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JOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON?
By JOHN R. ELTING*
N APOLEON, despite his faults and It was only after 1870 that disillusioned
failures, remains the Great Captain.
Americans began seeking after another, more
His swift, deadly campaigns, designed
cryptic disciple-named Clausewitz.
to force the enemy army into battle under
Any study of Jomini is handicapped by the
every possible disadvantage, mark him aunfortunate
mas- fact that his existing biographies
ter of strategy. His tactics-when impatience
are practically autobiographies, based on
and plentiful cannon fodder did not make
nothing more than his personal notes or the
him careless-combined audacity, simplicity,
stories he told in his older years.2 These pre-
and a sure instinct for the jugular. His grasp
sent him as a uniquely endowed genius, mas-
of military organization and logistics was ter of all military arts, and paragon of honor.
amazing. But he left no easy, comprehensive Had not the envious plottings of less talented
description of his system of war. Nineteenth men (so these stories insist) forced him away
century American officers who desired to from Napoleon's side in the latter's hour of
study Napoleon's campaigns had to turn to need, Napoleon probably would have died
his disciples. victorious and Emperor, in the fullness of his
Of these, Jomini was the first and fore- years, bequeathing throne and empire to his
most. The first known military engineering son.
textbook used at the United States Military The real Jomini was a very minor figure,
Academy proclaimed "General Jomini has seldom mentioned in orders or dispatches,
transcended all writers on war . . . and has practically ignored in the memoirs of the of-
reduced the hitherto mysterious science of ficers who had served with him. Any old
war to a few self-evident principles and soldier is apt to exaggerate his personal share
axioms."' Later, Henry W. Halleck trans- in "battles long ago." And Jomini-con-
lated a number of Jomini's works, but a fair vinced that he was a malignly thwarted great
number of American officers already had captain-sought compensation by gilding his
struggled through the original French edi- memories. Out-writing and out-living his
tions-copies of which still remain in the contemporaries, he had the pleasure of seeing
West Point Library. During the Civil War, his largest inventions uncritically believed.
Jomini's books could be found in the saddle- Antoine Henri Jomini was born in Pay-
bags on both sides. If Napoleon were the erne, Switzerland, on 6 March 1779. After
god of war, Jomini was his one, true prophet. an indifferent education, spiced by avid study
of military affairs, he was apprenticed to a
*Colonel Elting is Associate Professor and Deputy
Director, History of Military Art Courses, United States banker. In 1796, he secured a position in a
Military Academy, West Point, N. Y. Paris bank, but left it to become an inde-
10'Conor, John M. A Treatise on the Science of War
dnd Fortification, 1817. Vol. II, pages 385-386. (This pendent speculator. At first successful, he
was a good translation of Gay de Vernon's Traite' ete-
mentdire d'art mititaire et de fortication, Paris 1805, to 2This article is based generally on Courville, Xavier
which O'Connor added a "Summary of the Principles de. Jomini, ou de le Devin de Napoleon, Paris, 1935.
and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations," drawn Written by Jomini's decendants, from his personal pa-
largely from Jomini. pers, it is the most impartial of his biographies.
17
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18 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring
soon lost heavily; in 1798, he returned to him in the French service, and he could not
Switzerland in the train of a Swiss officer find a publisher for his book. He solicited
who expected to become that country's min- the Russian ambassador, but was dismissed
ister of war. (To provide funds for Bona- as too young to give lessons to Russian gen-
parte's Egyptian expedition, the Directory erals. In 1804, he approached Murat, then
had converted Switzerland into a thoroughly governor of Paris, with a plan to overthrow
plundered satellite.) Jomini's patron was the existing Swiss government and secure the
disappointed, but Jomini himself-thanks toannexation of that country to France.5 (In
his excellent handwriting-managed to be. later years, Jomini would pose as a fervent
come a secretary in the War Ministry. Energy Swiss patriot deeply hurt by any misfortune
and a certain sense of method eventually to his native land.) This offer was ignored.
gained him promotion to the grade of chef de However, learning that Ney might be en-
bataillon (major) on the war minister's staff.trusted with the raising of Swiss troops for
He proved highly useful in reorganizing thethe French service, Jomini sought him out
Swiss Army, but also showed his life-long in- and requested permission to dedicate the first
ability to work comfortably with others. Involume of his Traite to him. Ney was suit-
1802, thoroughly at odds with his superiors,ably impressed; he loaned Jomini the neces-
he resigned his commission and returned tosary money to publish the book and accepted
Paris. him as a volunteer aide-de-camp.
The time was singularly unpropitious. Eu- As such, Jomini took part in the training
rope was enjoying the unfamiliar pleasures of of Ney's new VI Corps along the Channel
peace, and First Consul Bonaparte was re- coast, and rode with it the next year when
ducing the French Army. Jomini had to ac- Napoleon turned suddenly eastward against
cept employment with a military contractorthe Austrians. As an aide, Jomini carried
but solaced this interlude by reading the Ney's orders and reports, explained them
works of Folard, Lloyd, Bulow, Saxe, and when necessary, observed their execution, and
Guibert. These, he claimed, proved less en- ran miscellaneous errands. Ney was im-
lightening than his study of the actual cam-pressed by Jominis' expositions of military
paigns of Frederick the Great, Bonaparte, theory; in addition, Jomini was energetic,
and the Archduke Charles, but he neverthe-spoke German fluently, and made a good
less plagiarized most of Lloyd's3 ideas when secretary. Jomni's own version of this cam-
he began writing his own book on the cam-paign, written years later, was that he func-
paigns of 1799 and 1800.4 tioned as Ney's chief of staff-drawing up
The renewal of war between France and plans and drafting them into orders. This
England in 1803 merely increased Jomini's we can discount. Marshal Berthier, Napol-
frustrations. There still was no opening foreon's chief of staff, knowing Ney's inexperi-
ence as a corps commander, had assigned him
an experienced chief of staff, General Du-
3Major General Henry Lloyd (1725-1783). English
soldier of fortune. His major work-The History of taillis. Ney himself "blooded" Jomini, get-
the Late Wdr in Germany; Between the King of Prus- ting him involved in a minor skirmish near
sia and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies, 3 vols.,
London, 1766-1790-is thoroughly modern in spirit. Ulm.
Lloyd apparently was the first to discern and define "the
principles of war" as we know them today.
Jomini remembered a more glorious
40riginally entitled Traits de Grande Tactique; later
(1803) Traite des Grandes Operations Militaires. It com- 5Carnet de I Sabretache, 1896; Deux Lettres de Jom-
pared these campaigns to those of Frederick the Great.ini, pages 53-56.
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1964 JOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON? 19
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20 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring
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1964 TOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON? 21
surrender and Joseph's panic. The VI Corps mission, Tchernitchev was in fact the head
was ordered to Spain, Ney going ahead. of an efficient spy system. Jomini's writings
Jomini led one division through Paris in a had achieved some popularity in Russia, and
triumphal passage which inspired him to Tchernitchev considered him a profitable
swagger like a veteran corps commander. Butcatch "to understand the system of a man
once in Spain, he found Ney unexpectedly [Napoleon] whom we must fight is already
demanding. Jomini was rebuked for addinghalf the victory." He promised Jomini the
officers to the corps staff without consultingequivalent of a brigadier general's commis-
Ney, and for becoming engaged to a Prus- sion in the Russian service. Jomini was will-
sian girl without seeking his commander's ing, especially so as he had just suffered again
customary consent. Jomini soon was com- at Berthier's hands. The four Swiss regiments
plaining that jealous members of his staff in the French service were being grouped into
were poisoning Ney's mind against him. brigades. Firmly prepared to begin at the
Other sources suggested that Jomini was top, Jomini had solicited command of one of
openly proclaiming himself the marshal's them. To grease this transaction, he pro-
brains ( a hallucination common to ambitious posed to dedicate a new edition of his Traite
young subordinates). The two men grated to Berthier. (By contemporary custom, this
on one another; the Spanish campaign was meant that its introduction would be a ful-
disappointing, and the VI Corps did not somely praiseful glorification of the imperial
function with its old efficiency. Jomini was chief of staff.) Berthier would accept the
shaken by the rough-handed foraging and dedication, but not Jomini's praise; he also
brutal guerrilla operations. Abruptly, Ney had dozens of better-qualified candidates for
sent him off with dispatches for Napoleon, the brigade.
then in Austria. Jomini reached Vienna short- Jomini secured six months sick leave; once
ly after the armistice which followed Wa- back in Switzerland, he sent in his resigna-
gram. He spoke windily of Spain and Ney's tion and proceeded to Munich to pick up
lack of aptitude for the fighlting there. Echoeshis promised Russian commission and pass-
reached Ney, who first ordered Jomini backport. There, he unexpectedly found himself
to Spain-then cancelled that order, desig- involved in a mysterious international low
nated a new chief of staff, and left Jominicomedy: neither passportl nor commission
stranded in Paris. awaited him; the Russian diplomatic service
Jomini's clamors over this new injustice denied knowledge of either; Tchernitchev had
left Napoleon in a quandary. He considered flitted off to Stockholm. The tormented Jo-
assigning Jomini to Davout, but may have mini sought a Bavarian commission but soon
concluded such treatment a little too drastic. found himself shooed back to Paris. After a
Consequently, Jomini went into the imperial mild reprimand and a proper act of submis-
staff. To him, this was degradation: his im-sion, he actually was promoted to general of
mediate chief was a mere colonel! He pro- brigade (brigadier general) and given finan-
tested to Berthier, who bluntly told him thatcial support for his current publiCations.
Napoleon could send him to Madagascar, More, Napoleon found Jomini an independ-
should that be the Imperial pleasure. ent assignment-he was to write a "thorough-
ly logical" history of the Italian campaign of
Seeking more congenial employment, Jomi-
ni again turned to Russia, in the person 1796. of
one of Tsar Alexander's aide-de-camps, Colo- This should have contented Jomini, but he
nel Tchernitchev. In Paris on a vague liaison soon was full of new complaints. The war
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22 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring
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1964 TfXATMTT nTC&PTlT (T NADAT RON? 23
ertheless accused Eble (then working in the Jomini's memories of how he prepared won-
icy Beresina to maintain the rickety bridges) derful orders, based on his profound knowl-
of "abandoning him" because of "anger over edge of Frederick the Great's operations in
the Emperor's orders that he accept Jomini's this area,15 which should have won the battle
recommendations as to the location of the for Napoleon. Jomini also claimed to have
bridges."'3 Being entirely innocent of engi-urged Ney to advance boldly into the Allied
neer training, Jomini would not have had therear; this claim may be valid, but an anony-
the least idea as to where or how these vital mous account pictures him as almost too rat-
bridges must be built. tled to write out an order.'6
Thereafter, Jomini was merely another Shortly thereafter, an armistice brought a
straggler shuffling westward through the cold,short pause in the campaign. Ney recom-
mended Jomini for promotion to general of
finally reaching the safety of Stettin. Shortly
thereafter, he was ordered to Paris. His own division (major general), apparently as much
memory was that Napoleon wished his advice to get rid of him as to reward him. Instead,
on the creation of a new army, and that onlyJomini was placed under arrest for letting his
he himself and one other general were allowedadministrative paperwork lapse badly into
the honor of returning to France. The less arrears. Jomini, and his admiring biographers,
dramatic truth was that all surplus officershave insisted that this was a trivial fault.
and NCOs were recalled to cadre new Quite to the contrary, Napoleon considered
units. 4 Jomini, however, reported too sick
such unit status reports vital, since they were
for such duty. the basis of his operational and logistical
planning.
He rejoined the French army in Germany They were his favorite reading
matter,
just after the battle of Lutzen (2 May 1813), which he loved "better than a girl
loves
and was assigned as a replacement for Ney's novels.'7 Jomini, of course, blamed
chief of staff, killed in action there. Berthier;
Ney concurrently, he managed to infuri-
now commanded the left wing of the army-ate Ney by contradicting him in front of his
division
five corps. This force was far too large for commanders. Denied promotion, Jo-
mini
his talents, which were mostly those of brav- ". . . abandoned the ungrateful flags
ery and personal leadership: Jomini wherelackedI have found nothing but humilia-
tion . . ." and deserted to the enemy.
the experience to supplement his chief's short-
Naively,
comings, and soon proved as personally irri- he somehow had expected to be
accepted
tating as ever. In late May, Ney was called as Tsar Alexander's principal mili-
tary
in against the right flank of the Allied main advisor, and thus as the guiding genius
of
army, which Napoleon had brought to bay at the Allied armies. In his own mind, he
Bautzen. Napoleon's plan was one of his merely had acted as the intellectual equivalent
finest and should have resulted in the Allies'of the sixteenth century Swiss mercenary
destruction. But a poorly managed series ofpikeman, and thus could conceive no reason
marches (properly the fault of Jomini, whose why the Allies should not trust him com-
responsibility it was to coordinate them) pletely. Some French writers have charged
brought Ney's wing into action piecemeal; l5This story dazzled General McClennan, who swal-
thereafter, Ney's irresolute tactics allowed thelowed it as completely as he did the Pinkerton reports on
Confederate strength in 1862. See McClellan's article in
Allies to escape. As usual, we may discountThe Gadxy magazine, June 1869.
16Morvan, Jean. Le Solddt Imperial, 1800-1804, Vol.
13Lecomte, Ferdinand. Le General Jomini, Sd Vie, et Il. Paris, 1904, page 492.
Ses Ecrits. Lausanne, 1861, f.n. page 113. 17Casse, A. dc. Memoires du Prince Eugene. Paris,
14Correspondence Item 19,491. 1859. Chiefly Vol. IV, pages 128-130.
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24 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring
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1964 JOMINI: DISCIPLE OF NAPOLEON? 25
soldier, his theories have guided military scant coverage, Jomini having little interest
thought for over a century and still strongly
and less experience in that roughhouse side
influence any study of the art of war. His of the military art. American ex-captains-of-
writings remain his actual accomplishment. fifty-dragoons, suddenly turned generals in
Many were minor potboilers, written to refute 1861, could have used considerable tactical
some other Napoleonic veteran. (Clausewitz guidance.
drew language of the sort once devoted to Jomini's writings reveal odd inner contra-
Berthier.) As previously noted, much of dictions. Fascinated as he was by Napoleon,
Jomini's Traite des Grande Operations Mili-
he still was distressed by the implications of
taires was lifted fromn Lloyd, in some cases
national wars. The employment of mass
practically word for word, though Jomini armies was a threat to civilization, the ap-
must be credited with clarifying some of pearance of new weapons distressing. He pre-
Lloyd's ideas. Later works included a fifteen- ferred "loyal and chivalrous warfare . . . I
volume Critical and Military History of the acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor
Wars of the Revolution, now seldom used, of the good old times when the French and
and the famous Vie Politique et Militaire de English Guards courteously invited each oth-
Napoleon, describing Napoleon's career er to fire first-as at Fontenoy-preferring
through 1814. (A subsequent volume cov- them to the frightful epoch when priests,
ered 1815.) The scheme of this latter workwomen, and children throughout Spain plot-
is peculiar: following his death, Napoleon ted the murder of isolated soldiers."22 Wars
arrives in Elysium, where he explains his should be neat, professional affairs, involving
career to the shades of Alexander, Caesar, neither civilians nor weapons of mass destruc-
and Frederick the Great. Throughout it (ex- tion. Thus he remained fascinated by Fred-
cept for the 1815 sequel) ,20 Napoleon speaks erick the Great, whose campaigns and battles
in the first person, giving it a remarkably were limited in space and time, and easily
authoritative air. (Though glib and facile, reduced to diagrams. Also, they were past
the book is too flawed with errors to be a safe
history, their sordid details hidden behind the
reference work, and "Napoleon's" voice often
greater blood and thunder of the Revolution-
sounds like Adjutant-Commandant Jomi.
ary and Napoleonic campaigns. Jomini was
ni's.) Finally, in 1838, Jomini summed up his
likely to be "lost on the heights of pure strat-
knowledge of warfare in his Precis de l'Art
egy, freeing his chessboard of all worldly
de la Guerre. This work "probably did more
concerns, he ended by seeing further than the
than any single book to fix the great sub-
divisions of modern military science for good
army commanders."23 Certainly-when his
and all and to give them common curren- own ego was not involved-he did end in see-
cy.,,21 It was translated into practically every ing more clearly than most what should have
European language, and read by military men been done, but those same "worldly concerns"
throughout the world, as a handy compendi- might include muddy roads, foul weather,
um of what every general should know. Prin- and other harsh facts of nature which limited
ciples, maxims and rules of thumb were con- what could be accomplished. His so-called
cisely set down as guideposts for military mastery of military history was a rather
study. Unfortunately, it gave tactics very sketchy knowledge of plans and maneuvers:
20Halleck put this likewise into the first person in his
translation. 22Jomini, Antoine H. Precis de l'A rt de la Guerre.
21Earle, Edward M. Makers of Modern Strategy. Paris, 1838, page 6.
Princeton, 1943, page 89. 23CourvilIe, page 4.
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26 MILITARY AFFAIRS Spring
systematized and defined the art of waging it, 24Ambrose, Stephen E. Hdlleck. Baton Rouge, 1962,
bringing order into the study of that most page 19 gives a good example.
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