Pakistan-India Disputes and Crises

Despite the Shimla Agreement, little progress was made towards settling disputes by
peaceful means after 1972.

Sir Creek

The line in Sir Creek, at the western terminus of the Pakistan-India boundary in
the Rann of Kutch, has remained unresolved since 1969 when the main dispute was
settled by an arbitration tribunal. India claimed that the boundary should run in
the middle of the creek.

Pakistan sought to resolve the difference between the two countries, but India said
it first wanted to complete an air survey of the area. The stalemate persisted, to
the detriment of poor fishermen on both sides.

Siachen: A Dispute within a Dispute

The Siachen Glacier descends from the lofty Karakorum Range and traverses part of
Baltistan in the Northern Areas, which was so difficult to access and inhospitable
that no fighting took place here in any of the three wars between the two
countries.

Pakistan exercised control over the glaciated area up to the Karakorum Pass, and
the terminus of the line of control between Xinjiang and the Northern Areas of the
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir remained the same as that of the 1948 ceasefire
line.

In the early 1980s, India sent a brigade-strength force to the Siachen area, which
Pakistan protested against, and the two countries fought intermittent duels, losing
even more men to frostbite.

The two countries arrived at an agreement in 1989 to redeploy forces to positions

conforming to the Shimla Agreement, but it has not been implemented.

Differences arose over interpretation of the Shimla Agreement, and the Indian side
demanded 'authentication' of the existing positions and the right to establish a
'civil post'.

Salal, Wullar, Baglihar, and Kishenganga Projects

Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 allows construction of run-of-the-river power plants,

but forbids the construction of dams on the western rivers in excess of prescribed
limits. Pakistan can raise the issue of dams in the permanent Indus Commission.

In the 1970s, India decided to build a dam on the Chenab River, but agreed to
reduce the height to relieve Pakistan's concerns.

Pakistan asked India to discontinue construction of a barrage on the Jhelum River

at the mouth of the Wullar Lake, but India refused to acknowledge that the project
was inconsistent with the treaty and offered to change the design and operating
procedures to eliminate any harmful effects on Pakistan.

A dispute arose when India decided to build a hydroelectric power project on the
Chenab River with a dam at Baglihar upstream from the Salal dam. Pakistan
complained to the World Bank, which reduced the height of the dam and reduced the
pondage by 14 percent.

Consular Missions
After the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1976, India offered to lease Jinnah
House in Mumbai for the Pakistan consulate. Pakistan accepted the Indian promise,
but Prime Minister Indira Gandhi refused to lease the house to Pakistan.

In 1980, the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi requested permission from the Indian
government to build a consular office in Mumbai.

The Pakistani government sent consular staff to open an office in Mumbai, but had
to close it down in March 1994 after discovering evidence of subversive activities
by the Indian personnel.

Diplomats of the two countries agreed in 1992 on a bilateral code of conduct, but
the governments have repeatedly accused each other of using their diplomatic staff
for activities incompatible with their legitimate functions.

Indian Plan for Attack on Kahuta, 1984

Pakistan received several intelligence reports during 1983-85 that India was
preparing an air attack on its uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. Islamabad
informed New Delhi through friendly intermediaries that any such attack would be
treated as an act of aggression.

The Brasstacks Crisis, 1986-87

Another crisis erupted when India decided to hold the largest combined military
exercise in South Asian history, code-named Brasstacks, in western Rajasthan,
hardly 50 kilometers from the Pakistan border.

The Indian army chief did not inform his Pakistani counterpart of the location,
schedule and scale of the exercise, which was resisted by Pakistani diplomats and
the Prime Minister.

As a precaution, the Pakistani army extended its own winter exercises and later
moved some formations to forward areas north of the Sutlej river opposite the
Indian town of Fazilka and west of the Ravi in Sialkot district.

The crisis peaked in January 1987 when India demanded a pullback of Pakistani
forces 'within 24 hours'. The Pakistani government took initiative to try to defuse
the dangerous situation and a deal was struck on 4 February to withdraw forces to
peacetime locations.

The Brasstacks crisis brought Pakistan and India closer to the brink of war than
any other crisis since 1971. Its basic and direct cause was the 'mammoth war games'
planned by an ambitious Indian army chief.

To prevent unintentional crises, the two sides concluded agreements in 1991 that
required advance notification of exercises and troop movements.

Re-entry to the Commonwealth

Britain's partisan role in the 1971 crisis was disappointing for Pakistan, and Z.A.
Bhutto decided to pull out of the Commonwealth in anger because it would not entail
any great loss except inconvenience to Pakistani settlers in Britain.

The precipitate decision to quit the Commonwealth was largely Bhutto's, but the
decision to rejoin was no less personal. Indira Gandhi frustrated the proposal to
return to the Commonwealth, and Rajiv Gandhi followed her mother's line, justifying
the opposition to Pakistan's return on the ground that Pakistan was ruled by a
dictator.

War Averted, 1990

In spring 1990, the situation in Kashmir continued to deteriorate, and India was
reported to have recommended air strikes on targets in Pakistan. The United States
sent Robert Gates to Islamabad and New Delhi to prevent war.

Disarmament Issues

Pakistan welcomed the Chemical Weapons Convention when it was concluded in 1993,
but did not ratify it until four years later because of concerns that the
verification provision might be exploited for intrusion into Pakistan's sensitive
nuclear facilities.

India ratified the CWC, which relieved Pakistan's concerns about the use of
chemical weapons against its security. India had to disclose that it had actually
produced chemical weapons, which undermined the credibility of India's pledges in a
bilateral framework.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was conceived to restrict qualitative improvement
of weapons technology. India was one of the sponsors.

Pakistan supported the treaty from the day it was proposed, but only on the
condition that it be non-discriminatory.

Pakistan's stance on the CTBT followed the standard line, and it sought to plug any
loopholes India might later exploit to change its mind about the treaty.

India opposed the CTBT at the UN General Assembly, and declared it would not sign
it. The United States Senate decided against ratification, and India's refusal
sealed its fate.

In early 2000, a suggestion was floated that Pakistan should consider signing the
CTBT. However, the government did not pursue the idea because of opposition from
political parties and a religious party that warned of mass agitation if the
government wavered in its resolve.

Although the idea had to be abandoned, public discussion about it yielded some
benefits, including better informed public opinion and a softer impression of
trigger-happy people.

FMCT, which would have frozen the production of enriched uranium and plutonium, was
proposed in the 1980s but has suffered relegation because of the collapse of the
CTBT. Smaller nuclear-weapons states are now more reluctant to embark on another
similar endeavor.

The United States and Russia have entered into bilateral agreements to reduce their
nuclear weapons stockpiles.

Chapter 17 Nuclear Tests

India conducted multiple nuclear explosion tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, and
Pakistan was suddenly confronted with this surprise development. The government was
impaled on the horns of a dilemma, as testing would jeopardize military security
and entail the threat of economic sanctions.

The security argument was irrefutable: Pakistan had to demonstrate that it, too,
possessed weapons capability. The rumblings of threats and bluster from across the
border drowned out whatever reservations existed, and Pakistan could not ignore the
threats.

Western states focused efforts on preventing Pakistan from following suit and sent
messages and made diplomatic demarches. But the one component most important to
Pakistan was missing from the dialogue: assurance on the key issue of security.

Pakistan conducted nuclear explosion tests in the Chaghi Mountain in Balochistan on

28 May 1998 as a response to Indian tests. Pakistan had no grand design, and did
not seek recognition or reward, membership of the nuclear club or a permanent seat
on the Security Council.

India's policy and pronouncements regarding its nuclear stance were opaque,
contradictory and misleading. Its diplomatic stance of denunciation of the
discrimination in the NPT and its demand for time-bound elimination of nuclear
arsenals was a smokescreen to camouflage its own nuclear ambitions.

Vajpayee's letters to Western leaders were propagandistic in nature, and

highlighted the history of India's relations with China. After China protested, New
Delhi back-tracked, assuring Beijing that it did not regard China as a threat.

The Indian test was severely criticized by all major powers, including the US, who
announced sanctions on defence sales, termination or suspension of some assistance
programmes, loans, and opposition to World Bank and IMF lending.

The focus of US policy immediately shifted to dissuading Pakistan from conducting

its own set of tests. Pakistan's response should not have surprised him: Foreign
Minister Gohar Ayub unleashed a broadside on India and the United States.

The world reaction lumped India and Pakistan together, although the joint
communiqué issued by the P-5, permanent members of the UN Security Council, noted
that India was the first to conduct the tests and Pakistan was obliged to respond.
The Security Council Resolution 1172 failed to make the same distinction.

The foreign ministers of the P-5 and the G-8 group of industrialized states issued
a communiqué postponing loans to Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Saudi Arabia provided Pakistan with 100,000 barrels of oil a day on a deferred
payments basis, and Western countries relaxed their penalties a year later. The
International Monetary Fund provided a $1.2 billion credit to Pakistan for
structural adjustment.

Nuclear Restraints

The Security Council resolution 1172 of 12 February 1999 prescribed an elaborate

agenda of restraints. Initiatives to stabilize the situation would be consistent
with Islamabad's past policy.

Washington abandoned efforts to restrain India from accumulating an increasing

stockpile of fissile material, and arranged for France to provide enriched uranium
fuel for the Tarapur power reactor, violating its own Nuclear Non-proliferation Act
of 1978.

Pakistan announced a moratorium on further nuclear tests and decided to participate

in negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty.

The prime ministers of Pakistan and India expressed willingness to sign the CTBT in
September 1998, but the plan was derailed when the Vajpayee government fell and New
Delhi decided to postpone a decision on signing till after the election in October.
Impact on Security

The Pakistani nuclear tests helped silence those in India who doubted Pakistan's
nuclear capability, and perhaps even the Indian prime minister, who said the tests
had created a 'new' situation.

Even before the May 1998 tests, those familiar with the apocalyptic power of
nuclear weapons expressed the view that acquisition of nuclear capability would
exercise a restraining influence on jingoism. The two countries' prime ministers
recognized the need for caution.

The May tests were salutary, but the chief of the Indian army remarked that if
militancy in India-held Kashmir 'grows too much', India could contemplate a
conventional war. The Security Council urged India and Pakistan to remove tensions
by finding solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including
Kashmir.

The words were not followed by any purposeful action, and the optimism generated by
Resolution 1172 and the Lahore Declaration soon evaporated with the outbreak of the
Kargil crisis.

Issues and Non-Issues

The academic debate on proliferation has focused on Iran and North Korea, but few
participants envisage the spread of nuclear weapons to many additional states.

Major nuclear powers and some political scientists oppose nuclear proliferation
because they believe that medium and small powers lack the resources, mutual
learning experience, and technical safeguards that help the superpowers manage
crises.

Political scientists do not share the above view, however. They argue that nuclear
weapons are a deterrent to war because they make the cost of war seem frighteningly
high, and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use
of such weapons.

A single 20-kiloton bomb, exploded over a densely populated city, could cause
130,000 instantaneous deaths, over 200,000 people would suffer blast injuries and
radiation burns, and many times more would be condemned to a life worse than death.

The awesome potential for destruction invests nuclear weapons with an unequalled
power of deterrence. This is the main rationale for the acquisition of nuclear
capabilities by states that lack the conventional power to deter aggression, and is
also the reason why Ukraine retained its nuclear weapons.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons is a serious threat, and measures must be taken to

prevent theft and clandestine diversion of nuclear materials. In the past, some
states were selective in their vigilance, and neither the USA nor the European
community expressed remorse for their collusion.

It is desirable to share precautions, procedures, and confidence building measures

to reduce the dangers of miscalculation, accidents, and theft among the nuclear
states, but targeting some small states cannot be constructive.

Nuclear weapons are not a panacea in every conflict and a less powerful state may
face dangerous dilemmas if it ends up with an unsurvivable nuclear capability as
well as a degraded conventional force.
The contingencies warranting a summons to the weapon of last resort should be
clearly and carefully defined. The people of a state can give an answer to the
cruel question of whether a victim of aggression should make a choice between
capitulation and annihilation.

Nuclear powers have built arsenals of diverse sizes, but deterrence can be realized
with a relatively modest arsenal. Moreover, nuclear deterrence is not decisively
degraded by quantitative or qualitative disparity, so long as a states strategic
arsenal is sufficient to survive the first strike and still deliver unacceptable
damage.

Medium nuclear powers have not considered it necessary to build thousands of

warheads. Israel has 510-650 kg of plutonium, enough for 110-190 nuclear warheads.

A small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to deter medium states, provided the weapons
can be delivered on targets of high value. If the adversary develops the capacity
for pre-emption and interception, the arsenal has to be augmented correspondingly.

The cost of designing, building and testing a plutonium-based nuclear device was
estimated at $100 million in 1968, and $51 million in 1976. If a country already
possessed the fissile material, the cost dropped to $1 million.

In addition to possible containment of the defence budget, a nuclear force makes

the disparity of conventional forces irrelevant, and allows Pakistan and India to
cut back on conventional forces and maintain a lower level balance.

Pakistan viewed nuclear weapons as a means of deterring and preventing war, not of
fighting one. Its nuclear doctrine was based on the principle of minimum credible
deterrence, and the size of its nuclear arsenal was determined by its own security
and economic circumstances.

Nuclear deterrence is not dependent on parity or ratio between arsenals. The Soviet
Union possessed deterrent capability during the Cuban crisis even though its
nuclear arsenal was a fraction of the size of the United States.

Over-zealous super-patriots misled the United States and the Soviet Union into a
race that rational analysts now consider insane. China did not commit the blunder.

Nuclear weapons are not an acceptable idea to strategic thinkers in the new
nuclear-capable states, nor to the nuclear-weapons states. Limiting nuclear weapons
is a practical proposition that can serve the interests of humankind and the states
involved.

The superpowers have set a good example by cutting their nuclear inventories by
some ninety percent in a decade to 3,000-3,500 warheads. The reduction process is
likely to continue.

Pakistan has supported proposals for a nuclear limitation regime, globally and
regionally. India rejected a proposal to consider nuclear and security issues in
South Asia at a conference of five states, and the United States gave up and
reverted to the Pakistan-specific policy.

The argument of an all-out arms race is inapplicable to Pakistan because its

nuclear capability is the smallest of all eight nuclear weapon states. Pakistan's
programme is driven by the need to deter aggression, not competition.

Statesmen and scholars worry that other countries may experience incidents of
miscalculation and near-accidents, and may not have the resources to put fail-safe
mechanisms in place.
States with nuclear weapons have learned to address and contain the risks of
accidents or unauthorized use. They have developed fail-safe mechanisms, and the US
may have provided relevant information and equipment to Pakistan and India.

In the United States and Russia, the presidents carry Black Boxes and can give
coded signals that enable nuclear weapons to be armed for explosion.

Pakistan set up a National Command Authority in February 2000. The Strategic Plans
Division was assigned responsibilities for research and development, up-gradation
and application of stringent custodial controls.

India has trumpeted the no-first-use of nuclear weapons but reserves the right to
use conventional force. China's commitment to peace is manifest in its policy of
peace toward neighbors.

Over-dependence on strategic deterrence can lead to misperceptions of local and

low-intensity conflicts as commencement of general hostilities, making the weapon-
of-last-resort a weapon-of-first-resort.

India's polemical approach to nuclear issues was manifest in its attribution of

Pakistan's nuclear capability to the transfer of technology from outside, while
ignoring the efforts of Pakistani scientists and engineers to indigenously
replicate and develop nuclear and missile technologies.

Foreign commentators have tried to stroke atavistic prejudices by describing the

Pakistan programme as a plan to produce an 'Islamic bomb'. Pakistan has joined the
world community in tightening custodial controls.

A transnational underworld network of manufactures and suppliers was accused of

transferring nuclear materials and technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea,
including centrifuges and drawings for a crude explosive device handed over to the
United States by Libya.

Pakistan cooperated in the investigation of allegations against A.Q. Khan and his
subordinates, and obtained relevant information through the interrogation of
accused individuals. The investigation concluded that the government had not
authorized any transfer, and that the sale was on account of the personal greed of
a few persons.

Fortunately, the US concerns were anticipated, and the government took measures to
streamline command and control and strengthen custodial security of strategic
assets. However, involvement of Pakistani scientists in the underground
international network of suppliers and traffickers of nuclear equipment and
technology kept Pakistan in the limelight.

Although Pakistan took effective measures to prevent any further leakage of

technology, international concerns remained about the security of Pakistan's
strategic assets, the danger of terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials, and
political stability.

Senator John F. Kerry expressed concerns about Pakistan's refusal to allow

interrogation of A.Q. Khan, and Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice
acknowledged the danger of Pakistani nuclear assets falling into the hands of
extremists. Pakistan provided parts of old and discarded centrifuges to IAEA for
comparison.

Researchers believe the United States has been obsessed with nuclear weapons and
technology falling into the hands of al Qaeda since 9/11. They believe the US has
conceived a plan for a simultaneous global covert and overt assault on all nuclear
facilities that were regarded as 'either unintentionally unsecure or intentionally
hostile'.

Ballistic Missiles: The Threat of Destabilization

As force multipliers, missiles enhance both offensive and defensive capability, and
make the adversary's nuclear deterrent less credible. They also create new dilemmas
connected with threats to the survivability of a small nuclear force.

Pakistan is concerned about India's missile programme, which includes short-range

surface-to-air missiles like Trishul and Akash and the anti-tank Nag, as well as
long-range Agni, which is capable of delivering nuclear warheads as far away as
Beijing, Jakarta, Riyadh, and Tehran.

Pakistan responded to the situation with missiles of its own, but the United States
raised vociferous objections and did little to restrain India from inducting
missiles into South Asia.

Pakistan has indigenously produced a variety of ballistic missiles, including the

liquid-fuel Ghauri and solid-fuel Shaheen, as well as the anti-aircraft Atiza and
the anti-tank Baktar Shikan.

Ballistic missiles can travel long distances in minutes and strike with little
notice. They can be used to spread panic and demoralize the population, or to knock
out punches at airfields and other targets.

Tests of missiles are necessary for validating the technology and improving
accuracy, but parity is not necessary for credibility or affordability.

Increasing Isolation, 1990-2001

Pakistan rose to international respect in the 1980s, but lost that respect at the
turn of the decade when the international community focused on its nuclear
programme and imposed sanctions. Poor governance, reckless international borrowing
and rampant corruption added to Pakistan's economic plight. General Pervez
Musharraf's government began to rescue Pakistan from international isolation by
implementing stringent austerity measures and cooperating with the United States.

US Sanctions Again

In 1989, the nuclear issue began to dominate Pakistan-US relations once again. The
US asked Islamabad to discontinue the weapons research programme, but Islamabad
declined, and the Psssler Amendment was activated, prohibiting economic and
military assistance to Pakistan. The US immediately cut off $700 million in
assistance to Pakistan and refused to transfer F-16 aircrafts and other military
equipment for which Pakistan had paid a billion dollars in cash. This revived the
bitter memories of Pakistan's past grievances of US refusal to honor commitments.

Fortunately, international financial institutions and bilateral donors did not

follow the US example, but the economy suffered a severe jolt.

Support for the Taliban

Pakistan's recognition of the Taliban government in May 1997 provoked international

disapproval and criticism, but the decision was not without justification. The
Taliban proved unreasonable and rigid and committed one blunder after another,
provoking international outrage.
Islamabad failed to foresee that the Taliban were internationally perceived as the
creation of Pakistan. The Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara parties in Afghanistan denounced
Pakistan, and the United Nations, OIC and ECO refused to recognize the Taliban
regime.

Pakistan was blamed for failing to prevent the Taliban from giving asylum to Osama
bin Laden and his followers. The United States itself did little to influence the
Taliban.

Pakistan, anxious to maintain cooperative relations with Afghanistan and cognizant

of the Taliban's friendly disposition toward Pakistan, proffered counsel and advice
for moderation, but the Taliban leadership was dismissive of criticism and
persisted in its suicidal course.

Declining Prestige

International goodwill for Pakistan was undermined by corruption at high levels,

poor governance, fiscal extravagance, mounting budgetary deficits and an escalating
debt burden.

Nuclear Tests

Pakistan alone was not the target of sanctions, but its economy was more vulnerable
to the aid cutoff, and the government resorted to a freeze of $11 billion in
foreign currency deposits, antagonizing hundreds of thousands of people.

Pakistan-India Dialogue, 1997-99

The dialogue between Pakistan and India was reopened in February 1997 at the level
of foreign secretaries, but the gap between the two positions was not bridged when
prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and I.K. Gujral met in May 1997.

The All Parties Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir called a hartal for the first time
since the Kashmir dispute arose, and appealed to the world community to promote an
initiative toward settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

The foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India agreed to recommence dialogue and set
up working groups. The prime ministers expressed determination to renew efforts for
durable peace.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan from 20-21 February 1999 and concluded a
summit with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The two sides agreed to intensify their
efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, and to
reduce the risks of accidental nuclear use.

The Lahore Summit was a grand if ephemeral success, but was greeted with vociferous
protests against India's brutal repression in Kashmir, and the Indian leaders
downplayed the importance of the commitment to resolve the outstanding issues.

The reference to the 'sanctity' of the Line of Control was particularly insensitive
and departed from Pakistan's view that the line was a temporary arrangement.

The Kargil Crisis, 1999

A grave crisis erupted in May 1999 following intrusion of armed personnel from
Pakistan into the Kargil heights in Kashmir. Pakistan denied the facts and
attributed the fighting to Kashmiri freedom fighters, but foreign countries
implicitly blamed Pakistan for the 'intruders'.
Armed men penetrated the Kargil-Dras sector and seized high ground threatening the
Srinagar-Leh road, so India retaliated with a massive air and army operation to
dislodge the guerrillas. The Pakistani foreign minister was accorded a frigid and
hostile reception in New Delhi.

Concern mounted internationally that the fighting in Kargil might escalate and lead
to a general war between Pakistan and India. Only the OIC backed Pakistan's
position and called for de-escalation and dialogue.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sued for the US President's intercession to defuse the
crisis. Clinton persuaded Sharif to agree to a joint statement that provided for an
immediate cessation of hostilities and a resumption of a Pakistan-India dialogue.

Reading into the Washington joint statement a US pledge to promote settlement of

the Kashmir question was not only a spin aimed at misleading public opinion but a
self-deception. The president had promised only his 'personal interest' in
promoting the 'Lahore process'.

Most commentators blamed the Pakistan government for losing sight of strategy and
approving a misconceived operation that could escalate to the nuclear level. The
APHC leader described the Pakistan government's policy as unpredictable.

Inconsistent and contradictory statements undermined Pakistan's credibility, and

shallow thinking was manifest in pendulum swings from naive bus diplomacy to the
Kargil gamble. Politics of corruption was diagnosed as the main reason for the
shallow and myopic policies.

Autopsies of the Kargil crisis by Pakistani commentators underlined the agonizing

dilemmas that Pakistan faced in regard to the Kashmir issue. Misconceived policies
and actions isolated Pakistan internationally and gravely damaged the heroic
freedom struggle of the Kashmiri people.

After the Kargil episode, Nawaz Sharif blamed the army for keeping him ignorant of
the plan for the Kargil operation, and dismissed Chief of Army Staff General Pervez
Musharraf while he was on his way back from Sri Lanka.

Coping with Isolation

General Pervez Musharraf focused efforts on improving governance and rectification

of Pakistan's fiscal predicament, and the debt burden was stabilized. Austerity and
belt-tightening were implemented, and by the end of June 2001, exports increased by
10 percent growth.

Friend countries maintained solidarity with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was generous in
economic assistance, China and Kuwait provided balance of payments support, Oman
extended substantial assistance for economic development, and the US used its
influence to contain Pakistan-India tension.

Bound by its rules, the Commonwealth suspended Pakistan's membership but maintained
contacts with the new leadership. The Pakistan delegation urged the UK to join in
efforts to reform bank secrecy laws which encouraged corruption, undermined good
governance and siphoned off scarce capital.

The Agra Summit

On New Year's Day, 2001, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee suggested a meeting
with the Pakistani president to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The two leaders held
several exclusive meetings and reached an understanding to resume dialogue.
The Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers agreed on a declaration text to be
recommended to the leaders. The Indian cabinet committee considered the draft for
over two hours, after which the Indian minister sought a meeting with his Pakistani
counterpart to discuss an amendment to the one-line paragraph on Kashmir.

The Pakistani president was told by the Indian prime minister that the cabinet
committee had not reached agreement, but that he would visit Pakistan later to
finalize the proposed agreement. Both sides tried to relieve the gloom by stating
that the summit was not a failure.

The Indian side soon started backtracking on the agreed draft, and Vajpayee said
that India would have to find place in any document that future negotiations
endeavor to conclude.

Observers speculated that President Musharraf's breakfast meeting with Indian media
luminaries had offended the Indian leaders, but there was little new in what he
said, and the Indian side agreed to finalize the draft of the declaration.

The Pakistani president's reference to Kashmir as the principal obstacle to

normalization of Pakistan-Indian relations was no more than a statement of the
obvious.

Vajpayee's explanation that Pakistan insisted on the settlement of the Jammu and
Kashmir issue as a pre-condition for normalization of relations was factually
incorrect.

The Indian cabinet committee objected to the draft, and months later the Indian
press attributed responsibility for obstructing agreement to the deputy prime
minister, L.K. Advani. Advani later admitted he had torpedoed the summit, now
giving a new explanation, namely that General Musharraf had blasted India's
position on cross-border terrorism.

Vajpayee had conceived and canvassed the initiative for dialogue with Pakistan on
Kashmir, but the agreement fell victim to internal political battles. Three months
later, terrorist attacks changed the global situation.

Chapter 19 Post-9/11 Policy

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September
2001 triggered a transformation of world politics, and left the American nation
traumatized and seething with rage and urge for revenge. The president of Pakistan
expressed condolences and solidarity with the American people.

The US media immediately pointed a finger of accusation at Osama bin Laden and
implicated the Taliban, and Pakistan was bound to face painful choices.

Policy Planning by Pakistan

President Musharraf attended a high-level meeting in Islamabad on 12 September and

surmised that the United States would take military action against the Taliban. He
considered Pakistan's options, keeping in mind the national interest and the need
for a realistic assessment of the obtaining environment.

The United States was likely to mount an attack against the Taliban with the
cooperation of major powers, and no proof of Taliban complicity with bin Laden
would be asked or considered necessary.

The Security Council resolution of December 2000 had imposed sanctions against the
Taliban, and Pakistan had cooperated. Now, a defiant policy course was out of the
question, as Pakistan's vital interests were at stake.

Pakistan had to pursue a strategy that would reduce risks to its own security and
strategic interests, avoid offence to the United States, and maintain cultural and
geographical ties with Afghanistan.

A cautious cooperation in a UN-approved action against the Taliban emerged as the

only feasible alternative. Pakistan should join the global consensus, not oppose US
attacks on targets in Afghanistan, and indicate a generally positive disposition
and negotiate details later.

Pakistan's strategy was decided on 12 September, before any specific requests from
the United States, and before public statements from President Bush.

Pakistan's analysis was borne out by events, and world consensus solidified in
favor of the United States. NATO invoked the treaty provision for joint defence,
and China, Japan and Russia expressed solidarity with the coalition.

US Policy

Soon the contours of US policy began to emerge. President Bush spoke of a

monumental struggle of good versus evil, Secretary of State Powell announced that
the US expected 'the fullest cooperation' of Pakistan, and the US warned that
Pakistan would be at risk if it did not cooperate.

On 13 September, US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage summoned the

ambassador of Pakistan to Washington to convey a list of seven steps the US wanted
Pakistan to take.

The United States is asking for blanket overflight and landing rights, intelligence
information, and territorial access to conduct operations against al Qaeda.

Islamabad was in a position to give a prompt and positive response to the US

request for assistance when it was received, with details on some points to be
worked out later. Pakistan made substantial concessions, but did not participate in
US military action in Afghanistan.

Consultation with Opinion Leaders

The president held lengthy and interactive discussions with a dozen groups of
prominent people from various walks of national life. They were realistic in their
assessment of the gravity of the situation.

The ulema (religious scholars) disagreed with the US policy towards Pakistan,
arguing that religious duty required Pakistan to support the Taliban, regardless of
costs and consequences. However, other religious scholars put forward convincing
refutation, citing instances from early Islamic history.

After the US-led coalition attacked Afghanistan on 6 October, Pakistani religious

parties called for demonstrations. The public doubted the wisdom of protesting, and
participation was limited to a narrow section of opinion.

The US and the West applauded the Pakistan government for enlightened leadership,
and manifested their solidarity by visiting Pakistan. Many leaders came to
Pakistan, including the heads of government of the UK, Germany, Belgium, and the
Netherlands.

Economic Cooperation and Assistance

Islamabad did not bargain for a quid pro quo, but was aware of the value of its
contribution to the fight against terrorism. The US and other Western countries
responded to this by increasing their support and assistance.

Pakistan's key role in the war on terrorism led to improved relations with major
countries, including the dismantling of nuclear and democracy sanctions and the
rescheduling of the debt.

The US waived Pakistan's democracy sanctions and nuclear sanctions in 2002 and 2003
and agreed to provide $3 billion in economic and military assistance over five
years. The US also agreed to sell F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan.

Over the period 2001-07, the United States transferred $7,135 million to Pakistan,
including $2,335 million in military assistance, budgetary support, development
assistance, earthquake relief, and $4,800 million in reimbursement of expenditures
on logistic support to US forces in Afghanistan.

Japan had not misled by false assumptions and considered resumption of development
assistance, if Pakistan signed the CTBT.

After 9/11, Japan provided $300 million as grant assistance to Pakistan and
supported Pakistan's case in the IMF and the Paris Club. Japan also rescheduled $12
billion in bilateral debt at lower interest rates and extended maturities,
effectively reducing the burden by 30 percent.

China's 'all weather friendship' with Pakistan and its understanding of Islamabad's
motivations ensured continuity of cooperation between the two countries, despite
Beijing's reservations over Islamabad's support for the Taliban. China also
supported the UN-led Bonn process in Afghanistan.

Pakistan and China have established friendly relations and have signed several
agreements to expand trade and invest in infrastructure. China has also given $500
million to support Pakistan's balance of payments.

Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan on 5-6 April 2005 and signed 21 agreements to
promote closer trade and economic ties, as well as mutually beneficial cooperation
across the board.

Pakistan has grievances against the United States for going back on its commitments
to Pakistan after achieving its immediate objectives. Pakistan was left without
resources to cope with millions of Afghan refugees.

Pakistan wanted durable commitment from Washington too, but officials in high
places in the Bush administration entertained doubts about Pakistan's reliability
for sustained support to the United States. This was welcome news to people in
Pakistan who place great emphasis on sincerity.

The US's sudden termination of support for Pakistan in 1990, and neglect of
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, was a flawed policy, and Washington's
limited capacity to influence the Taliban was undermined as a result of US
sanctions and aid cut off.

After 9/11, US spokespersons repeatedly assured the nations in the region of the
durability of their country's new policy, emphasizing especially the continuity of
US cooperation with Pakistan. The US Congress passed an act in December 2004 with
provisions assuring continued assistance to Pakistan after the expiry of the five-
year package in 2009.

The fall of the Taliban lifted the shadow on Pakistan's relations with Iran, and
after the coalition forces took control of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran lost
their rivalry for influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's measures to extradite or expel militants and extremists were appreciated

by Arab, Central Asian and other foreign countries.

New Afghanistan

The US-led coalition's military intervention in Afghanistan resulted in much

suffering, including thousands of innocent civilians.

Pakistan cooperated with the world community for an end to civil war, promotion of
peace and reconciliation among the different ethnic communities, and political
stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia prepared a joint working paper,
which was presented to the leaders of the United States and Britain.

The UN-chaired Bonn conference of prominent Afghans endorsed a multi-phase formula

that provided for an interim administration, a loya jirga, a general election, and
the return of former King Zahir Shah to his country.

Chairman-designate Hamid Karzai and members of the interim administration welcomed

a delegation led by the foreign minister to participate in the installation
ceremony. They expressed lasting gratitude for Pakistan's role in the liberation of
their country.

President Hamid Karzai's decision to visit Pakistan soon after assuming office and
the president of Pakistan's return visit to Kabul illustrated the desire of both
sides to reconstruct close friendly relations between the two countries.

Chairman Hamid Karzai was elected president of Afghanistan in 2004 with 55.4
percent of the vote, with solid support in the Pashtun east and south, as well as a
comfortable majority in the multi-ethnic west and urban centers, including Kabul.

Elections held in September 2005 provided political representation to all Afghan

ethnic and sectarian components of the population, and bilateral trade increased to
a record $500 million in 2004.

Political stability, the establishment of law and order, and continued economic
progress in Afghanistan will help resolve problems of narcotics production and
trafficking.

Pakistan-US Strategic Partnership

Pakistan was thrust to a frontline role in dealing with a crisis in Afghanistan

after 9/11 and decided to cooperate with the United States to facilitate its
foreseeable attack on the base of the perpetrators.

Washington made demands of Islamabad on 13 September, and Islamabad accepted them.

This was consistent with the principles of international law, and the policy was
maintained even after political parties formed the government in 2008.

The long and rugged mountainous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan with
hundreds of mountains and thousands of tracks and trails is difficult to seal, and
smugglers and outlaws exploit the absence of law enforcement administration to
evade arrest.

After the US and allied forces invaded Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and a large number of
the Taliban fled to the Pushtoon border region.
After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan moved a substantial number of troops
to the border and killed or captured thousands of terrorists.

After 9/11, US officials praised Pakistan's leadership as a voice of moderation and

reason in the Islamic world and pledged continuity of support for the strategic
partnership between the two countries. However, neither the US nor Pakistan
succeeded to liquidate the terrorists.

The US and its allies did not bring adequate forces to Afghanistan, so they co-
opted Afghan warlords to fight the opposition to the US invasion. These warlords
did not diligently pursue Osama Bin Laden.

The Bush administration's policies continued to alienate the Pushtoon majority in

Afghanistan, and the Taliban staged a resurgence due to US bombardment. Al Qaeda
also recovered influence because of insensitive US policies that offended the
Muslim world.

US insensitivity towards Muslims led to Islamophobia and the invasion of Iraq on a

trumped up charge. Torture was authorized to coerce confessions from suspects held
at the notorious Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and Bagram prisons.

The Bush administration demonstrated gross indifference to long-standing grievances

of Muslim peoples, allowed Israel to unleash terrorist gangs for atrocities against
Palestinians, and allowed Al Qaeda to rebuild strength and resume its agenda of
terrorism. The war on terror became unpopular in Pakistan.

The US and its Afghan ally asked Pakistan to do more, but Pakistan was already
doing more than they were. The US also suspected that Pakistan was playing a double
game by siding with the US but secretly colluding with the Taliban.

The US started using Drone missiles in 2004 to target Al Qaeda operatives and their
allies in their hideouts in FATA, who mounted attacks across the border. Pakistan
objected to the violation of its sovereignty and opinion leaders became highly
critical of the United States.

Islamabad was angry at the US for transferring civilian nuclease technology to

India, and for discriminating against Pakistan by refusing to extend the same
concession to Pakistan on the invalid ground that Pakistan's non-proliferation
record was flawed while India had 'impeccable non-proliferation credentials'.

Pakistan has a distrust of the United States because of the US' recurrent record of
unilateral cut-offs of cooperation with Pakistan, which has left Pakistan with a
multitude of problems bequeathed by the Cold War.

Respected American statesmen have recognized that Pakistan's grievances are not
unfounded, and the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States should make a
long-term commitment to Pakistan.

After 9/11, the US government made efforts to underscore the durability of its
commitment to Pakistan by providing $3 billion in economic and military aid, and
contributing generously to education, health and poverty reduction programmes.

President Barack Obama announced a new strategy to deal with the deteriorating
situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was aimed at disrupting, dismantling,
defeating and expelling Al Qaeda and preventing their return to either country.

President Obama emphasized strengthening Afghanistan and Pakistan and enhancing

their military, economic and governance capacity to overcome the threat posed by Al
Qaeda and militant extremists. He pledged to respect Pakistan's sovereignty and
consult with Pakistan before attacking high-value targets.

The Kerry-Lugar Bill, 2009, increased economic assistance from $300 million a year
to $1.5 billion a year for the next five years to support economic growth and
development, improve living standards, and build sustainable relations with
Pakistan.

Twenty countries, including the United States, Japan, Britain, Germany, China,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, pledged $5.7 billion in aid for Pakistan.

Pakistan's foreign policy had evidently situated it in the mainstream of world

opinion at a critical time in its history, when the country was confronted with an
existential threat. Terrorists attacked military convoys, check-posts, police
personnel, their premises and civilian officials, and destroyed valuable assets.

Chapter 21 Terrorism

Pakistan has condemned terrorism and supported international cooperation to

eradicate the scourge by eliminating its root causes, including alien occupation,
state oppression and repression, and gross violations of human rights. It has
intensified its pursuit of foreign militants, including Osama bin Laden, and has
suffered heavy losses in lives.

Pakistan's president urged world leaders to promote a just resolution of

international issues, but was disappointed at the lack of a salutary response.
Negotiations on a comprehensive international convention against terrorism stalled
because of disagreements on the definition of terrorism.

The events of 9/11 marked a seismic shift in international relations, as some

states began to use the label of terrorism to demonize political opponents and to
threaten or justify new military action on long-running disputes. Ironically, the
Indian government condemned terrorism when others under its yoke took to militant
struggle.

The Universal Human Rights Declaration, two human rights conventions, covenants on
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide have not restrained states from
suppressing popular protests for freedom and other human rights, and from
terrorizing people by resorting to indiscriminate violence, torture, custodial
killings, destruction of homes and businesses, molestation and rape.

Israel has enjoyed the strong support of the Western countries with influential
domestic Zionist lobbies, but the US political elite has conspicuously ignored this
root cause as Zionist lobbies exploited the popular outrage against terrorism and
Ariel Sharon's government resorted to demonlsation.

Islam Targeted

As the Soviet Union collapsed, Zionist political intellectuals and lobbyists in the
United States substituted Islam for communism as the new threat to the West, and
used out-of-context quotations from the Quran and incorrect translations to whip up
hatred against Muslims.

The projection of Islam as an enemy of the West was a preposterous fabrication, and
the predominant political thought in the Muslim world recognizes the desperate need
for cooperation with the West to end centuries of stagnation.

Politically motivated acts of militancy and violence, by an extremist fringe among

Muslims, unleashed a wave of Islamophobia in countries with significant Muslim
immigrant populations, especially the United States, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands. Muslim citizens, residents and visitors were exposed to economic and
social discrimination.

Islam teaches the noble precept of human fraternity, and abhors the killing of even
a single innocent person. It also emphasizes coexistence, and prohibits
discrimination on grounds of race, color, language, national origin, wealth or
gender.

All OIC countries condemned the 9/11 outrage and several of them provided logistic
support for the fight against terrorists in Afghanistan. Enlightened leaders in the
West were also anxious to avoid besmirching Islam and alienating the large Muslim
world.

Jihad is a fundamental duty for every believer, but an individual is not permitted
to unleash violence. A community is also not permitted to wage war, and rulers of
Muslim states have historically used the term of jihad in the same sense as states
in Europe used the doctrine of 'just war'.

Al Qaeda leaders issued declarations of jihad against Jews and Crusaders, but had
no authority to do so. Bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri issued statements
urging people to support the Pakistani Taliban in 'jihad' against the United
States.

Bin Laden and many of his followers were recruited by the CLA to join the Afghan
Mujahedeen in their liberation struggle against the Soviet occupation. After the
war was won, some of the volunteers joined bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Muslim countries realized the need to project a correct understanding of their

faith and condemned the 11 September outrage. They also reiterated Islamic
teachings that uphold the sanctity of human life.

A conference held in Istanbul in February 2002 by the OIC and EU members to

highlight harmony among civilizations rejected the perverse thesis of 'clash of
civilizations' and emphasized instead the history of mutually beneficial
interaction among civilizations.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia adopted policies to denounce the extremist fringe within
Muslim societies. President Musharraf courageously embarked on an energetic
promotion of 'enlightened moderation' emphasizing the need to replace the
institutions of hate, anger and militancy with a correct projection of Islam that
stands for 'peace, harmony, justice, equality and brotherhood'. The Muslim leader
pledged to focus on concrete solutions to international issues affecting Muslim
people, including a two-states solution, an end to the war in Iraq, and empowering
the people in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Terrorism and religion have long been abused to justify wars and campaigns of
terror. In the first century ad, a Jewish sect targeted fellow Jews suspected of
aiding the Romans, and in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Muslims were
liquidated in Spain and the Inquisition carried out brutal burnings.

State terrorism has a long history. Alexander burned and razed Persepolis, Tiberius
and Caligua executed people to terrorize the opposition, the Jacobins proclaimed
the 'Reign of Terror', and Britain, France and Portugal unleashed terror against
freedom movements in their colonies.

The United States waged war on Iraq, causing colossal destruction of communications
and urban infrastructure, and killing hundreds of thousands of people. Four million
people either emigrated or were internally dislocated, and the war became so
unpopular within the US that policy change was constraint.
Israel has persisted in state terrorism and aggression against Palestine over six
decades, subjecting the people of Palestine to occupation and repression. In 1993,
President Bill Clinton mediated a successful meeting between President Yasser
Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, laying the foundation for the Oslo
Declaration of Principles.

Ariel Sharon, Barak's successor, re-embarked on Israel's old policies of expansion

and ethnic cleansing by systematic violence and terror.

President Barack Obama called for a halt to Israeli settlements in occupied

Palestine and pledged to support a two-state solution.

The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy

The demonization of Islam, Palestinians, Kashmiris and Chechens, and the war on
terrorism, represent uncivilized responses to an objective problem that calls
instead for a comprehensive strategy combining preventive and deterrence measures
with redress of root causes.

The High Level Panel emphasized the need to resolve long-standing disputes,
including Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula, and outlined a five-point
global strategy for fighting terrorism, including dissuading disaffected groups
from choosing terrorism as a tactic, denial of means for terrorists to attack,
deterring states from supporting terrorists, and defending human rights.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led by Baitullah Mehsud, attacked military convoys

and check-posts, police personnel and premises and civilian officials, killing
large numbers of citizens and destroying valuable assets. The death toll mounted
from 590 in 2006 to over two thousand in 2008.

TTP recruited thousands of students of seminaries and other unemployed men to

unleash a campaign of terror, and militant maulanas did likewise and imitated TTP
to take control of parts of FATA. The Taliban defaulted in laying down arms as
required under an agreement.

Popular opinion in Pakistan realized that the terrorists posed an existential

threat to the country and the democratic system. The armed forces fought bravely
and succeeded in liquidating the terrorists and recovering control in Swat within
three months.

Retrospect

The roots of antagonism between Pakistan and India can be traced to the history of
Hindu-Muslim relations and contention between the Indian National Congress and the
Muslim League. India ignored the legitimate aspirations of its smaller neighbors
for relations based on the principle of sovereign equality.

India's imperial attitude is partly inherited from the predecessor British Raj, but
its roots are traceable to great power ambitions cultivated in the minds of the
Indian political elite by leaders of the Indian National Congress since the late
nineteenth century. Jawaharlal Nehru considered India as a world power and
envisioned an Indian sphere of influence extending from Bab el-Mandeb to the
Straits of Malacca.

We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power, but that superiority
is not so great that it will produce results in war or by fear of war. Therefore,
we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan.
This ambitious Nehru wants to establish a great empire unprecedented in India's
history, and believes that the small nation state is doomed.

India's drive to impose its own preferences on less powerful neighbors has been
manifest in its refusal to utilize the other peaceful means for settlement of
disputes.

New Delhi tried to paint Pakistan as a terrorist comer after 9/11, but Pakistan's
provident policy made it a frontline ally in the fight against terrorism.

After the 13 December 2001 attacks on the Indian parliament, India escalated
pressure on Pakistan, but the danger of war was averted due to a combination of
factors, including Pakistan's capacity for self-defence and the risk of escalation
to the nuclear level.

New Delhi threatened Pakistan, demanding an end to 'infiltration' and labeling the
Kashmiri freedom struggle as a 'terrorist' movement. Pakistan responded with
restraint and reason.

Prime Minister Vajpayee met President Musharraf in Islamabad on 6 January 2004 and
announced an agreement to recommence the composite dialogue. The dialogue included
peace and cooperation, terrorism, drug trafficking, and friendly exchanges.

After their meeting in Islamabad, the Pakistani President and Indian Prime Minister
expressed confidence that the composite dialogue would lead to peaceful settlement
of all bilateral disputes.

Several agreements were made between Pakistan and India, including the reduction of
risks from nuclear accidents, pre-notification of ballistic missile tests,
operationalisation of Khokhrapar-Munabhao rail link, release of prisoners, and
opening Sialkot-Jammu route.

In Jammu and Kashmir, both sides agree to respect the line of control, and agree to
refrain from using force in violation of it.

Joint surveys revealed that 29 of the 67 boundary pillars in the Rann of Kutch were
missing.

No progress was made on the Wullar Barrage dispute, as Pakistan argued that the
storage of 342,000-acre feet behind the barrage would violate the Indus Waters
Treaty. India did not address that point.

Pervez Musharraf suggested a seven regional solution for Jammu and Kashmir, which
was contrary to the recognized position of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan did
not endorse the irresponsible statement, and the parliament ignored it.

Musharraf went ahead to nominate a class-fellow to start a back-channel dialogue

with the Indian prime minister's nominee, but no agreement was reached.

After his resignation as President, Gen. Musharraf told an Indian TV interviewer

that the back-channel discussions had come close to agreements on all three
disputes, and that he had the support of corps commanders for the 'broad
principles'.

The restoration of a democratic government in Pakistan after the February 2008

elections has left open the question of the impact of Musharraf's 'personal' ideas
and the understandings allegedly reached in the back-channel talks on Pakistan's
position in respect of Jammu and Kashmir.
Mumbai Outrage: Pakistani federal authorities initiated a thorough investigation
into the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which were planned in Pakistan. They
requested India for more details, which India promised to provide, but Pakistani
media blamed India for delay in beginning prosecution.

The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India agreed in July 2009 to share information
on future terrorist threats.

The people of Kashmir have made it unmistakably known that they insist on being
heard, and that they do not accept the status quo as a solution. The United Nations
has a principal responsibility to seek a solution.

Korbel's assessment of the Kashmiri people has stood the test of time, and their
heroic struggle and sacrifices have demonstrated their resolve to win freedom.
Relations between Pakistan and India remain strained, and normalization is distant.

Although the Security Council implicitly recognized the threat posed by tension
between Pakistan and India, it has not resumed consideration of the Kashmir
question since the early 1960s.

The people of Kashmir have taken their destiny into their own hands and their
heroic sacrifices are a guarantee that the cause will endure. India's savage
repression has exposed the colonial nature of its stranglehold over occupied
Kashmir.

Hurriyat leaders wanted to be associated with the dialogue between Pakistan and
India on the question of settlement of Jammu and Kashmir, but India opposed the
suggestion.

President Musharraf's personal suggestion for a regional solution was futile, as

were previous ideas for a state-wide plebiscite or one only in the valley. A state-
wide plebiscite remained the only formula bearing the imprimatur of Security
Council resolutions.

The regional alternative was first conceived in 1950 by UN mediator Owen Dixon. It
envisaged regional plebiscites and the allocation of each section or area according
to the results of the vote therein.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was prepared to discuss a plebiscite in the valley
alone, but Pakistan was not keen on the idea because it would be a deviation from
the Security Council resolution.

Sheikh Abdullah floated the idea of independence after he realized that Nehru was
intent on maintaining Indian occupation. He was dismissed and jailed for twelve
years.

The only serious Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir took place after the Sino-
Indian border clash in 1962. The Indian side initially appeared open to the idea of
partitioning the state, but back-tracked as soon as the Chinese forces withdrew.

India proposed converting the ceasefire line into an international border at the
Shimla Conference in 1972, but Pakistan resisted and refused to barter away the
right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination.

Media analysts have long talked about alternatives to a statewide plebiscite, but
the Indian side has ruled out any redrawing of borders or further division.
Pakistan should support the people of Kashmir by maintaining the bottom line.

Mirwaiz Umar Farooq endorsed the peace moves between Pakistan and India, but Syed
Ali Shah Geelani expressed disappointment that the agreements brought no relief to
the Kashmiri people.

UN and Other Organizations

As wars became too destructive, major European Powers formed a Holy Alliance, the
Concert of Europe, and the League of Nations. The League failed to prevent the
Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia or Germany from annexing Austria and
Czechoslovakia.

The United Nations was established to save the world from the scourge of war. Its
charter requires members to settle disputes by peaceful means and in conformity
with principles of justice and international law.

The United Nations has a General Assembly and a Security Council. The Security
Council was paralyzed from the start because of discord between the USSR and the
US.

The Millennium Summit, held in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, adopted the
Millennium Declaration, which called for the eradication of poverty, primary
education for all children, reduction of maternal mortality by two-thirds, and
halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS.

The Millennium Development Goals were not achieved in the first five years, and
poverty intensified and HIV/AIDS took an increasing toll in sub-Sahara Africa.
Pakistan's population growth rate posed a serious obstacle to the reduction of
unemployment.

Development assistance by affluent countries remained inadequate, and global

military expenditure began to gallop in 2002, rising nearly 40 percent to approach
the colossal total of one trillion dollars. The United Nations was also criticized
for its inability to deal effectively with global problems.

The Millennium Declaration called for reform of the United Nations, including a
comprehensive reform of the Security Council.

A 16-member high-level panel was appointed by the Secretary General to recommend

clear and effective measures for ensuring effective collective action. The panel's
recommendations on terrorism, pre-emptive use of force, and enlargement of the
Security Council attracted special attention.

The members of the Panel believe that the United Nations cannot discharge its role
effectively if it does not resolve the long-standing disputes in Palestine, Kashmir
and the Korean Peninsula.

The UN summit meeting in September 2005 had to be content with the minimum common
denominator acceptable to member states due to controversy over the management of
funds accumulated by the UN from export of oil by Iraq.

Discussions on the enlargement of the Security Council began in the General

Assembly in 1993. Germany and Japan staked claims to permanent seats, while others
advocated for regional balance and the addition of non-permanent seats only.

The Secretary General appointed a high level panel to advise on enlargement of the
Security Council, which suggested two alternative models for enlargement. The panel
suggested that the General Assembly should take into account Article 23 of the
Charter when electing states to these seats.

Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India formed a group to support model A, but the Coffee
Club was in favor of periodic elections to ensure that the Security Council
actually acts on behalf of UN members.

The existing permanent members of the Security Council took divergent positions on
expanding the Security Council. France and the UK endorsed the G-4, the United
States backed only Japan and was joined by Russia in opposing veto power for new
permanent members, and China preferred to await consensus.

UN Summit, September 2005. One hundred and fifty heads of state or government
reaffirmed a strong commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and
pledged an additional $50 billion a year to fight poverty.

The leaders pledged to enhance the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,

accountability and credibility of the United Nations, and agreed to replace the
Commission on Human Rights with the Human Rights Council.

No agreement was reached on the enlargement of the Security Council or on

disarmament and nuclear proliferation due to the opposing approaches of 'dividing
for privilege' and 'uniting for consensus'.

The summit's meager achievements were largely due to disagreement among big powers
and the majority of states, who wanted to strengthen collective decision making to
address issues of fundamental concern to humanity.

Human Rights

Humanity has sought equal rights since the dawn of civilization. Islam promulgated
values and laws protecting civil and political rights, and the Renaissance movement
in Europe built up the philosophic rationale for civil and political rights.

The United Nations Charter reaffirmed faith in fundamental human rights, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the UN General
Assembly on 10 December 1948, codified as well as extended general concepts.

In 1966, two international covenants were adopted, one on economic, social and
cultural rights and the other on civil and political rights. Both covenants have
monitoring committees that receive reports from state parties.

Human rights have been accelerated with the adoption of numerous covenants and
conventions, including those on the rights of workers.

The United States and other Western countries criticized the Human Rights
Commission for being politicized. The summit meeting agreed to replace the
Commission with the Human Rights Council.

Pakistan's constitution requires the state to ensure observance of fundamental

rights, but some laws have been abused, leading to criticism at home and abroad.
The government responded to these concerns by amending the laws in 2004-05 to
protect innocent people from the excesses resulting from inefficient
implementation.

International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

The World Bank was established in 1944 to provide financial assistance to

developing countries. In 2003, it provided $18.5 billion in assistance.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an institution that helps member states
maintain adequate exchange reserves, facilitate expansion of international trade,
and promote international monetary cooperation. It provides loans under adequate
safeguards, and expects the recipient states to follow agreed programmes and
conditions.

Pakistan has received substantial amounts in concessional loans from foreign

countries and IFIs over the decades. Most of the high-interest debt was retired by
2004, while debt rescheduling reduced the annual debt-servicing burden from over $5
billion to less than $3 billion. Pakistan's dependence on foreign loans rose in
2007 due to a sudden rise in the price of petroleum and food grains, and increased
borrowings in 2008 and 2009, which increased its international debt burden to $55
billion in 2009.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) plays an increasingly important role in the
promotion of fair and free trade based on binding rules, ensuring transparency and
predictability, liberalization and reduction in tariffs on industrial products, and
smooth implementation of existing agreements.

The latest round of trade negotiations began in 2001 and focused on concerns
regarding the implementation of existing agreements, technical barriers, and
improvement of dispute settlement mechanisms. The industrialized countries
continued to provide massive support for domestic agriculture.