STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENT LOGIC I: THE

DIALECTICAL PRINCIPLE OF THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES

NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA AND ROBERT G. WOLF

The study of paraconsistent logics is the study of those logics

which formalize nontrivial inconsistent theories. Without here sur-
veying the field (which has been done in da Costa 1974, though
many important advances have been made since that essay was writ-
ten), we note that such theories arise in many areas of scientific and
philosophic research. For example, as the history of set theory re-
veals, formulations of set theory constantly face the danger of incon-
sistency. Philosophical theories also face the charge of witting or un-
witting inconsistency equally constantly. The value of such
(putative) inconsistent theories remains even if one's ultimate goal is
to construct consistent theories, as the properties of the inconsistent
theories might throw light on, and help give rise to, the consistent
theories that one is pursuing.
Yet the investigation of such inconsistent theories is only possible
if they do not collapse into the trivial theory in which all sentences
are derivable, that is, only if such inconsistent theories are absolutely
consistent. The construction of such logics to serve as the bases for
inconsistent theories (which logics themselves might either be nega-
tion-consistent or negation-inconsistent) which in the presence of
proper, non-logical axioms or rules that lead to negation-incon-
sistency do not also lead to absolute inconsistency is the purpose of
the field of paraconsistent logics.

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 NEWTONC.A. DA COSTA and ROBERTG. WOLF

The study of dialectical logics, on the other hand, is the study of

those logics which formalize theories based on the ideas and prin-
ciples introduced by Hegel and Marx and their followers. Such study
intersects that of paraconsistent logics. The two only intersect, and
do not coincide, as either one might hold that the Hegelian or
Marxist notion of negation or contradiction has little in common
with the notions of negation and contradiction utilized in logic or
one might formulate a dialectical theory using temporal concepts in
such a way that a contradiction never obtains within a given situa-
tion at a given time, but only between situations at different times;
in neither case would one be constructing paraconsistent logics. But
on many readings of the Hegelian(-Marxist) notions, existing contra-
dictions at a single instant a~reheld to be present within given philo-
sophical, political or social theories without rendering such theories
either trivial or inapplicable to experience. It seems (to us) plausible
that the logical notions and techniques already created to treat para-
consistent logics might be useful in the task of formalizing such
Hegelian(-Marxist) notions.
As the formal study of paraconsistent logics has not been
oriented towards dialectical notions (though the possibility of appli-
cation in the field of dialectical theory has been envisaged from the
start) the formalization o f dialectical theories using the math-
ematical tools of paraconsistent logic may lead to deviations from
"orthodox' dialec~tical doctrines. For this reason, our study here (and
in future essays) only claims a loose fit with the philosophical
theories which are our inspiration.
On the other hand, given that Hegelian (and Marxist) theories are
not frozen into an obligatory orthodoxy, it is open to us in any
given case to argue that the deviations suggested by the already exist-
Lug tools of paraconsistent logic are in fact desirable modifications of
dialectical theories. (We shall in fact take this option below.) We
view the interplay between dialectical logic and paraconsistent logic
as a two-way street, each field suggesting possibilities for the other.
There is, we hold, an intimate connection between the fields, offer-
ing room for growth in both fields.
In da Costa 1974, the intimate connection between paraconsis-
tent logics and dialectical logics and the mutual value of such con-
nections was already emphasized:

There are several conflicting conceptions of dialectic logic and

for most specialists, it is neither formal, nor even in principle
formalizable. Nonetheless, employing techniques used in the

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theory of inconsistent systems, it is apparently possible to for-

malize some of the proposed dialectical logics. It is convenient
to note that the formalizations we are talking about are ana-
logous in nature to the formalizations presented for various
parts of intuitionistic mathematics: we do not intend to found
dialectic logic on given formalisms, but only try to make ex-
plicit certain "regularities" of the "dialectical movement."
Thus, we may throw a new light on dialectical logic. (da Costa
1974, pp. 508-509)
Here we shall try to illustrate the type of elucidation we think
possible by presenting a formal logic designed to match a particular
doctrine in dialectical theory, that of the "unity of opposites". We
shall base our presentation on the surprisingly little known discus-
sion in McGill and Parry 1948.
We say "surprisingly" little known, as McGilI and Parry's elucida-
tion of the central dialectical position on the unity of opposites is a
model of clarity and balanced elucidation. Their treatment makes
use of techniques and terminology of contemporary analytic philo-
sophy and does much to make the principle of the unity of oppo-
sites intelligible to philosophers trained in the analytic tradition. For
this reason, their formulation of the principle is more immediately
amenable to the sort of formalization we are interested in than a
treatment couched in more traditional Hegelian or Marxist language.
McGill and Parry present six interpretations of the principle, only
the last two of which are of major interest here, as these last two are
the only ones "which clearly involve a revision of formal logic."
(McGill and Parry 1948, p. 422) We shall begin, though, with a dis-
cussion of the fourth interpretation, as our view of the status of that
interpretation will determine some of the principles by which we
construct our formal system.
The three interpretations, then, with which we are concerned are:
"4. A concrete system or process is simultaneously deter-
mined by oppositely directed forces, movements, tendencies,
i.e., directed toward A and -A.
5. In any concrete continuum, whether temporal or non-
temporal, there is a middle ground between two contiguous
opposite properties A and -A, i.e., a stretch of the continuum
where it is not true that everything is either A or -A.
6. In any concrete continuum, there is a stretch where some-
thing is both A and -A." (McGill and Parry 1948, p. 422)
As McGill and Parry insist, interpretation #4 does not seem in

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 NEWTONC.A. DA COSTA and ROBERTG. WOLF

any way contrary to classical logic and hence does not call for any
revision in logic. They also indicate that the terms "forces", "move-
ments" and "tendencies" are systematically ambiguous. What counts
- say - as a "force" varies quite radically from science to science. A
"force" at work in a gravitational system is quite different from a
"force" at work in a political system. The dialectical principle is
meant to cover all cases.
This raises the immediate question as to the status of the prin-
ciple of the unity of opposites. McGill and Parry interpret it as "a
philosophical generalization of findings in various sciences." (McGill
and Parry 1948, p. 426) They go on to suggest that its usefulness
might lie in giving "useful guidance to a scientist engaged in scien-
tific research, especially in suggesting possible correctives to one-
sided emphases in current scientific theories." They conclude that
"the principle of the unity of opposites may therefore be said to ex-
press methodological experience, and revised judgments, in several
fields of science." (McGill and Parry 1948, p. 427)
Without doubting that such a principle would arise as (i.e., be
psychologically suggested by) a generalization of practice in various
sciences and also serve as a heuristic warning to a working scientist
("Don't overlook the presence of internal forces opposed to each
other in a given system!"), we would suggest rather that a stronger
interpretation is feasible, for two reasons: 1) the historical origins of
dialectical theory in Hegelian philosophy make it implausible that
the principle is meant merely as a generalization of scientific prac-
tice. Surely, Hegel's dialectic (and the Marxist variant of it) is meant
to disclose the necessary structures and dynamics of human thought
or of reality (or of both). Generalizations are liable to counter-
example and have at best a contingent status, neither of which seem
likely for a basic principle of the (Hegelian-Marxist) dialectic.
2) It would be better to have a view of all three interpretations
(indeed of all six) which gives them a uniform status. McGiU and
Parry's account tends to motivate a view of interpretations #5 and
#6 as also being generalizations from empirical matters. While,
perhaps such generalizations can lead to revisions of one's basic logic
(as some argue today with respect to quantum theory), philosophical
discussion over the past decades (cf. Haack 1974) indicates that it is
by no means obvious that empirical theories can easily give rise to
fundamental alterations in one's logic. Any clash between empirical
practice and classical logic is likely to be interpreted as revealing a
failure in the practice. A view which avoids such problems seems
worth trying out.

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

Accordingly we would suggest an interpretation of interpretation

#4, not as a generalization from experience, but as a (Kantian-type)
regulative ideal governing theory construction. On this view, the
principle of the unity of opposites is a normative criteria governing
the logical structure of scientific (and philosophical) theories. A
theory which does not obey the principle is judged to be inadequate,
much as a physical theory which does not obey various invariance
principles is normally judged inadequate. (To the degree that one
judges that one's theories reflect reality, to that degree, then, the
normative criterion of the principle of the unity of opposites also
governs the structure of reality.)
On this view, the principle of the unity of opposites (interpreta-
tion #4) gives the following directive: Construct a theory of a con-
crete system or process in such a way that the system is partially
defined in terms of a simultaneous determination by oppositely
directed forces, movement or tendencies! Such a formulation seems
to agree with the Hegelian-Marxist approach to reality more than
does a formulation of the principle as an inductive generalization.
While, as McGfll and Parry insist, the interpretation does not run
counter to traditional formal logic, it does leave open the possibility
that there are other regulative ideals governing theory construction
that specify (or at least constrain) the underlying logics of empirical
and philosophical theories. Specifically it leaves open the possibility
of so viewing interpretations #5 and #6.
The possible existence of other constraints on the structure of
theories less radical than those involving a revision of logic is clearly
indicated by McGill and Parry. They mention a "complementary
principle", that the motion of a system is "also determined by the
motions of other systems external to it, and by the system of sys-
tems to which it belongs". (McGill and Parry 1948, p. 428)
With interpretations #5 and g:6, we do have formulations of the
principle which involve altering "traditional formal logic". In line
with our interpretation #4, we view interpretation #5 as a directive
requiring that a theory of any concrete continuum include a portion
where "it is not true that everything is either A or -A" for the appro-
priate A's. Interpretation #6 requires that a theory of "any concrete
continuum" include positions on the continuum where "something
is both A and -A". Phrased this way, neither interpretation directly
challenges traditional logic and seem to be much the same sort of
directive as interpretation #4.
The challenge to traditional logic, which is implicit, arises most
obviously with interpretation #6. Given the theorem scheme

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 NEWTONC.A. DA COSTAand ROBERTG. WOLF

J-A A-A. D B of classical logic, the occurance of a "stretch" on a

continuum with contradictory properties assigned leads to the truth
of any proposition whatsoever. Any theory which describes a con-
tinuum having objects possessing contradictory properties is equiva-
lent to the trivial theory, in which everything is true.
So, to come round again to the point insisted upon at the begin-
ning, to formulate theories of continua which obey the principle of
the unity of opposites, such theories must be founded upon a logic
which allows the construction of negation-inconsistent, though
absolutely consistent, theories, i.e., upon a paraconsistent logic. As
there are a multitude of paraconsistent logics, the requirement of a
paraconsistent logic underdetermines the exact logic to be used.

I. The Formulation of the Dialectical Logic DL

A. Here we shall follow out several hints presented by McGill
and Parry and attempt to present a formal logic which agrees with
the additional requirements that they suggest (any additional
features will be suggested by those features of paraconsistent logics
which have proven most fruitful). The first and most obvious requi-
rement is that the proposed logic be interpretable as a logic of va-
gueness. McGill and Parry (McGill and Parry 1948, pp. 428-436)
motivate interpretations #5 and r by referring to cases of "fringes"
where on a continuum it is hard to tell whether a given property
obtains or whether its contrary does.
For example, on a color spectrum, between two adjacent colors,
say blue and green, there will be a "fringe" consisting of color shades
where one is unable to determine which predicate (A (blue) or -A
(green)) actually applies and accordingly one is liable to apply both
predicates. As McGill and Parry insist, while with increasingly sophis-
ticated instruments and more and more arbitrarily refined defini-
tions, the extent of the fringe can be reduced, it seems impossible in
principle, when dealing with concrete continua, to eliminate comple-
tely the fringe phenomenon.
Thus any proposed logic must have as a possible interpretation a
use as a logic of vagueness. While that must be one permissible inter-
pretation, it would be a mistake to construct a logic whose primary
interpretation is limited to that of a logic of vagueness (along the
lines of Fine 1975, Kamp 1975, Thomason 197+ and Hilpinen
197+). (Mention of the recent work calls to mind a criterion of an
adequate logic of vagueness insisted upon by some of the above men-
tioned authors: a logic of vagueness should not be characterized by a

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finite characteristic matrix. As we shall see, our proposed logic satis-

fies this criterion also.)
A logic of vagueness would - in the terminology of Haack 1974
- be a supplement to classical logic. It seems more in line with the
underlying Hegelian-Marxist motivation for a dialectical logic that
the proposed formal logic be a replacement for classical logic. The
point may only be a psychological one, but there does seem to be a
difference between viewing classical logic as basically correct for
most purposes, requiring modification only in those cases where
fringe phenomena occur and viewing a dialectical logic as being
correct for most purposes, though the full range of the logic need
not be applied in those cases where the law of excluded middle is
obeyed. On the first view, classical logic is a subsystem of our
favored logic. (We shall show that in DL both views have a home:
the formulas of D L - where A~ is interpreted as 7 (AA-qA) - are a
proper subset of classical logic, but that classical logic is on a
plausible interpretations of the connectives of DL a subsystem of
DL.)
Moreover, by formulating a replacement to classical logic rather
than a supplement, we leave open the possibility of interpretations
for the proposed logic other than as a logic of vagueness. The prin-
ciple of the unity of opposites might govern theories, other than
those of concrete continua. This also seems more in line with the
Hegelian-Marxist origin of dialectical theory. Concrete continua pre-
sent a significant case where the principle is obeyed; the existence of
other examples should not be ruled out a priori. A formulation not
too closely tied to the phenomenon of vagueness seems clearly pre-
ferable.
B. A second requirement given by McGill and Parry (for
example on p. 422 of McGill and Parry 1948) is that classical logic
be retained as having validity in those cases not involving concrete
continua (or in general in any case which obeys the law of excluded
middle). As we would leave open the possibility that there are cases
of the failure of the law of excluded middle outside cases of con-
crete continua, we would require only that for all formulas A such
that A is 'stable' (A ~ holds), the axioms of classical logic also hold.
Such a result will be ensured in two steps: 1)as the counter-
examples to the classical logic C involve the use of negation (here-
after to be symbolized by --1), the proposed logic -DL- will be an ex-
tension of the positive fragment of classical logic -C+-, that is, all of
the theorems of C+ will be theorems of DL. 2) We add negation and
'stability' axioms - to be explained later - in subsequent sections to

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 NEWTONC.A. DA COSTAand ROBERTG. WOLF

insure that C can be construed as a proper subsystem of DL. We

begin therefore, after some preliminary conventions, by taking the
axioms and rules of C+ as a partial axiomatic base for DL.
Our primitive symbols are: 1) connectives: D, A , V , 7 , and o;
2) propositional variables: a denumerable infinite set of proposi-
tional variables, which we do not need to specify; 3) two families of
propositional constants kl, k2 . . . . and It, 12. . . . ( k i :# lj, for any i, j
Eco) these will be used in connection with DL*below): and
4) parentheses. The notions of proof, deduction, the symbol $-',
etc., are deffmed as usual. Capital Greek letters will always denote
sets of formttlas.
As we proceed for now without the use of negation, we take D, V,
and Aas primitive ( - will be taken as deined as usual), and use axiom
schemata to eliminate the need for a primitive rule of substitution
(note that A3 is the rule of modus ponens, or detachment, for D):
A1) A D(B DA)
g2) (A ~ B) D (((A D (a D C)) D (A D C))
A3) A, A D B / B
A4) A B. D A
A5) AAB. D B
A6) g D (B D .AAB)
A7) A D .A A B
A8) B D .A AB
A9) (A D C) D ((B D C) D (AV B. ~ C))
A10) AV (A D B)
While we have taken C - two-valued extensional propositional
logic V as our version of "traditional formal logic", there is no
barrier to taking some other positive logic as the base for a dialec-
tical logic. For example, the positive fragment - R+ - of the Ander-
son and Belnap system of relevant implication R (see Anderson and
Belnap 1975) would be a suitable candidate. As however our interest
lies in the failure of the law of non-contradiction and the behavior of
"7, and the relevant logics are motivated more via a consideration of
A1 and the behavior of D, it seems simpler here to take a classical
approach and leave a relevant dialectical logic, based on the ap-
proach taken here, for another occasion. (But see Routley and
Meyer 1976, and the revised treatment in Routley and Meyer 1978,
for a relevant version of a dialectical logic.)
C. The laws of excluded middle (AV -7 A) and of non-contradic-
tion ( - 7 ( A A 7 A)) must be non-theorems of DL. (See Theorem 2
below.)

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

D. We now come to the addition of axioms governing negation.

It is clear from McGill and Parry's remarks that they regard interpre-
tations #5 and #6 as equivalent (McGill and Parry 1948, p. 429); we
shall disagree with them and present our reasons after the presenta-
tion of Theorem 17. They therefore regard the law of excluded mid-
die as equivalent to the law of non-contradiction, an equivalence
which we shall reject. So we can not add (AV 7 A) = -'1 (AA 7 A) as
a theorem. But we can save part of what is usually tied up with the
rejected theorems, namely DeMorgan's laws linking negation with
conjunction and disjunction. Part of the motivation for adding
DeMorgan's laws is that they seem part of what is meant by nega-
tion; rejecting them would open some doubt as to whether or not
our unary connective 7 is really negation at all. So we add:
All) 7 (AAB)-(7 A V 7 B)
g12) 7 ( A V B ) - ( 7 AATB)

E. From their discussion of Heyting's calculus (McGill and Parry

1948, p. 429, footnote 14), it is also clear that they accept the law
of double negation ( 7 7 A = A), arguing as they do that a rejection
of the law "alters" the usual meaning of negation, and differentiat-
ing their own revisions of classical logic from such an altered defini-
tion.
We however again deviate from McGiU and Parry, for three
reasons:
1) Their argument does not carry conviction. Some meaning
variance with regard to negation seems inevitable if we are not
simply to adopt classical logic in toto. 7 is meant to be a sort of dia-
lectical or concrete negation ( T A is to be read as "A is not true"),
so that the decision simply to adopt double negation as an axiom
lest we have a case of meaning "alteration" ignores the fact that we
want to alter the classical meaning somewhat. (This line of response
might lead one to reject DeMorgan's laws to come up with a more in-
tuitionistic form of DL; such an approach, while not opted for here,
certainly seems worth following up.)
2) The place where on our Marxist derived intuitions - and on
McGill and Party's also - that we would expect our meaning for ne-
gation to be altered from the classical notion is precisely the law of
double negation (which is a positive reason for rejecting it, while
leaving DeMorgan's laws alone). Central to Hegelian and Marxist no-
tions of dialectical processes is that any process leads from a state A
to its contrary 1,7 A) and then inevitably to the contrary of the con-

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 NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

trary ( 7 7 A) which is never the original state of the process (on

pain of not being a developing process).
While it might be argued that such a dialectical 'law' of develop-
ment (the law of the negation of the negation) involves temporal
notions, not meant to be captured in DL, it seems to us more
plausible to begin with a notion of negation which will not have to
be repudiated later to account for tense notions. On a Quinean ploy
of "minimal mutilation", it seems better to allow our notion of ne-
gation to be open to later application to theories of temporal proces-
ses without having to retract our base logic.
3) After the initial decision not to assert double negation as an
axiom schemata, one of the writers (da Costa) added modalities and
tense operators to DL and to DL with quantifiers (supplying a gene-
ralized kind of Kripke semantics). In these systems, double negation
is not in fact a theorem and adding it as a theorem would reduce the
ability of the system to formalize the law of the negation of the ne-
gation. So, all in all, it seems better to reject double negation.
F. For those propositions which obey the laws of excluded mid-
die and non-contradiction, the full classical logic should be valid.
Such propositions are in some sense 'stable'; previous work in para-
consistent logics suggests introducing a new prirnitive unary con.
nective '~ which serves as an indicator of stability; i.e., if A ~ is true,
the A is well-behaved. Such a connective seems well within the spirit
of our Marxist enterprise as Marx and Hegel did not deny the valid-
ity of classical logic for a large class of propositions (and processes
and situations).
We add enough postulates to ensure that if the propositions A~
and B~ are true, then A and B obey all the laws of classical logic:
A13) A~ ~ . D .(A 3 B ) ~ 1 7 6 1 7 6 A) ~
A14) A~ ~ . D((ADB) D((AD7 B) D 7 A))
A15) A~ D ( 7 7 A D A )
A16) A ~176
- A~
A17) A ~ Do. ( g V 7 A) A((A D B) V ( 7 A D B))
A18) 7 A D.(AvTA. DB)V(A ATA)

The intuitive motivation behind these axioms is fairly straight-

forward. A13 insures that if A and B are stable (or well-behaved),
then so are their truth-functional compounds and also that -J A (and
7 B ) is well-behaved. A14 insures that for well-behaved A and B that
if A implies the contradiction B A T B then A is false. A15 insures
that double negation holds for well-behaved propositions.
AI6 insures that A is well-behaved iff A ~ is well-behaved. A17

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

insures that if we have A ~ then A and 7 A cannot be either both

false or both true. A18 insures that if A is not well-behaved, then
either A and 7 A are both true or A and 7 A are both false. (Subs-
tantiation for this view of A16-A18 will come from the semantics.)
The stability connective ,o, has, we note, affinities with Kura-
towski's interior operator (as A16 indicates) which might be worth
developing at greater length at another time, especially as our
favored interpretation in terms of a logic of vagueness of predicates
on a concrete continuum makes it clear that o has to be precisely an
interior operator, indicating propositions which are not on the
'fringes'. If A~ holds, then A is well away from the fringe areas
within the interior of whatever continuum is being discussed.
An alternative route to obtaining analogous properties for ~
would be to assume some of the preceeding postulates along with an
axiom of contraposition:
(A ~ B ) - ( 7 B ~ 7 A).
In an earlier version of DL, we did precisely that, though we had to
confess that we could not find any intuitive justification for contra-
position, adopting it because of its technical properties, chief among
them the fact that in the field of the axioms of DL, one could prove
a convenient replacement theorem.
Here we reject this simpler route for two reasons: 1) one of the
technical properties in the field of the axioms of DL is that contra-
position coupled with double negation leads to a collapse of DL into
C. As one might make a case ~t la McGill and Parry for double nega-
tion, junking contraposition seems the most reasonable course, given
that it never did - to us - have an intuitive rationale. (We of course
are doubly virtuous and doubly protected by dropping both double
negation and contraposition.)
Part and parcel of our junking contraposition is the failure of the
replacement theorem for DL. As the attraction of the theorem was a
purely technical one, and not a philosophically motivated one, we
do not mind the failure of a replacement theorem for DL.
2) The semantics below does not directly justify contraposition.
This is one of the areas where paraconsistent logic makes a positive
impact on dialectical logic. The type of semantics presented here has
been highly successful in developing viable paraconsistent logics: ex-
tension of the semantics to a dialectical paraconsistent logic is a pro-
mising area of research. If such an extension leads to a decision on
matters - such as contraposition - that are not touched upon in the
non-formal discussions of dialectics, no harm is done.

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 NEWTONC.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

G. As already insisted upon, DL should allow for the creation of

non-trivial inconsistent theories, as well as being non-trivial itself.
This after all is precisely the view we have taken of interpretations
#5 and #6; if we cannot construct such theories - at least for trea-
ting concrete continua - then we simply do not have a logic em-
bodying the principle of the unity of opposites. In this context, this
means that A A 7 A. D B must be a non-theorem of DL.
At this point, it should be emphasized that DL is motivated by
the one principle of the unity of opposites. McGill and Parry point
out (McGill and Parry 1948, p. 444) that there are other dialectical
principles which should also be incorporated into a fully adequate
logic, such as the principle of the transition from quantity to quality
and of the negation of the negation. This latter principle has been
adverted to above as part of our motivation for not including double
negation in DL. But explicit consideration of these principles in-
volves the construction of a tensed predicate dialectical logic, which
should be undertaken after presentation of the sentential base for
such logics. Our procedure is therefore to build toward such a tensed
predicate logic from the sentential base DL via a predicate version
DLQ.
The philosophical value of DL as a formalization of a dialectical
logic of the unity of opposites which admits of the desired interpre-
tations can only be assessed by an examination of the technical,
mathematical properties of DL, to which task we n o w turn.

II. Metatheorems of DL
Theorem 1. - schemata and rules of classical positive proposi-
All
tional logic are valid in DL.
P r o o f . - Immediate from AI-A10, which were chosen precisely
so that this would be immediate.
T h e o r e m 2. - In DL, the following schemata (among others)are
not valid:
O) AV7 A
(~) (A2B)~. 7AVB
(iii) A A T A . DB
(iv) 7(AATA)
(v) (A D B) D 7 ( A A 7 B)
(vi) AD(TADB)
(vii) (ADTA) D7 A
(viii) AATA. ~B
(ix) BDAVTA
(x) (TADA) DA
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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

(ra) -7 A D (A D B)
(xa) AV(TAAA ~
(raa) (AV 7 A)A((A D B ) V ( T A D B)) . D A ~
(xiv) (ADB) D ( T B D 7 A )
(xv) ( 7 B D 7 A ) D(A D B)
(xv)' (AV 7 A. ~ S)V(AA 7A). D 7 A ~
Proof. - It is sufficient to employ the following tables where 2
and 3 are the distinguished values:
A 7 A A~
0 0 0
1 2 2
2 1 2
3 3 0

A B A DB AAB AVB

0 0 2 0 0
1 0 2 1 0
2 0 0 0 2
3 0 0 1 2

0 1 2 1 0
1 1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1 2
3 1 1 1 3

0 2 2 0 2
1 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 3 2

0 3 2 1 3
1 3 2 1 3
2 3 3 3 2
3 3 3 3 3

Verifying that these matrices actually do the job that we claim they
do, we leave up to the reader.
Before moving on, we should perhaps comment, briefly, on the
significance of the non-theorems: the non-theoremhood of (iii), (vi),
(viii) and (xi) are absolutely essential to the paraconsistent proper-

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 NEWTONC.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

ties of DL when used as the sentential base of a dialectic theory;

contradictions do not lead to the collapse of the theory into the
trivial theory. (Contrast, by the Way, the theoremhood of A1 with
the non-theoremhood of (vi) and (x). Paraconsistent logics distin-
guish between formulas that the relevant logics lump together.)
The non-theorernhood of (v), (vii), (x), (xii) and (xiii) are central
to the dialectical properties of DL. They establish that not all formu-
las need obey all of the principles of classical logic.
The non-theoremhood of (ii) and (v) establish that D is really a
primitive connective in DL and not a truth-functional compound of
7 and V. D is not material implication. As we shall see, this is be-
cause 7 is not classical negation.
The non-theoremhood of (i) and (ix) signal the non-classical char-
acter or 7 ; their import has been discussed above. The non-theorem-
hood of (xiv) and (xv) signal the desired failure of contraposition.
Theorem 2 thus provides some of the technical evidence that DL
does the job it was designed for.
Theorem 2: - In DL, the schema 7 7 A = A is not valid.
Proof. - Use the following tables where 1 is designated and 0 is
not.
A B ADB AAB AVB A .-qA A~

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
Again verification is left to the reader. The significance of theorem
2' has already been discussed.
Theorem 3. - In DL, we have:
(xvi) I- (A ~ B) D A) D A
(xvii) ~-(A ~ .B VC) -- .(A ~ B) V(A ~ C)
(xvi~) ~-(A ~ B) V (B ~ A)
(xix) I-A~ A A T A . D B
(xx) I-A~ A A-IA. D -1B
Proof. - of (xix):
(a) A~ A T A AA F- (A D B) V ( T A D A) A17
But (b) A ~ A 7 A A A, A D B }- B (A3)
and (c) A~ T A D B ~-B A3
Therefore (d) A ~ A 7 A A A I- B Q.E.D. (a), (b), (c)

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENT LOGIC I

(xx) can be proven in exactly the same way (xvi)-(xviii) are left to
the reader.
That (xvi)-(xviii) are theorems shows the nearness to C of D L . D
and V have a classical, non-intuitionistic character, that remains even
when our non-classical -~ is added. The theoremhood of (xix) and
(xx) are steps toward showing that our stability connective does
mean that certain propositions are classically well-behaved; it a well-
behaved proposition A is both true and false, then all hell breaks
loose. In any formalized dialectical theory, only the non-well-
behaved propositions can be self-contradictory. (xix) and (xx) also
provide welcome technical evidence~that o u r - ] is indeed a type of
negation, since for well-behaved formulas, it takes on the properties
of classical negation - as we shall see below.
We now proceed to expand on our claim that well-behaved propo-
sitions obey all the laws of classical thought.

T h e o r e m 4. - Let Ptd {A} be a set of formulas o f DL containing

only the atomic formulas pl, p2 . . . . . Pn, and C* be the classical
propositional calculus - C - to which the unary connective o and
o
the postulates A13-A18 are added. Thenl "~, Pl, P~ . . . . , Pn [ - A in C*
iff[~, Pl, P2, 9 9 P~ [- g in DE.
P r o o f . - It is immediate that if P, p~, ~ p2~. . . . . Pn~ ~ A in DL, then
the same is true in C*, because DL is strictly weaker than C* (by
theorem 2).
Conversely, if P, p], p~ . . . . , Pn [- A in C*, then there exists a
deduction of A f r o m P t.) {Plo ,p2. . . ... . . p n }. m which only formulas
containing as atomic components formulas of the list Pl, p2 . . . . . Pn
appear. But by postualtes A13-A15, all postulates of C* are valid in
DL for these formulas, and we have [7, p~, p2 . . . . , Pn~- A in DL.
To nail the result down further, we point out that well-behaved
propositions have as consequences a set equivalent to a sufficient
basis for C:

T h e o r e m 5. - In DL, we have:
(xxi) A ~ [--A ~ V T A ~
(xxii) B~ f- (A ~ D B ~ D ((A ~ D 7 B ~ D 7 A ~
(xxiii) A ~ ~- A ~ D (-7 A ~ D B ~

P r o o f . - Left to the reader.

At this stage, we pause to point out that DL, while meant to serve
as a base for non-trivial inconsistent theories is itself negation-
consistent.

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 NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

Theorem 6. - DL is negation-consistent (and of course non-

trivial).
Proof. - Apply the tables of theorem 2!
The negation-consistency of DL separates DL from the relevant
dialectical logics studied in Routley anff Meyer 1976 and Routley
and Meyer 1978, which are deliberately negation-inconsistent. The
Roufley-Meyer systems prevent collapse in the logic, and not just in
associated theories, by limiting the rule of substitution to a proper
subset of the axioms.
Despite their strong argument for introducing inconsistent formu-
las into the base dialectical logic, it seems better to investigate both
options. At the end of this essay, we shall extend DL to a system
DL* which takes Routley's option and introduces isolated contradic-
tions in our logic.
It turns out to be possible to introduce a strong, classical negation
directly into DL by deffmition. As might be expected - using ~ for
our strong negation - the D,^,v,~-fragment of DL is isomorphic to
C. This possibility of doubling negations is a feature that paraconsis-
tent logics share with both relevant logics (see Meyer and Routley
1974 and Meyer 1974) and intuitionistic logics (see Rasiowa 1974).
In contrast to the relevant case, however, it is the classical negation
which is an inferential negation (cf. especially Meyer 1974) though
perhaps a Routley-Meyer type possible world semantics would make
DL appear closer to CR* on this point.
We begin our introduction of strong negation by defining a pro-
positional symbol ~ - :

Definition 1. -_h- = def P~ P A T P

where p is a timed atomic formula.

Definition 2. - (of strong or classical negation)

~A = de f A D.~-
Definition 3. - - v -= def ~.A_

It is perhaps not out of place to point out that definitions 1-3 are
quite standard in discussions of non-classical logic. Ais to be read as
denoting a 'strong' contradiction (and hence is stronger than the si-
milar constant which denotes only a given falsehood). Given
theorem 4 above, we would expect ~ to obey all the laws of classical
logic, giving us the interpretation of C as a subsystem of DL which
we said that we needed. That is does is the point of:

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

Theorem 7. - In DL:
(xxiv) ~- (A~B)~((A~B)3--A
(xxv) I-- ~ A D (A D B)
(xxvi) 1- AV~A
Proof. - Immediate, taking into account the definition of ~ and
the postulates of DL.
Corollary. - D,A,vand ~ satisfy all the postdates of classical pro-
positional logic (which is, therefore, in ~a~eertain sense, contained in
DL).
Proof. - Immediate, from a recognition that (xxiv)-(xxvi) are a
sufficient base for C

From the definitions, we can prove some theorems, which show

that in stable, well-behaved contexts ~ and 7 amount to the same
thing and that their properties diverge only in 'fringe' cases. (We
shall see later some more ways in which "~ and 7 interact.)
Theorem 8. - In DL:
(xxvii) ~- A ~ D .(A V 7 A)/X ("~A V ~ 7 A)
(xxviii)F-7 A~ D .~(A V 7 A)V (A A 7 A)
(xxix) A~ 7 A~ - ((AV 7 A) ( ~ A V ~ 7 A))V
~ ( A V 7 A ) V ( A A 7 A)
(xxx) ~- A~ D ( 7 A --- "~A)
(xxxi) ~- A D A
(xxxii) F- A D-v-
(xxxiii)~- (~rD A) - A
(xxiv) I- (A D ~ . ) - ~A
Proof. - Left to the reader. The theorem above suggests readings
for both negations. ~A can be read as "A is false" which is stronger
than 7 A, which is simply read as "A is not true". As discussions of
intuitionistic logic suggest, it can be argued that the assertion of the
falsity of A is a stronger claim than the mere claim that A is not
true.
In the field of dialectical logic, however, the negation of a propo-
sition is not given an intuitionistic reading; the stronger element in-
volved in asserting ~A, rather than 7 A, is the additional informa-
tion that A is well-behaved. As such cases on a dialectical view are
not the normal cases, but occur only in limited, more abstract and
idealized situations where much of the complexity of concrete cases
has been eliminated (one thinks of the use of simplifying assump-
tions in physical theory, such as the assumption that the planetary

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 NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

bodies are point masses) ~ can be naturally read as an ideal negation,

while ~ is read as a concrete negation. From our dialectical point of
view, -1 is the more basic type of negation which is usable in all si-
tuations, though it reduces to ~ in idealized situations.

lIl. Semantics for DL

In this section, we shall develop DL further by presenting a
model-set semantics for DL. This increases the "respectability" of
DL as it allows us to produce a semantic completeness theorem for
DL. Lack of such a completeness theorem and semantics for a logic
tends to make logicians look askance at any claims that a logic is in-
teresting. Such a reaction may have only a sociological significance
(though Wolf 1977 has argued for a deeper import), but it is a source
of satisfaction that a semantics is available. More importantly, the se-
mantics sheds conceptual light both on the sort of situation in which
a dialectical logic is useful and on the nature of our concrete nega-
tion.
The semantics used here is the Henkin-style semantics which has
proven fruitful in treating other paraconsistent logics, rather than
the Kripke-style (or the extended Kripke-Routley-Meyer-style) se-
mantics useful in modal (and relevant) contexts. This is one area
where our decision to approach dialectical logic via paraconsistent
logics makes a crucial impact on our argument. We would like to
acknowledge our debt to the work of Elias Alves in what follows
(see Alves 1976, da Costa and Alves 1976, and da Costa and Alves
1977). We are adapting in a straightforward way the approach which
Alves (in collaboration with da Costa) helped pioneer.
One key feature of the model-set semantics utilized here is its lin-
guistic slant. Possible worlds are not taken as primitive (though they
can be introduced along traditional lines through identification with
the non-trivial maximal sets defined below). What is taken as primi-
tive are sets of propositions (which sets can be called 'theories', as
Tarski does), which gives the semantics its linguistic slant. This lin-
guistic slant, whi/e perhaps not felt to be as intuitive as the possible
worlds approach, does have advantages to commend it.
1) It is ontologically more parsimonious than the possible
worlds approach. One does not have to commit oneself to the exist-
ence, or even meaningfulness, of 'possible', but non-existent, worlds.
The meaningfulness of dialectical logics is not thus unnecessarily tied
up with quite separate problems, those coupled with modal logics.
2) A feature of the semantics to be proposed is the existence of
incomplete theories and inconsistent theories. As the case of relevant

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

logics has made dear, a number of philosophers find the idea of in-
complete and/or inconsistent possible worlds incomprehensible. Our
approach here bypasses those problems and even promises to make
sense out of such locutions as "impossible possible world".
3) Such a linguistically oriented semantics fits nicely into our
suggested pragmatic-Kantian view of the principle of the unity of op-
posites. Such a principle regulates our construction of the concepts
and the theories which we apply to reality. Therefore the semantics
of our dialectical logic should speak directly about the theories we
use and not pretend to characterize a language-independent reality.
While such a conceptualist reading is not necessarily the most
defensible or truest to the dialectical tradition, that it is allowed by
the semantics strikes us as a virtue, rather than a defect.
We begin our presentation of the semantics with some (standard)
definitions:

Definition 4. - r = ( A Eh-:F'~-A}, where,~-ds the set of all formu-

las of DL.

Definition 5. - p i s said to be trivial i f ~ = h~;otherwise f~is called

non-trivial, r is said to be inconsistent if there is at least one formula
A such that A, -1 A ~D;otherwise I-1is called consistent. P is non-
trivially maximal if it is non-trivial and, for every formula A, if
7'~-A, then A E r ( o r r = P--~).r is said to be ~-incomplete if there is
at least one formula A, such that r }ZA and r J,c q A; otherwise, D is
-1 -complete.
We now develop some of the properties of maximal non-trivial
sets, via:

Theorem 9. -- If Dis non-trivially maximal and A and B are any

formulas whatsoever, then (using ~, and "~ as the metalinguistic ab-
breviations of implication and equivalence): 2
1) rt-A~* A E D
2) AE r~"A~ P;~A EP= AZ
3) A E P or ~A E D
4) I-A=~AEr
5) A, A~ E P ~ -}A ~D;-1A, A~ E r ~ A ~ ; and A,-1A
E r ~ A ~ !ED
6) A, A D B E D ~ B C I ~
7) A E) B E D~,A~ f o r B E D
8) AABEF~AErand BEt
9) AVBE r'~,AEror BEt

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 NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

o o A o
10) A,B~176176 ) ~p;
A ~ E V"~, A ~176E~
11) A~ ~ P = ~ A V - I A , ~ A V ~ 7 A Ef '
12) 7A~ ~ orAATAE [~
Proof. - Similar to the corresponding one o f the classical proposi-
tional calculus (D,A, V a n d ~ have all the properties o f the classical
implication, conjunction, disjunction and negation).
We now proceed to the crucial notion o f a valuation:
Definition 6. - A valuation of DL is a function v:/~ -+(0,1) such
that:
1) v(A D B) = 1 '~ v(A) = 0 or v(B) = 1
2) v(A A B) = 1 "~ v(A) = v(B) = 1
3) v(A VB) = 1 r v(A) = 1 or v(B)= 1
4) v(7(A/x a))= 1 ,~ ~ T A ) = 1 or v(TB)= 1
5) v ( 7 ( A V B)) = 1 '~ v ( T A ) = v ( T B ) = 1
6) v(A ~ = v(B ~) = 1
v((A D B) ~) = v((A A B) ~) = v((-I A) ~ = v ((A V B)~ = 1
7) v(A ~ = 1 ~-v(A ~176= 1
8) v(A~ = 1 ~ v ( 7 7 A D A ) = 1
9) v ( h ) = v ( 7 A) = v(A~ = 0
lO) v(A) ve v ( 7 A) ~ v ( 7 A ~ = 0
We list some properties of valuations.
Theorem 10. - I f v is a valuation, then:
1) v(A) = 1 ~ v ( ~ A ) = 0
2) v(A) = 0
3) v(~'~ = 1
4) v(A ~ = 1 ~ v ( A ) = 1 or v ( 7 A) = 1
5) v(A~) = 1 =~ v ( i ) = 0 or v ( 7 A) = 0
6) v(A ) = v(B ~ = v ( g D B) = v ( g D 7 B) = I =~ v ( 7 A) = I
7) v(g~ = 1 ~ v ( 7 7 A = A ) = 1
8) v(A ~ = 1 ~ v(A V - I A ) = v(~AV~ 7 A) = 1
9) v ( T h ~ = 1 ~ v ( A V 7 A ) = 0 or v ( h A 7 A) = 1

Proof. - Immediate, taking into account the definition o f valua-

tion. We now define some (traditional) semantic notions, though
with the appropriate modifications to take account o f our non-clas-
sical context.
Definition Z - The valuation v is said to be singular if there
exists at least one formula A such that v(A) = v ( T A ) ; otherwise v is
said to be normal.

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENT LOGIC I

Definition 8. - A given formula A is valid if v(A) = 1 for every va-

luation v. The valuation v is a m o d e l o f a set o f formulas p, if v(A) =
1 for every formula A such that A E P. If v(A) = 1 for every model v
o f P, we may say that A is a semantic consequence o f P, and we
write: VI= A. As usual, ~ ~ A is abbreviated t o ~ A, and this means
that A is valid.
We now show that DL is both consistent and complete with res-
pect to our valuations v. As usual, the consistency half is simpler.
T h e o r e m 11. - P l - A :*V~ A
Proof. - By induction on the length o f a deduction of A from P.
Also as usual, the completeness half is harder. We proceed, as be-
fore, in a highly traditional way.
Theorem 12. - Every non-trivial set of formulas is contained in a
maximal non-trivial set.
Proof. - Exactly like the case in classical logic.
Corollary 1. - There are inconsistent maximal non-trivial sets of
formulas.
Proof. - It is easy to verify that {p, -7 p} where p is a proposi-
tional variable is inconsistent, but is non-trivial.
Corollary 2. - There are -7 -incomplete maximal non-trivial sets
of formulas.
Proof. - { ' p , ~ - l p } , w h e r e p is a propositional variable, is easily
seen to be 7 incomplete and non-trivial.
Now we proceed to define the canonical model for D L
Theorem 13. - Every maximal non-trivial set of formulas has a
model.
Proof. - Let P be a maximal non-trivial set of formulas. We de-
fine a function v ' : ~ { 0 , 1}as follows: v'(A) = 1r A E P(v'(A) = 0
"~ A ~ P ) . It is easily'shown that v' is a valuation.
Corollary. - There are singular valuations (and also normal valua-
tions). There are normal (and singular) valuations which are 7 - i n -
complete, i.e., such that for at least one formula A, one has v(A) =
v(-1 A) = 0.

Proof. - Immediate, given the corollaries to theorem 12. If one

likes to identify the non-trivial maximal sets with 'possible worlds',
we have both incomplete and inconsistent possible worlds appearing
at this stage.
Finally:
Theorem 14. - f ~ A =>P I-- A
Proof. - Analogous to the case o f classical propositional logic,
employing the strong negation ~ (and not -]).

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 NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

Corollary 1. ~ ~- A r ~ A
Proof. - Immediate from theorems 11 and 14.
Corollary 2. - ~ A r A
Proof. - Immediate from corollary 1.
We have not spelled out our completeness proof in any detail;
this, we emphasize, is because the details are quite standard, not be-
cause we are hiding anything. The thesis by Alves and the papers by
da Costa and Alves mentioned earlier can be consulted, if there are
any doubts.
We note also:
Theorem 15. - There are inconsistent (7-incomplete) sets o f for-
mulas which have models. A set of formulas has a model iffit is not
trivial.
Proof. - Immediate from theorems 12 and 13 and their corolla-
ties.
Our semantics is a straightforward generalization of that for C
and makes dearer the meanings o f ~- and 7 9 In our semantics, all
propositions are true or false, but not both (which contrasts with the
situation studied in Dunn 1976). See Rescher 1969, pp. 144-148 for
a discussion of the significance of this feature of our semantics.
Nonetheless, a proposition A and its negation, 7 A, may be both
true or both false. If A is well-behaved, then if A is true, then 7 A is
false, and if A is false, then 7 A is true. That 7 should have these
properties is by now, we think, obvious.
As promised, we can get further information about DL from our
semantics. Specifically we can see both how our semantics leads us
to a rejection of double negation and how our use of semantics
designed for paraconsistent logics leads us to deviate from our
original source of inspiration - McGiU and Parry 1948.
Definition 9. - If k is a natural number greater than 0, then 7 k
will be an abbreviation of A proceeded by k occurrences of the sym-
bol 7 .
The following lemmas are not difficult, if one examines our defi-
nition of a valuation.
L e m m a 1. - In DL:

(xxxv) J'~7 kp = p, where p is a propositional variable

L e m m a 2. - In DL:
(xxxvi) , F 7 kp -- -3 lp, where p is a propositional variable, and k
and 1 are two different natural numbers greater than 0.
Hint. - Our definition of a valuation allows us to define the value

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

of 7 A independently from that of A. In any given case, we can

make the value of 7 kp different from that of p(71p).
From lemmas 1 and 2, via the argument in Gbdel 1932, we get
(the promised)
T h e o r e m 16. 7 DL does not have a finite characteristic matrix.
Our semantics leads us to deviate from McGill and Parry, as re-
ported in:
T h e o r e m 1Z - In DL:
(xxxvii) ~,zAV-q A . - 7 (AA 7 A)
P r o o f - It suffices to employ the above semantics.
McGill and Parry view (McGill and Parry 1948, p. 429) the prin-
ciples of excluded middle and of non-contradiction as equivalent,
which view is rejected in theorem 17. But the fact is that i f
7 ( A A 7A) - . A V T A , then i f A is true or if 7 A is true, then
7 (A A 7 A) must also be true. In particular, if A and 7 A are both
true, then 7 ( A A 7 A) would also be true 7 which seems odd, to
say the least. If we are to take the possibility of true contradictions
seriously, then (xxxvii) must be rejected and the principle of ex-
cluded middle and of non-contradiction must be separated. Again,
an interesting discussion of these issues can be found in Rescher
1969, pp. 148-154.
Some formulas in the neighborhood of the rejected (xxxvii) do
however hold:
T h e o r e m 18. - In DL, we have:
(xxxviii) }- 7 ( A A T A ) - . T A V 7 7A
(xxxix) [- 7 ( A V T A ) - . T A A 7 7A
(xl) [- A A T A . - ' ~ ( - - A V ~ T A )
(xli) [- ~ ( A A 7 A ) - .~A V ~-l A
Proof. - In each case, the theorem holds by a straightforward ap-
plication of the DeMorgan laws, which were postulated for 7 and
hold for ~ because of itsclassicalcharacter.
Some of the significance of theorems 17 and 18 can be seen from
the fact that they state that a 7 -incomplete situation, in the sense
that we have " q ( A V 7 A) would imply that a contradiction,
7 A A 7 7 A (by (xxxix)). But the converse doesn't hold: a contra-
dictory situation, in the sense that A A 7 A obtains, does not neces-
sarily imply the existence of a 7 -incomplete situation.
(It deserves to be mentioned that the expression " 7 .incomplete
situation" has at least two meanings, both of which occur in this
paper: 1) a situation in which A and 7 A are both false; 2) a situa-

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 NEWTONC.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

tion in which 7 ( A V 7 A) is true. There is also at least another

meaning of that expression: ~(AV -1 A) is true.)
From the semantic point of view, the following cases are possible:
I) A true and 7 A false;
II) A false and 7 A true;
III) A and 7 A both true;
IV) A and 7 A both false.
From the failure of (xxxvii), it seems plausible to admit that form
#-5 of the principle of the unity of opposites implies #6, but that the
converse is not in general true.
Theorem 19 (E.H. Alves). - DL is decidable.
After the completion of the first draft of this paper, E.H. Alves
succeeded in constructing a decision procedure for DL. The full de-
tails of the procedure and the proof that it really is a decision pro-
cedure for DL will be presented in a forthcoming paper by Alves.
Here we shall, with Alves' permission, merely give a sketch of the
procedure.
The decision procedure uses the semantics proposed above and is
an adaptation of the method described in da Costa and Alves 1977.
For each formula of DL we construct tables, called quasi-matrices,
according to the instructions below. The formula A is a theorem of
DL iff in any quasi-matrix for A, the last column contains only l's.
In order to construct a quasi-matrix for a formula A, the proce-
dure is as follows:

1) In a line, make a list of all the subformulas of A and some

other formulas, as follows:
i) First, write every atomic formula which occurs in A.
ii) Then, write every negation of those atomic formulas.
iii) Write the other subformulas of A, including (if they have
not yet been) other formulas, in such a way that:
1~ 7 B is written before B~
2~) 7 C and 7 D are written before 7 ( C V D ) or
-1(C AD).
3~ 7 C, 7 D, C~ and D~ are written before -1 (C ~ D).
4 ~ B~ and C~ are writen before (AV B)~ (A A B)~
and (A 3 B)~
5~ B~ is written before ( T B ) ~
iv) A formula can be written only if its proper subformulas
have already been written.
2) Under the list of the atomic formulas, place in successive lines

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENTLOGIC I

all the possible combinations of 0 and 1 which can be attri-

buted to these formulas.
3) Under each negation of an atomic formula, bifurcate each line,
writing in the first part 0 for the negation, and, in the second
part, 1. Every time there is a bifurcation, we proceed as above,
and this means that the values are the same for the two new
lines in the part on the left of it.
4) Calculate, in the order of the construction of the list, for each
line, the value of each formula as follows:

i) When no negations and no formulas of the form B~ are

involved, proceed as in a truth-table for the classical pro-
positional calculus.
ii) If any of the formulas under consideration is a negation
and so of the form 7B, proceed as follows:
1~ If B is of the form C~ check if the value of C is
equal to the value of 7 C. If this is the case, bi-
furcate the line. If the value of C is different from
the value of 7 C, simply write 0.
2~ If B is of the form 7 C, check if the value of C is
equal to the value of 7C. If this is the case, bi-
furcate the line. If the value of C is different from
the value of -]C, check if the value of C~ is 0 or 1.
If it is 0, bifurcate the line. If it is 1, simply write
the same value as C.
3~ If B is of the form C ~ D, check if the value of C is
equal to the value of "7 C, or if the value of D is
equal to the value of 7 D . If this is true, then bi-
furcate the line. If, on the other hand, the value of
C is different from the value of 7 C, and the value
of D is different than the value of 7 D, check if C~
or D ~ have the value 0. If this occurs, then bi-
furcate the line. If C~ and D ~ have the value 1,
then write 0 if B has the value 1, and vice-versa.
4 ~) If B is of the form C V D , write 0 i f 7 C has the
value 0, or i f 7 D has the value 0. Otherwise, write
1.
5~ If B is of the form C A D, write 0 if 7 C has the
value 0 and 7 D has the value 0; otherwise write 1.
iii) If any of the formulas under consideration is of the form
O .
B , check If the value of B Is equal to the value of 7 B.

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 NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

If this is the case, then write 0 under B~ Otherwise, pro-

ceed as follows:
1~ If B is an atomic formula, bifurcate the line.
2~ If B is of the form -] C, check if C ~ has the value
1. If this is the case, write 1 under B~ If C ~ has
the value 0, bifurcate the line.
3 ~) If B is of the form C VD, C A D o r C 3 D , checkif
the values of C~ and D ~ are 1. If this is the case,
write 1 under B~ If, on the contrary, the value of
C~ or the value of D ~ are 0, then bifurcate the line.
4 ~) If B is of the form C~, write under B ~ the same
value as C~.
The above decision procedure, while tedious as are most decision
procedures, has the virtue of being a generalization of the normal
procedure of truth-tables in classical logic.

IV. DL*, an Extended System

If we wish to formalize directly interpretations #5 and #6 of the
principle of the unity of opposites, we can take the approach
pioneered in Routley and Meyer 1976 and add new axioms to DL.
(Remember that the constants in the k series are distinct from those
in the 1 series.)
A19') ~ ( k 2 i V -]k2 i) [form #5 o f the principle o f the unity
of opposites]
A20') lj A-7 lj [form #6 of the same principle]
But we have to add another axiom scheme, which insures the
existence of well-behaved propositions.
A21') k ~2 i+ 1 [the principle of Aristotle]
The resulting system, DL + A19'-A21', we shall label DL*. DL*,
unlike DL, is -7-inconsistent - thanks to A19' and A20'. These
axioms assert - in effect - that there are indeed incomplete and in-
consistent situations, which possibility is allowed for, but not insist-
ed upon, by DL. A21' insures that DL* is "absolutely consistent" and
non-trivial by requiring that some true propositions be such that
their negations are false (and vice-versa). DL* shares the most impor-
tant characteristics that we have observed in DL*.
The interest of DL* is enhanced by:
Theorem 20. - DL* is non-trivial.
P r o o f - Apply the truth-tables of theorem 2', giving to k2i the

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 STUDIES IN PARACONSISTENT LOGIC I

value 3, to lj the value 3, and to k2 i+1 the value 2, i, j = 1, 2, 3 . . . .

In order to extend the above semantics to DL*, we introduce the
following new clauses into the definition of a valuation: for all v,
11) v(k2 i) = 0
12) v(-q k2"i) = 0
13) v(lj) = 1
14) v(-I lj) = 1
Alves has extended the decision procedure for DL to DL*, using
the added clauses to definition 6. The proof of this result will also be
published elsewhere.
DL* is clearly interpretable as a logic of vagueness, which is one
of the main desiderata we have set for ourselves. (DL is o f course
also so interpretable, but perhaps not as obviously.) We can there-
fore conclude by claiming that we have constructed a logic (indeed
two logics) which does formalize the important forms of the prin-
ciple of the unity of opposites. While our logics deviate from the po-
sitions taken by McGill and Parry, especially with regard to the laws
o f excluded middle and double negation and to the equivalence of
the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction, we have pre-
sented our reasons for viewing such deviations as virtues and not
defects.
DL (and DL*) are still only the first steps toward more adequate
logics, which would at least embrace quantifiers, identity, modalities
and tenses. However such extensions must wait for (possibly many)
later occasions.

INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICS
UNIVERSITY OF SAO PAULO
SAO PAULO, S.P.
BRAZIL

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
EDWARDSVILLE, ILLINOIS 62026
USA

NOTES

The authors would like to thank A.I. Arruda and A. Lopafi6, both for the
suggestions and criticisms each has made and for the inspiration their
work has provided. Also we would like to thank E.H. Alves for his
comments and for his own important work on the smbject. Wolf would

215
 NEWTON C.A. DA COSTA and ROBERT G. WOLF

also like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for fund-
ing him during the period in which this paper was written.
Note that our metalanguage is classical; e.g., A # ~means "A does not
belong to[~''. We could, we think, use DL in our metalanguage, making
our semantics fully dialectical - in much the same way that recent intui-
tionism is concerned to have a fully intuitionistic semantics and that
some recent work in relevant logics is concerned with fully relevant
proofs. But we do not feel that anything vital would be gained at this
stage.

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