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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

ACCESS TO PUBLIC
INFORMATION IN MALAWI

Research Report

Tilitonse
May 2013
Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 3
2.0 THE RATIONALE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 4
3.0 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................... 6
3.1 Literature Review ................................................................................................................................... 6
3.2 Key Informant Interviews........................................................................................................................ 6
3.3 Data Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 7
3.4 Limitations and Constraints .................................................................................................................... 7
4.0 KEY PEA OBSTACLES TO ACCESS TO INFORMATION ........................................................................ 7
4.1 Insufficient and Unsustained political will ............................................................................................... 8
4.2 Political marginalization.......................................................................................................................... 9
4.3 Weak Parliamentary committee system ................................................................................................. 9
4.4 Public service has low opinion of the civil society ................................................................................ 10
4.5 Informal networks: Politicisation of the Private Sectors........................................................................ 10
4.6 ATI Legislation campaign has been championed by the media ........................................................... 11
4.7 Information Literacy society and Public awareness ............................................................................. 12
4.8 Deference to duty-bearers ................................................................................................................... 12
4.9 E-government: Technological limitations ............................................................................................. 12
4.10 Statutory Barriers to access to information .......................................................................................... 13
4.11 Laws should be consistent and harmonised ........................................................................................ 14
4.12 Challenges related to the Bureaucracy ................................................................................................ 14
5.0 POTENTIAL PROGRAMMATIC AREAS TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION17
5.1. Advocacy for the enactment of the ATI bill and popularisation of the contents of the bill ..................... 17
5.2. Creating meso-level coalitions that use ATI for growth and development ........................................... 19
5.3. Dismantling collusive and distributive coalitions................................................................................... 20
5.4. Promoting higher standards of integrity in information dissemination by print and electronic Media....... 20
6.0. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 21
7.0 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 22
8.0 LIST OF RESPONDENTS........................................................................................................................ 23

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report presents findings of a political economy analysis of access to public information in Malawi.
The study was commissioned by the Tilitonse Programme which is a grant making facility whose overall
goal is to promote governance that is increasingly inclusive, accountable, and responsive to the citizens
of Malawi. The Programme’s theory of change is centred on an empirically informed assertion that
increased levels of citizen voice, action, and interaction with government, private sector, and others, can
create increased responsiveness in duty bearers and power holders in and outside government and
lead to greater social inclusion, increased accountability and the improved delivery of basic services.
The programme advocates an implementation approach of collaboration and coalition-building among
actors. Recent political economy analysis in international development has demonstrated that change
happens when a variety of interests come together in a loose coalition around an issue. Thus, bringing
societal groups together (including government, the private sector, faith groups, the media and others)
around an issue to advocate for and create positive change, is the most effective way to achieve desired
governance and development results. Tilitonse believes that local civil society organisations can play a
major role in realising the approach and securing the more inclusive, accountable and responsive
governance.

The programme provides funding through several windows, namely, General Open Calls and Thematic
Calls for project proposals. The Thematic Calls are made around specific ‘issues’ identified by the
programme. Access to information was identified by the programme as an issue that required attention
if more inclusive, accountable and responsive governance has to be achieved. Furthermore, within the
Tilitonse Theory of Change, access to information is identified as a first level result (i.e. output) that is
central for achieving the ultimate results of the programme because access to information is a cross-
cutting issue. This Political Economy Analysis was undertaken to inform the content of the call for
project proposals on Access to information. Although the report discusses obstacles to access to
information, nonetheless, its main focus is on identifying key players and their respective roles and
incentives relating to access to public information. It discusses the distribution and exercise of power
and how they shape attitudes and incentives for access to information. The report highlights the need
for the formation of coalitions at different levels to lobby for the enactment of ATI legislation, facilitate
information exchange, and promote the distilling and dissemination of credible information.

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2.0 THE RATIONALE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS

In a broad sense, political economy is understood to mean the interaction of political and economic
processes in a society that produces certain distributions of power and wealth between groups and
individuals, as well as the processes that transform or reproduce them over time. 1Development is not a
purely technical process that can be steered according to a formula of expertise and rational decision-
making. Disappointing results often stem from a failure to incorporate politics in the equation. The
implicit assumption, by most donors, lingers that the obstacles to better governance and development
performance are primarily financial, technical and managerial, and that progress can be made through
more appropriate policies, capacity building, strengthening demand from civil society and dialogue or
conditionality to change the behaviour of key individuals.2 Acknowledging that a major stumbling block
to effective aid delivery is of a political nature has led to the acceptance of political considerations in aid
programmes and negotiations.3 Some donors still find it hard to accept that politics is not an optional
extra, or something that gets in the way of development and that it is central to the whole endeavour. As
a result, a political economy approach has emerged with following central features:
 Emphasising the centrality of politics. Examining how political power is secured, exercised, and
contested is central to understanding how, where and why development is produced – however
defined. Political processes generate incentives that may induce or inhibit developmental types of
behaviour;
 Downplaying the normative. The starting point of most approaches to political economy analysis
(PEA) is to try to understand country realities in a disinterested fashion and to ground development
strategies in these. This contrasts with the more conventional approach in governance analysis of
defining a norm and seeking to understand why a country deviates from it and ensuring compliance;
 Identifying underlying factors that shape the political process. Political economy approaches try to
place current realities in the context of a country’s history, society and geography;
 Focusing on institutions. Institutions – both formal and informal – are seen as key to determining the
incentive structures that induce certain patterns of behaviour. Strong leadership and reform
champions can play important roles as change agents, but in general it is difficult for individuals to
bring about lasting change of the ‘rules of the game’.
1
Alex Duncan and Gareth Williams, Making development assistance more effective by using political economy
analysis: what has been done and what have we learned?Brighton: Policy Practice Ltd.,2010.
2
Sue Unsworth, ‘What’s Politics Got to Do with It?: Why Donors Find It So Hard to Come to Terms with
Politics, and Why This Matters’, Journal of International Development, 21(6), pp. 883-894.
3
Examples of guidelines for conducting political economy analyses include DfID’s drivers of change approach,
Using Drivers of Change to Improve Aid Effectiveness, London: DfID Practice Paper, 2005; the World Bank’s
variant, Verena Fritz, Kai Kaiser and Brian Levy, Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy
Analysis: Good Practice Framework, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2009; and Sida’s power analysis, Helena
Bjuremalm, Power Analysis: Experiences and Challenges (concept note), Stockholm: Sida, 2006.

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 Recognising that donors are political actors. Donor agencies are explicitly examined as politically
influential players with their own geo-strategic, commercial, and developmental objectives. The very
fact that they provide resources to selected beneficiaries may change the dynamics of political
contestation.

Potentially, the PEA approach can be useful in three major ways: (i) to guide thinking about change
processes; (ii) to chart strategies; and (iii) to design operational interventions. Understanding context is
a precondition for charting strategies whether they are formulated at country/national, sector, or
institutional levels. A PEA can give clues as to who are the actors involved in various economic and
political processes with a view to identifying the movers and shakers in a positive sense, on the one
hand, and the spoilers, on the other. In turn, the identification of these actors would create a basis for
building coalitions of social forces who are likely to move in the desired direction.

It is therefore apparent that information is the lubricant that oils or greases the interactions among
different actors. The way information is generated, processed, stored and shared determines whether
the interactions are smooth or that actors pulverize against each other. The fact that information is
power cannot be overemphasised. Whoever has information has power to make intelligent and informed
decisions both political and economic henceforth it calls for transparency in the way public information is
disseminated and shared. Access to public information is critical for enabling citizens to exercise their
voice, to effectively monitor and hold government to account, and to enter into informed dialogue about
decisions which affect their lives. It is seen as vital for empowering all citizens, including vulnerable and
excluded people, to claim their broader rights and entitlements. But the potential contribution to good
governance of access to information lies in both the willingness of government to be transparent, as well
as the ability of citizens to demand and use information – both of which may be constrained in low
capacity settings. The underlying governance principles of an access to information approach are
transparency, active participation, responsiveness, and accountability. These principles underlie a
conceptual framework which aims to maximize people’s participation in democratic and policy making
processes. In many developing countries and Malawi inclusive there are real structural, economic, and
political barriers which hinder both the capacity and incentives of governments to produce information,
and the ability of citizens to claim their right to information and to use it to demand better governance
and public services.

Entrenched cultures of secrecy in the political and bureaucratic hierarchies can slow down the drive
towards openness. The instinct towards withholding information, which is often deeply rooted in

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environments where secrecy has allowed officials to remain unaccountable, can be difficult to
overcome. Nonetheless, if an access law is to be effective, ways will have to be found to encourage
bureaucrats to implement the law in the spirit of openness and accountability. At the very least,
innovative ways will need to be developed which ensure that officials comply with the letter of the law.
This will require building strong coalitions among key actors from the Politicians, the bureaucrats/public
servants, the private sector/business, and civil society.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

The study used both primary and secondary data and within the qualitative approach. The primary data
was realised from interviews with Key informants in the public sector, private sector, and the civil
society. The interviews were conducted in Lilongwe and Salima districts. Importantly, desk research
added a lot of value to the study results.

3.1 Literature Review

The first part of literature review consisted of desk research that involved review of academic literature
on access to information in general, and in Malawi, in particular. This literature review focus on building
up the political economy framework for studying access to information in Malawi. It zeroed in on (a)
access to information and its constraints, (b) access to information and good governance, and (c)
mechanisms to support open information environments. The second part of literature review involved a
desk review of research reports relevant to the subject of access to public information and its
impediments. The objective was to identify gaps that can inform possible interventions.

3.2 Key Informant Interviews

Despite time constraints, the Researcher endeavoured to collect data through key informant interviews.
The sample of 13 key informants from the public sector, private sector, the media and civil society
organisations was done. Lilongwe and Salima had been sampled in order to compare challenges to
access to information in the urban and rural districts. Literature on access to information in developing
countries suggested that the underlying obstacles to access to public information are determined by
socio-economic factors such as levels of education, literacy rates, poverty, and centralization of
bureaucracy and availability of ICT services. In Malawi, there are clear variations in the incidence of
these factors between urban and rural areas.

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3.3 Data Analysis

The data was analysed using content analysis methodology. The content of academic literature was
summarized and clustered thematically. The themes were then integrated into a framework of obstacles
identified by the various authors. Data from secondary sources was used to assess the position in
Malawi with respect to each of the main components of the framework. Due to the sampling limitations
outlined below, the data was limited in its validity and reliability. Therefore, it was used merely to
supplement the more comprehensive secondary data collected through literature review.

3.4 Limitations and Constraints

The study was designed to be limited in scope due to time resource constraints. This militated against
the use of data-collection methods that would require enough time to conduct nation-wide interviews, in-
depth anthropological study of social norms and bureaucratic practices and collection of quantitative
data on actual demands for access and the responses to them. The Researcher mitigated the
limitations and constraints by maximizing the use of secondary data and triangulating it, as far as
possible, with the limited primary data available. The result was a study that provided a fair account of
the main obstacles that impede access to public information in Malawi and the salient political economy
issues.

4.0 KEY PEA OBSTACLES TO ACCESS TO INFORMATION

It is a fact that access to public information remains a big challenge in Malawi. The challenges and
obstacles are symptomatic of the country’s political and economic history. As described by
Kanyongolo4, the colonial and one-party systems of government did not make provision for access to
public information as a right. On the contrary, numerous policies and laws emphasized confidentiality
and official secrecy. With the advent of multiparty democracy in 1993 and subsequent constitutional
change in 1994, there seemed to be a window of positive change as the Constitution expressly provided
that access to public information held by the state and any of its organs is a human right. The Policy is
grounded primarily in section 37 of the Constitution which provides that: “Subject to any Act of
Parliament, every person shall have the right of access to all information held by the State or any of its
organs at any level of Government in so far as such information is required for the exercise of his
rights.” In order to operationalize this provision, the process, and campaign for enactment of ATI
legislation was started more than 10 years ago. The discussion of issues that follows below is the
analysis of the primary and secondary data on the nature of obstacles that impede access to public

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Obstacles to Access to Information in Malawi, NAMISA Research Report, Feb 2012

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information in Malawi. These obstacles are not exhaustive but have been singled out only for the
purpose of this assignment.

4.1 Insufficient and unsustained political will

Malawi does not have an access to information legislation yet. With the initiative by NAMISA the
process of coming up with access to information law was started but the bill is yet to be passed into law
although the process started as earlier as 2003. Political will has always been uncertain or ambiguous.
In Malawi, political power rests in the strong presidency such that even where an access to information
law to be enacted by parliament, there may still be only a weak commitment amongst political and
bureaucratic leadership circles to its effective functioning. It is also important to understand that lobbying
parliamentarians may not be enough because it is the cabinet that has the prerogative of taking bills to
parliament. Unless clear statements are made by the leadership, and proper systems which reward
openness are put in place, bureaucrats may well doubt that facilitating access to information is an
activity they should prioritise in their daily work. It is therefore vital that ministers, parliamentarians and
senior bureaucrats are encouraged to take up the issue of right to information proactively and
consistently pledge their unequivocal support for a new openness regime.

Learning from experience, the people in authority might be well aware of the importance of access to
information legislation more especially when they are in opposition. However, upon assuming power
and may be due to a number of factors such as culture of secrecy, fear of losing power, arrogance or
any other reason best known to them, they might form a stumbling block to the campaign. In Malawi,
those who normally oppose or delay the idea of having the best ATI legislation are people who were
previously campaigning for the same legislation. On the other hand the former ruling elites do call for
more openness and transparency, something which they opposed at the time they were in power. 5 In
other words, desire to remain in power is one of the causes for not guaranteeing access to information.
The people in authority would like to guarantee simple information which would not amount to criticism
from members of the public. Where there is no criticism, it is easy to remain in power because no
serious social challenges would be addressed against the government of the day. Many public leaders
would prefer leading ignorant population.6

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The DPP is calling government to open up the public media
6
In the early days of Joyce Banda’s leadership she public called for the opening up of the Public radio to the
opposition. Sadly, that window of hope is fast closing. The Bingu administration did the same during their early
days in office but they ended up enacting pieces of legislation that aimed at limit access to information and
freedom of expression.

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4.2 Political marginalization

Information is power. It can make or break governments. Historically, as described by Kanyongolo


(2012) the predominant political culture in Malawi has been characterized by the marginalization of
groups and individuals that are perceived to be oppositional in the access to public goods and services.
With respect to public information, such marginalization is manifested in resistance and suspicion on the
part of custodians of public information towards requests for access to that information submitted by
individuals and groups that are perceived to be oppositional (Kanyongolo, 2012). There is need
therefore on the part of Civil Society to put pressure on the government, politicians, and decision
makers in order to promote access to information. Unless there is consistent pressure from the
stakeholders, the government would not grant access to information. The media outlets must be utilized
in delivering the campaign materials to public. A media strategy could be the best methodology if well
designed in order to maintain the pressure. Members of the campaign team should as well avoid issuing
contradictory and ambiguous statements to the public.

4.3 Weak Parliamentary Committee system

In Malawi, lobbying parliament to enact or repeal laws relating to ATI may not be the strongest option
unlike in countries where ATI operate like South Africa, where parliament and parliamentary committees
were very instrumental in getting the law passed. Two parliamentary committees may be crucial for ATI
legislation; Legal Affairs, and Media and Communications committees. These two committees are
expected to confer and consult on ATI legislation but nothing of that sort has ever happened since the
process started. During an interview with the Interim chairperson of Media and Communications
Committee, it revealed that there is very little that the committee knows or has done about ATI
legislation.7 Sadly, the Chairperson confessed that they did not even have copies of the draft Bill and
draft Policy. It is doubtful whether such kind of the committee can make meaningful contribution towards
debate and passing of the ATI legislation. There is no passion and ownership.

Some people have argued that some parliamentary committees do not have clout to influence important
decision in the legislative process. It is important to note that the way committees of parliament are
structured entails the kind and quality of its membership and business. It is argued that that the calibre
and technical know-how of the members may compromise their ability to produce results. Political
parties in parliament normally assign senior and more knowledgeable members to Budget and Finance
Committee, Public Appointments Committee, and Legal Affairs Committees. Those that are assigned to

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The chairperson only remembers that there was one occasion whereby the Media and Communications
Committee was invited to a briefing working dinner session about the ATI Bill.

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other seemingly weaker committees have low level influence and cannot effectively influence decisions
unless otherwise supported. Such committees are also inadequately funded and their meetings are
heavily erratic. If parliamentary committees were strong, they could have by now exerted pressure on
the executive to bring the ATI draft bill before parliament. Lobbying parliament alone may be
inadequate.

4.4 Public service has low opinion of the civil society

Through the interview with public servants and the private sector, there is sustained impression that
both the public and private sectors8 have low opinion of civil society. Most public servants argued that
civil society leaders do not act on principles and good faith and that their incentives aren’t public good
but interested in personal aggrandisement and pleasing their funders. Civil society is perceived to be
more interested in victimising public servants as opposed to encouraging transparency. It is argued that
if civil society were interested in transparency then they were expected to live by similar example
themselves. Most public servants accused civil society as being led by people that lack capacity to
“comprehend and analysing how government works.”9 This view is also shared by some members of
parliament who argued that the manner in which civil society behaves and reacts makes some public
officers to withhold information. The civil society “is not objective and constructive. They blow up issues
out of proportion as such it is very detrimental to entrust them with sensitive public information. They
don’t know about what kind of information can be released and how should it be released.”10 Some have
argued that civil society leaders have political interests as well, such that their quest for public
information is to assist them gain political mileage. This was substantiated by the fact that some CSO
leaders work directly with political parties and some have ended up contesting for political offices. Due
to these perceptions public servants may not trust the civil society with public information. It calls for
building of trust.

4.5 Informal networks: Politicisation of the Private Sectors

Government is biggest and most reliable business partner to the private sector. Business persons that
antagonise government by aligning themselves with opposition parties or by not aligning themselves
with the ruling party run a risk of losing lucrative contracts with government. Those who benefit from the
system have no incentive to push for transparency in public information. They would always want to be
the first to know so that they have undue competitive advantage over the others. It is with no doubt that

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Interview with MCCCI reviewed that due to the same perception towards CSOs, they did not include in Public-
Private Dialogue Forum. This was initiated with funding from World Bank. Key members include Cabinet
ministers, Principal Secretaries, CEOs
9
Interview with senior public servants at the ministry of information and Salima District Council
10
An Opposition Member of Parliament who is in the media and communications committee of parliament.

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some business persons have joined active politics in order to be closer to power and benefit from the
strong chain of patronage and clientelism. Such politicians with huge business interests have always
defected to the ruling party in an event of power shifts. As long they are able to get information through
informal connections, they cannot support any changes to the status quo.

They will be happy to see government hide information or bend its own rules and procedures provided if
doing is to their advantage. An example is of the case when in 2012 government gave a directive that
CEOs for government departments were not entitled to specific kinds of Prado vehicles and they were
directed to implement this directive by purchasing lower models of which the main dealer is Toyota
Malawi. When the MCCCI confronted government about illegality of this directive, as it contravened
procurement procedures, Toyota Malawi was not happy because such a move was a disincentive to
them. Another example is that of MULLI Brothers Limited which is experiencing difficulties to do
business with the current regime.11 ATI legislation is therefore likely to promote the de-politicization of
the private sector. Unless the private sector understands that openness in access to public information
is to their own advantage they cannot support access to information legislation. Government respects
the private sector hence getting them on board in the struggle may add huge value to the cause.

4.6 ATI Legislation campaign has been championed by the media

Delays in the enacting and implementation of the ATI legislation is also rooted in the perceived fear that
the media would use the laws as a gun to force government disclose classified information. During the
interviews three important concerns came up. First, the ATI legislation has throughout been championed
by the media, and the question is; in whose interest are they doing so? The government and the public
servants are suspicious of the motives of the private media which is in the forefront of this campaign.
Second, most of the private media houses are owned by people who are politically aligned to different
political groups. Third, information is power such that government is always afraid that once the media
has full access to public information, the government may lose its clout and political muscle. In other
words, it is argued that media in Malawi has shown to be not quite responsible in the way it handles
sensitive information. Some of them are alleged to be agents of opposition politicians. With this
perception, it be wise to use the media as a vehicle in public awareness programming about ATI as
opposed to having them taking front seat. Maintaining them as champions of ATI legislation campaign
will result in unnecessary delays and foot-dragging on the part of government.

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Mulli has publicly complained that government is victimising his by denying him business because of his
association to the previous regime.

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4.7 Information Literacy society and Public awareness

Malawi generally lags behind in term of information literacy. It is argued that most Malawians do not
know where to get information, what type of information, and how to use that information? Public
awareness requires a society that has the capacity to absorb information. Low levels of public
awareness of the right to information obstruct the ability of people to demand access to such
information, let alone seek to enforce it, as a matter of right. The low level of public awareness of the
right to information is compounded by low awareness of the nature and type of information that is held
by the State and its organs. This is due to a combination of factors including low literacy and formal
education levels among Malawians, a culture of secrecy within the bureaucracy, and physical and social
marginalization of the majority of Malawians. There is a need to create public awareness of what is
access to information and its connection to their daily lives. People need to see it being done and not to
see what is ought to be done. The demands to know and the knowledge of how to use the information
obtained in solving social, economic, and political problems facing different people at different stages of
life need to be addressed. The message must be clear and unambiguous to specific group of people or
community. Lack of Public awareness could be a dangerous tool against an ATI campaign if different
messages or ambiguous messages are being sent to public. It therefore calls for consultative efforts
among key players to build strong coalition that will spearhead the fight for passing of ATI legislation
and its implementation.

4.8 Deference to duty-bearers

Kanyongolo (2012) has argued that deference to authority and officialdom is widespread among people
in Malawi and has deep roots in social norms. He further argues that this culture impedes the
willingness of people to make demands on such officials. In addition, people fear government officials
and government institutions. This is premised in historical reasons. During the colonial and one party
era, public offices were institutions of higher authority and influence whereby not every person would
just walk in and ask for information. People normally say “kumeneko ndi ku Boma kumaopsya!”12
People need to be empowered so that they are aware about their rights in society.

4.9 E-government: Technological limitations

This is one of the biggest challenges for the Malawi government. In trying to alleviate this problem, the
government had some time back embarked on a project called Government Wide Area Network
(GWAN) which was supposed to link all government departments to make their information available on
this network. GWAN was also meant to manage government and departments’ databases and websites.

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An interview with Director of Administration, Salima District Council

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In so doing the government established the Department of Information Systems and Technology
Management Services (DISTMS) to responsible for this activity among others. The department has
officers who are posted and assigned to various government departments. Sadly, this GWAN initiative
slopped. Government departments and ministries abandoned GWAN and engaged private ISPs.
Besides, most of the websites in the public service are dormant and do not carry relevant and up to date
information. In the past few years, it has been learnt that government secured huge funding from China
to improve and manage the e-government. Unfortunately, instead of directing the funding towards
already existing structures like DISTMS, the government established another department called e-
government which is now under the OPC and headed by Principal Secretary. It is not clear how this
newly established department coordinates with DISTMS. In other words, you have GWAN which was
under ministry of information and poorly funded while e-government is under the OPC and well-
funded. Whatever, the incentives, this is unnecessary duplication of effort.

4.10 Statutory barriers to access to information

Despite Constitutional provision for Access to information, Malawi has a wide range of statutory
provisions that prohibit disclosure of some types of public information to members of the public. The
uncertainty created by the continued existence of restrictive legislation sometimes makes it hard for
public officials to know exactly how much to disclose. If one law tells them to release information but
another tells them they will be prosecuted for any unauthorized disclosures, officials will most likely err
on the side of caution and continue to withhold information. In his study, Kanyongolo (2012) has cited 22
Acts of Parliament which have provisions that act as barriers to access to information. These laws must
be subjected to judicial challenge for inconsistency with the constitutional guarantee of the right to
access public information. Such statutes include; Banking Act (1989), Capital Market Development
(1990), Competition and Fair Trading Act (1998), Corrupt Practices Act (1995), Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Code (1967), Defence Force Act (2004), Employment Act (2000), Malawi Revenue Authority
Act (2000), Malawi Bureau of Standards Act (1972), Mental Treatment Act (1948), Money Laundering,
Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act (2006), National Assembly (Powers and
Privileges) Act (1957), Official Secrets Act (1913), Political Parties (Registration and Regulation) Act
(1993), Preservation of Public Security Act (1960), Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Act (1993),
Protected Places and Areas Act (1960), Public Audit Act (2003), Reserve Bank of Malawi Act (1989),
Science and Technology Act (2003), Treaties and Conventions Publication Act (1984), Veterinary and
Para-Veterinary Practitioners Act (2001).

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4.11 Laws should be consistent and harmonised

Difficulties in harmonising data protection, privacy, and access regimes can also create an opportunity
for resistant and reluctance in passing and implementing the ATI legislation. For example, data
protection and privacy laws, which are designed to protect information held about individuals, may at
times compete with public disclosure rights. Ideally, the challenge of balancing these interests should be
considered and addressed at the time the laws are drafted. This unfortunately, has not been done and if
clever bureaucrats can pick up it may lead to further delays. The government of Malawi can use this as
an excuse to delay the enactment and implementation of the ATI legislation. For example, when the bill
was drafted, the government argued that the bill could not be passed into law because there was no
policy to back it up. Now that both the bill and the policy have been drafted government may find
another excuse, and data protection law could be one of them. Lobbyists therefore ought to continue
putting pressure on government to speed up the process. But where they conflict, the pros and cons of
disclosure and the competing merits of the public and private rights need to be balanced according to
the public interest. Unfortunately though, if there is no political will and sincerity, privacy laws are too
easily invoked to deny information on the ground that the information is protected and may not legally be
released.

4.12 Challenges related to the Bureaucracy

The centralized nature of government bureaucracy in Malawi obstructs the majority of people who live in
both urban and rural areas from accessing information. This is exacerbated by the absence of a
functional representative local government system which has not existed since local government. There
is a widespread culture of secrecy among holders of public information which engenders a reluctance to
allow members of the public to access information from official sources. Some of the political economy
reasons for such kind of behaviour include;

 Senior Positions are politically appointed: Almost all controlling officers in government are
political appointees whether it is on merit or otherwise. This means that they are expected to
serve the interests of the appointing authority if they are to safeguard their lucrative positions.
They will always be cautious to release information which may not be in the interest of their
political masters which may result in jeopardising their own positions. These senior officers
need to be assured that ATI legislation may in fact be necessary for their own professionalism
and survival.

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 Fear of losing job: This has also contributed to certain extent. It is serious where no exact
terms of reference, no specific Monitoring and evaluation system and where there is no rule of
law. Guaranteeing access to information which the supervisory authorities think should not be
disclosed might cost someone to lose the job, demoted, or transferred to rural areas.

 Arrogance and lack of clarity on one’s conditions of service and use of discretion was also
mentioned as factors for non- disclosure of information. Some people are not conversant of
what falls within and what falls outside their powers. An example was given by one of the
respondents13 in Salima District that there was once a District Commissioner who made a
directive to her staff that only senior ranks of staff at the district were eligible to meet her in
person, nobody else. This culture of arrogance, unfortunately, became the acceptable mode of
operation even by the junior staff at the district council.

 Civil service rules and procedures: Countless rules that curb disclosure by prohibiting
government servants from ‘unauthorized’ communication of information are also often found
buried in civil service manuals and circulars. These are sometimes so widely cast that it is not
entirely surprising that many public servants decide it is safer to err on the side of discretion
than disclosure. In Malawi, administrative guidelines prevent officials from revealing any
information in any form to the public or the media without prior written approval from their
superiors.14 Government ministries and departments have whom they call, Controlling Officers.
It is therefore imperative that when the access to information law is passed, civil service rules
will also need to be reviewed and should be revised to bring them into line with the new access
regime. Otherwise, if contradictory rules are left in place, public servants may be confused as to
which official regulations they must follow. For example, the MPSRP which is rarely reviewed
and revised has provisions that prohibit officials from communicating any information of an
official nature to non-officials and the press.

 Oaths of secrecy: Government’s standard operating procedures and guidelines still require
ministers, parliamentarians, judges, and public servants to take pledges of loyalty or oaths of
secrecy. Though there is value in a proper level of confidentiality in the workplace, a blanket
ban on information disclosure can confuse public officials about their duties. “In modern

13
Mr. Chilangwe, member of Civil Society Education Coalition
14
Interview with PRO for the Auditor General reviewed that any information communicated to the public must
be certified by the Auditor General. In the event that he is out of office then that request has to wait. Any request
must be in writing and responses are given back in writing as well.

15
democracies, oaths of secrecy to government need to give way to oaths of openness to the
public. Otherwise, the very existence of an oath to maintain secrecy reinforces the message
that public officials are expected to resist all disclosure.”15

 Political interference and fear of reprisals: due to extensive politicization of the public
service, officers would always want to play it safe and are afraid to release information.
Besides, public officers spy on each other in order to gain favours from the authorities. This
leads to resistance and reluctance on the part of public officers to release information. It is
therefore necessary to put in place mechanisms that will assure officers that they will not
experience negative reprisals for release information to the public. One of the most important
practical ways of tackling this culture is to undertake training programmes to ensure that all
officials understand their duties and are committed to openness. Beyond the mechanics of
knowing what the law says, what records management systems hold and how information is to
be provided, holistic training should emphasise the role of public servants in implementing
openness as a core value of public service. Such trainings need to focus on changing the
attitudes that distance governments from people and must aim at ensuring them about their
protection they are likely to enjoy from political reprisals under the ATI law.

 Lack of proactiveness: absence of communication policies in workplaces might also lead to


receiving wrong information from the authorities. With the access to information policies, it shall
be easy to avoid confusion on the mandate and powers to deliver information to the public. Who
owns government information and who is supposed to speak on its behalf is a very big problem
in Malawi. Is it the OPC? State house Press team? Principal Secretaries/Directors? Or Public
Relations Officers? Ideally, ministry of information is the official mouth piece for the government
which is supposed to be proactive in making public information available to the public. The
ministry has officers in every district who are called district information officers. However, as put
by the former Director of Information, District Information officers are just mere journalists with
low expertise and poorly funded. Their only main duty is to manage the public address systems
for public functions. District information officers are the only district sector heads who are below
the rank of PO and most of them are non-graduates as such they have no clout and capacity to
generate and manage information at the local level.

15
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2008) Implementing Access to Information: A practical guide for
operationalizing access to information laws.

16
 Journalists serving as Public Relations Officers: In trying to address the problems of access
to public information, government is encouraging its ministries and departments to create
positions of Public Relations Officers. However, the problem is that most of them are journalists
and their work is limited and undermined by other professional officers within the departments
or ministries. Second, since most public officers are not technocrats on the subject matter they
are to talk about, they are supposed to consult and be told what to say by the senior officers.
Third, it appears the duty of the PRO is to refute or clarify on information which has been
published by the media and other players. This again is a major weakness. In other words,
government found a way of dealing with the media by employing journalists; “send a thief to
catch a thief.” Vocal journalists are offered good positions in government as a way of either
silencing them or making them a shield against fellow journalists.16 If this trend continues, it may
weaken the media which may be detrimental to democracy.

 Record Keeping: systems across most of the public bureaucracy are largely unsystematic,
outdated, and incomplete and, consequently, impede efficient and effective access to public
information. Besides, most of the government information is kept in hard copies and becomes
difficult to access information that was generated about 10 years ago.

5.0 POTENTIAL PROGRAMMATIC AREAS TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES ON


ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Projects on access to information should, in the main, seek to contribute to enhancing transparency
and accountability of public duty bearers and deepen and broaden the participation of non-state actors
in policy processes. In view of the foregoing political Economy Analysis above, the following areas are
suggested for implementable projects

5.1. Advocacy for the enactment of the ATI bill and popularisation of the contents of the bill

Project proposals on this theme should, ideally, also have aspects to do with the post-enactment of the
bill, (or elements whose implementation is not dependent on the enactment of the bill), preferably from
any of the other three outputs. However, getting the ATI legislation enacted will require a coalition of
interests that can advocate for ATI from different angles. Similarly, implementation, and monitoring of

16
Most of the key and vocal journalists are now serving as government press officers or personal assistants for
key politicians.

17
access to information require building up of strong coalitions at macro- or meso- levels. The analysis
has shown that efforts to promote access to information laws require comprehensive strategies, smart
alliances and a clear understanding of the impediments to ATI at different levels of governance. Some
of these obstacles were visible and easy to target, and others were hidden and more difficult to deal with
(Cruz: 2009). Representation to the coalition can be drawn from labour organisations, faith based
organisations, human rights groups, the private sector, public sector, political parties, parliament,
academia, and the legal community. A broad-based coalition is particularly important for advocacy
because the experience of NAMISA shows that efforts by a single organisation or sector are unlikely to
yield the desired outcomes on ATI. A coalition of interests from across social divides has better chances
of yielding more access to information. Influential elements in the private sector, civil society, media, and
academia should all be involved. It is important to ensure that although various players in the coalitions
will be engaged on multiple and different issues, what is paramount is that they must all agree from the
start to see open and accountable government as a central thread linking many of their concerns and
access to information as the most reliable means to that end. Building coalitions, however, requires a lot
of time and resilience to surmount disagreements and develop mutual trust and respect among
partners.

What could be expected of the Coalition?


Significantly, the passage of an access to information law may be a necessary but insufficient step
towards meaningful access to information: governments and citizens must be adequately able and
willing to implement, enforce, and use the laws. Implementation and enforcement of the law are the
most critical and challenging stages of reform (Neuman, 2009). The involvement of civil society in the
formulation and adoption of access to information laws may increase their long-term use and
sustainability. Right to information programmes as argued by Puddephatt (2006) should focus on four
key outcomes.

 The legal regime: An effective, enabling legal and policy environment for right to information,
based on best practice standards and developed in a participatory manner, exists and is firmly
established.
 Implementation of legislation by government: Functioning systems are in place,
implemented and supported by the bureaucracy, which enable citizen access to government
held information.

18
 Use by the general public and civil society: Active involvement by civil-society to gain access
to government held information, in raising citizen awareness on legislation and in generating
demand for government held information.
 Use by marginalised groups: Implementation of the right to information systems operates to
enable women, those living in poverty and other marginalised groups to access information.

As part of evidence-based advocacy, the project should champion the harmonization of existing law,
such as the official secrets laws, which may be in contradiction with the proposed ATI legislation, and
the reforms needed in record-keeping and information sharing in the public service and other areas to
ensure smooth implementation of the proposed legislation.

In order to popularise the contents of the ATI legislation, coalition partners may develop and distribute
copies of a guide on how to use the Act available to the public, develop and conduct civic educational
programmes to advance the understanding of ATI by the public, in particular to empower
disadvantaged communities about ATI and how to use it in exercising their rights, encourage public and
private bodies to participate in these programmes, and undertake their own educational programmes on
the understanding of ATI, and training public officers who will be responsible for the management and
giving out of information. In short, once the ATI legislation is enacted, the coalition partners will have to
assist in overseeing its full implementation and monitoring. This requires consistency, resilience,
tenacity, and considerable financial investment.

5.2. Creating meso-level coalitions that use ATI for growth and development

It is well established in empirical discourses on the political economy of development that coalitions
involving private sector, government policy makers and (CSOs) drive economic development through
sharing of credible policy and investment-relevant information through institutionalised mechanisms
(Lindblom, 1977; Handley,2008;.Woo-Cumings,1999; Maxfield and Scheneider,1997 and
Chingaipe,2010). However, such coalitions can either be growth and development enhancing or they
can be anti-developmental or anti-reforms (Taylor,2007) Developmental coalitions are known to thrive
on increased flow of accurate, reliable information between private sector; labour and the government
and the technical abilities of these segments of society to use the information for policy making or
investment decisions. However, the exchange of information between the private sector, government,
trade unions and civil society organisations is complicated by information asymmetries and incentives
for each actor to exploit the asymmetry and manipulate the exchange strategically to their respective
advantages. (Maxfield and Scheneider, 1997).

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Projects to be implemented at the sectoral level should seek to create or institutionalise forums for
collective action through inclusive coalitions involving private sector (represented by business
associations), labour providers (represented by trade unions, civil society organisations), media houses
and government that share policy-relevant and investment-relevant information. Business associations
at macro-level such as the MCCI or at sectoral level such as TAMA may be encouraged to submit
proposals.

5.3. Dismantling collusive and distributive coalitions

It is an empirical fact that the political economy of development in Malawi is characterised by collusive
and distributive coalitions and networks in different domains. Once the ATI bill is enacted, projects can
be supported to enhance access to information on critical areas of governance and development such
as investigative journalism (including training) focussing on selected issue- areas where individuals and
groups tend to band together in anti-developmental coalitions and networks. Examples of such areas
include public procurement, various government pay-outs, political financing and any other issue-areas
that impinge on accountability, responsiveness and inclusivity which are the key result areas of the
Tilitonse programme.

5.4. Promoting higher standards of integrity in information dissemination by print and


electronic media
It is observed that while many print and electronic media houses strive for ethical and professional journalism
that promote access to information, other media outlets exhibit lower standards. Furthermore, political alignments
often creep into good journalism and lower standards of impartiality and objectivity. This has been particularly true
of the public broadcaster whose execution of duties has been grossly compromised because of political
influence and interference, mostly from the ruling parties or government. Although the issue has been
on the reform agenda for almost all governments, there has been very little positive movement because
of the vested interests of powerful actors, especially in government. Consequently, over the years, the
broadcaster has in some significant ways perpetrated political marginalisation, defended government
unresponsiveness and defended unaccountability – all because of undue political influence.

Advocacy and reform project(s) aimed at transforming MBC from a state broadcaster to a public
broadcaster and a champion of access to information would be a worthwhile investment of the Tilitonse
programme if prospective grantees can demonstrate how their projects will manage power dynamics
and the effectiveness of their strategies of engagement with stakeholders.in order to secure a political

20
settlement that will transform MBC from being a state broadcaster to a truly public broadcaster. Project
proposals on this aspect will have to be clearer on addressing the formal and informal rules that over the
years have made MBC to be what it is in so far as dissemination of information is concerned.
Furthermore, projects to promote integrity, impartial and ethical journalism across the entire sector
would go a long way in promoting access to credible information. Media institutions such as NAMISA,
Media Council and MACRA may be encouraged to submit proposals

6.0. CONCLUSION

The fact that the ATI bill and Policy were drafted and awaiting consideration by the cabinet is a major
step towards the enactment to ATI legislation in Malawi. Huge amount of work has been done already
but critical stages still remain. Without a strong political commitment to the passing of legislation and its
implementation, backed by adequate resources and strategies to breakdown longstanding cultures of
secrecy, the efforts may be in vain. The need for strong coalitions at different levels therefore, cannot be
overemphasized. The first task of the coalitions will be to extensively and intensively lobby for the
enactment of ATI bill into law. Even with the law in place, there might still be some resistance on the
part of public officers. On the other hand, the public may not be fully aware about their rights to access
public information. This calls for massive public awareness programmes, focusing on both the supply
and demand sides of the access to information equation, which can be championed through sectoral
coalitions.

Helping the government to revamp their information systems may also be one of the assignments which
the coalition can take on board. If information is still not managed properly, applications will be
processed slowly. If systems are not in place to track the handling of requests and their disposal,
applications may get lost and may simply not be dealt with at all. It shall require political will by
government to ensure that all of these issues are handled at the outset of the implementation of any
new legislation. Rationality dictates that politicians will not spend money and effort on activities that do
not yield positive political and financial interests. This is where sustained pressure through funding of
the coalition activities by funders like Tilitonse will be of paramount importance. Opening up government
will streamline many governance processes, improve bureaucratic efficiency, reduce corruption, support
economic growth and foreign investment and result in better-targeted development initiatives.

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7.0 REFERENCES

Chingaipe, Henry (2010) Business and the State in Malawi: The Politics of Institutional Formation,
Maintenance and Change (PhD. Thesis, University of York)
Cruz, A., 2009, ‘Building Political Will for Enhanced Access to Information: Lessons from Latin America’,
Chapter 13 in From Political Won't to Political Will: Building Support for Participatory
Governance, ed. C. Malena, Civicus, pp 227-244
Darch, C., and Underwood, P., 2010, ‘Struggles for Freedom of Information in Africa’, in Freedom of
Information and the Developing World: The Citizen, the State, and Models of Openness,
Chandos Publishing Oxford
Handley, Antoinette (2008) Business and the State in Africa: Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Era
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Hubbard, P., 2007, ‘Putting the Power of Transparency in Context: Information’s Role in Reducing
Corruption in Uganda’s Education Sector’, Working Paper No 136, Center for Global
Development, Washington
Kanyongolo, E., 2012 ‘Obstacles to access to information in Malawi’, MISA Research Report
Lindblom, C.E (1977) Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books).
Maxfield, Sylvia and Ben Ross Schneider (eds.) (1997) Business and the State in developing countries (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press).
Neuman, L., 2009, ‘Enforcement Models: Content and Context’, Communication for Governance and
Accountability Program, World Bank, Washington DC
Neuman, L., and Calland, R., 2007, ‘Making the Access to Information Law Work: The Challenges of
Implementation’, in The Right to Know, ed. A. Florini, Colombia University Press
Puddephatt, A., 2009, ‘Exploring the Role of Civil Society in the Formulation and Adoption of Access to
Information Laws: The Cases of Bulgaria, India, Mexico, South Africa and the United Kingdom’,
Communication for Governance and Accountability Program, World Bank, Washington, DC
Puddephatt, A., McCall, E. and Wilde, A., 2006, 'A Guide to Measuring the Impact of Right to
Information Programmes', United Nations Development Programme, Oslo
Taylor, Scott D (2007) Business and the State in Southern Africa: The Politics of Economic Reform (Boulder
Colorado: Lynne Rienner).
UNDP, 2003, 'Access to Information', Practice Note, United Nations Development Programme, Oslo
Governance Centre, Oslo
Woo-Cummings, Meredith (1999) (ed.) The Developmental State (New York: Cornell University Press).

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8.0 LIST OF RESPONDENTS

Organization Interviewee Position


NAMISA/Journalist Association of Aubrey Chikungwa Executive Director
Malawi
Farm Radio Augustine Mulomole Journalist (Formerly
Communications Officer- NAMISA)
Auditor General and Business Thomas Chafunya PRO
Journalist Association
Malawi Economic Justice Network Dalitso Kubalasa Executive Director
National Commission for Science Hambani Gausi Chief Documentation Officer
and Technology
Ministry of Information and Civic Isaac Cheke Ziba Director of Information
education
Malawi Confederation of Hope Chavula Economist
Chambers of Commerce and
Industry
The Malawi Law Commission Chiza Nyirongo Chief Law Reform Officer
Malawi Human Rights Commission Grace Malera Executive Director
Civil Society Education Committee Joseph Chilangwe Committee Chairperson
Salima District Council R.C. Mkolombwe Director of Administration
Parliamentary Committee on Hon. E.S Chisale Interim Chairperson- Media and
media and information Communications Committee

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