NTC Aviation Observations 2019

UNCLASSIFIED/For Official Use Only
2019
(U) Improve OBSERVATION
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) for a Decisive Action (DA) Fight
(U) OBSERVATION: The current MTOE for a standard Shadow (RQ-7B) UAS platoon consists
of two Ground Control Stations (GCS) accompanied by two Ground Data Terminals (GDT) as
well as a Portable Ground Control Station (PGCS) accompanied by a Portable Ground Data
Terminal (PGDT). The current range of the GDT is 125 kilometers in comparison to the current
range of the PGDT of 30 kilometers. This makes units exclusively use their PGCS and PGDT as
a designated back up system and/or launch and recovery system. During the DA fight, the
brigade is jumping tactical assembly areas (TAA) every 24-48 hours. With the range of the
PGDT and the constant jumps from one TAA to the next, Shadow UAS platoons can no longer
establish functional forward sites at the brigade TAA.
(U) DISCUSSION: For this discussion, you must be aware of the current Air Worthiness Release
(AWR) for the Shadow. It states that at all times the platoon must have a backup system capable
of landing the aircraft. This in short means that you must, at all times, have a combination of two
GCS or a GCS and PGCS at the flight line. This requirement forces platoons to not have a
forward site because if a piece of equipment becomes damaged, they will not be able to perform
operations until that equipment is fixed or the forward site displaces, returns and is set up at the
flight line. In a DA fight, Shadow UAS platoons in the brigade become an afterthought because
they cannot keep up with the fast pace of the fight. This tends to have the operators flying the
aircraft separated from the brigade, resulting in a vague understanding of the battlefield and leads
to substandard tasks and purpose. When the military was fighting the counter insurgency (COIN)
environment, brigades did not encounter this issue because the Shadow UAS platoons were
located in the same TAA and the platoon would emplace a forward site in the tactical operations
center (TOC) so that the brigade staff could understand and observe what the Shadow operators
were observing.
(U) From my observation, the PGCS and PGDT are barely used during DA fights because every
platoon prefers to use the GCS and GDT with a longer range. The GDT can be used with the
PGCS which greatly improves the usefulness of the PGCS. If Platoons were fielded with three
GDT’s, they could instead emplace the PGCS inside the brigade TOC and fly their missions
from those seats inside the TOC. This is a viable option for platoons because the PGCS is
significantly smaller and able to set up and tear down with a GDT in an hour. This would greatly
improve operations for brigade’s because they could directly interact with the operators flying
the missions. Operators would then be able to call for fire directly on the TOC floor interacting
with each pertinent cell as needed, instead of being exclusively by the S2.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: My recommendation is that the MTOE for Shadow
platoons change to three GDT’s which will maximize the range of the PGCS. Because of this
increased range, Shadow platoons can emplace a forward site with the brigade TOC to improve
operations. I also recommend that we address the AWR to not making it a requirement to have a
back up GCS or PGCS capable of landing the aircraft. I recommend that it states that you will
attempt to have a backup, but if operations dictate otherwise, no backup is required with the
proper risk approval.
Improve OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) and Staff Weather Officer (SWO) Support at
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Mission Command Nodes.
OBSERVATION: BCTs fail to establish redundant BAE and SWO support at both the BCT
tactical operations center (TOC) and the BCT tactical command post (TAC) or provide a reliable
communications system to the UAS platoon, resulting in the interruption of collection from
organic BCT full motion video (FMV) assets such as the Shadow UAS.
DISCUSSION: BCTs at the NTC lose many hours of organic FMV collection due to the
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platoon not receiving required products such as the air
coordination order (ACO) or a valid weather brief from the SWO. These products are often
received using a Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR)/Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router
(NIPR) Access Point (SNAP) terminal via NIPR and SIPR; however, when the BCT TOC begins
tearing down their upper tactical infrastructure (TI) systems, the SWO and BAE are unable to
create and send the UAS operators the required products for flight operations. Additionally, the
SNAP terminal used for upper TI is greatly affected by windy conditions and a lack of expert
knowledge on operating the system, causing frequent loss of communication with the UAS
platoon and the interruption in collection.
Commanders, staff, and UAS personnel share the duties and responsibilities for UAS flight
operations. When planning UAS missions, staffs must consider a number of factors in addition to
collection requirements to include:
• Weather conditions before and during flight operations

• Flight axis and other air operations occurring
• Communications capabilities of the UAS platoon
(FOUO) Per ATP 2-19.4, Air Force weather teams, the main source of weather support, are
tactical mission and operations specialists, experts in the art of determining the effects of weather
on operations. These teams deploy with the BCT and provide direct and indirect weather support
tailored to the BCT’s needs. In addition, per AR 95-23 local commanders will establish policies
specifying when DD Form 175–1 (Flight Weather Briefing) is required to be filed with DD Form
175 (Military Flight Plan). Traditionally, this is identified in the UAS platoon’s standard
operating procedure (SOP), which must be understood by all involved in the planning. The S3
ensures synchronized use of the airspace by coordinating with the effects coordinator
(ECOORD), brigade aviation officer (BAO), air defense officer, and UAS liaison officer (LNO).
The S3 ensures airspace is sufficient to support all aspects of UAS operations. Lastly, the brigade
engineer battalion (BEB) executive officer (XO) and staff need to allocate appropriate
communications equipment to ensure the established primary, alternate, contingency, emergency
(PACE) plan can be executed across the battlefield.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To ensure there is no interruption in collection from

organic family of military vehicle (FMV) assets; BCTs, at the very minimum, should place a
BAE and SWO representative at both mission command nodes (TOC and TAC). This allows key
staff to have access to upper TI at all times and build the necessary documents such as the ACO
and updated weather briefings that allow the UAS platoon to support the BCT. Also and if
possible, it is very successful to place a SWO representative at the launch and recovery site to
provide direct support to the platoon. With the right personnel at both mission command nodes,
it is also important to ensure a valid PACE plan is established and practiced so all nodes can
communicate and pass required products. Additionally, if assets are available, a dedicated CPN
(Command Post Node) for the UAS platoon provides reliable upper TI that not only provides
products to conduct flight operations, but also consistent communication with the BCT for
reconnaissance and targeting. Lastly, considering and prioritizing the UAS platoon for upper TI
and staff support is key for mission planning and guaranteeing little interruption in collection due
to connectivity and staff support.
AR 95-23, Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Regulations

ATP 2-19.4, BCT Intelligence Operations
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Protecting the Aviation Task Force
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation rotational unit tactical assembly areas (TAAs) at the National
Training Center (NTC) generally position well within the range of enemy cannon and rocket
artillery. In the context of the scenario at NTC, this provides the unit with the opportunity to train
on ‘react to indirect fire’ and exercise mass casualty (MASCAL) contingency plans, as well as
reconstitution of personnel and equipment. While proximity of the aviation TAA provides the
unit with close access to the forward line of troops and friendly objectives, it places the aviation
unit firmly within observation of enemy reconnaissance units, and, therefore, at high risk of
observed indirect fires. With friendly attack aviation being near the top of every enemy’s high
priority target list, this makes the task of protecting the aviation task force daunting and
unachievable by a wholly organic aviation unit.
(U) DISCUSSION: To achieve the operational reach afforded by a TAA located near the forward
line of troops, the commander must consider how to mitigate the additional risk of detection by
enemy reconnaissance efforts and the potential for indirect fire. ADRP 3-0, paragraph 2-53
states, “Protection is an important contributor to operational reach. Commanders anticipate how
enemy actions and environmental factors might disrupt operations and then determine the
protection capabilities required to maintain sufficient reach.” In order to extend operational
reach, the task force commander must either augment his security force with enough strength to
deny the enemy’s ability to observe the TAA or position the TAA with enough standoff to
prevent enemy observation. The latter course of action would provide economy of force and
minimize risk of detection.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Producing the personnel and equipment to defend an
aviation TAA is a formidable task, even with a relatively benign threat. The size and type of
terrain required makes the task force difficult to mask from enemy detection. An enemy force
can effectively disrupt aviation operations with a small reconnaissance effort when the aviation
TAA is positioned near the forward line of troops. In lieu of more frequent survivability moves
that disrupt planning and mission command, units should maximize the use of jump FARPs and
tactical command posts to extend operational reach without compromising the survivability of
aviation task forces. Leveraging the small size of the jump forward arming and refueling point
(FARP), along with its inherent mobility, minimizes the enemy’s opportunity to observe,
identify, and destroy aircraft while they are on the ground and most vulnerable.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Intelligence Support to Aviation Operations in the Decisive Action Training
Environment (DATE)
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation S2 sections are woefully unprepared for the complexities of
intelligence support to aviation operations a (DATE) scenario. Aviation S2 sections struggle to
use the systematic processes of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and understand
the opposing force (OPFOR) with enough detail to create intelligence assessments that aid the
aviation task force (ATF) staff in development of friendly courses of actions (COAs) and
decision points for the commander.
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation operations in a DATE scenario, specifically at the National

Training Center (NTC), require an understanding of an area of operations (AO) larger than the
rotational brigade combat team’s (BCT) AO. The ATF not only has to support the BCT in their
AO, as a division asset, they will also execute missions in support of 52nd Infantry Division’s
AO outside of the BCT’s area of influence (AOI). While fully understanding the breadth of an
expansive operating environment (OE), aviation operations often require the S2 to “identify key
enemy events that are target indicators of the enemy’s COA and may act as the trigger for
execution of a pre-planned attack” (ATP 3-04.1). This level of fidelity sounds simple in concept
but is incredibly difficult in execution with S2 sections that are often understaffed and
inexperienced.
(U) Using an aviation deliberate attack mission as an example, the S2 has several tasks to
complete to enable engagement area (EA) development to include: identification of all possible
enemy COAs; development of named areas of interest (NAIs) or points along the enemy’s
mobility corridors where interdiction is likely; understanding in time and space where critical
events are likely to occur that necessitate a decision point; and request additional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that drive triggers for the ATF to launch attack
aviation (ATP 3-04.1). Not to mention, the S2 has to understand all surface to air (SA) threats
that could affect aviation assets for ingress and egress to the EA. For context, planning for this
deliberate attack mission typically occurs at the same time as planning for an air assault mission
30 kilometers away against an entirely different enemy organization, which requires the same
level of detailed analysis.
(U) Aviation S2 sections quickly become overwhelmed with the amount of analysis required to
support multiple planning cells, manage the current fight for situational awareness, support
multiple operations and intelligence (O&I) briefs, and project ISR requirements with enough
lead time for processing and approval. Instead of reaching out for support from adjacent and
higher units, aviation S2 sections typically provide incomplete analytical support to the ATF
resulting in gaps of information that lead to enemy engagements of aviation assets.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: While the responsibilities of an aviation S2 may

seem daunting, the S2 can mitigate the breadth of tasks through a few simple preparatory steps
and through coordination with certain entities. First, aviation S2 sections must understand IPB
and OPFOR tactics doctrinally. The best aviation S2 sections who rotate through NTC arrive
with a detailed mission analysis (MA) brief prepared at home station prior to arrival that includes
all four steps of IPB but most importantly a detailed modified combined obstacle overlay
(MCOO) and doctrinal threat templates that includes descriptions of the enemy by zone and with
associated air defense assets. Successful S2 sections understand the fundamentals of
reconnaissance and security operations, air assault operations, development of a layered
intelligence collection plan that answers the ATF commander’s priority intelligence requirements
(PIRs), and comprehends how the enemy employs air defense artillery (ADA) capabilities.
(U) Second, aviation S2 sections should communicate with adjacent and higher units and
communicate often. Constant communication with the brigade and division intelligence (Intel)
sections as well as adjacent units is imperative to creating shared understanding (ATP 3-04.1).
Aviation S2 sections must understand higher and adjacent friendly scheme of maneuvers and be
able to nest PIRs and requests for collections. This coordination could happen through daily
intelligence warfighting syncs and/or through face-to-face dialogue at brigade level rehearsals
such as the fires/information collection (IC) rehearsal or the combined arms rehearsal.
(FOUO) Third, aviation S2 sections must coordinate often and effectively with the aviation
mission survivability officer (AMSO), the ATF master gunner, S-3 planners, unmanned aircraft
system (UAS) platoon leader, and fires support officer. The AMSO, for instance, can provide
aviation threat system training to the S2 section and assist the S2 section with the identification
and characterization of threats to aviation (TC 3-04.9). These personnel are subject matter
experts in their field and can assist the S2 in areas where knowledge or experience is lacking.
(U) Finally, aviation S2 sections must read and understand aviation doctrine to understand how
aviation employs its assets, what analysis the staff and commander need to know about the
enemy, and how the enemy can affect aviation assets. S2’s often struggle to understand their role
in air mission briefs, air mission coordination meetings, and ATF level rehearsals. The analysis
of the enemy gained through completing IPB should not change, but understanding the
employment of aviation assets will determine how an S2 will focus their analysis of the enemy.
ATP 2-01.3, IPB

ATP 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment
TC 7-100.2, Opposing Forces Tactics
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Attack Reconnaissance Mission Planning
(U) OBSERVATION: At the National Training Center (NTC), observer, control, trainers
(OC/Ts) observe task force (TF) staffs repeatedly fail to provide definitive tactical mission tasks
to the company/troop (CO/TRP) to conduct proper troop leading procedures (TLP) and mission
planning. The TF staff’s inability to provide timely and adequate information dissemination to
the company/troops prevent them from conducting parallel mission planning to standard, leaving
them little or no time to produce a CO/TRP-level operations order (OPORD) or conduct
rehearsals. This leads to frustrations at the CO/TRP-level, reduces aircrew lethality, and
increases risk to aircrews.
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation TFs continually struggle with establishing and maintaining open
lines of communications (LoCs) with the brigade combat team (BCT). By the time the TF
injects themselves into the BCT planning cycle, it is usually well after course of action
development (COADEV) and wargaming. This means many of the routes, fire support
coordination measures (FSCMs), airspace coordination measures (ACMs) and engagement areas
(EAs) are identified, submitted, and approved. This severely limits any type of bottom-up
refinement.
(U) While the aviation TF struggles with synchronizing in the BCT planning cycle, they do not
help themselves. All too often, the TF awaits what mission the BCT would like the TF to
execute; the TF fails to lean forward. Without fail, the BCT has a mission for the TF to execute;
however, notification is usually less than 12 hours out from execution. Aviation TFs fail to
manage their internal planning horizons. If the unit creates a higher headquarters’ key times,
operational requirements, planning and TLP times, and enemy considerations (HOPE) timeline,
they usually fail to adhere to that timeline. The result is a complete disregard for the 1/3rd’s,
2/3rd’s rule, which forces the company/troop into ad hoc planning usually conducted by the air
mission commanders (AMC) two to three hours prior to execution.
Many times, under the guise of “mission command,” the aviation TF sub-contracts the planning
to the company/troop to provide the company/troop commanders the freedom to plan his scheme
of maneuver. “Without planning missions beyond the cursory task-and-purpose level, a
commander cannot effectively allocate resources or set priorities. He cannot know what is
achievable by his subordinates or what they require, if he has not explored the mission orders in
detail (Hiding Behind Mission Command: How the Fear of Micromanagement Prevents Leader
Involvement in Detailed Planning, Armor Magazine, July-September 2013, page 42). By sub-
contracting planning to the company/troop, the TF loses the oversight of mission management.
To exacerbate the matter, the TF fails to coordinate many of the warfighting functions within the
TF.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: In order to be successful, aviation TFs must ensure
continuous and consistent interaction with the BCT. This starts with establishing the appropriate
level of experience for the TF aviation liaison officers (LNOs). These officers, in conjunction
with the brigade aviation element (BAE), need to provide doctrinal sound options to the ground
force commander early in the planning cycle. Additionally, aviation TF staffs need to develop,
establish and adhere to a published HOPE timeline in order to provide subordinate formations
adequate time to conduct TLPs and bottom-up refinement. It is imperative for the staffs to
analyze the missions they receive as opposed to passing the problem to the company/troop and
ultimately to the flight AMCs to solve. The most critical aspect to allow a CO/TRP to execute
their assigned mission is the allocation and synchronization of assets to get the CO/TRP to rally
point/forward line of troops (RP/FLOT) and integrate into the ground scheme of maneuver. The
TF needs to conduct, at a minimum, a condensed military decision making process (MDMP)
with a strong focus on identifying what combat power is required for mission accomplishment,
potential friction points, and any additional echelon above brigade (EAB) enablers required for
mission success.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
(U) OBSERVATION: During an observed combined training center (CTC) rotation, aviation fire
support officers (FSO) lacked the capabilities to properly plan and execute suppression of enemy
air defense (SEAD) in a decisive action training environment (DATE). To compound the issue,
the aviation FSO did not give SEAD the proper emphasis during the same CTC rotation. As a
result, SEAD was not effective in degrading surface based enemy air defense assets in support of
friendly aviation assets.
(U) DISCUSSION: Joint Publication 3-01.4 (JP 3-01.4), JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses (J-SEAD), describes SEAD as a more proactive approach of security for air
operations, which allows supported aircrews to be more effective. However, FSOs typically
view SEAD as an exercise to satisfy training objectives rather than a necessary skillset requiring
multiple iterations to achieve proficiency. As a result, aviation FSOs have a limited SEAD
capability and experience. Additionally, units place little emphasis on furthering their capability
of SEAD employment at either home station or a CTC rotation.
(U) Per JP 3-01.4, there are three primary planning objectives for SEAD: (1) Accomplish an
accurate appraisal of enemy air defenses and their ability to influence the outcome of overall air
operations; (2) decide on the scope, magnitude, and duration of SEAD operations necessary to
reduce enemy air defense capabilities to acceptable risk levels; and (3) determine the capabilities
of available suppression assets, as well as potential competing requirements for these forces.
These planning objectives require extensive integration with the FSO and other warfighting
functions (WfF). Additionally, for SEAD utilizing surface fires, close synchronization is
required between the aviators flying the mission and the firing unit. To accomplish objective one
requires the FSO to get an accurate enemy situation from the S2. Once the FSO understands the
enemy’s capability, they must get commander’s guidance and combine with their expertise to
determine acceptable levels of SEAD to accomplish the mission to achieve objective two. To
accomplish the final objective, the FSO must work with higher/adjacent units to ascertain combat
power availability and effectiveness. Often overlooked is electronic warfare (EW). Not using
EW removes a highly effective neutralization piece in the SEAD fight. EW is a compliment to
surface fires, and at times, it is the only available asset.
(U) Generally the FSO receives the enemy situation from the S2 once planning is complete.
Once planned, there are often no rehearsals performed. FSOs generally move immediately into
execution. When units do conduct rehearsals for SEAD involving surface fires, they typically
involve only the FSO and the firing unit and do not include the pilots flying the mission. This
does not allow for a common understanding of the SEAD fires or allow the identification and
resolution of frictions with all parties.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: More emphasis needs to be placed on SEAD fires, in

both the understanding and practical application. EW must be an integral part, supplementing
surface fires. If there is an EW non-commissioned officer (NCO), that person must perform EW
in support of the unit rather than be tasked out for ancillary purposes. The FSO needs to be a
leading proponent of SEAD, however, the commander and S3 must emphasize SEAD training
and employment. All contributing parties must conduct multiple planning, rehearsal, and
execution iterations at home station prior to a CTC rotation in order to build experience and
expertise. Units will work out frictions and understand the process so that when they arrive at a
CTC rotation they can validate the process, or make minor revisions, rather than create the
process during a DATE scenario.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Task Force Transfer Mission Command from Tactical Command Post
to Main Command Post
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation task forces (TFs) are required to make survivability moves
within the area of operations, to include their command post (CP) several times in the course of a
rotation at the National Training Center. The time that it takes the aviation TF to tear down the
current CP, jump locations, and re-establish a functional CP typically takes up to 18 hours from
shutting down to fully operational capability; which takes the commander and staff out of the
fight for an extended period of time. Even with the best plans, TFs are rarely down for less than
8 hours, putting them completely out of the fight. When units implement their tactical command
post (TAC) and the CP, they can effectively maintain operations and maintain mission command
during transitions. While the concept is not new, the requirements for having upper tactical
infrastructure (TI) continue to increase.
(U) DISCUSSION: The S6 from an observed combat aviation brigade requested the
Transportable Tactical Command Communications (T2C2) Heavy and Lite (commonly referred
to as a “gator ball”) from their home station. Prior to arrival at NTC, the field support
representative gave a short duration class on the system, which allowed them to ensure the
functionality of the system during the reception, staging, onward-movement and integration
(RSOI) mission command validation exercise and use it for the initial jump into the rotation.
The aviation TF employed the system once on ground at the NTC, ensured its operational status
during RSOI, and conducted refresher training on the system prior to the start of operations. The
aviation TF used the T2C2 Lite to support upper TI for the TAC, and they used the command
post node (CPN)/small tactical terminal (STT) and T2C2 Heavy for redundant communications
for the CP. They established the TAC in the same location as the CP, tore down the CP, and
jumped while the TAC maintained mission command. After the CP reestablished and transferred
mission command, the TAC tore down and jumped forward. The T2C2 worked well because of
its lightweight and compact nature but could also use ASIP and Multiband Inter/Intra Team
Radio (MBITR) batteries to set up before obtaining power.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Aviation battalions and squadrons need to field
organic equipment to enable the establishment of a TAC and CP to minimize the down time and
keep the aviation TF in the fight. The observed battalion used the T2C2 Lite for the TAC and
the T2C2 for redundant communications for the battalion (BN) CP. The TF used the T2C2 Lite
very effectively for the TAC and maintaining mission command. There are other systems
available (Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR)/Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR)
Access Point [SNAP] or Tampa Microwave) which meet the same requirements as the T2C2 –
with the T2C2 and Tampa Microwave being the most highly recommended. Successful
employment of the TAC requires the aviation TF systems like these to ensure a seamless
transition between TAC and CP jumps.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Increasing Aviation Survivability through Tactical Flight Maneuvers and
Mission Planning
(U) OBSERVATION: Over the past 17 years, Army aviation has become extremely adept at
fighting on a counter insurgency (COIN)/wide area security battlefield. An enemy trained and
equipped with small arms, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and other unguided munitions
populates this battlefield. Guided air defense weapons such as radar and infrared have not been
prolific in the mature theaters of Afghanistan and Iraq. However, now with the paradigm shift in
strategic focus away from COIN and into a decisive action battlefield against a peer or near peer
threat, we can expect the mix of threat weaponry to be much different. This new threat mixture
will require a change in operational behavior from our aircrews to limit losses and ensure
mission success.
(U) DISCUSSION: The present generation of Army aviators who grew up in the COIN
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan learned hard lessons about the best defense against the threat
of small arms fire (SAF) weaponry of our adversaries. The overwhelming result of these lessons
has been to increase altitude and nullify the threat of small arms. Increasing altitude has proven
to be a very effective solution against unguided munitions and the result is a generation of
aircrew that instinctively resists flying low to the ground within small arms range. The aircrews
that come through the National Training Center (NTC) continually demonstrate this
enculturation. This includes AH-64 exposing themselves to the enemy instead of using terrain to
mask their location while conducting reconnaissance and attack missions, while UH-60 aircraft
tasked with command and control (C2) support flights at high orbits in view of the enemy visual
detection systems and radar threats. This higher flight profile places the aircraft in the ideal
position for enemy guided munitions that are extremely effective against slow flying aircraft
such as helicopters. For this less prolific problem of guided munitions on the COIN battlefield,
we have come to rely on technological solutions in the various forms of aircraft survivability
equipment (ASE) to counter and defeat the limited guided munitions. Conversely, against a peer
or near peer threat the volume and capability of guided munition air defense is likely to exceed
the capabilities of the currently fielded ASE and current tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs).
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To be successful against a peer/near pear threat

equipped with robust air defense systems, we can no longer rely on ASE and COIN TTPs to
survive. Thus, Army aviation needs to shift training focus back to the basic principles of terrain
flight and combat maneuvering. By changing the Army aviation culture to one where mission
planning and execution are founded on using terrain and maneuver to circumvent, avoid, and
defeat the enemies threat mix, while integrating our warfighting functions to utilize combined
arms maneuver, will be the only way to ensure the best chance of survival and mission success.
Integrating this training with the understanding of available electronic warfare (EW) assets,
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is
paramount to ensuring that aviation aircrews understand how to defeat radar threats and operate
in a decisive action environment.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) - Planning Considerations
(U) OBSERVATION: ATP 3-04.94 defines a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) as a
temporary facility organized, equipped, and deployed as far forward, or widely dispersed, as
tactically feasible to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the sustainment of aviation
maneuver units in combat. It also describes site selection criteria, planning considerations, and
the incorporation of tactical enablers. Due to the rapidly changing environment of the decisive
action fight, units often overlook the necessary planning steps for the successful employment of
a FARP dispersed from the aviation tactical assembly area (TAA).
(U) DISCUSSION: The deployment of a FARP at the National Training Center (NTC) rarely
integrates into the operations process. The forward support company (FSC) often receives the
task in the form of an unanalyzed six-digit grid and a no-later-than established time. This hinders
the ability of the FSC, to include the distro platoon leader, to fully understanding the scope of the
mission(s) to be supported, primarily the requirements for fuel, ammunition, and security. In
addition, the critical logistics node regularly has to fend for themselves with limited crew-served
weapons for upwards of 48 hours in a complex, hostile environment.
(U) Units operating at NTC routinely deploy a jump FARP (JFARP), which resembles the same
set-up of the active TAA FARP; a complex mixture of ammunition positioned around a four-
point HEMTT tanker refueling system (HTARS). Depending on the proficiency level of the unit,
this construct could take more than 90 minutes to establish and 90 minutes to collapse. This set-
up is largely due to the active, silent, jump, and rolling FARPs as the only doctrinal examples of
FARP layouts. This limits the maneuverability and flexibility of the JFARP and subjugates each
subsequent turn more susceptible to enemy attack.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: In order to provide redundancy of critical logistics

assets, the deployment of a FARP must consist of a thorough plan, including mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) considerations
for location and duration. This asset cannot remain stagnant on the battlefield and must maintain
the knowledge and flexibility to achieve the intended mission at the decisive point and time. This
requires integration of the S4 and FSC commander in all planning sessions in order to ensure full
synchronization of sustainment in the operations process.
(U) Instead of solely relying on baseline HTARS constructs, units should consider the cross-
pollination of the JFARP and rolling FARP concepts, otherwise known as a “warm FARP” to
provide maneuverability and flexibility throughout the battlespace. This construct consists of two
to four HEMMTs moving to the aircraft upon landing and pre-positioned ammunition on flat
racks. The major downside of this construct is the requirement for aircraft to shut down engines
in order receive fuel and ammunition on the auxiliary power unit (APU), but it provides
amplified maneuverability to the sustainers and allows the aircrews to maintain situational
awareness.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Forward Arming Refuel Point (FARP)
(U) OBSERVATION: FARP teams training at the National Training Center have an inadequate
understanding of aviation standards and conditions for conducting helicopter FARP operations.
FARP officer in charge (OIC) / non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOICs), are given a
general grid coordinate without direct and detailed guidance on FARP mission requirements.
FARP personnel conduct a “jump FARP” (JFARP) to extend the reach and increase attack
aviation station time for the aviation task force. FARPs and JFARPS employed without the
understanding of how they should fit into the task forces (TF’s) overall footprint and division
(DIV) / brigade combat teams (BCTs) scheme of maneuver, respectively. More often than not,
FARP locations and orientation obstruct portions of the tactical assembly area (TAA) layout
and/or is oriented toward the TAA, which is unsafe for arming aircraft (ACFT).
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation maintenance company/troop standard operating procedures (SOP)

include a section detailing FARP operations. These sections offer directions that are specific to
safety practices and tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs) for working around the ACFT. The
FARP SOP provides the unit with general guidance for FARP operations that are acceptable for
established FARP locations on improved surfaces. These locations are not co-located with the
rest of the TF. No guidance provided in SOPs for JFARP operations in a tactical environment, in
which the unit will need to operate safely in a decisive action environment and unimproved
conditions while coordinating into the TF’s footprint and operations. ATP 3-4.17 provides
guidance, but is not referenced in the SOPs. The units place insufficient emphasis on aviation
FARP fundamentals in their training, i.e. pre-planning in the FARP diagram for environmental
factors (wind direction), surface conditions (slope of terrain), arrival/departure hold
requirements, lighting requirements, etc. Furthermore, the military occupational specialties
(MOSs) that are required to operate a FARP are not cross-trained to facilitate contingencies or
redundancy, nor do units have defined hand/arm signals outlined in their SOP in the event of lost
communications with the pilots.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: SOP updates/cross training/home station rehearsals:

Units should reference ATP 3-4.17 to update their SOP in order to specify standards to assigned
personnel conducting FARP operations in decisive action environments. The unit’s SOP should
be clear on exact standards for: FARP diagrams/layout, contingency operations, cross training
requirements for FARP MOSs, and a set of task specific hand/arm signals. The SOP should be
verified by and disseminated to supporting units to ensure fidelity of FARP operations.
Commanders should incorporate FARP MOS cross training into their quarterly training plan. A
progression checklist should be developed for each cross-trained task a Soldier completes.
Soldiers should be proficient with the tasks essential to the FARP team’s overall mission
success. Home station rehearsals are low impact on the unit and do not require ACFT support.
They can be conducted in the field or in the unit’s area of operation (AO).
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: External Sling Load Operations
(U) OBSERVATION: External load operations at the National Training Center (NTC) are
underutilized. The most common use for external load operations is downed aircraft recovery.
External load operations possess the potential to assist commanders at the individual unit level
through the brigade in transporting cargo and equipment during tactical assembly area jumps by
decreasing convoy size. Leaders at every echelon fail to request or employ external load
operations to the fullest capacity.
(U) DISCUSSION: External load operations provide the ability to maneuver retransmitting
vehicles, equipment and personnel to elevated positions quickly, giving commanders increased
communications throughout the battlespace. External load operations would minimize the risks
associated to driving through and up austere terrain under any illumination conditions. The task
force (TF) would have the capability to offer the brigade support besides resupply and passenger
movements. The TF can provide support for rapid deployment of ground weapon systems and
light vehicles to forward staging areas.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Based on observations at the NTC, underutilization

of external load operations is common. External load aircrews need to be knowledgeable of their
environment and crew responsibilities. They need to exercise and train limited forms of external
load operation flights semi-annually. Additionally, aircrews should provide the capabilities of the
airframe in operation, along with rigging requirements of any cargo to the element they are
supporting. Increase command emphasis on external load operations in order to maximize
mission efficiency and effectiveness within the task force and brigade combat team (BCT)
supporting operations.
Improve OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Aviation (AVN) Task Force (TF) Integration into the Brigade Combat Teams
(BCT’s) Planning
OBSERVATION: The AVN TF often fails to integrate into the BCTs 72hr planning cycle
leaving it up to the BCT S3 and brigade aviation officer (BAO)/brigade aviation element (BAE)
cell to plan on all aviation assts.
DISCUSSION: This leads to AH-64s being utilized as in counter insurgency (COIN) and not in a
capacity that would best support the brigade (BDE) at the decisive point or setting the conditions
for the BCT to achieve the decisive point. AVN TF needs to utilize reception, staging, onward-
movement & integration (RSOI) to integrate into the BCTs planning cycle and place post
command liaisons officers (LNOs) up at the BCT or positon one of the field grades with the BCT
to help plan missions in conjunction with the BCT. This will ensure the AVN TF is receiving
doctrinal missions and that all necessary assets have been synchronized at the BDE level.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Early integration with the BCT prior to the deployment
to NTC is key. AVN units that work closely with the BCT during company and battalion
situation training exercises (STXs) have a tendency to already have best practices developed and
the BCT understands how to plan and allocate its AVN assets appropriately. This allows for the
BCT to successfully plan AVN into their scheme of maneuver with decent results.
2018
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Effective employment of Aviation Liaison Officers (LNOs)
(U) OBSERVATION: Over the last year at the National Training Center (NTC), units
underutilized and underemphasized the importance of aviation liaison officers. The aviation
liaison officers are coming to the NTC ill-prepared for their duties. Observations of the brigade
and division command posts show aviation liaisons are identified late, given little guidance, and
given no reporting structure from their organic unit. This leads to LNOs not contributing to the
maneuver commander’s planning efforts, and LNOs not aiding the aviation commander’s
situational understanding. Individual tasks #011-510-0310 (Perform Duties of Aviation Liaison
Officer) and #011-420-0310 (Implement Aviation Liaison Officer Duties) clearly outline
functions of aviation liaisons, and FM 3-04 (Army Aviation) emphasizes just how important a
liaison officer or liaison team is to both supporting and supported units.
(U) DISCUSSION: Operating in a decisive action training environment (DATE), with a large
volume of information passing through each command post, an aviation LNO is uniquely
positioned to ease planning efforts and ensure aircraft are employed in accordance with the
aviation task force commander’s intent. An aviation LNO “represents their units, as directed, to
facilitate air-ground operations and planning” (FM 3-04 pg. 2-20). If an LNO is identified late,
given minimal guidance, and doesn’t clearly understand the commander’s intent, they are at a
serious disadvantage to contribute to the fight. Early identification and tasking of an LNO
enables them the time necessary to “understand the capabilities, limitations, and tactical
employment of all aviation assets” (FM 3-04 pg.2-20). Most Officers, when selected for liaison
duty, must prepare outside their own aircraft and mission set to understand the employment of
aviation as a whole. Major considerations are aircraft fuel, munitions, and lifting capability,
which vary greatly by airframe. Early LNO designation also allows for “coordination with
airspace users and higher airspace elements for airspace management” (FM 3-04 pg. 2-20).
LNOs who come unprepared will struggle to appropriately represent the effort and abilities of
their task force. Observations show LNOs miss key information, over or under commit their
assets, and cause friction between supporting units. Liaison officers who are empowered by their
aviation command, and come prepared with “aviation estimates” (FM 3-04), aircraft capabilities,
priority information requirements (PIR)/commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR),
maps, crew duty cycles, and their own means of communication will be able to assist each effort
assigned to them. “LNOs ensure supportability of the COA and relay a clear task and purpose to
the parent aviation unit” (FM3-04 pg. 2-20).
(U)TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Both rotational units and aviation trainers need to
place more emphasis on the job of aviation liaison officer. The liaison is irreplaceable and should
be an active contributor to the staff they are supporting. They must come prepared with as much
information as possible and come ready to represent their aviation task force. “Battalion
commanders empower LNOs to act on their behalf and ensure liaison teams are fully resourced”
(FM 3-04 pg. 2-20).
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)
(U) OBSERVATION: The Army’s Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) community has benefitted
from superior technological advances, which have bolstered digital lines of communication and
increased opportunities for Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). However, the lack of
understanding of the fundamentals of reconnaissance within the UAS community, coupled with
the lack of integration (or improper employment) of UAS assets within the aviation task force’s
scheme of maneuver significantly degrades the effectiveness of the MUM-T concept. The failure
to successfully execute MUM-T between RQ-7B Shadows and AH-64 Apaches consistently
results in missed tactical opportunities to provide reaction time and maneuver space to the
supported ground force commander, and effectively shape the battlespace space through the
detection of enemy forces and the delivery of lethal effects from rotary-wing and/or indirect fire
assets.
(U) DISCUSSION: Army aviation “hunter-killer” pairing of attack and reconnaissance

platforms, used since the Vietnam conflict, continue to yield substantial successes in the
Afghanistan and Iraqi theatres during the Global War on Terror. The implementation of the
Aviation Restructuring Initiative and the consequential divestment of the OH-58 D Kiowa
Warrior served as the catalyst for the integration of UAS platforms within the combat aviation
brigade (CAB).
(U) The migration of tactical UAS (TUAS) assets from the military intelligence company
(MICO) to the CAB requires a paradigm shift from surveillance and intelligence gathering as a
stand-alone platform to active reconnaissance in concert with rotary-wing maneuver. Rotational
units deployed to the National Training Center (NTC) consistently struggle with the MUM-T
concept because of this failure to adjust to the shift. It is most prevalent in the following
disciplines:
(U) RQ-7B Shadow TUAS: The lack of fundamental understanding of reconnaissance forms
and activities, coupled with the “negative habit transfer” of counter-insurgency (COIN) practices
from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn
(OND) contribute to the:
1) Improper employment of UAS platforms in support of rotary-wing maneuver
2) Lack of proper training of UAS operators and mission commanders
3) Inability to provide reaction time and maneuver space based on the established priority
information requirements (PIR) of the supported aviation unit
Although a number of prior 152D MOS (OH-58D Kiowa Warrior pilots) have transitioned into
the UAS field, the UAS community as a whole has yet to incorporate holistically the
reconnaissance focus needed to exploit the advantages of the MUM-T concept. This results in a
less effective “hunter-killer” pairing and has failed to increase lethality between the sensor to
shooter.
(U) Doctrine: Current doctrine addresses the MUM-T concept, yet no document exists capturing
the successful tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for aerial reconnaissance utilized by the
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the UAS communities during the past 16 years of COIN in
OEF/OIF/OND. Although not all TTPs can be successfully implemented in the decisive action
operational environment experienced by units at the NTC, the overall lack of guiding doctrine
presents an additional obstacle for generating tactically sound and reconnaissance-minded
operators.
(U) Integration and Training: Although the task organization of TUAS within the CAB
provides TUAS units the proximity to their rotary-wing counterparts, deliberate home-station
training is needed to successfully accomplish true integration within the aviation force.
Successful MUM-T implementation cannot rely solely on the tangible digital systems being
present and operational, but must also include frequent and consistent integration with their
rotary-wing counterparts to maximize habitual operational relationships. Incorporating UAS
operators into the mission planning process (pre-mission planning, aircrew mission briefs, etc.) is
critical to setting favorable conditions for MUM-T.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Aviation maneuver unit commanders must take
deliberate action to increase incorporation of UAS into their scheme of maneuver. This
requirement must begin at the battalion/squadron level during the military decision making
process (MDMP) and/or rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP) and end at
the aircrew mission brief. The integration of TUAS at every level of the planning process will
facilitate the TUAS as a component of maneuver, and not just another enabler.
(U) Additionally, aircrew training programs (ATP) must address MUM-T as a quantifiable
training objective. ATP Commanders must invest the necessary energy during home-station
training to maximize opportunities to integrate TUAS assets, even when assets are not available.
Rehearsing and practicing the use of TUAS as the “hunter” component to their team will lend
itself to employing TUAS as an extension of the air weapons team during their maneuver, and
not as a foreign aerial element requiring airspace deconfliction.
(U) Furthermore, units must invest significant energy and effort in training their TUAS operators
and planners to focus more on the role of a reconnaissance asset, and not a surveillance asset.
Although tactical situations may dictate employment of TUAS for surveillance tasks, the tactical
task of reconnaissance needs to be their primary focus during training. Training operators with
their rotary-wing counter parts, with a focus in reconnaissance to answer PIRs in support of the
maneuver force, will not only yield more tactically competent operators, but will also bolster the
trust between the systems (TUAS and rotary-wing) needed to maximize MUM-T. Successful
training and integration is the key to successfully accomplishing TO&E Task 1-CO-7800.
Improve OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Reconciling Quick Reaction Force (QRF) within the Decisive Action Fight
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation task forces (TF) struggle to provide support during decisive
action training environments due to the ground force commander (GFC) relegating attack
aviation to the role of a QRF and/or reserve force. Attack aviation grew comfortable executing
these missions during wide area security operations supporting Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom. In order to be effective during combined arms maneuver, attack
aviation cannot be comfortable as only a QRF or reserve – they must plan attack missions that
support the GFC’s scheme of maneuver.
(U) The two types of attacks that an Attack Reconnaissance Company/Troop can execute are
hasty or deliberate. ATP 3-04.1, paragraph 2-35 states that, “based on the nature of the target
and complexity of the OE, Army Aviation attacks against enemy forces out of contact may be
conducted as hasty attacks, but most often are deliberate attacks.” This understanding is
important, because based on the operations tempo during the decisive action fight, multiple
maneuver battalions will be executing missions in support of the brigade combat team (BCT)
commander. Through understanding the friendly situation and scheme of maneuver, Attack
aviation can begin to plan attacks to support the GFC even when used as QRF. ATP 3-04.1,
paragraph 2-41 states:
(U) A hasty attack is an attack launched with the forces at hand and with minimal preparation to
maintain the momentum or take advantage of the enemy situation. The objectives are to
overwhelm the enemy quickly and seize the initiative. Speed is paramount; if momentum is lost,
the hasty attack can fail. An attack with speed, audacity, and boldness can offset the lack of
thorough preparation.
(U) DISCUSSION: Realizing that time available and vague understanding of the enemy situation
are inherent during the decisive action fight, the aviation task force must be able to determine
whether to execute hasty or deliberate attack planning (T&EO Conduct Aerial Attack Missions
(01-BN-8109), Step 22, Page 5, 21 August 2017). In order to generate options and provide
flexibility for the GFC, when given the QRF or reserve mission, aviation TF headquarters (HQs)
must conduct attack planning that supports the ground force. With the possibility of supporting
multiple maneuver battalions during the same operation, time becomes a precious commodity for
planning that aviation must invest wisely. The level of planning and detailed coordination of a
deliberate attack can overwhelm and overextend the aviation TF especially if there are other
missions or competing requirements to plan, execute, and track.
(U) With a good understanding of the friendly scheme of maneuver, Aviation can integrate by
conducting hasty attack planning to support the friendly movement and maneuver. Attack
aviation has speed, flexibility, and lethality that lends itself to being able to maneuver across an
area of operations at a moment’s notice in support of the GFC. However, without proper
planning, especially with understanding the friendly scheme of maneuver, attack aviation can
quickly desynchronize the friendly maneuver. Aviation units must utilize their time and
resources effectively, and are able to do so in planning hasty attacks.
(U) While attempting to change the paradigm and understanding of using attack aviation as QRF
versus another maneuver force in the decisive action environment, it becomes critical that
aviation planners understand the commander’s intent. When assigned as QRF, it is imperative
that Army aviation be able to properly plan and execute missions – typically an attack – at the
decisive time and point in support of the ground maneuver force. Through planning hasty
attacks that support each maneuver battalion the aviation TF will generate options for the GFC.
With planning multiple hasty attacks that support the GFC, this will ensure that attack aviation
comes to the fight with a good understanding of the friendly and enemy situation and are
integrated in such a manner that will reduce the probability of desynchronizing the combined
arms team.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: When assigned as QRF or the reserve force, Army
aviation must be able to understand the commander’s intent and conduct proper planning. It is
imperative to understand that as a BCT conducts its maneuver, the GFC relies on the speed and
flexibility of attack aviation in order to disrupt the enemy and gain momentum (ATP 3-04.1,
Paragraph 2-41). Attack aviation must become comfortable and excel at planning on order
attack missions that support multiple maneuver forces. Planning for hasty attacks will allow
integration of attack aviation that supports the ground force commander especially when the
time, place, and threat are unclear– which is typical when the ground force is maneuvering (ATP
3-04.1, Paragraph 2-42). Planning hasty attacks provide the most flexibility, understanding, and
time available for aviation TFs to properly synchronize and support the GFC while meeting their
intent.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Problem, Plan, People, Parts, Time, Tools and Training (P4T3) Integration in
Field Environment
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation commanders cannot build adequate combat power during their
rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) due to not formalizing and utilizing problem,
plan, people, parts, time, tools and training (P4T3) concepts and products to manage aviation
maintenance in a field environment. Training and evaluation outline (T&EO) # 01-CO-7730
steps 6a.-6k. are supported by the P4T3 process and are a critical step of this T&EO. Lack of, or
improper application of the P4T3 process leads to inconsistent maintenance actions that take
longer and produce less combat power.
(U) DISCUSSION: Soldiers do not understand what P4T3 is and are not trained in how it works
or how their unit utilizes the process. While Army techniques publication (ATP) 3-04.7 explains
the process and most standard operating procedures (SOP) state that the process will be used,
there is no training program in the unit. The SOPs fail to state how they will incorporate the
process and who will be the approving authority of the process. The use of P4T3 work sheets that
are formalized and instructions on how to utilize the work sheet would go a long way in
supporting the unit’s maintenance program. The process when utilized properly, reduces
maintenance down time and increases a unit’s ability to build combat power.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: ATP 3-04.7, Army Aviation Maintenance, paragraph
1-68, states P4T3 should always be used by commanders and staffs to analyze and coordinate
aviation maintenance. Regulating the process by removing ‘should’ from the statement ensures
that Army aviation uses this method to analyze and coordinate maintenance. Training of
maintenance managers becomes standardized by ensuring all managers Army wide utilize one
technique. Commanders need to not only state that P4T3 is to be utilized in in their units SOP
but also state how it will be used and through what channels the products of the P4T3 process
will be monitored and approved.
Improve OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in a Decisive Action Environment
OBSERVATION: In 2003, the RQ-7A entered service in the US Army. Its initial employment
was during the initial invasion into Iraq, supporting counter insurgency (COIN) operations in
Afghanistan, and conducting civil relief efforts in Africa Command (AFRICOM). For over 12
years, the tactical unmanned aircraft platform evolved in a forward operating base (FOB)
environment and trained at the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC). In 2015, with the Army moving back to a decisive action environment, the UAS
platoons and Shadow systems are slow to adapt. The recent Version 2 (V2) upgrade of the
Shadow system reengineered the control stations, ground data terminals, and the data link to the
aircraft. The upgrade also bolstered the flight endurance with an additional 2 hours by switching
all four aircraft to the “long-wing” variant. The Shadow system is now more intricate and
requires more time for maintenance and assembly. This additional time lengthens the
emplacement time for the V2 system. The observed system emplacement time for the Shadow
V1 Legacy system was between 4 to 6 hours with 4 hours required for displacement. The
Shadow V2 system emplacement time is between 6 to 10 hours with 4 to 8 hours for
displacement. These times do not account for site security, creating defensible positions, and
resetting fighter management.
DISCUSSION: The Shadow Tactical UAS system should lose its classification as a tactical
system. Because of its evolution in a COIN/FOB warfare environment the system has lost
mobility; the loss of mobility degrades the system’s ability to keep up with the movement speed
of a combat brigade while sacrificing security, safety, or standards. The expectation is that a
fully manned Shadow UAS platoon is able to provide 24 hours of coverage, putting the first
aircraft in the air within 6 hours of arrival on site. This number is only feasible if there is a
suitable recovery strip on the site. The V2 upgrade has further hindered the tactical aspect of the
Shadow UAS by increasing the number of single points of failure, requiring longer runways for a
heavier airframe, and extending preflight times through added procedures. Prior to the upgrade,
a preflight average was 1 hour; it is now 1.5 hours. It is now more common for preflight to have
errors or delays due to loading of communications security (COMSEC) in the aircraft or errors
with the data link modems. In order for a scheduled flight to make mission time, platoons will
have to build in additional operational check times by several hours. This further reduces the
Shadow system’s tactical advantage by delaying the first aircraft available and disrupting the
brigade combat team’s (BCTs) synchronization matrix. The platoons are still not operating or
performing at a pace that BCT needs in order to collect intelligence and perform manned-
unmanned teaming (MUM-T). Performing a site movement heavily disrupts flight operations
and can often result in damage to fragile equipment during displacement. With the upgrade to
the ground data terminals, the system manufacturer has been unable to keep up with orders due
to limited bench stock and excessive backorders. This leaves UAS platoons without a control
station for several months. The field service representative (FSR) preforms many repairs and
services to the system; this leaves units waiting on contractors to fulfil support requests.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The upgrades to the system should have focused on
increasing system reliability, enhancing the landing system to improve the tactical footprint, and
upgrading to a higher resolution camera in order to improve Shadow’s reconnaissance ability.
With funding available to upgrade the Tactical UAS, the Army should have chosen a more
mobile platform or spent more time consulting with entry level operators. If the Army intends to
retain the RQ-7BV2 system, it needs to change its UAS platoon into an unmanned aircraft
company utilizing the Grey Eagle construct as a reference. By moving a platoon from a combat
aviation brigade (CAB) to a UAS company in a BCT, there would be better focus providing
mission support for MUM-T and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) as a company
mission essential task list (METL), while still having enough equipment and personnel to buffer
the issue effect of the RQ-7BV2.
The Army should be testing other platform in BCT’s to evaluate their effectiveness in
comparison to the Shadow system. A brigade (BDE) level asset does not always require or
utilize the capabilities of the RQ-7B system. A cheaper and simpler system like Scan Eagle or
Silver Fox would be suitable to fill the role in a decisive action environment.
Improve OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Aviation Sustainment
OBSERVATION: Army aviation (AVN) battalion S4s and forward support companies (FSC)
fail to produce logistic synchronization (LOGSYNC) matrixes that synchronizes logistics across
all echelons and determines sustainment requirements. This is a lack of incorporating the
sustainment warfighting function into the planning and preparation of operations. Thus, the
production of annex F in the operations order (OPORD) is non-existent or paragraph 4 of the
OPORD lack inadequate sustainment key information and details.
DISCUSSION: Army aviation battalion S4s and forward support companies (FSC) operating in
the decisive action (DA) environments are required to maintain sustainment operations and
forecast sustainment requirements. S4s and FSCs must create logistic estimates and forecasting
of sustainment requirements. This entails understanding capabilities, capacity, assets available,
requirements, consumption, shortfalls, and mitigations. This will eventually tie into logistic
status reports (LOGSTATS). LOGSTATS are very critical in projecting sustainment
replenishment operations. Inaccurate LOGSTATS leads to unplanned or emergency resupply
operations. Additionally, having measurements depicted in each commodity tracker is essential
to forecasting logistic packages (LOGPACs) or resupply operations. In order to synchronize
logistics across the aviation battalion and all echelons, aviation S4s should conduct LOGSYNC
meetings. LOGSYNC meetings should capture all current commodity statuses (LOGSTATS),
sustainment missions next 72hrs, upcoming brigade combat team (BCT) and AVN missions,
transportation movement request (TMR) status, combat power, external supported recovery
(ESR) scrub, review changes/updates to LOGSYNC matrix, battle losses and replacement, and
issues or shortfalls with sustainment. Moreover, LOGSYNC meetings are the correct timing to
hand out the LOGSYNC matrix to the forward support companies in order for the unit to parallel
plan and facilitate proper troop leading procedures. In turn, the LOGSYNC matrix becomes
annex F of the OPORD.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Development of the LOGSYNC matrix should be a

collaborative effort between the S4 and FSC. The LOGSYNC matrix will synchronize all
sustainment units across all echelons. This will facilitate proper coordination with other
sustainment units across the battlefield and exert deliberate sustainment missions. To develop an
effective LOGSYNC matrix, companies must report accurate LOGSTATS to the S4, and S4
must conduct LOGSYNC meetings daily. Effective analog trackers with effective measurements
(percentages and color schemes; i.e. 100%-green) for all classes of supplies will assist with
capturing consumption rates, expenditures, and on hand/issues/receipts from current up to 72
hours. This will result in refined running estimates and accurate LOGSTATS. The LOGSYNC
matrix should depict sustainment missions 24-72 hours, by class and quantity of supply; start
point (SP) times; sustainment assets needed; combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB) to
brigade support battalion (BSB) and BSB to FSC (locations); aviation resupply operations
(aviation FSC to CSSB, aviation FSC to BSB, aviation FSC to field ammunition supply point
(FASP); and both tactical assembly area (TAA) forward arming and refueling procedures
(FARP) and jump FARP. After the production of the LOGSYNC matrix, this document needs to
get into the hands of the distribution platoon leader (PL) in order for parallel planning and
executing the troop leading procedures framework. Lastly, the LOGSYNC matrix becomes
annex F. The development and production of the LOGSYNC matrix repeats its cycles with
updates/changes once the delivery or receipt of the commodities has occurred. It is a live
document that receives updates daily.
(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Triggers for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation task force (AVN TF) fire support elements (FSE) at the National
Training Center (NTC) struggle with the planning and execution of suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD). Current aviation and field artillery doctrine does not address SEAD in detail
sufficiently required to enable field artillery Soldiers and aviators with the base knowledge
required to execute SEAD successfully. Often, the AVN TF commander wants SEAD planned
with a time-based trigger; however, due to unforeseen changes in the scheme of maneuver or the
timing of aircraft aviators find themselves within range of air defense artillery (ADA) system
during execution.
(U) DISCUSSION: According to ADRP 1-02 SEAD is any activity that neutralizes, destroys or
temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means.
Planning for SEAD is the joint responsibility of multiple entities in the brigade combat team
(BCT), to include: Fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), fires cell planners, brigade aviation
officer (BAO), brigade air liaison officer (ALO), and AVN TF fire support officer (FSO) (ATP
3-09.42). According to ATP 3-04.1, the AVN TF FSO plans, controls, and synchronizes all fire
support for operations to include coordinating Army and joint suppression of enemy air defenses.
The absence of doctrine on the planning considerations for effective SEAD fire requires
supporters and aviators to rely on experience instead of doctrine. There is often a capability gap
between the intent of the TF commander and the capabilities of SEAD when a time trigger is
used to initiate fires.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: AVN TF FSOs at the NTC often face an incomplete
targeting cycle when planning SEAD. When an ADA threat is identified, it is essential for SEAD
planning to begin immediately to ensure active suppression [artillery, mortar, or Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) fires] or passive suppression (electronic warfare) is planned and
coordinated at all echelons. Planning SEAD requires the FSO to coordinate with several
components of the AVN TF staff in addition to representatives on brigade (BDE) and division
(DIV) staffs. Additionally, the FSO must ensure the company/troop leadership have a shared
understanding of the scheme of fires and the subsequent triggers. As multiple AVN TF FSOs
have experienced in the decisive action training environment (DATE) at the NTC, planning
SEAD without effective collaboration results in a lack of understanding by aircrews, a
desynchronized plan, and an inability to overcome friction during execution. Cooperative
planning led by the AVN TF FSO is key to successful planning and execution of SEAD. While
planning, using an event-based trigger allows for flexibility for the FSE and the firing unit to
adjust with the timing of the aircraft within the effective range of enemy air defense weapon
systems.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Fighting for Communications and Building Situational Awareness: Positioning
AH-64 Support in a Forward Holding Area
(U) OBSERVATION: Brigades training at the National Training Center (NTC) increasingly
prefer to utilize the tactical control (TACON) AH-64 platoon in a hasty attack role against the
enemy’s counterattacking force. Key to this implementation is defining triggers to launch;
however, units continually struggle with mission command system integration into the brigade
combat team (BCT) whether it be upper or lower tactical internet (TI). This creates a latency
from the point of action through the relay to the aviation task force main command post (CP) and
finally to the TACON platoon. There is a general reluctance at the aviation task force level to
push forward with a forward arming and refueling point (FARP), tactical command post (TAC),
or holding area for the AH-64s to alleviate these problems.
(U) DISCUSSION: The tyranny of distance at the National Training Center is a fact. Units
routinely conduct operations more than 60km away from their tactical assembly area. Two-way
positive communications with the BCT must be the priority. When using the TACON AH-64
platoon in a hasty attack role, the aircrews must develop the situation rapidly with minimal
preparation to take advantage of the enemy situation. Speed is paramount; if momentum is lost,
the hasty attack can fail. Due to the rapidly evolving operational environment, the most
successful units at the NTC forward position to a tactical holding area in order to gain direct
communications with the BCT. A holding area is the last covered and concealed position prior to
the objective, which allows for final reconnaissance and coordination of assets by the
commander or air mission commander (AMC). It is normally located 2 to 5 kilometers behind
the forward line of troops (FLOT). Forward positioning is essential in order to combat the delay
of communicating triggers to launch, eliminating unnecessary travel time to the objective, and
allows the aircrews to develop their situational awareness of the operational environment directly
through the BCT. The BCT commander or his delegate can personally direct the AH-64 support
to the exact time and place throughout the entire BCT area of operations with little to no latency.
This approach greatly increases the effectiveness of attack aviation support massing fires at the
decisive time and place. There are some reservations to employing this approach due to the fact
the aviation task force main CP potentially can lose mission command of the TACON AH-64
platoon, but these concerns are negated by forward positioning a TAC at a FARP or co-locating
the TAC with the BCT. The TAC is an agile and flexible mission command node which greatly
extends the commander’s tactical reach. Currently, aviation units are not exercising this crucial
mission command extension to gain situational awareness direct from the BCT, but are relying
on upper TI mission command systems 40-60kms to the rear in their main CP.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Aviation task forces should deploy a FARP with a
TAC co-located within direct frequency modulated (FM) communications range of the BCT.
Additionally, in a separate location from the FARP to maximize survivability, the aviation task
force should position the TACON AH-64 platoon forward in a holding area 2 to 5 km from the
FLOT. This allows the aircrews to rapidly develop situational awareness and the trigger to
launch is immediate with decreased travel time.
(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Evasion Planning in a Decisive Action Environment
(U) OBSERVATION: Observations of multiple rotations conclude that aviation units and
individual crews are not conducting evasion planning based on their specific mission sets,
current friendly/enemy situation template (SITTEMP), and a lack in understanding the
operational environment. Individuals that develop evasion plans of action (EPA)’s, are typically
using a one-size fits all approach to their immediate evasion/and greater than 48 hour evasion
tactics. Crews/individuals demonstrate proficiency in knowing and understanding the
information contained in the special instructions (SPINS); however, the EPA they produce for
their respective missions do not contain the pertinent information, which is critical to recovery
planning and execution.
(U) DISCUSSION: Commanders must determine the necessity of their unit to prepare EPAs
prior to conducting combat missions. Units and individuals should prepare an EPA for each
mission conducted or when conditions change. Before executing a mission, crews should brief
actions to establish how an individual or group intends to evade capture in case they become
isolated. Units must take a bottom-up approach in preparation that will inform the higher
command the actions isolated personnel (IP) intend to make while evading capture. Preparing
EPAs must reference current air tactical orders (ATO)’s, SPINS information, operation orders
(OPORDs) or fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs). Units must establish personnel recovery (PR)
standard operating procedures (SOP)’s that standardize the production, distribution, and
collection of EPAs and the information required to complete the EPA.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Adding a section to the mission briefing process and
a corresponding addition to the mission briefing officers (MBOs) questions/checks, would
establish a sense of quality control to ensure crewmember(s) are conducting adequate planning.
This would also ensure there is a useable product that supports recovery planning and execution
efforts. Establish relevant policy/guidance in the unit PR SOP, which establishes a standard of
how the unit receives, maintains, and processes EPAs. One technique of maintaining the
paperwork is when crewmembers turn in their risk assessments to flight operations, they attach a
copy of the EPA, and it is then centrally located in the current operations (CUOPS) section of the
unit tactical operations center (TOC). Another technique is to transmit digitally via SharePoint
or email (note classification requirements increase when the document is filled).
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Timelines
(U) OBSERVATION: Managing timelines effectively during large-scale ground combat

operations proves to be a challenge to aviation task force (TF) headquarters (HQ). Three key
areas that deserve focus are understanding higher HQ’s planning horizon/cycle, early allocation
of initial timelines, and translating event-based triggers to time-based triggers. Any of these
three areas, if overlooked or not given adequate time for consideration, can desynchronize
aviation assets and the ground maneuver force.
(U) DISCUSSION: Without understanding the higher headquarters’ planning horizon, it is

difficult to conduct planning and provide support that takes full advantage of the flexibility that
aviation assets bring to the battlefield. Typically, the ground force produces and disseminates
orders to subordinate units and the aviation TF with 24 hours or less before execution. At this
time aviation TF begins mission planning – arguably, too late in the cycle. Without
understanding the higher HQ’s timeline, the aviation TF will not conduct the appropriate touch
points to send and receive information either limiting the aviation TF’s ability to provide support
or time to plan missions effectively. Knowing subordinate timelines of execution and planning
will also increase the TF’s understanding and enable them to conduct parallel planning more
effectively.
(U) Successful units understand their available time and effectively allocate it for planning,
preparing, and executing. Units that typically struggle with supporting and synchronizing
aviation assets into the ground force commander’s (GFC) scheme of maneuver (SOM) never
fully come to understand their time available. Aviation TFs must understand their time available
early on and allocate it effectively. Without allocating times and understanding how they are
constrained, aviation TFs will fall behind in the operations process.
(U) Understanding and identifying the trigger to launch aviation assets, whether attack or assault
forces, is often a complicated process in itself. Furthermore, translating event-based triggers into
time-based triggers for aviation planning is even more difficult. Failure to do so makes it highly
likely that aviation will not synchronize with the GFC to enable massing of fires to defeat the
enemy decisively.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The higher HQ, operational, planning, and enemy
(HOPE) timeline method can be useful for visually displaying and understanding the supported
HQ’s planning horizon. Adding subordinate’s time to the HOPE timeline helps to visualize and
understand the subordinate companies’ capabilities, making it a HOPE-(S) timeline. The
importance of aviation liaisons (LNOs) in helping to shape aviation operations at the brigade
combat team (BCT)/supported HQs, while providing this information to the aviation TF so they
can conduct parallel planning, is invaluable. When this link for sharing information between the
BCT/supported HQs and aviation TF is broken, it is often when aviation TFs conduct planning
outside the scope of the BCT’s anticipated support and usually leads to desynchronization of the
plan. The LNO must understand their importance while providing useful information and
expertise to the supported HQs, while actively sharing information to the aviation TF to allow for
parallel planning.
(U) In order to continue/execute parallel planning, the TF must allocate its own timeline for
operations early and keep it updated. Proper and early allocation of timelines will allow the TF
staff to understand priorities, synchronize the warfighting functions (WfF), and provide the
subordinate companies with time to conduct their own mission planning while continuously
executing. Units must constantly update and refine their timelines to be effective and maximize
their resources.
(U) Translating event-based triggers to time-based triggers relies heavily on the intelligence WfF
by properly accounting for the enemy’s and friendly’s courses of action to build potential timed
phase lines that translate events into time. Even though it is not an exact science, investing
planning and resources into accounting for the translation from trigger based to time based will
enable aviation TFs to remain flexible, adaptable, and more likely to be at the decisive point and
time when required.
(U) To achieve success at the NTC and in the decisive action fight against a peer or near peer
threat, aviation TFs must understand their time available. Increasing their interaction and
understanding of the GFC’s planning horizon through LNOs and face to face meetings is critical.
During this time, the aviation TF can shape their support, nest it within the GFC’s SOM, and
conduct parallel planning at the TF level with a properly allocated timeline. Aviation units are
time driven organizations and the ability to translate event-based triggers into time-based triggers
must be reconciled. The intelligence WfF drives this area in the ability to put marks on a
map/common operational picture (COP) that corresponds to time. The aviation TF is then
responsible for ensuring they have accomplished planning that allows them the flexibility to be
ready to execute in the fog of war. Focusing on these three areas will enable aviation TFs to
successfully support and synchronize with the GFC.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Planning and Executing Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) and Jump
Forward Arming and Refueling Point (JFARP) operations
(U) OBSERVATION: Army aviation battalions’ S4s, S3s, and forward support companies (FSC)
fail to effectively plan and execute FARP and Jump JFARP operations. This is due to a lack of
incorporating the sustainment warfighting function into operational planning and rehearsals.
(U) DISCUSSION: Army aviation battalions’ S3s, S4s, and FSCs operating in the decisive
action (DA) environments are required to deliberately plan FARP and JFARP operations and its
requirements (fuel service points, fuel, and ammunition). FSC commanders are responsible for
accomplishing the FARP mission and must assist the S3 in formulating the FARP plan to
synchronize and effectively support multiple mission lines. Additionally, the FSC commander
must coordinate fuel and ammunition requirements with the S-4. The S3 in conjunction with the
S4 must calculate the amount of ammunition required for mission lines. For fuel, the FSC and
S4 must understand capabilities, capacity, assets available, consumption, shortfalls, and
mitigation. Therefore, they must accurately forecast fuel requirements in order to effectively
support mission lines. Site selection is very significant to the execution of FARP and JFARP
operations. With site selection, the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time and support
available, and civil considerations (METT-C) must be heavily considered and synchronized
across all staff sections and key players (S2, S3, S6, SWO, etc.). Lastly, army aviation battalions
must visualize and create a shared understanding of FARP and JFARP operations (sustainment)
during rehearsals in support of mission lines in order to mitigate friction points and increase
transition of multiple air frames during execution.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Effectively executing the military decision making
process (MDMP) or rapid decision making process (RDMP) framework focused on sustainment
mission analysis will facilitate deliberate planning of FARP and JFARP operations. Integration
of the FSC with S3 and S4 to include FSC participation with assault and attack company level
planning and rehearsal of operations will create a shared understanding across multiple mission
lines and mitigate friction points. FSC and S4 need to understand fuel and ammunition on
hand/available vs. requirements; i.e. fuel calculation for FARP and JFARP is mission duration x
number of aircrafts x fuel consumption in gallon per hour = fuel requirements. For ammunition,
the S4 must calculate the required supply rate (RSR; rounds per weapon per day and is used to
state the ammunition requirements) against the controlled supply rate (CSR; rounds per day per
unit or weapon system for a given period) in order to fill ammunition shortages. RSR is the
estimated amount of ammunition needed to sustain the operations of a combat force without
restrictions for a specific period and CSR is the rate of ammunition consumption. S4 must
synchronize with the S3 and S2 with the type and amount of ammunition needed for the mission
based on the engagement criteria and disposition/composition of the enemy. Lastly, specifically
the JFARP, considering METT-C in site selection during mission analysis of the MDMP/RDMP
framework will facilitate capturing blind spots during operational planning.
• Mission: ground tactical plan, mission command constraints, personnel and equipment
configuration, number and type of aircrafts, air space management, and security and
survivability.
• Enemy: capabilities, posture, weapon systems.
• Terrain and weather: terrain and surface analysis, tactical dispersion of aircraft and
vehicles, terrain folds and reverse slopes for cover and concealment, ground main supply
routes, air avenues of approach (ingress and egress), sand, weather hazards (wind or
rain), and mobility constraints
• Time and support available: duration of support, distance constraints (FARP/JFARP to
objective and JFARP to supply point distribution, FARP set-up, and supply distribution
methods.
(U) Additionally, establishing holding areas allows aircraft to maintain the unit’s dictated
readiness condition (REDCON) status, and consider an aircraft maintenance pad to ensure
refueling and rearming pads are not congested that could degrade FARP operations. Developing
a FARP standard operating procedure (SOP) outlined in ATP 3-04.94 will facilitate parallel
planning at the company and platoon level. Moreover, deliberate planning needs to occur and
requires integration of the FSC, the staff, assault and attack companies in order to effectively
employ FARP and JFARP operations.
ATP 3-04.94, Forward Arming and Refueling Points

ADRP 4-0, Sustainment
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: P4T3 (Problem, Plan, People, Parts, Time, Tools, and Training) methodology at
Home Station to Support Expeditionary Maintenance
(U) OBSERVATION: Observations from multiple rotations conclude that aviation units and
aviation maintenance personnel struggle with returning aircraft to an operational status in a
timely manner. Aviation maintenance units are attributing expeditionary maintenance (the field
environment), mixed model design series (MDS) Taskforce organization and inexperienced
maintainers to these maintenance delays. By addressing these issues, aircraft down time can
significantly be reduced with proper P4T3 execution.
(U) DISCUSSION: Rotational unit air mission command (AMC) commanders routinely state
their unit’s weaknesses are in expeditionary maintenance, supporting a MDS aircraft not organic
to their unit, and inexperienced maintenance personnel. The difficulty in planning for a field
environment, sustainment/logistic capabilities to support mixed MDS organizations, and
inexperienced maintenance personnel are actually symptoms brought on by how units are
approaching expeditionary maintenance. The inherent limitations when assembling an aviation
task force can make it even more difficult to prepare and train all the necessary enablers to
achieve success.
(U) There are challenges associated with stocking adequate parts and special tools for mixed
MDS organizations that sometimes are unavoidable due to unscheduled maintenance and
competing priorities at home station. Units who begin the military decision making process
(MDMP) early and adapt the P4T3 methodology to the challenges associated with task force
organization and expeditionary maintenance typically perform better than those who treat the
P4T3 process as a half-hearted verbal battle drill. The P4T3 methodology outlined in ATP 3-04.7
is widely understood as a common sense platform for effective leadership, oversight, and
management of maintenance.
(U) Units who fail to execute a formal system at home station face a steep learning curve when
the mission requires maintenance operations in a field environment. The failures encountered
with field maintenance are usually characterized by failing to identify all the necessary
requirements before starting a scheduled maintenance task or failing to properly troubleshoot an
unscheduled maintenance event, all of which are fundamentals in the P4T3 methodology.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Commanders should implement a formal system of

the P4T3 methodology at home station. A successful system at home station allows leaders,
supervisors and junior Soldiers to build the correct muscle memory when tackling maintenance
problems/tasks regardless of the environment.
(U) A successful P4T3 methodology demonstrated by rotational units include a standardized

document explained in the unit’s standard operating procedure (SOP) and includes multiple
checks and balances conducted by the unit’s production control, quality control, and technical
supply supervisors. Leaders, supervisors, and Soldiers who execute and enforce the P4T3
methodology at home station will build a maintenance team capable of preserving combat power
while refining their expeditionary capabilities. These successful units are also able to provide
better running estimates and forecasts when it comes to sustaining aviation maintenance. Units
that fail to implement a formal system of the P4T3 methodology will continue to expose
themselves to overwhelming friction and hard lessons learned while failing to generate combat
power in a field environment.
2017
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Army Aviation in support of Sustainment Operations
(U) OBSERVATION: Army aviation is rarely employed in support of sustainment operations in

the decisive action (DA) training environment at the National Training Center (NTC).
Conducting air movements is a mission essential task (CATS Task #: 01-BN-8110) for aviation
task forces (TF), but the capability to employ air movements in support of (ISO) ground force
sustainment is rarely, if ever, utilized.
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation TFs rarely establish a well-defined system to process and plan
sustainment routes during their 14 day rotation. The TF does not conduct sufficient planning or
commit resources to provide the aircrews the requisite information to operate successfully in a
DA environment. On numerous occasions, the lift aircrew departs the aviation TF tactical
assembly area (TAA) with nothing more than a handful of frequencies and grids. Often, both the
grids and the frequencies are outdated and there is no information regarding the cargo size,
weight, or loading requirements. The DA environment requires TFs to constantly update their
common operating picture in order to (IOT) enable the successful employment of aviation assets.
(U) Brigade aviation elements (BAE) have their own internal set of friction points that do not
foster an environment that supports successful integration of aviation into the concept of support.
First, the BAE does not initially establish a meaningful relationship with the support officer
(SPO) and brigade combat team (BCT) S4. The relationship between the SPO and the S4 are
integral in the synchronization of sustainment assets. The physical network analysis is rarely
used to identify areas on the battlefield where aviation should or must be used compared to areas
where ground sustainment assets are the primary course of action. There seems to be no clear
priorities set for which cargo is moved via air vice ground (ATP 3-04.1, para. 6-60). Second, the
BAE does not correctly anticipate sustainment requirements caused by operations. For instance,
following a known main battle, there is very little planning for anticipated sustainment
requirements following the culmination of the operation. Third, the BAE, SPO, and S4 treat an
air mission request (AMR) as a “fire and forget” mission. Tomorrow will not be the same as
today in the DA environment, but the AMRs are rarely updated to provide current and accurate
information.
(U) The AMR processes that BAEs, SPOs, and S4s have grown accustomed to using from
multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan are not dynamic enough to support the speed of
the DA environment. An AMR from forward operating base (FOB) to FOB did not require the
detailed planning an air assault would typically warrant. The aviation community consistently
does significantly less planning ISO air movement compared to an air assault. An air movement
is defined as operations to enable the ground force commander to sustain the tempo of
operations, extend tactical reach, overcome complex terrain and sustain operations to maintain a
position of relative advantage over the enemy (ATP 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment, 6-1).
The only difference between an air movement and an air assault is the objective of the ground
force, but the difference in the level of planning associated with each MET is astonishing. The
BAE and the SPO do not efficiently analyze the necessary movements and develop a plan to
accomplish the requirements.
(U) The intelligence officers at echelon do not actively participate in the planning of aviation in
support of sustainment. The AMR process creates an approved mission with minimal input from
the current threat picture. Successful BAEs have a firm understanding of the enemy situation
and make recommendations to best mitigate the risk to aviation. Once the AMR is approved and
the aviation TF allocates resources against the AMR, the threat analysis both enroute and at the
helicopter landing zone (HLZ) are routinely overlooked. Comparing the threat analysis and
mitigation methods employed for an air assault versus an air movement further reinforces the
lack of intelligence in support of sustainment missions.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The aviation TF needs to create the systems required
to efficiently process AMRs to enable air movements to support a dynamic battlefield. The TF
needs to integrate staff planning to ensure the most efficient utilization of aviation ISO
sustainment. The integration of staff functions during the planning process or military decision
making process (MDMP) will allow the TF to understand the risks associated with each mission
and allow staff planners to optimize the process.
(U) The BAE, SPO, and S4 must develop relationships, potentially through combined training,
prior to a rotation at the NTC. Their relationship ensures efficient utilization of assets and helps
to provide the BCT commander with increased operational reach and responsiveness (ATP 3-
04.1, Para. 6-49). The SPO and S4 consistently anticipate logistics requirements of the
operations, but those requirements are not integrated with the BAE to provide assets during the
critical period following major operations.
(U) The BAE must remain more engaged with each AMR until mission execution. The systems
most BCTs and aviation TFs create do not account for the dynamic nature of the DA battlefield
(ATP 3-04.1, Para. 6-45). Most systems are modeled off of a static Afghanistan, FOB to FOB
transport network rather than a responsive planning process to enable each mission. The
BAE/SPO should collect the required sustainment missions, create a viable plan to allocate
resources, and develop a course of action, such as; hub and spoke or point to point (ATP 3-04.1,
Para. 6-9). Further, there is rarely a system to ensure the correct parts and people get to the
correct locations. The BAE/SPO can integrate a team to ride on the aircraft to ensure efficient
and accurate delivery of cargo and personnel.
(U) To facilitate the efficient loading and unloading of personnel and cargo, every unit utilizing
aircraft for logistical purposes needs to identify appropriate HLZs. These HLZs need to be in
accordance with FM 3-21.38, Pathfinder Operations, and should accommodate all types of
aircraft. These logistical HLZs should be separate from any medical HLZs as sustainment
operations may prohibit other aircraft from landing and interfering with MEDEVAC operations.
Each HLZ should have an associated call-sign and frequency provided with the HLZ diagram to
the aviation TF to enable on site coordination. It is imperative that when units move, the aviation
TF is notified so pre-planned missions are not flown to old assembly areas wasting resources and
increasing risk unnecessarily (ATP 3-04.1, Para. 6-26).
(U) Aviation staffs need to conduct detailed planning ISO sustainment. AMRs are consistently
treated as a task rather than a mission. When allocating the total available staff planning hours a
balance needs to be reached to support the more complex missions while not completely ignoring
the AMR process.
(U) The DA fight creates a number of challenges to maneuver and sustainment. The argument
that United States forces will only enter a battlefield once the logistical pipelines are well
established is not a valid assumption. BCT and aviation TFs have the assets now to cope with
the uncertainty of maneuver warfare, the challenge is to create lasting systems and relationships
capable of sustaining the tempo of operations and extending the tactical and operational reach of
the combined arms team.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Task Force (TF) Logistics during Military Decision Making Process
(MDMP)
(U) OBSERVATION: The sustainment cell (logistics) running estimates, data analysis, or inputs
from the aviation TF logistics officer (S4) are rarely utilized during the MDMP or considered
during hasty planning of future operations. During the course of action (COA) development and
analysis steps, the S4 assessment of the logistics feasibility is not integrated into the operational
plan, which inhibits the development of a concept of support for the COA (CATS Task: 01-BN-
5100).
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation TFs execute the MDMP or abbreviated hasty planning processes
without key inputs from the TF S4. Logistics are considered, but rarely planned or synchronized
in parallel with the operation. The plan is developed without reference to logistic feasibility or
deficiencies causing the S4 and logistic support companies to remain in a reactive posture, or
worse, fail to provide the logistic support required to enable successful mission execution.
(U) The S4 must be integrated into the operations planning process. As stated in ADRP 4-0, it is
essential that sustainment and operation planners work closely to synchronize all of the
warfighting functions, in particular, sustainment. The ability to maximize the combat power
necessary to support decisive action operations is heavily dependent on how effective a unit
plans, coordinates, and synchronizes logistics (ATP 3-04.1). Regardless of the mission (offense,
defense, stability operations), it is imperative for aviation units to anticipate and forecast the
support and supplies necessary to successfully maintain the appropriate tempo and endurance
through the entire range of military operations (FM 3-04). It is the S4’s responsibility to track,
analyze, anticipate and coordinate all of the supplies, activities and systems to effectively
provide external and internal logistical support to the mission (ATP 3-04.1). As the logistics
subject matter expert, it is imperative the S4 is well integrated into the MDMP to ensure the
logistical requirements of the plan are properly assessed (ATTP 5-0.1).
(U) Integrating the S4 into the operations planning process not only provides the staff and
commander with critical logistical analysis, limitations and inputs; but it also enables the S4 to
proactively procure the necessary logistic support and supplies required for the mission due to
the synchronization during planning. The operations order paragraph IV and annex F
(sustainment) developed by the S4 is specifically tailored to the mission; enhancing the
responsiveness, flexibility, and integration of logistical support (ATP 3-04.1). Including the S4
into the plan will allow sustainment to enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and
prolong endurance of combat assets (ADRP 4-0).
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Utilize the S4’s knowledge and expertise for key
inputs specific to the mission during the MDMP. The knowledge, supply data analysis, and
relationships with logical supporting units the S4 possesses must be integrated with the
operation. Participation in the planning process enables the S4’s ability to anticipate
requirements and coordinate the logistical operations to meet mission demand. Understanding
logistical feasibility and limitations is just as critical for operational planners to understand, in
order to, mitigate the plan from being unsupportable due to logistics. Sustainment must be
synchronized with operations; ensuring the S4 has a seat at the planning table will support this
end state.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Operations in the Vicinity of Urban Centers
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation operations in the vicinity of urban centers during decisive action
(DA) operations against a near peer threat with more numerous and more sophisticated air
defense (AD) systems requires additional consideration for maneuver commanders.
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation forces need to conduct in depth analysis in selecting attack by fire
(ABF), helicopter landing zones (HLZ), and restricted operating zones (ROZ) when planning and
executing urban operations (CATS 01-2-5198, Conduct Aviation Mission Planning/Preparation).
In addition, due to personnel recovery and collateral damage considerations, risk must be
properly identified, mitigated, and approved at the appropriate levels.
(FOUO) Aviation operations in an urban environment are more challenging in DA operations

due to the ease with which AD threats can maneuver and utilize cover and concealment within
the urban environment. Aircraft may no longer have the freedom of maneuver they have enjoyed
in recent conflicts in the urban environment. In the DA fight, the opposing force (OPFOR)
operates with crew-served weapons and AD threats including man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS), ZSU-23-4s, or SA-22 systems which often operate in conjunction with radar
acquisition and targeting capabilities. These threat systems can easily engage aircraft employing
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) historically used in the stability operations of Iraq and
Afghanistan. In urban environments, opposing forces (OPFOR) can quickly conceal themselves
from observation by repositioning and using permanent structures for cover and concealment.
The OPFOR can easily operate these weapon systems from inside or outside structures, or from
the super-surface (top of structures), surface, or subsurface (ATP 3-06.1, Aviation Urban
Operations, 2016).
(FOUO) For attack aircraft and information collection (IC) platforms, observation angles
continually change as aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) maneuver in vicinity of
urban areas. An open, busy market could rapidly be masked by a tall structure resulting in a loss
of positive identification by the observer. To mitigate this, aircraft may need to operate at higher
altitudes, which allows for a larger aerial perspective with minimal blind spots. The addition of
the common missile warning system (CMWS), Modern Target Acquisition and Designation
Sight (MTADS), Aircraft Survivability Product Improvement (ASPI), and lack of radar threats
have allowed aircraft to operate at altitude with relative immunity in recent conflicts. However,
operating at higher altitudes expose aircraft to radar threats. An obvious solution is to operate at
lower altitudes, thus increasing the survivability against radar AD systems employed within
urban environments (ATP 3-06.1, 2016).
(U) Attack aircraft may also increase standoff to remain outside the weapon engagement zone
(WEZ) of radar threats and operate from stationary battle positions providing cover from enemy
weapon systems. However, this limits the aircrew’s perspective throughout the city’s urban
valleys and provides an opportunity for enemy forces to maneuver on stationary aircraft.
Increasing standoff will also increase munition dispersion which increases the potential for
collateral damage. Collateral damage caused by attack rotary wing aviation will result in further
supporting the insurgent information operations, increases their candidates for recruiting, and the
potential for insurgency the ground force commander will have to contend with during stability
operations. Careful consideration to risk (operational/strategic) must be addressed prior to
attacking targets in urban environments, especially during operations against a near peer threat
that has numerous and sophisticated AD systems forcing attack aircraft to operate from greater
standoff distances.
(FOUO) The combination of attack and unmanned aircraft, known as manned-unmanned

teaming (MUM-T), is a highly effective solution in the urban environment. MUM-T enables the
commander to gain and maintain contact with enemy forces in an urban environment. MUM-T
allows the shooting aircraft to maintain standoff from the urban area, thus limiting aircraft threat
exposure time, while the unmanned aircraft identifies targets. Specifically armed UAS’s like the
Grey Eagle are particularly well suited for employment in urban environments due to their ability
to not only identify, but also engage targets with their point target system (Hellfire missiles).
Multiple unmanned aircraft over different objectives could use a smaller number of attack
aircraft than may then quickly transition between targets. Target handovers can be achieved
through a visual handover from one platform to another or remote shots can be executed to
further limit shooter exposure (ATP 3-06.1, 2016).
(FOUO) The same applies to UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft conducting aerial mission command or
air assaults to helicopter landing zones (HLZ) for urban air assault missions. Often, commanders
want continuous observation of the objective from the mission command aircraft in order to
provide adaptable mission command during execution when the situation rapidly changes. An
observed TTP is for mission command aircraft to orbit at altitude in vicinity of the urban
objective area. Again, this increases the risk of AD engagement due to the aircraft operating
within the WEZ. The risk is even greater when conducting air assaults or air movements as a
single engagement by an AD system could render an assault force ineffective. Selecting HLZs
within the city allows the assault force to quickly mass; however, limited HLZ selection also
allows the enemy to more easily predict where the assault force is landing and to prepare a
defense (ATP 3-06.1, 2016). The assault force should consider the threat when developing the
ground tactical plan and potentially land at a secure HLZ, an HLZ outside of the city perimeter,
or an HLZ that is a terrain feature away and include false insertion HLZs in the air assault
landing plan.
(U) The aviation mission survivability officers (AMSO) within the brigade aviation element
(BAE) and the Army aviation task force (TF) are specifically trained in the capabilities and
limitations of aircraft survivability equipment and how AD systems will impact the use of Army
aviation in an urban environment. The AMSO must be an active participant during mission
analysis and course of action development to ensure aviation mission survivability is understood
by commanders (ATP 3-04.2, Aviation Mission Survivability, 2015). In addition, identifying the
risk of an aircraft shoot down over an urban environment presents personnel recovery challenges
and risks that must be identified and mitigated by the staff and approved by the commander.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: (U) To mitigate the AD threat, ground and aviation
planners should consider the AD threat and select ABFs out of the threat WEZs. Planners must
consider the increased standoff distances may not allow the aircraft to acquire and engage targets
due to limited field of view and may increase collateral damage in the urban environment. The
collateral damage risk must be addressed during planning and the risk must be approved at the
appropriate level during execution. In addition, the integration of armed UAS as an attack
platform into the scheme of maneuver and the utilization of MUM-T will mitigate risks to the
aviation and the ground forces during stability operations. Armed UAS, such as Gray Eagle, are
more likely to operate with greater freedom, are less likely to be shot down (besides radar
threats), but most importantly, have the ability to engage point targets with their Hellfire
missiles.
(U) To mitigate the AD threat, ground and aviation planners should select multiple HLZs,
Mission Command restricted operating zones (ROZs), and ABFs either out of the WEZ or one
terrain feature away. Though this increases the distance the ground force must move and
maneuver, it increases survivability and mitigates the risk of losing an aircraft and/or ground
forces due to AD threat. Also, mission command aircraft must operate a safe distance from the
urban objective area and at lower altitudes. Seeing the objective area from the mission command
aircraft should not be a factor in selecting a mission command ROZ. Instead, planners should
consider line of sight communication capabilities and position the ROZ to enable the maneuver
commander to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations.
(U) Aviation TFs must communicate their unique capabilities to supported units in order to
achieve the desired effects of the ground force commander while reducing risk to aviation.
Commanders should also incorporate the AMSO within the BAE or in the Aviation TF to
provide subject matter expertise on aircraft survivability equipment capabilities and limitations
in order to assist in mission analysis and course of action (COA) development when utilizing
Army aviation in an urban environment.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation in support of Sustainment Operations in Decisive Action Training

Environment (DATE)
(U) OBSERVATION: Army Aviation is rarely employed in support of sustainment operations in

DATE National Training Center (NTC).
(U) DISCUSSION: (U) Conducting air movements is a mission essential task (CATS Task #: 01-
BN-8110) for aviation task forces (TF), but the capability to employ air movements in support of
(ISO) ground force sustainment is rarely, if ever, utilized. Aviation TFs rarely establish a well-
defined system to process and plan sustainment routes during their 14 day rotation. The TF does
not conduct sufficient planning or commit resources to provide the aircrews the requisite
information to operate successfully in a DA environment. On numerous occasions, the lift
aircrew departs the aviation TF tactical assembly area (TAA) with nothing more than a handful
of frequencies and grids. Often, both the grids and the frequencies are outdated and there is no
information regarding the cargo size, weight, or loading requirements. The DA environment
requires TFs to constantly update their common operating picture in order to (IOT) enable the
successful employment of aviation assets.
(U) Brigade aviation elements (BAE) have their own internal set of friction points that do not
foster an environment that supports successful integration of aviation into the concept of support.
First, the BAE does not initially foster a meaningful relationship with the support officer (SPO)
and brigade combat team (BCT) S4. The relationship between the SPO and the S4 are integral in
the synchronization of sustainment assets. The physical network analysis is rarely used to
identify areas on the battlefield where aviation should or must be used compared to areas where
ground sustainment assets are the primary course of action. There seems to be no clear priorities
set for which cargo is moved via air vice ground (ATP 3-04.1, Para. 6-60). Second, the BAE
does not correctly anticipate sustainment requirements caused by operations. For instance,
following a known main battle, there is very little planning for anticipated sustainment
requirements following the culmination of the operation. Third, the BAE, SPO, and S4 treat an
air mission request (AMR) as a “fire and forget” mission. Tomorrow will not be the same as
today in the DA environment, but the AMRs are rarely updated to provide current and accurate
information.
(U) The AMR processes that BAEs, SPOs, and S4s have grown accustomed to using from
multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan are not dynamic enough to support the speed of
the DA environment. An AMR from forward operating base (FOB) to FOB did not require the
detailed planning an air assault would typically warrant. The aviation community consistently
does significantly less planning ISO an air movement compared to an air assault. An air
movement is defined as operations to enable the ground force commander to sustain the tempo of
operations, extend tactical reach, overcome complex terrain and sustain operations to maintain a
position of relative advantage over the enemy (ATP 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment, 6-1).
The only difference between an air movement and an air assault is the objective of the ground
force, but the difference in the level of planning associated with each mission essential task
(MET) is astonishing. The BAE and the SPO do not efficiently analyze the necessary
movements and develop a plan to accomplish the requirements.
(U) The intelligence officers at echelon do not actively participate in the planning of aviation in
support of sustainment. The AMR process creates an approved mission with minimal input from
the current threat picture. Successful BAEs have a firm understanding of the enemy situation
and make recommendations to best mitigate the risk to aviation. Once the AMR is approved and
the aviation TF allocates resources against the AMR, the threat analysis both enroute and at the
helicopter landing zone (HLZ) are routinely overlooked. Comparing the threat analysis and
mitigation methods employed for an air assault versus an air movement further reinforces the
lack of intelligence in support of sustainment missions.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: (U) The aviation TF needs to create the systems
required to efficiently process AMRs to enable air movements to support a dynamic battlefield.
The TF needs to integrate staff planning to ensure the most efficient utilization of aviation ISO
sustainment. The integration of staff functions during the planning process or military decision
making process (MDMP) will allow the TF to understand the risks associated with each mission
and allow staff planners to optimize the process.
(U) The BAE, SPO, and S4 must develop relationships, potentially through combined training,
prior to a rotation at the NTC. Their relationship ensures efficient utilization of assets and helps
to provide the BCT commander with increased operational reach and responsiveness (ATP 3-
04.1, Para. 6-49). The SPO and S4 consistently anticipate logistics requirements of the
operations, but those requirements are not integrated with the BAE to provide assets during the
critical period following major operations.
(U) The BAE must remain more engaged with each AMR until mission execution. The systems
most brigade combat teams (BCTs) and aviation TFs create do not account for the dynamic
nature of the DA battlefield (ATP 3-04.1, para. 6-45). Most systems are modeled off of a static
Afghanistan, FOB to FOB transport network rather than a responsive planning process to enable
each mission. The BAE/SPO should collect the required sustainment missions, create a viable
plan to allocate resources, and develop a course of action, such as; hub and spoke or point to
point (ATP 3-04.1, para. 6-9). Further, there is rarely a system to ensure the correct parts and
people get to the correct locations. The BAE/SPO can integrate a team to ride on the aircraft to
ensure efficient and accurate delivery of cargo and personnel.
(U) To facilitate the efficient loading and unloading of personnel and cargo, every unit utilizing
aircraft for logistical purposes needs to identify appropriate HLZs. These HLZs need to be in
accordance with FM 3-21.38, Pathfinder Operations, and should accommodate all types of
aircraft. These logistical HLZs should be separate from any medical HLZs as sustainment
operations may prohibit other aircraft from landing and interfering with medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC) operations. Each HLZ should have an associated call-sign and frequency
provided with the HLZ diagram to the aviation TF to enable on site coordination. It is imperative
that when units move, the aviation TF is notified so pre-planned missions are not flown to old
assembly areas wasting resources and increasing risk unnecessarily (ATP 3-04.1, para. 6-26).
(U) Aviation staffs need to conduct detailed planning ISO sustainment. AMRs are consistently
treated as a task rather than a mission. When allocating the total available staff planning hours a
balance needs to be reached to support the more complex missions while not completely ignoring
the AMR process.
(U) The DA fight creates a number of challenges to maneuver and sustainment. The argument
that United States forces will only enter a battlefield once the logistical pipelines are well
established is not a valid assumption. BCT and aviation TFs have the assets now to cope with
the uncertainty of maneuver warfare, the challenge is how to create lasting systems and
relationships capable of sustaining the tempo of operations and extending the tactical and
operational reach of the combined arms team.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Task Force (TF) Products in Support of the Military Decision Making
Process (MDMP)
(U) OBSERVATION: The sustainment cell (logistics) running estimates, data analysis, or inputs
from the aviation TF logistics officer (S4) are rarely utilized during the MDMP or considered
during hasty planning of future operations. During the course of action (COA) development and
analysis steps, the S4 assessment of the logistics feasibility is not integrated into the operational
plan, which inhibits the development of a concept of support for the COA (CATS Task: 01-BN-
5100).
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation TFs execute the MDMP or abbreviated hasty planning processes
without key inputs from the TF S4. Logistics are considered, but rarely planned or synchronized
in parallel with the operation. The plan is developed without reference to logistic feasibility or
deficiencies causing the S4 and logistic support companies to remain in a reactive posture, or
worse, fail to provide the logistic support required to enable successful mission execution.
(U) The S4 must be integrated into the operations planning process. As stated in Army Doctrine
Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, it is essential that sustainment and operation planners work
closely to synchronize all of the warfighting functions, in particular, sustainment. The ability to
maximize the combat power necessary to support decisive action operations is heavily dependent
on how effective a unit plans, coordinates, and synchronizes logistics (ATP 3-04.1). Regardless
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
of the mission (offense, defense, stability operations), it is imperative for Aviation units to
anticipate and forecast the support and supplies necessary to successfully maintain the
appropriate tempo and endurance through the entire range of military operations (FM 3-04). It is
the S4’s responsibility to track, analyze, anticipate and coordinate all of the supplies, activities
and systems to effectively provide external and internal logistical support to the mission (ATP 3-
04.1). As the logistics subject matter expert, it is imperative the S4 is well integrated into the
MDMP to ensure the logistical requirements of the plan are properly assessed (ATP 5-0.1).
(U) Integrating the S4 into the operations planning process not only provides the staff and
commander with critical logistical analysis, limitations and inputs; but it also enables the S4 to
proactively procure the necessary logistic support and supplies required for the mission due to
the synchronization during planning. The operations order paragraph IV and annex F
(sustainment) developed by the S4 is specifically tailored to the mission; enhancing the
responsiveness, flexibility, and integration of logistical support (ATP 3-04.1). Including the S4
into the plan will allow sustainment to enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and
prolong endurance of combat assets (ADRP 4-0).
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Utilize the S4’s knowledge and expertise for key
inputs specific to the mission during the MDMP. The knowledge, supply data analysis, and
relationships with logistical supporting units the S4 possesses must be integrated with the
operation. Participation in the planning process enables the S4’s ability to anticipate
requirements and coordinate the logistical operations to meet mission demand. Understanding
logistical feasibility and limitations is just as critical for operational planners to understand, in
order to, mitigate the plan from being unsupportable due to logistics. Sustainment must be
synchronized with operations; ensuring the S4 has a seat at the planning table will support this
end state.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) and Staff Weather Officer (SWO) Support at
Brigade Combat Team Mission Command Nodes
(U) OBSERVATION: Brigade combat teams (BCTs) fail to establish redundant BAE and SWO
support at both the BCT command post (CP) and the BCT tactical command post (TAC) or
provide a reliable communications system to the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) platoon
resulting in the interruption of collection from organic BCT full motion video (FMV) assets such
as the Shadow UAS.
(U) DISCUSSION: BCTs at the NTC lose hours of organic FMV collection due to the UAS
platoon not receiving required products such as the air coordination order (ACO) or a valid
weather brief from the SWO. These products are often received using a Secure Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPR) / Non-Secure Internet Protocol (NIPR) access point (SNAP) terminal via
NIPR and SIPR. When the BCT CP upper tactical infrastructure (TI) systems are offline; the
SWO and BAE are unable to create and send the UAS operators the required products for flight
operations. Additionally, the SNAP terminal used for upper TI is often very unreliable and is
greatly affected by weather conditions causing the loss of communication with the UAS platoon
and the interruption in collection.
(U) Commanders, staff, and UAS personnel share the duties and responsibilities for UAS flight
operations. When planning UAS missions, staffs must consider a number of factors in addition
to collection requirements to include:
Weather conditions before and during flight operations
Flight axis and other air operations occurring
Communications capabilities of the UAS platoon
(FOUO) Per ATP 2-19.4, Air Force weather teams, the main source of weather support, are
tactical mission and operations specialists, experts in the art of determining the effects of weather
on operations. These teams deploy with the BCT and provide direct and indirect weather support
tailored to the BCT’s needs. Also, per AR 95-23 local commanders will establish policies
specifying when Department of Defense (DD) Form 175–1, Flight Weather Briefing, is required
to be filed with DD Form 175, Military Flight Plan. Traditionally, this is identified in the UAS
platoon’s standard operating procedures (SOP), which must be understood by all involved in the
planning. The S3 ensures synchronized use of the airspace by coordinating with the effects
coordinator (ECOORD), brigade aviation officer (BAO), air defense officer, and UAS liaison
officer (LNO). The S3 ensures airspace is sufficient to support all aspects of UAS operations.
Lastly, the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) executive officer (XO) and staff need to allocate
appropriate communications equipment to ensure the established primary, alternate, contingency,
emergency (PACE) plan can be executed across the battlefield.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To ensure there is no interruption in collection from

organic FMV assets; BCTs, at the very minimum, should place a BAE and SWO representative
at both mission command nodes (CP and TAC). This allows key staff to have access to upper TI
at all times and build the necessary documents such as the ACO and updated weather briefings
that allow the UAS platoon to support the BCT. Also, and if possible, it is very successful to
place a SWO representative at the launch and recovery site to provide direct support to the
platoon. With the right personnel at both mission command nodes, it is also important to ensure
a valid PACE plan is established and practiced so all nodes can communicate and pass required
products. Additionally, if assets are available, a dedicated command post node (CPN) for the
UAS platoon provides reliable upper TI that not only provides products to conduct flight
operations, but also consistent communication with the BCT for reconnaissance and targeting.
Lastly, considering and prioritizing the UAS platoon for upper TI and staff support is key for
mission planning and guaranteeing little interruption in collection due to connectivity and staff
support.
AR 95-23, Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Regulations

ATP 2-19.4, BCT Intelligence Operations
(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Nesting Aircraft Maintenance Programs with Aviation Operations
(U) OBSERVATION: Task forces (TF) continually struggle at nesting their aircraft maintenance
programs with aviation operations during decisive action (DA) rotations at the National Training
Center (NTC). A combination of inadequate mission command and weak command influence
encumbers maintenance leaders’ ability to properly forecast resources and priorities at the 24, 48,
and 72 hour marks. As a result, aviation task forces repeatedly fail to generate and maintain
required aviation combat power in support of (ISO) operational demands during DA training
rotations at the NTC.
(U) DISCUSSION: The intent of mission command is to establish and maintain the shared
understanding necessary to empower subordinate leaders in exercising disciplined initiative
within the scope of their commander’s Intent (ADP 6-0). Aviation task forces at the NTC
however, often employ mission command in limited scope and focus, resulting in inadequate
information dispersion and incomplete synchronization within their formations. The aviation task
force commonly prioritizes higher echelon missions with little to no effort placed on the nesting
of supporting efforts; specifically sustainment.
(U) The lack of emphasis on establishing situational awareness between operations and
sustainment results in maintenance formations that are both under informed and underutilized.
Further aggravating the situation is the reluctance of TFs to incorporate maintenance
contingency/planning into their military decision making process (MDMP). During TF MDMP
little, if any, consideration is given to maintenance contingency or support for planned mission
sets. It is also common for maintenance leaders to be excluded from TF level mission rehearsals.
Without a comprehensive and synchronized task force level maintenance plan, “maintenance
contingencies” are relegated to an automatic bump to a spare aircraft or cancelation of missions
when issues arise outside the flight crew’s ability to repair. In many cases, maintenance faults
found during preflight or run up could be corrected if maintenance elements were readily
available. However, TFs at the NTC often unnecessarily restrict their combat power during
critical periods of the battle due to their failure to properly inform, posture, and leverage
maintenance formations ISO current operations.
(U) Executive officers (XOs) are intended to be the primary senior leaders responsible for the
planning and execution of maintenance efforts (TC 3-04.1). In addition, the aviation maintenance
officer (AMO) is the primary advisor to the TF commander in regards to generating combat
power. Together, they should facilitate the proper synchronization between maintenance and
operations. However, the trend at the NTC is XOs do not maintain adequate understanding of
their TF’s maintenance operations combined with AMO’s who fail to inject themselves into the
operational planning process.
(U) In addition to inadequate information distribution and maintenance-operations nesting, the

NTC has experienced a trend of weak commander emphasis placed on maintenance operations;
both in respect to attendance at production control (PC) meetings and in regard to broader
interactions and engagement with maintenance leadership and Soldiers. Command emphasis not
only “sets the tone” for Soldiers, but also provides the maintenance leadership with the authority,
guidance, and leverage to effectively execute their maintenance mission (TC 3-04.7 par 1-6).
(U) TFs at the NTC that lack a deliberate focus on maintenance experience a decreased level of
company/troop leadership involvement in maintenance operations. Line company/troop
representatives at PC meetings are typically junior in rank and position and cannot accurately
articulate the company’s projected operational demands. This, in combination with insufficient
mission command systems, results in PC establishing maintenance priorities that are not
depended upon, nor relevant to operational demands.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: In addition to improving overall mission command,

units coming to NTC should focus on fully synchronizing sustainment elements into their
MDMP. In addition, emphasis should be placed on improving current operations and future
operations relationships with maintenance leaders and their understanding of their maintenance
company’s capabilities and limitations. Mission rehearsals should include all elements of the TF
regardless of direct level of involvement.
(U) The TF XO should place emphasis on building competence in aviation maintenance

management while building effective relationships with both their PC officer and AMO. In
addition, AMO’s should broaden their understanding of, and involvement in, their unit’s
operational planning process.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) Timelines
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation task forces must better establish realistic and attainable MDMP
timelines. In essence, they need to create a plan to plan.
(U) DISCUSSION: (U) A key output, and arguably one of the most important, from the first step
of MDMP, receipt of mission, is the initial allocation of time which is driven by the executive
officer (FM 6-0, p. 9-2). This key output allows the staff to abbreviate MDMP and balance
detailed planning against the need for immediate action (FM 6-0, p. 9-5). The issue is staffs are
not establishing realistic and attainable timelines that can be maintained throughout continuous
operations. Of the previous six rotations at the National Training Center (NTC), the aviation
task forces have yet to follow an established planning timeline. This has two causes: improper
analysis of staff requirements and no allocated time for contingencies.
(U) A general rule of thumb is the aviation task force must manage three on-going operations:
task force level planning, company level planning, and mission execution. With the task force
staff involved in all three and other standard duties and responsibilities, requirements easily
become a burden which then occupy the majority of available time. Often, when the executive
officer (XO) or operations officer (S3) establishes a planning timeline, no time is allocated for
the staff to conduct other priority tasks. Examples of other requirements during task force level
planning are orders production for the operations section, logistic synchronization for the S4,
current operations for the S3 and fire support officer. Other needed considerations are meal
times and sleep. Most often, the initial allocation of time is a continuous planning timeline that
is never ending until completion, for example 0900-1100 mission analysis, 1100-1500 course of
action (COA) development, 1500-1700 COA analysis, and so forth. When does the staff conduct
their other required tasks? With such a general timeline, they often are pulled away to complete
those tasks and are unable to focus on thorough planning.
(U) The decisive action fight is highly volatile and unpredictable. To increase predictability,
commanders must plan and prepare for realistic contingencies in order to facilitate decision
making. However, the aviation task force staff do not prepare for contingencies when
developing the initial planning timeline. Again, with the aforementioned timeline, when does the
staff have time for last minute or high priority tasks that arise? The decisive action training
environment is characterized by uncertainty and rapidly shifting conditions; planning timelines
must provide enough flexibility to account for an unplanned division brief or a current operations
emergency. Some argue that this is why they allow more time for each phase, but reality is the
timeline becomes too loose and is quickly not followed. If MDMP participants are continuously
pulled away, other participants will either pick up the full load of planning or simply not
participate. Building in time for contingencies allows the staff to easily adjust planning events or
to allow participants to step away momentarily. However, the key is the timeline must be strictly
enforced by the XO.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: (U) During receipt of mission, the XO must quickly
establish a realistic and attainable plan to plan. Planning timelines must be tied in with other
staff requirements, the battle rhythm, and allow time for contingencies. A recommended
technique is to allow time in between each planning step to meet other requirements. If the staff
must complete mission analysis and COA development in one day, an example is to allocate
three hours for both with four hours in between for other staff requirements and individual needs.
Another technique is to shave 25% of allocated time off the top. If a task force has four days to
plan an operation, the initial plan to plan should result in publishing the operations order
(OPORD) by day three which allows for a fourth day for contingencies, planning timeline shift,
or to analyze branches and sequels. This will allow the task force to fully complete MDMP and
truly allow them to utilize the one-third/two-third rule.
FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations

CALL MDMP Handbook, 15-06, MAR 15
ATP 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Unit Planning and Execution of Forward Arming Refueling Point (FARP)
Operations
(U) OBSERVATION: The aviation sustainment section has observed a variety of aviation FARP
operation challenges over the course of 20 National Training Center (NTC) rotations. One
constant observation is poor rotational unit planning and execution of FARP operations. Though
Army Techniques Publication (ATP 3-04.1 and ATP 3-04.94 addresses FARP operations, Army
doctrine lacks the specificity that speaks to the broader considerations of FARP planning and
execution. The lack of reference material for planning has created a dearth of understanding for
commanders and staffs on what specific guidance to give subordinates to execute aviation FARP
operations.
(U) DISCUSSION: The FARP enables commanders to extend their operational reach or project
power within the area of operation (AO) during attack, air assault, or aviation support missions.
During a recent rotation at the NTC, the unit shut down both the active FARP at the tactical
assembly area (TAA) and the jump FARP that was staged forward with the brigade support
battalion (BSB) while an attack mission was still ongoing. The issue stemmed from a lack of
guidance and shared understanding at multiple echelons in the aviation task force (TF). The
result was a loss of an entire platoon of AH-64s ability to quickly return to the fight at a critical
point in the battle. While this example is fairly extreme, there are issues that routinely arise
during rotations and when left unchecked can become significant problems. I believe that the
problem stems from a lack of guidance provided by commanders to their subordinates regarding
the specifics of sustainment. The typical battalion level order rarely provides more than the
following:
Task: Provide Jump FARP at the following grid 11S NV 1234 5678
Purpose: Support aviation operations
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: ATP 3-04.1 addresses commander’s guidance for
reconnaissance and security missions. This guidance provides the necessary information for
crews as they plan and execute operations. In the essence of standardizing our doctrine and
providing the required information to our subordinates, I recommend adding the following to
ATP 3-04.1 “Commanders FARP Guidance.” This is designed for battalion commanders.
However, it is the company commander’s responsibility to seek this guidance if it is not
provided.
(U) Focus: While executing FARP operations, the sustainment element must understand the
aircraft and the mission the FARP will be designed to support. The commander directs the
number of points required, fuel, and ammunition required and the aircraft priority. The priority
may change during phases, or along an established timeline.
(U) Tempo: Clearly articulating the sustainment tempo allows the commander and staff to
establish time requirements such as the duration of the FARP, peak usage, and resupply
schedule. This guidance dictates how the sustainment force arrays its personnel to ensure
necessary task accomplishment and fighter management.
(U) Engagement / Disengagement Criteria: Engagement and disengagement criteria specifies

the conditions in which the sustainment element will ensure equipment and personnel are set. For
example, the JFARP will remain silent until 14 0630 APR 2017, at which point it will become
active for 6 hours.
(U) Displacement Criteria: The commander directs either time-based or enemy based
displacement criteria for the sustainment element. The displacement criteria is a set of conditions
that, if met, necessitates the movement of the FARP back to its higher headquarters or to a
primary or secondary predetermined location.
In an environment where communications are restricted, scheduled communication may be
necessary. It may also be necessary to denote reporting requirements to FARP personnel prior to
execution, including commander’s critical information requirements. Here are some examples of
reporting requirements.
-The FARP is under attack.

-The FARP relocates or ceases operations.
-The FARP is not operational at the scheduled time.
-A request is made to resupply Class III/V products.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Planning
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation task force (AVN TF) fire support elements (FSE) at the National
Training Center (NTC) struggle with the planning and execution of suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD) in support of (ISO) both division (DIV) and brigade (BDE) missions. Current
aviation and field artillery doctrine does not address SEAD in detail sufficiently to arm field
artillerymen and aviators with the knowledge necessary to consistently plan and execute SEAD.
(U) DISCUSSION: Doctrine defines SEAD as any activity that neutralizes, destroys or
temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means
(ADRP 1-02). Army doctrine assigns responsibility for the coordination of SEAD to multiple
entities in the brigade combat team (BCT), to include: fire support coordinator (FSCOORD),
fires cell planners, brigade aviation officer (BAO), brigade air liaison officer (ALO), and AVN
TF fire support officer (FSO) (ATP 3-09.42). Additionally, targeting cells at divisions and corps
have specific responsibilities for SEAD target development.
(U) As defined by JP 1-02, SEAD can be accomplished through both destructive and disruptive
means. Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or operating personnel.
Though ideal, destructive may place large demands on the available combat capabilities and
forces. Lethal attacks can originate from field artillery cannon and rocket fires as well as rotary
and fixed wing aircraft. Disruptive means seek to temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay, or
neutralize through active (electronic attack, chaff) or passive (emission control, warning
receivers) means to increase aircraft survivability. Electronic warfare can provide active non-
lethal SEAD by jamming the enemy’s command and control and radar capabilities using various
air and ground based platforms. Typically, known air defense artillery (ADA) targets should be
attacked immediately utilizing destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) according to most
high-payoff target lists (HPTL), attack guidance matrixes (AGM), and target selection standards
(TSS); however, support for suppressing undetected, templated systems must be planned as well.
Localized SEAD operations are those confined to geographic areas associated with specific
targets or transit routes for a specific time with targets serviced primarily by organic means.
(U) ATP 3-04.1 states the AVN TF FSO plans, controls, and synchronizes all fire support for
operations to include coordinating Army and joint suppression of enemy air defenses. To
properly accomplish this task, the AVN TF FSO at a minimum must:
1. Maintain situational awareness of friendly scheme of fires through running estimates

2. Receive AVN TF commanders (CDR’s) intent for SEAD
3. Collaborate with S2 on enemy situation template (SITEMP) and targeting
4. Collaborate with battalion/company/troop (BN/CO/TRP) aviation mission survivability
officer (AMSO) regarding route of flight and de-confliction
5. Develop target area of interest (TAI) and request collection assets to refine
6. Conduct fire planning and synchronize with H-hour sequence
7. Brief and rehearse scheme of fires to include go/no-go criteria as it relates to SEAD
8. Conduct field artillery (FA) technical rehearsal with DIV and/or BCT FSE
9. Monitor timing during execution and adjust fires as necessary
(U) Planning SEAD requires the FSO to coordinate with several components of the AVN TF
staff in addition to representatives on BDE and DIV staffs. Additionally, the FSO must ensure
the company/troop leadership have a shared understanding of the scheme of fires. As multiple
AVN TF FSOs can attest from their experiences in the decisive action training environment
(DATE) at the NTC, planning SEAD without effective collaboration results in a lack of
understanding by aircrews, an unsynchronized plan, and an inability to overcome friction during
execution. Cooperative planning led by the AVN TF FSO is key to successful planning and
execution of SEAD.
(U) The importance of running estimates is universal across all war fighting functions at echelon
and the AVN TF FSE is no exception. Creating and maintaining situational awareness through
fires running estimates is difficult due to the complexity of missions executed by the AVN TF
spanning the entirety of the DIV area of operations in support of both the close and deep fights.
FSE running estimates include the fire support overlay, fire support coordination measure
(FSCM) and airspace control measure trackers, the current air tasking order (ATO), and the air
coordination order (ACO). To build and maintain an understanding of BDE operations,
attendance at division and BDE rehearsals is key. The AVN TF FSO must ensure his or her FSE
has effective representation at higher echelon rehearsals as this is critical to ensuring AVN TF
operations are synchronized with the BDE scheme of fires.
(FOUO) Collaboration with the AVN TF S2 is critical to SEAD planning. ATP 3-09.60 assigns
responsibility for enemy air defense target development to fires cells at the DIV and CORPS
echelons. At the NTC, AVN TFs are typically reluctant to send requests for information (RFIs)
to the appropriate echelon in order to leverage DIV and BDE capabilities to develop target areas
of interests (TAIs) oriented towards SEAD operations. The timelines that AVN TFs typically
work on in terms of crafting mission orders, be it self-induced or otherwise, exasperates the issue
as it makes submission of collection requests early enough to make the air tasking order (ATO)
very difficult. However, at a minimum the AVN TF S2 and FSO must target using templating
techniques (ATP 3-09.42).
(FOUO) AVN TF FSOs at the NTC are often faced with overcoming an incomplete targeting
cycle when planning SEAD. It is critical to understand that the goal of SEAD is to allow
freedom of movement for friendly aircraft. To this end, all known or suspected threat air defense
sites that cannot be avoided and are capable of engaging friendly air assets must be targeted
(ATP 3-09.60). During mission analysis, key enemy air defense systems should be identified by
the S2 as high-value targets (HVTs) and then nominated onto the HPTL due to their threat to
friendly air assets. This staff function must be in concert with efforts by higher echelon staffs,
particularly in deep area operations. According to JP 3-01, there are three primary objectives for
planning SEAD in support of air operations:
1. Accomplish an accurate appraisal of enemy air defenses and their ability to influence
the outcome of overall air operations.
2. Decide on the scope, magnitude, and duration of SEAD operations necessary to
reduce enemy air defense capabilities to acceptable risk levels.
3. Determine the capabilities of available suppression assets, as well as potential
competing requirements for these forces.
(U) SEAD fires are categorized as planned or immediate. Planned SEAD is conducted against
targets developed during the targeting process and designated for attack. Planned SEAD is
further broken down into three types:
1. Scheduled SEAD is executed based on a time sequence. An artillery time on target

mission is synchronized with route and timeline information.
2. On-call SEAD is event trigger based under positive control. The use of pro-words from
an execution checklist simplifies this method of triggering SEAD fires.
3. Deceptive SEAD is fired into an area to deceive the enemy or cause him to reposition his
air defense weapons away from where actual operations will take place.
(U) Immediate SEAD is conducted against ADA targets of opportunity that are detected within
the range of available weapon systems and not yet targeted. The execution of immediate SEAD
should reflect priorities established on the HPTL and in accordance with the AGM.
(U) The AVN TF AMSO provides the expertise necessary to understand the mission set and
associated airspace considerations. The AMSO and air mission commander (AMC) are able to
provide the flight ingress and egress routes necessary to calculate the precise time in the
aircraft’s flight that will be in range of the enemy’s radar or direct-fire line of sight. The brigade
aviation element (BAE) in conjunction with (ICW) the AVN TF will have approved air routes,
air control points (ACP), and airspace coordination areas (ACA). Since SEAD can be either
time or event based, having an exacting understanding of the route of flight is critical. However,
the FSO must often work on assumptions in order to ensure submission deadlines for targets.
(U) AVN TF staffs should plan primary, secondary, and tertiary air corridors for operations.
Crafting multiple schemes of fires may be necessary as each schedule of fires must provide
SEAD for each route to ensure enemy air defenses are suppressed any time aircraft are in the
targeted weapons system’s threat ring. A useful technique is to develop multiple courses of
action (COA) for SEAD and subsequently craft a schedule of fires that provides the necessary
suppression in blocks of time that work for all air routes. The targets that were developed in
conjunction with the S2 are overlaid with airspace coordinating measures (ACM) and
synchronized with the operation though an H-hour sequence. A properly developed H-hour
sequence, the specific hour on D-day at which an operation commences, is critical to the
execution of SEAD because this sequence ties all events of an operation together on one
timeline. AV TF staffs that build an H-hour sequence reflected in a comprehensive execution
checklist (EXCHECK) are generally successful at integrating SEAD into their operations here at
the NTC.
(U) To begin fire planning for SEAD, place an enemy situation template and friendly graphics on
the fire support situation map. Obtain a time-distance heading card, or route card, from the
appropriate AMSO. This provides the flight speed and direction information for the flight route.
Using information from the air mission planning card, plot range fans depicting maximum
effective enemy distances for acquisition and engagement for templated ADA systems along the
route. Referencing appropriate running estimates, HPTL, and AGM, the FSO can determine the
likely friendly delivery assets available for providing SEAD (ATP 3-60). With enemy range
fans plotted, friendly delivery assets available, and the AVN flight speed and route, the FSO can
now plan suppressive fires on enemy ADA systems.
(U) During the planning process, ATP 3-09.42 states the following considerations must be
addressed when planning SEAD:
- Ammunition
- Position of assets and azimuth of fire (AOF)
- Counter-fire radar azimuth of cuing
- Sensor-to-shooter architecture
- Clearance of fire procedures
The AV TF FSO must determine the duration and volume of fires required to protect friendly
aircraft during vulnerable periods of flight, consider the vulnerability, resiliency, range, and
method of acquisition of the targeted enemy air defense weapons, number and type of friendly
aircraft, aircraft flight tactics and the separation required between aircraft and SEAD fires, type
of ordnance used for suppression, and vulnerability of the SEAD firing unit.
(FOUO) An additional aspect of SEAD planning is validating airspace de-confliction. Lethal

SEAD fires can be de-conflicted laterally, by altitude, and by time. Lateral separation is
effective for coordinating SEAD fires against targets that are safely separated from ACM. The
minimum separation distance between SEAD targets and aircraft routes varies based on
munitions used. Altitude separation requires aircraft to remain above or below indirect-fire
trajectories at certain points along the ballistic flight path (ORD-X). Section 10-10 of DA PAM
385-63 provides a useful step-action drill for altitude deconfliction. Separation may be increased
by firing high-angle or reduced charge. Establishing an ACA is a method of maintaining altitude
and lateral separation through procedural control. A lateral offset in the form of a final attack
heading or cone prevents premature crossing of the gun target line (ATP 3-09.32). Time
separation requires the timing of SEAD to be coordinated with the routing of aircraft so that even
though aircraft and SEAD may occupy the same airspace, they do not do so at the same time.
(U) Another means of computing the timing necessary for the synchronization of SEAD is to
leverage the battalion AMSO and the air mission planning system (AMPS). Within the AMPS
software air corridors, waypoints, other pertinent ACMs and air with associated threat rings can
be quickly built. Once these geometries are built, the AMPS can provide airspeed, route of
flight, and time of flight data that can be leveraged to quickly and accurately arrange a schedule
of fires tied to tactical triggers along the route of flight. Additionally, the AVN TF FSO can build
applicable FSCMs, targets and other pertinent fire support data into the AMPS so that aviators
can reference this information on moving map displays in the aircraft.
(U) Once the AVN TF FSO has completed fire planning for SEAD and submitted the target list
worksheet (TLWS), fire support execution matrix (FSEM), and schedule of fires to the
appropriate FSE (could be DIV or BCT depending on mission), his or her next step in ensuring
conditions are set for successful execution is to brief and rehearse the plan. In accordance with
unit standard operating procedures, the fire support planning documents should be consolidated
into a kneeboard product and uploaded into the AMPS for aircrews to reference in flight. These
aircrew products should utilize degrees rather than mils to express direction. Though the TF may
not have an opportunity to conduct a TF fire support rehearsal, the FSO must ensure the outcome
goals for a fire support rehearsal are still achieved prior to execution. At the NTC, AVN TF
staffs often utilize the aircrew operations and intelligence brief (O/I) to introduce and rehearse
the SEAD plan. Aircrews are unable to gain a shared understanding of the plan and the AVN TF
misses opportunities to establish decision points, go/no-go criteria and rehearse contingencies
such as the desynchronization of delivery assets or aircraft communication difficulties. For air
assaults (AASLT), SEAD planning must be addressed at the initial planning conference (IPC),
air mission coordination meeting (AMCM), air mission brief (AMB), operations order (OPORD)
brief, rehearsals, and O/I forums (ATP 3-04.1). Consistently addressing the SEAD plan ensures
all entities have an understanding beyond superficiality and better enable the AVN TF to
overcome friction during execution.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To be successful in the planning and execution of

SEAD, BDE and AVN TF staffs must be coached to consider air defense threats during mission
analysis and collaborate with the AVN TF AMSO, S2, and FSO. Additionally, leaders must
ensure the SEAD plan is rehearsed at echelon using proper FSCM and ACMs. Also needed is an
update to ATP 3-04.1 that provides AVN TF FSOs the information and processes needed to
successfully plan and execute SEAD. Finally, an updated training and evaluation outline report
for the planning and execution of SEAD at the AVN TF level will assist coaching efforts at the
NTC.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Maintenance Companies/Troops (AMC/AMT) Reacting to Enemy

Contact During Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART) Missions
(U) OBSERVATION: AMC/AMT are consistently untrained and poorly equipped for a React to
Enemy Contact battle drill during downed aircraft recovery team (DART) missions. During
multiple iterations of DART operations at the National Training Center, the aircraft recovery
team received heavy casualties from a much smaller, less equipped enemy force. Additionally,
the DART frequently lacks the ability to communicate with higher headquarters due to an
absence of over the horizon communications, typically departing the tactical assembly area
(TAA) solely with line of sight radios. Upon enemy contact, the DART has no way to
communicate a situation report to the task force for support.
(U) DISCUSSION: AMC/AMT standard operating procedures (SOPs) typically include a

downed aircraft recovery section outlining basic recovery procedures for damaged or disabled
aircraft. This DART section mostly consists of information specific to aircraft recovery with
checklists and products solely focused on maintenance related tasks. DART battle drills and
training is generally confined to improving proficiency on the team’s assembly, convoy
operations, aerial recovery kit installation, battle damage/repair, and security team emplacement.
However, inadequate emphasis is placed on ensuring team members are proficient on battle drills
concerning enemy contact, combat lifesaving techniques, and the subsequent actions required.
In a decisive action fight, the aviation task force is often required to secure the downed aircraft
site without external support. According to FM 3-04.513, AMC/AMT commanders are
responsible for providing a DART security team if not provided by outside units. Leaders must
ensure their DART is trained and equipped to deal with enemy contact as well as execute
rudimentary combat tactics, techniques, and procedures.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: AMC/AMT DART SOPs must be expanded to

include the following: DART training requirements for actions on contact, DART aid and litter
teams, primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) plan, and liquid, ammunition,
casualties, equipment (LACE) reports. ATP 3-21.8, appendix J contains standardized battle
drills and collective actions made in response to common battle occurrences. Each team member
should be familiar with these basic drills that are vital to mission success. Commanders should
incorporate these drills into their quarterly training plan. Additionally, every effort should be
made to ensure any team/convoy departing the tactical assembly area (TAA) be equipped with
operational over-the-horizon communications. Mission rehearsals should encompass every
aspect of aircraft recovery operations from team assembly, convoy operations, communications,
actions on contact, and ultimately recovery of the downed aircraft.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Decisive Action (DA)
(U) OBSERVATION: UAS warrant officers [military occupational specialty (MOS) 150U,
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (TUAS) Operations Technician) largely lack the combined
arms knowledge necessary to bridge the intelligence collection and exploitation gap as the Army
transitions UAS from a heavily monitored, spectrum rich counterinsurgency environment to a
more autonomous method of employment in an austere DA, hybrid threat environment. Due to
this transition, UAS units struggle to identify their role in the overall aviation and ground scheme
of maneuver; primarily as it pertains to the employment of UAS as a reconnaissance platform
during attack operations (Task# 01-CO-5193,5179).
(U) DISCUSSION: A UAS warrant officer (WO) can be expected to lead a platoon within a unit
fielded with either the Shadow or Gray Eagle UAS platform. These can be further separated into
Gray Eagle units subordinate to Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) or Forces
Command (FORSCOM), or a Shadow unit subordinate to an attack reconnaissance squadron
(heavy) or a special troops battalion. Although at times, these unit mission essential task lists
(METLs) might reflect commonality (CATS Ref# 87306R100 and 01287K100), the application
of those METLs varies greatly based on the parent unit. Often in the DA fight, the parent unit
and the UAS asset are often not co-located and spectrum management limits the ability of the
commander to reach directly into the UAS crew-station via their video feed. Without a deep
understanding of the commander’s intent at the individual leader level, the UAS unit struggles to
provide timely intelligence to drive the friendly scheme of maneuver.
(U) UAS warrant officers are not required to be qualified or current in the platform they are
assigned to, nor do they receive more than familiarization training on any specific airframe or
doctrine during the TUAS Warrant Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca, which focuses
instead on general problem solving. Generalized training allows for flexibility in assigning UAS
warrant officers between units and platforms as the aviation branch works to fill personnel voids.
However, it hinders UAS warrant officers from gaining a depth of knowledge in the specifics of
one assigned area of mission execution, let alone truly understanding the capabilities of the
platform and payload they are expected to manage. This creates an intermediary point where
they are not the subject matter experts in any particular area but remain charged with the
responsibility of advocating courses of action that leverage the unit’s capability to meet the
commander’s intent.
(U) Although UAS platoon leader positions are designated for CW3’s, these positions are often
manned with junior CW2s and WO1s, who lack operational aviation knowledge from their
feeder field. Doctrinal knowledge of employment of UAS is lacking across all branches but it is
compounded when UAS leaders fail to provide adequate guidance. Further, failing to understand
the friendly scheme of maneuver, graphic control measures, or the purpose of the intelligence
collection plan causes delays in synchronization, missed triggers, and lost exploitation
opportunities. UAS leaders in both Gray Eagle Companies and Shadow Platoons have repeatedly
demonstrated a lack of foundational depth of knowledge in reconnaissance as it applies to the

DA fight. This is most explicitly demonstrated when UAS units fail to accurately relay
information pertaining to overall enemy maneuver, ground maneuver corridors, obstacles, or
composition within assigned NAIs. This is due to a fundamental lack of knowledge at the
operator and platoon leader level and is made evident when UAS leaders consistently fail in or
poorly execute the briefing of OPORDs and details like the Air Mission Commander/Ground
maneuver commander’s intent to the operators executing the mission (Step 4.b.Task# 01-4-7928,
01-TS-2806). Due to the inherent inaccuracies of this iterative process compounded by the initial
lack of understating at the leader level, UAS crews lose the expanded purpose of their
reconnaissance mission. When this occurs, UAS operators invariably revert to previously trained
methodologies of passively acquiring information and awaiting remote analysis of their video,
rather than developing and reporting the situation within the commander’s reconnaissance
guidance.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: UAS warrant officers should be assessed into a
platform specific additional skill identifier (ASI) similar to the 15W and 15E populations. They
should be required to maintain currency in their rated UAS platform. Once assessed and
qualified, they should only be assigned to units that operate that platform and should remain on a
unit aircrew training program a staff supported capacity when assigned outside the unit.
(U) UAS warrant officers should attend the Air Cavalry Leader’s Course or the Cavalry Leader’s
Course within the first two years of graduation from their platform specific training school. This
will provide a solid common doctrine base until unit level leaders can develop an individual
knowledge base to train from within.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: "Minimum Force" in correlation to “Minimum Combat Power” during the Air
Assault Planning Process
(U) OBSERVATION: There is a lack of shared understanding between the air assault task force
(AATF) and aviation task force (AVNTF) with regard to the "minimum force" and essential
mission combat power required when planning and executing an air assault (AASLT) mission.
Additionally, what is the difference between the two? Is "minimum force" the minimum size of
the element required to successfully execute the ground tactical plan, or is "minimum force" the
minimum size of the element which can be inserted at a helicopter landing zone (HLZ) on the
first lift of an AASLT mission? The definition is left to interpretation, which results in a lack of
detail oriented coordination and vague mission guidance throughout the AASLT mission
planning process.
(U) DISCUSSION: The discussion begins with the air mission coordination meeting (AMCM)
checklist. The ATP 3-04.1 provides an example AMCM checklist and within that checklist is the
term "minimum force." "Minimum force" is a term that is frequently found to be in most all
AMCM checklists and routinely briefed, but this term lacks clarity and definition.
(U) In an AMCM checklist, "minimum force" is usually only discussed as mission abort criteria
which typically correlates to the minimum passengers required in order to execute the ground
tactical plan. As a result, the number or aircraft required to support the ground tactical plan is
only discussed as abort criteria and not to the criteria the AATF commander (AATFC) deems
necessary for mission success. These two concepts must be discussed independently during the
mission development process and the difference between “minimum force” and mission essential
combat power must be understood.
(U) There is no definition of “minimum force,” listed in ATP 3-04.1 or any other doctrinal
reference. Mission essential combat power however, is clearly defined in the ATP 3-04.1 but is
not observed to be on any AMCM checklists. It is imperative for the AATF and AVNTF staffs to
discuss and create a shared understanding of these criteria and terminology prior to the ground
tactical plan course of action (COA) development. This coordination and understanding of both
mission essential combat power and “minimum force” need to continually be assessed and
understood throughout the duration of the AASLT planning process.
(U) "5-96. Mission essential combat power. Air assault mission planners use mission variables to
determine the minimum combat power – to include infantry, artillery, attack reconnaissance
helicopters, UAS and FW aircraft – needed to ensure mission success. Use abort criteria to
ensure friendly forces have the required combat ratio for the operation." (ATP 3-04.1)
(U) "5-21. The five planning stages of an air assault are not developed independently. The AATF
staff and supporting aviation unit coordinate, develop, and refine plans concurrently to make best
use of available time and resources. The staff first develops the ground tactical plan, which
serves as the basis to develop the other plans. Each plan may potentially affect the others.
Changes in an aspect of one planning stage may require adjustments in the other planning stages.
The AATFC [Air Assault Task Force Commander] must determine if such adjustments entail
acceptable risk...” (ATP 3-04.1)
(U) “5-23. The ground tactical plan is the focal point of planning and foundational for a
successful air assault. All other planning stages support this plan... "(ATP 3-04.1)
(U) The AATFCs scheme of maneuver and required mission essential combat power determines
the number of aircraft required to support the mission. If the number of aircraft required to
accomplish the AATFCs intent is not available, the AATFC must then make the decision to;
accept risk, cancel the mission, or coordinate for the allocation of additional resources. The
smallest element size and disposition which the AATFC deems necessary to conduct self-
sustaining operations, security, or successfully execute the planned mission is the “minimum
force.” Multiple lifts may be required in order to achieve the desired mission essential combat
power and successfully execute the ground tactical plan within the AATFC intent.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Recommend that “minimum force” be defined by

doctrine and both “minimum force” and mission essential combat power be implemented
independently from each other to create a better understanding of the ground force commander’s
intent in relation to the AASLT planning process. Until such time, both "minimum force" and
mission essential combat power must be discussed individually and in detail during the planning
process of an AASLT mission. Recommend "minimum force," be defined in ATP 3-04.1 as, “the
smallest element size and composition of the first lift of an AASLT capable of conducting self-
sustaining operations, security, or successfully execute the ground tactical plan in the event that
no sequential lifts can land to the HLZ or objective area.”
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Task Forces (TF) Failure to Plan for Redundant Secure
Communications to Execute a Tactical Road March and Occupy an Assembly Area.
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation Task Forces often fail to plan for redundant secure
communications requirements necessary to execute a tactical road march and occupy an
assembly area (07-CO-9014). The inability to communicate is often seen as an acceptable risk by
those in command and their advisors. This negligence creates unnecessary friction on the staff,
companies, and the serials, but more importantly, disables mission command during critical
operations such as the tactical road march (TRM).
(U) DISCUSSION: The communication plan is critical for all mission command nodes to battle
track and enable their subordinate units, but particularly for the TRM. Like all war fighting
functions, the communications plan must be generated in mission analysis, course of action
development, and course of action analysis of the military decision making process (MDMP).
These plans need to be briefed and rehearsed in order to enable communication throughout the
operation. All plans and rehearsals should direct the implementation of frequency modulation
(FM) retransmission (RETRANS) team locations and networks, Blue Force Tracker (BFT) role
names/unit reference names (URNs), and the utilization of over the horizon communications
(OTH). OTH systems such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) in the
form of BFT and/or Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) in each convoy should be meticulously
planned and detailed. In addition, risk should be identified in the absence of these OTH systems
or a lack of line of sight (LOS) coverage. Lastly, redundant communications must be planned
and rehearsed throughout the primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) plan using a
communication exercise (COMEX) as a portion of the rehearsal or the pre-combat checks / pre-
combat inspections (PCC/PCI).
(U) During the rehearsal, and most definitely during quartering party (QP) operations, the
convoy should tactically halt to emplace a RETRANS and its security detail before a planned
loss of LOS. These specific locations can be planned and depicted on graphics using either check
points or phase lines. This will ensure the QP has secure FM communications throughout the
convoy. The trigger to continue movement passed a phase line is the establishment of a fully
mission capable FM RETRANS site that enables a leader and chemical reconnaissance
(RECON) of the tactical assembly area (TAA).
(U) The RETRANS vehicle should be retransmitting throughout the convoy. This allows
RETRANS to be full mission-capable upon arriving to its location. This minimizes the time the
QP is at the halt. The RETRANS should have a PACE plan with, but not limited to, FM, JCR,
high frequency (HF), and tactical satellite (TACSAT), and three days of supply (DOS). The team
should bring an simple key loader (SKL), PRM-36 radio test set, a Defense Advanced Global
Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR), and additional W-4 cables, also known as “dog
bone cables” for troubleshooting issues. As well, RETRANS is typically in a great location for
an observation post (OP). In conjunction with this OP, a forward observer can be given the task
to call for fire on RECON objectives.
(U) Trained communications security (COMSEC) representatives should be present in each

serial to assist with filling radios for secure communications. As an operator level task, FM radio
and BFT/JCR operators should fill the equipment. Each vehicle in a convoy should have a
minimum of one FM radio for the convoy commanders to have better command and control (C2)
of their serial.
(U) Once the TAA is deemed clear of enemy personnel or observation and/or a CBRN threats,
the QP officer in charge (OIC) should establish security as priority number one. Each security
position and entry control point should have a minimum of a FM radio for reporting and alerts.
The second priority, then, is communications. LOS challenges will enable certain locations or
mission command nodes to communicate while others may be unable. As such, it is critical that
the signal team immediately execute a communications survey by vehicle. Once the most reliable
location is identified, the command post (CP) may be established.
(U) The communications systems you should bring on QP are, but not limited to, a command
post node (CPN) and satellite transportable terminal (STT), mission command (MSN CMD)
systems (MCS), Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) and Secret Internet Protocol
Router (SIPR) workstations and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones, HF radios,
TACSAT radios, and JCR CP Kits. To start building the CP, place your antenna farm away from
the generators. Generators and other antennas should not be placed near the antennas as this can
cause electromagnetic interference and degrade your FM communications. The STT and
TACSAT should have a clear view of the southern sky to connect with their respective satellites
orbiting Earth’s equator. If you are south of the equator, face the STT north. At this point and
pending required key leaders, the new CP is postured to assume mission command to the CP.
Standardizing the CP configuration is essential for prompt wiring and system emplacement. For
quicker C2 transfer, consider sling loading your critical equipment.
(U) While the QP CP jumps forward, the executive officer and remaining staff have MSN CMD
and can continue the MDMP process, receive fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and prepare follow
on main body serials to maneuver forward. Once MSN CMD is transferred, this is the trigger for
the rear CP to prepare for movement as part of a serial.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: It is imperative for the staff to rapidly establish a
mission command node to battle track current and plan future operations immediately upon
arriving at a new TAA. Establishing our communications networks (NETs) is critical to enabling
a TF and accomplishing missions. Failure will increase friction and degrade mission command
while exponentially decreasing our ability to accomplish missions.
2016
Sustain OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Utilizing Terrain to Enable Aviation Maneuver
OBSERVATION: Aviation units training at the National Training Center have shown
improvement in their ability to maneuver aircraft while utilizing terrain to mask their movement,
as well as staying below the crest of the hills to avoid being silhouetted.
DISCUSSION: Effective movement techniques make it very difficult for enemy personnel to
identify and engage the aircraft. Aircrews are consistently able to engage the enemy and
reposition for additional engagements while remaining undetected. One key to units’ success is
establishing Assault by fire positions (ABFs) that are outside the max effective range of enemy
weapon systems, but within the max effective range of the hellfire missile. This allows the AH-
64 to conduct engagements without taking effective fire from the enemy.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should include engagement area development and
maneuver planning into their training plan at the battalion, company and platoon levels to ensure
that staff planners and aviators who are part of company planning cells understand how to
maximize the effects of the AH-64 weapons systems while maximizing survivability.
Improve OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Company Planning Cells
OBSERVATION: A recurring observation from decisive action (DA) rotations at the National
Training Center is aviation units in general no longer possess the competence to effectively plan
missions at the company level.
DISCUSSION: What once existed in the practice of company planning cells is now a lost art.
This is largely a by-product of the operations in support of the global war on terror (GWOT)
over the past fourteen years, during which mission planning was largely consolidated and
conducted at the battalion task force level. The execution of mission command, the complexity
of the DA environment as well as the plethora of mission profiles, requires that companies re-
learn the art of organizational decentralized planning in a time constrained environment.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Familiarization with the company/troop planning cell

process (FM 3-04.126, sections 2-137, 2-138, and 2-139) will assist companies to effectively
plan operations for the decisive action training environment. The process encourages companies
to achieve a shared understanding through parrallel planning with their parent task force. The
task force resource companies with required base mission products, but the companies must do
the the detailed deliberate mission planning. Company planning cells enable companies to build
thorough and detailed deliberate plans in a time constrained environment. A company’s ability to
generate a thorough company-level plan is essential to enabling the aviation task force to conduct
operational maneuver especially when each company is but one component (main
element/support element) of a battalion’s operational misson.
Improve OBSERVATION
SOURCE: NTC
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Aviation Maintenance with Battalion Headquarters and

Operations
OBSERVATION: The aircraft status displayed at the production control (PC) section often did
not correlate with the tracking board in the main command post (CP).
DISCUSSION: PC relied on line companies to brief accurate aircraft faults, flight hours and
upcoming inspections, and then disseminated the data to battalion, brigade and rear detachment.
However, the maintenance status reported to the main CP was often inaccurate, which ultimately
hindered their mission planning. In addition, the PC section was largely unaware of upcoming
missions and aircraft requirements so they did not factor this information when making decisions
about maintenance priorities.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The task force executive officer (XO) and/or operations
officer (S3) should attend the PC meeting at least once a day and address upcoming mission sets
and shortfalls. The PC section should also battle track task force operations in order to make
informed decisions regarding maintenance priorities.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Shared Understanding of Attack Helicopter Units with Brigade and Division
Level Scheme of Maneuver
(U) OBSERVATION: Attack helicopter units who train at the National Training Center (NTC)
frequently demonstrate a lack of shared understanding of the brigade-level and division-level
scheme of maneuver and how their aviation mission is designed to shape the battlefield. This
lack of understanding of the higher unit’s intent and scheme of maneuver greatly inhibits attack
aviation’s ability to effectively support the brigade’s and division’s maneuver. Attack aviators
are frequently unaware of which ground maneuver units constitute the main and supporting
efforts. Additionally, attack aviation planners habitually lack awareness of the location of
adjacent maneuver aviation task forces and what tactical tasks those units are executing. ADRP
6-0 states that “shared understanding and purpose form the basis for unity of effort and trust.”
(U) DISCUSSION: Attack aviation units at the company/troop level and at the task force level
have frequently struggled to achieve a shared understanding of higher and adjacent unit schemes
of maneuver. One key source of friction pertains to developing and maintaining a common
operational picture (COP). Unit graphics often lack detail beyond depicting the operational phase
lines and unit boundaries. Operation orders (OPORDs) from both division and brigade normally
specify subordinate unit tasks and locations and identify both main and supporting efforts. This
information should be listed in the situation section of the aviation task force OPORD, but is
frequently left out. In many observed cases, troops/companies have only received a verbal
OPORD that does not specify the task and purpose of adjacent units. Often the aviation task
force OPORD provides little more than a general overview of the brigade’s plan. A
company/troop level COP will enable the leaders to understand, visualize, describe, and direct
the action necessary to achieve the mission’s key objectives.
(U) When attack aviation troop/company planners submit requests for information (RFIs) to the
aviation task force requesting the location, task, and purpose of the ground maneuver units, they
rarely receive the information required to effectively understand the brigade’s maneuver plan.
The information they do receive often arrives too late, in piecemeal, or only partly answers their
RFIs. Units usually receive the locations of ground maneuver units, but important information is
often omitted such as the ground scheme of maneuver, tactical tasks, or key objectives. Army
aviation is able to rapidly move across the battlefield and support multiple ground maneuver
units during a battle, but that capability is rarely realized due to aviation units’ failure to
understand the ground units’ missions. Aviators frequently expend precious minutes during
battles developing an understanding of the ground situation, and then formulating a hasty plan
instead of focusing on supporting the ground maneuver unit’s actions. If aviation planners
understood the mission of each ground maneuver unit prior to the start of each mission, attack
aviation maneuver can be planned to support or complement the ground maneuver units if and
when they are re-tasked during battles. This prior planning will enable aviators to exercise
another mission command principle, disciplined initiative, during urgent situations more rapidly
because they will already know the mission’s purpose, key task, and desired endstate. This type
of information is also critical to prevent fratricide. The NTC has observed many instances where
fratricide could have been avoided if attack aviators better understood the ground maneuver plan
before departing on their mission. Attack weapon elements habitually commit fratricide when
engaged in the close fight utilizing ill-defined or unknown friendly graphics. Fratricide also
occurs during transition from the deep fight, close fight, and into the security area which often
occurs when attack weapon elements are dynamically retasked or used as a quick reaction force.
Additionally, fratricide occurs when attack weapon elements are operating in support of other
division/theater shaping operations within the brigade’s sector and neither are aware of the others
plan.
(U) Units that fail to fully understand the ground scheme of maneuver typically struggle to
effectively synchronize all of their resources. One common symptom of this at the NTC is the
logjam that occurs when multiple airframes arrive at the forward arming and refueling point
(FARP) at the same for refuel. Often priorities have not been set to determine the order in which
units should receive fuel, which may lead to unnecessary delays in the most critical missions.
When more than one attack helicopter troop/company rotates through the NTC during the same
rotation in an aviation task force, they often lack awareness of each other’s missions in the same
operation. Another frequent observation is the ground main effort is often left without its planned
attack helicopter support because the attack helicopter unit tasked to support the ground main
effort has maintenance issues and the other attack unit is unwilling to provide aircraft. The attack
helicopter unit not supporting the main effort is frequently too focused on their own assigned
mission to understand the ground brigade’s overall concept and priorities. More disconcerting is
that platoons and sections do not have awareness of the mission of other elements in their
troop/company. These synchronization and prioritization problems could easily be alleviated if
aviation task forces conducted full rehearsals.
(U) Attack aviators knowingly depart on missions without fully understanding the higher level
commander’s intent and end state, limiting the probability of success at take-off. The aviators
may fully understand their mission but not how it nests within the brigade’s overall concept, such
as an attack designed to force the enemy force to turn its movement into the brigade’s main
effort or planned engagement area. If attack aviators understood the broader brigade concept,
they would be better able to execute disciplined initiative and make decisions in accordance with
the commander’s intent. Air mission commanders (AMCs) frequently make haphazard decisions
without taking into account the bigger picture. An example of such decisions is an attack element
defensively breaking contact with the enemy after receiving fire, without realizing their element
was the only friendly unit protecting the friendly flank. Another example is an attack element
terminating a reconnaissance mission early due to no observed enemy activity; then as the
brigade’s mission progresses, the enemy penetrates in the area the attack element was tasked to
observe. These are easily remedied by conducting more detailed and thorough rehearsals at the
aviation task force level with the aircrews flying in support of the missions. Aviation Tactical
Employment, ATP 3-04.1, states that combined mission briefs and rehearsals must be conducted,
yet aviation task forces habitually omit this important mission planning step. In situations when
time constraints do not allow for thorough rehearsals, planners can provide sufficient detail to
aircrews through a detailed synchronization matrix and accurate graphics.
(U) Frequently, aviators are unaware of brigade named areas of interest (NAIs), and this is one of
the most significant gaps in shared understanding that observers at the NTC witness. Aviation is
excellent at providing early warning and reaction time, but if aviators do not know where to look
or what to look for, they cannot effectively provide this benefit. Aviation task forces often fail to
communicate higher level NAIs to subordinate units, or overlook them when they are not
specifically tasked to observe those NAIs. Individual aviators typically lack awareness of the
anticipated enemy courses of action. This may occur because planners overlook the enemy
portion of the situation section of the OPORD or because that section lacks sufficient detail. As a
result, aviators fail to confirm or deny enemy activity, and aviation fails to enable the brigade
and division to develop their understanding of the battlefield. When aircrews do not know what
information is pertinent to report to higher, aircrews fail to make timely reports that would
otherwise inform higher commanders’ decisions.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units in a decisive action environment proactively

establish positive communications with adjacent ground maneuver units and seek regular
position and activity updates from those units. The frequency of those updates should increase
with the pace of the battle. The resulting shared understanding would enable aviation task forces
and troops/companies to continue modifying their plan and actions to support the commander’s
intent. Aviation task forces must do more than flight tracking aircraft departures and arrivals and
achieve battle tracking to enable understanding. The aviation task force must track the ground
units’ scheme of maneuver during execution to enable the aviation task force commander to
adjust aviation maneuver to achieve success as part of the combined arms team. Finally, the
aviation task force must accurately track internal logistic requirements and maintenance posture
to allow task force influence during mission execution in order to meet the commander’s intent
as described in ATP 3-04.1, Chapter 1, Mission Command. Troops/companies COP development
should be a top priority to enable shared understanding of the battlefield. Aviators cannot
understand the battlefield if they do not fully understand the ground maneuver unit plans and
fully understand the situation of the aviation task force.
(U) Additionally, units should send the aircrew members who will execute missions to the
associated brigade and aviation task force combined arms rehearsals (CARs) to aid
understanding of the timing and sequencing of operations. If aircrews are not able to attend,
aviation planners must develop products that accurately depict the scheme of maneuver and how
the plan meets the higher commander’s intent. This will enable commanders, platoon leaders,
and air mobility commands (AMCs) to make decisions which accomplish their mission while
supporting the brigade’s scheme of maneuver. Aviators must understand the significance of the
higher level NAIs and how they affect the brigade’s and division’s mission. Army Aviation has
much to offer if effectively incorporated into the information collection plan. Army Aviation has
the capacity to conduct reconnaissance while transitioning to and from missions, as well as
during their missions. Units that plan to fully exercise this capability will experience greater
success and further develop their higher units’ situational understanding.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Liaison Officers (LNOs)
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation liaison officers at division and brigade lack proper commander’s
guidance and experience to allow the aviation commander to have “buy-in” and provide
knowledge management and situational understanding at the appropriate level.
(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation units training at the National Training Center (NTC) dispatch
LNOs to the division and brigade level to assist the aviation task force in knowledge
management, situational understanding, and integration into the division’s and brigade’s fights.
However, LNOs provided by from the aviation task force to the brigade lack proper
commander’s guidance on how they should interact with the brigade. Additionally, the aviation
task force commander does not provide an agreement with the brigade commander and staff on
what the aviation LNO should provide to the brigade. The aviation LNO is often integrated into
the brigade aviation element (BAE) to fulfill routine duties for the brigade aviation officer
(BAO) due to undermanned BAE staff section. A combination of minimal guidance and
commander agreement often leads the LNO to be another worker within the brigade staff that
does not actively participate in the brigade’s military decision making process (MDMP) to
integrate aviation into the brigade commander’s maneuver fight. Aviation liaison teams assist
the maneuver commander with visualizing and describing how best to employ army aviation as a
member of the combined arms team (FM 3-04, 2015, p. 1-5). Aviation liaison teams support the
combat aviation brigade (CAB) or aviation task force to help conduct detailed planning and unit-
to-unit coordination for the duration of a specific operation (FM 3-04, 2015, p. 2-20). Aviation
LNOs perform the following tasks (FM 3-04, 2015, p. 2-20):
- Understand and incorporate capabilities, limitation, and tactical employment of aviation

and assets.
- Assist in the preparation of aviation estimates, plans, orders, and reports.
- Assist in planning aviation missions.
- Coordinate with airspace users and the higher airspace element for airspace management
(and integration).
- Maintain the operational status of aviation assets and their impacts on the supported
unit’s mission.
- Inform appropriate aviation units of current and possible future operations.
- Maintain continuous communications with aviation units supporting the ground unit.
The aviation task force rarely send LNOs to the supported ground maneuver battalion. As stated
in FM 3-02 (2015, p. 2-20), the aviation unit sends a battalion-level LNO team to a supported
ground maneuver battalion since the ground maneuver battalion does not have a dedicated BAE
for aviation coordination.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Most Army Aviation battalions have an modified
table of organization & Equipment (MTOE) for a LNO team, consisting of an aviation O-3 and
an aviation mission survivability officer (AMSO) W-03. The aviation LNO team should have
operational experience in the employment of army aviation for all seven aviation core
competencies (FM 3-04, 2015, p. 2-20): information collection; provide reaction time and
maneuver space; destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces; air assault ground
maneuver; air movement for sustainment; medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC); enable mission command over extended ranges (FM 3-04, 2015, p. 3-
1). As a matter of fratricide prevention, aviation LNOs should ensure that the aviation element
understands the scheme of maneuver and ground commander’s intent; exchange information
throughout the entire operation, not just during mission planning; standardize graphic control
measures; and establish and maintain communications between the aviation element and the
ground maneuver (TC 3-04.45, 2014, p. 10-5). The aviation commander must have an
agreement with the ground maneuver brigade or battalion commander that the aviation LNO
team is to perform the tasks outlined in FM 3-04 and strive to integrate army aviation as a
maneuver unit, instead of serving as an additional staff member. Additionally, the aviation
commander should provide guidance to the aviation LNO to act as the commander’s voice to the
ground maneuver brigade or battalion. Finally, the aviation commander’s LNO team should
consist of officers of caliber that represent the best of army aviation and with the appropriate
experience to integrate into the ground maneuver brigade or battalions MDMP. As a rule of
thumb, it should “hurt” the aviation task force to lose the officers.
Task 01-1-8087, Coordinate Aviation Liaison Officer Actions

Improve OBSERVATION
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Integrating Aviation Mission Survivability Officers (AMSO) into Military
Decision Making Process (MDMP)
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation Mission Survivability Officers (AMSO) fail to integrate into the
fires, intelligence, and protection warfighting functions during mission analysis and course of
action development. The lack of staff integration has resulted in inadequate planning, executing,
and inaccurate decision making from the commander, staff, and aircrew members when
operating in an integrated air defense system (IADS) threat.
(U) DISCUSSION: The Forces Command (FORSCOM) commander’s training guidance for
fiscal year 2016 challenges units that come to the combat training centers to gain proficiency at
understanding the complex threats operating in the air domain and employing the various means
and capabilities to mitigate those threats. The combat training centers provide the opportunity
for AMSOs to perform their warfighting function to support the commander, staff, and aircrew
members at the appropriate classification level. The AMSO is the unit subject matter expert in
army aviation force protection. However, it has been observed that AMSOs do not perform the
following tasks outlined in TC 3-04.9 (Commander’s Aviation Mission Survivability Program):
assisting the commander as the primary advisor for aviation mission survivability (AMS),
assessing the tactics employed and individual, crew, and collective responses to aircraft
survivability equipment (ASE) indications/threat during tactical scenario training, integrating
threat versus aircraft survivability planning, formulation, and dissemination of techniques and
procedures, and providing aviation threat system training to the S2 section, and assist the S2
sections with the identification and characterization of threats to aviation. Often, battalion level
AMSOs at NTC are performing company level tasks such as generating a standard mission load
for aircraft avionics systems, planning company level missions, or making terrain boards, instead
of performing proper mission analysis with the battalion staff during MDMP. AMSOs receive
specific training on threat weapon systems which influence, disrupt, or deny friendly aviation
operations. With this training, the AMSO supports the S2 and S3 sections by comparing
weapons systems with installed ASE, therefore enabling the commander to make decisions based
on ASE capabilities and limitations and developing tactics to defeat, destroy, or suppress enemy
threats to army aviation (TC 3-04.9). AMSOs that are not performing these duties are not
advising the commander, staff, or aircrew members. AMSOs are also not providing the correct
information because the AMSOs lack the necessary tools to conduct mission analysis. This
results in inaccurate information for planning and executing and ultimately affects the decision
making process to allow the aviation and ground commander to integrate army aviation into the
maneuver plan.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: AMSOs must integrate into the S3 and S2 sections to
conduct unit level combat aviation mission survivability analysis and planning (Task 011-410-
0010). Commanders and staffs must understand the AMSOs duties, responsibilities, and
capabilities in order to employ the AMSO in accordance with TC 3-04.9. AMSOs must gather
their tools of the trade for any home station or other training event in order to properly train
AMS. For instance, unit AMSOs must connect their aviation mission planning system (AMPS)
to the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network in order to help the S2 and S3 section to
conduct proper mission analysis. AMSOs must also download to the SIPR AMPS the TC 3-
04.2, Aviation Combat Survivability manual, located only on the United States Army Aviation
Center of Excellence (USAACE) SIPR website, and the AFTTP 3-1, Volume 2, the U.S. Air
Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures guide for Threats to Aviation, located on the air force
tactics division on SIPR. Finally, AMSOs must input AMS information into operations orders
(OPORDs). In TC 3-04.9 and FM 6-0, there is not a specific location for the aviation combat
survivability appendix in the OPORD. However, Task 011-410-0013 (develop the tactical
survivability appendix of the electronic warfare annex to OPORD) suggests that the appendix
should reside in appendix 12, tab D, within annex C – operations. Another option is to place the
aviation combat survivability within appendix 8 to annex E – protection. FM 6-0 defines
survivability as how personnel and physical assets have inherent survivability qualities or
capabilities that can be enhanced through various means and methods in order to employ natural
or artificial materials that may be used to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy or adversary.
Aviation mission survivability utilizes various methods to protect aircrew members and aircraft
by means of tactics, equipment, and the environment. Unit AMSOs must integrate early into the
planning process in order to provide the necessary information to the commander, staff, and
aircrew members to ensure mission success when operating in an IADS environment.
Task 011-410-0010: Conduct Unit Level Combat Aviation Mission Survivability

Analysis/Planning
Task 011-300-0017: Advise the BAO/Plans Officer on Army Aviation Survivability
Measures/Countermeasures.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Attack Aviation Company/Troops Mission Planning Cells
(U) OBSERVATION: Attack aviation company/troops rarely execute mission planning cells in
an efficient or effective manner. Attack company/troop planning cells are attempted at the
National Training Center (NTC), but frequently, the planning cells fail to focus on the complete
tactical situation due to minimal leadership involvement to ensure the planning is conducted
effectively. Additionally, units have not practiced planning cells during home station training
which results in the lack of familiarity in the planning process while planning and preparing for
missions at the NTC. Company/troop planning cells are not conducted in accordance with the
unit tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP) nor the published doctrine.
(U) DISCUSSION: The vast majority of mission plans at the company and troop level do not
have details greater than that of a general concept or general scheme of maneuver. Many times,
the plan lacks sufficient detail to execute a brigade or battalion level synchronized plan. Units
habitually do not understand how the enemy operates and they do not effectively plan on how to
counter the enemy threat. The company/troop plans lack details such as the higher level purpose
of the mission and how it nest within the higher unit mission. Aviation Tactical Employment
(ATP 3-04.1) states all elements of aviation missions must be familiar with both the aviation
commander’s and ground commander’s intent. Companies and troops rarely meet mission
success criteria if they do not plan their missions to nest within the intent of the higher level
commander’s intent. Companies/troops lack understanding of friendly unit’s position,
composition, disposition, and scheme of maneuver which is often overlook during course of
action (COA) analysis. This results in units rarely depicting accurate friendly unit graphics on
the unit common operating picture (COP). Troop/company commanders do not plan their
mission to synchronize with key events of the supported ground maneuver unit nor do they
synchronize with key timelines with other assets on the battlefield. This leads to frequently
missed hard times during mission execution without a sense of urgency to attempt to execute on
time. Only two units in the past year have demonstrated familiarity with planning cells and were
effectively synchronized with the higher unit mission. Most units arrive lack practice or
familiarity with planning cells and are not able to effectively overcome the training deficiency
while at the NTC. Other details skipped during planning include the planned mission primary
and alternate routes, designated attack by fire (ABF) positions, and battle positions (BPs), and
ground maneuver graphics and control measures. This leads to target fixation during execution
resulting in attack elements losing focus on the other targets in their engagement area. Due to a
lack of understanding of the enemy situation during planning, the attack elements do not
adequately plan the method of fire distribution, sensor distribution, fire control, and other control
methods to ensure they met the commander’s destruction criteria quickly and effectively as
outlined in ATP 3-04.1. Understanding the enemy is a highly important planning factor which is
often overlooked by attack aviation. Company/troop threat planning cells routinely culminate
threat planning with the threat identification of the enemy weapon systems and their capabilities.
Company/troop planners rarely template the enemy on the battlefield with an enemy situation
template (SITEMP), array the enemy in the planned engagement area in the manner in which the
enemy fights, and identify threat ranges/rings of the enemy weapon systems. The company and
troop planners seldom conduct follow on development of the enemy understanding after the first
mission. Attack elements instead rely on the general threat overview provided by the aviation
task force intelligence officer instead of applying detailed threat analysis in their planning cell to
develop the enemy situation in order to apply the threat template during course of action
development. Finally, attack pilots frequently do not know how the enemy moves, fights, and
composition of enemy elements, although, this information is readily available in the NTC
redbook. Attack aviation units usually arrive to the NTC with predetermined planning cells and
their responsibility. The majority of the planning is left up to the company/troop aviation mission
survivability officer (AMSO) with occasional assistance from the air mission commander
(AMCs) or a platoon leader assigned to execute the mission. Companies and troops operate using
combat aviation brigade tactical standard operation procedures (TACSOPs) which outline a
planning cell methodology, but planning methods are rarely followed or even known by the
aviators planning the missions. Finally, inefficient time management by the planning cell often
leads to minimal rehearsal time. Company/troop planning cells frequently omit planning and
coordinating for sustainment and for communications. Planning cells which could be combined
into the other planning cells such as flight plans-mission brief-risk assessment cell could be
combined into the operations cell. ATP 3-04.1 provides a suggested template which mirrors the
army operations order and is more focused on the tactical mission. The company/troop planning
cells generally have an inadvertent instrument meteorological condition (IIMC) planning cells
which can be covered by referring to the unit TASCOP, and many times companies/troops stop
planning for IIMC after the first mission. AMCs and pilots-in-command should be making
intelligent weather decisions prior to entering IIMC, additionally executing IIMC procedures in a
threat environment place army aircraft in a highly vulnerable position and may not be tactically
feasible. Almost every attack aviation company/troop have a planning cell position called the
“pit boss” or “lead planner” who is responsible to ensure every planning cell member
accomplishes their part of the plan, but this leader rarely drives the planning process, whether it
is the commander, a platoon leader, or AMC. This position is rarely active and does not ensure
coordination between the planning cells occur. This is a command type position and should be
filled by a company/troop leader or, at least, filled by the AMC of the mission.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Attack aviation units should plan in detail as outlined
in the ATP 3-04.1 for their tactical mission and ensure their scheme of maneuver is nested and
synchronized with the higher scheme of maneuver. Units can ensure their unit is nested and
synchronized with the higher scheme of maneuver by conducting detailed rehearsals prior to
mission execution. Company/troop planners must back plan hard timelines and events, as well
as incorporate aircraft maintenance and other contingencies which often cause delays. Unit
leadership must understand the synchronization impacts for not meeting timeline.
Commanders/AMCs must enforce the timeline by having their key attack elements available at
key events or times in order to ensure conditions are set for mission success. Company/troops
should incorporate conditions checks into the synchronization matrix or execution checklist to
ensure the mission is ready for execution. Companies/troops should utilize planning cells as
outlined in the ATP 3-04.1 to focus more on the tactical mission. ATP 3-04.1, annex C, provides
a step by step detailed checklist for companies/troops to follow when executing planning cells.
Additionally, each offensive mission set has specific planning considerations for each type listed
under each section. Successful planning cannot be limited to only one or two people in a
company/troop. Companies/troops should have multiple people assigned to each planning cell to
facilitate 24 hour planning and redundancy. Planning cells should integrate other members of
the task force (S2, AMSO, FSO) to develop a more complete plan and ensure a shared
understanding across the task force prior to mission execution. Successful planning requires
people to understand the enemy situation, how the enemy fights, how the ground supported units
and higher units are fighting, and they must understanding how the company/troop’s mission
nests and synchronizes with the overall plan. Company/troop leaders must ensure the unit plan is
detailed and coordinated between each planning cell and drive each cell to complete the plan to
help ensure mission execution. Units should refine and understand their TACSOP. The
TACSOP should define roles and responsibilities for planning cells and have a standardized
planning cell checklist for both hasty and deliberate missions. Finally, units should practice
planning cells often at home station utilizing their TACSOP and ATP 3-04.1 to drive the
planning cell process.
CATS Task Number 01-2-5198, Conduct Aviation Mission Planning/Preparation.
(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Mission Command Systems
(U) OBSERVATION: Many aviation task force main command posts have mission command
systems which are inadequately employed and lack operators with an adequate proficiency level
to conduct digital planning and coordination events with higher and adjacent units.
(U) DISCUSSION: During operational planning, aviation task forces (TFs) conduct multiple
planning and coordination meetings with supported division and brigade units via digital means
due to the geographic displacement of each echelon. An aviation task force must constantly plan
and coordinate with adjacent supported units during the military decision making process
(MDMP) while executing current operations. The primary means of facilitating current and
future operations is through the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) with Ventrillo to support
voice communications. Supporting systems include internet chat programs such as Transverse
Chat, Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) Chat, Blue Force Tracking hardware and software, and
voice over secure internet protocol communication systems (SVOIP). These systems supplement
standard radio communications with aircraft during operations and exist to coordinate with
higher and adjacent units (ATP 3-04.1, Chapter 1). Most aviation task forces place the mission
command systems used for mission planning in the current operations (CUOPS) section of their
main command post (CP). Aviation TFs routinely conduct digital planning coordination and
briefings (initial planning conferences, air mission briefs, air mission coordination meetings,
back briefs, etc.) with higher and adjacent units using a CPOF in their current operations
(CUOPS) section. The placement of these mission command systems within CUOPs interrupts
current mission execution, distracts CUOPs personnel and limits the effectiveness of the
coordination. More often than not, the essential planning and coordination meetings are being
held in a small crowded spot in the CUOPs section. The result is a disruption to the CUOPS
ability to battle track and maintain situational understating across all warfighting functions.
Furthermore, the mission command systems are frequently configured with headphones and
microphones which only facilitate communication to and from the person sitting right next to it,
and not the other essential staff members sitting near-by. This configuration limits the
effectiveness and shared understanding amongst the participants. Most main CPs have a future
operations (FUOPS) or plans tent designated to facilitate planning, but units fail to establish
mission command systems to facilitate digital coordination and planning with adjacent and
higher units (FM 6-0, Chapter 1). Additionally, aviation TF staffs lack the necessary proficiency
to effectively employ their CPOF for use during mission planning (CATS Task # 150-132-1013:
Produce a Collaborative Brief with Mission Command Workstation/Command Post of the
Future). Aviation TFs often lack the expertise to establish and maintain a consistent connectivity
on the tactical internet to allow CPOF to function properly, therefore the unit defaults to the use
of SVOIP to conduct the planning. SVOIP use for planning further inhibits shared
understanding across the staff by eliminating visual aids used for reference during planning and
coordination meetings.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Aviation TF main CPs must be designed and
configured with the expectation that digital planning is required using CPOF as discussed in ATP
3-04.1, Chapter 1. The Aviation TF should employ their mission command systems to maximize
the effectiveness of both FUOPS and CUOPS. Aviation battalions are sufficiently equipped (4
on modiefied table of organization & equipment (MTOE)] to use CPOF in FUOPS and CUOPS.
For the mission command systems to be effective during planning, aviation TFs should design
their main CP with a dedicated FUOPS section capable of conducting digital briefings and
coordination using CPOF. The CPOF should be configured with a microphone and speakers to
allow for multiple staff members and/or commanders to receive and participate in briefings
during the planning process (ATP 3-04.1 chapter 1, FM 6-0, chapters 1 & 3). Finally, aviation
TFs must employ their mission command systems to their fullest capacity during field and
command post training exercises in order to validate bandwidth, connectivity processes, and
provide additional operator training (FM 6-0 Chapter 3).
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Airspace Integration
(U) OBSERVATION: Brigade combat teams do not adequately plan, synchronize, and integrate
airspace to enable fires, army aviation maneuver, information collection, and prevent fratricide
(Task 011-300-0006, Integrate Airspace Command and Control into Army Airspace
Requirements for the Brigade Combat Team). Note: FM 3-52 (2013, p. iv) uses the joint term
airspace control, replacing the term army airspace command and control (AC2). The intent of
the terminology change is for army forces to integrate all airspace users (i.e. army aviation, fires,
close air support, and unmanned aerial systems) while minimizing adverse impacts. This
doctrinal name change is not currently reflected on the combined arms training strategy.
(U) DISCUSSION: Brigade staff members have relied on their counterinsurgency (COIN)
experience to separate aircraft using restricted operating zones (ROZ) and using ROZs for gun
target lines commonly called “hot walls.” The ROZs often prohibited army aviation or
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) from maintaining continuous reconnaissance or security, even
to the point of breaking enemy contact in order to employ artillery fires or launch small UAS.
Compounding the airspace management issue is the lack of planning and integration of army
aviation into the brigade’s maneuver has caused army aviation to rely on COIN experiences. In
a COIN environment, army aviation would expect to have freedom of maneuver within a
brigade’s airspace as ROZs were left active 24 hours a day, 7 days a week because large caliber
artillery missions were not typically utilized during the latter part of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) or operation enduring freedom (OEF), especially in locations with the potential for
collateral damage. This lack of airspace understanding by aircrews has led to several airspace
violations at the NTC such as flying through active ROZs, not adhering to air corridors provided
in the airspace control order (ACO), or aircrews not relaying intent to the brigade in order to gain
the advantage in a battle that would cause aircrews to stray from published ACO. This lack of
airspace understanding is a result of a deficiency of mission command, common air and ground
graphics, and rehearsals between the brigade and the aviation task Force. Furthermore, this
causes a delay in artillery fires. The NTC has established a divisional airspace plan that serves as
the baseline for air operations. In the past, the brigade with a tactical control (TACON) aviation
task force would maneuver army aviation similar to COIN, utilizing dynamic retasking when
communications were established potentially desynchronizing a subordinate battalion’s

maneuver plan or fires plan as discussed earlier. The rotational brigade would not establish
airspace, such as air routes/corridors, that would facilitate maneuver of army aviation for
sustainment of the brigade, employ attack aviation as a maneuver force, or allow unmanned
aircraft system (UAS) to be utilized for information collection or as another artillery observer.
NTC’s divisional airspace construct, consisting of air corridors (AIRCOR), is the baseline
airspace that enables maneuver, sustainment, and fires for army rotary wing aircraft. FM 3-52,
Airspace Control, defines an AIRCOR as a bi-directional or restricted air route of travel
specified for use by aircraft. AIRCORs at the NTC provide a baseline airspace plan for the
brigade to permit army aviation to provide sustainment, maneuver, and fires in support of the
brigade while permitting freedom of maneuver for transient aircraft while moving through the
brigade’s area. The brigade must coordinate with division to restrict movement along division
owned airspace, particularly for utilizing the brigade’s artillery or small UAS. The brigade’s
airspace element is the air defense airspace management / brigade aviation element
(ADAM/BAE) cell which integrates the brigade’s airspace to include air and missile defense and
aviation functions (FM 3-52). The ADAM/BAE manages a working group that facilitates and
synchronizes airspace contributions from all elements that perform an airspace collective task.
The working group consists of the air liaison officer, airspace element (ADAM/BAE), aviation
element, fires cells, tactical air control party, and the UAS element (FM 3-52). Brigade airspace
control typically employs airspace coordination areas (ACA), which is a fires support
coordination measure (FSCM), to enable attack aviation to establish battle positions, attack or
support by fire positions, or holding areas. ACAs are established in a target area to reasonably
protect friendly aircraft from friendly, indirect, surface-to-surface fires (ATP 3-52.1). An ACA
is restrictive for fires, not restrictive for aircraft. Additionally, ACAs can be formal
(disseminated via fire support channels or airspace control order) or informal (established as
required by the ground commander and supporting aircraft). ACAs require a higher degree of
dissemination; being an FSCM, ACA graphics are transmitted via fire support channels (ATP 3-
52.1), but should also be included on the airspace control order (ACO).
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Brigades must establish a baseline airspace plan
prior to any operation based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available and
civil considerations (METT-TC) and the operational environment and have to understand that the
airspace control authority can reside several echelons above, sometimes at the joint forces
commander level and must fit their plan into the airspace control authority’s plan to support joint
air operations (FM 3-52). At NTC, the airspace control authority resides at 52nd infantry division
(ID). Additionally, the brigade must be able to have line of sight communications, retransmitted
or otherwise, as a primary means to procedurally command and control aircraft within the
brigade’s airspace. Brigades must understand that army aviation utilizes maneuver graphics and
tactical mission tasks (minus ones that require a unit to hold terrain) the same way an armor unit
would utilize graphics. When developing army aviation maneuver into the brigade’s maneuver,
airspace should be developed during mission analysis and course of action (COA) development
as a separate overlay. For example, the brigade wants to utilize attack by fire (ABF) positions
for AH-64s to attack within an engagement area (EA). The ABFs should be graphically depicted
with the EA, as this more accurately portray the aviation mission for the aviation and ground
commander, versus depicting an ACA with an EA on the same graphic which may not accurately
allow the commander to conceptualize army aviation maneuver. Again, an ACA is an FSCM,
not a maneuver graphic therefore using this to show Army Aviation maneuver is inappropriate
(ATP 3-52.1). Finally, ADAM/BAEs must coordinate with all of the brigade’s airspace users to
ensure that an airspace common operating picture (COP) are accurate and continually updated
with all airspace user’s graphics across all systems, such as analog COPs and digital COPs
[Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Tactical Airspace Integration
System (TAIS), Command Post of the Future (CPOF) etc.]. When aircraft occupy planned
airspace, the ADAM/BAE can use an aircraft icon and attach it to the analog COP. A technique
like this will help fires conceptualize where airspace users are on the battlefield to minimize the
time to clear airspace for fires, and it also allows the commander to visualize where his
maneuver elements are within his battlespace.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Task Force Commanders Intent
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation task force commanders often struggle to establish a clear and
concise commander’s intent that includes the expanded purpose, realistic or applicable key tasks,
and a measurable end state (ADRP 5-0). Without a proper commander’s intent, subordinate
commanders are left on their own to determine how to best accomplish the mission when the
original plan is no longer applicable.
(U) DISCUSSION: The commander’s intent concisely defines success for the given operation.
A well formulated commander’s intent is derived from higher headquarters and enables
subordinate commanders by giving them guidance and direction with the associated boundaries
to accomplish the unit’s specific mission without a reliance on additional guidance, orders, or
communication. Linking the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units, a
commander’s intent is the commander’s way to facilitate a shared understanding of the mission
and the bigger picture, while focusing subordinate commanders on the specific conditions that
must be met in order to accomplish the unit’s mission. The initial commander’s intent should be
issued during the mission analysis step of the military decision making process (MDMP) and
included in the second warning order. The initial intent should be used to guide the planning
process and then refined prior to issuing the operations order (FM 6-0). Commanders create
their intent by dividing it into an expanded purpose, key tasks, and the end state. These three
components organize the intent into the chronological order of the mission. The expanded
purpose gives subordinate commanders insight into the broader purpose of the operation and
how the unit’s efforts affect the force as a whole. The key tasks are activities that the unit must
accomplish as a whole in order to reach the desired end state. Key tasks are essential to keep
subordinates focused on achieving the desired end state when the concept of operation no longer
fits the current situation. The end state describes the specific conditions the commander desires
to exist after the operation. It includes the desired state of the friendly forces in relationship to
the enemy, terrain, and various other considerations. The end state encourages unity of effort
among subordinates. During recent CTC rotations, aviation observer, coach/trainer’s (OC/Ts)
observed multiple operations where the commander’s intent was unclear and inconclusive,
resulting in an unorganized and ineffective planning process. A routine observation is the

Battalion S3 or executive officer (XO) develops the commander’s intent during the planning
process and the first time the commander sees his intent in writing is during the operations orders
brief. The battalion commander often modifies his intent during the orders brief which leads to
confusion with the company commanders and staff. Understanding the commander’s intent is
paramount during the conduct of operations when the operational variables cause the plan to
change. In one instance, the lack of a concise commander’s intent forced aircrews to act on their
own initiative when inaccurate intelligence estimates and unforeseen friction points converted a
deliberate attack mission into a hasty movement to contact behind enemy lines. Without a clear
understanding of the role the unit played in the bigger picture throughout the area of operations,
aircrews were unable to coordinate with adjacent units and adapt their task and purpose to better
support the ground forces in the operation. The ultimate result was an attack helicopter platoon
with massive firepower inadvertently stuck in a high risk situation utilizing its capabilities to
provide only negligible effects in support of the ground force and toward achieving the higher
headquarters’ desired end state. Army Leaders stress that the commander’s intent must be
simple and memorable (ADRP 5-0). Leaders and Soldiers two echelons lower in the chain of
command must clearly understand the intent and be able to apply it during operations.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Commanders should play an active role in the
mission analysis step of the MDMP and issue their initial intent as soon as possible. Without the
initial intent of the commander at the beginning of the planning process, commanders leave the
definition of success and the focus of the mission planning on the staff to develop. Commanders
and their staff should review ADRP 5-0, JP 3-0, JP 5-0, and additional staff planning doctrine to
understand the role of a commander’s intent and its three components in operational planning
and execution. Following course of action (COA) development, commanders should refine their
initial intent to be included in the operations order to ensure the unit has a shared understanding
of the mission and subordinates are enabled to exercise disciplined initiative keeping within the
vision of the commander.
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Information Collection from Planning to Execution in the Aviation Task Force
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation task force (TF) rotational units frequently fail to perform
information collection, from planning to execution, at both the TF and company/troop level
(CATS Task #150-MC-2300).
(U) DISCUSSION: Information collection (IC) is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the
planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and
dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (ATP 2-01, Plan
Requirements and Assess Collection). Aviation TFs struggle to perform information collection
primarily due to a lack of planning during the military decision making process (MDMP).
Aviation TF intelligence officers (S2) fail to produce complete intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) products to include: high value target lists (HVTL), high payoff target list
(HPTL), event templates (EVENTEMP) and event matrix (CATS Task #34-4-3173, Provide
Intelligence Support to Information Collection Planning). The EVENTEMP is the most
important product the commander and staff use to visualize how the enemy will fight in time and
space. The EVENTEMP must include the situational template (SITEMP), timed phase lines and
named areas of interest (NAIs). The TF S2 and staff must develop NAIs to ensure IC at the
correct location and time to satisfy priority intelligence requirements (PIR) (ATP 2-01). Staffs
and commanders often struggle to develop PIR for each battle phase. Even when the commander
approves PIRs, the staff routinely fails to produce the information collection matrix (ICM) which
links PIRs, indicators, specific intelligence requirements (SIR), NAIs, times and target areas of
interest (TAIs). Although the ICM is not a tasking document, it is an essential tool to assist the
staff in planning and assist the aircrews in reporting given a particular NAI and time frame. Due
to the lack of an ICM, aircrews do not understand what data and information is important,
therefore, fail to report during and after mission execution. The lack of complete IPB products,
ICMs, collection synchronization matrixes and overlays, make it virtually impossible to publish a
task force information collection plan in an operations order (OPORD), annex L (CATS task
#34-4-3173). Aircrews and TF staffs are generally unprepared for reconnaissance missions
without a published annex L and collection plan since the TF is unable to put assets at the right
place and time to acquire the information needed by decision makers. Aviation TFs often work
directly with a supported ground unit performing reconnaissance and security missions, but
aviation TF staffs and aircrews almost never receive an ICM or NAI overlay from the ground
force. The lack of cross talk and coordination between ground and aviation TFs significantly
limits the effective employment of Army aviation assets as information collection assets.
Recently, a brigade combat team (BCT) tasked the aviation TF to conduct a deliberate attack
against enemy forces within an engagement area designated by the BCT. The BCT and aviation
TF failed to plan and perform information collection prior to mission execution. The units did
not have complete IPB products, ICM, IC synchronization matrix or overlays to support
deliberate attack planning and engagement area (EA) development. There was no IC plan tied to
decision points with associated PIR. The result was an aviation TF committing a platoon of AH-
64s with artillery to support suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) to an EA with templated,
but not verified enemy, causing negative enemy engagements within the EA and a waste of
combat power. These assets could have been allocated to other priority missions if an IC plan
existed to support the mission.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Aviation TF S2 and staffs need to complete IPB through
the production of an EVENTEMP. After the completion of the EVENTEMP, the staff must
produce an information collection matrix which ties PIRs (approved by the task force
commander), indicators, SIRs, NAIs, times and target areas of interest (TAIs) (FM 3-55,
Information Collection). Aviation staffs must conduct COA analysis (wargame) to refine the
ICM and NAI overlay. The commander and staff must publish an OPORD to include annex B
(intelligence estimate) and annex L (information collection plan). The TF S2 should understand
what assets are available to request to support the TF information collection plan from its higher
headquarters and incorporate the assets into the IC synch matrix. Finally, the TF must conduct
TF level rehearsals of the operation to include the missions and operations supporting the
information collection plan. ATP 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment, Chapter 3:
Reconnaissance, outlines numerous advantages that Army aviation brings to IC: aviation assets
conduct reconnaissance of large zones/areas more rapidly than most ground forces, aviation
assets possess the ability to rapidly develop the situation and transition to a hasty attack through
rapid and forceful reconnaissance, and aviation assets conduct organic reconnaissance
management through employment of cueing, mixing and redundancy. While there are a plethora
of advantages Army aviation brings to IC, staffs and commanders need to be mindful of the air
threat when incorporating Army aviation into the IC plan. TF aviation mission survivability
officers (AMSO) have a key role to play throughout IPB, MDMP and the development of the IC
plan. Many aviation units have an organic un-manned aerial system (UAS) capability. The
manned-unmanned team (MUM-T) concept and the use of UAS provide aviation TFs unique IC
opportunities and advantages. The UAS enables task forces to conduct effective reconnaissance
by organically implementing the fundamentals of reconnaissance. The Shadow UAS enables the
TF to ensure continuous reconnaissance before, during and after operations. The Shadow can
provide landing zone/pickup zone (LZ/PZ) area reconnaissance and conduct ground and air route
reconnaissance prior to mission execution. Following an operation, such as a deliberate attack
by AH-64s, the Shadow can conduct reconnaissance focused on confirming battle damage
assessments (BDA). UAS can also maintain contact with remaining enemy forces to determine
their follow on actions, thereby enabling planning for future operations. Additionally, the
Shadow also can enable continuous reconnaissance while aircrews make rotations through a
forward arming and refueling point (FARP) during missions. Lastly, employment of UAS by the
TF can ensure the unit conducting reconnaissance makes enemy contact with the smallest
element, thereby reducing the risk of aircrews becoming decisively engaged (ATP 3-04.1).
When aviation operates with supported ground units, the staff should conduct adjacent unit
coordination to obtain, at a minimum, their ICM and NAI overlay (ATP 3-04.1).
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Air Mission Commander Positions are filled with Warrant Officers
(U) OBSERVATION: During the past six NTC rotations, a noticeable shift has occurred in
which a majority of air mission commander (AMC) positions are filled with warrant officers
rather than the commander or platoon leaders. Aviation’s doctrinal position, according to FM 3-
99 and ATP 3-04.1, that the AMC can be the commander’s designated representative has become
the rule instead of the exception, resulting in company commanders and platoon leaders serving
as a regular pilot rather than the AMC of their respective organization while conducting aviation
missions.
(U) DISCUSSION: As units are rotating through the National Training Center, company
commanders and platoon leaders have shown a reluctance to serve as the AMC for their
respective echelon, primarily air movements and air assaults. They often have a reliance on
senior warrant officers serving as the AMC. During one rotation, the AMC for all four planned
or executed air assaults were warrant officers. There are two reasons for this: lack of experience
and lack of AMC training programs. After querying commanders who were not qualified AMC,
all cited their inexperience in leading air movements and air assaults as to why they were not
qualified or comfortable to serve as the AMC. For platoon leaders, this is due to their short
tenure and is hard to circumvent. However, company commanders should have experience at
this point in their career. Senior warrant officers, who often serve as the AMC, clearly have a
plethora of experience in aviation operations due to the previous fifteen years of combat.
However, they do not have the authority or responsibility to command their organization. This is
reserved for the commander, and “commanders who assign responsibility and authority to their
subordinates still retain the overall responsibility of the actions of their commands” (AR 600-20,
2-1b). The warrant officer may be the AMC, but if the company commander is also flying in that
formation, who truly has the authority and responsibility? If an infantry company is ordered to
seize an objective, the company commander leads the attack, despite the first sergeant having
more experience. So, why does the aviation company commander or platoon leader often only
participate in the aviation mission instead of lead it, and how can aviation commanders and
platoon leaders truly lead their formations if they cannot lead them in combat? The second
reason for company leaders not serving as the AMC is due to a lack of emphasis and
prioritization of AMC progression at home station. Battalions have created robust AMC
progression programs, but many are not backed up by the needed focus on company
commanders and platoon leaders. Half of the assault and heavy lift commanders in the past three
NTC rotations were not AMC qualified, and were unable to fully lead their formations in
decisive action training environment (DATE). Battalion commanders need to ensure their junior
leaders are quickly progressing as an AMC so that mission command is better utilized.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Battalion and company commanders should place
special emphasis on AMC progressions for company commanders and platoon leaders within
their formations. These leaders need to build their experience and progress quickly to AMC with
support from their organization. A recommended timeline for company commanders is to be
complete with AMC progression prior to taking command. The same is true for platoon leaders
if possible; however, due to having little prior experience, they should be complete with enough
time to effectively lead their platoon. Due to the addition in appendix C of TC 3-04.11 for
battalions to have a formal AMC training program, company commander and platoon leader
responsibilities in chapter 1 should now include an AMC progression requirement. A
progressive approach, from conducting planning exercises of team missions all the way through
execution of platoon and company air assaults will ensure leaders get the required training and
experience necessary to succeed. At home, combat training centers units should be executing as
if in country, not spending time training junior leaders how to execute. How do these leaders
fight and win if they are not prepared to execute their assigned rolls as leaders of their
formations?
(U) SOURCE: NTC
(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Operations with Sophisticated Air Defense (AD) Systems
(U) OBSERVATION: Aviation operations in the vicinity of urban centers during decisive action
(DA) operations against a near peer threat with more numerous and more sophisticated AD
systems requires additional consideration for maneuver commanders. Aviation forces need to
conduct in depth analysis in selecting attack by fire (ABF), helicopter landing zones (HLZ), and
restricted operating zones (ROZ) when planning and executing urban operations (CATS 01-2-
5198, conduct aviation mission planning/preparation). In addition, due to personnel recovery and
collateral damage considerations, risk must be properly identified, mitigated, and approved at the
appropriate levels.
(U) DISCUSSION: For attack aircraft and information collection (IC) platforms, observation
angles continually change as aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) maneuver in vicinity
of urban areas. An open, busy market could rapidly be masked by a tall structure resulting in a
loss of positive identification by the observer. To mitigate this, aircraft may need to operate at
higher altitudes, which allows for a larger aerial perspective with minimal blind spots. The
addition of the common missile warning system (CMWS), Modern Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight (MTADS), Aircraft Survivability Product Improvement (ASPI), and lack of
radar threats have allowed aircraft to operate at altitudes with relative immunity in recent
conflicts. However, operating at higher altitudes expose aircraft to radar threats. An obvious
solution is to operate at lower altitudes, thus, increasing the survivability against radar AD
systems employed within urban environments (ATP 3-06.1, 2016).
(U) Attack aircraft may also increase standoff to remain outside the weapon engagement zone
(WEZ) of radar threats and operate from stationary battle positions providing cover from enemy
weapon systems. However, this limits the aircrew’s perspective throughout the city’s urban
valleys and provides an opportunity for enemy forces to maneuver on stationary aircraft.
Increasing standoff will also increase munition dispersion which increases the potential for
collateral damage. Collateral damage caused by attack rotary wing aviation will result in further
supporting the insurgent information operations, increases their candidates for recruiting, and the
potential for insurgency the ground force commander will have to contend with during stability
operations. Careful consideration to risk (operational/strategic) must be addressed prior to
attacking targets in urban environments, especially during operations against a near peer threat
that has numerous and sophisticated AD systems forcing attack aircraft to operate from greater
standoff distances.
(U) The combination of attack and unmanned aircraft, known as manned-unmanned teaming
(MUM-T), is a highly effective solution in the urban environment. MUM-T enables the
commander to gain and maintain contact with enemy forces in an urban environment. MUM-T
allows the shooting aircraft to maintain standoff from the urban area, thus limiting aircraft threat
exposure time, while the unmanned aircraft identifies targets. Specifically armed unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS’s) like the Grey Eagle are particularly well suited for employment in
urban environments due to their ability to not only identify, but also engage targets with their
point target system (hellfire missiles). Multiple unmanned aircraft over different objectives could
use a smaller number of attack aircraft that may then quickly transition between targets. Target
handovers can be achieved through a visual handover from one platform to another or remote
shots can be executed to further limit shooter exposure (ATP 3-06.1, 2016).
(U) The same applies to UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft conducting aerial mission command or air
assaults to helicopter landing zones (HLZ) for urban air assault missions. Often, commanders
want continuous observation of the objective from the mission command aircraft in order to
provide adaptable mission command during execution when the situation rapidly changes. An
observed tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) is for mission command aircraft to orbit at
altitude in vicinity of the urban objective area. Again, this increases the risk of AD engagement
due to the aircraft operating within the WEZ. The risk is even greater when conducting air
assaults or air movements as a single engagement by an AD system could render an assault force
ineffective. Selecting HLZs within the city allows the assault force to quickly mass; however,
limited HLZ selection also allows the enemy to more easily predict where the assault force is
landing and to prepare a defense (ATP 3-06.1, 2016). The assault force should consider the
threat when developing the ground tactical plan and potentially land at a secure HLZ, an HLZ
outside of the city perimeter, or an HLZ that is a terrain feature away and include false insertion
HLZs in the air assault landing plan.
(U) The aviation mission survivability officers (AMSO) within the brigade aviation element
(BAE) and the army aviation task force (TF) are specifically trained in the capabilities and
limitations of aircraft survivability equipment and how AD systems will impact the use of Army
Aviation in an urban environment. The AMSO must be an active participant during mission
analysis and course of action development to ensure aviation mission survivability is understood
by commanders (ATP 3-04.2, Aviation Mission Survivability, 2015). In addition, identifying the
risk of an aircraft shoot down over an urban environment presents personnel recovery challenges
and risks that must be identified and mitigated by the staff and approved by the commander.
(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To mitigate the AD threat, ground and aviation
planners should consider the AD threat and select ABFs out of the threat WEZs. Planners must
consider the increased standoff distances may not allow the aircraft to acquire and engage targets
due to limited field of view and may increase collateral damage in the urban environment. The
collateral damage risk must be addressed during planning and the risk must be approved at the
appropriate level during execution. In addition, the integration of armed UAS as an attack
platform into the scheme of maneuver and the utilization of MUM-T will mitigate risks to the
aviation and the ground forces during stability operations. Armed UAS, such as Gray Eagle, are
more likely to operate with greater freedom, are less likely to be shot down (besides radar
threats), but most importantly, have the ability to engage point targets with their Hellfire
missiles.
(U) To mitigate the AD threat, ground and aviation planners should select multiple HLZs,
mission command ROZs, and ABFs either out of the WEZ or one terrain feature away. Though
this increases the distance the ground force must move and maneuver, it increases survivability
and mitigates the risk of losing an aircraft and/or ground forces due to AD threat. Also, mission
command aircraft must operate a safe distance from the urban objective area and at lower
altitudes. Seeing the objective area from the mission command aircraft should not be a factor in
selecting a mission command ROZ. Instead, planners should consider line of sight
communication capabilities and position the ROZ to enable the maneuver commander to
understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations.
(U) Aviation TFs must communicate their unique capabilities to supported units in order to
achieve the desired effects of the ground force commander while reducing risk to aviation.
Commanders should also incorporate the AMSO within the BAE or in the aviation TF to provide
subject matter expertise on aircraft survivability equipment capabilities and limitations in order
to assist in mission analysis and course of action (COA) development when utilizing Army
aviation in an urban environment.

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UNCLASSIFIED/For Official Use Only

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

• Weather conditions before and during flight operations

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To ensure there is no interruption in collection from

AR 95-23, Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Regulations

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Protecting the Aviation Task Force

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation operations in a DATE scenario, specifically at the National

(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: While the responsibilities of an aviation S2 may

ATP 2-01.3, IPB

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Attack Reconnaissance Mission Planning

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: More emphasis needs to be placed on SEAD fires, in

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To be successful against a peer/near pear threat

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: In order to provide redundancy of critical logistics

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Forward Arming Refuel Point (FARP)

(U) DISCUSSION: Aviation maintenance company/troop standard operating procedures (SOP)

(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: SOP updates/cross training/home station rehearsals:

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: External Sling Load Operations

(U) TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Based on observations at the NTC, underutilization

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Effective employment of Aviation Liaison Officers (LNOs)

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

(U) DISCUSSION: Army aviation “hunter-killer” pairing of attack and reconnaissance

1) Improper employment of UAS platforms in support of rotary-wing maneuver

2) Lack of proper training of UAS operators and mission commanders

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

SUBJECT: Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in a Decisive Action Environment

SUBJECT: Aviation Sustainment

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Development of the LOGSYNC matrix should be a

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Triggers for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Evasion Planning in a Decisive Action Environment

(U) Improve OBSERVATION

(U) SOURCE: NTC

(U) SUBJECT: Aviation Timelines

(U) OBSERVATION: Managing timelines effectively during large-scale ground combat