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system, and, it is said, Austria offered him easier terms if he would.
He had been brought up with the old ideas of the royal position, but
he was statesman enough to perceive that if Piedmont and the
House of Savoy were to lead in the movement of Italian
independence, they must win the confidence of the liberals; and he
had sworn to maintain the constitution. He was always a man of his
word, whatever policy might advise, and answered that he should be
loyal to the constitution.
Piedmont's history for the next few years is a record of liberal
legislation, as it was then understood. This legislation was especially
directed against antiquated ecclesiastical privileges, with the purpose
of realizing Cavour's principle, "A free Church in a free State." A little
later Cavour was called to the head of the government, and for ten
years, with certain brief exceptions, he remained the chief figure on
the Italian stage. There are diverse judgments on the very diverse
merits of the master-builders of the Italian kingdom; some admire
most Mazzini, the indefatigable conspirator, the dreamy idealist, the
nobly fanatical republican; others, Garibaldi, the man after Petrarch's
heart, the rival of Roland or the Cid; others, Victor Emmanuel, the
honourable, bold, shrewd, resolute king; but all agree that Cavour's
brilliant diplomacy entitles him to rank as one of the world's great
statesmen, and that his work was indispensable to the establishment
of the Italian kingdom.
This period prior to the war with Austria is Cavour's. He set the
finances of Piedmont on a better basis; he began a series of
measures for the development of her resources; he secured various
internal reforms, but his brilliant achievement was in his foreign
policy. He knew that the Austrians could not be dispossessed without
a war, that Piedmont was not strong enough of herself, and that in
order to gain allies she must get a hearing before Europe. The
Crimean War gave Cavour an opportunity. England and France would
have preferred Austria as an ally, and there was much cautious
proceeding; but Austria hesitated, and Piedmont offered herself.
Many Italians deemed the plan of taking part in a war with which
Piedmont had no visible concern a piece of folly; but Cavour carried
his point. The Piedmontese army went, behaved with credit, and
effaced the unfavourable impression left by the disastrous
campaigns of 1848-49. The fruits of the Crimean expedition were
gathered at the Congress of Paris (1856), where Cavour, supported
by England and France, was able to call the attention of the
Congress to the condition of Italy. He pointed to the tyranny of
Austria in Lombardy and Venetia, to the abominable condition of the
Papal States, to the horrible misgovernment in the Two Sicilies; and
he pointed to Piedmont as the bulwark against Austrian
preponderance on the one hand, and against the revolutionary spirit
on the other. Nothing definite was done, but the Italian question had
been broached, and Cavour's participation in the Congress was
recognized as a great achievement.
Piedmont's leadership was helped by rash revolts elsewhere, easily
put down and cruelly punished; and it became plainer and plainer
that through the steady, orderly monarchy of Sardinia deliverance
was to come, if at all, and not through the visionary schemes of
Mazzini. The dark, mysterious plans of Napoleon III now loomed on
the horizon. Relations between him and Cavour became closer.
Cavour, no doubt, would have liked to gain his ends without French
aid, but that could not be done. The only other possible ally,
England, would not interfere. In the summer of 1858 an
understanding was reached between him and Napoleon that in case
of Austrian aggression France would aid Piedmont. On January 1,
1859, Napoleon hinted to the world what had happened; on January
10, Victor Emmanuel at the opening of the Piedmontese parliament
said that the political situation was not free from perils ahead, "for
while we respect treaties, we cannot disregard the cry of pain which
comes to us from so many parts of Italy." Count Cavour asked for a
loan of 50,000,000 lire. Affairs moved fast. Relations between
Piedmont and Austria were strained taut; but it was essential that
Austria should be the aggressor. Russia and England, in order to
prevent war, suggested a European Congress to consider matters.
Napoleon consented; and Cavour, who knew that freedom for Italy
could only be obtained by war, feared that his chance had gone.
There was talk of disarmament, but no agreement had been
reached, when Austria, impatient and arrogant, sent an ultimatum to
Piedmont that she must disarm prior to the Congress. Victor
Emmanuel refused and war was declared.
The French Emperor crossed the Alps, and in June the allies won
the battles of Magenta and Solferino. The Italians believed that
Austria would now be driven from every foot of Italian soil: when,
suddenly, without consulting Piedmont, Napoleon, for reasons of
French policy, made peace with Austria. The Emperor of Austria
ceded Lombardy to Napoleon, and Napoleon transferred it to
Piedmont; and, as a sop to the spirit of Italian unity, both Emperors
agreed to favour the scheme of a confederation of the Italian States
with the Pope at its head, but the latter plan was left in the air. This
was the end of the high hopes of Italian freedom and unity. Italy had
received a slap in the face. Cavour was furious; he had a stormy
interview with his king, and passionately urged him not to consent,
but the king had the good sense to see that he must. Cavour
immediately resigned.
Meanwhile the war had caused the recall of the Austrian troops
south of the Po, and the patriots had risen in joy. The Grand Duke of
Tuscany, the Duke of Modena, the Duchess Regent of Parma, the
papal legates of the Romagna, ran away, and provisional
governments were established; but a permanent political disposition
was attended with difficulties. The states themselves wished to join
Piedmont, but the wish was not unanimous, for many people wanted
to preserve local autonomy and their old historic boundaries.
Napoleon favoured his vague confederacy, and a European Congress
supported his view. Indecision reigned, but the cause of national
union triumphed through the vigour of Count Bettino Ricasoli, a man
of iron character, head of the provisional government in Tuscany.
"We must," he wrote, "no longer speak of Piedmont, nor of Florence,
nor of Tuscany; we must speak neither of fusion nor annexation, but
of the union of the Italian people under the constitutional
government of Victor Emmanuel."[24] Certainly the fugitive dukes
could only return by force, and though Continental Europe approved
their return, there was nobody to supply the force. The little states
voted to join Piedmont. Piedmont, however, hesitated, in fear of
European contradiction. Nobody but Cavour could manage the
matter, and he was recalled to office (1860). Cavour appealed to the
doctrine of the popular will to be expressed by a plebiscite. France,
however, would only consent upon cession of Savoy and Nice, a
measure already talked of as the price of the French alliance; and in
spite of the reluctance of the king to surrender Savoy, the cradle of
his race, the price had to be paid. The cession was made, and
Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna were united with the
Kingdom of Sardinia under the name of the Kingdom of Italy (April
15, 1860).
In the mean time Ferdinand II, King of the Two Sicilies, had died,
hated and despised by everybody, and his son Francis II, a weak,
ignorant, bigoted lad, had mounted the throne. He refused a
suggestion of Victor Emmanuel to join in the war against Austria,
threw himself into the arms of the reactionary party, and made an
alliance with the Pope. The discontented liberals took courage at the
news from the north. In April, 1860, the revolt began in Palermo,
and, though suppressed there, spread. Two young patriots,
Francesco Crispi and Rosalino Pilo, went about stirring the people to
action. Garibaldi was begged to put himself at the head of the
proposed revolution. On the night of May 6, two ships, the Lombardy
and the Piedmont, secretly left Genoa, and took Garibaldi and a
thousand volunteers aboard. This band, known as i Mille, is nearly as
famous and as legendary as King Arthur and his Round Table. On
May 11, the ships landed at Marsala. Two Neapolitan cruisers came
up, but two English men-of-war happened to be there also; and the
English captains, under guise of friendly notification to the
Neapolitans, took some action which delayed the latter long enough
to let the last Garibaldians disembark. Once on shore, Garibaldi's
volunteers ran to secure the telegraph office. They arrived just after
the operator had telegraphed that two Piedmontese ships, filled with
troops, had come into the harbour; a Garibaldian was able to add to
the message, "I have made a mistake; they are two merchantmen."
The answer came back, "Idiot." The volunteers marched inland. A
provisional government was organized; Garibaldi was made dictator,
and Crispi secretary of state. The cry was "Italy and Victor
Emmanuel!" Garibaldi was joined by insurgent Sicilians, and, with
numbers considerably increased, fought and defeated the Bourbon
army. The story reads like the exploits of Hector before the Greek
trenches. Victory followed victory. Palermo fell, Milazzo and Messina;
then he crossed the straits and invaded Calabria (August). This
marvellous triumph, for there had been thirty thousand regular
troops to oppose Garibaldi, frightened King Francis; he proclaimed a
constitution, appealed to Napoleon, and even to Victor Emmanuel,
for help. It was too late. Garibaldi swept on victorious, and the king
fled from Naples (September 6); the next day Garibaldi marched in
and assumed dictatorship of the kingdom.
England approved, but Continental Europe looked askance at this
irregular proceeding, and Victor Emmanuel and Cavour began to feel
uneasy, apprehensive lest the Great Powers should intervene in
Italian affairs. It was a difficult situation. Garibaldi was moving on
northward, and proclaimed his intention of going to Rome,
regardless of the French army stationed there, and then to Venice,
regardless of the European treaties that gave Venice to Austria.
Besides, the Pope had collected an army (largely of foreign recruits)
to suppress the liberal movements in Umbria and the Marches, and
to give aid to the Neapolitan king. Here were further opportunities
for foreign intervention. Evidently Cavour must act promptly if he
wished Piedmont to continue to control the national movement. He
requested the Pope to dismiss his new army. The Pope refused. The
Piedmontese army crossed the pontifical border, scattered the papal
army, and took possession of all the papal territory, except the city
of Rome and the country immediately about it, and then marched on
across the Neapolitan boundary. Here the Bourbon army was holding
Garibaldi at bay. The arrival of the Piedmontese determined the
issue. A less noble man might have shown resentment at having
another come at the eleventh hour and seize the fruits of victory, but
Garibaldi hailed Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy, refused the
proffered honours and rewards, and went home, a poor man, to the
little island of Caprera. The Two Sicilies and the liberated parts of the
Papal States voted to join the Kingdom of Italy. In February, 1861,
the first Italian parliament was held, and Victor Emmanuel formally
received the title King of Italy. Excepting Rome and Venice, Italy was
free and independent.
Rome was the more pressing question of the two. A history of
twenty-five hundred years, a profound sentiment, a patriotic, poetic,
romantic love, had inevitably determined that Rome must be the
capital of United Italy. On the other hand, opposed to the Italian
national sentiment was the historic Catholic sentiment, diffused
throughout Europe and strongest in France. The Pope naturally
deemed his Italian birth inferior in obligation to his Catholic position.
Moreover, the Temporal Power of the Popes had endured for more
than a thousand years, and since the time of Julius II the pontifical
title had been as good as the title to public or private property
anywhere. Catholics honestly believed that this political kingdom was
necessary to the independence of the Church. How could the world,
they said, believe in papal impartiality if the Papacy were under the
thumb of the Italian government? The difference in point of view
inevitably brought the ardent Papist and the patriotic Nationalist to
mutual injustice. The Italians looked on Pius IX as their worst
enemy; the Roman Curia deemed the Italians robbers. French
sympathy with the Papists, and especially the presence of a French
army in Rome, made the question exceedingly difficult. A special
circumstance aggravated the difficulty. The King of Naples, having
taken refuge in Rome, armed and subsidized gangs of brigands, who
raided the Neapolitan provinces and committed unspeakable
outrages. These rascals, when pursued by the Piedmontese army,
crossed the pontifical border and were safe. This condition was
intolerable.
At this juncture the great statesman who had steadfastly pursued
his policy,—a free Church in a free State,—and never lost hope of a
peaceful solution of the Roman difficulty, died (June 6, 1861). The
priest who shrived him was summoned to Rome, deprived of his
parish, suspended from his office, and sent to finish his days in a
remote monastery; so strongly did the Roman Court feel that Cavour
and his abettors were wicked men.
Cavour's successors, Ricasoli and Rattazzi, with feebler gait,
followed his policy as best they could; but uncertainty and hesitation
prevailed. The two great questions, Rome and Venice, pressed for
solution. The radicals clamored to have the Italian army march on
Rome. Garibaldi's impatience would not brook further inaction. He
left his island home at Caprera, and betook himself to Sicily, crying,
"Rome or Death!" With a little army of hot-tempered radicals he
crossed into Calabria. The Italian government had no choice.
Regular troops met Garibaldi at Aspromonte, near Reggio, and bade
him withdraw; he refused; shots were fired. Which side fired first is
uncertain. Garibaldi was wounded and made prisoner (August 29,
1862). This indignity to the national hero roused much hard feeling,
but reasonable men perceived that the solution of the Roman
question had to be found in some other way than by a filibustering
expedition against a city held by the troops of a power with whom
the nation was at peace.
The liberation of Venice came first. Prussia occupied a position in
Germany somewhat similar to that of Piedmont in Italy. Both had
somewhat similar problems. Both felt antagonism to Austria, and
also a suspicion of France. In April, 1866, the two states made an
alliance against Austria, who, fearing the combination, tried to break
it by offering to cede Venetia to Italy if she would abandon the
Prussian alliance. Victor Emmanuel refused, and war began in June.
The Italians were beaten both on land and sea, to their great
mortification and chagrin. The crushing Prussian victory at Sadowa,
however, forced Austria to accept the victor's terms, including the
cession of Venice. On November 7 Victor Emmanuel entered the city.
Rome alone was left.
Garibaldi made another desperate attempt, but was defeated by
the French at Mentana (1867). Not by Italian victories, but in
consequence of Prussian victories, the conquest of Rome was finally
effected. The French were obliged to withdraw their garrison during
the Franco-Prussian War, and then the Italian government, which, to
the shame of ardent patriots, had so long forborne out of obedience
to the will of the French, gave notice to the world that it would
annex Rome. After a useless call upon the Pope for peaceful
surrender, Victor Emmanuel directed his army to march on the city.
Real resistance was out of the question, but Pius IX had decided to
yield only to force. On the 20th of September, 1870, a breach was
made in the wall near Porta Pia, a few shots were fired, a few score
soldiers killed and wounded, and the Italian army marched in and
took possession of the city. A plebiscite was held, and by a vote of
133,681 to 1507 the city voted to become a part of Italy. In June,
1871, the seat of government was formally removed from Florence,
and Rome once again, after fifteen hundred years, became the
capital of the Kingdom of Italy.

FOOTNOTE:

[24] The Union of Italy, W. J. Stillman, p. 300.

 CHAPTER XXXIX
CONCLUSION (1872-1900)

The union of Italy was so triumphant, the efforts which

accomplished it so heroic, and the whole tone of Italian history
throughout the Risorgimento so romantic and noble, that the period
since of necessity looks flat and dull. The Italians themselves had
imagined that the union of Italy would be followed by some career,
political, moral, or intellectual, that would be comparable to the
career of ancient Rome. A reaction was inevitable. No nation could
continue at so enthusiastic a pitch. Moreover, the difficulties before it
were great.
Chief of these difficulties was the persistent hostility of the Papacy.
Pius IX, a kind, lovable, timid man, wholly inadequate to cope with a
revolutionary situation, had passed from his early sympathy with the
liberal movement to the opposite extreme, and hated it with the
hatred of fear. His hatred of liberal ideas may be seen in his conduct
with regard to ecclesiastical matters. He insisted upon the extremest
conservative dogma, as if it were a shield to protect the Papacy, the
papal city, the Papal States, and the whole Catholic world, from all
assaults of Satan and his liberal crew. First he proclaimed the dogma
of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, next he published
the "Syllabus," which is a condemnation of all those doctrines
commonly embodied in Bills of Rights. Finally, he convoked the
Vatican Council (1869-70), and procured a decree that the Pope is
infallible in matters of faith and morals. This decree gave the death-
blow to whatever remains of republicanism there were in the
Church, and established the Pope as absolute monarch. An
Ecumenical Council, representing the Church, had previously been
the infallible head of the Church; now the Pope was substituted for
the Council.
In this way the Church more and more assumed an attitude of
irreconcilable hostility to the ideas that prevailed among the
educated classes in Italy. After the occupation of Rome by the Italian
government, Pius shut himself up in the Vatican palace and
proclaimed himself a prisoner. He first advised and then commanded
Catholics to stay away from the polls at national elections, and
directed his foreign policy to the end of reëstablishing his Temporal
Power. This policy, judged by the popular belief in the divine right of
nationality and of majorities, is of course wrong; judged by one who
regards the interests of the Church as paramount, it may be
defended as an attempt to adhere to the old ways under which the
Catholic Church had played its extraordinary part in European
history. After the occupation of Rome the Italian government passed
the Law of Guarantees (May 10, 1871), which guaranteed to the
Pope an annual subsidy of somewhat more than 3,000,000 lire a
year, and also the personal and diplomatic rights of a sovereign,
such as to maintain his court, to receive ambassadors, to have
separate postal and telegraph service, to keep the Vatican and
Lateran palaces, etc. Pius IX refused to accept the subsidy.
Another difficulty, which has confronted the government since the
union, has been the discord between the North and South. The
northern provinces, especially Lombardy and Piedmont, have been
making progress in manufactures and in commerce; whereas, on the
contrary, the South, very ignorant and very poor, and devoted to
agriculture, wine, grain, lemons, oranges, etc., without facilities for
manufacture and without capacity for commerce, has made doubtful
advance. Special causes have hindered it. In Sicily, in consequence
of long-continued poverty, ignorance, and misgovernment, the secret
societies, known as the Mafia, have overrun great parts of the
island. The original cause of the Mafia was probably self-protection,
the lower classes banding together to save themselves from the
oppressions of the upper classes who clung to the remains of the
feudal system. The landowners, for example, had used their control
of the courts to maintain privileges and injustice. As a natural
consequence, members of the Mafia deemed it ignoble to revenge
wrongs by judicial process, and still more ignoble to give any
information to any officers of the government. They settled their
own disputes and righted their own wrongs. With the grant of
suffrage the Mafia became a political power, and only permitted the
election of such candidates as it approved.
In Naples there was also a power behind the scenes which
resembled the Mafia, but in reality was totally distinct and individual.
This Neapolitan power, a legacy from Bourbon times, was the
Camorra, a society of criminals or ruffians on the edge of crime,
organized for the purpose of levying tribute by blackmail; it was not
unlike the worst municipal rings in this country, and gained its
livelihood from the vicious, and from politicians who benefited by its
support. Both Camorra and Mafia have been very great obstacles to
social progress, and still exist.
The North, conscious of a higher standard of civilization, has
wished to educate and reform the South, and also, perhaps, has not
been unwilling to let taxation fall more heavily in proportion upon
the agricultural produce of the South than on the manufactured
products of the North. Resenting this assumption of superiority, and
suspicious of unfair treatment, especially with regard to indirect
taxation, the South has felt itself aggrieved; and so there have been
continual misunderstanding and friction between it and the North.
In its foreign relations the country has also had hard problems.
France and Italy ceased to be friends. Italy could not forget that the
French had upheld the papal power in Rome, and had defeated
Garibaldi at Mentana; and France was indignant that Italy had not
come to her rescue in 1870. France also was jealous of a rival in the
Mediterranean; while the Italians believed that France favoured a
revival of the Temporal Power. This unfriendliness, fostered by the
Italian clericals, constituted a most disturbing factor in Italy's foreign
relations. The breach was increased by other causes, and Italy in
alarm turned to find friends elsewhere. Austria and Germany, who
had already made an alliance, were glad to have Italy join, as
further security for the peace of Europe against any action by France
or Russia. So the three joined and made the Triple Alliance (1882),
which was renewed from time to time and still exists. This alliance
has given Italy ample security against any attack by France, but has
imposed upon her very heavy military burdens in order to keep her
army at a certain standard of efficiency.
As time went on the actors of the great age dropped off one by
one; Mazzini in 1872, Victor Emmanuel in 1878, Garibaldi in 1882. It
is after their departure, their noble desires fulfilled, their noble tasks
accomplished, that Italy looks little and inadequate. The
parliamentary struggles have certainly been neither noble nor
romantic. After the occupation of Rome, the Right, the conservative
party, under Marco Minghetti, Quintino Sella, and others, was in
power for half a dozen years, and by means of a burdensome
taxation succeeded in making receipts equal expenses. But taxes
and refusal to extend the suffrage led to its fall from power, and the
Left, the progressive party, under Agostino Depretis, assumed the
government. Depretis abolished an unpopular tax on grinding corn,
made primary education compulsory, and extended the suffrage
from 600,000 voters to 2,000,000. After these reforms the dominant
party ceased to have a definite programme. There was general
confusion, known as Transformism. The deputies split up into little
groups under petty leaders and fell to log-rolling. The story is dreary
and unimportant.
Depretis, who died in 1887, was succeeded by Francesco Crispi,
the most striking political figure since Cavour. Crispi began life as an
advocate at Palermo, and took part as a very young man in the early
agitations for constitutional reforms. He was successful at the bar,
and had moved to Naples to practise before the appellate tribunals
there, when the events that led to the uprisings of '48 began to
effervesce. Crispi took a leading part. After the uprisings had been
suppressed, he lived in exile till the time was ripe to begin again.
Then he returned to Sicily and plotted for the revolution which
terminated in Garibaldi's expedition. He acquired great influence,
took his seat in the Italian parliament, and soon became leader of
the radical Left. In spite of vicissitudes and a not unattacked
reputation, he was the chief parliamentary figure on the death of
Depretis, and dominated Italian politics till 1896. In his youth Crispi
had been a follower of Mazzini's republican theories; later, though
still a republican in sympathy, he announced the opinion that "the
Republic would divide us, the Monarchy unites us," and abandoned
his old republican associates. For this reason among others he
incurred the animosity of old friends and allies.
During the period of his ascendency the subdivision of the
deputies into little groups made government difficult, and for a
couple of years he was out of office. In that interval hard times,
adding weight to republican and socialist propaganda, caused
strikes, riots, and insurrections; and accompanying these
disturbances came the "Bank Scandals." Sundry banks,
conspicuously the important Banca Romana, had been violating the
laws which regulated the government of banks, and had been
engaged in most improper dealings with politicians, as, for instance,
lending money to deputies on little or no security. These scandals,
together with the strikes, wrecked the ministry, and the country
called on Crispi, as the one strong man able to take control. He
assumed office in December, 1893, and remained till 1896, when he
fell with equal suddenness. The cause of his fall requires a separate
paragraph.
About 1870 an Italian steamship company established a coaling
station on the west coast of the Red Sea, and acquired a certain
strip of land which it afterwards ceded to the government (1882).
From this beginning the Italian government advanced, upon one
pretext or another, to the establishment of a colonial dependency. It
occupied Massawa, established the "Colonia Erithrea," and
proclaimed a zone of influence along the east coast of Africa. Various
battles were fought with the natives; and at last the government
sent fifteen thousand men to perform some brilliant exploit for its
own political benefit. The Italian troops were badly handled; they
walked into a trap set by the Abyssinians, and suffered a terrible
rout, losing half their numbers (1896). Crispi fell at once, and the
new ministry under Di Rudinì, in spite of cries for revenge, prudently
abandoned the colonial policy, and made peace as best it could. Italy
renounced her protectorate, and contented herself with a strip of
coast by Massawa. Thus ended the scheme of colonial
aggrandizement begun in ignorance and folly.
The fall of Crispi removed the last interesting figure of the
Risorgimento, and left Italian politics in a confused medley. Since
then, various leaders of no marked ability or individuality have
struggled with the permanent difficulties of Church and State, North
and South, capitalism and socialism, and the shifting difficulties of
foreign relations. All this time is too near to present any definite
pattern to the casual eye. The century closed sadly with the
assassination of King Humbert (1878-1900) by an ignorant workman
who called himself a nihilist. Humbert was not a good ruler, but he
had a kind heart and many pleasant qualities, which endeared him
to the Italian people. He was succeeded by his son Victor Emmanuel
III, the present king.
The greatest Italian figure of the last decades of the nineteenth
century was not to be found in the service of the State, but of the
Church. In 1810 Gioacchino Pecci was born in Carpineto, a dead little
village perched on a hillside near Anagni, the town where Boniface
VIII was nearly murdered by Sciarra Colonna five hundred years
before. His father, Count Lodovico Pecci, had served in Napoleon's
army; his mother was said to be descended from Cola di Rienzo. The
count was the seigneur of the place, and lived in a somewhat
shabby palace which had seen better days. Gioacchino was educated
at a Jesuit school in Rome. He soon gave evidence of marked ability,
and was taken into the papal service and sent as apostolic delegate
to Benevento. Banditti infested the neighbourhood, and the nobility
of the town were little better than the banditti. Pecci displayed
character. He was promoted, and at the age of thirty-three was sent
as papal nuncio to Belgium, with the title of Archbishop of Damietta,
an archbishopric that had been in partibus infidelium since the days
of St. Louis. In Belgium, where liberal ideas were jostling the old
ecclesiastical system, Pecci distinguished himself for tact and
address. From Belgium he went to Perugia as bishop, and governed
the city for thirty-two years, during the trying time in which (largely
at the expense of the Church) Italy was forcing her way to freedom.
In 1860 his authority was overthrown by the Piedmontese soldiers,
and many tales of brutality and wantonness charged upon the
nationalists were brought to his troubled ears, and he unfortunately
received a most unfavourable impression of liberals and liberalism.
His reputation for ability, character, and diplomacy became so well
established, that in the conclave on the death of Pius IX he had no
serious competitor. Leo XIII (1878-1903) was already an old man
when he was elected Pope, and had had the misfortune to receive
his education and training in the narrow school of the old papal
régime. Preceded by an incompetent Pope, he found himself
confronted by the wreck of the Temporal Power, and by a liberalism
which was not only triumphant in Italy, but in nearly all western
Europe. He had not far to go to find thoughtful men who expected
to see the Papacy collapse and die. Most difficult matters in
Germany, in Ireland, in France, in the United States, required
delicate and skilful management. It is not too much to say that Leo
raised the Papacy higher in the world's regard than it had stood for
two hundred years. Had he been a younger man, and trained in a
more liberal school, he might, perhaps, have attempted the task of
adjusting ecclesiastical conservatism and tradition to the needs of a
fast changing world. But he was too old. With a few brilliant
exceptions he accepted the conservative policy. He affected to deem
himself a prisoner in the Vatican, and claimed the restoration of the
Temporal Power; he declared Thomas Aquinas the best teacher for
the priesthood, and stood firm on the dogmas of the Council of
Trent. Nevertheless, his was a most impressive personality, and he
stands in the long list of Popes in a rank inferior only to the highest.
In his old age, as he strolled in the Vatican gardens, meditating
Latin verses, or thinking over his encyclical letters, "On the Condition
of the Working Classes," "On Christian Democracy," "On the Holy
Eucharist," or turning his emaciated, sweet, Voltairean face to the
great dome of St. Peter's, he may well have let his mind wander in
peace over the outside world, for never since Luther cast off his
papal allegiance had the whole Christian world been so united in
admiration for a Pope of Rome. All Christians could say amen to the
prayer in his last poem, "Suprema Leonis Vota:"—

Expleat o clemens anxia vota Deus,

Scilicet ut tandem superis de civibus

unus
Divino aeternum lumine et ore fruar.
[25]

We have now reached our goal, the end of the nineteenth century,
and if we look back and contemplate the vicissitudes of Italy, such as
no other nation ever experienced, twice on the throne of Europe,
three times crowned with its crown,—Imperial, Ecclesiastical,
Intellectual,—and resurvey the three centuries during which foreign
tyrant and native priest joined hands to smother and quench the
Italian fire, and then read in detail the heroic acts of the men who
sacrificed themselves for Italian freedom, we shall feel sure that the
dull colours of the present generation are but signs of a time of rest,
and that the genius of Italy lives within and will again enrich the
world with deeds of men sprung from the "gentle Latin blood."

FOOTNOTE:

[25] Fulfil, O gracious God, my anxious prayer,

That, at the last, one among the citizens of Heaven

I may enjoy Thy Light, Thy Face, forever.
 APPENDIX
I
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF POPES AND EMPERORS
Year of Year of
Popes. Emperors.
Accession. Accession.
A.D A.D.
Romulus
468 Simplicius 475
Augustulus
483 Felix III Anastasius I[1] 491
492 Gelasius I
496 Anastasius II
498 Symmachus
Laurentius (Anti-
498
pope)
514 Hormisdas
Justin I 518
523 John I
526 Felix IV
JUSTINIAN[2] 527
530 Boniface II
Dioscorus (Anti-
530
pope)
532 John II
535 Agapetus I
536 Silverius
537 Vigilius
555 Pelagius I
560 John III
Justin II 565
574 Benedict I
578 Pelagius II Tiberius II 578
Maurice 582
GREGORY I (THE
590
GREAT)[2]
Phocas 602
604 Sabinianus
607 Boniface III
607 Boniface IV
HERACLIUS 610
615 Deusdedit
618 Boniface V
625 Honorius I
638 Severinus
640 John IV
Constantine III
}
Heracleonas,
641
}
Constans II
}
640 Theodorus I
649 Martin I
654 Eugenius I
657 Vitalianus
Constantine IV
668
(Pogonatus)
672 Adeodatus
676 Domnus I
678 Agatho
682 Leo II
683? Benedict II
685 John V Justinian II 685
685? Conon
687 Sergius I
687 Paschal (Anti-pope)
Theodorus (Anti-
687
pope)
Leontius 694
Tiberius Apsimar 697
701 John VI
Justinian II
705 John VII 705
restored
708 Sisinnius
708 Constantine
Philippicus
711
Bardanes
Anastasius II 713
715 Gregory II
Theodosius III 716
LEO III (THE
718
ISAURIAN)
731 Gregory III
Constantine V
741 Zacharias 741
(Copronymus)
752 Stephen II
752 Stephen III
757 Paul I
768 Stephen IV
772 Hadrian I
Leo IV 775
Constantine VI 780
795 LEO III Deposition of
Constantine VI by
Irene 797