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LECTURE 4 Terms and Conditions Lecture
LECTURE 4 Terms and Conditions Lecture
1
• • puffs;
• • reprepresentations; or
• • terms.
• The most common type of puff is the advertising gimmick.
• Puffs are statements that give rise to no legal consequences.
• They are statements that are not meant to be taken literally and
by which there is no intention to be legally bound
9 Terms of a Contract
• The obligations undertaken by the parties to a contract are
defined by the terms of a contract.
• Terms could be either express or be implied.
• Whether terms of a contract are express or implied terms,
contractual terms can be categorised into two other types:
•
•
10 Terms of a Contract
• CONDITIONS
» These are the more important contractual terms.
» If a party to a contract breaches a condition, the ‘innocent’
party is entitled to treat the contract at an end (repudiate the
contract).
» This will entitle the innocent party to go back, so far as it is
possible to do so, to the position that existed before the
contract came into existence. The innocent party may also be
entitled to damages for breach of contract.
» Poussard v Spiers and Pond [1876] 1 QBD 410
11 Terms of a Contract
• WARRANTIES
• These are the lesser important terms of the contract.
• If the broken term is only a warranty, then the innocent party must
go on with the contract, but s/he can sue for damages for any
11
• If the broken term is only a warranty, then the innocent party must
go on with the contract, but s/he can sue for damages for any
loss caused as a result of the breach.
• Bettini v Gye [1876] 1 QBD 183
• Why should care be taken when using the terms ‘conditions’ and
‘warranties’ to ensure that they are being used in their correct
legal meaning.
•
12 Express terms
• Terms that the parties have specifically decided should form part
of the contract are known as ‘express terms’
• Where oral contracts are made, problems can arise as not every
promise made during negotiations will amount to a term
• Other statements will be more than puffs and will amount to terms
or mere representations, and it is vital that these different types of
statement can be distinguished
•
13 Recission vs mere claim for damages
• The Breach of a term will allow the innocent party to either
Rescind the contract and sue for breach of Contract and claim
damages OR simply choose to go ahead with the Contract and
Merely sue for Damages.
• In the case of breach of representation, The only option for the
Innocent party is to claim damages.
• A breach of a Term vs a breach of a Representation will also
determine the measure of Damages!!
14 Misrepresentation and Terms of the Contract
15 Mere representations and Terms
• Terms are contractual undertakings that set out the rights and
obligations of the parties
14
15
• Terms are contractual undertakings that set out the rights and
obligations of the parties
20
were inaccurate, it would result in automatic breach of the
contract?” (Heilbut, Symons and Co. v Buckleton [1913] AC 30.)
•
20
• RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH & Co.
KG (UK Production) [2010]:
• “Whether there is a binding contract between the parties and, if
so, upon what terms depends upon what they have agreed.
• It depends not upon their subjective state of mind, but upon a
consideration of what was communicated between them by
words or conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a
conclusion that they intended to create legal relations and had
agreed upon all the terms which they regarded or the law
requires as essential for the formation of legally binding
relations.”
21 How do we find the intention of the parties: the presumptions
•
1.Whether the statement maker has special knowledge of the
matter in question – where the representor has greater
knowledge of the matter than the other, this is indicative that the
statement is intended to be a term – Dick Bentley v Harold Smith
Motors [1965] 2 All ER 65;
2.where the representee( the person receiving the statement) has
greater knowledge of the matter than the other, this is indicative
that the statement is intended to be a mere representation –
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325).
3.Whether the maker of the statement accepted responsibility for
the soundness of the statement – where such responsibility is
assumed, this indicates that the statement was intended to be a
term (Shawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 64).
•
22
•
22 Oscar Chess Ltd v. Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370, Court of
Appeal : where the representee( the person receiving the
statement) has greater knowledge of the matter than the
other, this is indicative that the statement is intended to be a
mere representation
•
• The contract was for a exchange of a old car for a reduction in
the Cost of the new car.
• The car was represented as being 1948 model ( the papers
confirmed this) and were given a value of 270£
• But later on was found that the Model was 1939, worth only 170£
• The P sought the cost of the difference between the two
• Held: this was an innocent misrepresentation and Wasn’t a term
of the contract!
• The age of the car ‘induced’ the parties into a contract, but wasn’t
considered as a Term
• Distinction between a Warranty and Condition discussed by
Denning J
23 Denning J
• Turning now to the present case, much depends on the precise
words that were used. If the seller says: ‘I believe the car is a
1948 Morris. Here is the registration book to prove it’, there is
clearly no warranty. It is a statement of belief, not a contractual
promise.
• If, however, the seller says: ‘I guarantee that it is a 1948 Morris.
This is borne out by the registration book, but you need not rely
solely on that. I give you my own guarantee that it is’, there is
clearly a warranty. The seller is making himself contractually
responsible, even though the registration book is wrong.
•
•
24 Denning J on the expertise of the maker of the statement
• It seems to me clear that the motor dealers who bought the car
relied on the year stated in the log-book.
• If they had wished to make sure of it, they could have checked it
then and there, by taking the engine number and chassis number
and writing to the makers.
• They did not do so at the time, but only eight months later.
and writing to the makers.
• They did not do so at the time, but only eight months later.
• They are experts, and, as they did not make that check at the
time, I do not think that they should now be allowed to recover
against the innocent seller who produced to them all the evidence
which he had, namely, the registration book.
• I agree that it is hard on the plaintiffs to have paid more than the
car is worth, but it would be equally hard on the seller to make
him pay the difference.
•
25 Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v. Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd
[1965] 1 WLR 623, Court of Appeal
• The plaintiff, Dick Bentley, told the defendant, Harold Smith, that
he was on the look-out for a ‘well vetted Bentley car’.
• Mr Smith found one and bought it for £1,500. He then informed
Mr Bentley of his acquisition.
• Mr Bentley then went to see the car.
• Mr Smith told him that the car had been fitted with a replacement
engine and gearbox and that it had done only 20,000 miles since
the work had been carried out.
• The speedometer on the car showed only 20,000 miles. Mr
Bentley agreed to buy the car for £1,850 but the car proved to be
a ‘considerable disappointment to him’.
• He brought an action for damages for breach of warranty.
• Mr Smith admitted that he had made a statement that, to the best
of his belief, the car had done only 20,000 miles since the
replacement of the engine and the gear box but he denied that
these statements amounted to warranties or representations and
averred that the statements were made honestly in the belief that
they were true.
•
•
26 Judges view on this issue:
• Here we have a dealer, Smith ( the seller), who was in a position
to know, or at least to find out, the history of the car.
• He could get it by writing to the makers. He did not do so. Indeed
it was done later. When the history of this car was examined, his
statement turned out to be quite wrong.
• He ought to have known better. There was no reasonable
foundation for it.
• He ought to have known better. There was no reasonable
foundation for it.
• The judge found that the representations were not dishonest.
• Smith was not guilty of fraud. But he made the statement as to
20,000 miles without any foundation.
• And the judge was well justified in finding that there was a
warranty.
• He said: ‘I have no hesitation [in saying] that as a matter of law
the statement was a warranty. Smith stated a fact that should be
within his own knowledge. He had jumped to a conclusion and
stated it as a fact. A fact that a buyer would act on’. That is ample
foundation for the inference of a warranty.
•
•
27 Presumptions ( contd..)
4. The importance attached to the statement – the more important
the matter, the greater the likelihood that the parties intended the
statement to be a term (Bannerman v White [1861] 142 ER 685).
5. Where the statement is accompanied by a recommendation that
its truth be verified – the statement is more likely to be a mere
representation (Ecay v Godfrey [1947] 80 LI L Rep 286).
6. Where one party clearly relied upon the other, this is indicative
that the statement was intended to be a term (Esso Petroleum Co
Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801).
28 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v. Mardon [1976] QB 801, Court of
Appeal: Where one party clearly relied upon the other, this is
indicative that the statement was intended to be a term
• The Court found for the claimant, viewing that the matter of
whether the hops had received Sulphur treatment was indeed a
contractual term rather than a mere representation.
• The Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the
claimant had communicated the significance and consequence of
the treatment to the defendant, meaning they were reasonably
aware of its importance and that the claimant was only
contracting on these grounds.
•
34 Factors that the courts will take into account when deciding
between a Term or a mere representation: summary
• First, [the courts] may have regard to the time which elapsed
between the time of making the statement and the final
manifestation of agreement; if the interval is a long one, this
points to a representation.
• Secondly, they may consider the importance of the statement in
the minds of the parties; a statement which is important is likely
to be classed as a term of the contract.
• Thirdly, if the statement was followed by the execution of a formal
contract in writing, it is more likely to be regarded as a
representation where it is not incorporated in the written
document.
• Finally, where the maker of the statement is, vis-à-vis the other
party, in a better position to ascertain the accuracy of the
statement or has the primary responsibility for doing this, the
Courts will tend to regard it as a contractual term.
•
35 Pakistani case law on mere Opinions
• Mere Opinions are not incorporated as terms of the contract:
• CASELAW:
• 2003 YLR 1523: relevant as it states that mere opinions are not
binding.
• The plaintiff authorized the defendant to operate a duty free shop
at Karachi airport.
• The plaintiff sued to enforce the agreement but the defendant
said that contract to open the shop was voidable as there had
been misrepresentation regarding the forecast of the number of
said that contract to open the shop was voidable as there had
been misrepresentation regarding the forecast of the number of
passengers expected through the terminal. Held??
• The court held that the forecast was not a statement of fact and
was not binding.
• Opinions may be binding where they are made by an expert who
has more knowledge in the field and where the other party has
relied upon that expertise. This will be covered in
misrepresentation/fraud.
•
36 EXPRESS TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
Pakistani case law
42
matter."
• This test covers terms which one side alleges must be implied in
order to make the contract work – to give it business efficacy.
• The leading case in this field is The Moorcock (1889).
• The defendants owned a wharf and jetty on the river Thames
which people could pay to use to load and unload their boats.
The defendants contracted with the plaintiffs for the unloading of
the plaintiffs’ boat, called The Moorcock, at their wharf.
• Both parties knew that the water level at the wharf was low and
that the boat would have to rest on the river bed when the tide
was down.
• This would be all right if the river bed was soft mud, but would
damage the boat if it was hard ground.
• In fact, the boat was damaged when it hit a ridge of hard ground
at low tide.
• The contract did not expressly state that the boat would be
moored safely.
• The plaintiffs brought an action for compensation for the damage
to the boat on the basis that there had been a breach of contract.
50
to the boat on the basis that there had been a breach of contract.
50 The Courts rationale
• The Court of Appeal implied a term into the contract that the boat
would be moored safely at the jetty.
• Such a term was necessary to give the contract business
efficacy.
• Otherwise, the boat owner ‘would simply be buying an
opportunity of danger’. The term had been breached and the
action for damages for breach of contract was therefore
successful
• The court implies a term into the contract on the basis that it is
necessary to do so in order to make the contract work.
• That said, was the term implied in The Moorcock one that was
necessary to give efficacy to the contract? Could the contract not
have worked without such a term?
• The issue before the court was, in essence, who was to take the
risk of the bed of the river being unsuitable for the vessel.
Business efficacy does not seem to require that the risk be
allocated to one party or the other.
• Nevertheless, the court took the view that business efficacy
supported the implication of a term to the effect that the
defendants had undertaken to exercise reasonable care to
ascertain that the river bed adjoining the jetty was in such a
condition as not to cause injury to the vessel.
•
51 The officious bystander test: Shirlaw v Southern Foundries
(1926)
• Mr Shirlaw had been the managing director of Southern
Foundries Ltd, which was in the business of iron castings. But
then another company called ‘Federated Foundries Ltd’ took over
the business.
• The new owners had altered article 8 of Southern Foundries Ltd's
constitution, empowering two directors and the secretary (who
were friends of Federated Foundries) to remove any director.
• Then they acted on it, by sacking Mr Shirlaw.
• Mr Shirlaw's contract, signed in 1933 stated that he was to
remain in post for ten years.
• Mr Shirlaw sued the company for breach of contract, claiming for
an injunction to stay in office or substantial damages.
•
52
•
52
• The Court of Appeal held
• that it was an implied term in the 21 December 1933 agreement
that the company would not remove Mr Shirlaw from his
directorship for the time in which he was appointed as managing
director.
• Furthermore, it was held that it was an implied term that the
company would not alter its articles to create a right of removal
and there was no case for reducing the damages awarded by the
High Court.
53 The officious bystander test
• Both the officious bystander and the business efficacy tests are
subjective: they ask what the parties in the case would have
agreed, and not what a reasonable person in their position would
have agreed.
• Consequently, attempts to imply terms in fact commonly fail for
one of two reasons.
• a term will not be implied in fact where one of the parties is
unaware of the subject matter of the suggested term to be
implied, or
• the facts on which the implication of the term is based.
• The question before the court was whether it should imply into a
lease term which entitled the lessee to recover that part of an
advance payment of rent which related to a period after the
exercise by the lessee of a break period in the lease.
• The lessee paid the full quarter’s rent due on 25 December 2011
but on 24 January 2012 exercised its right under the break clause
to determine the lease.
• The lessee then sought to recover the rent attributable to the
period between 24 January 2012 and the end of the quarter,
being 24 March 2012.
•
59 The SC on the issue of Implication of terms?
• The Supreme Court declined to imply the proposed term into the
lease and it did so for two principal reasons.
1. First, the lease was a very detailed document which had been
entered into between two substantial and experienced parties and
had been negotiated and drafted by expert solicitors.
Further, the lease made provision for a number of contingencies,
but it did not make provision for the return of the balance of an
advance payment of rent in the circumstances of this particular
case.
2. Second, the existence of such an implied term was not
supported by ‘the general attitude of the law to the apportionability
of rent payable in advance’ .
• On the contrary, the long-established rule of the common law is
that rent, whether payable in arrear or in advance, is not
apportionable in time.
•
60 Lady Hale in Marks and Spencer Plc v. BNP Paribas Securities
Services Trust Co
• ‘It may well be that a more helpful way of putting Lord Simon’s
second requirement is, as suggested by Lord Sumption in
argument, that a term can only be implied if, without the term, the
contract would lack commercial or practical coherence.
• On the issue is that what the instrument, read as a whole against
the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to
mean?’
the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to
mean?’
• ‘First, the notion that a term will be implied if a reasonable reader
of the contract, knowing all its provisions and the surrounding
circumstances, would understand it to be implied is quite
acceptable, provided that
• (i) the reasonable reader is treated as reading the contract at the
time it was made and
• (ii) he would consider the term to be so obvious as to go without
saying or to be necessary for business efficacy.’
•
61 Implication vs Interpretation?
• On the question of whether Implying the term is an exercise in
Interpretation( reinterpretation) of the contract?
• The court must first ascertain the meaning of the express terms
of the contract, and it is only once that task has been completed
that the court should turn to the question whether or not it is
appropriate to imply a term into the contract.
• The sequential nature of this exercise derives support from the
rule that the courts cannot imply a term into a contract which is
inconsistent, whether linguistically or in terms of substance, with
the express terms of the contract
•
62 Relationship between the Officious Bystander test and
Business Efficacy test
• After the Marks and Spencer case, it seems that there is no
difference in these two tests for implying a term in a contract.
• Lady Hale’s speech clearly shows that these tests aren’t
particularly separate tests but rather two strands of the same test
to see whether the term can be implied In fact by the courts or
not?
• And the test seems to be both of business efficacy and necessity.
63 Implied terms in law: Courts role
• In addition to implying terms in fact, the courts can also imply
terms in law
• The differences between terms implied in law and fact are:
1.Terms implied in fact are ‘one-offs’ as they apply to the
idiosyncratic facts of that case only.
2.Conversely, terms implied in law establish a precedent that
idiosyncratic facts of that case only.
2.Conversely, terms implied in law establish a precedent that
is applied to all similar contracts
3.Terms implied in fact are based on the unexpressed
intentions of the parties,
4.whereas terms implied in law are not based on the parties’
intentions
66
the term that the P owed a duty to keep the commons in repair as
this was too onerous a duty
• The D appealed to the HOL
66 The HOL( SC)
• Their appeal was successful in relation to their claim pursuant to
section 32(1) of the Housing Act 1961 and it was held that they
were entitled to nominal damages of £5.
• In relation to their claim that the plaintiffs were in breach of their
duty to keep the common parts of the building in repair, the
House of Lords held that the plaintiffs were subject to an
obligation to take reasonable care to do so but that, on the facts,
they had not breached that duty.
•
67 Lord Wilberforce ( HOL)
• To say that the construction of a complete contract out of these
elements involves a process of ‘implication’ may be correct; it
would be so if implication means the supplying of what is not
expressed.
• But there are varieties of implications which the courts think fit to
make and they do not necessarily involve the same process.
• Where there is, on the face of it, a complete, bilateral contract,
the courts are sometimes willing to add terms to it, as implied
terms: this is very common in mercantile contracts where there is
an established usage: in that case the courts are spelling out
what both parties know and would, if asked, unhesitatingly agree
to be part of the bargain.
• In other cases, where there is an apparently complete bargain,
the courts are willing to add a term on the ground that without it
the contract will not work—this is the case, if not of The Moorcock
(1889) 14 PD 64 itself on its facts, at least of the doctrine of The
Moorcock as usually applied.
•
68 Which terms ought to be implied?
The test of Necessity…
• The court here is simply concerned to establish what the contract
is, the parties not having themselves fully stated the terms.
• In this sense the court is searching for what must be implied.
• My Lords, in order to be able to choose between these, it is
necessary to define what test is to be applied, and I do not find
this difficult.
• In my opinion such obligation should be read into the contract as
69
this difficult.
• In my opinion such obligation should be read into the contract as
the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires, no more, no
less: a test, in other words, of necessity.
•
69 Reasonableness of the implied term: Lord Wilberforce
• My Lords, if, as I think, the test of the existence of the term is
necessity the standard must surely not exceed what is necessary
having regard to the circumstances.
• To imply an absolute obligation to repair would go beyond what is
a necessary legal incident and would indeed be unreasonable.
• An obligation to take reasonable care to keep in reasonable
repair and usability is what fits the requirements of the case.
• Such a definition involves—and I think rightly—recognition that
the tenants themselves have their responsibilities.
• What it is reasonable to expect of a landlord has a clear relation
to what a reasonable set of tenants should do for themselves.
•
70 Shell UK Ltd v. Lostock Garage Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1187: the
test for reasonableness?
• Lostock and Shell had a written contract that Shell would supply
petrol and oil to Lostock, in return for Lostock buying its goods
from Shell exclusively.
• In a price war, Shell reduced its petrol prices for some nearby
petrol stations. Customers went there, and Lostock had no choice
but to trade at a loss.
• Lostock sought another supplier and Shell sued Lostock for
breach of contract.
• Judgment
• The Court of Appeal, by a majority, held that no term could be
implied that Shell should not "abnormally discriminate" against
Lostock.
• It was held that Shell would not have agreed to the term[1] and
that the implied term would be too vague.
•
71 Terms implied in law vs In Fact: Lord Dennings opinion in
Shell UK Ltd v. Lostock Garage Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1187
Test of reasonableness for recognised relationship
78
loss caused as a result of the breach.
• Bettini v Gye [1876] 1 QBD 183
• Why should care be taken when using the terms ‘conditions’ and
‘warranties’ to ensure that they are being used in their correct
legal meaning.
•
78 Terms of a Contract under SOGA 1979( Pakistani SOGA 1925)
“In a contract of sale ... there is an implied term on the part of the
seller that in the case of a sale he has a right to sell the goods,
and in the case of an agreement to sell he will have such a right
at the time when the property is to pass.”
Niblett v Confectioners' Materials Co Ltd. [1921] 3KB 387
Microbeads AC v Vinhurst Road Markings Ltd. [1975] 1 All ER
529
84
85
Re Charge Card Services Ltd. [1988] 3 All E.R. 702
•
86 Application of sec 13
• Section 13 is largely self-explanatory.
• In the simplest type of case, if a seller describes a jacket as a
leather jacket but it is made from material that is not leather there
will be a breach of s 13.
• Similarly, if a car is described as a 2016 model but turns out to be
a 2014 model there will also be a breach of the section.
• The seller is under a general obligation to provide the goods
contracted for and will be in breach of this performance obligation
if he fails to do so.
• Description of the commercial characteristics of the goods
Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v Christopher Hill Ltd.[1972] AC 441 (
the herring meal for Birds case)
Reardon Smith Lines v Hansen Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 ( the
Ships name case)
•
•
87 Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441
(HL)
• Section 14(3) inserts a term into all contracts for the supply of
goods in the course of a business that the goods are reasonably
fit for the purpose for which they were bought.
• Griffiths v Peter Conway Ltd [1939] 1 All ER 685
• Objective strict liability standard
• Frost v Aylesbury Dairy Co [1905] 1 KB 608 (CA)
• Reliance on seller
• Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1936] AC 562
• Rebut presumption if not relying on seller’s skill and judgement
• Teheran-Europe Co Ltd v ST Belton (Tractors) Ltd [1968] 2 QB
545
•
96 Comparison
• S14(2) and s14(3)
• Can be a breach of both terms
• 14(2) ‘fitness for all the purposes for which the goods are
commonly supplied’
• 14(3) ‘goods are reasonably fit for the purpose for which they
97
96
commonly supplied’
• 14(3) ‘goods are reasonably fit for the purpose for which they
were bought’
• Jewson Ltd v Boyhan [2003] EWCA Civ 1030
• Remedies – condition – reject, repudiate and recover damages.
97 Goods to Correspond to Sample
• Section 15 – where goods have been sold by sample-
» The bulk should correspond with the quality of the sample.
» The goods should be free from any defect, making their quality
unsatisfactory, which would not be apparent on reasonable
examination of the sample.
• The word sample was elaborated upon by Lord Macnaghten in
James Drummond & Sons v E.H. Van Ingen & Co (1887) 12
App.Cas. 284
“After all, the office of a sample is to present to the eye the real
meaning and intention of the parties with regard to the subject-
matter of the contract, which, owing to the imperfection of
language, it may be difficult or impossible to express in words.
The sample speaks for itself.”
• Steels & Bucks Ltd v Bleecker Bik & Co Ltd.[1956] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 228
• Godley v Perry [1960] 1 WLR 9
98 B 2 C contracts and Consumer protection
99 Punjab Consumer protection Act 2005
LIABILITY ARISING FROM DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
122
121
•
•
127 Functions of Exclusion Clauses
1.Allocation of risks under the contract.
2.Exclusion clauses can help reduce litigation costs by making
clear the division of responsibility between the parties.
3.Exclusion clauses are often used in standard form contracts
which, by enabling people, to mass-produce their contracts,
helps reduce the cost of negotiations and of making contracts.
4.But powerful parties may use exclusion clauses to exclude
liability towards the weaker party, thereby leaving the weak
without a remedy
5.
•
128 Issue with exclusion clauses
• The courts do not have the power, at common law, to invalidate
128 Issue with exclusion clauses
• The courts do not have the power, at common law, to invalidate
an exclusion or limitation clause on the ground that it was
unreasonable.
• In UK we have the UCTA that now determines the regulation of
the exclusion clauses. But absent a statutory provision, generally
the courts cannot invalidate a written/ express exclusion clause.
• Judges like Lord Denning did attempt to formulate such a
jurisdiction but his attempts in this regard were firmly rejected by
the House of Lords.
• In the absence of a direct power to regulate unreasonable
exclusion clauses the courts resorted to indirect means.
• The principal indirect means were the rules relating to the
incorporation and interpretation of exclusion clauses
•
129 Outline of the Law
(1)Incorporation (was the clause part of the contract?);
(2)Construction (does the wording of the clause actually cover the
liability in question?); and
(3)Statutory Control, principally in the form of the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977 (UCTA), the Consumer Rights Contract Act
2015
130 Incorporation
• Signatures
• Notice
• Must be contained in a contractual document
• Previous dealings
131 Signatures
Signed documents containing exclusion clauses are binding.
132
contract meant that the woman was bound by the exclusion
clause, and therefore had no remedy.
135
134
• The Plaintiff left his bag in a station cloakroom, paid the fee of 2d
and received a cloakroom ticket in return.
• On the front of the ticket was printed details such as opening
hours of the office, and also the words: ‘See back’.
• On the back there was a clause limiting to £10 the company’s
liability for the loss of property left with them.
• When the plaintiff returned to collect his bag, it had been lost. The
bag was worth £24 10s, so Mr Parker claimed that amount from
the railway company;
• the company maintained that their liability was limited to £10.
• The Court of Appeal said that a party could be deemed to have
had reasonable notice if they knew of the clause, or if reasonable
steps were taken to bring the clause to their notice.
• On the facts of the case the limitation had been incorporated into
the contract, and the train company was only required to pay £10.
•
137
•
137 Parker v SE Railway [1877]
• If it is proved that, at the time the contract is made, the claimant
has actual knowledge of the existence of a term, then s/he will
be bound by it.
• If it is proved that, at the time the contract is made, claimant has
no actual knowledge of the existence of a term, then s/he will
not be bound by it, unless s/he is deemed to have such
knowledge and s/he will be so deemed if s/he was given
reasonable notice of it.
•
138 REASONABLE STEPS TO INCORPORATE THE CLAUSE
• In deciding whether reasonable steps have been taken, the
courts will look at
1.when the notice was given,
2.what form it took, and
3.how serious and unusual the effect of the exemption clause is.
•
139 Time of notice
144
£5 per transparency per day would be considered expensive
even today, let alone at the time when the case took place, and it
seems that the high price made the court consider the term
particularly onerous
•
•
144 Previous Dealings
Even where there has been an insufficient notice, an exclusion
clause may nevertheless be incorporated where there has been a
previous course of dealing between the parties on the same terms.
145