical knowledge. This suggests
that at least one kind of know-how, namely unreflective direct know-how, cannot be
analyzed in terms of the capacity for Anscombean practical knowledge. In addition
to that, very recently, inspired by Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, Pineros
Glasscock has introduced a novel case against the necessity of Anscombean practical
knowledge for intentional action, which can be employed against Setiya’s account of
know-how too. Here is his case:

Suppose a musician is singing Marc Anthony’s I need to Know over and over
for several hours, until she completely loses her voice so that by the end of the
process she is no longer singing. Imagine further that the musician’s ears are
covered with fully sound-proof earplugs, so that she cannot hear herself sing-
ing. The musician … knows that after several hours her voice is gone. This
means that at some point in the process she will be in an epistemically hazard-
ous situation, where her beliefs about what she is doing could easily be false …
and would thus not amount to knowledge. (2021: 5)

At the point that the musician does not know that she is singing, she still manifests
knowing how to sing. Therefore, this is another example of manifesting knowing
how without manifesting the capacity for Anscombean practical knowledge.36
Concerning Setiya’s suggestion (2012), there is also a worry about the right order
of explanation. Why do we not explain Anscombean practical knowledge in terms
of know-how? Interestingly, in his (2008), Setiya suggests such an explanation. In
fact, Setiya’s project in that paper is in accordance with the spirit of know-how-first
anti-intellectualism. He takes know-how as the starting point of his explanation and
gives a novel account of the challenging problem of the justificatory condition of

36
Perhaps Davidson’s famous case of the carbon copier as against Anscombean practical knowledge is
another counterexample to Setiya’s view.

13
340 Page 22 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

Anscomean practical knowledge. Thus, while know-how-first is contrary to Setiya’s

account in his (2012), it is entirely compatible with the account suggested in his
(2008).
As I said above, a full examination of Setiya’s view requires another essay. How-
ever, cases of unreflective direct know-how, Pineros Glasscock’s anti-luminosity
argument, and the question about the right order of explanation provide a proponent
of the know-how-first view with prima facie arguments that if a reductive analysis of
know-how wants to be successful, it needs to appeal to a more fundamental notion
than Anscombean practical knowledge.

4 Some implications of know-how-first for Anti-intellectualism

The adoption of a know-how-first version of anti-intellectualism opens new perspec-

tives on, and suggests a new area of solutions to, challenges that anti-intellectualists
must face in explaining the nature of knowing how. In this section, I look at two
instances of these challenges, and consider the new solutions to them which are avail-
able to a know-how-first anti-intellectualist.

4.1 The sufficiency problem

According to some classic anti-intellectualist views, a reliable ability to do an inten-

tional action F is sufficient for knowing how to do F. However, intellectualists argue
against this sufficiency thesis by way of several counterexamples. Here I focus on
one of these counterexamples and seek to show how a know-how-first solution to this
problem proceeds. Consider the following case, originally suggested by Bengson and
Moffet (2007) as a counterexample to the sufficiency thesis:

Salchow
Irina is a figure skater who wants to perform a complex jump called Salchow.
When performing a salchow, one should take off from the back inside edge of
one skate and land on the back outside edge of the opposite skate. However,
Irina is seriously confused about how to perform a Salchow. She thinks mistak-
enly that the way of performing a Salchow is to take off from the front outside
edge of one skate and land on the front inside edge of the other skate. However,
Irina has a severe neurological abnormality that makes her act in ways that
differ dramatically from how she actually thinks she is acting. So while she
is seriously mistaken about how to perform a Salchow, whenever she actually
attempts to do a Salchow, the abnormality causes Irina to unknowingly perform
the correct sequence of moves, and so she ends up successfully performing a
Salchow.

While Irina has a reliable ability to do a Salchow intentionally, she obviously does
not know how to perform a Salchow. Thus, the possession of reliable ability to do
intentional action F is not sufficient for possessing knowledge-how to do F. Inspired
by virtue epistemology, an influential anti-intellectualist response to the case of Sal-

13
Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 23 of 30 340

chow (and similar cases) is that someone has knowledge-how to do F only when not
only does she have a reliable ability to do F but also her success would be because of
her ability. Put differently, in cases of knowing how, unlike the case of Salchow, the
agent’s success has to be attributable to her ability. In Carter and Pritchard’s words:

If one successfully Fs because of one’s ability (vis-a-vis F), then one knows
how to F. (2015a: 182, emphasis added)

Irina has not satisfied this condition since her success is because of and attributable
to her abnormality, and not her ability. Therefore, lacking know-how is explained by
appealing to the because-of relation between success and ability conditions.3738
However, it is widely argued that virtue epistemologists and their proponents face
severe problems in explaining the nature of this because-of relation. Greco (2012)
distinguishes five ways virtue epistemologists understand the nature of the because-
of relation, seeking to show what problems each of these suggestions faces. Anti-
intellectualists will face similar difficulties if they choose any of these suggestions to
explain the nature of the because-of relation between the success condition and the
ability condition in cases of knowing how. As an example, following Greco (2009),
classic anti-intellectualists can suggest that Irina’s success is not because of her abil-
ity in the right way since the most salient part of the explanation of Irina’s success is
her abnormality, not her ability. If anti-intellectualists choose this option they would
have a problem in explaining what can be called ‘easy know-how’.39 Suppose, for
example, Stephen and Klay are two players in a basketball team. Stephen evades five
defenders and then passes to Klay, who scores the goal by an easy layup. While Klay
manifests the know-how of scoring the goal, the most salient part of the explanation
of his success is definitely Stephen’s ability to dribble and not Klay’s. If we explain
the because-of relation between success and ability in terms of the most salient part
of the explanation of success, this would deliver the wrong verdict that Klay’s suc-
cess is not because of his ability, and he does not manifest this easy know-how.
Given the problems that virtue epistemologists face in explaining the because-of
relation, we should ask whether there is a successful analysis of the because-of rela-
tion at all. One might think that a proponent of reductive anti-intellectualism does
not need to take a stance on this issue since every suggestion virtue epistemologists
finally found to be plausible would be available to reductive anti-intellectualists too.40
However, this is simply false, since it is not clear that there would be a reductive
analysis of the because-of relation. Facing difficulties in explanation of the nature of
because-of relation, some virtue epistemologies, such as Miracchi (2015) and Kelp

37
See, for example, Carter & Pritchard (2015a: 195 fn 26).
38
Carter and Czarnecki (2016: 3–5) provide a similar explanation of the lack of knowing-how in the case
of Salchow by appealing to the lack of an attribution relation instead of a because-of relation. In what fol-
lows, I focus on the problem of illustrating the nature of the because-of relation; however, I am inclined to
say that a similar problem arises for illustrating the nature of the attribution relation too.
39
This problem is similar to the problem virtue epistemologists face in explaining knowledge from testi-
mony. See Lackey (2007).
40
See Carter & Pritchard (2015b : 800, fn. 6).

13
340 Page 24 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

(2017), have recently chosen a knowledge-first view and suggested a non-reductive

approach to knowledge. Similarly, it is not clear that there is a non-reductive explana-
tion of the because-of relation in cases of knowing-how too.
From a know-how-first point of view, we ought not to try to solve the sufficiency
problem posed by the case of Salchow, but rather we should dissolve this problem.
Anti-intellectualists get the order of explanation wrong if they try to explain the fact
that Irina lacks knowledge-how in virtue of lacking intentional ability. Instead, they
should explain the profile of Irina’s intentional ability in terms of her lacking knowl-
edge-how. Given what was said above, the standard know-how-first explanation of
the case of Salchow is to deny that Irina performs a Salchow intentionally. Like win-
ning a lottery and rolling a six, Irina’s performing a Salchow is too accidental for it
to count as an intentional action. Moreover, there is a kind of causal deviancy in the
case of Salchow that shows that it is more similar to the case of the would-be assassin
formulated by Hornsby. In either case, the intuition that Irina does not perform a Sal-
chow intentionally is best explained by the fact that she does not manifest knowing
how to perform a Salchow.
However, as we saw in the last section, one might emphasize that while Irina’s
success is highly accidental, she still does a Salchow intentionally. In which case,
the alternative know-how-first explanation is to argue that Irina’s intentional action
falls short of the best kind of intentional action since she does not manifest knowing
how to perform a Salchow. Put differently, Irina’s success in performing a Salchow
is not because of her intentional ability in the right way, since she does not manifest
knowing how to do Salchow. With this suggestion on the table, proponents of know-
how-first anti-intellectualism have an explanation of the because-of relation which
is not available to reductive anti-intellectualists like Carter & Pritchard (2015ab),
according to which, the because-of relation should be explained in terms of knowing-
how, not vice versa.
As a result, the know-how-first view avoids difficulties that arise for some reduc-
tive anti-intellectualists in explaining the because-of relation, providing anti-intellec-
tualists with a solution to, or perhaps better a dissolution of, the sufficiency problem
illustrated in the case of Salchow.

4.2 The necessary condition problem

In addition to challenging the sufficiency thesis, intellectualists argue against the

necessity of (intentional or intelligent) ability for know-how. As an example, Stanley
& Williamson (2001: 416) write: “a master pianist who loses both of her arms in a
tragic car accident still knows how to play the piano. But she has lost her ability to do
so.” Let us call this problem the necessary condition problem. As we saw in Sect. 2,
the kind of ability which is necessary for knowing how can be described as the abil-
ity in the normal situation or right circumstance; however, the normality or right
condition itself cannot be spelled out without appealing to know-how. Therefore, in a
normal situation for manifesting knowing how to play the piano in which the amputee
pianist would have hands, she is able to play the piano because she knows how to
play the piano.

13
Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 25 of 30 340

Some reductive anti-intellectualists seek to explain cases like the amputee pia-
nist by distinguishing “ability-can and opportunity-can” (Glick, 2012: 131; Carter
& Navarro 2017: 671–672). The amputee pianist has the ability to play the piano
although she does not have the opportunity to manifest her ability. However, they
must face the problem of giving criteria for distinguishing between an ability and an
opportunity. Interestingly, as we saw in the previous section, philosophers who work
on the nature of ability distinguish between general ability (ability without opportu-
nity) and specific ability (ability plus opportunity) by appealing to know-how itself.
In Clarke’s words: “I have the motor skill, competence, and know-how needed to
ride a bike. This fact might be said to suffice for my having a kind of ability to ride,
what is often called a general ability” (ibid., 893). Moreover, Carter and Navarro
distinguish between ability and opportunity by using Sosa’s triple S structure. In this
view, what the amputee pianist preserves after the accident is her skill of playing the
piano. Mentioning cases like the amputee pianist, Carter & Navarro (2017: 671) sug-
gest that “all of them preserve the relevant skill”. However, it is an intuitive idea that
skill itself should be explained in terms of know-how. Several anti-intellectualists,
including Ryle (1949) himself, use the terms skill and knowing-how interchangeably,
and many in the literature endorse that skill requires knowing how.41 Therefore, if we
invoke either general ability or skill, it is not clear that we can distinguish between
the ability and opportunity without appealing to know-how itself. Thus it is not clear
that there would be a reductive solution to the necessary condition problem posed
by cases like the amputee pianist. On the other hand, if we choose a know-how-first
anti-intellectualism, the problem disappears since we can easily distinguish between
ability and opportunity by appealing to know-how itself. The amputee pianist has still
the general ability and skill of playing piano because she preserves her know-how of
playing piano.42

41
As an example, Stanley (2011: 176) writes: “It is a (near enough) conceptual truth that acting with skill
requires knowledge how.”
42
As said above, I cannot address the recent vast anti-intellectualist literature, containing several accounts
each of which departs from classic anti-intellectualism in some respects. However, let us take just one
example and see whether it can overcome the two problems discussed in the present section. Rejecting the
received anti-intellectualist thesis that the verb ‘know’ is ambiguous, Kremer (2016) has recently devel-
oped an interesting novel Rylean account of know-how, putting both knowledge-how and knowledge-that
under the unified category of ‘capacity to get things right’. Kremer does not directly discuss the case of
Salchow; however, as mentioned in fn. 32, he imposes a high level of intelligence as a constraint on know-
how by which he may be able to exclude cases like Salchow. Borrowing the idea from Ryle, Kremer (2016:
32) writes: “to exhibit intelligence or know-how, one must be critically engaged with one’s performance”.
Given this, Kremer can argue that Irina does not have the right critical perspective on Salchow, and
therefore she does not manifest knowing-how. However, as we saw in the previous section, this capacity
to critically engage is itself a kind of knowing how. Therefore, it cannot be a reductive way of excluding
cases like Salchow. Moreover, even if we accept that Kremer can provide a reductive solution to the suf-
ficiency problem, I doubt that he can overcome the necessary condition problem. Kremer considers Ryle’s
definition of know-how as “intelligent power” and also endorses that “clearly, knowledge-how has some
sort of connection to ability” (32–33). However, he does not illustrate what the precise nature of this con-
nection is or how we can diagnose cases like the amputee pianist in which someone has knowing how to
do something without having an ability to do it. Concerning the necessary condition problem, Kremer’s
account, at best, is unclear.

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340 Page 26 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

5 Conclusions

I sought to give a new version of anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how, which

I called the know-how-first view. Inspired by Williamson,43 who argues that propo-
sitional knowledge is a sui generis unanalyzable mental state that comes first in the
epistemic realm, I suggested that know-how is a sui generis unanalyzable power that
comes first in the practical realm. To motivate this suggestion, I followed two lines
of argument: in the first line of argument, I appealed to dispositionalism to argue
that know-how is an unanalyzable power, and that we cannot specify the practicality
of know-how without invoking the notion of know-how itself. In the second line of
argument, I argued that know-how comes first in the practical realm, since know-how
is prior to intentional and intelligent abilities in the order of explanation of agential
action. Finally, I took a look at two problems for anti-intellectualism, namely the
sufficiency problem and the necessary condition problem, seeking to show that there
are know-how-first anti-intellectualist solutions (or dissolutions) to these problems
which are not available to reductive anti-intellectualists.
I admit that a proponent of know-how-first anti-intellectualism still has a lot
of work to do to develop a comprehensive account of know-how. As I said at the
beginning, this paper should be seen as a starting point for a new anti-intellectualist
research program. As concluding remarks, I want to briefly address three limitations
of my arguments in the present paper, which point the way for three lines of future
work for an anti-intellectualist know-how-first research program.
The first is to generalize the negative proposal of know-how-first anti-intellectual-
ism. In the present paper, my focus was on arguing against what I called the classic
or standard anti-intellectualist views, according to which know-how is analyzed in
terms of intentional or intelligent ability. However, the reductive anti-intellectual-
ist projects are not limited to these standard views. In recent years, several alter-
native accounts of know-how have been suggested in the anti-intellectualist camp.
An urgent need in developing a know-how-first anti-intellectualism is to show that
the alternative anti-intellectualist suggestions fail to provide a reductive analysis of
know-how.44

43
It is worth noting that while know-how-first anti-intellectualism is inspired by Williamson’s knowledge-
first approach, it is also contrary to knowledge-first in some respects. Although Stanley and Williamson
themselves do not explicitly assert this point, we can consider their intellectualism about know-how (2001)
and skill (2017) as applications of the knowledge-first project, since it shows the explanatory power of
propositional knowledge in the practical realm. Therefore, if, as know-how-first anti-intellectualism sug-
gests, we accept that know-how and not propositional knowledge comes first in the practical realm, we
are running contrary to at least one application of Williamson’s knowledge-first approach. Thanks to a
reviewer of Synthese for turning my attention to this point.
44
In Sect. 3 and Sect. 4 I argued briefly against three of these alternative accounts, that is, Setiya’s sug-
gestion in his (2012), Kremer’s (2016) and Lowenstein’s (2017). However, a full examination of these
accounts and other alternative anti-intellectualist analyses of know-how (such as Hadgood-coote’s (2018)
and Elzinga’s (2018)) requires another essay. Moreover, it would be nice to find an a priori recipe for coun-
terexamples to every reductive analysis of know-how (similar to the recipe Zagzebski (1996: 288–289)
introduces for every analysis of propositional knowledge). Thanks to a reviewer of Synthese for this inter-
esting suggestion.

13
Synthese (2022) 200: 340 Page 27 of 30 340

The second line is to expand the horizon of the positive proposal of know-how-
first anti-intellectualism. If we make clear that more notions can be explained in terms
of know-how, it will be shown that the know-how-first project has more explanatory
power. As mentioned in Sect. 3, by explaining the justificatory profile of Anscombean
practical knowledge in terms of knowing-how, Setiya (2008) develops a know-how-
first-friendly account which solves a challenging problem in the philosophy of action.
To expand the scope of a know-how-first project, explaining other central notions and
solving other challenging problems by appealing to know-how can be the order of
the future.45
The third line is to deal with the challenges that anti-intellectualism faces. In
Sect. 4, I sought to show how know-how-first solutions to the sufficiency and nec-
essary condition problems would proceed. However, there are other problems for
which a plausible anti-intellectualist account ought to find solutions. In my view, the
problem of explaining the epistemic profile of know-how is the most challenging
problem for anti-intellectualism. Several anti-intellectualists have recently addressed
this problem, framing it in different versions. For example, Kremer (2016: 25) formu-
lated it as the problem of the unity of knowledge:

Gilbert Ryle is perhaps most famous for making a distinction between knowl-
edge-how and knowledge-that, … Ryle’s position must overcome a significant
difficulty: to explain the unity of knowledge.

A know-how-first anti-intellectualism can be accepted as a plausible account only if

it can provide a solution to this problem46 and other challenges the anti-intellectualist
must face.4748

45
Perhaps the best candidate for this line of research is to revive some classic accounts which depend on
an explanatory priority for know-how. For two classic examples, we can refer to Putnam’s explanation of
the nature of grasping meaning in terms of knowing-how: “knowing the meaning of the word ‘gold’ or of
the word ‘elm’ is not a matter of knowing that at all, but a matter of knowing how” (1996: xvi); and Lewis’s
account of knowing what experiences like, according to which this knowledge “isn’t knowing that. It’s
knowing how” (1999: 288). Giving explanatory priority to know-how in such accounts has more plausibil-
ity from a know-how-first point of view.
46
In my view, there is a modest and a radical know-how-first solution to this problem. The modest solu-
tion is to choose knowledge-first regarding propositional knowledge and develop an analogical conception
of knowledge which comes first either in the epistemic or practical realm. And the radical solution is to
give a know-how-first version of what is called radical anti-intellectualism, namely that not only is know-
how knowledge, but indeed it is the original notion of knowledge, whereas knowledge-that is a derivative
concept which can be reduced to knowledge-how. Of course, fleshing out these general strategies requires
distinct papers.
47
As an example, another challenging problem is to provide a semantic account of ascriptions of know-
how which would be in accordance with a know-how-first anti-intellectualism.
48
Perhaps there is a fourth line of work by which a proponent of the know-how-first view could respond
to objections which are not limited to know-how-first anti-intellectualism but which seek to target every
view which is inspired by knowledge-first. For example, just as Williamson (2000) thinks that the concep-
tual priority of knowledge over belief is relevant to epistemological issues, I assume that the conceptual
priority of know-how over, for example, intentional action, is relevant to the philosophical debate on
know-how. In contrast, inspired by Sosa (2015), for example, one might object that what is relevant to
philosophical debate is only the metaphysical priority. Responding to this and similar objections against

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340 Page 28 of 30 Synthese (2022) 200: 340

Acknowledgements Many thanks to Ebrahim Azadegan, Arash Abazari, Davood Hosseini, and Sadjad
Abolfathi. I am also grateful to Mahmoud Morvarid and two anonymous reviewers of Synthese for their
helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Ben Young who kindly helped me at every stage
in writing the paper. The paper has been written in the memory of J. G. Bennett, one of the pioneers of the
know-how-first view. The research for this paper was fully funded by the Iran National Science Foundation
(INSF, grant number: 99025855).

Funding The research for this article was funded by Iran National Science Foundation (Number:
99025855).

Declarations

Conflict of interest The author has no conflict of interest.

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