Professional Documents
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Socio-Economic Rights in The Contemporary World Market
Socio-Economic Rights in The Contemporary World Market
Introduction
On the face of it, the prospects for the realisation of social and economic
rights in China and India are good. Years of high economic growth rates,
barely diminished even by the ‘global financial crisis’ of 2008, have made
significant inroads into poverty alleviation or at least created the potential
for doing so. The long-term prospects for continued growth in these two
countries seem comparatively fair. However, there is a sting in the tale of
Chinese and Indian economic success. In world historical terms, it is much
closer to a development model anticipated by Marx and Engels – the
completion of the world market, as all nations are compelled, ‘on pain of
extinction’, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production. The principal
mechanism driving this process, they thought, was the pressure upon states
to respond to competition from imports as the world market expanded in
the wake of the introduction of ‘large-scale industrial production’, princi-
pally by transforming the social relations of production within their own
territory, both to produce an exploitable proletariat, and to oblige capital-
ists to compete with domestic and foreign rivals. Only when all nations were
drawn in to this transformation process, Marx and Engels surmised, would
the disciplines of global capitalist competition really begin to bite. States
would then be obliged to live by the rules of the world market, itself ‘at
once the precondition and the result of capitalist production’.2 Among
other things, all states would be compelled to tailor socio-economic rights
to the exigencies of global competitiveness. Marx and Engels also thought,
of course, that the situation produced would be inherently unstable and
contradictory, and prone to the risk of being overthrown.
1 Professor, Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong.
2 K. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971, p. 253; K. Marx and
F. Engels, ‘Critique of the German Ideology’ in K. Marx and F. Engels (eds.) Collected Works
of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 1845–1847, Vol. 5: Theses on Feuerbach, The German Ideology
and Related Manuscripts, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 69. For a further discussion
see P. Cammack, ‘Classical Marxism’, in T. Weiss and R. Wilkinson (eds.), International
Organization and Global Governance, London and New York, Routledge, 2013, p. 169.
6201 T&F Socio-Economic Rights in Emerging Free Markets:Royal_A 23/6/15 11:08 Page 22
22 Paul Cammack
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., pp. 19–20.
6 Ibid., pp. 5 and 8.
7 Ibid., p. 13.
8 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
9 Ibid., p. 18.
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24 Paul Cammack
10 OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012, p.
18. Available at: http://arhiv.mm.gov.si/vlada/temp/OECD2012.pdf (accessed 20
February 2014). See also A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, London: Penguin, 1999, pp.
104–106.
11 OECD, Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World, Paris:
OECD Publishing, 2012. Available at: www.oecd.org/site/devpgd2012/ (accessed 20
February 2014).
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12 Ibid., p. 58.
13 Ibid., p. 60.
14 Ibid., p. 61.
15 Ibid., pp. 67–68.
16 Ibid., pp. 155, 157.
17 Ibid., p. 174.
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26 Paul Cammack
Social policies and t he labour market in Braz il, China, India and
Sout h A frica
Social inclusion, then, comes down to a social ‘right’ of access to health and
a basic education, in an environment in which macro-level policies foster
high levels of labour utilisation and productivity, and an economic ‘right’
to compete in the labour market is created as a result. The policy implica-
tions of this approach for Brazil, China, India and South Africa (BCIS) was
systematically addressed in a ‘high-level conference’ organised in Paris in
May 2010 by the OECD’s Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social
Affairs on the theme of ‘Inequalities in Emerging Economies: What Role
for Labour Market and Social Policies?’. This brought together policy
makers from the four BCIS countries, and drew policy conclusions later
published in the same year as ‘Tackling Inequalities in Brazil, China, India
and South Africa: the Role of Labour Market and Social Policies’, which
produced a detailed blueprint in accordance with the logic identified
above, starting with the assumption that economic growth ‘depends on
productivity improvements and the functioning of labour markets, but well-
functioning labour markets rest in turn on a sustained and stable path of
economic growth.’19 The specific circumstances of the BCIS countries were
noted: high if declining proportions of the population in extreme poverty
and therefore vulnerable to external shocks, underdeveloped labour
markets and social policy institutions, widespread informality in the labour
market, and limited administrative capacity. The following similarities and
needs were also noted:
18 Ibid., p. 177.
19 OECD, Tackling Inequalities in Brazil, China, India and South Africa: the Role of Labour Market
and Social Policies, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010, p. 14. Available at:
http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/product/8110131e.pdf (accessed 20
February 2014).
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Policy makers then must find a balance between allocating labour to its
most productive use and protecting workers. In this context, it was noted
that the tendency in the BCIS countries to ‘give priority to job security
rather than improving labour force skills and employability’ has some nega-
tive features.21 In particular, only the better off workers (generally in the
formal sector) enjoy protection and the majority who lose their jobs are
forced into the informal sector. This form of labour reallocation ‘imposes
large welfare costs on workers and an inefficient job matching that nega-
tively affects labour productivity’.22 The first conclusion drawn is that
income support mechanisms are to be preferred to employment protec-
tion. But the concern is equally with the need to persuade workers into
retraining and work:
20 Ibid., p. 264.
21 Ibid., p. 268.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 276.
24 Ibid., p. 297.
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28 Paul Cammack
It is clear then that the OECD has a detailed policy framework oriented
towards achieving policy reform across the developing world in pursuit of
a genuinely global capitalist system, and increasingly focused on imple-
menting its policies in the leading emerging economies. As we have seen,
the OECD advocates the derivation of socio-economic rights from a prior
commitment to productivity and competitiveness in a global capitalist
economy. In such advocacy, it works in close partnership with the World
Bank, whose commitment to a similar agenda is noted in the next section.
25 Ibid., p. 298.
26 OECD, Social Cohesion in a Shifting World, above n. 11.
27 Ibid., p. 70; World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty, Washington: World Bank,
1990, p. iii. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5973
(accessed 20 February 2014).
28 World Bank, World Development Report 2013: Jobs, Washington: World Bank, 2013. Available
at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11843 (accessed 20 February
2014).
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These opening lines immediately disclose the connection that the World
Bank sees between work on the one hand and economic and social better-
ment on the other. As in 1990, it either comes from the productive sale of
labour power, or not at all. Jobs then matter, but not just any jobs. Beyond
their value to the individual, different jobs have different social impacts.
Some are beneficial, while others can have ‘negative spillovers’:
Jobs for women can change the way households spend money and
invest in the education and health of children. Jobs in cities support
greater specialization and the exchange of ideas, making other jobs
more productive. Jobs connected to global markets bring home new
technological and managerial knowledge. And in turbulent environ-
ments, jobs for young men can provide alternatives to violence and
help restore peace. … Jobs supported through transfers or privilege
represent a burden to others or undermine their opportunities to find
remunerative employment. Jobs damaging the environment take a toll
on everybody. Thus it is that some jobs do more for development, while
others may do little, even if they are appealing to individuals.30
It matters, therefore, what will produce ‘good’ jobs, and the resulting invo-
cation of productivity, living standards, and social cohesion at the heart of
the World Bank’s own global capitalist manifesto relates directly to the issue
of socio-economic rights in India and China as elsewhere. The connections
between productivity and social cohesion are set out in two central chapters
of the World Bank’s 2013 report. As with the OECD, the focus is on the
reallocation of labour from low-productivity to high-productivity jobs.
Classically, and entirely in line with the perspective set out at the start of
this chapter, the World Bank identifies four main forces behind increases
in national per capita output:
30 Paul Cammack
The first is the use of more capital per unit of labour. The second is an
increase in the number of people working, relative to the total popu-
lation. … The third mechanism through which output can grow is by
making people themselves more productive. The acquisition of skills,
also known as human capital accumulation, allows a person to do more
using the same amount of capital. The fourth mechanism is techno-
logical progress, measured as changes in total factor productivity.
Technological progress amounts to combining capital, labour, and
skills more efficiently, while applying new knowledge.31
The World Bank typically presents ‘good jobs’ as ‘jobs that are empower-
ing, build agency, and provide access to voice’, in contrast to insecure jobs
or ‘jobs that people find demoralizing’, in which ‘lack of status, job secu-
rity, or voice at work can lead people to feel disempowered and hopeless
about the future and to stop participating in social networks’.32 This reflects
a strategy of embedding the hegemony of capital in labour systems by
encouraging the proletariat around the world to see competitive labour
markets and exploitation by capital in its most advanced forms as empow-
ering. To the extent that the human objects of this ideological onslaught
reflect the same ideas back, as the World Bank suggests they do, ‘social
cohesion’ is achieved. In other words, social cohesion and the hegemony
of capital over labour become synonymous. The character of the World
Bank’s ideological project is transparent in the self-congratulatory vignette
that concludes the chapter:
In this context, the World Bank insists that rights are the foundation of
employment policy. The emergence of rights in the context of work can be
traced from the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights to the
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The
31 Ibid., p. 99.
32 Ibid., pp. 126, 132.
33 Ibid., pp. 143–144.
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34 Ibid., p. 158.
35 Ibid., p. 160, Figure 5.2.
36 ILO, Decent Work, Report of the Director-General, 87th Session, Geneva: ILO, 1999.
Available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/rep-i.htm (accessed
20 February 2014). ILO, Social Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive Globalization, Geneva:
ILO, 2011. Available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/spfag/download/
background/bachrep_en.pdf (accessed 20 February 2014).
37 S. Lee and D. McCann (eds.), Regulating for Decent Work: New Directions in Labour Market
Regulation, London: Palgrave/ILO, 2011, pp. 10–11.
38 Ibid., p. 13.
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32 Paul Cammack
In short, a common logic that runs through the work of the OECD, the
World Bank and the ILO is the extension of markets on a global scale and
the transformation of the social relations of production in order to
enhance capital intensity and productivity. The content of the ILO’s ‘fair
and inclusive globalization’, like the World Bank’s ‘social cohesion’, is
determined by the push for productive jobs in the global economy. As the
section below shows, it connects directly with the agenda of the WTO in the
area of trade.
the goal of free trade. Reductions in tariffs promote trade and strengthen
competition, and are wholly desirable, so tariffs should not be used to
protect socio-economic rights. On non-tariff measures (NTMs), the WTO
sees a ‘basic policy challenge – how to ensure that NTMs do not restrict or
distort trade, and at the same time ensure that they can be used for neces-
sary and legitimate policy goals’.41 In terms of rights, the outcome is clear
cut, in principle at least: individuals have a right to be protected from harm
to their health or safety, or damage to the environment, but not from the
impact of competition arising from further integration of global markets –
and where there are alternative means to protecting the former, those
means that have no negative impact on the latter are to be preferred.42
The WTO’s position on the appropriate policy response to any tensions
or short-term negative consequences to the opening up of trade was spelled
out in its annual World Trade Report in 2008, in a discussion that aimed at
countering rising opposition to the agenda of promoting deeper integra-
tion of all countries into the global economy. According to the 2008 World
Trade Report, since the long-term benefits of trade liberalisation in terms of
improved resource allocation and efficiency were clear, governments
should increase public investment in relevant infrastructure, remove regu-
latory burdens, incentivise private investment, introduce trade-specific
adjustment and temporary assistance programmes, reform the educational
and regulatory environment, and enforce property rights in order to
encourage innovation – in other words, promote trade liberalisation and
adapt to it.43 The argument then extended well beyond the ‘trade agenda’
narrowly conceived. In particular, the WTO took up ‘the policy implications
of recent developments in trade theory and the challenges arising from
more open trade’, noting that ‘the “new-new” trade theory stresses the
attractiveness of reciprocal trade opening… because productivity improve-
ments are driven by additional exports and lower profit margins lead to the
exit of low-productivity jobs’.44 As the social consequences of liberalisation
include the reallocation of resources from one sector to another, with nega-
tive consequences that may be permanent for some, policy responses must
be found that offer temporary support to the losers while still facilitating
transition – the cue for an extended discussion of modern social protection
systems centred on active labour market policies.45
41 WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2012: Trade and public policies: A closer look at non-tariff
measures in the 21st century’, 2012, p. 39. Available at: www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf (accessed 20 February 2014).
42 Ibid., p. 53.
43 WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2008: Trade in a Globalizing World’, 2008, pp. xxiv-xxvi.
Available at: www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_
report08_e.pdf (accessed 20 February 2014).
44 Ibid., p. 147.
45 Ibid., pp. 151–152.
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34 Paul Cammack
Key findings of this WTO Report were that the rate of increase of trade
and growth are closely correlated, that rising levels of trade are associated
with rising productivity, and that rising imports in particular prompt a set
of reactions that improve productivity – innovation from some firms and
closure of others due to the competition effect.46 ‘New-new’ as such argu-
ments may be, they are not that new – in the mid-1840s, as noted above,
Marx and Engels argued that during the industrial revolution, massively
increased productivity prompted industrialists to seek overseas markets,
forcing local producers invest to compete, or disappear, and identified this
as the driving force behind ‘world history’ by virtue of its being the princi-
pal mechanism behind global proletarianisation, and the means by which
workers are alienated in and enslaved to the world market.47
The WTO, naturally, seeks to smooth out rather than exacerbate the
tensions provoked by the development of the world market. Two of the
principal authors of the 2008 World Trade Report, Marc Bacchetta and
Marion Jansen, subsequently turned their attention, along with colleagues
from ILO, to ‘the social aspects of economic creative destruction encour-
aged by trade reform and openness, and the uncertainty these processes
can create for persons and communities’.48 They concluded that there is
‘an important role for governments in investing in public goods and in
strengthening the functioning of different markets that are crucial for
smooth and growth-enhancing reallocation processes’, and that central to
it is the use of social protection, adjusted to local conditions).49
The implications of the development of a world market for social and
economic rights were clearly identified in a chapter by Mitra and Ranjan,
in which the authors propose that leaving aside ‘poverty alleviation meas-
ures which help people who are born poor or who lack the productive
assets or skills to get out of poverty’, the focus should be on ‘social insur-
ance programmes or other labour market interventions that allow people
to deal with labour market risk’.50 Four reasons were given for ‘the need
for… social protection when workers are vulnerable to shocks, especially in
a more globalized world’:
(1) for various reasons, the market for private unemployment insur-
ance is missing, making it imperative for the government to step in to
fill this void; (2) social protection increases efficiency by addressing
market failures stemming from externalities such as labour-market
The analysis that followed was straightforward, and was based on the
assumption that trade liberalisation is a deliberate policy choice, and there-
fore one whose consequences governments must address: ‘insurance
against labour market risk can increase efficiency by promoting the emer-
gence or expansion of more risky jobs and industries’; lay-offs in a sector
facing import competition may ‘crowd’ the labour market, but this conges-
tion can be eased by an adjustment subsidy; subsidies also mitigate the
effect of unions seeking to bargain for higher wages in exchange for reduc-
tion in employment; jobs lost to import competition due to trade
liberalisation will not be immediately replaced by jobs in expanding export
sectors, so there is a case for short-term protection for workers displaced;
and a ‘tiny bit’ of protection may deter workers from blocking reform.52
It is refreshing to see the case for ‘social protection [making] globaliza-
tion more palatable politically’ put forward with such candour, albeit in this
rather recondite source. It confirms that the expectation is that import
competition will both lead to the closure of ‘inefficient’ firms, and lead to
the emergence of new exporting firms, and that the logic governing the
definition of the socio-economic rights of workers, is the logic of capital.
With that in mind, we may turn directly to the cases of China and India.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., pp. 201–204. Mitra and Ranjan note:
The question is whether compensation of workers (where they are made just a tiny bit
better off than their pre-reform situation), say through some kind of lump sum redis-
tribution, by capitalists can lead to a vote for reforms. It is important to note that if we
take as given that compensation will take place, then everyone will vote for reforms as
nobody now loses from reforms. Now, if there is a vote on whether workers should be
compensated or not by capitalists, the majority will always vote for it, irrespective of
the order in which the two votes (the one on reforms and other on compensation)
take place. Thus with this economic structure, we are going to get reforms if both
reforms and compensation are democratically determined.
Ibid., p. 205
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36 Paul Cammack
The first of the ‘Economic Surveys’ on India appeared in 2007, and the
second in 2011, whereas the first on China appeared in 2005, the second in
2010, and third in March 2013. At the core of the OECD approach,
whether for its members or for non-members with whom it engages, is the
perspective that socio-economic entitlements must conform to the logic of
global competitiveness, or in other words that they should take a form
which is compatible with and ideally positively supportive of the maximum
development of the forces of production. In the case of India and China,
this results in the promotion of ‘inclusive growth’ – with specific implica-
tions for the scope for the recognition of social and economic rights, and
the form they might ideally take.
As we shall see, the OECD offers sharply contrasting analyses of China
and India, as can be seen in the comparative discussion in OECD’s 2010
Report ‘Tackling Inequalities’.53 The character and significance of the real-
location of labour, industrial production and productivity are key
comparison aspects. In China, ‘economic reforms that started in the early
1980s promoted important structural changes and an export-led growth
pattern that rests on labour shifts from low-productivity agriculture to
higher-productivity industry and services’, while in India the failure of
manufacturing firms to exploit the comparative advantage of low labour
costs means that they have remained small, with ‘limited productivity gains
and weak job creation’.54 India’s success in relatively high-skill service activ-
ities notwithstanding, labour force participation rates are some 25 per cent
higher in China.55 Informal sector work is substantial in each case (though
less so in the urban areas of China), and in each case, too, inequality is
increasing.56
In the OECD’s view, regulation of individual dismissal in both China and
India is too restrictive, requiring ‘excessive notification or time-consuming
requirements that make it extremely difficult to lay-off workers.’57
Severance payments are high, especially in China.58 On the other hand,
many workers are not covered at all by the severance payments system. As
regards income support, it is virtually non-existent in India, and is
restricted to formal sector urban workers in China, covering 47 per cent of
locally registered workers but only 6.5 per cent of migrant workers as of
2010, with very low income benefits.59 There is clearly scope in both cases,
in the OECD’s opinion, for some improvement in the circumstances of
workers. But in structural terms, India and China stand in different
relationships to the world market, and this is brought strongly to the fore
in the 2010 and 2011 OECD ‘Economic Surveys’– with direct implications
for the policy recommendations made.
It can be said that the OECD’s analysis as well as recommendations are
consistent with the consensus across the four international organisations
reviewed in this chapter – the ‘gang of four’ – as regards the imperative of
integration into the world market through increased productivity and
attendant reforms to labour markets and social protection.
China
The 2010 OECD Economic Survey of China notes the significance of
rapidly rising living standards, and the falling incidence of poverty, and is
optimistic that there is potential for continuing gains to be made in this
area. The analysis in the 2010 Survey is focused on productive labour, and
addresses social and economic rights in relation to it. The OECD notes that
the Chinese manufacturing sector is highly integrated into world markets,
highlights the part played by the re-allocation of labour from agriculture
towards services and manufacturing in rising productivity over recent years,
and suggests that in the future further productivity increases will depend
heavily on research and development and innovation.60 In China, an indus-
trial revolution has taken place, producing large factories using modern
production techniques, fed by a supply of relatively skilled and educated
workers from the countryside and the provinces: the ‘transition from a
centrally-controlled economic system to a competitive environment driven
by the private sector has been nothing short of extraordinary.’61 Massive
investment in health, housing, education and production-related infra-
structure has held off the emergence of serious bottlenecks.
At the same time, inefficiencies abound, especially in the state sector,
and there are still substantial productivity gains to be made. In short,
‘[a]lthough the elements of a competitive market-based economy are
becoming increasingly well established… the transition is far from
complete and… the reduction in the extent of government intervention
lags behind China’s impressive economic development’.62 In addition, the
OECD argues, as do many others, that China is in sight of the end of its
capacity to grow on the basis of adding new workers into an industrial
sector that still relies heavily on relatively low-skilled assembly operations
that are highly productive in comparison with agriculture, but not in
comparison with industrial sectors elsewhere in the world. The principal
60 OECD, Economic Survey of China 2010, Paris: OECD, 2010, p. 24. Available at:
http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/product/1010061e.pdf (accessed 20
February 2014).
61 Ibid., p. 102.
62 Ibid.
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38 Paul Cammack
The OECD argues that in the short term China should rebalance its econ-
omy towards the internal market. But the OECD’s primary area of focus is
what it terms the ‘social policy challenge’:
63 Ibid., pp. 162–163. The OECD’s reading of the demographic data persuades it to locate
the Lewis turning point a decade further into the future than F. Cai, Y. Du and M. Wang,
‘Migration and Labor Mobility in China’, United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), Human Development Reports Research Paper 2009/09, New York: UNDP, pp.
22–25.
64 OECD, Economic Survey of China 2010, above n. 60, p. 29.
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The OECD’s analytical framework is a powerful one, with ample room for
addressing the question of rights in both conceptual and practical terms.
The analytical framework does so, however, as the ensuing analysis demon-
strates at length, in accordance with the logic of the world market. The key
here (in sharp contrast to India) is that ‘informal employment is low in
China and most urban workers are employed by firms’.66 In this context,
the OECD welcomed the formalisation of labour relations represented by
the enactment of the Labour Contract Law in 2008. The OECD wants the
retirement age raised, to keep more people in work, and pension schemes
unified (at present they may differ even from town to town), as ‘different
degrees of generosity and lack of portability hinder labour mobility and
lead to substantial differences in wages across relatively small distances’ –
in short, the ‘extremely decentralised nature of the pension system is a
major problem and a national system is needed’.67 To further reduce barri-
ers to labour mobility, migrants to urban areas and their children should
be accorded equal access to housing, health insurance and education, and
a developed market for land rights is needed. Beyond this, the minimum
living allowance (MLA) first introduced in Shanghai in the early 1990s and
extended on a national basis in 1999 should be rationalised in accordance
with the needs of the labour market:
For people who are neither orphans, disabled nor elderly, the MLA
needs to be accompanied by advice and help to return them to the
labour market. This needs to be backed up by a greatly improved
administration system capable of verifying individuals’ income and
identity in order to avoid fraud.68
It is arguable then that the OECD addresses social and economic rights in
China in relation to what it describes as a labour market in transition, and
in the context of incipient reforms in all relevant areas. It continues to
urge China to ‘shift the focus from job security (strict labour protection)
to policies oriented towards facilitating the job search and improving the
employability of workers’.69 In other words, its prescriptions in relation to
rights are both consistent with its overall orientation to the desirability of
a genuinely global capitalist economy, and attuned to the specific areas in
65 Ibid., p. 40.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., pp. 41–42.
68 Ibid., p. 148.
69 OECD, China: Structural Reforms for Inclusive Growth, Paris: OECD, 2014, p. 7.
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40 Paul Cammack
India
The OECD’s 2011 Economic Survey of India welcomes India’s strong
macro-economic performance and high rate of growth, but notes at the
same time the gap between India’s (modestly rising) level of productivity
and the OECD average.70 All policy recommendations of the OECD flow
from this perspective, and specifically from its diagnosis of the poor record
of industry modernisation. The general prescription is a familiar one –
improve the business climate for local and international firms alike, reduce
barriers to trade and investment, shift from state to private investment for
core infrastructure, and reduce the fiscal deficit within an institutional
framework imposing fiscal discipline. But the persistent theme is specific to
India – that it has failed to develop a modern and competitive industrial
sector – and this in turn leads to specific prescriptions for the reform of
labour and product markets and of social protection. Characteristically,
these aspects are linked in a single analytical perspective, which sees the
capacity for welfare gains for rural and urban populations alike, but at the
same time insists that they can only be sustainably realised through
enhanced productivity.
Comparing India with Brazil (where conditional cash transfers were
pioneered), says the OECD, ‘calls into question the effectiveness of existing
welfare safety nets and the provision of essential social services’.71 Spending
is relatively high in India, but the system is fragmented, coverage is patchy,
and the poor are ‘vulnerable to economic shocks and reliant on family and
other networks’; workfare schemes are ineffective, and the use of condi-
tional cash transfers is limited.72 Better provision of basic education would
improve the capacity of the poor to command higher wages, and improve-
ments in health care would have direct impact on productivity, as
‘improvements in health status have a direct impact on welfare and can also
boost economic growth through higher worker productivity and by
supporting capital formation’.73 However, the fundamental problems lie in
the labour market and the industrial sector – excessive state and central
regulation restricts labour market dynamism and job creation, particularly
by the larger firms with over 100 employees to which employment protec-
tion rules generally apply. The OECD’s 2011 Economic Survey of India
notes:
The fact that employment protection rules, and the Industrial Disputes
Act more generally, apply only to firms with more than 100 employees
provides incentives for firms to stay small or to hide the full extent of
their employment. Compared with other large emerging economies,
India’s employment is dominated by small firms; Hasan and Jandoc
(2010) report that 84% of manufacturing employment in India is in
firms with less than 50 employees, compared with 25% in China. As well
as providing less protection and training to workers, smaller firms often
have greater difficulties gaining access to credit and tend to be less
productive, which ultimately reduces the scope for higher wages. To
promote job creation and poverty reduction, the government should
reduce the administrative burden for dismissal faced by larger firms.74
74 OECD, Economic Survey of India 2011, above n. 70, p. 38. (emphasis added)
75 Ibid., pp. 38–39.
76 R. Hasan and K. Jandoc, ‘The Distribution of Firm Size in India: What Can Survey Data
Tell Us?’, ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 213, Asia Development Bank, 2010,
‘Figure 1: Share of Manufacturing Employment by Enterprise Size Groups (percent)’, p.
7. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.174.1520&
rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed 20 February 2014).
6201 T&F Socio-Economic Rights in Emerging Free Markets:Royal_A 23/6/15 11:08 Page 42
42 Paul Cammack
This logic prevails throughout the 2011 OECD Survey of India. Thus, a
potential strength of India’s NREGS (the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme) ‘is that the requirement to work at a low wage may
encourage the self-selection of the neediest and discourage those who have
a higher reservation wage’;79 a problem with subsidies is that they are not
efficiently targeted, so they tend to accrue to the relatively well-off, when
targeted conditional cash transfers would be better;80 and fossil fuel subsi-
dies are a universal benefit, with multiple negative consequences, and
should be replaced by targeted cash transfers, a policy shift to be embarked
upon in 2012.81 In sum, in India, as in China, there is scope for significant
gains in welfare. But they are to be achieved, if at all, by reforms which drive
the country towards successful integration into the global economy on the
basis of higher productivity, especially in the industrial sector.
Conclusion
At the heart of the struggle over social and economic rights in China and
India is the unfortunate circumstance that the emergence of each as major
players in the global economy coincides with, and indeed may be said to
constitute, the completion of the world market in the double sense under-
stood by Marx and Engels: the spread of global exchange, and the
intensification of the process of proletarianisation on a global scale. It
coincides, in other words, with the first intimations of the genuinely global
rule of capital imagined by Marx and Engels over 150 years ago. There is a
fundamental contradiction between the aspirations of the populations of
the two countries for socio-economic rights, and the global rule of capital,
reflected above all in the pressures towards competitiveness in global
labour and product markets.
This chapter has shown that the four leading international organisations
concerned with trade, employment, labour markets and social protection
have converged on a set of policy prescriptions which centre on the imper-
ative to reallocate labour towards higher productivity activity, and to tailor
socio-economic rights to that end. This does not mean that gains in income
and welfare and improvements in social provision are impossible. On the
contrary, there is justifiable expectation for improvement in both cases.
What it does mean, however, is that if the policies promoted by these organ-
isations are pursued with success, any such social and economic
enhancement that occurs will be shaped by and be subject to the world
market. In this respect, this reflects the conscious subordination of social
protection to the goal of competitiveness in the world market.82 The chap-
ter has also shown that the political economies of China and India differ
sharply, with the development of large-scale exporting industry in China,
along with attendant changes to the class structure, contrasting with the
conspicuous lack of such development in India. The challenges faced by
each country and the prescriptions of the international organisations
analysed vary accordingly. Nevertheless, they always concur in relation to
the character and demands of the world market.
82 P. Cammack, ‘Risk, Social Protection and the World Market’, Journal of Contemporary Asia,
2012, vol. 42:3, 359.