2334
4, OCTOBER 2012
Game-Theoretic Communication
Structures in Microgrids
Nishantha C. Ekneligoda, Member, IEEE, and Wayne W. Weaver, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper presents a game-theoretic communication
structure, which is a network constructed among distributed
controllers in the microgrid. This helps to share local controller
information, such as control input, individual objectives among
controllers, and finds a better optimized cost for the individual
objectives. The modeling follows a game-theoretic framework
for the energy conversion and control elements inside small-scale
power systems (SSPS) or microgrids. These elements form teams
to optimize performance and operation based on available infor-
mation and communication. The team players are able to minimize
a common objective when there is communication, and shift to the
individual local objectives when communication fails. This paper
also presents analysis to determine the minimal performance
standards for the given level of communicated information. Then
it shows optimal information mixing for team player modeling. In
addition, a Stackelberg model is proposed for the microgrid with
a leader-follower modeling approach. The last part of this paper
shows possible examples with network contingency study with
team player participation.
Index Terms— Communication structures, distributed control,
game theory, microgrids, player local objectives, team players.
I. INTRODUCTION
S MALL-SCALE power systems (SSPS) are an integrated
power network made up of individual energy sources,
loads, and storage elements. In most cases, the loads and
sources in SSPS are highly nonlinear and have multiple ob-
jectives, such as controlling a dc bus voltage and regulating
power. Further, a change in a load or source will affect the entire
real-time system, which can jeopardize stability, especially in
low-inertia and underdamped systems. Microgrids [1], Naval
ship electric power systems (NSEPS) [2], spacecraft systems
[3], telecommunication power systems [4], and automotive
power systems [5] are typical examples of SSPS. Higher
reliability, controllability, ease of distributed generation. and
penetration of renewable generations [1], [6] are all reasons
SSPSs are becoming an attractive alternative to the more
traditional large-scale utility grid.
In large-scale systems, the loads are typically modeled as
constant power, or PQ buses, and PV buses are used to model
Manuscript received February 16, 2012; revised June 25, 2012; accepted
July 15, 2012. Date of publication August 31, 2012; date of current version
September 19, 2012. This material is based upon work supported by the
National Science Foundation under Grant No.0901094. A version of this
paper entitled “Optimal Team Communication Structures in Micro-grids” was
presented at the IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, Phoenix
AZ, September 2011. Paper no. TPWRD-00159-2012.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI 49931-1295 USA (e-mail:
ncekneli@mtu.edu).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRD.2012.2210057
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 27, NO.
constant generation [7]. In this construct, the power-flow
problem must be numerically solved as described in [8]
under the general assumption that generation matches demand
at all times. In SSPS, most of the cases loads and sources
are equipped with power-electronic interfaces (PEIs). Some
devices, such as synchronous generators or line-connected
motors, do not require a PEI. However, in this paper, it is
assumed that all loads and sources are connected through a PEI.
Therefore, in an SSPS, the load and sources can be modeled as
dynamic energy resources since the elements are controlable
PEI [9]. In a game-theoretic modeling approach, these dynamic
quantities are called players in the system. Then, the control
system should provide the required flexibility of the players to
ensure operation as a single aggregated system. The modeling
discussed in this paper is based on microgrids but, the discussed
methods can be easily applied to other types of SSPSs as well.
Many techniques have been reported in the literature to study
power systems and microgrid dynamics and control, including
game-theoretic approaches [7]. However, the application of
game theory to the communication structure in microgrids is
limited. Game theory captures the nature of strategic situations,
or games, where an individual’s successful choices depends on
the choices of others in a common system [10]. The application
of game theory can be seen in engineering in the areas of power
systems [7], electricity market financial transactions [11], traffic
planning [12], computer networks [13], and communication
networks [14]. It was shown in [7] that cooperative games can
improve the utility within a microgrid, but communication is
required.
This paper presents a method to improve the power-electronic
converters’ local objectives by forming teams within the micro-
grid given some form of communication structure. The player
objectives can either achieve desired power, maximizing busbar
voltage, or any other local objective or a combination of them.
A communication structure can be any number of technologies,
including Ethernet, cellular, CAN Bus, MOD bus, or even as
simple as pilot wire. This paper seeks to minimize the amount
of shared information needed to improve performance. There-
fore, the specific technology in the context of this paper is im-
pertinent. Teams in game theory are discussed in [15] and [16].
This approach is advantageous since microgrids have limited
resources which need to be allocated effectively. In most cases,
it is possible to form teams in a microgrid which is a combina-
tion of any element in the microgrid, including loads, sources,
or energy storage.
The proposed method considers the available information
and the corresponding team player objective improvement in
the microgrid. However, having more information implies that
EKNELIGODA AND WEAVER: GAME-THEORETIC COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES IN MICROGRIDS
more communication channels are available in the network.
This causes complexity, increased cost, and increased failure
modes [7]. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the level of
improvement that a player archives versus increased commu-
nication. The discussions in [17] and [18] show the georouting
schemes algorithm operating with neighboring devices infor-
mation and comparison methods. These discussions form a
detailed analysis of the impact of neighbors information on
cooperative analysis.
In this paper, a player by player (pbp) optimization is used
to find the Nash equilibrium (NE) of team players with com-
munication. The NE [7], [15], [16] is a operating point where
no player has an incentive to change its current control deci-
sion. By changing his or her control decision from equilibrium
each player receives a lost for their new team objective. The pbp
optimization works with optimizing one player while keeping
the remainder constant. In this way, the initial noncooperative
game is transformed into cooperative game sets, which show
improvements in overall objectives. In cooperative game, there
is no single optimal strategy that is preferable to all others and
can lead to a non-zero-sum game. In nonzero-sum games, the in-
teracting parties’ aggregate gains and losses are either less than
or more than zero, whereas in zero-sum games, the interacting
parties’ aggregate gains and losses are added to zero.
This paper will discuss the individual noncooperative Nash
strategy compared to the different team cooperative strategies.
In each method, attention is given to reduce the level of infor-
mation necessary to achieve a significant improvement. In ad-
dition, it shows the optimum information mixing of the players.
In this way, players can operate in an NE while communica-
tion exists. Then, if communication fails, they can switch to the
local individual strategy while maintaining a minimal level of
Pareto optimality for the noncooperative game. In a Pareto op-
timal solution, the player cannot increase his or her utility payoff
without reducing the payoff of another.
Finally, a Stackelberg concept is proposed for a leader-fol-
lower-based organization [15]. Under this modeling, a leader
achieves a better operating point than the team equilibrium.
However, this improvement causes the followers to obtain
weaker operating points than the team equilibrium. This ap-
proach can be useful in systems with high priority or changing
priority elements. The last section of this paper is focused on
contingency analysis with team player participation. The main
goal of this paper is to show how the team player participation
improves the player objectives in the microgrid. The particular
structure (ac or dc) is relatively immaterial for this particular
work and, therefore, the simpler dc power system was consid-
ered.
II. PLAYER OBJECTIVES IN A MICROGRID
The PEI can be modeled as a controllable dynamic player
in the system as discussed in [7]. Consider a microgrid with
and as the bus voltage and injected current vectors. If
represents the bus admittance matrix of this microgrid, then the
2335
relationship between these two vectors can be written as the
nodal equations
(1)
All vectors are of dimension , with representing
the number of buses. In general, the bus admittance matrix
is symmetric and is a function of line admittances and
shunt-to-ground load resistances of the system. The process of
solving nodal equations in (1) and the busbar voltage calcula-
tion is discussed in [7] and [8]. Based on the work presented
in [7] it is useful to define the source player team set , the
load player team set , and the remaining voltage bus set in
the SSPS. This set categorization is important in the examples
section while defining player objectives. Then, the player
objective function can be modeled in the general form
(2)
where is the input terminal resistances of the players other
than . The term is the objective function for player in terms
of , , and . The Nash equilibrium (denoted by ) is found
at a point so that
(3)
In other words, at NE, a player has minimized its cost function
under all of the other players reactions. At such a equilibrium
point, the player objective is and optimal player con-
trol decision is given by
III. TEAM MODELING
The NE discussed in Section II may or may not be the global
minimum of a player and could be improved given the forma-
tion of cooperative teams within the microgrid. Normally, team
players have similar requirements within the system and may
be physically close. For example, multiple loads that are oper-
ating near each other can form a team. Likewise, source players
could team together, or teams could be made up of a mix of
sources, loads, and storage players. It is then useful to study the
possibility of improving the overall utility of the system by in-
troducing cooperative teams with communication. In this paper,
different communication structures will be proposed and mod-
ified to determine an optimal set of information. Under each
modification, the corresponding minimization function of the
players will be changed.
The objectives within an electrical power system can be con-
sidered as continuous and bounded. However, determining the
convexity of highly nonlinear power system equations is a com-
plicated task. Therefore, in such a situation, it is necessary to use
modeling and simulations in a heuristic turn-based method [7] to
obtain an equilibrium. In this method, the first player optimizes
its operating space and others remain at their initial conditions.
Then first player fixes its local control input and the next player
starts optimizing its operating space while the remaining players
2336
are fixed. Next, the opportunity goes to the third player and this
process is repeated for all players in the team. The next round
starts again in a similar fashion starting with the first player from
its equilibrium found in the previous round. This process will re-
peat until all of the players find an operating point where neither
wants to move from their equilibrium.
However, this does not guarantee that the new equilibrium
has lower costs over the noncooperative game. In such situa-
tions, by obtaining player’s local objectives under the new equi-
librium, the improvement of the objective can be checked. How-
ever, checking the convexity or direct analytic calculation of
partial derivatives for KKT conditions of these highly nonlinear
power system equations is difficult. As a result, evaluating par-
tial derivatives at the equilibrium points found in the turn-based
approach, it is possible to make an approximate test for the KKT
conditions at the NE, if it is modeled as a constraint problem.
However, this NE may not be the global minimum or the best
NE that can be obtained from an analytic solution. Anyway, it
provides a practical solution which is close to an NE.
If a communication channel exists among all players in the
team, then they can minimize a common objective function
which may yield a better value for the individual local objec-
tives. However, when communication fails, they can switch
back to the purely local objectives. The mathematical proof
followed here considers the load teams which can be easily
applied to the source team as well. One possible cooperative
team objective function is
(4)
where are the weighting factors, is the number of players
in the network, and are the individual player objectives.
The weighted common objective has two equilibrium points
[15]. However, the distributed controllers need to consider a
player-by-player optimality. Therefore, the NE equilibrium
can be found using the turn-based approach discussed before.
However, the new NE will be a local minima for the team
objectives under each local control decision. Therefore, the
equilibrium point can be obtained with a simultaneous solution
of
(5)
The partial derivative of with respect to in (5) repre-
sents the rate of change of player team objective variation with
respect to the local control decision. The local control is chosen
as the converter input impedance. Obtaining a closed-form so-
lution of the highly nonlinear power system equation of type
(5) is generally not feasible. In addition, in a team there should
have at least three players. As a result, team players-based mod-
eling and related equations are highly nonlinear. In such situa-
tions, it is necessary to obtain the solution using the turn-based
approach [7]. In addition, the availability of many players in
the team needs a higher level of communication among players
under a common objective.
Consider the modified team objectives shown in Fig. 1 where
each individual players objective is weighted with a factor of
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 27, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2012
Fig. 1. Team player formation only with neighboring information.
the local objective and is added to the weighted value of the
neighboring objective. Fig. 1 shows the modeling structure con-
sidering only information from the immediate neighbor clock-
wise. Therefore, the communication channel required per player
is reduced to one. Mathematically, this can be proven consid-
ering the team player objective in (4) with ’s equal to 1. From
above, is the team objective, which means
is also a team objective for the considered team. However, (6)
shows that another person-by-person game exists that defines
the local objective as depicted in Fig. 1. This modeling reduces
the communication required per player to only neighboring in-
formation. Therefore, a modification of the team objective func-
tion is proposed as
(6)
where ’s are the scaler weighting factors of converter objec-
tives. The players operation will be shifted to a new point which
is obtained from (5) and (6) as
(7)
To achieve an improvement, it is necessary to have a lower cost
of the team player’s local objectives under the new equilibrium.
Communicating with an immediate neighbor may be accurate
and economically useful (lower cost). The reason is that it needs
only one communication channel per player for communicating
with a neighboring payer. Further, it has low failure modes. In
contingency analysis, the failure of neighboring information and
all information cases is discussed. These two example cases give
the fundamental idea and can be easily explored for other cases.
IV. STAKELBERG MODEL
In some cases in team modeling, it is useful to give priority
to one player within a team by defining a leader. Based on the
choice of the leader, the remaining controllers act like followers.
This modeling is important and useful in a microgrid of high pri-
ority loads. The Stackelberg concept helps to define a team in
such an approach. The literature shows that the Stackelberg con-
cept-based modeling can be split into three different categories
EKNELIGODA AND WEAVER: GAME-THEORETIC COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES IN MICROGRIDS 2337

within the framework of noncooperative decision making [15].

For example, consider three-person nonzero-sum games. If th
player cost function and corresponding con-
trol strategies are , where de-
notes the control strategy sets.
Hierarchy 1: one leader and two followers. The followers
react to the leader’s announced control strategy. They play ac-
cording to a specific equilibrium among themselves. In these
situations, the controller finds the equilibrium so that

(8) Fig. 2. Nine-bus dc power system with load and source teams [7].
where is the optimal response set of the follower’s
group and is defined for each by
The remaining bus set is defined as . In addition,
all of the line resistances are 0.087 p.u. in the following exam-
and (9) ples.

In the followers game, is a corresponding B. Load Player Teams Participation

optimal strategy pair [15]. First, the effect of a team made up of the loads in the system
Hierarchy 2: The second method is two leaders and one fol- is considered. In this example, the source voltages are fixed at
lower. The leaders play according to a specific equilibrium con- 1.05 p.u. The individual load player minimization objective was
cept among themselves. The two leaders take into account pos- chosen as
sible optimal responses of the single follower. For the three-
person finite game with two leaders (P1 and P2) and one fol- (12)
lower P3:
where represents the player-desired power level. In this
example, the load team was defined with players at busbar 5,
6, and 8. The load player objective considered here drives the
converter to regulate its input power while maximizing its ter-
minal voltage. The desired power level of players 5, 6, and 8 was
chosen as 1, 0.9, and 1.1 p.u., respectively. Values of the mixing
(10) gains ’s used for all load players with the neighboring player
objective communication team approach are 1. The , , and
was considered as 1, 1.2, and 0.8 for all load players with
where is the optimal response set of the follower’s the approach communicating all information. The ’s and ’s
group and is defined for each by denotes the weighting factors used in one information sharing
and all information sharing with team approach. There is not
(11) any relationship between values and the desired power level.
In the followers game, is a corresponding op- The only thing that is important is to tune the values in such a
timal strategy pair [15]. way that the initial objectives receive better cost under the team
Hierarchy 3: First, player one announces his or her operation.
control strategy. Then, player two determines his or her The player equilibrium was calculated using the heuristic
strategy by also taking into account possible responses of player turn-based approach explained in Section III. The time frame
three . Finally, optimizes his or her objective in view required to operate for a considered player will depend on the
of the announced strategies of and . The Equilibrium practical situations. However, it is better to have it fast enough
definitions for Hierarchy 3 can be easily built the same as in the system. When one controller optimizes its objectives,
in Hierarchy 1 and 2. However, for the sake of brevity, the others need to hold their control decision. Therefore, a fast time
definition for hierarchy 3 is not included in this paper and is frame is necessary. For an example, a 1-min time scale will be
available in “Basar page 146 [15].” a good selection.
Consider the load player transition in each turn where the
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE communication is limited to one information. The results are
shown in Fig. 3 where players 5, 6, and 8 start their initial values
A. System Description of 1.2, 0.6, and 0.7 p.u., respectively. At the end of the first turn,
Consider the nine-bus system shown in Fig. 2, which is based they are at values of 0.825, 1.01, and 0.794 p.u., respectively.
on the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)WSCC nine-bus Then, in the second round player, 5, 6, and 8 find values of 0.896,
test case [7], [9]. This system has three load players defined as 1.011, and 0.793 p.u., respectively. This process repeats until
the set and three source players . all players reach an equilibrium found to be 0.897, 1.016, and
2338 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 27, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2012

Fig. 3. Players’ transition from initial point to equilibrium with only sharing
neighboring information.

TABLE I
PLAYER LOCAL COST RESULTS Fig. 4. Illustration of individual versus team objectives.

TABLE II
PLAYER LOCAL COST IN THE SOURCE TEAM EXAMPLE

0.801 p.u., respectively, at turn 5. The equilibrium found with all

information also required, only five turns were needed to reach
equilibrium under these player objectives. However, this will
depend on the player objectives and weights used.
where denotes the weighting factor of the source player ob-
The observed equilibriums and player costs for different ob-
jective. From (13), the source player has two objectives of reg-
jective modifications are shown in Table I. It is seen from the re-
ulating their terminal voltage while minimizing the voltage into
sults in Table I that having more information improves the load
the network which minimizes power injected. The loads 5, 6,
player local objectives. This point is illustrated in Fig. 4 where
and 8 were fixed at 0.95, 0.88, and 0.75 p.u., respectively. The
the curves represent individual and team objectives. In Fig. 4,
and values used for all players are 1. The values used
the curves show that an individual can achieve lower cost when
for source player 1, 2, 3 are 0.6, 0.5, and 0.4, respectively. The
using team objectives rather than just its own local objective.
and coefficient represents the fraction of the information
In each team approach, a players objective drives a new equi-
mixing between all team players and neighboring team players.
librium of in such a way that ,
In this case, the aim is to get an improvement with communi-
where the term represents the players objectives at
cation in each player objective. Therefore, the priority is con-
noncooperative equilibrium and are the local controls of
sidered as equal. The coefficient represents the priority of
players other than . In this particular example, the observed
objectives of a considered source player objective. The priority
player objective improvement is around 2% and player equilib-
of different objectives of the considered player can be different.
rium change is around 5%. In addition, the team player equilib-
The observed results are given in Table II under each coop-
rium points also increase under this objective. In this particular
erative game. According to Table II, the source player can im-
example, the information required for the two methods is the
prove his or her objectives with communication. In this partic-
neighboring player local objective value and remaining team
ular example, having one information level improves the objec-
player local objectives. The term represents the th player
tives around 25% from the noncooperative level. However, it
modified minimization objective with communication in each
shows only a 2%–6% improvement from one information level
approach, and is the counter variable which is used for adding
to all information level.
the two neighboring player objectives.

C. Source Player Teams Participation D. Load and Source Team Participation

Next, a source team participation strategy is demonstrated. In
this model, the load converter control strategy was kept constant
and source converters change their control strategies to mini-
mize objectives. The source player minimization objective was
chosen as
(13)
Next, the effects of forming a load team and a source team si-
multaneously in the system are considered. The constants used
for source and load players are the same as in the previous exam-
ples of Sections V-B and C. However, this case simulation was
limited to one information improvement which includes only
the neighboring player local objective value, and the results are
shown in Table III. In this case for the used local objective, do
EKNELIGODA AND WEAVER: GAME-THEORETIC COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES IN MICROGRIDS 2339

TABLE III
NEW EQUILIBRIUM UNDER LOAD AND SOURCE TEAM PARTICIPATION

Fig. 5. Player cost variation with a level of information mixing.

VII. STAKELBERG EXAMPLE

The objective improvement observed in each model dis-
not find a local minimum under all information available and cussed before does not help a given player to reach higher levels
load and source teams operating in the system simultaneously. than his or her team members. Therefore, the aforementioned
According to the results shown in Table III, there is a 4% load team was simulated under Stackleberg modeling with the
deviation of source player equilibrium from the individual team following hierarchies and the objective from (14). In each of
participation cases. When load teams are considered, this devia- the following hierarchies given, the leader control space
tion is around 2%. Therefore, it can be concluded that the single is constrained within the limit of 0.001 to 2.001 p.u. In this
team participation and simultaneous participation has little ef- example, team players do not attempt to minimize a common
fect in power system games with communication. However, this function or mixed objective. They only share their local control
can be changed with the different player objectives and control inputs and optimize their initial local objective accordingly.
input selections. The controllers are able to find the static team Hierarchy 1 (H1): Player 5 is the leader and players 6
equilibrium point in five turns. According to the results, the load and 8 are followers. and react to the leader’s an-
team takes a higher number of turns to achieve its equilibrium. nounced control strategy. In this particular hierarchy (H1), the
In this case, it is five turns, whereas the source team needs only followers action was modeled with two stages under the leaders’
three. action variation above and below 0.2 p.u. This is only a example
case and the designer can modify the problem with the require-
ment. The followers action is a function of the leaders’ control
VI. SENSITIVITY OF MIXING COEFFICIENTS decision as in the hierarchy 1 definition in Section IV. In other
In some cases, information mixing shows significant sensitiv- words, the function in hierarchy 1 defines the followers ac-
ities with the local objective. Consider the example cases where tion. The example shown in (15) is a simple form of followers
players may be interested in maximizing their power. This sce- action variation as a function of the leaders decision. Therefore,
nario exists in cases when the system experiences a disturbance in this case, the followers control action assumes
or excessive loss of generation. In these situations, players ob-
jectives will switch to a function, such as (15)
.
(14) Hierarchy 2 (H2): and are the leaders of the team.
will act as a follower. reacts according to the leaders
Then, the objectives were improved by using the communica- announced control strategy assumed as in
tion only with the neighboring player approach.
Then, the sensitivity analysis was carried out for the player
local objective with while . The sensitivity anal- (16)
ysis helps to determine the optimal information mixing of the
players, and the observed results are shown in Fig. 5. This vari-
ation is not continuous, because for all values of , while Hierarchy 3 (H3): announces his or her control strategy.
, players do not find an NE. The reason for this is in some par- Player then determines his or her strategy by taking the re-
ticular values of , the modified objective does not contain a sponse of . then affirms his or her strategy to . Finally,
local minimum. optimizes his or her objective in view of the announced
In Fig. 5, it is seen that the player local objectives can achieve strategies of and as in
the minimum of the entire minimum set at 2.01, while
1. Therefore, in this case, the better option is to obtain (17)
2.01 times neighboring information and mixed with the con-
verter local objective. In addition, for the values of
and
the system does not reach an equilibrium. This means that under
these values, the mixed converter objective does not contain a
(18)
local minimum under the converter control input strategy set. .
2340 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY, VOL. 27, NO. 4, OCTOBER 2012

TABLE IV
STAKELBURG COST IN EACH HIERARCHY

The observed results from each hierarchy are shown in

Table IV. The team was limited to a load team in the microgrid
under this concept. According to Table IV, under H1, the leader
achieves the highest possible outcome under limited resources.
Fig. 6. Equilibrium changes only with S1 changing to 0.5 p.u.
The followers had to share the remainder. In this particular
example, the leader achieves a 3.217 cost. The followers
achieve their goals equally of 1.0699 according to the re-
sponse of the leader. In H2, leaders and achieve their
targets equally of 2.3619 in this example. The follower
has to use the remaining resources according to the announced
strategies of leaders and reaches the objective of 0.9883.
Finally, in H3, players have different levels like the main leader
and the subleader in the team. As a result, the main leader
achieves the highest objective of 2.8618 while a subleader
shows a cost of 1.4861. The follower obtains the remaining
1.203. In each Stackleberg concept, modeling the necessary
information from remaining players is the control input. If it is
necessary, this modeling can be modified to the model based on
the remaining player objective information. The Stackleberg Fig. 7. Equilibrium changes only with S1 loosing the receiving information
concept-based models can be built in different ways depending from neighboring source player 2.
on the requirements in the microgrid. However, this example is
limited only to show the possibility of this method used in the
microgrid for different objectives. B. Loss of Receiving Information of Player 1
Suppose at a given instance that source player 1 looses com-
VIII. CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS WITH THE TEAM PLAYERS munications from source player 2, while the other team infor-
mation remains. In such a situation, players equilibrium changes
The equilibrium found in the aforementioned cases with com- are shown in Fig. 7. In this case, source player 1 operates while
munication is different with different scenarios. For example, maximizing its local objective function. As a result of the objec-
scenarios could include load steps, loss of generation, and loss tive shifting, it shows higher fluctuations than the other source
of communication between players. In such situations, the equi- team players. The load team players show a small transition and
librium changes from an old point to a new one. In the following archive their equilibrium within three turns.
examples, it is assumed that team players operate only with re-
ceiving one information level from the neighboring player. C. Loss of Total Communication in the System

A. Effect of Source Changes in the System
Assume that the source player 1 is of the following profile:
,
(19)
otherwise.
The time corresponds to the point where system players have
18 turns during transition. In this case, the players equilibrium
has transitioned as shown in Fig. 6. Source player 1 suddenly
changes its generation to a lower value of 0.5 p.u. These results
are not unlike in a photovoltaic system when a large cloud casts
a shadow on a solar panel, or in a wind turbine when the wind
dies. According to Fig. 6, the load team needs a higher number
of turns to reach its equilibrium. Source player 1 keeps his or her
control decision constant while the other sources change their
actions.
Fig. 8 shows the players equilibrium transition during the
total loss of communication in the system. This is possible in
cases where lightning stroke changes the entire communication
in a system. In these cases, each player optimizing an objec-
tive is shifted from team objective to individual objectives as
a loss of communication. Therefore, each player shows signif-
icant transition from initial to the new equilibrium. In this par-
ticular example, source team players take a larger time period
to reach equilibrium than the load players.
In the aforementioned approaches, the power-flow solution
was obtained without considering the slack bus. In other words,
sources have the freedom to change their injected power with
demand changes. Therefore, this system operates with a dis-
tributed slack bus, where every source adjusts the mismatch [7].
In hardware implementation, fast communication of informa-
tion among team players is required. If the communication delay
EKNELIGODA AND WEAVER: GAME-THEORETIC COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES IN MICROGRIDS
Fig. 8. Equilibrium changes with loss of total communication in the system.
is negligible, then the information adding, objective minimiza-
tion, and player control position detection can be determined
through the software system. Then, the corresponding signal
can be injected to the required hardware system to operate in
real time. However, in real-time operation, it is necessary have
a fast control system in order to have better performance. Oth-
erwise, it will create failure modes in the system.
IX. CONCLUSION
The formulation of team players in microgrids helps to
improve the objectives of the system elements. The potential
level of improvement depends on the level of communication
available. In each method, players form teams and modify
the minimization objectives. The direct solution for equilib-
rium for highly nonlinear power system equations is difficult.
The turn-based approach improves the solution to obtain the
equilibrium under each team model of converter teams. The
improved model using neighboring information is important
to reduce the required information level. However, during
information mixing, a significant sensitivity for player local ob-
jectives is seen. Therefore, to achieve optimum improvement,
it is necessary to mix information under the optimum value.
The Stackleberg concept helps to allocate bigger portions of
resources for given players depending on the requirements.
Expanding this analysis for different converter objectives,
multiple team participation and different methods of objective
mixing are possible future directions of research. In addition,
it is necessary to observe the sensitivity of each mixing factor
under each model. Also, forming teams for dynamic differential
games is an interesting future topic of this paper. Then, the
game will be a path optimization instead of point optimization.
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Nishantha C. Ekneligoda (M’12) received the
B.S. and M.S. degrees in electrical engineering
from the University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka, in
2003 and 2005, respectively, the MSME degree in
mechanical engineering from Southern Methodist
University, Dallas, TX, in 2008, and the Ph.D. degree
in electrical power from Michigan Technological
University, Houghton.
His research interests include power system con-
trols; power electronics; nonlinear, optimal, and dis-
tributed controls; and renewable energy systems.
Wayne W. Weaver (S’03–M’08) received the B.S.
degree in electrical engineering and the B.S. degree
in mechanical engineering from GMI Engineering
and Management Institute, MI, in 1997, and the M.S.
and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering from the
University of Illinois, Urbana, in 2004 and 2007,
respectively.
Currently, he is an Assistant Professor in the De-
partment of Electrical Engineering, Michigan Tech-
nological University, Houghton. He was a Research
and Design Engineer with Caterpillar Inc., Peoria, IL,
from 1997 to 2003. From 2006 to 2008, he was a Researcher with the U.S. Army
Corp of Engineers, Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC),
Construction Engineering Research Lab (CERL), Champaign IL, focusing on
distributed and renewable energy technology research.
Dr. Weaver is a registered professional engineer in the State of Illinois.