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    A History of Air Warfare - Operation Desert Storm - 1991

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    Licio Jesus JESUS

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    John Andreas Olen (Orrrarion Desrnr Sroaxs, the US-led military campaign designed to drive Iragi forces from Kuwait, began in che carly hours of January 17, 1991, and ended on Feb- ruary 28, when George H. W. Bush declared a cease-fire. In forty-two days of military action, Coalition ground force experienced combat in only the last one hundred hours. ‘The ground campaign, with its wide and deep sweep into Iraq, combined with a shrewd, amphibious deception effort and careful logistical planning, consticuted an impressive achievement. Yet in asessing the speed and scale of the victory it is important to grasp that Coalition accomplishments were, in large measure, made possible by the comprehensive air offensive. The fighting on the ground unfolded without the fluctuating fortunes that normally mark major milieary campaigns because air operations, with more chan 1,800 combat aircraft in action, roughly 110,000 flights recorded, and more than 90,000 tons of aerial ordnance delivered! had decided the fate of the bate well before the ground offensive began. Ie was not the volume alone that proved devastating to che Iragi regime and ies armed forces, but also the unprecedented precision of the air campaign. Ofall the weapons dropped or launched, an estimated 8 percent were precision guided. These weapons proved very effective and improved air power effectiveness considerably? This chapter examines whae the Coalition accomplished at the operational level by focusing on the application of air power through the lens of five distinct types of air operations, or primary combat functions. The first, coral ofthe ar, ensured that sir, sea, and ground operations could proceed ae the place, intensity, and time of the Coalition's choosing without significant interference from Iraqs armed forces. The second, strategic atack,lagely paralyzed the Iragi command and contol apparatus and the regime’ ability to pursue its political and military goals. The third, supply interdiction, denied Iraqi soldiers eficient use of transportation links, halting timely delivery of food, water, and spare parts. Fourth, direct fore attack destroyed large 7 178 A Histony of Aix Wansans portions of Iraq artillery, tanks, and armored personnel catirs in the Fld prior to ‘engagements on the ground. Finally, air power filled its traditional role by providing close ar support (CAS) to Coalition forces once the ground invasion began.’ ‘The chapter describes the direct and indirect effects of the air campaign and includes Iraqi perspectives on the “Mother of All Batls,” as Saddam Hlusscin dubbed the 1991 was! THE INVASION OF KUWAIT From the Wests viewpoint, the crisis in the Gulf began on August 2, 1990, when Iraqi president Saddam Hussein ordered his lie miliary force to invade neighboring Kveit, Iraq’ stated objectives were co “occupy the city of Kuwait and other Kuwait cities” and to capture the ruling family as well as senior government officials’ The Republican Guard initiated the main effort by conducting a wel deliberate corps-level attack over multiple axes of advance. ‘The attack was based ‘on surprise, mass, and speed. An estimated 100,000 officers and men from the Republican Guard crossed the border with an array of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, supported by fighter-bombers, helicopters, special forees, and naval vessels integrated and. Although the ground advance dominated the invasion, the attacking force included all of Iraqs military services. The Iraqi air force conducted reconnaissance missions and gained control of the air by attacking Kuwait’s air defense system, aircraft, helicopters, and airfields. Helicopters from the army’s aviation branch ‘conducted a major airlift operation, fying from southern Iraq into several landing zones in Kuwait, and dropping special forces in downtown Kuwait City. The Iraqi navy, forts part, ook control of Faylakah and other islands, naval bases, and Kuwaiti territorial waters In less than forty-eight hours, Iraqi soldiers, armen, and seamen controlled strategic positions throughout Kuwait, including its capital. The attack in force wok the world by surprise. A long-standing and complex mix of grand strategies, conspiracy theories, regional animosities,and personal resentment underlay Saddam’ decision to invade Kuwait. The immediate impetus for che invasion resulted from an economic crisis triggered by Iraq’ pursuie of further political and military power, coupled with Saddamis belief that Iraq deserved more generous financial assistance, especially from its southeen Gulf neighboss. Iraq had tried to maintain high levels of military spending despite having accumulated considerable debt from its war with Iran, but by 1989-1990 most creditors had become increasingly reluctant to provide new loans to Iraq or to forgive debts. Ar the same time, afer eight years of war, the Opurarion Desexr Stons, 1991 179 Iraqi population sought an improved standard of living and became estive when the Saddam found it deeply offensive thas {government filed to meet its expectations. rather than being graceful co Iraq and to him personally for saving Kuwait from the Iranian mullahs, che emir of Kuwait lowered oil prices, thereby cutting into Iraq’ oil revenues; refused to forgive Iraq its war debt; and turned down Iraqs request to buy or lease the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. The Iraqi leadership also accused Kuwait of using state-of-the-art drilling technology to tap into the underground reservoir of Iraqi oil in the Rumaylah field, further reducing Ira’ sourees of income. ‘Throughout the summer of 1990, Saddam proclaimed that he considered these actions tantamount to economic war and ehreatened that Iraq would take action if Kwait did not agree to ies demands.” More prosaically, Saddam Hussein simply wanted 0 add Kuwaits fabulous ‘wealth to the depleted Lragi treasury and believed that noching could prevent him from taking conteol of his small, poorly armed neighbor. Kuwait's armed forces consisted of 20,300 troops, 245 ranks, and 35 combat aircraft Iraq outnumbered them 25 to 1 in tanks and 20 to 1 in combat aieraft. Thus, Saddam hac lee fear of serious resistance Iraq had long claimed that Kuwait had been a district governed by Basra during the Ottoman Empire and that the separate emirate was an artificial eration of the Briish, who sought to divide and control the fragi people. Saddam used this ‘argument to characterize Ira’ takeover of Kuwait as an “internal matter.” but he fully expected that the world would react negatively. Indeed, the United States responded immediately by condemning the invasion and freezing Iraqi asets. U.S. policy ‘was motivated by a combination of ideology and realpolitik. The only remaining superpower could not stay passive when one sovereign state invaded another—a ‘country whose independent status had been recognized by the United Nations (UN) Equally important, the United States viewed the invasion of Kuwait as a threat «0 oil fields in the region on which the United States and its allies depended. The UN Security Council also condemned the invasion within hours, ‘On August 8, President George H. W. Bush publicly outlined the U.S. position, stating both defensive and offensive objectives. The United Stares would defend Saudi Arabia against a possible invasion and would pursue four political objectives: to effect the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; to restore Kuwait legitimate government; to protect the lives of “American citizens: and to promote the security and the stability ofthe Persian Gulf* ‘That afternoon, the fist squadron of U.S. fighter-bombers arrived at Dhahran Air Base, marking the beginning of an American deployment that would include more than 500,000 men and women and several million tons of equipment and suppli. 180 A Histony of Aix Wansans ‘The deployment was initially geared toward defending Saudi Arabia (Operation Desert Shield), bur the Coalition soon started preparing for the offensive scenario (Operation Desert Storm). ‘While the United States took the lead in opposing the Iraqi occupation, the Bush administration worked with the UN and secured broad support for its undertakings. ‘As the Iragi occupation continued, the UN Security Council consecutively passed twelve resolutions, culminating on November 29, 1990, in the authorization for the American-led Coalition to use “all means necessary” if Iragi forces did not leave Kavait by January 15, 1991. ‘When it became obvious that Iraq would not comply with the UN resolutions, President Bush authorized Operation Desert Storm, ‘The Bush administration hhad ftom the beginning defined swo constraints that went hand in hand with the political objectives and were governed by the same combination of ideology and realpol damage resulting from miliary attacks, taking special precautions to avoid Iraqi civilian casualties. The administration believed that low casualties would be esential ik. The first was to minimize U.S. and Coalition casualties and collateral to securing and maintaining U.S. public support for the war. The second was to discourage Israel ftom undertaking any military action. With Egypt, Syria, and other ‘Arab states declaring their commitment to the liberation of Kuwait, the cooperation berween Christians and Muslims was in many ways unprecedented. Not only had Saudi Arabia invited military forces o the region, but it would also fund large parts of the participation of Coalition forces, make preexisting bases available, and ensure an abundance of fuel. US. policymakers recognized that it would be very difficul, if not impossible, ro maintain a multinational coalition that relied on Arab support if Israel became a de facto member of the alliance. Saddam Hussein could have averted a fall-sale conficeifhe had made political ‘concessions early on and withdrawn his troops from Kuwait. Instead, his immediate response was to demonstrate his resolve by declaring complete annexation of Kuwait as Irags “nineteenth province.” The weeks and months that followed witnessed an ‘enormous military buildup: the Iragis built “Fortress Kuwait,” while the Coalition deployed more and more troops to the region. The Coalition's military preparations ‘were coupled with diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions. Meanwhile, the Iraqis showed litte mercy toward occupied Kuwait,” and their brualty strengthened the Coalition's justification for action. In hindsight, Saddam made several major miscalculations. The first was that his surprise atack caused the United States to become suspicious about his wider intentions—especally the possibilty that he might onder che Iaqi troops positioned con the Saudi-Kuwaiti border to advance into Saudi Arabia Thus, when four days Opurarion Desexr Stons, 1991 181 after the invasion Saddam promised the United States that he would not attack Saudi Arabia, he lacked credibility. Moreover, he had not foreseen that the Arab League, as well as the UN, would sharply condemn his actions. Most important, he had not predicted that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia would call upon the United Staes for help, he underestimated the U.S. admi and he failed to realize that the Soviet Union was no longer in a position co influence US. devision making." Nevertheless, Saddam did not view war as an instrument co be used only when all other options had been exhausted. Rather, he seems to have believed that this ‘war would provide him a historic opportunity to unite the Arab peoples under his leadership and to deal with the conspiracies of his enemies—who included che Gulf istration's determination to see Kuwait liberated, scares a5 well as the United States and Israel. Ideally, faq would retain Kuwait, or ax least part ofits however, if that proved impossible, aq could avoid humiliation simply by putting up a fight. According to Saddam’ calculations, if Iraq achieved ‘even the appearance of a stalemate with the Coalition, he and his regime would reap ‘enormous political dividends and prestige in che Arab world. Finally, even if Iraq suffered a military defeat, Saddam would ensure the survival of his regime. ‘Thus, despite the unexpectedly large and determined forces mustering against him, Saddam resolved to stay in Kuwait and fight the “Mother of All Baces.” THE AIR CAMPAIGN: THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and his military commanders, Army Generals Colin Powell (the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Norman Schwarzkopf (che commander in chief of U.S. Central Command), defined cheir military goals according to the declared political objectives and the associated political constrains: to destroy Iraqs military capability to wage war co gain and maintain ai superiority: to cut Iraqi supply lines; to eliminate Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capability; wo destoy the Republican Guaed forces; and to facilitate the liberation of Kuwait City by Arab forces." Having consulted various air power experts, General Schwarzkopf became convinced that air power could play an unprecedented role in preparing for the liberation by ensuring chat bloodshed on the ground would be kept to a minimum. With a substantial leap of fith, Schwarzkopf moved beyond the tradivional AirLand Batle doctrine, which saw air power as only a supporting rather than a dominant element of a military campaign. Schwarzkopf instead decided to give air power time to systematically decompose the Iraq political military apparatus by attacking high-value targets in downtown Baghdad, lines of communications throughout Iraq, as well as ground formations in occupied Kuwait” 182 A Histony of Aix Wansans ‘The conceptual framework for the offensive operation had been clearly defined and was in place only three weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On August 25, Schwarzkopf declared his intent: Initially execute deception operations co focus his [Saddam Hussein] ateension ‘on defense and cause incorrect organization of forces. We will iniially aac into Ingi homeland using sie power to decapitate his leadership, command and control, and eliminate his ability to reinforce Iragi forees in Kuwait and Southern Iraq, We will chen guin undisputed air superiority over Kuwait so that ‘we can subsequently and selectively attack Iraqi ground forces with air power in order to reduce his combat power and destroy reinforcing units, Finally, we will fix Iraqi forces in place and destroy reinforcing units, axacks followed by armored force penetration and exploitation to seize key lines of communication nodes, which will put us in a position to interdict resupply and remaining reinforcements from Iraq and eliminate forces in Kuwait.” ‘Against this backdrop, Schwarzkopf defined a four-phased strategy: a strategic air campaign to establish air superiority over Iraq and incapacitate its regime: a a series of airstrikes subsequent air campaign to establish air superiority over Kuwait; against Iraqi tanks, arillery, and troops in Kuwait; and, finaly, a ground campaign that would secure the liberation of Kuwait. While the different elements of the aie ‘campaign were to be executed concurrently, with various levels of effort, the final phase—che ground campaign—would nor start until the fighting capacity of Iraqi formations had been reduced by 50 percent Saddam Hussein underestimated the military might and the technical superiority ‘of his opponents Sil, he expected that the Coalition would open hostilities with an air campaign and was confident that the Iragis could absorb such punishment and «even succeed in shooting down several Coalition areraft with its aie defense system. He viewed the air campaign merely as a phase before the “real was.” In anticipation of large-scale air atacks, he instructed his commanders to ensure “wide dispersion and large distances between different set of troops” and to combine the principle of dispersion with the extensive use of camouflage and decoys." The initiatives generally focused on “force protection,” were passive in nature, and included re- swictions on using electronic communications. The Iragi army’s chief of staff later noted chat Saddam gave the order “not [10] use the phones... there were microwave phones and landlines, he prohibited us from using [them al], ll messages were to be hhand delivered through liaison officers." Opurarion Desexr Stons, 1991 183 fa ground war occurred, Saddam's overall military strategy rested on inflicting high casualties ashe was well aware that this was the Western world’s most vulnerable point. Over time, he reasoned, Iraq would inflict higher losses than the Coalition could bear. Moreover, he viewed the Coalition as an ad hoc alliance and therefore an unstable one. Like the United States, he recognized that Arab nations would find ic politically impossible to remain in an alliance that included Israel as an active ‘member, and therefore he planned on atacks chat would draw Israel into the confi. ‘CONTROL OF THE AiR: SUPPRESSION OF THE [RAQL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM ‘The responsibilty for executing the Coalition air campaign fell on the shoulders ‘of Schwarzkopf's air commander, Lieutenant General Charles A. Homner:” With aircraft from the United Stares and eleven other European andl Arab counties, his fist operational task was to gain control ofthe at. ‘The Iraqi air force was considered the sixth largest in the world, It had a sub- scantial number of atack helicopters and more than seven hundred combat aircraft, including the aging MiG-21 and the more capable MiG-23 and MiG-25. Most important, it had thiry-five MiG-29s and sixty-five French-built Mirage F-1Es, both high-technology air supe rity fighters. These airrafe were supported by an infrastructure of twenty-four main operating bases, thirty dispersal bases, and more than six hundred hardened aircraft shelters, some of which were designed co survive a nuclear attack. However, studies of the Iran-Iraq War indicated that Baghdad would depend mainly on its ground-based air defenses rather than fighter aircraft to deal with air actacks.""To gain and maintain ai superiority, the Coalition set out to suppress Iraqs integrated air defense system and its radar-guided surface-to-air missles (SAMS), destroy Iraqi combat aircraft, and render its airfields unusable. ‘The Iraqi air defense system, named KARI (Iraq spelled backward in French), included four sector operation centers, seventeen regional interception centers, and more than four hundred observation posts, most of them well protected by con and equipped with state-of-the-art technology. Although the air defenses were dispersed throughout the country, focusing on the defense of more than 200 national “headquarters and projects,” of which 125 were military, éhe KARI system was set up primarily to deal with atacks from the eas (Israel) and the wes (Iran) 2" KARI's command and control system was designed to track airborne chreats and allocate particular tacks to either fighter aircraft or SAM batteries. The radar- guided SAMs included SA-2s, SA~3s, SA~6s, and the shorter range SA-8s and Rolands. These batteries were concentrated around major cities and significant 184 A Histony of Aix Wansans military facilities, with the purpose of shooting down aircraft from medium and high altitudes. In addition, aq had a large number of antiaircraft artillery and a variery of| infrared SAMs to protect point targets from low-altitude threats Coalition planners realized early on chat KARI was the nervous system of Iraqs air defenses. Thus, che plan to suppress Iraq's radar-guided SAMs without risking numerous casualties to friendly forces was based on a three-track approach. The fist track soughe to damage and disable che command and contol system, thereby preventing Iragi commanders from coordinating a sustainable defense. This portion ‘of the plan fest became “visible” to the Iraqis through the impact of precision guided bombs from stealthy F-117s and, shortly afterward, Tomahawk land attack missles Tewas heavily armed U.S. Army AH-64 Apache and MH-53 Pave Low helicopters, however, that fist crossed into Iraqi airspace and destroyed a radar station guarding the approaches to Baghdad, ‘The second track focused on the active suppression of Iraq’ radar-guided SAMs bby using drones and high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMS). The Coalition launched a series of BQM-74 drones in advance of suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) packages. The drones looked like aircraft on Iraqi radar screens, and as the Iraqis ativated their SAMs, they had to turn on their radars to fire. When the radars revealed their positions, HARMs from Wile Wease! F—4Gs and FA-18s destroyed them to fre the medium-altitude range for non-stalthy aireraft. In the fist houes ‘of the wat, Coalition sensors logged neatly one hundred Iraqi air defense radar cemissions—a number that dropped to fifteen shortly afterward and then became only “sporadic.” ‘The Coalition fired five hundred HARMSs during the first wwenty- four hours ofthe wat, with the result chat Iraqi air defense operators quickly realized that their best chance of survival lay in keeping their SAM batteries switched off?" “The third track followed up the initial weakening of the Iraqi air defenses with wide and deep attacks by a whole range of aierafi: A-10s, F-16s, F-111Es, F-111Fs, Fil5s, GReIs, F/A+18s, A-GEs, and B-52s. The plan was to ensure thatthe attacks ‘were so intense thatthe Iraqis would be unable to defend themselves in a coordinated fashion and thus would be discouraged from further ation, By USS. government estimates, the Coalition attacks effectively climinaced the Iraqi air defense system within the frst hour of war: after the very first night of ‘operations, individual air defense sectors were forced into autonomous mode, and KARI no longer functioned as an integrated system. The initial HARM attacks, ‘combined with precision strikes from F-117s and Tomahawk eruise missles, left much of KARI shattered, opening up the country so completely that within days, Coalition air-to-air tankers regularly operated in Iragi airspace.” Simultaneously, Opurarion Desexr Stons, 1991 185 Coalition aircraft rendered several atfelds inoperable and severely damaged oxhers by dropping mines on runways and hitting maintenance and storage facilities. By preventing the Iraqis ftom taking to the skies, the Coalition also eliminared an ‘especially feared possibilty: that the Iraqis might use aircraft to deliver biological or chemical weapons. After the fist nigh of atacks, Saddam Hussein visited the air defense center in Baghdad to receive an update on unfolding events and provide guidance. His main purpose was not to assess the damage that the Coalition had inflicted but co prevent the agi air defense commanders and Iraqi airforce from overreacting, He reminded his forces that in the greater scheme of his strategy for a long campaign, theic presence on the battlefield was more important chan their military effectiveness. He then ordered them to reposition MiG-29s to air bases that had already been struck, assuming that che Coalition would focus on the undamaged airfields. He instructed the air defense commanders that rather than engage in intense and random firing, they should insticute “disciplined shooting instructions because the enemy will ey co force us co use our ammunition continuously.” {As for Saddam Hussein’ “courageous air falcons.” with few exceptions the Iraqi pilocs did nor fight after the fist few days. The Iraqis ew slightly over one hundred Airetorair sorties in the frst three days of che war—an unimpressive performance given the sizeof lag air force." Around midday on January 24, the lagi ai force ‘came close to completing its most daring and only significant stike mission of the ‘war: evo Fels set out to attack the huge oil export erminal center at Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, but a Royal Saudi Air Force F-15C shot down both.” From the next day onward, the Iraqi ai force registered fewer than five sorties a day, and even the best pilots stood litte chance: nearly half of che thirty-three confirmed allied it-to- air kills were accomplished beyond visual range. Many Iraqi pilots never knew what hit them. Others were shot down shortly after takeoff thus, Iraqi pilots soon became reluctant to ly at all. Just as the air defenders quickly learned that activating theie radars meant inviting a deadly attack, the pilots concluded that flying meant dying. Iraqi records concede that afier one week of Coalition bombing, “The enemy has achieved air superiority... The Iraqi Air Force lost the ability to move becween bases... The aie bases themselves were ‘busy repairing the tarmacs and runways and deactivating the bombs." ‘ould not dispute Coalition air superiority and thus sought to hide and protect Iraqi aireraft in hardened shelters rather than challenge the Coalition in the ait. After four days of operations, Coalition aircraft began to destroy these shelcers with precision- guided munitions. F-111Fs, capable of carrying four laser-guided bombs, served "The Iraqi air force commanders quickly realized that they 186 A Histony of Aix Wansans 4s the principal shelter-busters, delivering GBU-10s and GBU-24s. According to Iraqi reports, “The enemy was able to strike these bunkers, destroy them, and the aircraft inside them. While the baccle was still going, orders were given to evacuate the [bunkers] of all the aircraft to outside the airbase into the surrounding ara." ‘The “surrounding area” meant relocating aireraft to schools and mosques, as Saddam ‘was certain that the Coalition would not attack civilian, histori, or religious sites. Aircraft were also camouflaged in palm groves, placed under tents “covered with @ layer of mud to match che surrounding are.” or buried in the sand. The overall ‘effect was to render all the aircraft irrelevant by moving them away from operational airfields. “The decision to send first-line combat airerafe to sanctuary in Iran further illustrates Iraq’s desperation." Even before the war, Saddam had decided to send porters, co Lran, and he had ordered and valleys," but on January 26 he issued an order that the Iragi air force fly is surviving combat aircraft co Ira. ‘The memorandum directs that eighteen Mirages, nine Sukhois, and one Falcon-50 be “evacuated” to Iran; additional orders were issued over the next three weeks, Iraqi 3 airrafi, Soviet-made Ilyushin ‘eansportation fleet hidden in intelligence reports state that a total of 137 Iraqi aircraft and 11 caprured Kuwaiti aircraft were sent to Iran before and during the war. Saddam later explained that the decision to evacuate resulted from Coalition air superiority and the limited impact Iraqi planes had on the battle. Thus, for “safekeeping ...che planes were sent co lan tundil the appropriate time comes to use them against the enemy.” Having suppressed the Iraqi air defense system and rendered the Iraqi ait force largely inoperable, the Coalition had achieved che basis from which allied air commanders could mount systematic and sustained attacks from the medium alsitude environment of ten thousand to «welve thousand feee against any target in rag without major risk to Coalition aircraft and pilots On January 27, Schwarzkopf and Horner declared that the Coalition had secured air supremacy, as distinguished from air superiority, which it had seized in the first moments of the ‘war. The declaration characterized the Iraqi airforce as no longer combat-effective.* Although the Iragis had to accept that they would be bombed whenever and wherever che Coalition chose, chey had one weapon that presented a major challenge to the Coalition: modified Scud missiles ateached co mobile launchers that could reach any city in Israel. Before the war began, Saddam had decided that he could achieve three goals by atacking Israel: improve Iraqi morale; increase Iraq’ and his ‘own personal prestige in the Arab world: and force the Jewish state to retaliate by bombing Ira, chereby driving the Arab sates out of che Coalition, Opurarion Desexr Stons, 1991 187 Asan immediate response to the Coalition's atack on Baghdad, Saddam Hussein ‘ordered his missile commander to begin “striking targets inside the criminal Zionist ‘entity with the heaviest fire possible.” Probably aware of the warning issued by Serecary of State James Baker in carly January that the United States would be willing to use unconventional weapons if the Iraqis used chemical or biologieal weapons, Saddam specified that “strikes must be carried out with ‘ordinary’ conventional ammunition for the missles. The fring must continue until further notice.” ‘On January 18, Iraq launched eight missiles in quick succession at predesignated targets in Tel Aviv and Haifa. The Iragi operational pattern of firing, moving, confirming new targets, reloading, and firing again ftom a position five to ten kilometers from the previous one became more ecient with every launch, However, the actual number of launches decreased thanks toa combination of Coalition effores and Saddam's order to hold back to ensure that Ie (Of the eighty-cighe total Scud launches, chitty occursed during the first seven days of the wat. January 25, when Irag fired ten missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia, saw the most launches, Over the last thirty days of the war, the Tragis barely launched one missile per day on average.” The United States assigned Patriot antiair missiles to counter these Scud. Although after-action reports questioned the military effectiveness of these missiles, would not run out of missiles they contributed significantly to raising public morale in Israel and helped discourage Israel from undertaking military action. Yet while the Coalition succeeded in keeping Israel out of the war, the Scud attacks allowed Saddam Hussein to make a claim that satined the respect of many Arabs: Iraq was the only Arab stare with the courage to actack deep into Jewish territory. According to Saddam, the Isralis “stood around ‘with their hands positioned on rheir heads, and the missiles rained down on there."** Operations intended to gain and maintain control of the air accounted for 14 percent of the Coalition’ total air-to-ground strikes.” The Coalition launched 1,270 strikes against SAM batteries, 2,990 against aieields, and 1,460 against Seud launchers. An Iragiafter-action report shows thatthe Irais had assumed that the aie attacks would be at low altitude, permitting destruction of Coalition aircraft. Iraq certainly had not anticipated the sheer mass of air power, or that che “interceptors ‘would be neutralized in such a short period of time." ‘Srrarecic Artace: Incanscrrarine Tae Inagt REGIME ‘At the same time asthe Coalition established aie superiority, it also soughe to paralyze the Iraqi leadership, degrade Iraq’ military capabilities, and neutralize the collective will o fight: This strategic portion of the ai offensive emphasized concurrent and 188 A Histony of Aix Wansans precise targeting ofthe regime itself, Rather than apply air power in a gradual fashion, ic was designed as an all-out offensive. The underlying theory was that striking at the heart ofthe regime from the opening moment of the war would ineroduce so much frision into Iraqs political-miliary system that it would be unable to coordinate offensive and defensive responses effectively. Air attacks would simultaneously

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