Jungheinrich Forklift DFG 425 GE120-400ZT Spare Parts Manual FN427081

Jungheinrich Forklift DFG 425

GE120-400ZT Spare Parts Manual
FN427081
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GE120-400ZT Forklift Spare Parts Catalog Date: 2011 Number of Pages: 357
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General Kearny, finding that he could not arrest the march, put
Berry’s brigade off to the swamp to flank and strike it, and took part
of Jamison’s brigade to follow. They got into the swamp and
followed it up to the open near the Couch intrenchment,[16] but
Jenkins knew that there was some one there to meet them, and
pushed his onward battle. General Hill ordered Rains’s brigade to
turn this new force, while Rodes attacked, but the latter’s men were
worn, and some of them were with the advance. Kemper’s brigade
was sent to support the forward battle, but General Hill directed it to
his right against Berry, in front of Rains, and it seems that the heavy,
swampy ground so obstructed operations on both sides as to limit
their work to infantry fusillades until six o’clock.
Our battle on the Williamsburg road was in a sack. We were strong
enough to guard our flanks and push straight on, but the front was
growing heavy. It was time for Wilcox’s brigades under his last order,
but nothing was heard of them. I asked General Stuart, who had
joined me, if there were obstacles to Wilcox’s march between the
Charles City and Williamsburg roads. He reported that there was
nothing more than swamp lands, hardly knee-deep. He was asked
for a guide, who was sent with a courier bearing orders for them to
remain with General Wilcox until he reported at my head-quarters.
Again I reported the cramped condition of our work, owing to the
artillery practice from beyond the railroad, and asked General
Johnston to have the division that was with him drive that force
away and loose our left. This note was ordered to be put into
General Johnston’s hands. He gave peremptory commands to that
effect, but the movements were so slow that he lost patience and
rode with Hood’s leading brigade, pulled it on, and ordered
communication opened with my left.
 Larger Image

At one o’clock, General McClellan, at his head-quarters beyond the

river, six miles away, heard the noise of battle and ordered Sumner’s
(Second) corps under arms to await orders. General Sumner ordered
the command under arms, marched the divisions to their separate
bridges, and put the columns on the bridges, partly submerged, to
hold them to their moorings, anxiously awaiting authority from his
chief to march to the relief of his comrades. The bridge where
Sedgwick’s division stood was passable, but Richardson’s was under
water waist-deep, and the flooding river rising. Richardson waded
one brigade through, but thought that he could save time by
marching up to the Sedgwick bridge, which so delayed him that he
did not reach the field until after night.
As General Johnston rode with Hood’s brigade, he saw the
detachment under General Couch marching north to find at the
Adams House the road to Grapevine Bridge, his open way of retreat.
Directly he heard firing where Couch was marching, but thought that
Smith’s other brigades were equal to work that could open up there,
and rode on, ordering Hood to find communication with my left.
Smith’s other brigades were: Whiting’s, commanded by Colonel Law;
Hampton’s, Pettigrew’s, and Hatton’s; Whiting commanding the
division, Smith commanding the left wing. Smith quotes Colonel
Frobel, who was with him at the time,—viz.:
“Whiting’s brigade was gone; it had been ordered forward to charge
the batteries which were firing upon us. The brigade was repulsed,
and in a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of
woods to the left of the Nine Miles road, near the crossing. There
was only a part of a brigade in this charge. Pender soon rallied and
reformed them on the edge of the woods. General Whiting sent an
order to him to reconnoitre the batteries, and if he thought they
could be taken, to try it again. Before he could do so, some one
galloped up, shouting, ‘Charge that battery!’ The men hurried
forward at double-quick, but were repulsed as before.”[17]
It seems that at that moment General Sumner reached the field. He
reported:
“On arriving on the field, I found General Couch, with four regiments
and two companies of infantry and Brady’s battery. These troops
were drawn up in line near Adams’s House, and there was a pause in
the battle.”
He received his orders at 2.30 p.m. and marched with Sedgwick’s
division—three brigades—and Kirby’s battery, and reached the
ground of Couch’s work at 4.30. In less than an hour he had
surveyed the ground and placed his troops to receive battle.
General Smith attacked with Hampton’s, Pettigrew’s, and Hatton’s
brigades. It seems he made no use of artillery, though on the field
right and left the opportunity was fair. The troops fought bravely, as
did all Confederate soldiers. We heard the steady, rolling fire of
musketry and the boom of cannon that told of deadly work as far as
the Williamsburg road, but it did not last. General Hatton was killed,
General Pettigrew wounded and a prisoner, and General Hampton
wounded. General Smith was beaten.
General Sumner reported:
“I ordered the following regiments, Eighty-second New York, Thirty-
fourth New York, Fifteenth Massachusetts, Twentieth Massachusetts,
and Seventh Michigan, to move to the front and charge bayonets.
There were two fences between us and the enemy, but our men
gallantly rushed over them, and the enemy broke and fled, and this
closed the battle of Saturday.”[18]
General Smith sent to call Hood’s brigade from his right, and posted
it, about dark, near Fair Oaks Station. At parting, General Hood said,
“Our people over yonder are whipped.”
General Wilcox filed his three brigades into the Williamsburg road,
followed by two of Huger’s division at five o’clock. He was reminded
of his orders to be abreast of the battle, and that he was only four
hours behind it; but reported that while marching by the first order
by the Charles City road, he received orders to try the Williamsburg
road; that, marching for that road, he was called by orders to follow
a guide, who brought him back to the Charles City road. He
confessed that his orders to march with the front of battle were plain
and well understood, but his marches did not quite agree with the
comprehensive view of his orders.
Two of his regiments—the Eleventh Alabama, under Colonel
Sydenham Moore, and the Nineteenth Mississippi, under Major
Mullens—were ordered to join Kemper, turn the position of the
enemy at that point, and capture or dislodge them. With the other
regiments, General Wilcox was ordered by the Williamsburg road to
report to General Hill, Pryor’s brigade to follow him, Colston’s
brigade to support the move under Colonel Moore.
Armistead’s and Mahone’s brigades, of Huger’s division, were sent to
R. H. Anderson, who was ordered to put them in his position and
move his other regiments to the front.
Colonel Moore hurried his leading companies into the turning move
against Berry’s brigade before his regiment was up, and before the
Mississippi regiment was in supporting distance, and fell mortally
wounded. General Kearny, seeing the move and other troops
marching towards it, ordered his troops out and in retreat through
the swamp. He reported of it:
“Although so critically placed, and despite the masses that gathered
on and had passed us, checked the enemy in his intent of cutting off
against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the advanced
regiments, arrested by orders and this contest in the rear, to return
from their hitherto victorious career and retire by a remaining wood-
path known to our scouts (the saw-mill road), until they once more
arrived at and remained in the impregnable position we had left at
noon at our own fortified division camp.”[19]
He states the hour as six p.m.
Birney’s brigade of Kearny’s division was ordered along the north
side of the railroad a little before night, and had several encounters
with parts of R. H. Anderson’s brigade and some regiments of G. B.
Anderson’s. Jenkins, nothing daunted, pushed his brave battle
forward until the shades of night settled about the wood, and flashes
of dark-lanterns began to creep through the pines in search of
wounded, friend and foe.
At seven o’clock, General Johnston ordered his troops on the field to
sleep on their lines, and be ready to renew operations in the
morning, and ordered General Smith to call up other troops of the
left wing. At half after seven he was hit by a rifle-ball, then a
fragment of shell unhorsed him, and he was borne from the field, so
severely wounded that he was for a considerable time incapacitated
for duty. The command devolved temporarily upon General G. W.
Smith. General Johnston was skilled in the art and science of war,
gifted in his quick, penetrating mind and soldierly bearing, genial
and affectionate in nature, honorable and winning in person, and
confiding in his love. He drew the hearts of those about him so close
that his comrades felt that they could die for him. Until his recovery
the Confederacy experienced a serious deprivation, and when that
occurred he was no longer commander-in-chief, for General Lee was
promptly called to the post of honor.
The brigades were so mixed up through the pines when the battle
closed that there was some delay in getting the regiments to their
proper commands, getting up supplies, and arranging for the
morning. D. H. Hill’s was put in good order and in bivouac near the
Casey intrenchment; those of Longstreet between the Williamsburg
road and railroad. Wilcox’s brigade took position on the right, in
place of the detachment under Jenkins; Pryor’s brigade next on the
left; Kemper, Anderson, and Colston near the stage road
(Williamsburg). They made blazing fires of pine-knots to dry their
clothing and blankets, and these lighted reinforcing Union troops to
their lines behind the railroad.
The brigades of Huger’s division (Armistead’s and Mahone’s) were
near the left. Pickett was ordered to report to General Hill at
daylight, also the batteries of Maurin, Stribling, and Watson. It was
past eleven o’clock when all things were made ready and the killed
and wounded cared for; then I rode to find the head-quarters of our
new commander.
SUMMARY OF FORCES AND LOSSES.

Union troops engaged on the Williamsburg road,

reported
by General Heintzelman, commanding Casey’s,
Couch’s,
and Kearny’s divisions 18,500
Hooker’s division was at hand, but no part of it
engaged.
Confederates engaged on the Williamsburg road,
of D. H.
8900[20]
Hill’s division
Two brigades and two regiments of Longstreet’s
5700
division
14,600

Two lines of intrenchments were

attacked and carried, six pieces of
artillery and several thousand small-arms
were captured, and the enemy was
forced back to his third line of
intrenchments by night, a mile and a half
from the point of his opening.

Sedgwick’s division is not separately accounted for,

but
6080
an average of the divisions reported by General
Heintzelman will give him
Estimate of Couch’s command 2000
Union force against General Smith 8080
Smith’s division, five brigades 10,500
But Hood’s brigade was not engaged 2,100
Of Smith’s division in action 8,400
Union losses on the Williamsburg road 4563
Confederate losses on the Williamsburg road 3515
Union losses on the Nine Miles road 468
Confederate losses on the Nine Miles road 1283
 CHAPTER VIII.

SEQUELÆ OF SEVEN PINES.

The Forces under Command of G. W.
Smith after Johnston was wounded
—The Battle of the 1st—Longstreet
requests Reinforcements and a
Diversion—Council held—McLaws
alone sustains Longstreet’s
Opposition to retiring—Severe
Fighting—Pickett’s Brave Stand—
General Lee assigned to Command—
He orders the withdrawal of the
Army—Criticism of General Smith—
Confederates should not have lost
the Battle—Keyes’s Corroboration.
Major-General G. W. Smith was of the highest standing of the West
Point classes, and, like others of the Engineers, had a big name to
help him in the position to which he had been suddenly called by the
incapacitation of the Confederate commander.
I found his head-quarters at one o’clock in the morning, reported the
work of the commands on the Williamsburg road on the 31st, and
asked for part of the troops ordered up by General Johnston, that
we might resume battle at daylight. He was disturbed by reports of
pontoon bridges, said to be under construction for the use of other
reinforcements to join the enemy from the east side, and was
anxious lest the enemy might march his two corps on the east side
by the upper river and occupy Richmond. But after a time these
notions gave way, and he suggested that we could renew the battle
on the Williamsburg road, provided we would send him one of our
brigades to help hold his position and make the battle by a wheel on
his right as a pivot.
As the commands stood, Smith’s division on our left was at right
angles to the York River Railroad, facing east, his right near Fair
Oaks Station. Besides his division of ten thousand, he had
Magruder’s and other commands of fresh troops near him,—twenty
thousand. My left lay near Smith’s right, the line extending parallel to
the railroad for a mile, facing north; thence it broke to the rear, and
covered the ground from that point to the swamp, the return front
facing the enemy’s third intrenched line. Smith’s part of the field was
open and fine for artillery practice. The field fronting on the railroad
was so shut in by heavy pine forest and tangled swamp that we had
no place for a single gun. D. H. Hill’s division was in reserve near the
Casey encampment.
The enemy stood: Sedgwick’s division in front of Smith; Richardson’s
division in column of three brigades parallel to the railroad and
behind it, prepared to attack my left; on Richardson’s left was
Birney’s brigade behind the railroad, and under the enemy’s third
intrenched line were the balance of the Third and all of the Fourth
Corps. So the plan to wheel on Smith’s right as a pivot, my right
stepping out on the wheel, would have left the Third and Fourth
Corps to attack our rear as soon as we moved.
Besides, it was evident that our new commander would do nothing,
and we must look to accident for such aid as might be drawn to us
during the battle.
The plan proposed could only be considered under the hypothesis
that Magruder would come in as the pivotal point, and, upon having
the enemy’s line fully exposed, would find the field fine for his
batteries, and put them in practice without orders from his
commander, and, breaking the enemy’s line by an enfilade fire from
his artillery, would come into battle and give it cohesive power.
I left head-quarters at three o’clock, and after an hour’s repose rode
to the front to find General Hill. Wilcox’s brigade was on my right on
the return front, Pryor’s brigade on his left, and R. H. Anderson,
Kemper, Colston, Armistead, and Mahone occupied the line between
the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Pickett’s brigade was ordered
to be with General Hill at daylight, and Maurin’s, Stribling’s, and
Watson’s batteries, of Pickett’s brigade, to take position on the right
of Armistead’s.
I found General Hill before he had his breakfast, enjoying the
comforts of Casey’s camp. Pickett had passed and was in search of
his position, which was soon disclosed by a fusillade from the front
of Richardson’s division. A party of “bummers” from Richmond had
found their way into the camp at Fair Oaks, and were getting such
things as they could put their hands on. They were taken in the gray
of the morning for Confederate troops and fired upon. This made
some confusion with our new troops, and part of them opened fire
in the wrong direction, putting two or three bullets through General
Hill’s tent before he got out of it. Hood’s brigade of Smith’s division,
the pivotal point, came under this fire, and was immediately
withdrawn. Hood reported his position good, but his orders were to
retire.
Our cavalry had established communication with head-quarters, and
gave prompt notice of movements as they occurred. The pivot was
moving to the rear, but battle on the Williamsburg road steadily
advanced, with orders to develop the enemy’s battle front through
its extent along the railroad; not to make the fancied wheel, but to
expose his line to the practice of our batteries on the Nine Miles
road.
Our infantry moved steadily, engaging French’s brigade of
Richardson’s division, which was led by one of Howard’s regiments.
French was supported by Howard’s brigade, and Howard by
Meagher’s, and the firing extended along my line as far as the return
front of my right. But Magruder was not on the field to seize the
opportunity for his artillery. He was nowhere near the battle,—had
not been called. General Whiting, however, saw the opportunity so
inviting, and reported to his commander at half after six o’clock,—
“I am going to try a diversion for Longstreet, and have found, as
reported, a position for artillery. The enemy are in full view and in
heavy masses. I have ordered up Lee with four pieces. The musketry
firing in advance is tremendous.”[21]
General Smith had parties posted along the heights of the
Chickahominy in close observation of the movements of the enemy’s
forces on the east bank. These parties reported from time to time
that the enemy was moving his forces down the east bank and
crossing them over to take part in the fight. The accounts proved
false, but they continued to come to head-quarters, and were
forwarded to my command on the Williamsburg road and gave us
some concern. Failing to receive approval of his chief, General
Whiting reported at nine o’clock,—
“If I don’t receive an answer in half an hour, I shall commence
withdrawing my forces.”[22]
The answer he received was to throw back his right and take
position a little nearer to the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road,
[23] thus swinging the pivot farther back. General Smith complained
that the enemy was getting into the interval between our lines, but
position between two fires was not the place the enemy wanted; he
could not know that Smith wouldn’t shoot. Under this long and
severe infantry fight there was no point on my part of the field upon
which we could post a single gun. Part of Armistead’s new troops
gave way, but the gallant brigadier maintained his ground and soon
collected his other regiments. Before this I had reported ready, and
awaiting a guide, the brigade that was to be sent over to the Nine
Miles road. At half after ten o’clock, General Smith sent word that he
had heard nothing of the brigade expected to come to his support,
and renewed his reports of the enemy crossing over and
concentrating against us on the Williamsburg road. He repeated, too,
his wish to have his cavalry keep close communication between the
wings of the army. This close communication had been established
early in the morning and was maintained through the day, and the
reports of the enemy’s crossing were all false, but our new
commander seemed to forget. At the same time he wrote me,—
“I have directed Whiting to take close defensive relations with
Magruder. At any rate, that was absolutely necessary to enable a
good defence to be made whilst you are pivoting on Whiting’s
position.”[24]
Whiting’s position, instead of being pivotal, began its rearward move
at the opening fire at daybreak, and continued in that line of conduct
until it reached a point of quiet. General Smith was informed that the
brigade called for by him would not be sent over; that his troops
were doing nothing, while all of mine were in severe battle, except a
single brigade, and the enemy was massing his fighting force against
me; that the grounds were so flooded that it was difficult to keep up
our supply of ammunition; that with the aid of his troops the battle
would be ours.
But just then he held a council with Generals McLaws and Whiting
and Chief Engineer Stevens, and submitted the question, “Must the
troops be withdrawn, or the attack continued?”
All voted in favor of the former except McLaws. In a letter, since
written, he has said,—
“I alone urged that you be reinforced and the attack continued, and
the question was reconsidered, and I was sent to learn your
views.”[25]
Before General McLaws found me, I wrote General Smith,—
“Can you reinforce me? The entire enemy seems to be opposed to
me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can fight together,
we can finish the work to-day, and Mac’s time will be up. If I cannot
get help, I fear that I must fall back.”
General McLaws reported of his ride to my lines,—
“I went and found you with J. E. B. Stuart. You were in favor of
resuming the assault, and wanted five thousand men.”[26]
Nothing was sent in reply to McLaws’s report, but we soon learned
that the left wing of the army was quiet and serene in defensive
positions about the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road.
At the first quiet of our battle, after the left wing quit the field, I
ordered the brigades withdrawn to defensive position about the
trenches at Seven Pines, but before the order reached the front the
fight was renewed by Hooker’s division upon Wilcox and Pryor, and
reached out to our left near Fair Oaks. In the heat of this, General
Wilcox received the order to retire, and in undue haste pulled his
command out, assumed authority over Pryor, and ordered him off.
Pickett, the true soldier, knowing that the order was not intended for
such emergency, stood and resisted the attack. Colston was sent to
his aid, and the attack was repulsed. Immediately after this repulse
was a quiet advance upon Pickett’s right. The commander asked,
“What troops are these?” “Virginians!” “Don’t fire!” he ordered; “we
will capture the last one of these Virginians.” Just then the Virginians
rose and opened a fearful fire that drove him back to his bushy
cover, which ended the battle of Seven Pines. Pickett was withdrawn
to position assigned for his brigade, our line of skirmishers remaining
near the enemy’s during the day and night. General Wilcox reported
of his battle, when he pulled off from it, that he was doing as well as
he could wish, but General Hooker reported, “Pursuit was hopeless.”
The failure of the enemy to push the opportunity made by the
precipitate retreat of General Wilcox, and Pickett’s successful
resistance, told that there was nothing in the reports of troops
coming over from the east side to take part in the battle, and we
were convinced that the river was not passable. I made an appeal
for ten thousand men, that we might renew our battle without
regard to General Smith and those about him. It received no more
consideration than the appeal made through General McLaws.
Then General Lee, having been assigned to command, came upon
the field after noon by the Nine Miles road, and, with General Smith,
came over to the Williamsburg road. A similar proposition was made
General Lee, but General Smith protested that the enemy was
strongly fortified. At the time the enemy’s main battle front was
behind the railroad, fronting against me but exposed to easy enfilade
fire of batteries to be posted on his right flank on the Nine Miles
road, while his front against me was covered by the railway
embankment. It is needless to add that under the fire of batteries so
posted his lines would have been broken to confusion in twenty
minutes. General Holmes marched down the Williamsburg road and
rested in wait for General Lee. Like General Huger, he held rank over
me. General Lee ordered the troops back to their former lines. Those
on the Williamsburg road were drawn back during the night, the
rear-guard, Pickett’s brigade, passing the Casey works at sunrise on
the 2d unmolested. Part of Richardson’s division mistook the camp at
Fair Oaks for the Casey camp, and claimed to have recovered it on
the afternoon of the 1st, but it was not until the morning of the 2d
that the Casey camp was abandoned.
The Confederate losses in the two days’ fight were 6134; the Union
losses, 5031.
It seems from Union accounts that all of our dead were not found
and buried on the afternoon of the 1st. It is possible, as our battle
was in the heavy forest and swamp tangles.
General Smith has written a great deal about the battle of Seven
Pines during the past twenty or thirty years, in efforts to show that
the failure of success was due to want of conduct on the part of the
forces on the Williamsburg road. He claims that he was only out as a
party of observation, to prevent reinforcement of the enemy from
the east side of the river, and that he kept Sumner off of us. But he
waited three hours after the enemy’s ranks and lines had been
broken, instead of moving with and finishing the battle, thus giving
Sumner time to march from the east of the river, and strike him and
beat him to disorder, and change the lost battle to success. He
shows that Hill’s and Longstreet’s divisions could have gained the
battle unaided,—which may be true enough, but it would have been
a fruitless success, for the enemy got forces over to protect those of
the west side; whereas, the stronger battle, ordered by the four
divisions, could and would have made a complete success of it but
for the balky conduct of the divisions ordered to guard the flanks.
Instead of six hours’ hard work to reach the enemy’s third line, we
could have captured it in the second hour and had the field cleaned
up before Sumner crossed the river.
General Keyes, the commander of the Fourth Corps, in his “Fifty
Years’ Observations,” says,—
“The left of my lines were all protected by the White Oak Swamp,
but the right was on ground so favorable to the approach of the
enemy, and so far from the Chickahominy, that if Johnston had
attacked them an hour or two earlier than he did, I could have made
but a feeble defence comparatively, and every man of us would have
been killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or river before
assistance could have reached us.”
General Smith lay in wait three hours after the enemy’s positions
were broken and carried, giving ample time for the march of the
succoring forces. The hour of the attack was not so important as
prompt and vigorous work. If the battle had opened at sunrise,
Smith would have made the same wait, and Sumner’s march would
have been in time to beat him. All elements of success were in the
plan, but balky troops will mar the strongest plans. He tries to
persuade himself that he intended to join our battle on the
Williamsburg road, but there was no fight in his heart after his
maladroit encounter with Sedgwick’s division on the afternoon of the
31st. The opportunity for enfilade fire of his artillery along the
enemy’s battle front, at the morning opening and all of the forenoon,
was waiting him; while reports of the enemy crossing the river,
reinforcing against my single contest, were demanding relief and aid.
He reported sick on the 2d and left the army. When ready for duty
he was assigned about Richmond and the seaboard of North
Carolina. He applied to be restored to command of his division in the
field, but the authorities thought his services could be used better
elsewhere. He resigned his commission in the Confederate service,
went to Georgia, and joined Joe Brown’s militia, where he found
congenial service, better suited to his ideas of vigorous warfare.
 CHAPTER IX.

ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND.

The Great General’s Assignment not at
first assuring to the Army—Able as
an Engineer but limited as to Field
Service—He makes the
Acquaintance of his Lieutenants—
Calls a Council—Gains Confidence by
saying Nothing—“A Little Humor now
and then”—Lee plans a
Simultaneous Attack on McClellan’s
Front and Rear—J. E. B. Stuart’s
Daring Reconnoissance around the
Union Army.
The assignment of General Lee to command the army of Northern
Virginia was far from reconciling the troops to the loss of our
beloved chief, Joseph E. Johnston, with whom the army had been
closely connected since its earliest active life. All hearts had learned
to lean upon him with confidence, and to love him dearly. General
Lee’s experience in active field work was limited to his West Virginia
campaign against General Rosecrans, which was not successful. His
services on our coast defences were known as able, and those who
knew him in Mexico as one of the principal engineers of General
Scott’s column, marching for the capture of the capital of that great
republic, knew that as military engineer he was especially
distinguished; but officers of the line are not apt to look to the staff
in choosing leaders of soldiers, either in tactics or strategy. There
were, therefore, some misgivings as to the power and skill for field
service of the new commander. The change was accepted, however,
as a happy relief from the existing halting policy of the late
temporary commander.

During the first week of his authority he called his general officers to
meet him on the Nine Miles road for a general talk. This novelty was
not reassuring, as experience had told that secrecy in war was an
essential element of success; that public discussion and secrecy
were incompatible. As he disclosed nothing, those of serious thought
became hopeful, and followed his wise example. The brigadiers
talked freely, but only of the parts of the line occupied by their
brigades; and the meeting finally took a playful turn. General
Toombs’s brigade was before some formidable works under
construction by General Franklin. He suggested an elevation a few
hundred yards in his rear, as a better defensive line and more
comfortable position for his men; a very good military point. This
seemed strange in General Toombs, however, as he was known to
have frequent talks with his troops, complaining of West Point men
holding the army from battle, digging and throwing up lines of sand
instead of showing lines of battle, where all could have fair fight.
Referring to his suggestion to retire and construct a new line,
General D. H. Hill, who behind the austere presence of a major-
general had a fund of dry humor, said,—
“I think it may be better to advance General Toombs’s brigade, till he
can bring Franklin’s working parties under the fire of his short-range
arms, so that the working parties may be broken up.”
General Whiting, who was apprehensive of bayous and parallels,
complained of sickness in his command, and asked a change of
position from the unfair Fair Oaks. Though of brilliant, highly
cultivated mind, the dark side of the picture was always more
imposing with him. Several of the major-generals failed to join us till
the conference was about to disperse. All rode back to their camps
little wiser than when they went, except that they found General
Lee’s object was to learn of the temper of those of his officers whom
he did not know, and of the condition and tone among their troops.
He ordered his engineers over the line occupied by the army, to
rearrange its defensive construction, and to put working parties on
all points needing reinforcing. Whiting’s division was broken up.
Three of the brigades were ordered to A. P. Hill’s division. He was
permitted to choose two brigades that were to constitute his own
command. Besides his own, he selected Hood’s brigade. With these
two he was ordered by way of Lynchburg to report to General
Jackson, in the Valley district.
General Lee was seen almost daily riding over his lines, making
suggestions to working parties and encouraging their efforts to put
sand-banks between their persons and the enemy’s batteries, and
they were beginning to appreciate the value of such adjuncts. Above
all, they soon began to look eagerly for his daily rides, his pleasing
yet commanding presence, and the energy he displayed in speeding
their labors.
The day after the conference on the Nine Miles road, availing myself
of General Lee’s invitation to free interchange of ideas, I rode over
to his head-quarters, and renewed my suggestion of a move against
General McClellan’s right flank, which rested behind Beaver Dam
Creek. The strength of the position was explained, and mention
made that, in consequence of that strong ground, a move somewhat
similar, ordered by General Johnston for the 28th of May, was
abandoned. At the same time he was assured that a march of an
hour could turn the head of the creek and dislodge the force behind
it. He received me pleasantly and gave a patient hearing to the
suggestions, without indicating approval or disapproval. A few days
after he wrote General Jackson:[27]
“Head-quarters, near Richmond, Va.,
“June 11, 1862.
“Brigadier-General Thomas J. Jackson,
“Commanding Valley District:
“General,—Your recent successes have been the cause of the liveliest
joy in this army as well as in the country. The admiration excited by
your skill and boldness has been constantly mingled with solicitude
for your situation. The practicability of reinforcing you has been the
subject of earnest consideration. It has been determined to do so at
the expense of weakening this army. Brigadier-General Lawton, with
six regiments from Georgia, is on the way to you, and Brigadier-
General Whiting, with eight veteran regiments, leaves here to-day.
The object is to enable you to crush the forces opposed to you.
Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the
passes covered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your main
body, including Ewell’s division and Lawton’s and Whiting’s