(CHAPTER IV Aids in Interpretation and Construction Sec. 55. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aids, and Presump- tions In Aid of Construction, - In trying to ascertain t depisistive intent, courts may make use of elements that are found in the law itself, or the so-called fatrinsle alds; or facts ormatters not found in the language of the law, or the so-called extrinsic aids. The courts may also make use of seria presumptions based on logic or established by pro- visions of Ia ‘Sec. 56. Intrinsic Alds. - These may consist ofthe ttle; the preamble; the words, phrases, and sentences; context; Punctuation; headings and marginal notes; and legislative definitions and interpretation clauses Sec. 57. he Title. - As previously discussed," the Constitution of the Philippines requires thatthe subject of she law be expressed in the title thereof, Consequently, In {e28¢ Of doubt as t0 the scope of the body of the act or the connotation of general words used therein, the tle may be {considered for the purpose of restricting, explaining or elucidating the same." Being aware of the constitutional equirement, the legislators must be presumed to have taken pains to have the title express the real subject matter of the JaweyBut it has been held that resort tothe title of a statute 38 an aid in construction is an unsafe criterion and is not entitled to much weight." This must be so because under Prevailing jurisprudence the title need not be a complete Index of the subject of the act. Sec. 58. The Preamble, - As sometimes expressed, the Preamble is the key to open the minds of the makers of the 4aW It is especially helpful when the ambiguity is not simply that arising from the meaning of particular words, but such as may arise in respect to the general scope and TBS Bee Cape op, 136 Mage a Commiaione of nena Revenue, 314 US 125 Commisionr of Curt Relaale, 0.8. Wo 1-11860, 136 See dscesion vader Caper 1. 86 ‘meaning of a statute. But it must be borne in mind preamble is Rot an essential part of the act and it confer or enlarge powers.” GO CHIOCO VS, MARTINEZ, ET AL., 45 Phil. 256 FACTS: In an action to recover a loan with usurious interest, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to retura to defendant the wsurious interest collected but absolved the later from paying the princi- pal of tbe loan. On appeal, plaintiff contended, among others, {that under the Usury Law (Act No. 2655, as amended by Act No. 2992) the court had no power to order the forfeiture of the principal RULING: ‘The law did not intend to bar the creditor from coming to court for the recovery of his capital. And this conclusion is fully sustained not only by the history of the Usury Law bot also by the preamble thereof. Speaking of the necessity of the interveation ofthe prosecuting attorney in actions resulting from the violation ‘of the Usury Law, a8 well a of the penal sanction, said preamble tives the following reasoning: “We believe i to be 4 sound proposition that the fiscal should intervene in the actions arising from the violation of the proposed provisions set out in the ‘original bill because, among other reasons, those poor persons ‘unable toemploy analtorney will be represented and thus the law ‘would not bea dead lee. But without the penal clause, it seems {hat such intervention is wot proper. But why not insert such 2 clause? We would not be the first and only nation which would ‘do such a theory, We ae ofthe opinion tha a fine equivalent io {our times the amount in excess of the interest charged oF subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, would be suf cient and better than the forfeiture ofthe principal.” there can be n0 room for doubt that it was pot the intention of the Philippine Legislature to forfeit the principal in condemning — usury by means of a law. 197 Cooauy Min. Co, ys South Carolan, 144 US. $30.88 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION PEOPLE ET AL. VS. ECHAVESET AL., GR. Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980 FACTS: Informations for violation of Presidential Decree No, 772 penalizing squatting were dismissed motu proprio by the Court of First Instance on the ground that the said decree did not apply to grazing lands, which were occupied by the accused. RULING: We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree oes not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities of ‘more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made bby well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves, pastare lands ia rural areas The preamble of the decree is quoted below: “Whereas, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing Secretaries of National Defense, Public Works and Communications, Social Welfare and the Di sector of Public Works, the PHHC General manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rebabilitation ‘Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, to remove all illegal construction inclading boildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits ‘8 public and private property, squatting is still a major Problem in urban communities all over the country; “Whereas, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and'private lands belong 10 the affluent class; “Whereas, there is a need to further intensify the forermment's rive agains this illegal and nefarious prac- [shouldbe stressed that Leuer of Instruction No. 19 refers 0 ‘Mtal constructions on public and private property. Itis comple- ‘Riated by Letir of instruction No. 19-A which provides for the of squatters inthe interest of public heal, safety and Peace and order. On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, lke the grazing lands involved in this case, ts punished by Republic Act. No. 947 which makes it unlawful for Ay person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or ceapy agricultural lands. PEOPLE VS. HON. A. PURISIMA ET AL., G.R. Nos. 1-42050-66, November 20, 1978 FACTS: Informations for violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 were ‘ordered quashed by respondent Judge oa the ground that they failed to allege an essential element ofthe offense, ¢., that the ‘carrying outside of the accused’s residence ofa bladed, poiated ‘or blunt weapon isin furtherance or oa the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, lawlessness, or public disorder. ‘The People however argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows. {thatthe prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activi- ties and that they are essentially a malum pronibitam penalized for reason of public policy. RULING: In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure presidental decree in these cases -the primary rle i to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is controlling factor, for in the words of this Court io Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teebankee, what- ever is within the spirit ofa statte is within the statute, snd this hhas to be so if strict adberéace to the letier would resolt in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. ‘There are certain aids available to us to ascertain the inteator reason for P-D. 9(3). Among these are the preseace of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out inthe ‘“Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (I) the state of martial law in the ouotry pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos, 6 and 7 which are paticolarly meatioaed ia P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,90 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION | insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly ‘weapons, The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute, usually introduced by the word “"whereas"', is not tssential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, ot ure inberent defects in the satute; thatthe explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of {he decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such taplanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. We disagree with hese contentions, Becanse of FOB P..9. ‘what acts fall within the purview of } ee is ingire no the nen ad spi 0€ BG ad ti cn Be found among oes i the preamble or oe clauses wich enumerate te faci or even wich jenty the promulgation ofthe decree 0d the sit Sanctions apd tere Sec. 59. Words, Phrases and Sentences; Context - As ascosued calc," thelepslatve intent must primary be termined fron the language’ of the statute, and such Tanpuage consists of ine words, prass and sentences used therein: But the meaning of the law, it must be borne in ting, snot tobe extracted from any single pat portion or fecuon or ffom isolated words and phrases, clauses or Sentences, bu com a general consideration of view ofthe beuasanole™ Every part of he statue most be inter- preted with reference the contet. Tis means that every Part of he statute must be considered together and kept ‘ebsssles Intanofthe whol nace ot subservient to the general in ee ZA 60. Punctuation. - Punctuation is/an/aid of low _/ degree in interpreting the language of astatute and can never ‘control agains theinteligible meaning of the written word.'* But if punctuation of a statute gives it a meaning which is 13 Chapter 3, spa, 199 12645, 500345, pp. 699-700, Ho Tamayo Gc 38 Pi 95) reasonable andi apparent accord with he eae Wt may be ued ats sdonal argument tat thera meaning of he words hw uncle = ey ithas bee elt reiace wpe pancantin tc low foundation yon wich re a tht wouldupet ihe cbvout pers of te Cons the laws." ee ei U.S. VS. HART ET AL, 26 PHIL. 149 FACTS: Accused-appellants were convicted by vagrancy, punishable under Section | of Act 519, wi won incans of sapport.” Theevidebg: however hbase appellants had visible means of support. RULING: ‘ Relying wpon the second clause to sustald the , a ee visible means of support” as sed in that clause doee ant apply to every person f ‘ambling housss. "bu oxanming ot. ‘ting rouge he Sou i else had Rea intended for ““without visible means of support” to qualify the ‘first part of the clause, either comma after gambling would bave Been omitted, or else a comma after the ult Mt Maa, 470.0. 12245 Aas. Sogn, 143 ellelago v4, Aquino, OR, No. 1636, Sept. 28,1957.~ 92 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION tion found inthe printed Act. sof the statute as tbus ponctuated: | Batan argument ased upon puctaton lone snot en ee SRE ire, i effect intenc yy the: if Superfluous oF incorrect puactu marks, and inserting others where necessary. "The Attorney-General has based his argumest upon the propo- sition that nether visible means of support nor a lawful calling fa sufficient defense under the last four paragraphs of the section; hence, not being universally a defense to a charge of ‘vagrancy, they should not be allowed except where the Legisla- ture has $0 provided. The then proceeds to show, by a “mere ‘grammatical criticism” of the second paragraph, thatthe Legis- Tatare did not intend to allow visible means of support ora lawful calling o block prosecution for vagrancy founded on the charge that the defendant was found loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses. ‘A most important step in the reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such @ construction ofthe law. What is loitering? The dictionaries say ‘tisidling or wasting one’s time. The time spent in saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything but that, So th inder the proposed construction, practically all who frequent such places commit a crime in so doing, for which they ae liable topunishment under the Vagrancy Law. We cannot believe that i was the intention of the Legislature to penalize what, in the ‘ase of saloons and dram shops, is under the law's protection. If ite urged that what is trve of saloons and dram shops isnot rue 0f gambling houses inthis respect, we encounter the wording of the law, which makes no distinction whatever between loitering ‘round saloons and dram shops, and loitering around gambling shops, and loitering around gambling 61. Headings and Marginal Notes. - For the pur- ‘ose of explaining and clearing up ambiguities inthe enact- aay Clauses of statutes, reference may also be had to the ings of portions of statutes, such as titles, articles, ) the amount of successional rights; (c) heinse validity ofte provisions of the wil; and (4) the capacity to socceed. They provide that - ““ART. 16, Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where itis situated.”” “However, intestate and testamentary successions both swith respect tothe order of succession andio the amount of Suecessional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testa ‘mentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, ‘whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless ofthe country wherein said property may be found.”” “ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph. tree, ofthe Civil Code, stating that - “Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or Property, and those which have for their object public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective bylaws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign couatry.”” revails.as the exception to Art. 16 par. 2 ofthe Civil Code afore- uoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress delered the Heel Pestvibetnoing the provslons of hs ond the net ‘receding article"” when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code and Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing ‘without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 ofthe old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their ‘Purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 as specific Provision in itself which must be applied to intestate and testate Cieetsiows. As further indication of this legislative intent, Ganaress added new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed isto be goveracd bythe national law of It is therefore evident that what evi lever public policy or good fantom may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress ‘Bot intended to extend the same to the succession of foreiga Imwee —peuedd by He sort pawgd : STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STATUTES 129 nationals, For thas specifically chosen to lave, lateral the| “mount of successional rights, 10 the decedent's national law. Specific provisions most prevail over general ones. ‘The rule above stated is, of course, applicable only as an id in ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intent; it cannot be applied where the effect will be to override and render almost useless express word, jn she, statute.” Sec. 78. Mandatory and Directory Provisions. - A mandatory provision prevails over directory ones. Thus, it has been held that Article 335 of the New Civil Code, ‘enumerating the persons that cannot adopt, one of whom is non-resident alien, prevails over Article 338 of the same Code which enumerates the persons that may be adopted {including a step-child by the step-father or step-mother; $0 that a step-father who is a non-resident alien cannot adopt his step-chid.2* Sec. 79. Provisos and Exceptions. - Where a proviso ‘was repugnant 10 the body of the enactment, the old rule was that it “repealed” the enacting part, This rule depended on the fact that because the proviso appeared subsequent to the enacting part it was the latest legislative expression and therefore controled. Obviously, this view was unsound for the entire statute was enacted at one time and the location of the proviso was the result of legislative style and not of legislative intention /The legislature cannot be presumed to destroy at birth its own enactment, Thus, the view of Chan- cellor Kent that the enacting clause and proviso should be construed together and that repugnancy between the enact- ing part and the proviso will not vold the enacting part has become the general rule.2” Otherwise stated, a proviso which is directly repugnant to the purview or body of an act is inoperative and void.” 207 30 Am. nc, Se. 267. 9.972. Jon Brehm ve. Repl, OR. No. L-1836,Sepember 30,1963. 30> 2 Semertd p.470471. The erm “enacting cane” whem td ia const nh peony exception tad antag cases tefes othe body othe SSUTEENGUS note conned withthe enacting clus,” previo nud, ‘hic nates heater ta pated he aw ‘710 Borromeo va Marien, 41 Phil 322.139 THESTA’ (TUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STA’ However inthe following decision the old rule has bees applies. [ARENAS YS. CITY OF SAN CARLOS ET AL 1G.R. No, L-34024, April 5, 1978 FACTS: pettone, a City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) ied san euion to compel the city 10 appropriate money to cover bid eriiferental which he claimed be is entitled to wm pumthic Act No. $967. Respondents alleged among others thal Republic Act No, $967 provides that the salary ofthe city jodBe aera ieast be P100.00 per month less than that of city mayor talinat the city judge receives an annval salary of P12,000: Much sP100.00 per month less thas the salary Deing received By TBe city mayor which is P13,200.00 yearly. The Court of Fi Instance of San Carlos City dismissed the petition. RULING: ‘The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. $96] a ‘Sec. 7, Unless the City Charter or any special law provi higher salary, the city judge in chartered cities shall receive ‘asl salary which shall not be lower than the sums as prov herein below: ‘(@) For second and third class cities, eighteen thous ‘esos per annum; “Por the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first tite, the city judge aball receive one thousand pesos less that fixed for the district judge, and for second and third cli cites, the city judge shall receive one thousand five buné ‘esos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for of receive two thousand pesos 1es8 that fixed for the district jodge: Provided however, That salary of city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos ‘month less than that ofthe city mayor.”” ‘The petitioner contends that “x x x ifthe last proviso of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 would be interpreted a5 controling measure for fixing the salary ofthe city jodges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that of a City Mayor ce f second and third class cites) woald be ‘endered totally wseless.” The petitioner submitted “that since the principal intention of the legislature in enacting Section 7 of ‘Republic het 3967 isto increase the salary of he city judges, then the last proviso of sad Section 7 should give way to the provi- ‘sions of said section preceding said proviso,” “The record shows that when Republic Act No. $967 took effect ‘on June 21, 1969, Sin Carlos City Pangasinan) was a third class ity: tha the petitioner as city judge received an annual salary of $12,000.00; and thatthe city mayor of San Carlos City received tin annual salary of P13,200.00 which was exactly P100.00 ‘month more thas the salary ofthe city judge. im the deliberation of the Senate thatthe intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No, 5967 was that the Shiary ofa city judge should nt be higher than the salary ofthe Sy Zayor, The saving clause “Provided, bowever, That the ‘Salary of city judge shall be at Teast P1O0,00 per month less than ato the city mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary of ety judges for second and third class cities at 18,000.00 per annum. “The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit dhe general language ofa statute. When there is imecoocilable repegnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is iven precedence over the latter onthe round that isthe atest Expression ofthe intent of thelegimae) get Tn as much asthe city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an annual salary of P13,200.00, the respondents TE ie compelled to provide for an anaval salary of P18,000.00 for the petitioner asthe city Judge of the said city. Crawford states, in connection with exceptions, that in the event the body of the statute is irreconcilable with the ‘exception, the latter, according to the best reasoned authori~ ties, is void.*"" Exceptions,-as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as thelr 1an~ (guage fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved In “TI Crater, Stnary Connection See. 299. 612.favor of the general provisions rather than the ex; ‘(Phere a general rule is established by statute with Hoos, the court will not curtail the former nor add 10 {atte by implication.*"* ‘See. 80. Duty of Courts to Reconcile Conte Statutes, - Consistency in statutes is of prime importa tnd, inthe absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws smed to be consistent with each other. Where it possible todo, it is the duty of courts, in the construs (ofstatates, to harmonize and reconcile laws, and to ad construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes reconciles it with other statutory provisions.” ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATI INC. VS. FELICIANO, G.R. No, 24022, March 1965 Facts: ‘A tice importation by the Rice and Corn Administration sought tobe enjoined on the ground that Republic Act No. 34 ‘Provides that importation of rice and corn is left to private par ‘upon payment of the corresponding taxes. Republic Act 2207 however provides that should there be an existing ‘imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by National Economic Council, the President of the Phil Authorize such importation thru any government ‘may designate. The principal question is whether Republic A No, 3452 has repealed Republic Act No, 2207. RULING: To’epin with, the two laws, ath (wo laws, although with a common objec- live, refer to different methods applicable to different circum stances, Thus, the total banning of importation under normal, {zadons as provides for in Republic Act 2207 is one sep to Achieve the rice and cor sufficiency program ofthe Administra~ a4 ht Samson ota. vt.Courtot Appeals tal, 0.8. No. L-43182, November salt? 50m. I. Sc. 363 ae 367; Valera. Taos 40 Pil 823; People MO. No, L-3167S, fae 29,1982. i f STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER jon, The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation ot rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor shortage ‘wll unduly compete with the local prodacers and depress the Jocal price which may discourage them from raising said crop. (On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of tice importation as embodied in Republic ActNo. 3452is another Siep adopted to attain the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their meth- ods of approach are different; one is by a (otal ban of rice inporiation and on the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the goverament during normal period. There is another area where the two laws find a common poiat ‘ofreconciliation: the normalcy ofthe time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three situations: (1) when the local produce of rice {s sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough {o constitute a national emergency; and (3) when the shortage in the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importa- tion is allowed whether by the government or by the private tector, However, im the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation by the government. ‘Republic Act 3452, on the other band, deals only with situa- T and 2, But not with 3. Nowhere in said law can we discern overs importation where the shortage i the local supply is of such gravity a8 to constitute amational emergency. In short. Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, bt when there is a shortage in local supply of such gravity so constitute anational emergency, we have to turn to Republic ‘Act 2207. These two laws therefore are not inconsistent and 10, Implied repeal does not ensue Sec. 81. Statutes of Later Date. - When two statutes of different dates and contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, and there is no way of reconciling them, the statute of later date, being presumed to be the latest expression of legislative will on the subject, prevails.” 713 Harman vt Rosie Corpernion of the Piipins, 0 Pil. 490,— _|34 THE STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STA PACIS VS. AVERIA, G.R. No. L-22526, November 29, 1966 FACTS: ‘Aher the Collector of Customs of Manila started seizure and forfeiture proceedings against a fishing boat allegedly used in smuggling, and which was inthe custody of the Philippine Navy, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, upon application of the) ‘owner of the boat, issued a writ of replevin commanding the provincial sheriff of Cavite to take immediate possession of the’ Boal, The Collector of Customs however contended that his jurisdiction to conduct seizure and forfeiture proceedings of vessels for violation ofthe Tariff and Customs Code is exclusive, ofthe Courts of First Instance. RULING Petitioner would contend thatthe jurisdiction ofthe Bureau of Ccusoms to conduct scizure and forfeiture proceedings of vessels for violation ofthe Tarif and Customs Code is exclsive of the Cours of First Testance, “He would further maintain that the istance ofa wit of rplevia, as what actualy transpired ia this case will prevent the Bureau of Customs frm further proceeding withthe seizure and forfeiture for allegedly under Section 2531, ete Tata Csims Coe, ote may be eid oly while the thing subject to forteitore isin the cust Gaines of Conoms. ¥ : nae ‘The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, list the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. At te same time, in Par2of Tile VI thereof, it provides forthe procedure in seizure snd forfeiture cates and vests in the Collector of Customs the sathorty to hear and decide said cates. The Collector's decision ‘is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs whose decision it, ‘in turn appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals and then directly {otis Court. On the other hand, Section 44(c) ofthe Judiciary Aet of 1948 lodges inthe Court of First Instance original juris Acton in all cates ia which the value of the property in contro- Yeray amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original ‘f the Court of First Instance when exercised in Action fr recovery of personal property which is subject of & — ‘STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STATUTES 135 proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, ‘and to render futile, the forfeiture proceedings. This is precisely ‘what took place in this ease. The seizure and forfeiture proceed- ing against the M/B “‘Bukang Liwayway" before the Collecior of, Customs of Manila, was stifled by the issuance of a writ of replevin by the Court of First Instance of Cavite. ‘Should Section 44 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give away. to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code, or vice versa? In our opinion, inthis particular case, the Court of Fist Instance should yield tothe jurisdiction ofthe Collector of Customs. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which (ook effect oa Joly 1, 1957, much Tater than the Judiciary Act of 1948. Its axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior state, Moreover, on grounds of public policy, if is more reasonable to conclude that the legislators Tavended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a scizare and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation ‘customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of replevia, AMANDY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL G.R. No, L-76288, May 23, 1988 FACTS: In 1986 petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court cof Lucena City of violation of Section & of Rep. Act. No. 6425, Slncrwise Known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, for Pocttsion of a probibited drug i 1983, and sentenced among pepers to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) day. He filed th application for probation, alleging that be is entted to the Suspended seatence under P.D.968. The application was denied By'the court for the reason that P.D. 1990 removed from the swf the exceptions tothe probations law those “senlenced imum of imprisooment of more than 6 years ‘The only isve to be determined inthis case is whetBeror not the respondent lower court committed reversible eror in dias rising the petitioner's application fr probation notwithand- ing the favorable recommendation of the probation ofTiest‘original Probation Law of 1976, Presidential Decree 968, provided in its Section 9 that “(Obe benefits ofthis Dec shall tbe extended to those: (a) seatenced to serve a maxim term of imprisonment of more than six years. x x x" In 1980, Batas Pambansa Big. 76 amended Section 9 of P. ffmore han si years and one day.” Subsequaly, in 1985 then President Marcos promolg Fresideatal Decree No, 1990 which amended BP 76nd rea tothe eater formulation in P.D. No. 968. The latent decree the mate excludes from the benefits of te Probation Law aa applicant who bas been “sentenced to serve a maximum lerm imprisoameat of more than six years.” Tuisapparent rom the history of the provision in question thal 1 disagreement on policy matters existed between ihe thet resident and the thea legislature. In the two Presiden Decrees, the Presideat was for denying probation to aay ong Senzaced1oimprisonment of more than six years The Balsa, the other hand, was for amcading the applicable term of ‘imprisonment to more than six years andone day. Since under the ‘sual situation then existing, both the Batazang Pambansa and {be Presidentcouldegslatc onthe same subject al the same time, the ater issuance has to prevail. This is P.D. 1990 The petitioner docs ot attack the validity of PD. 1990. He Units bimsetf o stating that P-D. 1990 di no intend to auliy BP.76, He slates that the intent and purpose of PD. 1990 is 0 sy applications for probation filed by those who sil appeal the jdgneat of conviction, only to pursve tbe same whes their peal is eventually dismissed. It is, according to him, nol Ineaded to deny probation benefits to those sentenced 106 years ‘36 day bya al coun fo suutain the petitioner's construction of P.D. 1990, Sec.2 2 deny the very purpose of the amendatory decree. The fier of one day rom the original sx years and one day, i to nly those fenders convicted of less grave felonies as, ia Art 9 of the Revised Penal Code. The questioned terent,P-. 1990 would not have struck out one day in onralvocal terms ifthe intention was not to exclude tore OF the next higher felonies from its coverage. The contention, therefore ofthe petitioner that B.P. 76 ndP.D. 1990 ton different subjects, the latter allegedly refering to Persons who appeal the judgment of conviction being disquall- fied from availing of the benefits of probation while B.P. 76 specifically dealing with the extension of benefits of probation to ‘ote sentenced to a maximum penalty of 6 years and I day, is devoid of merit. ‘According 10 the petitioner, B.P. 76 and P.D. 1990 mast be harmonized to ascertain the legislative intent. There can be m0 harmonization where one law specifically amends another. Where the provision of law is clear and unambiguous, so that there i 0 ‘occasion forthe court's seeking legislative intent, the law must te taken a it i, devoid of judicial addition or subwaction (lnsular Lumber Co. vs. Court of Tax Appeals. eta, 192 Phil. 29) ‘The other argument thatthe omission of “one day” from P-D. 1990 is the result of misprint or inadvertence im the careless reparation of Presidential Decrees cannot be given serious consideration. P.D. 1990 merely weat back to the P.D. 968 wording. ‘The supposed misprint is at the exact dividing line between correccional penalties and aflictive penalties. Iveannot be anything bot deliberate. The rule above discussed will not, however, apply where the conflict arises between general and special laws. Sec. 82. Conflicts Between General and Special Laws. To the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special aw, the latter will coatrol the former without regard to the respective dates of passage. The special law is to be taken as am exception to the ‘general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing. ‘contrary conclusion.** This is because implied repeals are ‘ot favored and as much as possible effect must be given to all enactments ofthe legislature. Thus, in one case, Repub- lic Act 337, which governs banks and banking institutions ‘and known as the General Banking Act, was held to prevail ‘over the provisions of Act 3135, which was promulgated "to 216 Lagmas ve Cae oP Couabaay GX No 20h, Sees 9 < "1S Bagh vt. Plpiac National Bak, $2010. 614; De Jme 120 SCRA "60; Levers ve. Inermedlate Appeie Coute aby OR. (66614 January 251988,F 9-8 STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STA seult the sale of property under special powers inserted reeianexedt eal estate mortgages,” in the matter of the infnption price of mortgages Wherein the mortgagee Is a ‘Gar or banking institution.** Similarly thas Deen ruled that in tax sales of properties Quezon City, the Quezon City Charter (Com ActNo.502) thnich provides for a one-year redemption period prevails et Republic Act No, 1275, providing for a two-year fedemption period; the latter is a general law.** 4 “The Police Act of 1966, providing for the procedure of removal and suspension of policeman, has been held to prevail over the Decentralization Actof 1967, alater general fav that provides for the procedure and suspension of all divil service employees in the Government.” CASSION ET AL. VS. BANCO NACIONAL FILIPINO, §9 PHIL. 560 FACTS: Paints mortgaged two parcels of tand, which they had scquied as homesteads, (0 the defendant Philippine National Tank, The morgagors having defaulted, defendant foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and sold the lands to the highest bidder. Over oe year afer wards bu before the expiration of five year from the auction sae, plaintiffs offered to repurchase the ‘und bat defendant turned dows the offer, contending that under ‘Act No. 2938 as amended by Act No. 2712, creating the Pilip- | pine National Bank, and Act No. 3136, which authorizes ‘auajudicial foreclosure of mortages, the debris alowed only se year to redeem the property. Plintifs, on the other hand, ‘ey on Section 117 ofthe Public Land Act which provides that “every conveyance of land acquired under the fee patent and Homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repur= chase by the applicant, his widow, of legal heirs for a period of five year from the date of conveyan-e ee RULING: ‘Section 288 of Act No. 190 laid down the rule in the construe- tion of two or more conflicting statutes or instruments, by providing that ‘‘when a general and particular provision are ‘inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former,” and that "‘a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent ‘with it” Section 60 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court reprodaced Section 288 of the former Code of Civil Procedure governing the Interpretation of conflicting instruments but omitted that part which refers to conflicting laws. It is mot necessary to express am ‘opinion whether the Rules of Court repealed the omitted part for th of wihout an express enactment it is a familir rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repog- ‘nancy between a general and special law or provision, thelatter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of, passage. (Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol and Corpus, 44 Phil. 138; 59 CJ. 1056, 1057; Crawford, The Construction of Statutes, section 230.) ‘Now then, it seems plain that section 32 of Act No. 2938 and. section 6 of Act 3135 are wider in scope or more comprehensive. than Section 117 of Act No. 2874. They comprehend al kinds of property brought within the relations and circumstances pro- vided thereby, while section 177 of Act No. 2874 relates 10 & specific class of property. Stated otherwise, the property on ‘which the Philippine National Bank's Charter and Act No, 3135 are opertive is any property mortgaged to the Bank, whereas, a8 already stated, Act No. 2874 by its own terms is operative only fon lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provsions. Section 32 of Act 2938 and Section 6 of Act No, 3135 standing alone would include homestead or free patented lands, while Section 117 of Act No. 2874 would not embrace any property other than that mentioned therein even if Acts Nos. 2938 and 3135 didmotexist. Touse the words of ActNo. 190 and theReles of Court, Act No. 2874 manifests “‘a particular intemt,”” to promote the spread of small land ownership and the preservation ff public land grants in the hands of the underprivileged for ‘whose benefit they are specially ictended and whose welfare is a special concern of the State. ‘We therefore hold that No. 2874 is controlling, that home- ‘steads constitute an exception to Acts Nos. 2938 and 3135.8 STATUTE, ITS FROVISIONS, AND OTHER STAI GARCIA VS. PASCUAL, GR. No. L-16950, December 22, 1961 FACTS: Pekoner, who was appointed clerk of court of the justice of court (AoW municipal court) of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, $e acting jstice ofthe peace, pursuant to Section 75 of Rep, Ne. 296, otberwise known asthe Judiciary Act, filed manda- Sos proceedings to compel the respondent municipal mayor to [jwove papers needed for the payment of bis salary. It is {Beever contended by respondent that he, not the justice of the ‘has the power of appointment under Rep. Act. No. 1551, finer law, and the same as repealed Section 75 of Republic Act Ne 286. UUNG: (nttisappeal appellants nsst that the provisions of Rep. Act We. 1551 repealed the provisions of section 75 of the Judiciary Jet becane section 10f Rep. Act No. 1531 provides that all sevlyees whose salaries are paid by the general fonds of the ‘sicipalty shall be appointed by the mayor upon recommends- mol he chet of office, so tha, as th clerk of court of the jute ofthe peace is paid out of the general fonds of the smicpalty, he power to appoint the said clerk should be led the mayor as with all other subordinate officials ofthe ‘Wein no merit inthe above contention. Inthe first place, vitnatt te peace are appointed by the President of the lipyne, the same manner as judges of superior courts, in fete ote separation of powers amoag te tree depar- alt ofthe governmen., The independence ofthe judiciary lie ober departments of the goverumeat Is one of the Principles esiabished by the Constiatios fe zinence wil be greatly hampered if subordinate offic era abet ppolaimen by te head of he manic ovince. Acusory reading ofthe provisions of Rep. Act Br 1S51 clearly shows that what it intended 1 be made subject eat by the municipal mayor are the subordinate the masicipalty, like employees in the executive ‘employees in the municipal council or board. There ils ig atc and reason why sald act, as a general law, may be considered ing repealed the specific provisions of section 75 of Rep. ‘A substantially similar rule prevailsin cases where the two conflicting provisions are found in different statates relating tothe same subject. It san established rule inthe ‘constructions of statutes that a subsequent act treating a subject in general terms, and not expressly contradicting the provisions of a prior special statute, is not 10 be considered at intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, ualess itis absolutely ecessary $0 {0 construe it in order to give its words any ‘meaning at all, Hence, where there are two acts or provi- sions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question and the other general, ‘whieh, if standing alone, would inclode the same matter, ‘and thus cooflict with the special act or provision, the special act must be taken as intended to constitute an ‘exception to the general act, as the legislature is not presumed to have intended a conflict. Thus, when the provisions of a general law, applicable to the entre state, fare repugeant to the provisions of a previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such general law does not operate to modify or ‘epeal the special law, either wholly orm part, ualess such ‘modification or repeal is provided for in express words, or arises by necessary implication.”" (pp. 328-329, Black on Interpretation of Laws.) BAGATSING ET AL. VS. RAMIREZ ET AL. G.R. No. L-41631, December 17, 1976 FACTS: ‘The Municipal Board of Manila enacted an ordinance regulat- {ng the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls. The validity ofthe ordinance was impagned oa ‘the ground that the publication requirement under the Revised | (Charter of the City of Manila was not complied with.RULING: ‘The nexus of the present controversy is apparent conf terweea the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local ‘For Code on the manner of publishing tax ordinance enacted b the Monicipal Board of Manila. For, while Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides: ‘Each proposed ordinance shall be published in two sity newspapers of general circulation in the city, and ‘all not be discussed or enacted untill afler the third day following such publications. * * * Each approved ordi- nance * ** shall be published in two daily newspapers of within ten days after its proval, and shall take effect and bein force on and after fe twentieth day following its publication, if no date is fixed in the ordinance.” Section 43 ofthe Local Tax Code directs: ‘Within ten days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordi ances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges ‘shall be published for three consecutive days ia newspa Per or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction ofthe local government, or posted in the local legislative tall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within te territorial jurisdiction of the local government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the ‘spective component and mother units of a local govern- ent for dissemination. "" ther words, while the Revised Charter of the City of Mala requires publication before the enactment of the ordi- utc and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of ‘sera circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only pre for publication after the approval of “ordinances levying inance in the local legis- {atv all or premises and in two other conspicuous places within ‘the territorial juris compl Charter of the City spawned tis gal :stion that the Revised Charter of the City of _ ates oly tothe City of Manila, ‘general law because it applies Universally tall local yovernments, Blackstone defines general law as auniversal ul affecting the entire community andspecal law as one relating to particular persons things ofa laa. And. thervle commonly sds that a rir special law is 301 ordinary repealed hy asubsequcetgenerallaw. The fact that one special and the other general reales a presumptive that the special is (© be considered as remaining an exception ofthe general, one a5 feneral law ofthe land, the other asthe law ofa particular eae. However the rule readily yields to a situation where the spectal statute rters to a subject tn general, which the general state ttcasin particular. Ths exactly i the circumstance obtaining inthe cate at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter ofthe City of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general, Le, iespective of the nature and scope theeot. whereas, Section 43 of the Local "ax Code relates 0 “ordinances levyiog or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. Te regard, therefore, to onde tances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Maaila's doubtlessly dominant force losesit continuity whea approaches the realm of “ordinances levying or imposing taxes fer or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code coetrls, Here, asalways,a general provision must give way toa partcelat provision. Special provision governs. This is ¢specally te ‘hore the law containing the particular provision was enacted Inter than the one containing the general provision. ‘The City Charice of Manila was promulgated on Jone 18, 1949 as agaiast the Local Tax Code which was decreedon June I, 1973. Thelaw= power cannot be said to have fended the establishment leave in force provisions ofa prior law by which the new will of {he legislating power be thwarted and overthrowa. Such atesult ‘would render legislation useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to reproach of uncertainty and wniatelligibility. ‘The case of City of Manila vs, Teotico is apposite. Inthatcase, ‘Teotico sued the City of Manila for damages arising from the juries he suffered when he fel inside an uncovered anda7 ee tami cb merc Jor manhole on P. Burgos Avenve. The City of Mani esied lability 00 the basis of the City Charter (R.A, ‘xemping the City of Manila from any liability for damages of {ajory to persons oF property arising from the failure of the city. fice to enforce the provisions ofthe charter or any other law ‘cordinance, or from negligence of the City Mayor, Municipal Board or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of the charter or of any other law or ordinance. Upon the oer band, Article 2189 ofthe Civil Code makes cities Tible for damages for the death of, oF injury suffered by any persasby reason of defective condition of roads, streets, ridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control of supervision. On review, the Court held the Civil Code control- ling. i is trve that, insofar as its territorial application is, concerned, the Revised City Charter is a special law and the subject matter of the two laws, the Revised City Charter estab- lishes 2 general rule of liability arising from the negligence in feaerl, regardless ofthe object thereof, whereas the Civil Code. ‘oastitates a particular prescription for liability due to defective streets in particalar. Inthe same manner, the Revised Charter of the Cty prescribes a rule forthe publication of “ordinance” in feaenl, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the obi és ce levying or imposing taxes, fees or Me in part fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by ‘implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one ‘Achaner provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by ‘later statate and where a statute is controlling, it must be read {mothe charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision ‘Aubsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities pee- ‘ails over any conflicting charter provision, for the eason that a ‘harler must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public Policy of the state. A chartered city 18 not an independent {Sletiemiy. The state remains supreme in all maters not purely RG, Qtderwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution tay antral laws ofthe state; iis to have read intoit that general wich goveras the municipal corporation and which the iy adap €28H04 Set aside but to which it must yield. When a Adopts a charter tin eftect adopts as pat of its charter the law of such charter. GR. No. 1-61998, Febrasry 22, 1983, FACTS: Petitioner, a Comelec registrar, was charged bythe Tanodbayan, wih violation of the 1978 Election Code before the Sundiganbay- tn. He moved to quash the information on the ground that jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and try the same is lodged withthe Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Cour). The Sandiganbayan denied bis motion to quash; hence this petition for ceniorar RULING. Petitioner and respondent rely on different provisions of the 1973 Constitution a8 bases for their respective contentions. Petitioner invokes Section 2 of Article XIIfe] of the 1973 Com stitution which vests upon the COMELEC the power ‘to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections," and its implementing legislation, and Section 182 of the 1978 Elec- tion Code, which provides the following: “Section 182 - Prosecution. The Commission shall, thea its duly authorized legal officers, have the power to conduct preliminary investigation ofall election offenses. punishable under this Code and to prosecute the same. The ‘Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecat- ing arms of the government." Petitioner further cites Section 184 of the same Code which Invests the court of first instance with “exclusive original juris- diction to try and decide and criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which sball be under the | jurisdiction of the city ormunicipal courts. xx x General supports the petitioner’s views. ‘Upon the other hand, the Sandiganbayaa, in its resolution of August 13, 1982, aserts its jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 5054 om the authority of Section $, Article XIII of the Coastita- jon, which mandated the creation by the Batasang ‘2 special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, whichie over criminal an cv ete ivtring sand such be eres conmited seen ceding tae oer inna ela 1 wif ‘wuld ein an time ePOWEE Hasse he Sedianhayan a wa, ofc ad Be rear Present Decres No, 1606s 1607 cei. a acon 4 of PD. No, 166, be Sandgabaran sna bve jonas ayn othe egal cours panic Act No 209, a mende = om ee 1 nike Ant aan CoP “ Ae effete pre, a8 Se a, i would dining tween er eo epi et No.3: 1 et ASomminedhy pac omecr an cnloe ‘. ened my peti officers and employees neal aie - i tarned Tie Vio be ave ysicon seated em roe os conelled corer Sere eeceined by aw ie anigabayan a8 tf sonttna acter prac in he ete (ees commit ate ocean hose commited 8a ints oe Mae poston taken by the Sanizanby att crn ao maid z ato tbe COMELEC ofthe powcr. amon oe etree adniestetall laws GPE concomiuant aor ae canoe ot widen competing reson, Tae ve mete ‘SCentoonal satendmest or 0 ue Save gone pagan [mendes ce, order and boven condo on eon era ese Cs people and make a mee ile ceTEmiN of a sn dn every qualities cuzen wae TOTS SSiatetec ot we anon omnes any eecivenes 19 ach at provisions lel es exc 9save jisdcton over criminal and civil cases involving gi find corrupt practices, and such otber offenses committed abli offices and employees, including those in government Freed and controlled corporations, in relation wo weir office a imiy be determined by law.” ‘To te Sandiganbayan, as set forth inthe challenged resoly tion, "xxx he Key phrase in the determination as to whether Sndigasbayan othe regolar cours of first instance should take ‘copnizance ofan election offense, is the phrase, “in relation their office." Thus, it would distinguish between elect offenses commited by public officers and employees in re totheiroffce and those committed not in relation to their office ‘We find the position taken by the Sandiganbayan devoid merit. The grant {0 the COMELEC of the power, among others, enforce and administer all laws relative tothe conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident Gonstiational intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of lectio, falure of which would result in the frustration of the lof te people and make a mere ile ceremony of secred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecul ‘ifeases committed by public officials in relation to their office ould thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this lear constitotional mandate. From a careful scrutiny ofthe constitutional provisions relied spon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit erat wo it adits prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayaa, of authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses =e by public officers in relation to their office, as ontadistngushed from the clear and categorical bestowal of a ‘authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the ours of fis instance under Sectins 182 and 184, respectively, the Election Code of 1978. ictte te Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have uri faruphOter “sxx offenses committed by public officers x x ae tei office as may be determine by law (Se. {AE-XIM; while the Office of the Tanodbayan shall “receive Xi) Se Complaints relative to public office.” [Sec: 6, c clause, “as may be determined by law” is, 10 ‘mind, imbued with grave import. It called for a legislation that ‘would define and delineate the power and jurisdictioa of both the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan, as what, in fact had been provided for in Presidential Decree Nos. 1606 and 1607, creating the said entities, “Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No, 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: “{a]_ Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, ‘otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Prac- tices Act, and Republic Act No. 1317; {b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned oF controlled corporations, embraced in Title VITof the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and Other crimes or offenses committed by public offic- rs or employees, including those employed in gov- fernment-owned or controlled corporations, in rela- tion to their office. Plainly, the above quoted paragraph {c]is butarestatementof the constitutional provision relating to the Sandiganbayaa. Tt is also to be noted that it is phrased in terms so broad and general that it cannot be legitimately construed to vest said entity with ‘exclusive jurisdiction over electon offenses committed by pablic otticers in relation to their office. Neither cam it be interpreted toimpliedly repeal the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted by Section 184 of the Election Code of 1978 to the court of first instance to hear and decide all election offenses, without quali- fication as to the status of the accused. ‘Apart from the fact that repeals by implication are sot fa- vored, it is noted that while Section 184 of the Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4{¢] ofP.D. No. 166 speaks generally of “other crimes of offenses committed by public officers x x x ia relation other ofice."” Needless to state, fs between specific and general statutes, the former must prevail ‘ince it evinces the legislative intent more clearty than geaeral Statute does. And where a reconciliation between the statate Is possible, as in the case at bar, the former should be deemed an ‘exception to the latter. ‘The same principle of statutory construction should be ap- plied with respect tothe powers vested upon the COMELEC and the Tanodbayan in $0 far as election offenses are concerned. (dla ‘THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL VS. ‘CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 45385, January 12, 1990 | FACT: Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. (CEPAL was ranted a franchise 00 June 17, 1961 uader Republic Act Né 3247 to install, operate and maintain an electric light, beat power system in the City of Cagayan de Oro and its subu Under the said law and its amendatory acts, it was uniform} provided that CEPALCO shall pay a franchise tax of three Centum of its gr0Ss earnings and that payment thereof “shall in lieu ofall taxes and assessments of whatever authority o privileges, earnings, income, franchise, poles, wires, transfor rs, and insulators of the grantee.” 0 June 8, 1973, the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231) was ‘promulgated. Section 9 thereof provided that “Any provision Special laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the province may Impose a ax on business enjoying franchise, based on the gross ‘eceipis realized within its territorial jurisdiction, atthe rate of sot exceeding one-half of one per cent of the gross annual tectipts for the preceding calendar year.” Pursuant to this Provision, the Province of Misamis Oriental promulgated an. ‘ordinance which levied on business enjoying franchise a tax of ‘one-half percent of their gross annual receipts forthe preceding, Calendar year. Both the Secretary of Justice, and the Secretary of Finance were however of the opinion that CEPALCO was exempt from payment of the tax imposed by the provincial feveaue ordinance. The Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental also held, in a petition for declaratory relief, that ‘CEPALCO was exempt. Hence, this appeal by the province. UUNG: ‘We find no merit in the petition for review. jor collected through court action. Railroad Cos Rafferty 40 Phil. 224). The rales that special 2nd local staat applicable oa particular cat isnt repealed by 2 later statute whichis general i Its terms, provisions and application even ifthe terms of the general act are broad enough {oinclude the cass inthe special la Republic Acts Nos. 3247, 3570, and 6020 are special laws applicable only CEPALCO, while P.D. No 231 isa general iat “The prestmption is thatthe special statutes ae exceptions ‘othe generallaw (PD. No. 231) because they pertain oa special Charter granted to mect a particular set of conditions and eicum- ances. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION YS. HON PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ET AL., G.R. No. 72477, October 16, 1990. FACTS: ‘The province of Misamis Oriental and Municipality of Jasaam ‘ited with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City acivil action against the National Power Corporation for the collection of real property tax. The NAPOCOR moved to dismiss the civil ‘case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, relying on Presidential Decree No. 242, dated July 9, 1973, providing that disputes, claims and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice. The lower court however held that it had tion over the case in view of Section 82 of the Real Property Tax Code, enacted on July 1, 1974, providing that delinquent real property taxes due the province or city may be ‘ence, this special civil action for certiorari. RULING: ‘An examination of these two decrees shows that P.D. 242 is a There is no provision in P.D. No. 231 expressly or impliedly nding or repealing Section 3 of R.A. No. 6020. The pet- persed FePUENaNCY between the two statutes should be very clear na ou ay hold tha the prior one has been repealed by ince ther ila ‘general law which deals with administrative settlement or adju- ‘ication of disputes, claims and controversies between oramong government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including {government-owned or controlled corporations, The coverage is broad and sweeping, encompassing all disputes, claims and controversies.ye ‘ME STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STAI ‘pD.464, onthe other band, governs the appraisal and seen of real property fo Purposes of taxation by provinces, ct me paicipaliies, a8 well as the levy, collection and ada tation of real property tax. It is a special law which y with real property taxes. a Tris a basic tenet in statutory construction that betwee general law and special law, the special law prevail EENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT Where a later special law on a particular subjects repug tm ovinconsisteat with a prior general law on the same sul {yaral repeal of the later will be implied tothe extent of fepagnancy oF an exception grafted upon the general law. ‘special law must be intended to constitute an exception tbe general law in the absence of special circumstances fore a contrary conclusion The coaflict in the provisions on jurisdiction between P. 242 and PD. 464 should be resolved in favor of the latter la since itis a special law and of later enactment. P.D. 242 m yield oP.D. 464 0n the matter of who or which tribunal or age tas jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of property taxes. Therefore, respondent court has jurisdiction hear and decide Civil Case No. 9901 LOPEZ VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL. GR. No. 87119, April 16, 1991 FACTS: 1a September, 1988 the Vice-Mayor of Manila who was at same time the Presiding Officer of the City Council of Mani Appointed nineteen officers and employees inthe Executive Si ‘ofthe Office ofthe Presiding Officer, pursuant to Section 15 Republic Act No. 409, a8 amended, which provided that Board shall appoint and the Vice-Mayor shal sign all appoint Anis of the other employees of the Board. The City Le Otficer was however of the opinion that it was the City May who was the proper appointing officer in view of Section 4 Repeblic Act S185 which provided that employees paid out ‘Moviacial, city or municipal funds shouldbe appointed, sb) {civil aw, rules and regulations, by the Provincial Gov pf Municipal Mayor, as thie case may be, and which tas repealed Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409. ‘THE STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER ‘The Civil Service Commission held that it is the City Couneit ‘to which the appointing power is vested. RULING: ‘As we stated atthe outset, the issue is whether or not Section 15, supra, ofthe Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed, ‘and as a result the City Council can no longer tender appoint- ‘ments to Council positions. ‘There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization ofthe Government of the City of Manila, is a special law, whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Big. 337, which apply to municipal governments in gea- cral, are general laws. As the Solicitor General points oat, and. ‘we agree with him, itis a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law - regardless of their dates of passage - and the special is to be considered as remaining an ‘exception to the general $0 also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible, the laws. ‘must be reconciled in that manner. Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and, the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the court in bolding that the later in time repeals the other. ‘Why special law prevails over a general law bas beea put by the Court as follows: 11x The Legislature consider and make provision forall the circumstances of the particular case. The Legislatore having Specially considered all of the facts and circomstances ia the particular case ia granting a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law con taining provision repugnant tote provisions of the charter, and without making any mention of is intention to amend or modity the charter, intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis vi: Cook County, 74 111, App. 1St; Philippine Railway Co. vs, Nolting, 34 Phi, 401) none case, we held tat Republic Act No, $185 6d not divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the Charter ofthe City ‘of Manila to approve the city Budget.—- ‘THE STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STA’ so We Cn Seer Common ta rohan ss paren Patani cacrypasey neared Bp Slang Srcnporrag et eactanons toed Sealed copings orca ee Tgetprerrerie-tirelaketteciar Bie isarcae ncinvs crate ee Sesina peers stops son on I prensa secs ee eee (Council of Manila for instance, ofits appointing power granted. Ig ne cr ret re me ecmpiamnetuenactioats besser Stand commen Cob ta pas aed a The rule treated in this section, it must be stressed, is Simply arule of construction which should be disreparded where its application would do violence to the intent of the Aetisiature. In this connection, the Supreme Court in one fase, went as far as saying that the circumstances surround: {ing the passage ofthe laws allegedly conflicting, as well the subsequent enactments of Congress, should be cons fred i order to determine the obvious policy and intent of the legislature" sm preits (Mula Bale) Sec. 83. Conflict Between Substantive and Procedural Law. - Substantive law is a positive law which creates, defines, and regulates the rights and duties of the pafties and Wich glverise to a cause of action, On the other hand, Procedural law, also referred to as law of remedy or emedial law, is the law which pertains to practice and cedure, or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is made effective 2 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. ASUNCION ET AL... No. L-46095, November 23, 1977 ‘agh” Misi Leu Case Association ve, The Audion Orval, 108 Pi 3 AC18. 9.741 ‘THE STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER 87 ofthe O14 Roles of Court provides that procedure should FACTS: During the pendency before the Court of First Instance of Manila of a collection suit brought by the herein petitioner against private respondents who were joint and solidary debtors, ‘one ofthe later died. The said Court dismissed the case pursuant to Section 6, Rule 86, of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that were thagply debtor, without prejudice to the right ofthe estate to recov@Pcootribution from the other debtor gx x."" Petitioner, in its lone assignment of error, alleged that the respondent Court erred in dismissing the cate against all the private respondents, instead of dismissing the case oaly as ‘against the deceased defendant and thereafter proceeding against the surviving defendants, private respondents herein. RULING: Petitioner's contention is well taken. Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 ofthe Revised Rules of Court was erroneous. ‘A-cursory perysal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rales of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provi- ‘sion merely setup the procedure in enforcing collection i case. ‘a creditor chooses to pursue bis claim against the estate of the ‘deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a ‘creditor (ia solidary obligation) has the option whether to file, ‘or not to file a claim against the estate ofa solidary debtor. In onstruing Section 6, Rule 87 ofthe old Rules of Court, whichis, the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court agid i the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Inc. vs, Villarama, etal. (107 Phil, 891) that: “TLis evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule creditor desites to g0 wgainat the deceased debtor, but Soaegie en aeons¥ {4 THE STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STAN ‘compliance with such procedure a condition precedent ‘efore an ordinary action against the surviving debtors, thould the creditors choose to demand payment from the later, could be entertained (0 the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court of jurisdiction to lake cognizance ofthe action against the surviving debiors, Upon the other band, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors for some of all of them simultancously."* Mis esa clear that Article 1216 of the Civil Code is iglicic provision la thls mate Sad provision gives er the igh to proceed agtas anyone of thot fetes or sour all of them simultaneously. THe tatoo eft to the soldary ereiior lo determine aga thom be wlleafrce collection, In case of death of one of {ary echo be (he credivon) may, ibe choos, proc tine sorvvingsoldary bios wioe neces felamia he esaecf the deceased debtors, Its nt nandalor for hin to have the case dismissed ax against the servi fedora filets cain against he estate he deceased soi Aer a was nade apparent inthe aforequted decision. For feu the eedtr to proceed gaint the esate, making Ht 4 taaidonpecedeat for any collection action agains he sai ing debtors to prosper, would deprive him of bs sebstanyg Beh poviedby Arche 1216 ofthe New Civil Code Astor rgd by petitionet,tSeta 6, Rate 86 ft Revied ules of Court were applied itealy Astle 1216 tg New Civil Code would, in fect, be repeated since under tg Kaleo Court peitioncr as no choice butt proceed aginst fale of Manuc Barredo only. Obviously, ths provision die ies the Bank's right under the New Civil Code top Aunt anyoe, some oral ofthe solldary debirs.Sech zation not anctiond bythe ric sled to require cation, that a subsianive law cannot Satesty epoca ie erin sted, Seton 6 vite Rales of Court cannot be made prevail Atle 126 af the New Civil Code, te former beng me Presi ie ens, reovr, no less an the New Conatiation ofthe Pil meee. in Section 5, Article X, provides that rules promulgated Court shou iminjgh, increase or m taney Cat sould ‘nt dining, inrete “a rr srarre. rs rows, 20 orgies 155 won ~ ‘84, Statutes In Parl Materia." - Statutes. which ‘felate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, of which have a common purpose, are in pari materia. It does not matter that the statutes were enacted at different times or contain no reference to one another. ‘Under the so-called “pari materia" rule of construction, it is well established that in the construction of a particular statute, or any of its provisions, all statutes relating to the Same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read iftonnection with it, and they shoyld be construed together as though they constituted one Taw. This rule finds justification in the assumption that statutes relating to the same subject matter were enacted in accord with the same legislative purpose.”** © & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION VS. NAWASA, G.R. No, L-27275, November 18, 1967 FACTS: ‘The lower court held that inthe purchase of materials for its wwaterwork projects, NAWASA thould give preference to local materials that are available, practicable and usable, im accor- ‘ance with Section I ofthe Republic ActNo. 912, which provides: that “ia the construction or repair work undertaken by the Government,” Philippine made materials should be used. NAWASA bowever contends that it does not fall within the purview of the term “Government” used in the law. gp rvtinc: ‘A comparative analysis of Republic Act 912 and Commion- ‘wealth Act 138, otherwise knowa as the ‘“Flag Law,”” the later “Aa Act‘ Give Native Products and Domestic Entities the Preference inthe Purchase of Articles forthe Goverameat,”” and the former “*An Act to Require the Use, Under Certain Condi ‘Upon the sume mate fst SECIS, See 366 pp 401-804. 4220 Bid Paseo ve Revie, $4 PAL 378, B11 Cnvfor, Saary Connection, See. 231, 9p. 03-434,156 THE STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STA‘ sont of Philippine Made Materials or Products ia Govern projects or Public Works Construction, Whether Done Directly ty be Government of Awarded thra Contracts," diclones that Todbrelate othe same subject matter and have the same nation, Dist perpose or object: o give preference 1o locally produced tata purchases, works or projects ofthe Goverument The E Ghervaion that Commonwealth Act 138 expressly incivden puccuiesby Government-owned companies, while Republic Act | Sitmerly elas wo constuction orepae wor Seve Wyte Goveramea, is no argument for the proposition that Goven ‘ea-owned or controlled corporations have been excepicd ff the operation ofthe latter law, for it to be clear that Ginmon- wealth Act 138 effo ordains that the Purchase and Equipment Division of government-owned companies authorized to pur ‘hase or contract for materials and supplies for public use, buildings, or public works, shall ‘Produced materials or products. B ley should be construed together to a ‘expressed national policy. Thus, ive preference to locally statutes in pari materia, tain the purpose of an ‘i has been aptly stated: nthe presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the previous siatutes ‘lating to the same subjéet matte, itis beld that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the ‘ew provision was enacted in accord with the legislative Paicy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should Se GmMMed together. Provisions in an act which are Pre #8 another act relating to the same subject matter [Atte applied in a proceeding under the other act, when the Aconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes relating (6 fame subject matter are to be compared with the new Provision; and Construction, both Ot cat Construed that effect is given to every provision confer, Satues in pari materia, although in appdtent 1 Ate 80 far as reasonably possible construed to be with each otber."” (Sutherland, Stitulory Construction, Vo. 2, pp, $30.32), The main object ive of the Government is to develop our ect ein soan ise connsy wiibe eonoete coe Ptzain ig can both Commonwealth Act 183.and Republic Act Scnribale tothe realization of the aforesaldnatonlis- ‘THE STATUTE, ITS PROVISIONS, AND OTHER STATUTES 157 tic poticy by requiring the use of Philippine made products or ‘materials, whenever available, practical and usable fo govern- ‘ment construction works or repair projects. The alleged conflict between the two laws is more apparent than real, and shoald not be allowed to defeat the purpose of these laws. We have to ‘declare, therefore, thatthe NAWASA, like any other coroporation exercising proprietary or governmental functions should be deemed embraced within the term “‘Government’” found in Republe Act 912, and in repair and construction of their works, ‘or projects or the purchase of materials therefor, local materials should be given preference when available, practicable and usable (Gre rie of pari materia, however, does not permit the wse ‘of a previous statute to control by way of former policy the plain language of subequent statutes, or to add a restriction {hereto found in the earlier statute and excluded from the later statute; nor has the rule any application in construing an act intended to be complete ini words, this rule of onstruction may not Be appied 10. marrow the ‘compass of one statute by reference to another non-confllct- ‘ng and non-repealing act, and restrictions placed in a power ‘none instance cannot be extended to another case for which they were not intended and for which another provision is made.™? And so it has been held in one case, that the application of the rule cannot be widened to the extent of supplying a deficiency ofa prescriptive period in one statute with a prescriptive period provided for in another. #3 Sec. 85, Ré-enacted Statutes; Principle of Legislative Approvals by Re-enactment. - Generally, where a statute, ‘or aprovision thereof, has been re-enacted by the legislature in the same manner or substantially the same language, the lawmakers are presumed to have the construction, ifthe same is uniform, placed upon such statute oF provic sion, before re-enactment, by the court of last resort in the state unless the statute as re-enacted clearly indicates @ different intention.2 ‘Hence, in the interpretation of re- 2 CIS, Se.336.9.813. 223 Pore Sun Fedo, GR. No, L850, September 1957. 224 cawtord, Suawory Coantvction, Sec. 273, p 437; Monelibane va, Fen, 97 Pail 24. R