7

THEORIES ABOUT CONFLICT ESCALATION

Whatever t h e underlying bases f o r a c o n f l i c t , once p a r t i s a n s begin t o wage a s t r u g -

g l e against each o t h e r , t h e means o f conducting the f i g h t may e s c a l a t e i n ways which
seem t o go beyond t h e o r i g i n a l i s s u e s i n contention. Thus, t h e i n t e n s i t y o r scope o f
the s t r u g g l e may increase and recourse i s made t o violence. Escalation can produce
a c t i o n s which make a p a r t i c u l a r f i g h t seem t o be u n r e a l i s t i c : t h e means are no longer
appropriate t o t h e o s t e n s i b l e ends o f any of t h e contending p a r t i e s . This is another
important time when c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n methods could play a r o l e i n c o n f l i c t m i t i g a t i o n .
Understanding t h e processes o f c o n f l i c t e s c a l a t i o n and d e e s c a l a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i s essen-
t i a l t o many kinds o f c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n .

Theories. I w i l l d i s c u s s two s e t s of processes t h a t a n a l y s t s o f s o c i a l c o n f l i c t s

use t o account f o r e s c a l a t i o n and d e e s c a l a t i o n : those o c c u r r i n g within and those be-
tween adversaries (Xriesberg, 1982). Within any adversary, social-psychological pro-
cesses and organizational developments r e s u l t in e i t h e r e s c a l a t i n g o r deescalating a
c o n f l i c t . Among t h e social-psychological processes, I note only a few. A s a f i g h t
goes on and t h e c o s t s o f waging i t rise, t h e goal o f t h e f i g h t increases i n value t o
j u s t i f y t h e s a c r i f i c e s already made. The increased value o f t h e goal i n t u r n i s a reason
f o r increasing t h e e f f o r t . On t h e o t h e r hand, under o t h e r circumstances, f o r i n s t a n c e
when the increased c o s t s f o r a t t a i n i n g t h e goal become too great, t h e r i s i n g c o s t s of
t h e e f f o r t can a l s o lead t o a devaluation o f t h e goal. To some e x t e n t t h i s occurred
with t h e U . S . war i n Vietnam.

I n a d d i t i o n t o c o g n i t i v e processes, a f f e c t i v e ones shape t h e c o n f l i c t ' s course.

Thus, as a f i g h t endures, f e e l i n g s o f anger, f e a r , and h a t r e d a r e l i k e l y t o be generated
toward the adversary; such f e e l i n g s provide a motive f o r e s c a l a t i n g e f f o r t and a l s o i n t e r -
f e r e with noting any c o n c i l i a t o r y o v e r t u r e s by t h e a n t a g o n i s t , i f they a r e made. I n addi-
t i o n , c r i s e s tend t o produce f e e l i n g s o f anxiety and s u r p r i s e within t h e p a r t i e s which
seem t o lead them t o r e s t r i c t a l t e r n a t i v e s and become r i g i d in thought ( H o l s t i , 1971).
As a r e s u l t , inappropriate p o l i c i e s w i l l be pursued and c o n f l i c t e s c a l a t e d .

Organizational changes within each adversary a s a c o n f l i c t continues a r e a l s o

sources of c o n f l i c t e s c a l a t i o n and d e e s c a l a t i o n . For example, r i v a l r y f o r l e a d e r s h i p
of t h e p a r t y i n a f i g h t may make f o r e s c a l a t i o n o r d e e s c a l a t i o n , depending i n p a r t on
the s t r e n g t h of t h e challenging r i v a l s from t h e moderate o r h a r d l i n e s i d e s (McWorter and
Crain, 1967). A s a f i g h t p e r s i s t s , persons committed t o t h e f i g h t r i s e i n influence and
doubters are shunned; consequently, t h e commitment t o f i g h t on and i n c r e a s e t h e i n t e n s i t y
and scope o f t h e f i g h t w i l l be reinforced without c o n t r a d i c t i o n . This happened within
the U.S. government a s t h e war i n Vietnam e s c a l a t e d (Halberstam, 1972). On t h e o t h e r
hand, as t h e f i g h t expands i n scope so t h a t more people become involved, many of t h e new
a l l i e s may have less commitment t o t h e o s t e n s i b l e g o a l s of t h e f i g h t than do those who
were previously engaged i n t h e s t r u g g l e . Those new a l l i e s t h e n may provide a moderating
and deescalatinE force.

In a d d i t i o n t o i n t e r n a l developments, t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s between adver-

s a r i e s changes as t h e c o n f l i c t goes on and those changes make f o r e s c a l a t i o n of t h e f i g h t
o r , under o t h e r conditions, f o r i t s d e e s c a l a t i o n . For example, as t h e s t r u g g l e p e r s i s t s ,
more and more i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d a s a d v e r s a r i e s seek t o " s e t t l e o l d scores.Il Furthermore,
a s the f i g h t continues, r e l a t i o n s become p o l a r i z e d so t h a t communications become more d i f -
f i c u l t and t h e r e s t r a i n t s based upon comon interests diminish. Each p a r t y t o t h e f i g h t
t r i e s t o g e t a l l i e s t o support its a c t i o n s and this a l s o t e n d s t o e s c a l a t e t h e scope of
t h e f i g h t . On t h e o t h e r hand, d e e s c a l a t i o n occurs when t h e i s s u e s i n contention can
be narrowed and then f r a c t i o n a t e d : broken up i n t o sub-issues whose gains and l o s s e s
can be traded o f f a g a i n s t each o t h e r ( F i s h e r , 1964).

One of t h e most fundamental conditions a f f e c t i n g whether t h e s e processes generate

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e s c a l a t i o n or d e e s c a l a t i o n i s t h e way i n which each p a r t y responds t o t h e o t h e r . Some

r e s e a r c h e r s stress t h a t responding s t r o n g l y t o t h e challenges of an adversary may d e t e r ,
limit, o r suppress e s c a l a t i o n . On t h e o t h e r hand, o t h e r s n o t e t h a t a harsh response may
be provocative and produce e s c a l a t i o n . Some t h e o r i s t s argue t h a t a c o n c i l i a t o r y response
may s a t i s f y t h e adversary and limit e s c a l a t i o n ; b u t o t h e r s argue t h a t a y i e l d i n g (appeas-
i n g ) response i n v i t e s t h e adversary t o i n c r e a s e i t s demands and t h e r e s u l t i s f u r t h e r
escalation.

There i s evidence i n support o f each of t h e c i t e d i d e a s ; b u t a l s o some evidence

i n c o n s i s t e n t with them. I cannot summarize a l l t h e evidence h e r e , but w i l l c i t e some
of t h e p e r t i n e n t work. Analyses of student demonstrations i n c o l l e g e s have found t h a t
a s e v e r e response w i l l i t s e l f become an i s s u e and e s c a l a t e a c o n f l i c t (Morgan, 1970).
S i m i l a r l y , massive South Vietnamese e f f o r t s t o suppress insurgency seemed t o make t h e
South Vietnamese Army an invader i n i t s own country (Gurr, 1970: 238-51). I n i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s , e f f o r t s a t d e t e r r e n c e may t u r n i n t o arms r a c e s and, r a t h e r than in-
h i b i t i n g v i o l e n c e , enhance i t (Wallace and Wilson, 1978). On t h e o t h e r hand, very coer-
c i v e p o l i t i c a l systems may be a s s o c i a t e d with r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l s of domestic p o l i t i c a l
v i o l e n c e and i n s t a b i l i t y (Curr, 1969).

On t h e whole, t h e evidence suggests t h a t responses which are about a t t h e l e v e l of

t h e adversary's a c t i o n s a r e most s u c c e s s f u l i n l i m i t i n g e s c a l a t i o n . Snyder and Diesing
(1977: 98-100) found t h i s i n t h e i r s t u d i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s . Others have noted
t h i s a l s o i n t h e handling of r i o t e r s and insurgents by governmental f o r c e s (Schonborn,
1975; National Advisory Commission on C i v i l Disorders, 1968: 84-108).

E s c a l a t i o n and d e e s c a l a t i o n can be explained i n terms o f changes i n t h e s a l i e n c e of

a p a r t i c u l a r c o n f l i c t . This i s based on t h e assumption t h a t every c o n f l i c t i s i n t e r l o c k e d
with many o t h e r s (Kriesberg, 1980). To understand t h i s , consider a p a r t i c u l a r f i g h t a s
t h e f o c a l one, f o r example an i n t e r r a c i a l community c o n f l i c t . It may be i n t e r l o c k e d w i t h
o t h e r s in a series of s t r u g g l e s extending over y e a r s o r decades. I n a d d i t i o n , it may be
p a r t o f s e v e r a l converging f i g h t s a s each adversary extends i t s i d e n t i t y t o narrower o r
wider c i r c l e s . Furthermore, i t may be l i n k e d t o many o r few o t h e r i s s u e s so t h a t many
o r few l i n e s o f cleavage a r e superimposed a s when race, c l a s s , and r e g i o n a l cleavages
c o i n c i d e (Dahrendorf, 1959). The f o c a l c o n f l i c t may a l s o be c r o s s c u t with many o t h e r s ;
t h a t is, subgroups within each adversary unit f i n d t h a t they have common i n t e r e s t s with
each o t h e r as a g a i n s t o t h e r members i n t h e i r own c o l l e c t i v i t y ; f o r example, l e a d e r s of
adversary groups nay c o l l a b o r a t e a t t h e expense o f t h e i r f o l l o w e r s . I n a d d i t i o n , each
adversary i s made up of many subgroups and s t r u g g l e s among them a r e a f f e c t e d by and a l s o
a f f e c t t h e course of e x t e r n a l f i g h t s (Wilkenfeld and Zinnes, 1973); under some circum-
s t a n c e s e x t e r n a l f i g h t s f o s t e r i n t e r n a l cohesion (Markides and Cohn, 1982). F i n a l l y ,
one p a r t y i n t h e f o c a l c o n f l i c t may be engaged i n one o r more o t h e r struggles concurrently;
such concurrent f i g h t s can i n h i b i t o r enhance t h e i n t e n s i t y and scope of t h e f o c a l c o n f l i c t .

Implications. Understanding t h e ways in which each p a r t y i n a f i g h t a f f e c t s the con-

d u c t o f t h e o t h e r s and how c o n f l i c t s i n t e r l o c k can suggest ways f o r a d v e r s a r i e s t o m i t i -
g a t e o r t o e n l a r g e c o n f l i c t s . It a l s o suggests how i n t e r m e d i a r i e s can moderate or en-
hance c o n f l i c t behavior. I n o t e a few of t h e s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s .

I n t e r m e d i a r i e s can seek t o s h i f t p a r t i s a n s ' views about which c o n f l i c t i s t r u l y t h e

f o c a l one. Recognizing t h e o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y o f a l l t h e c o n f l i c t s , t h e p a r t i s a n s can
s t i l l change t h e i r views about which one i s primary and which i s secondary. Thus, lead-
e r s of r i v a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s may come t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h r e a t s from a t h i r d source a r e a
danger t o them and subordinate t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s i n o r d e r t o b e t t e r face tbcommon danger.
Or, adversary l e a d e r s may come to b e l i e v e t h a t each f a c e s i n t e r n a l challenges which make
cooperation (even c o l l u s i o n ) between them a u s e f u l way o f handling t h e i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s .
Mediators can h e l p a d v e r s a r i e s a l t e r t h e p a r t i s a n s ' views about which c o n f l i c t i s most
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s a l i e n t . One adversary may a l s o seek t o persuade t h e o t h er t h a t by s h i f t i n g a t t e n t i o n ,

they w i l l f i n d common i n t e r e s t s and hence reasons f o r d eescal at i n g t h e s t r u g g l e . This
i s exemplified by t h e appeals and arguments of c i v i l r i g h t s l ead er s who reason that
reduction o f discriminatory p o l i c i e s w i l l f r e e up resources which w i l l improve t h e
general s o c i a l and economic conditions of t h e country t o t h e g r e a t e r b e n e f i t n o t only of
blacks and o t h e r m i n o r i ti e s , but of a l l people.

Understanding how each adversary a f f e c t s t h e escal at o r y and deescalatory act i o n of

the o t h er provides a mediating intermediary with a u sef u l s e t of options. He o r she
can inform a l l t h e adversaries about these processes and can suggest t o any o f them
which of t h e i r act i o n s w i l l tend t o be e s c a l a t o r y and which ones would n o t be. The
adversaries themselves may use such information, wherever i t i s gained, t o limit escal at i o n .
For example, j u s t before the Cuban missile c r i s i s of October, 1962 President John F.
Kennedy had read Barbara Tuchman's account o f th e e scal at i o n leading t o World War I i n her
book The Guns of August (Tuchman, 1962). President Kennedy wanted t o avoid t h e kind of
e sc a l at o r y a c t i o n s t h a t l e d to war i n August, 1914 and took a c t i o n s which he thought
would prevent such e s c a l a t i o n (Schlesinger, 1965: 832).

THEORIES ABOUT OUTCOMES

Although we have a v a s t l i t e r a t u r e about t h e causes of c o n f l i c t s and a s u b s t a n t i a l

l i t e r a t u r e about es c a la ti o n , s t u d i e s about t h e termination and outcomes o f c o n f l i c t s
a r e r e l a t i v e l y few. Many of t h e empirical and t h e o r e t i c a l s t u d i e s t h a t e x i s t a r e from
the f i e l d o f i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s and labor-management negotiations. I n ad d i t i o n t o
drawing from t h a t l i t e r a t u r e I s h a l l draw f r o n s t u d i es of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacemaking,
i nte r p er s o n al encounters, and community c o n f l i c t s (Kriesberg, 1982).

One important consideration must be noted a t t h e o u t s e t . When we think about o u t -

comes of c o n f l i c t s , we g e n e r a l ly th in k about who wins and who l o ses. This is t h e typical
way ad v er s ar i es regard t h e outcome and they speak of v i ct o r y and d ef eat . Undoubtedly,
t h a t is a fundamental dimension of every f i g h t : how much of what each adversary sought
d i d i t achieve a t t h e expense o f t h e o t h e r . This i s t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e aspect of the con-
f l i c t outcome.

Outcomes a l s o have joint a s p e c ts . That i s , ad v er sar i es may a l l s u f f e r some l o s s e s

and they may a l l d er i v e some gains given t h e outcome and consequences of a st r u g g l e.
D istr i b u t i v e outcomes a r e sometimes r e f e r r e d t o as win/lose outcomes and j o i n t ones
e i t h e r as l o s e/ l o s e o r win/win outcomes. R e a li ty is more complex than any conceptual
a b s t r a c t i o n and outcomes of r e a l f i g h t s have both d i s t r i b u t i v e and j o i n t asp ect s.

Theories. Analysts of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t s have examined a v a r i e t y of f a c t o r s which

shape c o n f l i c t outcomes. I w i l l map o u t t h r e e s e t s o f f a c t o r s and focus t h e discussion
on one of them. The most obvious determinant o f t h e outcome of a f i g h t i s t h e s t r u g g l e
i t s e l f as waged by t h e p a r t is a n s . But i n a d d it io n t h e outcome i s shaped by ex t er n al and
general s o c i a l f o r ce s about which t h e a d v e r s a r ie s may have l i t t l e co n t r o l . The way i n
which a c o n f l i c t is brought t o an end may a l s o a f f e c t t h e outcome and t h a t i s of par-
t i c u l a r relevance i n t h e context of c o n f l i c t r e s o lu t i o n . Before d i scu ssi n g t h a t i n de-
t a i l , a f eu observations a r e necessary about t h e nat u r e of t h e c o n f l i c t i t s e l f and o f i t s
s o c i a l context.

The n a t u r e and e x t e n t of j o i n t and d i s t r i b u t i v e asp ect s of t h e outcome are s t r o n g l y

a f fe ct ed by t h e ch ar a c t e r of t h e s t r u g g l e between t h e adversaries. Thus, t h e nature o f
t h e ad v er s ar i es ' goals in t h e f i g h t must l i m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of one o r another s i d e
"winning" o r of a l l t h e a d v e r s a r ie s llwinning.'t The more extreme t h e demands one p a r t y
makes upon t h e o t h e r , th e more l i k e l y i s t h e s tr u gg l e t o be viewed as a zero-sum f i g h t .
A zero-sum f i g h t is one i n which t h e gain o f one p a r t y i s equal t o t h e loss of t h e o t h e r
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p a r t y , thus making t h e sum of t h e payoffs zero (Rapoport, 1960). When t h e c o n f l i c t i s

perceived i n t h i s way, t h e outcome i s t h e r e f o r e viewed i n d i s t r i b u t i v e terms, with one
p a r t y winning a t t h e expense of t h e enemy. Furthermore, t h e g r e a t e r t h e magnitude of
t h e goal sought, t h e more r e s i s t a n c e t h a t i t arouses and t h e more d i f f i c u l t i t i s t o win.
For example, one aspect of t h e magnitude of t h e g o a l sought i s whether a challenging
group seeks t o d i s p l a c e i t s a n t a g o n i s t s . Groups seeking t o d i s p l a c e t h e i ? a n t a g o n i s t s
are much less l i k e l y t o g a i n acceptance and t o g a i n new advantages than groups n o t
seeking displacement (Gamson, 1975).

How groups pursue c o n f l i c t s should be a well-studied determinant of t h e i r outcomes.

But r e l a t i v e l y few s t u d i e s have s y s t e m a t i c a l l y compared t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f v i o l e n t and
nonviolent coercion, of rewards and of persuasion (Snyder and Kelly, 1976; Kriesberg,
1981; Gamson, 1975). Even t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e a v a i l a b l e s t u d i e s cannot be summarized i n
t h i s paper s i n c e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f modes d i f f e r s d e p e n d i n g on t h e vantage p o i n t taken,
t h e goals t h e adversaries seek, and t h e s o c i a l - h i s t o r i c a l context o f t h e s t r u g g l e . The
evidence does i n d i c a t e , among o t h e r f i n d i n g s , t h a t v i o l e n c e i s o f t e n counter-productive,
e s p e c i a l l y f o r challenging groups r e l a t i v e t o more powerful a u t h o r i t i e s (Gamson, 1975;
T a f t and Ross, 1969). Noncoercive inducements, rewards and p e r s u a s i v e e f f o r t s , may be
p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t i n t h e d e e s c a l a t i o n o f c o n f l i c t s and i n discovering and a c t u a l i z i n g
outcomes which provide mutual b e n e f i t s . The u s e o f coercion seems t o emphasize t h e zero-
sum n a t u r e of a s t r u g g l e and hence c o n t r i b u t e t o outcomes which are viewed i n terms of
v i c t o r i e s and d e f e a t s r a t h e r than of mutual b e n e f i t . Experimental evidence, however,
i n d i c a t e s how a bargaining p a r t n e r who c o n s i s t e n t l y makes concessions can be e x p l o i t e d
r e s u l t i n g In an outcome which i s n o t mutually b e n e f i c i a l ( P r u i t t and Lewis, 1977).

The outcomes of c o n f l i c t s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d by s o c i a l f o r c e s and contexts

beyond t h e domain of t h e a n t a g o n i s t s i n a s p e c i f i c f i g h t . How much o r what one adver-
s a r y g a i n s in a f i g h t depends i n p a r t on t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s it has and t h e ways i n which
t h i r d p a r t i e s regard t h e c o n f l i c t and i n t e r v e n e . The n a t u r e of t h e economic, p o l i t i c a l ,
c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l and geographic c o n t e x t o f t h e s t r u g g l e imposes considerable c o n s t r a i n t s
on t h e p o s s i b l e outcomes. Thus, t h e outcomesof s t r u g g l e s between worker o r g a n i z a t i o n s
and employers a r e shaped by a l l t h e s e kinds o f conditions and a t any given time a r e not
r e a d i l y a l t e r e d by any of t h e a d v e r s a r i e s . For example, t h e United Automobile Workers'
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining with General Motors i s constrained by t h e markets f o r automobiles
and f o r l a b o r .

The t h i r d set of f a c t o r s a f f e c t i r g an outcome i s e s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t f o r c o n f l i c t

r e s o l u t i o n : t h e terminating process. Every f i g h t ends, even i f t h e outcome i s t h e b a s i s
f o r a new f i g h t . Sometimes f i g h t s end i m p l i c i t l y -- t h e a d v e r s a r i e s simply terminate
c o n f l i c t behavior and cease s t r i v i n g f o r t h e g o a l s i n contention. Often, however, t h e
c o n f l i c t i s ended e x p l i c i t l y , through d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s . This e x p l i c i t
process may be more o r less i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d with many o r few formal r e g u l a t i o n s about
t h e procedures f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e f i g h t . The j u d i c i a l and t h e e l e c t o r a l systems a r e
examples o f h i g h l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d procedures f o r c o n f l i c t management i n t h i s and most
societies.

I n t h i s paper, I d i s c u s s e x p l i c i t terminating processes and focus on s t u d i e s about

bargaining e f f o r t s of a d v e r s a r i e s and about t h e r o l e s of i n t e r m e d i a r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y
mediators. Much of t h e w r i t i n g about bargaining i s concerned with t h e s t r a t e g i e s and
t a c t i c s one o f t h e a d v e r s a r i e s uses t o gain more than t h e o t h e r ( S c h e l l i n g , 1960;
Siege1 and Fouraker, 1960; Bachrach and Lawler, 1981). Making high i n i t i a l demands i n
bargaining does seem t o y i e l d r e l a t i v e l y higher g a i n s , although i t a l s o r i s k s reaching
no agreement (Bartos, 1970). Committing o n e s e l f t o a bargaining p o s i t i o n a l s o seems t o
i n c r e a s e r e l a t i v e bargaining g a i n s , s i n c e t h e opposing s i d e tends t o b e l i e v e t h a t it
must make concessions i n o r d e r t o reach an agreement.
 11

There i s less research on bargaining t a c t i c s which tend t o produce i n t e g r a t i v e

sol ut i o n s . The e x i s t i n g work i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n o rd er t o f a c i l i t a t e reaching an inte-
g r a t i v e outcome, t h e adversaries must come t o view themselves a s f aci n g a problem
r a t h e r than being divided by an i s s u e and then discover a so l u t i o n t o t h e i r problem
( F i s h e r , 1978; Walton and McKersie, 1965). Coming t o see themselves a s having a common
problem o f t en e n t a i l s s h i f t i n g a t t e n t i o n from one c o n f l i c t t o another among t h e many
i n which t h e n eg o t i a to r s a r e involved (Kriesberg, 1980; 1981). The n eg o t i at o r s, f o r
example, may come t o see t h a t they have i n t e r e s t s i n common as against t h e i r r esp ect i v e
c onst i t u en ci es o r t h a t they s h a r e a common e x te r n al enemy. They may a l s o see t h a t they
have an opportunity t o advance o th e r common i n t e r e s t s , a p t l y named superordinate g o al s
( S h e r i f , 1966).

Intermediaries can and do play a v a r i e t y o f r o l e s i n helping t o terminate c o n f l i c t s .

They may impose o r enforce a termination; th e y may serve as f a c t f i n d er s; and they may
a c t a s mediators. I w i l l n o te the various a c t i v i t i e s mediators may perform t o f a c i l i -
tate ad v er s ar i es ' r e s o lv in g t h e i r c o n f l i c t . Mediators may provide a n e u t r a l s e t t i n g i n
which t h e an t ag o n i s t s meet. Mediators may help provide information from and about one
adversary t o t h e o t h e r and they may provide Information about t h e n at u r e o f c o n f l i c t
processes (Burton, 1969). They may reduce t h e b a r r i e r s t o i n t er p er so n al communication
between adversaries. They may help t o improve the procedures being used by t h e n eg o t i -
a t i n g adversaries. Mediators may suggest new options and help t h e p ar t i san s t o t h i n k o f
new options themselves. Mediators may a l s o add resources t o compensate one o r both
p a r t i e s f o r l o s s es involved in t h e s e t tl e m e n t o r t o provide payoffs o r b en ef i t s t o be
j o i n t l y gained by t h e adversaries. F in a l ly , mediators can help reaching an agreement
by generating constituency support for t h e agreement and generating pressure upon t h e
ne go t i at i n g ad v er s ar i e s .

Given t h e many f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e outcome o f any f i g h t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t indeed

t o a s s es s t h e consequences o f mediators and o f d i f f e r e n t kinds of mediator a c t i v i t i e s
upon t h e outcome. I note some consequences f o r which t h e r e i s empirical evidence.
Rubin and Brown (1975) found t h a t i n experimental games where a mediator intervened
t o make suggestions t h e s u b j e c ts made l a r g e r and more frequent concessions. Kochan and
J i c k (1978) analyzed a c t u a l public s e c t o r l a b o r mediations and found that t h e mediators
who were r e l a t i v e l y a c t i v e i n making suggestions and p r essu r i n g t h e n eg o t i at o r s were more
l i k e l y than nonassertive mediators t o narrow t h e d i f f er en ces between t h e bargainers, par-
t i c u l a r l y about nonsalary issues.
There i s a l s o evidence t h a t mediators c o n t r i b u t e t o increasing t h e equity of out-
comes and hence t o t h e i r i n t e g r a t i v e a s p e c t s . For example, i n experimental s t u d i e s
Rubin and Bmwn (1975) found t h a t even small in te r ven t i o n s by observers o r mediators in-
c r e a s e t h e p r es s u r es toward adhering t o norms of f a i r n e s s . Perhaps mediators help pro-
duce higher y i el d s f o r th e n e g o t ia to r s because they can provide so l u t i o n s which can be
accepted without loss of f a c e (Brookmire and S i s tr u n k , 1980). The presence of a t r u s t e d
mediator a l s o f a c i l i t a t e s t h e more open expression o f opinions and hence t h e more l i k e l y
discovery of i n t e g r a t i v e outcomes (Walton, 1969). Mediators, by t h e i r very p a r t l c i p a -
t i o n i n n eg o t i at i o n s , lend legitimacy t o a l l p a r t i e s i n t h e negotiations. If one p a r t y
lacks legitimacy i n t h e eyes of an adversary, mediation accords it some and hence tends
t o equalize t h e bargaining. The e f f e c ti v e n e s s of mediators i s g r e a t l y circumscribed by
t h e nature of t h e c o n f l i c t s and t h e s o c i a l environment which surrounds it. Thus, Kochan
and Jick (1978) found t h a t t h e outcome of l a b o r n e g o t i at i o n s i s more af f ect ed by f o r ces
out sid e o f t h e co n t r o l of t h e mediator, namely t h e n a t u r e of t h e dispute, than by medi-
a t o r s t r a t e g i e s . Thus too, many e f f o r t s of mediators i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s seem
t o f a i l ; they succeed when t h e a d v e r s a r i e s , for t h e i r own reasons, a r e ready t o end t h e
dispu t e.
12

Implications. On the b a s i s of t h i s b r i e f review o f s t u d i e s about c o n f l i c t termi-

n a t i o n , I want t o note two s e t s of implications. F i r s t , t h e outcome o f a c o n f l i c t
i s a f f e c t e d by many f a c t o r s . Neither one of t h e p a r t i s a n s nor any s i n g l e intermediary
can determine the outcome. Large s o c i a l f o r c e s s e t c o n s t r a i n t s on any outcome and t h e
i n t e r a c t i o n among t h e adversaries profoundly shapes t h e outcome. Nevertheless, within
those c o n s t r a i n t s , s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s o f a d v e r sar i es do co n t r i b u t e t o t h e d i s t r i -
b u t i v e and j o i n t aspects o f t h e outcome. C o n f l ic t r eso l u t i o n a c t i v i t i e s a r e more l i k e l y
t o be e f f e c t i v e when they a r e congruent with converging f o r ces than when they are not.
Timing i s of considerable s ig n i f ic a n c e i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t s which are inher-
e n t l y dynamic and i n t e r a c t i v e . I n t e r v e n ti o n s which might be e f f e c t i v e a t one s t a g e i n
a f i g h t may be counterproductive a t another.
Knowledge about the many processes involved i n c o n f l i c t termination and how those
processes are af f ecte d by d i f f e r e n t conditions i s c r u c i a l t o i n cr ease t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t
e f f o r t s t o resolve c o n f l i c t s w i l l be e f f e c t i v e . Sometimes the p u r s u i t of one means i n t e r -
f e r e s with t h e ef f ec t iv e n e s s of another. S t r i v i n g t o gain a high y i e l d from a bargaining
outcome may jeopardize reaching any agreement a t a l l . Awareness of how each adversary
i n seeking t o maximize i t s own gains may produce mutual l o sses f o r a l l t h e ad v er sar i es
i s a n important and fundamental i n s i g h t . When a d ver sar i es recognize t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s
of c o n f l i c t outcomes which a r e mutually b e n e f i c i a l t h e t ask s o f c o n f l i c t r eso l u t i o n a r e
eased. But t h e r e are many reasons why a d v e r s a r ie s w i l l seek t o harm an adversary o r t o
g a i n some goals a t t h e expense of t h e adversary. This brings u s back t o considering t h e
underlying c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n . That matter is discussed i n t h e conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS

Persons seeking t o m i ti g a te c o n f l i c t s a r e l i k e l y t o be e f f e c t i v e i n s o f a r as they

understand t h e underlying conditions of s t r u g g l e s and t h e processes o f c o n f l i c t emer-
gence, es cal at i o n , deescalation, and termination. Of course, i n ad d i t i o n , would-be
mit i g at o r s b e n e f i t from knowledge about t h e s p e c i f i c conditions and p e r s o n a l i t i e s in-
volved in t h e s t r u g g le -- about i t s h i s t o r y and how a l l t h e p a r t i s a n s view i t . I n t h i s
paper I have emphasized the general conditions and processes o f c o n f l i c t s t h a t a r e rele-
v a n t f o r c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t io n .

Too o f t e n t h eo r i z i n g about t h e bases of c o n f l i c t and about c o n f l i c t emergence are

n o t r e l a t e d t o theorizing about c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t io n. Thus, we may recognize t h a t t h e r e
are objectively-based is s u e s t h a t u n d e r l ie c o n f l i c t s . We a l s o explain how c o n f l i c t
awareness emerges in terms of incompatible values and i n t e r e s t s of an t ag o n i st s. But
when we consider c o n f l i c t r e s o lu ti o n , we may focus on t h e importance of improved comu-
n i c a t i o n between adversaries and t h e i r discovery of common i n t e r e s t s and v al u es, as i f
t o deny o r minimize t h e r e a l i s t i c components o f t h e f i g h t . In t h i s paper I have s t r e s s e d
ways in which t h a t kind of discrepancy can b e reconciled.

Before proceeding, note t h e two senses i n which c o n f l i c t s may be u n r e a l i s t i c . F i r s t ,

t h e an al y s t (a c o n f l i c t bystander, intermediary, o r even p a r t i s a n ) makes a judgment t h a t
t h e ad v er s ar i es think they have incompatible ends when they r e a l l y do not. Second, t h e
a n a l y s t makes a judgment t h a t t h e means being used i n t h e f i g h t are too extreme ( o r too
moderate) f o r t h e o s t e n s i b l e ends. The previous discussions about t h e underlying bases
of c o n f l i c t s and the emergence of c o n f l i c t awareness help us r eco n ci l e t h e discrepancies
regarding t h e f i r s t kind of u n r e a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t . The discussion about e s c a l a t i o n and
de e scal at i o n helps us understand t h e discrepancies r e l a t e d t o t h e second k i n d .

The discussion of the immense number o f underlying bases of c o n f l i c t and c o n f l i c t

emergence implies t h a t every s o c i a l c o n f l i c t has some r e a l i s t i c components. It i s use-
f u l f o r t h e an al y s t and would-be c o n f l i c t m i ti g a to r t o recognize t h a t . On t h e o t h e r
hand, t h i s immensity o f c o n f l i c t bases a l s o implies t h a t an an al y st can argue t h a t t h e
adversaries should give more a t t e n t i o n t o a d i f f e r e n t c o n f l i c t o r t o t h e i r other common
i n t e r e s t s and values and less t o the c o n f l i c t they regard as primary. The analyst can
regard t h e adversaries as engaged i n an u n r e a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t insofar a s they a r e giving
salience t o a c o n f l i c t t o which the analyst gives lower p r i o r i t y . S h i f t s from one t o
another primary c o n f l i c t among t h e multitude of interlocking c o n f l i c t s can be t h e source
of rapid escalation and deescalation. Conflict resolution can be enhanced, then, by
helping t o s h i f t the adversaries' sense of who they a r e and what t h e i r cantending issues
are. Furthermore, whether o r not the common i n t e r e s t s and values of adversaries derive
from being a l l i e d in other f i g h t s , would-be c o n f l i c t mitigators can t r y t o increase atten-
tion to those common i n t e r e s t s and values and associated cooperative a c t i v i t i e s and
potentialities.

The discussion about escalation and deescalation suggests some of the many ways
c o n f l i c t means can become inappropriate f o r t h e i r ostensible purposes. Inducements used
t o pursue conflicting objectives a r e chosen, a t l e a s t in p a r t , t o gain constituency
support. F o r example, i n the 1970s e l i t e groups i n the U.S. competed t o gain governmen-
t a l power by arguing i n favor of greatly increased arms spending (Wolfe and Sanders, 1 9 7 9 ) .
Appearing "tough" was important t o s i g n i f i c a n t elements of the public and elites. Such
considerations can r e s u l t in t h e use of c o n f l i c t means t h a t a r e q u i t e inappropriate f o r
the given adversary and f o r t h e ostensible purposes. Even t h e interaction between t h e
adversaries can generate feelings and reasoning t h a t carry the means of struggle beyond
appropriateness f o r t h e purported goals. Awareness of these processes can suggest ways
of interrupting escalation and fostering deescalation. Awareness may even help t h e p r i -
mary adversaries t o use means t h a t l i m i t and control unwanted escalation.

The r e s u l t s of c o n f l i c t resolution e f f o r t s and the outcomes of c o n f l i c t s can help

reveal what have been the underlying bases of c o n f l i c t s and t h e extent t o which means
had become inappropriate. This is most obviously the case when a l l t h e adversaries
suffer severe losses i n the outcome. For example t h i s was the case f o r a l l the major
combatant powers i n World War I. But whatever the outcome, i n retrospect the analyst
can discern reasons f o r the a l t e r n a t i v e s pursued and assess a l t e r n a t i v e s which were
not followed and perhaps not even considered a t the time. Adversaries p a r t i c u l a r l y
can understand why t h e adversary was, f o r example, not deterred.

In conclusion, the search f o r s t a b l e and equitable outcomes must take i n t o account

the ever-present r e a l i s t i c and u n r e a l i s t i c components of a f i g h t . Knowing the theories
and empirical research about the underlying c o n f l i c t conditions and the processes of
c o n f l i c t emergence, escalation, deescalation, and termination contributes t o the wisdom
and effectiveness of conflict resolution e f f o r t s . They indicate the constraints as well
as t h e opportunities of each adversary and would-be intermediary.

But the knowledge i s about c o n f l i c t s i n general or about s p e c i f i c e a r l i e r ones.

Faced with a current, unique c o n f l i c t , adversaries and intermediaries should view it
freshly and apply the knowledge freshly, giving a t t e n t i o n t o the uniqueness of the cur-
rent struggle. Applying generalizations, no matter how good, t o a single, new instance
can provide guidance, but cannot be a routine prescription. Clinical insight and exper-
ience should be combined with systematic knowledge t o maximize effectiveness.

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