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Neuzeitliche Philosophie, Teil II.
Neuzeitliche Philosophie, Teil II.
“Wenn wir sagen, daß die Sä tze der Metaphysik sinnlos sind, so ist dieses Wort
im strengsten Sinn gemeint.” Carnap, Ü berwindung die Metaphysik durch
logische Analyse der Sprache, Einleitung, § 3.
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“The idea of existence is no distinct idea which we unite with that of the object,
and which is capable of forming a compound idea by union.” Treatise, I.3.7.
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“...we can judge only of the operations of causes by experience, and that,
reasoning a priori, any thing might appear able to produce anything”. Letter
from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, § 10.
“The contrary of every matter of fact is still possibile... it can never imply a
contradiction” IV, §1.
“The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause... For the
effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be
discovered in it”. IV. § 7.
“In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not,
therefore, be discovered in the cause...” IV. § 8.
“...the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience”. IV. § 10.
“...all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the
future will be conformable to the past”. IV. § 16.
“From causes which appear similar, we expect similar effects. This is the
sum of all our experimental conclusions.” IV. § 17.
“...in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind, which is
not supported by any argument or process of the understanding”. V. § 2.
“...we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference, which we are not able to
draw from one instance”. V. § 5.
“All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object,
present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and
some other object”. V. § 8.
“...when one of the objects is presented ...the mind is carried to the conception
of the correlative ...reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it”. V. § 14.
“The transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason.
It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience”. V. § 19.
“...that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the
senses.” V. § 19.
“...nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of
the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated”.
“...an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course
to that which she has established among external objects; though we are
ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession
of objects totally depends.” V. § 21.
“...all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions ...it is impossible for us
to think of any thing, which we have not antecedently felt”. VII. § 4.
“Nihil est in intellectus quod non sit prius in sensu.”
“To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary
connection, let us examine its impression”. VII. § 5.
“...we the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could
forsee the effect, even without experience”. VII. § 7.
“It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the
contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation”. VII. § 8.
“...no reasoning can ever give us a new, original, simple idea”. VII. § 8.
“We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only
teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in
the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable”.
VII. § 13.
“...our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness”. VII. §
15.
“...even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as
in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent
conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like
connection between them.” VII, § 20.
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Hume é francês.
A ideia de "standard".
"...is not able fully to satisfy itself with regard to its own operations".
Ter no teste, que agora a metafísica passa a ter uma base antropológica e
não teológica.
O juízo é relaçã o.
A inferência causal é justa mas irracional. É assim que nos movemos no mundo.
Só há causalidade a posteriori.
Experience contra appearance.
Toda a reflexã o antropoló gica tem como ponto de partida a ideia de estado de
natureza.
Os três princípios de associaçã o, the only bonds that unite our thoughts together.