Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament

An International Journal of Nordic Theology

ISSN: 0901-8328 (Print) 1502-7244 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sold20

Predetermined for Predestination? On the

Assumed Notion of Predestination in the Dead Sea
Scrolls

Årstein Justnes

To cite this article: Årstein Justnes (2019) Predetermined for Predestination? On the Assumed
Notion of Predestination in the Dead Sea Scrolls, Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament, 33:1,
82-94, DOI: 10.1080/09018328.2019.1600257

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09018328.2019.1600257

Published online: 03 May 2019.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 18

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=sold20
Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament, 2019
Vol. 33, No. 1, 82-94, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09018328.2019.1600257

Predetermined for Predestination?

On the Assumed Notion of Predestination in
the Dead Sea Scrolls

Årstein Justnes
Department of Religion, History and Philosophy, University of Agder,
Kristiansand, Norway
arstein.justnes@uia.no

ABSTRACT: The present article argues that the concept of predestination

does not on the whole lend itself to Qumran studies. Unlike the writings of
Augustine and Calvin, the scrolls contain nothing like a doctrine of predesti-
nation. The article reviews several texts from 1QS, 1QH, and CD, generally
understood to reflect predestination, and suggests other ways of describing
and interpreting the material.
Key words: predestination; determination; Dead Sea Scrolls; Qumran

Introduction
The conventional wisdom is that predestination played an important role in
the theology of the “Qumran movement”. Roland Bergmeier says that the
most unique theological concepts found at Qumran are dualism and predesti-
nation,1 and Magen Broshi even claims that the notion of predestination
stems from the Essenes.2
I will argue that the Qumran “sectarian” texts hardly reflect a notion of
predestination. Rather, Qumran scholars’ early adoption of a terminology
originating from centuries of debates on predestination predetermined the
scrolls for predestination. In this article, I will suggest other ways of charac-

1. R. Bergmeier, Glaube als Gabe nach Johannes. Religions- und theologiege-

schichtliche Studien zum prädestianischen Dualismus im vierten Evangelium (Bei-
träge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament Sechste Folge; Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 1980). Cf. also E.H. Merrill, Qumran and Predestination: A Theologi-
cal Study of the Thanksgiving Hymns (Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah 8;
Leiden: Brill, 1975), pp. 12-13: “… predestination is one of the chief doctrines in
1QH, if not the most prominent.”
2. M. Broshi, “Predestination in the Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Magen
Broshi (ed.), Bread, Wine, Walls and Scrolls (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press,
2001), pp. 238-52 at p. 247. Broshi also speaks of predestination as “the Essene car-
dinal tenet” (241).

© 2019 The Editors of the Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament

 Predetermined for Predestination? 83

terizing the phenomena in the scrolls that most scholars erroneously describe
as constituting predestination.

The use of the term “predestination” in Qumran studies

In his 2006 study “Predestination and Free Will in the Theology of the Dead
Sea Scrolls”,3 Philip Alexander concludes with the following remarks:
The similarities between … [the] worldview [in Qumran theology] and cer-
tain much later theologies are striking. The parallels with high Calvinism are
obvious. These similarities should be boldly confronted and explored, be-
cause they offer, within the framework of the history of religions, a potential
source of insight into the Qumran mentality. …
The comparison … raises all the moral arguments which were later urged
against high Calvinism. If all is foreordained, if who is elect and who is
damned is predetermined by God, how can humans be regarded as moral
agents, since moral agency depends on free will? And if humans are not free
agents what is the moral basis of punishment and reward? These were ques-
tions with which the later Calvinists and their opponents were to wrestle
mightily. They are not directly addressed, as far as I am aware, in Qumran lit-
erature. They were, however, problems which exercised Jewish thinkers at
the time. Indeed, one of Josephus’ criteria for differentiating the Jewish sects
of his day was their stance on the question of fate and free-will. The failure in
the scrolls to confront these questions inevitably leaves the modern reader
with a sense of unfinished theological business.4
In this piece, Alexander notes the similarities between the “sectarian”
Qumran texts, i.e. the texts assumed to originate in the Qumran movement,
and Calvinism. According to Alexander, these similarities “offer … a poten-
tial source of insight into the Qumran mentality”. Under this it lies as a tacit
premise that the notion of predestination taken to be reflected in the “sectar-
ian” texts and the theological doctrine of predestination in Calvinism are
comparable, or even – more or less – the same.5 In the conclusion of the pa-
per on which his article was based, Alexander remarks ironically on his own
use of terminology:
It will, I am sure, not have escaped your notice that I found myself willy
nilly drawing on the vocabulary of “predestination” and “foreordination”
in expounding the Qumran theology.6

3. P.S. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will in the Theology of the Dead Sea
Scrolls,” in J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole (eds.), Divine and Human Agency in
Paul and His Cultural Environment (Library of New Testament Studies 335; Lon-
don: T&T Clark 2006), pp. 27-49.
4. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will,” p. 48.
5. Cf. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will,” p. 48, n. 33: “In Calvinist terms the
Qumran texts seem to subscribe to the ‘double predestination’ position of the Synod
of Dort.”
6. P.S. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will in the Theology of the Dead Sea
Scrolls,” paper read at a seminar on Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cul-
84 Årstein Justnes

This may serve to illustrate an interesting fact of which it is important to

be aware: When scholars meet with these (or related) phenomena in the
Qumran texts, they very often use a theologically charged terminology that
has been subject to debate since the time of Augustine. While the scrolls are
much older than Augustine, Calvin, and Luther, they were nevertheless found
much later, namely between 1946/7 and 1956. In other words: The Qumran
material came into the game when the game was more or less over; when the
different positions had been established and the essential terminology had
been not only defined but also refined a number of times.7
There are also other challenges: If we look through different studies
touching upon themes like determinism and predestination in the Qumran
texts, we soon notice the varying use of essential terminology. When scholars
use key concepts they obviously mean different things. For example, while
Merrill uses “determinism” to refer to “non-Jewish or non-Christian concepts
such as fatalism”, predestination according to his definition “implies provi-
dential arrangement of the universe, including man and his destiny”.8 Eileen
Schuller, on the other hand, uses the same concepts as synonyms. 9 The focus
in Armin Lange’s impressive study Weisheit und Prädestination: Wei-
sheitliche Urordnung und Prädestination in den Textfunden von Qumran of
1995 is not predestination as we know it from ecclesiastical history but rather
a predetermined order of history (prädestinatianischer Geschichtsordnung).10

tural Environment at the University of Aberdeen, August 18-21, 2004

(http://www.abdn.ac.uk/divinity/Gathercole/paper-alexander.htm).
7. For a more recent discussion of predestination, see F.L. Shults, Reforming the
Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005).
8. Merrill, Qumran, p. 15.
9. E. Schuller, “Petitionary Prayer and the Religion of Qumran,” in J.J. Collins and
R. Kugler (eds.), Aspects of Religion in the Dead Sea Scrolls (Grand Rapids: Eerd-
mans 2000), pp. 29-45. Note also E.O. Tukasi, Determinism and Petitionary Prayer
in John and the Dead Sea Scrolls: An Ideological Reading of John and the Rule of
the Community (1QS) (London: T&T Clark, 2008), p. 14: “… we shall use the terms
‘determinism’ and ‘predestination’ interchangeably in the sense that they both affirm
the dictates of God beforehand (cause), whether broadly or narrowly, which guide
the course of events (effect).”
10. A. Lange, Weisheit und Prädestination: Weisheitliche Urordnung und Prä-
destination in den Textfunden von Qumran (Studies on the Texts of the Desert of
Judah 18; Leiden: Brill, 1995). It should be noted that the doctoral dissertation on
which the book was based had another title better corresponding to the content of the
book: Weisheit und Prädestination: Eine Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang von
weisheitlicher Urordnung und prädestinatianischer Geschichtsordnung in den Text-
funden von Qumran. See also A. Lange, “Wisdom and Predestination in the Dead
Sea Scroll,” Dead Sea Discoveries 2 (1995), pp. 340-54 at p. 343: “In 1Q27 1 … the
idea of a predestined order of the world can also be found” (cf. also pp. 353 and 354).
For a related use of the concept of predestination, cf. D. Dimant, “Ages of Creation,”
in L.H. Schiffman and J.C. VanderKam (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls
(vol. 1; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 11-13 (esp. p. 12): “(The Pesher
 Predetermined for Predestination? 85

And, to give a final example, when Josephus states that the Essenes maintain
“that fate is ruler of all things, and that nothing happens to people except it be
according to its decree” (Ant. 13:172)11 some scholars say that Josephus is
describing a belief in predestination, others that he is describing a determinis-
tic belief.12
In other words, the term predestination is used to describe a predeter-
mined order of history, determinism, fate, and individual predestination.13 All
this makes it somewhat difficult to grasp what in essence predestination is in
Qumran studies and to judge the precise implications of a vast amount of
studies.14

Definitions of determinism and predestination

In his article on determinism in the Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls,
Jean Duhaime defines the pair determinism and predestination as follows:
Determinism, as a philosophical concept, is the view that “given certain ini-
tial conditions, everything that ensues is bound to happen as it does and in no
other way …”. A closely related notion is that of predestination, which is the
determination, by a conscious and voluntary act of a deity, of the destiny of
individuals or groups as salvation or damnation (double predestination).15

on the Periods) … presents the Periods within the framework of predestination char-
acteristic of the community’s thought (4Q180 1.1-3, 1.3,4,9-10 …).”
Lange can also use the verb “predestine” seemingly as a synonym to “(pre-)elect”, cf.
Lange, “Wisdom and Predestination,” p. 351 (“… according to CD 2:2-13 not only is
the fate of the wicked written down in this book, but lines 12-13 state that whoever is
righteous has also been predestined by God”) and p. 352 (“Who is to be wicked and
who is to be righteous have been predestined by God in this order”).
11. Quoted from J. Duhaime, “Determinism,” in L.H. Schiffman and J.C. Vander-
Kam (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls (vol. 1; New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press), pp. 194-98 at p. 194.
12. J.C. VanderKam, The Dead Sea Scrolls Today (2d ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerd-
mans, 2010), pp. 102-3 seems to use the concepts “determinism”, “predestination”,
“predeterminism”, and “fate” as synonyms.
13. A.P. Jassen, “Religion and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” Religion Compass 1/1 (2007),
pp. 1-25 at p. 11 defines predestination as “The view that certain individuals are
assigned to the lot of evil at the time of their creation ...”.
14. I will not comment on the extensive use in the literature of variations like “pre-
destination language” or “general predestination phraseology”, cf. for instance
Dimant, “Ages of Creation,” p. 12 who uses the latter phrase to describe 4Q180 frg.
4.
15. Duhaime’s (“Determinism,” p. 194) definition of determinism builds on I. Mar-
coulesco’s article “Free will and determinism,” in M. Eliade (ed.), Encyclopedia of
Religions (vol. 5; New York, 1987), pp. 419-21. Cf. also Bergmeier’s, Glaube, p. 29,
n. 11 definitions: „Präzise bezeichnet ... [Determinismus] das Vorherbestimmtsein
allen Geschehens …, während die Vorherbestimmung über ‘Heilsteilhabe oder Heils-
verschlossenheit’ der Menschen speziell mit dem Terminus ‘Prädestination’ ausge-
drückt wird.”
86 Årstein Justnes

There are several problems with applying these definitions to the Qumran
material. The most obvious is that they are modern constructions based on a
modern understanding of these phenomena rather than concepts emanating
from analyses and readings of the Qumran material.16 This gives Duhaime’s
approach an anachronistic frame that partly determines his analysis. It be-
comes (at least in principle) a search for present-day determinism and predes-
tination. Especially problematic is his definition of predestination. It is still a
matter of debate whether the Qumran movement believed in life after death at
all. When we speak about predestination in the sectarian texts and predestina-
tion as a Christian doctrine, we are very likely talking about two (or more)
different phenomena. The Christian doctrine points beyond this life and
death, something the Qumran material never (or at best: seldom) does.17
As I have already indicated, I suggest that the inevitably anachronistic
concept of predestination (and its derivatives) should be avoided in Qumran
studies. Qumran scholars should aim for more precise characterisations of the

Duhaime also gives a definition of “free will”: “Free will … is the conviction that
human beings have a capacity to make deliberate choices, especially between moral
alternatives, and therefore bear full responsibility for the ultimate consequences of
their actions.” The concept “free will” (liberum arbitrium) was introduced in the
West by Tertullian, and later adopted and modified by Augustine. Instead of “free
will” I prefer to speak of “human freedom”. The former almost sounds like an abso-
lute; strictly speaking, it hardly makes sense to speak of different degrees of “free
will”. The concept “human freedom” is, however, more flexible and more useful in
this discussion, since it is possible to think of different degrees of freedom.
16. It is highly unlikely that the Qumranites related to determinism and predestina-
tion – or similar phenomena – as abstract concepts. Contra Tukasi, Determinism, p.
30: “… the concept of determinism is explicit in certain passages of the Rule of the
Community …”. Cf. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will,” p. 31: “… we must
remember the philosophical poverty of the Hebrew language at this date …, and the
difficulty it had in expressing abstract concept.”
17. Cf. for instance Calvin, Institutes III.21.5: “By predestination we mean God’s
eternal decree through which he determined by himself what would happen to each
human being. All have not been created equal, but some were pre-ordained to ever-
lasting life, others to everlasting damnation. As the individual has been created either
for the one or for the other purpose, so we say he is predestined to life or to death”. I
owe this reference to J.A. Loade, “Calvin’s election mix in small-scale theology,”
HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 65 (1) (2009), pp. 1-6 at pp. 2-3. Cf. also
S. Priest, “Calvin, John (Jean),” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford
University Press 2005; Oxford Reference Online: Oxford University Press, 2010;
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t116.e
326): “[Calvin’s] main theological doctrine is absolute predestination, which entails
the inevitability of the eternal salvation of the elect and the eternal damnation of the
unchosen, irrespective of perceived desert but according to the will of God. The
inadmissibility of grace is a logical consequence of absolute predestination (because
F is inadmissible if and only if F is not liable to be lost).”
 Predetermined for Predestination? 87

different phenomena they meet in the texts.18 The term “determinism” (and
its derivatives) seems more useful, since it is a broader and more flexible
term—both easier to modify and to use as a modifier.19 Nonetheless, this
concept should also be used with caution and sensitivity, and not as a con-
venient basket in which to place every text that refers to the activity of God
before creation.
In what follows I will offer several examples of a deterministic view of
history found in writings from the Second Temple period, and then put some
stress on the fact that predestination does not necessarily follow from deter-
minism in the sectarian texts from Qumran. After this I will describe different
forms of “predetermination” in two sectarian texts, concluding the article by
offering some synthetic observations.

Deterministic view of history

It is a fundamental thought in several Jewish writings from the Second Tem-
ple period that God has determined the course of history. In the book of Dan-
iel (chapter 9), history is divided into 70 weeks of years covering the period
from the time of Daniel to the end. At the close of this book, Daniel even
attempts to calculate the date at which the end will come. Luckily for us, he
was wrong. John J. Collins speaks in this connection of “the end of the prede-
termined course of history”.20
Divisions of history into ten or seven periods are generally well attested in
Jewish apocalyptic literature.21 In the Apocalypse of Weeks in 1 Enoch, we
can follow God’s acts in history – from creation to the end time – through ten
periods or weeks, where the last three weeks are yet to be realized. The au-
thor of the book of Jubilees uses a Jubilee-scheme, i.e. periods consisting of 7
times 7 years, in order to organize history. 11QMelchizedek also divides
history into “jubilee periods”. Also in several other Qumran texts history is
divided into periods or epochs that God has foreordained. See for instance
4Q180 1 1-3:22

18. When we study the Qumran texts in search of particular phenomena or notions, it
is furthermore of primary importance that our analyses of these texts are sensitive to
their genre. Different texts and different genres serve different functions and pur-
poses, and different notions play different roles in different contexts.
19. In some sense and at some levels, determinism is an experienced part of human
life. We know that we are predetermined to die, and that most of us are bound to go
through different stages in life. Predestination, on the other hand, implies a conscious
act of a deity and a final destination. It is not difficult to think of different degrees of
determinism, but harder to imagine different degrees of predestination.
20. J.J. Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls (London: Routledge, 1997),
p. 14.
21. Collins, Apocalypticism, p. 21.
22. All the translations from the Dead Sea Scrolls are taken from E.M. Cook, M.O.
Wise, and M.G. Abegg, The Dead Sea scrolls : a new translation (San Francisco:
HarperSanFrancisco, 2005).
88 Årstein Justnes

1
The prophetic interpretation concerning the ages which God made: an age to
complete [all that is] 2and shall be. Before He created them, He established
[their] workings [. . .] 3age by age. 23
It often comes with this technique that the writer and his intended audi-
ence are described as living in a critical period of history. History itself is a
praeludium to the time in which they are living. More important, however,
for the purposes of this article: all this shows that history, according to these
authors, has a purpose, a meaning, and a goal. While it moves forward, it
remains structured on the basis of God’s order, his plans, and his wisdom.24

The need to distinguish between determinism and predestination: 1QS

3 and 1QHa 9
A radicalised and rather consistent deterministic view of history is found in
the Treatise on the two spirits (1QS 3,15-26):
All that is now and ever shall be originates with the God of knowledge. Be-
fore things come to be, He has ordered all their design, 16so that when they do
come to exist—at their appointed times as ordained by His glorious plan—
they fulfill their destiny, a destiny impossible to change. He controls 17the
laws governing all things, and He provides for all their pursuits.
He created humankind to rule over 18the world, appointing for them two
spirits in which to walk until the time ordained for His visitation. These are
the spirits 19of truth and falsehood. Upright character and fate originate with
the Habitation of Light; perverse, with the Fountain of Darkness. 20The au-
thority of the Prince of Light extends to the governance of all righteous peo-
ple; therefore, they walk in the paths of light. Correspondingly, the authority
of the Angel 21of Darkness embraces the governance of all wicked people, so
they walk in the paths of darkness.
The authority of the Angel of Darkness further extends to the corruption
22
of all the righteous. All their sins, iniquities, shameful and rebellious deeds
are at his prompting, 23a situation God in His mysteries allows to continue un-
til His era dawns. Moreover, all the afflictions of the righteous, and every trial
in its season, occur because of this Angel’s diabolic rule. 24And the spirits al-
lied with him share but a single resolve: to cause the Sons of Light to stum-
ble.
Yet the God of Israel (and the Angel of His Truth) assists all 25the Sons of
Light. It is actually He who created the spirits of light and darkness, making
them the cornerstone of every deed, 26their impulses the premise of every ac-
tion (1QS 3,15-26).

23. Cf. Dimant, “Ages of Creation,” p. 11: “This description refers to a concept of
history as a sequence of precisely defined periods, a concept occurring in other
community writings (Rule of the Community, 1QS iii.15 and 23, iv.13; 1QH a i.24;
Pesher Habakkuk, 1QpHab vii.13) …”.
24. In the War Scroll we learn that history will end in a series of acts of war, which
ultimately culminate in the victory of the people of God. This is predetermined. Even
specific war acts seem to be determined by God “… for it is a day appointed by Him
from ancient times as a battle of annihilation for the Sons of Darkness” (1QM 1,10).
 Predetermined for Predestination? 89

Not only has God created all things, he has also determined plans for all
his creation. God has initiated everything, and he knows how it will end. I
read the Treatise on the two spirits in 1QS 3,13-4,26 partly as a further reflec-
tion upon the creation narrative in Genesis 1.25 Whereas God, according to
Gen 1,14-18, created defined paths for the two great lights, the author of the
treatise states that God has created everything with clear functions and clearly
defined tasks.26 The whole of creation is a symphony under his wise conduc-
torship.
Several scholars find the notion of predestination in this text,27 and Alex
P. Jassen even says it reflects individual predestination.28 It is, however, not
at all clear what exactly suggests the categories “predestination” and “indi-
vidual”,29 as the main focus in the text is neither the individual nor predesti-
nation, but the order of God’s creation. Emmanuel Tukasi identifies three
types of determinism in 1QS 3,15-4,26: cosmological, eschatological, and
soteriological determinism.30 While the text indeed has strong deterministic
traits, it should be noted that it also contains features modifying this impres-
sion.31 1QS 4 shows that human beings—despite the division of humanity
into two camps—are responsible for their acts and will be rewarded or pun-
ished according to their ways in the world (see also 1QS 3,24-25).

25. The linguistic parallels between the two texts are striking, but the theology in
1QS 3-4 is, in many ways, more developed. Cf. Alexander, “Predestination and Free
Will,” who is more moderate: “… the Sermon on the Two Spirits … presupposes a
distinctive reading of Genesis 1-3” (p. 27); “Implicit here … is a classic theistic,
creatio ex nihilo reading of the story of creation in Genesis 1, though significantly no
quotation is offered of that biblical text” (p. 29).
26. God’s plan for his creatures, their works, their deeds, their tasks, their course, and
their thoughts are outlined.
27. Cf. already K.G. Kuhn, “Die Sektenschrift [1QS] und die iranische Religion,”
ZTK 49 (1952), pp. 296–316 at p. 312: “Gott hat für jeden Menschen vor seinem Sein
die Zugehörigkeit zur einen oder zur andern Seite bestimmt, und demzufolge sind bei
seinem Sein seine Taten und sein Ende unabänderlich festgelegt (Sekt. 3, 15 f.).“
VanderKam, Dead Sea Scrolls, p. 102 says that 1QS 3-4 “articulate a thoroughly
predestinarian theology of world history and human endeavor” and, on the next page,
that it reflects “the doctrine of predestination”. Broshi, “Predestination,” p. 240 char-
acterises the text as “predestinarian” and finds in it a “principle of dual predestina-
tion”. Note also p. 238: “Just a year after the publication … it became clear that the
single most important theological element in this composition is its firm belief in
predestination, to be precise, double predestination.”
28. Jassen, “Religion,” p. 11.
29. Duhaime, “Determinism,” p. 195 says that the “deterministic notion of a pre-
existent order of beings” implies predestination of the individuals. But how can we
know that? Vanderkam’s (Dead Sea Scrolls, p. 104) claim that “the whole scenario
in the War Rule presupposes a doctrine of predestination” is the same as saying that
determinism presupposes a doctrine of predestination.
30. Tukasi, Determinism, pp. 32-57.
31. Cf. also Tukasi, Determinism, p. 61: “It cannot be justified from 1QS that the
God of Knowledge assigns certain deeds for certain people.”
90 Årstein Justnes

Another text closely related to the Treatise on the two spirits is 1QHa 9,9-
10.15-22:
9
By Your wisdom [You have establish]ed the successive [generations] and
before You created them You knew {all} their works 10forever and ever. [For
apart from You no]thing is done, and without Your will nothing is known.
You have created the earth with Your strength, 16seas and deeps [ . . . and]
their [ . . . ] You have determined in Your wisdom, and all that is in them
17
You have determined according to Your will. [You appointed them] for the
spirit of man whom You have formed upon the earth, for all the days of eter-
nity 18and the everlasting generations in accordance with [their] w[orks . . .]
in their ordained seasons. You apportioned their service in all their genera-
tions and judgm[en]t 19for its appointed times for the domini[on . . .] their [. .
.] for successive generations and the punishment for their retribution as well
as 20all their afflictions. [ . . . ] You have apportioned it to all their offspring
according to the number of everlasting generations 21and for all the years of
eternity [ . . . ] and in the wisdom of Your knowledge You determined their
destiny before 22they came into existence and according [to Your will] every-
thing come[s to pass], and nothing happens apart from You.
Like the Treatise on the two spirits, this text is often said to reflect indi-
vidual predestination.32 The fragmentary nature of the text makes it difficult
to understand exactly what the different lines refer to, but it is clear enough
that the perspective is collective. The psalmist praises God for his creation of
order in the universe and for his ordering of the tasks of all creation. We meet
the deterministic language of praise that we already know from some of the
biblical psalms (cf. for instance Psalm 139),33 but hardly any notion of pre-
destination.34 The perspective is general, or better: all-inclusive. Just as
heaven and earth, seas and ocean depths have received their tasks and desti-

32. See for instance E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of
Patterns of Religion (London: SCM, 1977), pp. 174-75. According to VanderKam,
Dead Sea Scrolls, p. 103, 1QHa 9 illustrates “the doctrine of fate or predestination”.
Broshi, “Predestination,” p. 240 says it reflects “the doctrine of dual predestination”.
33. Even though the thoughts reflected in Psalm 139 are clearly reinforced in 1QH a 9
(cf. also ll. 23–29), we should note that the deterministic language of praise is al-
ready established in the hymnic tradition of the Hebrew Bible, which should suffice
to show that you do not need a strong deterministic theology in order to use determi-
nistic language of praise, or that such a language presupposes a notion of individual
predestination. Contra Schuller, “Petitionary Prayer,” p. 45 who has argued that the
strong belief in predestination in the Qumran movement implicitly influenced the
prayer texts they used: “These were predominantly psalms and hymns of praise that
confessed and acknowledged the sovereignty and power of the God who has deter-
mined all things in his wisdom. Such expressions of doxology and thanksgiving were
a direct outgrowth of a strongly deterministic theology.” There is indeed a possibility
that the chain of causes goes in the opposite order. It is equally possible that the de-
terministic theology partly was a direct outgrowth of the psalms and hymns.
34. Lange, “Wisdom,” p. 350 says that “God is praised as the one who predestined
the fate of human beings according to their epochs [in 15–20]”.
 Predetermined for Predestination? 91

nations, so has mankind.35 The author makes anthropology part of his cos-
mology de facto.

Towards more precise categories

Since, as noted above, the concepts of predestination and determinism have
been used in many and various ways in scholarly literature on the Qumran
texts, it seems worthwhile to review some of the key texts in search of nu-
ances and more precise categories. In an attempt to better address and de-
scribe the material, I will try to distinguish between (1) Paradigmatic prede-
termination and (2) Collective pre-election.
1. Paradigmatic predetermination
By using the concept “paradigmatic predetermination”, I refer to predetermi-
nation linked to idealised groups in contrasting categories such as “the right-
eous” – “the wicked” or “the sons of light” – “the sons of darkness”. Accord-
ing to the psalm in 1QHa 7,25-30, the ways of the just man and the wicked
ones are already determined:
I know by Your understanding it is not by human strength [. . .] a man’s
26
way is [not] in himself, nor is a person able to determine his step. But I
know that in Your hand is the inclination of every spirit [. . . and all] his
[works] 27You have determined before ever You created him. How should
any be able to change Your words? You alone have [creat]ed 28the righteous
one, and from the womb you established him to give heed to Your covenant
at the appointed time of grace and to walk in all things, nourishing himself
29
in the abundance of Your compassion, and relieving all the distress of his
soul for an eternal salvation and everlasting peace without want. Thus You
raise 30his glory above the mortal.
But the wicked you have created for [the time of] Your [w]rath, from the
womb You set them apart for the day of slaughter. 31For they walk in a way
which is not profitable, and they reject Your covenant [and] their soul abhors
Your [truth.] They have no delight in all that 32You have commanded, but
they have chosen that which You hate.
Three elements in this text are especially worthy of comment:
(A) The text praises God both for the ways of the righteous and the wicked.

35. Cf. also Daniel J. Harrington, “Creation,” Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls,
in Lawrence H. Schiffman and James C. VanderKam (eds). (vol 1; Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp. 155-57 at p. 155: “According to 1QHodayota, the goal or
end of creation is the glory of God: ‘You have stretched out the heavens for your
glory; all their host you have established for your good pleasure’ (1QHa ix.9-10 …).
Just as the heavenly bodies and the forces of nature follow the plan of God, so do the
earth and the seas: ‘You have established them by your wisdom, and everything that
is in them you have established for your good pleasure’ (1QH a ix.14-15 …). Al-
though mankind has been given dominion over the earth, humans too are subject to
the sovereignty and foreknowledge of God: ‘By the wisdom of your knowledge you
have established their course before they exist. According to your good pleasure
everything happens, and apart from you nothing is done’ (1QH a ix.19-20 …).”
92 Årstein Justnes

(B) In the three last lines, we find that predetermination and human freedom
somehow join forces. The wicked are predetermined for the day of slaughter,
and have at the same time chosen what God hates.
(C) That the wicked, according to line 30, are determined for the day of
slaughter can hardly mean that every wicked man shall end his life in a day
of slaughter. More likely, it means that the wicked ones, or perhaps we
should say the wicked “race”, will one day be annihilated.36
Thus, stating like Menahem Mansoor that this text reflects predestination
is misleading.37 Rather, its strongly deterministic features are a characteristic
part of the genre of the Hodayot and primarily serve the psalmist in his praise
of God.38 He pictures God’s greatness by describing Him as the creator of
both righteous and wicked, their ways and their ends. And in order to glorify
God, he so to speak “sacrifices” the glory of man.

2. Collective pre-election
By using the term “collective pre-election” I want to establish a category
between “universal/ paradigmatic” and “individual” describing for instance
God’s “pre-election” of Israel, or predetermination of other groups.39
CD 2,5-13
The close links between the Treatise on the Two Spirits (cf. above) and the
Damascus Document 2,2-13 have long been recognised. Concerning the lat-
ter, Philip Davies says that it is “strongly predestinarian in tone”40 while
Alexander notes that it “is strongly deterministic in character, and traces eve-
rything back to divine causality”.41

36. Also in the Treatise on the Two Spirits (see above) all humankind is divided into
two corresponding camps, consisting of righteous and wicked people. This division
of humankind is ordained by God and is confirmed empirically by the ethical paths
that the righteous and the wicked choose. But within this deterministic framework,
both the “sons of light” and the “sons of darkness” have freedom and will be respon-
sible for their choices.
37. M. Mansoor, Thanksgiving Hymns (Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah 3;
Leiden: Brill, 1961), p. 56. He comments, “Thus God has created man; He has pre-
destined every man from birth for evil or for good, for destruction or for salvation.”
38. To some extent the text also illustrates how deterministic language can be a pow-
erful resource in polemics.
39. Cf. also 4Q215a 1 ii 8d-10a, where God is said to have determined all the work
of the peoples: “For he [established] their work before they were created, and he
assigned the service of righteousness as their borders in their generations” (my trans-
lation).
40. P.R. Davies, The Damascus Covenant: An Interpretation of the “Damascus Doc-
ument” (JSOTSup 25; Sheffield: The University of Sheffield 1983), p. 72.
41. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will,” p. 43. Cf. on the same page: “Like the
Sermon, CD 2,2-13 divides humanity without remainder into two camps — the good
and the bad.”
 Predetermined for Predestination? 93

But Strength, Might, and great Wrath in the flames of fire 6with all the angels
of destruction shall come against all who rebel against the proper way and
who despise the law, until they are without remnant 7or survivor, for God had
not chosen them from ancient eternity. Before they were created, 8He knew
what they would do. So He rejected the generations of old and turned away
from the land 9until they were gone.
He knows the time of appearance and the number and exact times of
10
everything that has ever existed and ever will exist before it happens in the
proper time, for all the years of eternity. 11And in all of these times, He has
arranged that there should be for Himself people called by name, so that there
would always be survivors on the earth, replenishing 12the surface of the earth
with their descendants. He taught them through those anointed by the holy
spirit, the seers of 13truth. He explicitly called them by name. But whoever He
had rejected He caused to stray.
The main contrast in this piece is between “all who rebel against the prop-
er way and who despise the law” and God’s people, who are a people called
by name. Alexander’s comment that “The wicked are wicked because ‘God
did not choose them’”42 is hardly a precise way of putting it. Rather, the point
seems to be that God did not choose those who despise the law, because he
knew that they would fail.43 In other words, his non-election of the wicked
(2,3.7) was based on his foreknowledge.
Interestingly, the text implicitly seems to reflect people moving from one
predetermined group to another (cf. 2,6-7): In order to rebel against “the
proper way”, one must have walked it. Of course, according to the author,
God knew what they would do, and accordingly did not choose them. Still,
the text shows that there are not “waterproof bulkheads” between the elect
and the non-elect.
Alexander comments that “it is difficult to live practically and religiously
with rigorous predestinarianism”.44 I would rather say: This text shows that
both practically and religiously it is not that difficult to live with pre-election.
In the Qumran texts predetermination is not a philosophical or practical prob-
lem that needs to be solved or overcome.
What is perhaps most interesting is that the text shows the rhetorical
power and explanatory potential of what we might call deterministic lan-
guage. It is almost as if the author is exclaiming: “God knew it! He knew that

42. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will,” p. 43. Cf. also his rather detailed
expansion: “In not choosing these wicked people he was excluding them from the
community of the saved and condemning them to ‘fiery flames at the hand of all the
angels of destruction’.”
43. Again VanderKam, Dead Sea Scrolls, p. 104 makes use of this text as a witness
to the doctrine of predestination. Also in line with this is Lange, “Wisdom,” p. 351.
Note, however, Jacob Licht’s (“The Doctrine of the Thanksgiving Scroll,” Israel
Exploration Journal 6.1 [1956], pp. 1-13 at p. 4, n. 8) necessary distinction (referring
to 1QH 1,7 and CD 2,7-8): “In terms of a more developed theology this statement
would be properly described as one of divine prescience, rather than predestination.”
44. Alexander, “Predestination and Free Will,” p. 48.
94 Årstein Justnes

you would do this! He knew that you would fail! Therefore he did not choose
you!” Rather than the “predestinarian tone” (Davies) or “divine causality”
(Alexander), I would prefer to emphasise the notion of divine foreknowledge
in this text.
Concluding remarks
I have argued against using the term “predestination” (and its derivatives) in
Qumran studies because it is an anachronism. As we have seen, however, it is
a rather basic assumption in several Jewish texts from the Second Temple
period that both the course of history and the paths of men—in some sense
and at some level—are predetermined. But unlike in the later Christian theo-
logical tradition, neither determinism nor predestination is ever treated as a
theological or philosophical problem in the Qumran texts.
Deterministic ideas are, for the most part, reflected in poetical texts. In all
of the abovementioned texts notions of predetermination seem primarily to
function as a means of stressing the greatness of God and his wisdom. Espe-
cially in the hymnic material, deterministic language becomes a powerful
resource in the praise of God. The worshipper sacrifices his or her freedom,
so to speak, in order to describe God in more elevated terms. This may serve
to illustrate the close relationship between theology and anthropology in po-
etry and praise: with a more detailed description of God’s works and great-
ness there seems to follow a more negative anthropology. Or, to put it
bluntly: With a greater God, you get a more unworthy and sinful humankind.
And the more almighty the psalmist pictures his God, the more deterministic
his theology is likely to become. While this deterministic language of praise
is compatible with both a deterministic worldview and the notion of predesti-
nation, it does not necessarily presuppose either of them.
Furthermore, the texts we have reviewed seem to provide firm grounds for
drawing some negative conclusions:

 Predetermination is rarely, if ever, “treated” on the level of the indi-

vidual in the Qumran texts.
 Predeterministic ideas and notions of human freedom are never ex-
plicitly contrasted. The idea that predetermination (or predestination)
makes humans not responsible for their lives and actions is alien to
the texts that we have reviewed.
 Notions of predetermination consistently seem to be linked to human
life here and now and never to salvation after death.