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Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?

Author(s): John R. Elting


Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring, 1964), pp. 17-26
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1984719
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JOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON?

By JOHN R. ELTING*

N APOLEON, despite his faults and It was only after 1870 that disillusioned
failures, remains the Great Captain.
Americans began seeking after another, more
His swift, deadly campaigns, designed
cryptic disciple-named Clausewitz.
to force the enemy army into battle under
Any study of Jomini is handicapped by the
every possible disadvantage, mark him aunfortunate
mas- fact that his existing biographies
ter of strategy. His tactics-when impatience
are practically autobiographies, based on
and plentiful cannon fodder did not make
nothing more than his personal notes or the
him careless-combined audacity, simplicity,
stories he told in his older years.2 These pre-
and a sure instinct for the jugular. His grasp
sent him as a uniquely endowed genius, mas-
of military organization and logistics was ter of all military arts, and paragon of honor.
amazing. But he left no easy, comprehensive Had not the envious plottings of less talented
description of his system of war. Nineteenth men (so these stories insist) forced him away
century American officers who desired to from Napoleon's side in the latter's hour of
study Napoleon's campaigns had to turn to need, Napoleon probably would have died
his disciples. victorious and Emperor, in the fullness of his
Of these, Jomini was the first and fore- years, bequeathing throne and empire to his
most. The first known military engineering son.
textbook used at the United States Military The real Jomini was a very minor figure,
Academy proclaimed "General Jomini has seldom mentioned in orders or dispatches,
transcended all writers on war . . . and has practically ignored in the memoirs of the of-
reduced the hitherto mysterious science of ficers who had served with him. Any old
war to a few self-evident principles and soldier is apt to exaggerate his personal share
axioms."' Later, Henry W. Halleck trans- in "battles long ago." And Jomini-con-
lated a number of Jomini's works, but a fair vinced that he was a malignly thwarted great
number of American officers already had captain-sought compensation by gilding his
struggled through the original French edi- memories. Out-writing and out-living his
tions-copies of which still remain in the contemporaries, he had the pleasure of seeing
West Point Library. During the Civil War, his largest inventions uncritically believed.
Jomini's books could be found in the saddle- Antoine Henri Jomini was born in Pay-
bags on both sides. If Napoleon were the erne, Switzerland, on 6 March 1779. After
god of war, Jomini was his one, true prophet. an indifferent education, spiced by avid study
of military affairs, he was apprenticed to a
*Colonel Elting is Associate Professor and Deputy
Director, History of Military Art Courses, United States banker. In 1796, he secured a position in a
Military Academy, West Point, N. Y. Paris bank, but left it to become an inde-
10'Conor, John M. A Treatise on the Science of War
dnd Fortification, 1817. Vol. II, pages 385-386. (This pendent speculator. At first successful, he
was a good translation of Gay de Vernon's Traite' ete-
mentdire d'art mititaire et de fortication, Paris 1805, to 2This article is based generally on Courville, Xavier
which O'Connor added a "Summary of the Principles de. Jomini, ou de le Devin de Napoleon, Paris, 1935.
and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations," drawn Written by Jomini's decendants, from his personal pa-
largely from Jomini. pers, it is the most impartial of his biographies.

17

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18 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring

soon lost heavily; in 1798, he returned to him in the French service, and he could not
Switzerland in the train of a Swiss officer find a publisher for his book. He solicited
who expected to become that country's min- the Russian ambassador, but was dismissed
ister of war. (To provide funds for Bona- as too young to give lessons to Russian gen-
parte's Egyptian expedition, the Directory erals. In 1804, he approached Murat, then
had converted Switzerland into a thoroughly governor of Paris, with a plan to overthrow
plundered satellite.) Jomini's patron was the existing Swiss government and secure the
disappointed, but Jomini himself-thanks toannexation of that country to France.5 (In
his excellent handwriting-managed to be. later years, Jomini would pose as a fervent
come a secretary in the War Ministry. Energy Swiss patriot deeply hurt by any misfortune
and a certain sense of method eventually to his native land.) This offer was ignored.
gained him promotion to the grade of chef de However, learning that Ney might be en-
bataillon (major) on the war minister's staff.trusted with the raising of Swiss troops for
He proved highly useful in reorganizing thethe French service, Jomini sought him out
Swiss Army, but also showed his life-long in- and requested permission to dedicate the first
ability to work comfortably with others. Involume of his Traite to him. Ney was suit-
1802, thoroughly at odds with his superiors,ably impressed; he loaned Jomini the neces-
he resigned his commission and returned tosary money to publish the book and accepted
Paris. him as a volunteer aide-de-camp.
The time was singularly unpropitious. Eu- As such, Jomini took part in the training
rope was enjoying the unfamiliar pleasures of of Ney's new VI Corps along the Channel
peace, and First Consul Bonaparte was re- coast, and rode with it the next year when
ducing the French Army. Jomini had to ac- Napoleon turned suddenly eastward against
cept employment with a military contractorthe Austrians. As an aide, Jomini carried
but solaced this interlude by reading the Ney's orders and reports, explained them
works of Folard, Lloyd, Bulow, Saxe, and when necessary, observed their execution, and
Guibert. These, he claimed, proved less en- ran miscellaneous errands. Ney was im-
lightening than his study of the actual cam-pressed by Jominis' expositions of military
paigns of Frederick the Great, Bonaparte, theory; in addition, Jomini was energetic,
and the Archduke Charles, but he neverthe-spoke German fluently, and made a good
less plagiarized most of Lloyd's3 ideas when secretary. Jomni's own version of this cam-
he began writing his own book on the cam-paign, written years later, was that he func-
paigns of 1799 and 1800.4 tioned as Ney's chief of staff-drawing up
The renewal of war between France and plans and drafting them into orders. This
England in 1803 merely increased Jomini's we can discount. Marshal Berthier, Napol-
frustrations. There still was no opening foreon's chief of staff, knowing Ney's inexperi-
ence as a corps commander, had assigned him
an experienced chief of staff, General Du-
3Major General Henry Lloyd (1725-1783). English
soldier of fortune. His major work-The History of taillis. Ney himself "blooded" Jomini, get-
the Late Wdr in Germany; Between the King of Prus- ting him involved in a minor skirmish near
sia and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies, 3 vols.,
London, 1766-1790-is thoroughly modern in spirit. Ulm.
Lloyd apparently was the first to discern and define "the
principles of war" as we know them today.
Jomini remembered a more glorious
40riginally entitled Traits de Grande Tactique; later
(1803) Traite des Grandes Operations Militaires. It com- 5Carnet de I Sabretache, 1896; Deux Lettres de Jom-
pared these campaigns to those of Frederick the Great.ini, pages 53-56.

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1964 JOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON? 19

achievement, which has


Ney's operations, but tossedbecome
the packet aside a
part of the folk-lore without opening it.ofJominithe Ulm
again departed
Napoleon-so it goes-had left Ney to block unhappily. However, Napoleon had merely
the roads leading northward out of Ulm; put the packet into his "hold" file. Later, he
Murat, placed in command of the French had portions of Jomini's work read to him,
right wing, ordered Ney to move south of and was both surprised and impressed. (One
the Danube, leaving these roads open; Jominionly can conclude that the Emperor had
encouraged Ney to delay the execution of never read Lloyd-but then, Lloyd had been
this order; Ney-thus inspired-left Du- an Englishman, and Englishmen were pro-
verbially thick of head, if stout of arm.
pont's division on the north bank to check the
Austrian's attempted escape until Napoleon Nothing to be learned from them!) He or-
could arrive. It is a striking story-unfor- dered Jomini given a French commission as
tunately, it evaporates whenever subjected to "adjutant-commandant" (a staff grade equiv-
serious study.6 alent to colonel). Characteristically, Jomini
After the capitulation of the Austrian always used the title "colonel," with its im-
forces around Ulm, Ney's corps was orderedplication of command status, and resented
southward into the Tyrol to cover the rightany correction.
flank of Napoleon's offensive toward Vienna. With Austria defeated, Jomini was able to
Given the mission of carrying Ney's reportsfinish the third volume of his Traite. Though
forward to the imperial headquarters, Jomini war with Prussia was increasingly probable
hoped to find the opportunity to attract Na-(Jomini himself drew up a staff study for
poleon's personal interest. Instead, he foundNey on 15 September 1806 accurately pre-
himself ushered routinely into Berthier's pres- dicting the general course of Napoleon's
ence. Accounts of this confrontation are strategy in that event), he did not scruple to
vague, but Jomini obviously made a scene bring his work to the attention of the Prus-
over being denied immediate access to the sian ambassador. But at the end of Septem-
Emperor. Shocked by such insubordination ber, Jomini was abruptly summoned to Na-
from a mere civilian serving as a volunteer poleon's headquarters at Mayence; there, the
aide, the veteran Berthier brusquely sent him Emperor himself informed him that-because
away with a flea in each ear. Jomini there-of the wide knowledge of Frederick the
after cherished Berthier as his malevolent Great's campaigns his writings had displayed
personal enemy; his hatred grew pathological, -he would be attached to the imperial head-
feeding itself on the quaint conceit that Ber- quarters during the coming campaign. As
thier was jealous of him. His revenge was Jomini fondly remembered this occasion, he
overwhelming; he spent the rest of his lifepromptly astonished Napoleon by rattling
effectively blackening Berthier's reputationoff an accurate description of the strategy
as a man and soldier. the Emperor would employ, and was warned
On a second trip to imperial headquarters,to keep this knowledge secret-even from
Jomini put copies of the first two volumes of
Berthier! Jomini's story may be largely true.
his Traite into the packet of Ney's reports.
He had already forecast this general move-
Austerlitz having been fought and won, Na-
ment in his 15 September staff study; for the
poleon had time to cross-examine him as to
rest, Napoleon was practical psychologist
6For example: Dumolin, Maurice. Precis d'Histoire enough to know that the best method of
Militaire: Revolution et Empire. Vol. II. Paris, 1906,
pages 166-179. keeping Jomini quiet was to make the whole

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20 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring

business a "secret" ated some scandal among his associates,


between thebytw
Of course, Berthier had begun preparing expressing a wish to be in the Russian com-
plans for such an advance some three weeks mander's boots for a couple of hours. Later,
earlier.7 Jomini would recall how Napoleon had called
Jomini's real services, if any, during the him aside and told him that the French were
subsequent campaign are as yet unrevealed. so badly battered that they must retreat
At Jena, he carried orders to Ney, and un- unless the enemy withdrew first. General
doubtedly spent a rough afternoon at that Grouchy would command the rear guard,
mashal's elbow. For some reason, he did not but supervision of the entire operation would
rejoin imperial headquarters until just before be entrusted to Adjutant-Commandant Jomi-
the occupation of Berlin, about ten days ni. (This yarn probably was the glorified
later. Berlin was a Mecca for Jomini: Fred- memory of having carried a message to
erick the Great had been his hero from child- Grouchy, or some such minor chore.)
hood, and remained the yardstick by which After Eylau Jomini went on sick leave,
he measured Napoleon. Now, rushing to thereby missing the Friedland campaign which
Frederick's former palace of San Souci, he brought Russia to heel. But thereafter came
entered Frederick's study (maintained as a the question of his future assignment. Dutail-
memorial), and bullied the custodian into lis had lost an arm early in the Friedland
letting him deck himself with Frederick's campaign, and Ney requested Jomini as his
decorations, sash, and swordbelt. His preen- replacement. Dutaillis considered himself
ing in this regalia was interrupted by the still capable of active service. Considering the
arrival of Napoleon and Berthier. capabilities of all three officers, Berthier chose
This was the beginning of Jomini's Prus- to name Jomini as assistant chief of staff,
sian troubles. He eagerly scraped acquaint- under Dutaillis. Instead of accepting this de-
ence with a Prussian delegation which ar- cision as an opportunity to learn the details
rived to explore the chances for peace. of staff work from a competent senior, Jomini
went into a frenzy. He had "rendered great
Through it, he offered copies of his books to
the King of Prussia. Possibly the Prussiansservices"; he "was Swiss" (and so, somehow,
not bound to accept the same discipline as his
used him as a catspaw. At any rate, told to
comrades); he refused to be "the subordinate
prepare a study on the fortresses of Silesia
as a guide for Vandamme's occupation of of an invalid." He wrote Napoleon in this
that province, Jomini expanded his work into vein, threatening to resign if not given what
a long memorandum on the general policy he considered his just dues.
Napoleon should pursue toward Prussia. Napoleon seldom wasted potential talent.
Prussia, Jomini insisted, must be pardoned Now, he ordered Dutaillis found another
and enlarged-not punished. Poland was not command, and Jomini named as Ney's chief
worth liberation and should remain a Prus- of staff. The VI Corps settled into comfort-
sian possession. Jomini's next appearance be-able billets in Silesia; Ney went on leave;
fore Napoleon drew the sardonic greeting, and Jomini relaxed amid the pleasures of
"Mr. Politician." Prussian society. The division and brigade
Somewhat in eclipse, disapproving and un-commanders found their own amusements.
happy, Jomini accompanied the imperial The training and discipline of the VI Corps
headquarters into Poland. At Eylau, he cre- fell off.
Meanwhile, Napoleon's first Spanish ven-
7Napoleon. Correspondence de Ndpoleon 1. Paris,
1858-1870. Item 10,744. ture collapsed ingloriously with Dupont's

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1964 TOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON? 21

surrender and Joseph's panic. The VI Corps mission, Tchernitchev was in fact the head
was ordered to Spain, Ney going ahead. of an efficient spy system. Jomini's writings
Jomini led one division through Paris in a had achieved some popularity in Russia, and
triumphal passage which inspired him to Tchernitchev considered him a profitable
swagger like a veteran corps commander. Butcatch "to understand the system of a man
once in Spain, he found Ney unexpectedly [Napoleon] whom we must fight is already
demanding. Jomini was rebuked for addinghalf the victory." He promised Jomini the
officers to the corps staff without consultingequivalent of a brigadier general's commis-
Ney, and for becoming engaged to a Prus- sion in the Russian service. Jomini was will-
sian girl without seeking his commander's ing, especially so as he had just suffered again
customary consent. Jomini soon was com- at Berthier's hands. The four Swiss regiments
plaining that jealous members of his staff in the French service were being grouped into
were poisoning Ney's mind against him. brigades. Firmly prepared to begin at the
Other sources suggested that Jomini was top, Jomini had solicited command of one of
openly proclaiming himself the marshal's them. To grease this transaction, he pro-
brains ( a hallucination common to ambitious posed to dedicate a new edition of his Traite
young subordinates). The two men grated to Berthier. (By contemporary custom, this
on one another; the Spanish campaign was meant that its introduction would be a ful-
disappointing, and the VI Corps did not somely praiseful glorification of the imperial
function with its old efficiency. Jomini was chief of staff.) Berthier would accept the
shaken by the rough-handed foraging and dedication, but not Jomini's praise; he also
brutal guerrilla operations. Abruptly, Ney had dozens of better-qualified candidates for
sent him off with dispatches for Napoleon, the brigade.
then in Austria. Jomini reached Vienna short- Jomini secured six months sick leave; once
ly after the armistice which followed Wa- back in Switzerland, he sent in his resigna-
gram. He spoke windily of Spain and Ney's tion and proceeded to Munich to pick up
lack of aptitude for the fighlting there. Echoeshis promised Russian commission and pass-
reached Ney, who first ordered Jomini backport. There, he unexpectedly found himself
to Spain-then cancelled that order, desig- involved in a mysterious international low
nated a new chief of staff, and left Jominicomedy: neither passportl nor commission
stranded in Paris. awaited him; the Russian diplomatic service
Jomini's clamors over this new injustice denied knowledge of either; Tchernitchev had
left Napoleon in a quandary. He considered flitted off to Stockholm. The tormented Jo-
assigning Jomini to Davout, but may have mini sought a Bavarian commission but soon
concluded such treatment a little too drastic. found himself shooed back to Paris. After a
Consequently, Jomini went into the imperial mild reprimand and a proper act of submis-
staff. To him, this was degradation: his im-sion, he actually was promoted to general of
mediate chief was a mere colonel! He pro- brigade (brigadier general) and given finan-
tested to Berthier, who bluntly told him thatcial support for his current publiCations.
Napoleon could send him to Madagascar, More, Napoleon found Jomini an independ-
should that be the Imperial pleasure. ent assignment-he was to write a "thorough-
ly logical" history of the Italian campaign of
Seeking more congenial employment, Jomi-
ni again turned to Russia, in the person 1796. of
one of Tsar Alexander's aide-de-camps, Colo- This should have contented Jomini, but he
nel Tchernitchev. In Paris on a vague liaison soon was full of new complaints. The war

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22 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring

ministry's files were insubordinate. not Their conveniently


pennyante squabbles
ranged; he had tofinally drudge brought them imperial rebukes; sta
through
strength returns Jomini and other
was ordered forward to raw take overdata;
the
important material (he felt certain)
governorship of Smolensk."0 The date of his w
ing kept from him. Obviously,
arrival cannot be definitely established, but Berthi
still plotting against he obviously him!came late, He saw thathad little couldmar
a French girl, but had been financiall
be done, and so did little. None of the senior
hit by a Swiss bank officers failure.
stationed around Smolensk Tchernitcmention
was back, with enticing him. sums of mon
Jomini's long-awaited Shortly after his Russian
arrival, the great retreat comm
However, war was obviously close. French began. Jomini's version of it reaches epic
counterintelligence agents cracked Tchernit- heights, telling how he guided the French
chev's ring, that wily Slav escaping just in army from Smolensk to Orsha, warned Na-
time. Jomini decided to hold his Russialn poleon of Tshitshagov's advance, persuaded
commission in reserve-after all, Napoleon the Emperor not to risk his remaining troops
had a habit of winning wars. in a suicidal counteroffensive, and located
In January 1812, Jomini was transferred the Studenka ford across the Beresina, thus
back to the imperial staff, as official historian saving the fighting core of the Grand Armee.
of the Grande Armee. By his own account, In sad truth, no "guiding" was needed: from
he felt embarrassment over invading the ter- Smolensk to Orsha the retreating army fol-
ritory of Tsar Alexander "who had mani- lowed the same road along which it had
fested such good feeling toward him," and marched on Moscow. Jomini's warning of
was careful to bring this to Napoleon's at- Tshitshagov was only one of many, and not
tention at the first opportunity. The story the first. He did recommend against an at-
is peculiar, but Napoleon did detach him as tempt to move from Orsha through Minsk
military governor of Vilna, the first impor- because of the difficult intervening country,
tant city occupied by the French. but his knowledge was hearsay, and Napo-
This assignment was difficult enough. Vil- leon questioned knowledgable inhabitants.
na became a major advanced base, and its Jomini may have guided Eble's artillerymen
governor had frequent opportunities to dis- and engineers to the Studenka bridge site,
play his talent for making bricks without but Oudinot had already selected that cross-
straw. Jomini found this uninspiring; his ing."1 Various fragmentary references"2 sug-
reports generally were a recitation of why gest that Berthier had sent Jomini ahead of
things had not been done. Napoleon rebuked the retreating main army to collect detach-
him for "sleeping" and "weeping"8 though ments and provisions, and reconnoiter alter-
Berthier showed understanding of Jomini's nate routes. None of the detailed accounts
problems, and explained them to the impa- of the Beresina crossing mention him. By
tient Emperor.9 Jomini's main interest would his own story, he fell seriously ill during this
appear to have been his feud with General operation, and saved himself during the con-
Hogendorp, governor-general of Lithuania fusion of the second day's crossing. He nev-
and thus Jomini's immediate superior. Ho-
lOCorrespondence. Item 19,157.
gendorp was overbearing, Jomini insolent and I1Sigur, Philippe-Paul de. Ndpoleon's Russian Cam.
paign. Boston, 1958, pages 219-220. This book partially
8Correspondence. Item 18,995. supports Jomini's daims, but is itself largely unreliable.
9Fabry, G. Campdgne de Russie, 1812. Vol. III. Paris '2See chiefly Campagne de Russie, 1812. Vol. V.
1902, pages 10.11. Paris 1912.

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1964 TfXATMTT nTC&PTlT (T NADAT RON? 23

ertheless accused Eble (then working in the Jomini's memories of how he prepared won-
icy Beresina to maintain the rickety bridges) derful orders, based on his profound knowl-
of "abandoning him" because of "anger over edge of Frederick the Great's operations in
the Emperor's orders that he accept Jomini's this area,15 which should have won the battle
recommendations as to the location of the for Napoleon. Jomini also claimed to have
bridges."'3 Being entirely innocent of engi-urged Ney to advance boldly into the Allied
neer training, Jomini would not have had therear; this claim may be valid, but an anony-
the least idea as to where or how these vital mous account pictures him as almost too rat-
bridges must be built. tled to write out an order.'6
Thereafter, Jomini was merely another Shortly thereafter, an armistice brought a
straggler shuffling westward through the cold,short pause in the campaign. Ney recom-
mended Jomini for promotion to general of
finally reaching the safety of Stettin. Shortly
thereafter, he was ordered to Paris. His own division (major general), apparently as much
memory was that Napoleon wished his advice to get rid of him as to reward him. Instead,
on the creation of a new army, and that onlyJomini was placed under arrest for letting his
he himself and one other general were allowedadministrative paperwork lapse badly into
the honor of returning to France. The less arrears. Jomini, and his admiring biographers,
dramatic truth was that all surplus officershave insisted that this was a trivial fault.
and NCOs were recalled to cadre new Quite to the contrary, Napoleon considered
units. 4 Jomini, however, reported too sick
such unit status reports vital, since they were
for such duty. the basis of his operational and logistical
planning.
He rejoined the French army in Germany They were his favorite reading
matter,
just after the battle of Lutzen (2 May 1813), which he loved "better than a girl
loves
and was assigned as a replacement for Ney's novels.'7 Jomini, of course, blamed
chief of staff, killed in action there. Berthier;
Ney concurrently, he managed to infuri-
now commanded the left wing of the army-ate Ney by contradicting him in front of his
division
five corps. This force was far too large for commanders. Denied promotion, Jo-
mini
his talents, which were mostly those of brav- ". . . abandoned the ungrateful flags
ery and personal leadership: Jomini wherelackedI have found nothing but humilia-
tion . . ." and deserted to the enemy.
the experience to supplement his chief's short-
Naively,
comings, and soon proved as personally irri- he somehow had expected to be
accepted
tating as ever. In late May, Ney was called as Tsar Alexander's principal mili-
tary
in against the right flank of the Allied main advisor, and thus as the guiding genius
of
army, which Napoleon had brought to bay at the Allied armies. In his own mind, he
Bautzen. Napoleon's plan was one of his merely had acted as the intellectual equivalent
finest and should have resulted in the Allies'of the sixteenth century Swiss mercenary
destruction. But a poorly managed series ofpikeman, and thus could conceive no reason
marches (properly the fault of Jomini, whose why the Allies should not trust him com-
responsibility it was to coordinate them) pletely. Some French writers have charged
brought Ney's wing into action piecemeal; l5This story dazzled General McClennan, who swal-
thereafter, Ney's irresolute tactics allowed thelowed it as completely as he did the Pinkerton reports on
Confederate strength in 1862. See McClellan's article in
Allies to escape. As usual, we may discountThe Gadxy magazine, June 1869.
16Morvan, Jean. Le Solddt Imperial, 1800-1804, Vol.
13Lecomte, Ferdinand. Le General Jomini, Sd Vie, et Il. Paris, 1904, page 492.
Ses Ecrits. Lausanne, 1861, f.n. page 113. 17Casse, A. dc. Memoires du Prince Eugene. Paris,
14Correspondence Item 19,491. 1859. Chiefly Vol. IV, pages 128-130.

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24 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring

him with revealing one else'sNapoleon's


business soon gave him a plans
new crop
Allies, and one of ofBernadotte's
enemies. He set up the first orders-
Russian mili-
day says he did."8 tary academy
It seems (from which ambitious
reasonab Rus-
established, however, that Napoleon's de- sians soon elbowed him), was briefly military
tailed orders for the forthcoming campaign tutor to the future Nicholas I and Alexander
had not reached Ney's headquarters until II, created various diplomatic teapot tempests,
after Jomini's departure. and filled occasional staff assignments. After
Tsar Alexander, as always, was initially 1856, he lived largely in Paris, fighting end-
charming, subsequently evasive. He already less inky wars in defense of his theories and
had a military mentor in the person of Gen- his career, and telling increasingly gaudy
eral Moreau, and his staff was a welter of stories. Gradually, as the Napoleonic veterans
shifty volunteers of all nations. Jomini of- died with the passing years, Jomini's glorifi-
fered much excellent advice, but seldom saw cation of Napoleon brought Frenchmen to
it accepted, since he never fully comprehend- overlook his conduct in 1813. In 1859, Na-
ed that the Allied leaders had to pay at least poleon III even consulted him concerning an
as much attention to maintaining English-Rus- impending campaign against Austria, but
sian-Prussian-Austrian-Swedish-Bavarian har- derived no discernible enlightenment. Ten
mony as they did to fighting Napoleon. He years later Jomini died.
claimed to have saved the Allied army at He had never commanded so much as a
Dresden, planned Vandamme's defeat at company, even in peacetime. (In fact, he
Kulm, and ensured the Allied victory at Leip- considered small unit command experience
zig, but his associates found him less a savior unnecessary.) He did well as a free-lance
aide de camp in 1805, but failed flatly as a
than a nuisance. The English representative,
chief of staff in 1808-1809 and 1813. Even
General Stewart, snapped that "The presence
of Jomini . . . complicated and hindered as an official historian, he was more produc-
everything"; General Toll, of the Tsar's staff, tive of complaints and excuses than of books.
agreed that "That man is not fit to serve He was incapable of accepting a subordinate
during war.,,'9 Stung by such ingratitude, position, a rebuke, or an unpleasant assign-
Jomini was ready to leave the Russian service ment for the good of the service-or even to
when the arrival of his wife and child re- gain experience and good will for his own
minded him that he had given hostages to future career. Napoleon attempted to find
fortune. Accordingly, he accompanied the him appropriate employment, but failed even
Tsar through 1814 and 1815, except for a more completely than at Waterloo.
brief and unsuccessful attempt to make him- This failure to find an assignment which
self a place in the Swiss government. In 1815, matched his own opinion of his talents was an
he rejoiced over Berthier's mysterious death ever-gnawing canker within Jomini. Conse-
at Bamberg. He also gave Madame Ney quently, his historical works frequently re-
cast history, to prove that he really had been
some extremely cautious assistance in seeking
Alexander's intervention to prevent her hus-one of its prime makers, that only Berthier's
band's execution. jealous plottings had cheated him of his just
Thereafter, Jomini accompanied Alexanderglory, that he always had been the trusted
consultant to whom Napoleon secretly turned
to Russia. where his habit of minding every-
in time of need. Generations of Americans
18Bernadotte, Jean B. J. Proclaimations de S. A. R. have
le accepted this self-canonization.
Prince Royal de Suede. Gottingen, 1913, page 18.
19Lecomrte, page 365. But though Jomini had little success as a

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1964 JOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON? 25

soldier, his theories have guided military scant coverage, Jomini having little interest
thought for over a century and still strongly
and less experience in that roughhouse side
influence any study of the art of war. His of the military art. American ex-captains-of-
writings remain his actual accomplishment. fifty-dragoons, suddenly turned generals in
Many were minor potboilers, written to refute 1861, could have used considerable tactical
some other Napoleonic veteran. (Clausewitz guidance.
drew language of the sort once devoted to Jomini's writings reveal odd inner contra-
Berthier.) As previously noted, much of dictions. Fascinated as he was by Napoleon,
Jomini's Traite des Grande Operations Mili-
he still was distressed by the implications of
taires was lifted fromn Lloyd, in some cases
national wars. The employment of mass
practically word for word, though Jomini armies was a threat to civilization, the ap-
must be credited with clarifying some of pearance of new weapons distressing. He pre-
Lloyd's ideas. Later works included a fifteen- ferred "loyal and chivalrous warfare . . . I
volume Critical and Military History of the acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor
Wars of the Revolution, now seldom used, of the good old times when the French and
and the famous Vie Politique et Militaire de English Guards courteously invited each oth-
Napoleon, describing Napoleon's career er to fire first-as at Fontenoy-preferring
through 1814. (A subsequent volume cov- them to the frightful epoch when priests,
ered 1815.) The scheme of this latter workwomen, and children throughout Spain plot-
is peculiar: following his death, Napoleon ted the murder of isolated soldiers."22 Wars
arrives in Elysium, where he explains his should be neat, professional affairs, involving
career to the shades of Alexander, Caesar, neither civilians nor weapons of mass destruc-
and Frederick the Great. Throughout it (ex- tion. Thus he remained fascinated by Fred-
cept for the 1815 sequel) ,20 Napoleon speaks erick the Great, whose campaigns and battles
in the first person, giving it a remarkably were limited in space and time, and easily
authoritative air. (Though glib and facile, reduced to diagrams. Also, they were past
the book is too flawed with errors to be a safe
history, their sordid details hidden behind the
reference work, and "Napoleon's" voice often
greater blood and thunder of the Revolution-
sounds like Adjutant-Commandant Jomi.
ary and Napoleonic campaigns. Jomini was
ni's.) Finally, in 1838, Jomini summed up his
likely to be "lost on the heights of pure strat-
knowledge of warfare in his Precis de l'Art
egy, freeing his chessboard of all worldly
de la Guerre. This work "probably did more
concerns, he ended by seeing further than the
than any single book to fix the great sub-
divisions of modern military science for good
army commanders."23 Certainly-when his
and all and to give them common curren- own ego was not involved-he did end in see-
cy.,,21 It was translated into practically every ing more clearly than most what should have
European language, and read by military men been done, but those same "worldly concerns"
throughout the world, as a handy compendi- might include muddy roads, foul weather,
um of what every general should know. Prin- and other harsh facts of nature which limited
ciples, maxims and rules of thumb were con- what could be accomplished. His so-called
cisely set down as guideposts for military mastery of military history was a rather
study. Unfortunately, it gave tactics very sketchy knowledge of plans and maneuvers:
20Halleck put this likewise into the first person in his
translation. 22Jomini, Antoine H. Precis de l'A rt de la Guerre.
21Earle, Edward M. Makers of Modern Strategy. Paris, 1838, page 6.
Princeton, 1943, page 89. 23CourvilIe, page 4.

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26 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring

he did not realize disorderly species of human


that the activity. Those
"court
change at Fontenoy was actually a half- principles of war, which he lifted from
drunken English officer's dare to the French Lloyd's studies, remain the backbone of the
to stand and fight; that isolated enemy (or military art. But Jomini's tidy version of
allied) soldiers have been liable to haggled strategy too often was that of Frederick
throats throughout Spanish history; or that rather than Napoleon-careful, limited cam-
Frederick's grenadiers could flay a country-paigns, fought to win and hold some minor
side as thoroughly as Napoleon's. He appre- principality. A successful general seized stra-
ciated Napoleon's strategy, but never under- tegic points and occupied important areas; he
stood the Napoleon who "went into the fire," might fight skillful battles, but he did not
inspiring green conscripts to whip something exactly seek them.
above their weight in Prussian and Russian American generals of 1861, facing a mili-
veterans. (To do him justice, Jomini half- tary problem as vast as Napoleon's invasion
realized this lack. His later writings stress of Russia, studied Jomini in the misguided
".... that war is not an exact science, but a faith that they were studying Napoleon.24
drama full of passion." But, somehow, no They marched against strategic points-
sense of personal commitment puts life into Corinth, Richmond, Atlanta-content to let
those words.) Confederate armies escape to fight again, so
Basically an observer and a critic, he loved long as they could occupy this real estate.
the study of war, but had little taste for war And so the war worried on, until other com-
itself. In Napoleon's Grande Armee, unusu- manders emerged, possessing the true, brutal-
al bravery was a very usual thing, yet-as ly clear Napoleonic appreciation, "There are
far as existing records show-Jomini haz-many good generals . . . but they see too many
arded himself as little as possible. Unlike things; as for me, I see only one: masses.
Clausewitz, he was not interested in the basic I seek to destroy them, knowing well that the
nature of war. Instead, with rare clarity, he oroenori,e , will th n T1f themsle."PVq9

systematized and defined the art of waging it, 24Ambrose, Stephen E. Hdlleck. Baton Rouge, 1962,
bringing order into the study of that most page 19 gives a good example.

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