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Blink: the power of thinking without

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 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
J. Behav. Dec. Making, 18: 305–309 (2005)

Book Review

Beyond Blink: A Challenge to Behavioral Decision Making

BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING, Malcolm Gladwell. New York: Little,
Brown. 2005. ISBN: 0–316–17232–4.

Review by Robin M. Hogarth, ICREA & Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain and Paul J. H.
Schoemaker, The Wharton School, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

Malcolm Gladwell’s (2005) Blink is a good read and will probably become an international best seller.
Gladwell writes in an engaging fashion, is well informed and few match his ability to tell interesting stories
with colourful characters. In Blink, Gladwell addresses an issue that is central to the field of judgment and
decision making, namely the ability of people to make ‘snap’ judgments that are accurate or, in Gladwell’s
phrase, to ‘thin-slice’.
Gladwell states up front that Blink aims to achieve three explicit ‘tasks’: (1) ‘to convince you of a
simple fact: decisions made very quickly can be every bit as good as decisions made cautiously and delib-
erately’ (p. 14), (2) to identify ‘when we should trust our instincts and when we should be wary of them’
(p. 15) and (3) ‘to convince you that our snap judgments and first impressions can be educated and con-
trolled’ (p. 15).
Gladwell is not a behavioural scientist but presents scientific (and other) evidence in an authoritative man-
ner such that non-scientists would view Blink as reporting on the science underlying his thesis. The Econ-
omist, for example, placed Blink at the top of its list of best selling science books (Vol. 375, No. 8420, p. 79).
Limiting ourselves to Gladwell’s own stated tasks (i.e. goals), it is appropriate to ask whether the evidence
Gladwell cites meets his own goals. Also, we wish to comment on the overall merits of the book for beha-
vioural decision making (BDM) and beyond.
By our count, Gladwell’s evidence consists of approximately 25 scientific studies, 12 case studies, 22
anecdotes and a couple of informal studies, all spread over some 250 pages. Contrary to academic books,
Gladwell does not present his arguments in a structured, logical flow where, for example, the evidence is
summarised at key points to demonstrate that the data indeed support the thesis being developed. Instead,
his style is to engage the reader with a series of intriguing cases, characters, anecdotes and snippets of scien-
tific evidence. Figuring out what this all means is the reader’s task. With Gladwell, the pleasure of reading
lies more in savouring the journey rather than the final destination. Thus, although highly entertaining, for
many readers there could be much confusion as to the conclusions that Gladwell means to reach. For this
reason, we deem it important to make explicit how we perceive the structure and content of the book.
In the Introduction, Gladwell motivates the thesis that blink or snap judgments can be more effective than
deliberate thinking. In Chapters 1 and 2, he provides evidence (plus some great stories) that thin-slicing can
be effective in different contexts and that humans lack conscious awareness of their own judgmental pro-
cesses. Anyone familiar with the relevant scientific literature would mostly agree with what is said up to this
point. The only charge one might make is that Gladwell has selected atypical cases, such as the instant recog-
nition by certain art experts that an ancient marble statue (kouros) purchased by the J. Paul Getty Museum in
California is a fake. He fails to mention, however, that art experts have often failed to recognise fakes for

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

306 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

years. An especially infamous case is that of the Dutch painter Han van Meegeren who, before and during the
second World War, produced several widely ‘acknowledged’ Vermeer masterpieces that were exhibited in
European museums for many years prior to being revealed as forgeries by the painter himself.1
Starting in Chapter 3, Gladwell provides some examples of when thin-slicing can go wrong (e.g. when
voters elect a President) and further evidence that we lack insight into our own mental processes. At this
point, however, the critical reader starts to wonder under what conditions thin-slicing is or is not functional
(Gladwell’s second task). This confusion is likely to be amplified in Chapter 4 where an extensive example
involving war games shows that thin-slicing based on deep experience can be more effective than rational
models. On the other hand, there is a stunning example of how a simple scoring procedure to diagnose
patients complaining of chest pain outperforms the intuitive judgments of physicians regarding the risks
of heart attack. Scholars will wonder what sets these two cases apart.
Although fascinating to read (as the journey continues), Chapters 5 and 6 contain several messages that are
hard to fit into any coherent framework or argument indicating important contingencies. We learn, for exam-
ple, that in market research—as well as in other walks of life—it is critical to ask the right questions. We
meet remarkable characters who have developed incredible abilities to discriminate foods or interpret facial
expressions. We are told how verbalising our thoughts can sometimes interfere with our ability to make good
judgments. We are also provided with a stunning and tragic example of thin-slicing gone badly awry when
police officers mistake a wallet for a gun at midnight in a dark corner. However, we are further told that if
police follow certain procedures (to reduce stress), there will be less likelihood of erroneous thin-slicing.
In the Conclusion, there is an excellent example of how one can improve judgment in a specific applica-
tion by eliminating irrelevant, distracting cues. It concerns seasoned musicians selecting new orchestra
members based on live auditions. When the experts listen to the applicants without visual cues, by placing
a screen between the player and the judges, rather different evaluations result than when the debutantes are in
full view. (We predict, parenthetically, that this will become a classic example in courses on decision making
and deservedly so!)
There is no question that, with these wide ranging examples, Gladwell is effective in achieving his first
goal. There is ample evidence that ‘decisions made very quickly can be every bit as good as decisions made
cautiously and deliberately’ (italics added by us). What can be debated, of course, is how representative
Gladwell’s examples are of the ecology of everyday decision making (see also below).
Regarding Gladwell’s crucial second goal, he does describe situations where thin-slicing can go wrong.
But he does not address the issue of what characteristics distinguish situations when thin-slicing is and is not
effective. For example, we learn that many people must have been fooled by Warren Harding’s attractive
appearance as a politician of stature. And yet, evidence is also cited that students can judge the effectiveness
of lecturers based on brief observations of the latter. Similarly, whereas analytical models are portrayed as
ineffective relative to individual intuitive expertise in constantly changing situations such as war games, such
models are depicted as being more effective than human judgments in the chaos of an urban hospital. Such
seemingly contradictory examples cry out for an explanation as to when conditions do or do not favor thin-
slicing. Yet, none is offered.
Gladwell does quote the judicious snap judgment of a fire chief who saved the lives of his team by ordering
them out of a building shortly before it collapsed (Klein, 1998). But he does not recount the famous story of
an experienced fire chief at the Mann Gulch trench of a Montana mountain range (Useem, 1998) who saved
his own life through analytical reasoning whereas almost all members of his crew perished when trusting
their gut instinct to flee the fire. Nor is there mention of the numerous studies where simple bootstrapping
models have out-predicted intuitive judgments by experts (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002).

1
http : ==www:chm:bris:ac:uk=webprojects2002=lhomer=Webpage=meegeren:htm. Of course, there may be many other fakes currently
in the art world that simply have not yet been revealed as such.

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 305–309 (2005)
 Book Review 307

In short, Gladwell does not distinguish well between those situations where thin-slicing is and is not effec-
tive. So, what do Gladwell’s own examples actually say about this key issue? We decided to focus on the 12
case studies of the book that were introduced to describe instances of blink and which, we believe, comprise
the evidence that people are most likely to remember. We rated these cases independently on several differ-
ent dimensions that we classified on continua from low ( ¼ 1) to high ( ¼ 7). We then averaged our two sets of
independent judgments. Here is a summary of what we found (see the Appendix for our complete ratings of
the cases).
Mean Standard Range
Deviation
Y: Overall quality of judgments 5.0 2.3 1–7
X1: How analytical was the judgment 2.9 2.1 1–7
X3: Experience level of judges 6.2 1.1 3–7
X5: Task provides good feedback 5.3 1.6 2–7
X6: Stability of judgmental task 5.3 1.6 2–7
X8: Level of stress or emotionality 3.0 1.8 1–7

From this quick analysis, we learn that Gladwell is primarily looking at tasks where judgmental perfor-
mance (typically accuracy of predictions) is high; the judges were generally experienced and operated in
environments that provided good feedback; the judgmental tasks they face were generally stable (i.e. the
underlying causal mechanisms do not vary much over time); and there is generally a low level of stress.
Most researchers in BDM would likely agree that people can indeed learn to make good intuitive judg-
ments in the kinds of task environments Gladwell describes (e.g. see Shanteau, Friel, Thomas, & Raacke,
2005). However, it is problematic to consider this particular sample of tasks as being representative of the
situations that people ordinarily face. Blink is subject to the same criticisms leveled against findings on heur-
istics and biases, namely the failure to establish representative sampling of judgmental tasks (Hogarth,
1981). Those partial to Egon Brunswik’s view of psychology will correctly criticise Blink as dealing with
a thin and unrepresentative slice of life.
As to educating and controlling our snap judgments, Gladwell does not make a clear list of suggestions to
meet his third objective. Instead, various hints are made by way of examples. One is quite negative: Do not
let your snap judgments determine what you do, as in the example of the car salesman who treats all cus-
tomers the same. A second is to gain deep knowledge in a particular domain through extensive study (e.g. the
‘love lab’ of John Gottman, Paul Ekman’s ability to identify facial expressions and the food experts: Gail
Vance Civille and Judy Heylmun). However, what is not clear from these examples is the point at which
sufficient expertise has been gained. Why, for example, do musical experts not recognise what the public
wants to hear (the case of the rock musician Kenna)? As a third pointer, Gladwell suggests that certain tasks
may be re-organised so that dysfunctional aspects of snap judgments can be avoided. One is to make sure that
police always follow procedures that reduce stress. Another is to prevent people from seeing information that
could bias their judgments (recall the value of holding ‘blind auditions’ for orchestra players). We consider
this all good advice.
In sum, Gladwell does suggest ways in which ‘snap judgments can be educated and controlled’ but, failing
a thorough answer to his second task, it is not clear that people would know when to invoke such procedures.
Up to this point, our review has been critical of Gladwell. After all, he is making public pronouncements
about scientific research and, as such, his arguments should be carefully examined. And we could continue
this review in a critical vein. For example, we could complain that Gladwell does his readers a disservice by
failing to mention classic studies that are important to the topic he addresses (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1982; Koehler & Harvey, 2004). Or we could examine his failure to cite other recent work suggesting that
intuition can be educated (Hogarth, 2001) and that good judgment is not incompatible with stress
(Hammond, 2000). However, we do not believe this to be as useful as emphasising that Gladwell has helped

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 305–309 (2005)
308 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

BDM—and the world at large—by drawing attention to an important and still mysterious phenomenon,
namely the ubiquity of blink judgments.
Since Gladwell has fallen short in achieving his second and third goals, he implicitly leaves them
as two key challenges for the scientific community. One is to specify the conditions under which
blinks are or are not effective. The second is to identify effective means to control and hone intuitive
judgments. Our hope is that Gladwell’s book will redirect the research agenda so that these challenges
will receive the attention they deserve. A valuable outcome would be that, within a few years, a well-
grounded book will be published along the lines of Beyond Blink: When to Blink or Think, and How to
Do Both Well.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We thank Howard Kunreuther and J. Edward Russo for their helpful comments on this review.

APPENDIX: SCORING OF THE MAIN BLINK EXAMPLES

Book
Pages Case Description Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8

3–8 Fake Kouros statue 7.0 1.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 6.5 1.0 1.5
18–34 The Love Lab 6.5 4.0 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.5 6.5 1.5 1.0
48–52 Vic Braden—Tennis 6.5 1.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 2.0 1.5
72–76 Warren Harding Election 1.0 2.5 5.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 4.0 1.5 2.5
88–96 Car salesmen—Prejudice 6.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0
99–125 Paul van Riper—War Game 7.0 3.0 3.0 6.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 5.5 5.5
125–145 Cook County Hospital 6.5 7.0 7.0 6.5 4.5 6.0 6.5 5.0 3.5
147–166 Rock Musician Kenna 2.5 1.0 5.0 6.5 4.5 4.0 3.5 1.5 2.5
176–176 Herman Miller Chair 5.5 3.0 4.5 5.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 1.5 2.5
189–197 Diallo shooting in Bronx 1.0 1.0 6.5 6.0 6.5 6.0 5.0 7.0 7.0
197–214 Interpreting facial expression 7.0 5.5 7.0 7.0 5.5 7.0 7.0 1.5 1.5
245–254 Auditions for ochestra jobs 4.0 1.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 6.5 7.0 2.5 2.5
Mean 5.04 2.92 5.96 6.21 4.96 5.25 5.25 2.96 2.96
Standard Deviation 2.32 2.08 1.34 1.12 1.48 1.60 1.56 2.06 1.79

Notes: All scales are 1 ¼ low to 7 ¼ high

Y Overall quality of the expert’s judgement (1 ¼ poor; 7 ¼ excellent).
X1 How deliberate was the judgement (1 ¼ pure snap; 4 ¼ mix of intuition & analysis; 7 ¼ highly analytical)?
X2 Was high predictive accuracy the main performance objective (as opposed to insight, creativity, surprise
(1 ¼ no; 7 ¼ yes).
X3 How experienced was the judge in this task in terms of frequency, years of practice etc (1 ¼ low; 7 ¼ high
experience)?
X4 To what extent did the judge appear to be using thin slicing? (1 ¼ not clear; 7 ¼ few cues drove the
judgement)?
X5 Does this task permit learning from experience (1 ¼ wicked—complex feedback; 7 ¼ very friendly, like
tennis)?
X6 How stable is the domain of expertise (1 ¼ changes continually, like the stock market; 7 ¼ very stable, like
golf)?
X7 Was there significant time pressure (1 ¼ no hurry—time for analysis; 7 ¼ urgent as in an emergency or
crises)?
X8 How emotional or stressful was the judgement task (1 ¼ low; dispassionate stance; 7 ¼ high—in the heat of
battle)?

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 305–309 (2005)
 Book Review 309

REFERENCES

Hammond, K. R. (2000). Judgments under stress. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hogarth, R. M. (1981). Beyond discrete biases: functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics.
Psychological Bulletin, 90, 197–217.
Hogarth, R. M. (2001). Educating intuition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge
University Press.
Klein, G. (1998). Sources of power. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Koehler, D. J., & Harvey, N. (2004). Blackwell handbook of judgment & decision making. Malden, MA: Blackwell
Publishing.
Russo, J. E., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (2002). Winning decisions. New York: Doubleday Publishing Co.
Shanteau, J., Brian M. F., Thomas, R. P., & Raacke, J. (2005). Development of expertise in a dynamic decision-making
environment. In T. Betsch, & S. Haberstroh, (Eds.), The routines of decision making. Mahwah: Erlbaum.
Useem, M. (1998). The leadership moment. Chapter 2. NY: Random House.

Published online in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com).
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.497

Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 305–309 (2005)

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