RYLANDS V FLETCHER

UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330

DATE OF JUDGEMENT- JULY 17, 1868
JUDGES: LORD CAIRNS AND LORD CRANWORTH

FACTS OF THE CASE

In November 1861, the plaintiff, Thomas Fletcher brought an action against the
defendant, Ryland & Horrocks, to recover damages for an injury caused to his
mines by water overflowing into them from a reservoir which the Defendants
had constructed. This case was referred to an arbitrator, who was afterward
directed, instead of making award, to prepare a special case for consideration of
the Judges.
The Plaintiff was the lessee of certain coal mines known as the Red House
Colliery, under the Earl of Wilton. He had also obtained from two other persons,
Mr Hulton and Mr. Whitehead, leave to work for coal under their lands. The
positions of the various properties were these:- There was a turnpike road
leading from Bury to Bolton, which formed a southern boundary to the
properties of these different persons. A parish road, called the Old Wood Lane,
formed their northern boundary. These roads might be described as forming
two sides of a square, of which the other two sides were formed by the lands of
Mr. Whitehead on the east and Lord Wilton on the west. The Defendant’s
grounds lay along the turnpike road, or southern boundary, stretching from its
center westward. On these grounds were a mill and a small old reservoir. The
proper grounds of the Red House Colliery also lay, in part, along the southern
boundary, stretching from its centre eastward. Immediately north of the
Defendant’s land lay the land of Mr. Hulton, and still farther north that of Lord
Wilton. On this land of Lord Wilton the Defendants, in 1860, constructed (with
his Lordship's permission) a new reservoir, the water from which would pass
almost in a southerly direction across a part of the land of Lord Wilton and the
land of Mr. Hulton, and so reach the Defendant's mill. The line of direction
from this new reservoir to the Red Colliery mine was nearly south-east.
The Plaintiff, under his lease from Lord Wilton, and under his agreements with
Messrs. Hulton and Whitehead, worked the mines under their respective lands.
In the course of doing so, he came upon old shafts and passages of mines
formerly worked, but of which the workings had long ceased; the origin and
the existence of these shafts and passages were unknown. The shafts were
vertical, the passages horizontal, and the former especially seemed filled with
marl and rubbish. Defendants employed for the purpose of constructing their
new reservoir persons who were admitted to be competent as engineers and
contractors to perform the work, and there was no charge of negligence made
against the Defendants Reyland personally. But in the course of excavating the
bed of the new reservoir, five old shafts, running vertically downwards, were
met with in the portion of the land selected for its site. The case found that "on
the part of the Defendants there was no personal negligence or default
whatever in or about, or in relation to, the selection of the said site, or in or
about the planning or construction of the said reservoir; but, in point of fact,
reasonable and proper care and skill were not exercised by, or on the part of, the
persons so employed by them, with reference to the shafts so met with as
aforesaid, to provide for the sufficiency of the said reservoir to bear the
pressure of water which, when filled to the height pro- posed, it would have to
bear."
The reservoir was completed at the beginning of December 1860, and on the
morning of the 11th of that month the reservoir, being then partially filled with
water, one of the aforesaid vertical shafts gave way, and burst downwards, in
consequence of which the water of the reservoir flowed into the old passages
and coal-workings underneath, and by means of the underground
communications then existing between them and the Plaintiff's workings in
the Red House Colliery, the colliery was flooded and the workings thereof
stopped. Rylands, the plaintiff, and Fletcher sued the defendant for damages.
The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the Plaintiff was entitled
to recover damages by reason of the matters hereinbefore stated. The Court of
Exchequer, Mr. Baron Bramwell dissenting, gave judgment for the Defendants
(1). That judgment was afterward reversed in the Court of Exchequer Chamber
(2). The case was then brought on Error to this House.
ISSUES INVOLVED IN CASE
1. Whether there was any nuisance or not?
2. Was the Defendant negligible?
3. Was the use of Defendant’s land unreasonable and thus was he to be held
liable for damages incurred by Plaintiff?

JUDGEMENT
THE COURT OF LIVERPOOL
The Court of Liverpool gave its judgement in the favour of the defendant holding
that there was neither any trespass (as the flooding was not direct and
immediate) nor any nuisance (as the flooding was not a continuous event, it is a
one-off event). Later, in December 1864, via a Court order, an arbitrator was
appointed for the case. The arbitrator too decided in favour of the defendant by
stating that the defendant had no way of knowing about the mine shafts so he
could not be held liable. The arbitrators, however, held the contractors liable for
their negligence.
EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS
The case then went to the Exchequer of Pleas, where it was heard between
3rd and 5th May 1865. It was heard on two points:
o Whether the defendants were liable for the actions of the contractors and
o Whether the defendants were responsible for the damage regardless of
their lack of negligence.
They decided for the first point that the defendants were not liable, but they
had a diverse opinion on the second point. Channell B recused. Pollock
CB and Martin B held that the defendants were not liable, as since a negligence
claim couldn’t be brought, there was no valid case. Bramwell B, dissenting,
argued that the claimant had the right to enjoy his land free of interference from
water that came from defendant's reservoir, and so as a result the defendant
was guilty of both trespass and the commissioning of a nuisance. He stated that
“the general law, wholly independent of contract” should be that the
defendants were liable, “on the simple ground that the defendants have caused
water to flow into the [claimant]’s mines, which but for their actions wouldn’t
have gone there…”
COURT OF EXCHEQUER CHAMBER
Fletcher was angered by the decision of the three exchequer judges and
appealed to the exchequer chamber composed of six judges. The six judges
“overturned the previous decision”. Fletcher. Blackburn J spoke on the behalf of
all the judges and said that “we, the judges of the exchequer think that correct
rule of law is that, any person, who for his own intentions brings on his land
anything, accumulates and keeps on the land that thing, which is likely to cause
trouble if it escapes, must keep it at his own risk, and, if he doesn’t do so, is
clear (without need for further information), in charge of all the damage which
is that the natural effect of its escape.” Blackburn J further said that that person
can excuse himself from the liability by taking certain defences like – that the
escape was caused because of the plaintiff’s default; or by proving that the
escape was a consequence of the act of God” (Fordham Margaret1995)
The judges concluded that “none of these excuses had been proven in the case”,
and it was, therefore “unnecessary to find out what another excuse would be
sufficient”. The judges, in the judgement, relied on the “basis of the liability for
damages of land through the tort of chattel of trespass, the tort of nuisance”, as
well as “the scienter action (common law rule that deals with the damages
directly done by animals to human beings)” (Duhame.org, 2009).
The court of Exchequer Chamber provided a rule when the liability of an owner,
who has brought any dangerous in his premises can arise. At the same time, the
court also discussed certain defences which can absolve the liability.
The court of Exchequer Chamber held Rylands liable for the damage done to the
Fletcher. The court held that the defendants owed a duty of care towards the
risk, as they were aware of the fact that if that quantity of water would escape,
it would be harmful. There was a want of care by the defendants, as they were
doing unnatural use of their land by storing that huge quantity of water. Though
it was not harmful that time, but would be harmful if escapes.
Rylands felt that this was not just. He appealed to the House of Lords.
HOUSE OF LORDS
The House of Lords dismissed Ryland’s appeal. They agreed with the six
exchequer judges but went further to feature a limitation on the liability.
DECISION
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal and agreed with the six Exchequer
judges. Lord Cairns, while speaking for the House of Lords, stated their
agreement of the rule stated above by Justice Blackburn in the court of
Exchequer Chamber but included a further limitation on liability. The one more
requirement is that the land from which the escape occurs must have been
modified in a way which would be considered non-natural, unusual or
inappropriate. The decision of House of Lords added a requirement that the use
be ‘non-natural’. The judgement of this case was delivered on 17 July. In this the
court consisted of only two judges, Lord Cairns and Lord Cranworth; Lord
Colonsay didn’t attend the case.
LEGAL REASONING
A person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and,
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape.
The rule to be applied is, “when one person in managing his own affairs causes,
however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should
be the party to suffer.”
The court judgment was affirmed, stating in essence that the Defendant’s use of
the land was unreasonable, engaged in without proper caution, and resulted in
harm to the Plaintiff. The Rylands court considers the manner in which the
Defendant used the land and concluded such use was “non-natural”.
CONCLUSION
Ryland v. Fletcher is a famous English case that established the ‘Rule of Strict
Liability’ in the field of law of torts. Mr. Ryland claimed that because he
employed an independent contractor, he had no control over their behavior. He
is not accountable for an independent contractor’s error.
However, Rylands was found accountable for the damage done to the Fletcher
by the Exchequer Chamber court. The defendants owed a duty of care to the
risk, according to the court, because they were aware that if that amount of
water leaked, it would be dangerous. The defendants showed a lack of care by
holding such a large amount of water on their farm, which was an unnatural use
of their land. Though it was not dangerous at the moment, it would be
dangerous if it escaped.
RULE OF STRICT LIABILITY
Through Rylands v/s Fletcher and many other later cases various developments
took place regarding the rule of strict liability. While certain exceptions like Act
of third party and Statutory authority were added to the rule, the pivotal
conditions for the applicability of the rule were also clarified by Courts. The
essentials for the applicability of rule of strict liability can be summarised as
follows:
1. Presence of Dangerous thing:
The first essential requirement for applicability of rule laid down in Ryland
V Fletcher is the presence of a dangerous thing. A person can be made
liable only if the thing which he had collected or had bought was
dangerous. What is dangerous may depend on facts and circumstances of
the case. Some of the examples of dangerous things are: poisonous trees,
explosives, noxious fumes, rusty wire, etc.

2. Escape:
Another requirement for the applicability of strict liability rule is the
escape of dangerous thing bought by the defendant. "The thing must
escape to the area outside the occupation and control of the defendant." If
the thing did not escape and damage is still caused, the defendant then
can't be held liable. For instance, if you bought an explosive material for
doing some experiment in your home. While doing the experiment, the
explosive material suddenly exploded and injured your co-worker working
with you. Here, you can't be held liable under the rule of strict liability as
there is no escape of the things outside your premises.

3. Non-natural use of land:

The last requirement for the applicability of the rule of strict liability is that
the dangerous thing was brought into the purview of non-natural use of
 land. For the use to be non-natural it "must be some special use bringing
with it increased danger to others, and must not merely by the ordinary
use of land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the
community"[iii] For instance, if you grow a tree on your land, it is natural
to use of land but if you grow a poisonous tree on your land, it is a non-
natural use of land as it brings with itself an increased danger to others.
Exceptions
However, in Ryland v/s Fletcher, certain exceptions were also stated in which
rule of strict liability cannot be applied. Many other exceptions were also added
in later cased.

The exceptions of the rule of strict liability can be summarised as follows:

1. Plaintiff's own default:
If the damage is caused by plaintiff's own default or wrongdoing then the rule of
strict liability can't be applied. For instance, in Ponting V Noakes[iv], the
plaintiff's horse itself intruded in defendant's property and ate poisonous leaves.
The Court held that as the damage is caused by plaintiff's own fault as he let his
horse intrude into the property of defendant (either purposely or via
negligence). Had the horse not intruded into the property of plaintiff, the
damage would not have been caused. Hence, the court held that in this case the
plaintiff didn't have any right to complaint.

2. Act of God:
The term "Act of God' has been defined by Blackburn J. in Rylands V Fletcher.
According to him "Circumstances which no human foresight can provide against,
and of which human prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility" are
called Act of God. The same can be understood via reference of Nichols V
Marsland[v], in which the defendant created artificial lakes on his land. But that
year, there happened to be an extraordinary rainfall, highest in human memory,
as a result of which embankments of lakes gave away and damaged plaintiff's
four bridges. The Court held that the defendant was not guilty as it was an act of
god as it was totally unforeseen and had happened because of supernatural
forces without any human intervention.
 3. Consent of the Plaintiff:
According to this exception, if the plaintiff has consented to the accumulation of
dangerous thing on the defendant's land, then the plaintiff does not have any
right of complaint and the rule of strict liability could not be applied. It s similar
to the rule of volenti non fit injuria. The consent of the plaintiff can be express
or implied. The consent is express, when the plaintiff assertively gives his
consent. For example, A and B lives in the same house.
A wants plant a poisonous tree in the house for research purpose and ask B if he
is OK with that. B agrees. Here, the consent given is express. On the other hand
consent can also be implied. Strictly talking of strict liability, consent is implied
when the source of danger is for the 'common benefit' of both plaintiff and
defendant. For instance, in Carstairs V Taylor[vi], the plaintiff hired ground floor
of defendant's house on rent.
There happened to be a water tank on the roof for supply of water. One day, the
water from the tank leaked and damaged plaintiff's goods. It was held that the
defendant's can't be held liable as plaintiff impliedly had consented to the
accumulation of dangerous thing (as the thing was installed for the common
benefit of both plaintiff and defendant).

4. Act of third party:

If the damages has been caused by the act of a third party or stranger over
whom defendant has no control, then rule of strict liability can't be applied. For
instance, in Box V Jubb, some strangers blocked the drain of defendant's
reservoir as a result of which the reservoir overflowed and damaged plaintiff's
property. The Court held that the defendant could not be held liable as the
damage has been caused by the act of stranger.
It must be noted that if the act of stranger can be foreseen and prevented by the
defendant, then the defendant has a duty to stop it. Failure on part of defendant
to do so would make him liable.

5. Statutory Authority:
If the damage has been caused by an act which the legislature authorizes
then; the rule of strict liability can't be applied. For example. If a railway line
is constructed by a Statute and some damage is caused by it, then the person
can't use the rule of strict liability. In Green V Chelsea Waterworks Co[viii],
the defendant company had a statutory duty to maintain continuous supply
of water. A main belonging to the Company burst without any negligence on
its part, as a consequence of which the plaintiff's premises were flooded with
water. It was held that the company was not liable as the company was
engaged in performing a statutory duty.