Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics 6th Edition

Contemporary Issues in Business
Ethics 6th Edition

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Contents
PREFACE xiii
I BUSINESS AND ETHICS
1 B usiness , E thics , and the F ree M ar k et 1

Introduction 1
What Is Ethics? 4
Ethical Relativism 5
Business Ethics: The “Free Market” Theory 7
Reading 1.1 Milton Friedman
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits 8
Doing Business Ethics: An Analysis of Friedman 11
Friedman’s Radical Position 13
Free Society 15
The “Tax Argument” 16
Is Obedience to the Law Enough? 21
In Summary 23
iv
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CONTENTS v
2 P hil o s o phical E thics : U tilit y, R ights ,

Virtue 2 5
Introduction 25
Utilitarianism: Maximize the Overall Good 26
Challenges to Utilitarianism 27
Ethics of Rights and Duties 30
Rights and Respect 30
Dignity and Autonomy 32
Virtue Ethics: What Type of Person Should One Be? 33
3 P hil o s o phical E thics : U tilitarianism and

the F ree M ar k et 3 9
Introduction 39
Utilitarian Defense of the Free Market 40
An Analysis of the Utilitarian Defense 42
Is the Free Market the Best Means? 42
The “Good” of Free Market Utilitarianism 46
Means and Ends Challenges 48
In Summary 51
4 P hil o s o phical E thics : R ights and the

M ar k et 5 3
Introduction 53
A Rights Framework for Ethics 53
Identifying Rights 54
The Scope of Rights 55
Negative and Positive Rights 56
Basic and Instrumental Rights 57
Resolving Rights Conflicts 59
Two Rights-Based Arguments for the Free Market 60
The Right to Liberty and the Market:
The Libertarian Defense 61
Private Property Rights and the Market 64
If Not the Free Market, What? 67
In Summary 68
vi CONTENTS
I I B usiness : P urp o se , G o v ernance , and

L eadership
5 T he P urp o se o f the C o rp o rati o n 7 1

Introduction 71
The Debate Over Corporate Purpose 72
Reinterpreting the Debate Over Corporate Purpose 75
In Summary 77
Case Study: Apple:Tax Dodgers or Smart Managers? 78
Reading 5.1 R. Edward Freeman
Managing for Stakeholders 79
Reading 5.2 John R. Boatright
What’s Wrong—and What’s Right—with Stakeholder
Management 89
Reading 5.3 Lynn A. Stout
The Problem of Corporate Purpose 98
Decision Scenario A: Peabody Energy and Patriot Coal 105
Decision Scenario B: A New Form of Corporation? 106
6 G o v ernance and L eadership 1 0 9

Introduction 109
Governance 109
Leadership 114
Case Study: Clashing Cultures? Goldman Sachs and Patagonia 116
Reading 6.1 United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Report 117
Reading 6.2 John J. McCall
Executive Compensation 126
Reading 6.3 Ronald Duska
Ethics in Financial Services: Systems and Individuals 138
Reading 6.4 Norman E. Bowie
Organizational Integrity and Moral Climates 147
CONTENTS vii
Decision Scenario A: Jack Welch’s Leadership 154

Decision Scenario B: Dodd-Frank and Executive Compensation 155
III B usiness and E mpl o y ees

7 E mpl o y ee R ights : J o b S ecurit y and
Participati o n 1 5 7
Introduction 157
Job Security: Dismissals and Layoffs 158
Individual Dismissals 158
Just Cause versus EAW 161
Layoffs 163
Employee Participation 168
Varieties of Participation 168
Participation and Rights 169
Participation and Firm Performance 169
Participation and Organized Labor 171
Case Study:Will German Labor Practices Come to Tennessee? 172
Reading 7.1 Norman Bowie
Meaningful Work: A Kantian Approach 174
Reading 7.2 Tara J. Radin and Patricia H. Werhane
Employment-At-Will, Employee Rights, and Future
Directions for Employment 179
Reading 7.3 Ian Maitland
Rights in the Workplace: A Nozickian Argument 190
An Ethical Basis for Employee Participation 193
Decision Scenario A: Too Attractive for Your Job? 200
Decision Scenario B: Employee Relations at EDS 201
Decision Scenario C: Electromation: Illegal Employee Participation 202
Decision Scenario D: The German Model of Employee Participation 204
Decision Scenario E: Saturn Motors: Shifting Into Reverse? 205
Decision Scenario F: Unwritten Employment Contracts 206
Decision Scenario G: Levi’s Shrinks 207
viii CONTENTS
8 E mpl o y ee R ights : H ealth , E q ualit y, S peech ,

and P ri vac y 209
Introduction 209
Health and Safety 210
Government Regulation to Protect Health and
Safety 212
Cost-Benefit Analysis 213
Health Insurance and Work 214
Equal Treatment in the Workplace 214
Government Regulation to Counter Discrimination 215
Arguments For and Against 217
Sexual Harassment 218
Gender Discrimination 220
Free Expression and Privacy in the Workplace 221
Case Study: Business and Governmental Responsibility for Employee
Health Insurance 224
Reading 8.1 James Chelius
The Occupational Safety and Health Problem 226
Reading 8.2 Ashley Nelson
On Leaning Out 232
Reading 8.3 Bruce Barry
Civil Rights and Wrongs 235
Decision Scenario A: Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance
at Work 244
Decision Scenario B: Dismissal Based on Religious Values? 244
Decision Scenario C: Genetic Screening in the Workplace 245
Decision Scenario D: When Gender Harassment is Not Sexual 247
Decision Scenario E: If You Work Here, Don’t Smoke 248
9 E thical R esp o nsibilities in B usiness :

H o nest y, L o yalt y, C o nflicts o f I nterest 2 4 9
Introduction 249
CONTENTS ix
Honesty, Loyalty, and Trust 250

Honesty 250
Loyalty 252
Trust 252
Professional Responsibilities and the Gatekeeper Function 253
Case Study: Conflicts of Interests in Subprime Mortgages 253
Reading 9.1 John R. Boatright
Conflict of Interest 255
Reading 9.2 Albert Carr
Is Business Bluffing Ethical? 258
Reading 9.3 Ronald Duska
Whistleblowing and Employee Loyalty 265
Decision Scenario A: Edward Snowdon:Traitor or Whistleblower? 269
Decision Scenario B: Employee Responsibility at Goldman Sachs 270
Decision Scenario C: Timing Mutual Funds 271
Decision Scenario D: “Soft Money” in the Securities Industry 272
I V B usiness and C o nsumers
10 P r o duct L iabilit y and S afet y 275

Introduction 275
The History of Product Liability 275
Assessing Product Liability Alternatives 278
Reforming Product Liability Law 280
Product Safety Regulation 282
Ethics and the Marketing of Dangerous Products 285
Case Study: Caution: McDonald’s Coffee Is Hot—And Its Food Will
Make You Fat! 287
Fairness, Strict Liability, and Public Policy 289
Reading 10.2 George G. Brenkert
Social Products Liability:The Case of the Firearms
Manufacturers 291
x CONTENTS
Reading 10.3 Steven Kelman

Cost-Benefit Analysis 298
Decision Scenario A: Sellers’ Response to Deadly Tragedy 304
Decision Scenario B: Tobacco Companies Under Fire 305
Decision Scenario C: Selling Guns: Negligent Marketing? 307
Decision Scenario D: The Michigan Toy Box Company 308
Decision Scenario E: A. H. Robins and the Dalkon Shield 310
Decision Scenario F: Diethylstilbestrol (DES) 311
11 M ar k eting E thics : Advertising, Sales, and

Consumerism 313
Introduction 313
Deceptive Marketing, Advertising, and Sales 314
Manipulation, Autonomy, and Vulnerability 315
Marketing, Consumerism, and Values 320
Coporate Political Advertising 321
Case Study: Loyalty Cards: A Benefit or a Threat to
Consumers? 323
Deceptive Advertising 325
Reading 11.2 Thomas Carson
Deception and Withholding Information in Sales 330
Reading 11.3 Glenn D. Braunstein
Let’s Junk Junk-Food Advertising to Kids 340
Reading 11.4 President Barack Obama’s National Economic
Council and Office of Science and Technology
Policy (2012)
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 342
Reading 11.5 Juliet B. Schor
Why Do We Consume So Much? 348
Decision Scenario A: Nike: Advertising, Marketing, and Free
Speech 354
CONTENTS xi
Decision Scenario B: Marketing in School 356

Decision Scenario C: Advertising’s Image of Women 357
Decision Scenario D: New, Improved,...and Smaller 358
Decision Scenario E: Eight Pitches 358
V B usiness and Other C o nstituencies
12 B usiness , E n v ir o nment, and

S ustainabilit y 361
Introduction 361
Environmental Responsibilities and the Market 362
Sustainable Development and Business 364
Case Study:When Is a Business Sustainable? 365
Reading 12.1 Norman Bowie
Morality, Money, and Motor Cars 367
Reading 12.2 Joseph R. DesJardins
Sustainable Business: Environmental Responsibilities and
Business Opportunities 372
Reading 12.3 William McDonough and Michael Braungart
The Next Industrial Revolution 378
Reading 12.4 W. Richard Sherman
The Triple Bottom Line:The Reporting of “Doing Well” &
“Doing Good” 385
Decision Scenario A: Global Climate Change 392
Decision Scenario B: Pacific Lumber 393
Decision Scenario C: Walt Disney Versus the Sierra Club 394
Decision Scenario D: Don’t Buy This Jacket 395
Decision Scenario E: Interface Corporation: Sustainable Business 396
13 G l o bal B usiness and H uman R ights 3 9 9

Introduction 399
The Ethical Relativist Approach 400
xii CONTENTS
The Nonrelativist Approach 402

Case Study: Business Responsibility, Global Manufacturing, and the
Rana Plaza Building Collapse 405
Reading 13.1 Ivar Kolstad
Human Rights and Positive Corporate Duties:The
Importance of Corporate–State Interaction 407
Reading 13.2 Ian Maitland
The Great Non-Debate Over International
Sweatshops 416
Reading 13.3 Denis G. Arnold and Norman E. Bowie
Sweatshops and Respect for Persons 425
Decision Scenario A: Doing Business with Repressive Governments:
Nokia-Siemens in Iran 438
Decision Scenario B: Doing Business with Repressive Governments:
Google in China 439
Decision Scenario C: Brazil: Economic Development Versus
Environmental Protection 441
Decision Scenario D: “When in Rome”: International Affirmative
Action 442
Decision Scenario E: Child and Bonded Labor: Business Responsibility
for Supplier Practices 443
Decision Scenario F: Drug Safety and The Third World 444
INDEX 447
Preface
It has been thirty years since publication of the first edition of Contemporary Issues
in Business Ethics. In bringing out this Sixth Edition, we remain committed to
the four goals of the first edition. First, we seek to approach business ethics from
a social and political perspective that examines the proper place of business within
a society committed to democratic ideals. We believed then, as we continue to
believe today, that business ethics is too often approached from a narrow personal
and managerial perspective, as if the only relevant question is “What should I do
as a business manager?” Instead, we approach business as a social institution exist-
ing in a social and political context, in which a broad range of stakeholders, and
their rights and responsibilities, influence the daily operations of business.
Second, we continue to bring special attention to the rights and responsibilities
of employees. Many students who use this text will eventually hold managerial
positions, but they all, with few exceptions, will first and always be employees
working for others. Employees depend on business for their income and—of
increasing importance—health care. The workplace is where most of us spend
half of our waking life, a context in which others have the authority to direct our
behavior. Any situation in which an institution exercises control over an indi-
vidual’s ability to satisfy basic needs and choices deserves close ethical attention,
and business is no exception.
Third, we continue to seek a balance between careful philosophical analysis and
ease of accessibility to a wide range of student interests and abilities. We believe this
book will stimulate student interest both at first glance and after sustained and
close study. We hope students will come away from this text not only having
xiii
xiv PREFACE
learned a good deal about business ethics, but also with the ability to think and
reason philosophically.
Finally, we present readings and cases that reflect a wide range of disciplines and
perspectives. Our readings come not only from philosophy and management, but
also from law, economics, journalism, marketing, social science, and finance.
Case and Decision Scenarios encourage students to apply the lessons from these
diverse fields and perspectives to practical real-world issues.
The Sixth Edition incorporates a number of substantive changes reflecting
cutting edge developments in business ethics. Two new chapters have been
added, but we have retained many crucial readings, including some that were
original to the first edition and have become classics over the years.
Readers of prior editions will recognize a familiar logical structure to this text.
In Part I we introduce students to the conversation by beginning with the classic
essay by Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits.” Chapter 1 through Chapter 4 use this essay—and the ethical, social,
and economic views it presupposes—to introduce students to the basics catego-
ries of philosophical ethics: utilitarianism, rights, duties, relativism, virtues, ethics
and the law, and so forth. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of Part II are new and exam-
ine business as a social institution in some depth, with particular attention paid to
issues of the nature and purpose of the corporation, corporate governance, cor-
porate culture, and leadership. The general conclusion from these early chapters
is that a philosophically adequate account of business ethics must acknowledge
that business has many ethical responsibilities beyond the narrow ones described
by Friedman. To understand the full range and content of such responsibilities,
we then examine the ethical relationships of business with its major stakeholders:
employees (Part III), consumers (Part IV), and society at large (Part V).
New to the Sixth Edition
This Sixth Edition of Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics reflects a substantive

revision of the contents and structure of the text. This edition includes:
• Eighteen new readings from authors such as:
Bruce Barry
John Boatright
Norman Bowie
Ron Duska
Edward Freeman
Steven Kelman
John McCall
Tara Radin
PREFACE xv
Lynn Stout
Pat Werhane
• Eighteen classic readings retained from authors such as:

Denis Arnold
Norman Bowie
George Brenkert
Albert Carr
Thomas Carson
James Chelius
Joseph DesJardins
Ron Duska
Milton Friedman
Ian Maitland
John McCall
Juliet Schor
• Twenty-three new Cases and Decision Scenarios (fifty-four total) on such

topics as:
Goldman Sachs
Patagonia
Bangladesh and Rana Plaza
Doing Business in China
Corporate Loyalty Cards
Volkswagon
Electronic Monitoring at Work
Apple
Edward Snowdon
Subprime Mortgages
B-Corps
Consumer Loyalty Cards
• Two entirely new chapters, on corporate purpose (Chapter 5) and on gover-

nance and leadership (Chapter 6)
• New coverage of:
The Affordable Care Act

Free Speech in the Workplace
xvi PREFACE
Religious Freedom at Work

Corporate Culture
Corporate Purpose
Governance
Leadership
CEO Compensation
The 2008 Financial Crash
Virtue Ethics
Consumer Data Privacy
Sustainability
UN Framework on Business and Human Rights
Corporate Complicity with Human Rights Violations
Conflicts of Interest
Subprime Mortgages
Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace
Corporate Political Advertising
Rana Plaza Factory Collapse in Bangladesh
Supply Chain Management
Job Dismissals
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Deception and Manipulation of Consumers
Women’s Career Paths
• Retained emphasis on the social, political, and philosophical foundations of

business ethics
• Retained organizing structure focused on potential business obligations to
employees, consumers, and society at large
Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of our reviewers:

Rikki Abzug–Ramapo College; Bonnie Ackerman–Westchester Community
College; Joseph Adamo–Cazenovia College; Carolyn Ashe–University of
Houston; Kathy Bowen–Murray State College; Kenneth Ferguson–East Carolina
University; Hannah Love–Pacific Lutheran University; Peter Madsen– Carnegie
Mellon University; Timothy Madigan–St. John Fisher College; Wade Maki–
University of North Carolina Greensboro; Robert Micallef–Madonna University;
PREFACE xvii
Paul Nnodim–Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts; and Csaba Nyiri–University

of Toledo.
Once again, we thank everyone at Cengage Learning for their support in shep-
herding this manuscript through the editorial and production process. We espe-
cially wish to thank Ian Lague–Development Editor, Debra Matteson–Product
Manager, Elena Montillo–Production Manager, Joshua Duncan–Assistant Editor,
and Alexandra Ricciardi—Intellectual Property Analyst. Finally, as always, we
thank our families: Linda, Michael, and Matt and Kate and Alexa.
1
Business, Ethics,
and the Free Market
INTRODUCTION
In January 2011, the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission issued its report on the causes
of the economic crisis that began in 2007. Among its conclusions, the commission
found that “[t]he crisis was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother
Nature or computer models gone haywire. The captains of finance and the public
stewards of our financial system ignored warnings and failed to question, understand,
and manage evolving risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American
public.” The commission cited “dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk
management,” “widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision,” “exces-
sive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency,” an “ill-prepared” govern-
ment, “failures of credit rating agencies,” and “a systemic breakdown in accountability
and ethics.”
One of the major lessons to be drawn from these findings is that the best analysis
of the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s cites both
personal failures of individuals and shortcomings within the economic, social, and
political context in which these individuals acted. It was both the “captains of finance”
and the “public stewards of our financial system” who failed us, and who were respon-
sible for the harms to the “well-being” of the public.
These conclusions highlight the perspective we take in this book. Business eth-
ics involves not only issues of managerial decision making but also must examine the
economic, social, political, and legal institutions and practices within which individual
decisions are made. Ethics involves issues at both the individual, personal level and
issues of social institutions, structures, and practices.
1
2 Part I Business and Ethics
Unethical and shady business practices in such major financial firms as Bear
Stearns, Countrywide Financial, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup,
Merrill Lynch, McLennan, Credit Suisse, Fannie Mae, and First Boston all played
roles in the financial collapse that had global implications that continue to this day.
Fraud, deception, conflicts of interest, and sheer greed seemed to characterize the
standard business practices of the financial industry in the first decade of the twenty-
first century.
Numerous institutions were designed to prevent such abuse by providing over-
sight and regulation in financial markets. Boards of directors have legal and ethical
obligations to oversee the activities of managers and ensure that the best interests
of the corporation are being served. Auditors and accountants have an obligation
to conduct independent appraisals and testify to the integrity of corporate financial
reports. Financial analysts and credit rating firms have an obligation to provide truthful
advice to investors. Government regulators and private oversight boards have an obli-
gation to prevent fraud and conflicts of interest, and to promote responsible corporate
governance.
Unfortunately, all of these watchdogs failed in their oversight function. In many
cases, the very CEOs charged with corruption also held positions as chairmen of the
boards of directors. In such situations it would be extremely unlikely for the board to
fulfill its oversight obligations. Accountants and auditors were involved in each of the
unethical practices mentioned previously, and in every case they, too, stand accused
of fraud. The Securities and Exchange Commission charged financial analysts and
financial advisors at numerous financial institutions and credit agencies with mis-
leading investors by issuing fraudulent reports or by concealing conflicts of interest.
Deregulation, including the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, a federal law that
had prohibited commercial banks from engaging in securities and investment bank-
ing, created an environment in which financial institutions could push the envelope
of ethical practice with impunity. Failures in judgment and failures in ethics ran deep
throughout the financial system, and millions of people lost their homes, their jobs,
their retirement savings, and their businesses as a result.
Business is among the most powerful and influential social institutions in human
history. As so clearly seen by the results of the 2007–2008 economic meltdown, deci-
sions made in business affect nearly every aspect of contemporary life. Almost half of
our waking hours are spent in the workplace (at least for those of us fortunate enough
to have full-time employment; for those who lack full-time work, that fact also is
highly influenced by business decisions). What we eat, where we live, if and how we
work, how we are governed, how we spend our leisure time, and how much access
we have to education and health care are all strongly influenced by what happens in
business.
It is crucial, therefore, that we think carefully about the ethical status of busi-
ness. Businesses are not natural objects that humans have discovered; they are human
institutions humans have created. Therefore, we are responsible for the existence
Chapter 1 Business, Ethics, and the Free Market 3
and structure of business institutions and must acknowledge that responsibility by

monitoring the ethical dimensions of business activities.
What is the appropriate role of business in society? How should business institu-
tions be structured to ensure that they are consistent with the fundamental values
of a society? What responsibilities do businesses have to the society in which they
operate? To their employees? To the consumers of the goods and services that they
provide? Conversely, what responsibilities does a society have to business owners
and managers? These questions make it easy to see why business ethics is relevant
to every individual—as citizen, as employee, as consumer, as responsible business
manager.
To understand more fully the relevance of ethics to business, it is worth con-
sidering the range of people harmed by the widespread business misconduct that
brought about the economic meltdown. Certainly the individuals accused of crimes
and unethical behavior, as well as their families, have been affected directly. Although
critics claim that not enough white-collar crime has been prosecuted, many execu-
tives involved in recent scandals face years of legal and financial troubles and social
dishonor. Their families, in many cases innocent of any wrongdoing themselves, face
similar burdens.
Employees of these firms have been harmed in many ways as well. Tens of thou-
sands of innocent people lost their jobs as a consequence of the collapse of such
firms as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide Financial, and AIG. As a result,
thousands of innocent families lost their income, health care insurance, and retirement
funds. Many investors suffered significant losses from these practices as well. Quite
literally, billions of dollars have been lost by investors due to fraud and corruption
within the financial industry. There is little doubt that financial misconduct under-
mined investor confidence in financial markets and that this contributed to lengthen-
ing and deepening the economic downturn.
Millions of people lost their homes, and years later remain deeply in debt, as a
result of the collapse of the housing bubble that had been created by these unethical
financial practices.
It is fair to say that the general public has been harmed as well. Six years later,
the U.S. economy continues to feel the effects of these failures, and the entire global
economy has been even slower to recover.
In light of these events, the centrality of ethics to a business education might
seem abundantly clear. It would be impossible even to begin talking about these cases
without using the language, concepts, and categories of ethics. In this way, a course in
business ethics is as central to a business education as courses in managerial accounting,
finance, marketing, human resource management, and all the other core disciplines
of a business curriculum. Yet despite this, skepticism about the relevance of ethics to
business remains. Many people simply think ethics is irrelevant to business. To counter
this common misperception, this chapter makes the case for the need to study ethics
in a business setting.
WHAT IS ETHICS?
Ethics is all about choices. What kind of person should I be? What should I do? How
should I behave? What should I value? In what type of society ought we live? The
ancient Greek philosopher Socrates claimed that “the unexamined life is not worth
living,” and this statement captures the essence of an ethical life. Every single day,
each one of us faces a range of ethical questions that boil down to perhaps the most
fundamental question of all: How should I live my life? Answering these questions
is unavoidable; we go through life either explicitly answering these questions, or we
implicitly answer them by the choices we make each day.
In thinking about these questions, it is helpful to distinguish between two dif-
ferent senses of “ethics.” The word ethics itself is derived from the Greek word ethos,
meaning “custom.” In this sense,“business ethics” refers to the actual customs, attitudes,
values, and rules that operate within the business world.With this understanding, busi-
ness ethics is often studied by social scientists who are interested in understanding the
actual decisions, behaviors, practices, and values that occur within business settings.
Business ethics in this sense is descriptive in that it describes the values and practices
within business.
But from the earliest days of Greek philosophy, philosophers have not been satis-
fied with simply identifying what is customary with what is ethical. Ethics also refers to
an intellectual and academic discipline, a subfield within philosophy, that evaluates and
makes judgments about those customs, values, and rules by which people live. In this
way, “business ethics” is normative in that it evaluates the customary values and behavior
of business against ethical norms. Descriptive ethics focuses on what is valued, whereas
normative ethics is concerned with what should be valued.
But philosophical ethics is not content with merely what should and ought to
be; philosophical ethics also aims to answer the question “Why?” Philosophical ethics
asks us to step back and abstract ourselves from the actual practices of society to evalu-
ate those practices and to provide a systematic justification for those evaluations. It is
fair to say that Western philosophy was born in Socrates’s critical examination of the
customary norms of Greek society. Socrates described philosophy as the gadfly that
buzzes around a noble, but sluggish horse. The role of the gadfly (business ethics) is to
prod the horse (business and society) out of complacency and keep it moving forward
by questioning, examining, and justifying what is considered normal or acceptable.
Failing to do so is to live an unexamined life. One consequence of this is that one may
effectively sleepwalk through life, uncritically accepting the norms, values, and expec-
tations of one’s environment.This, Socrates tells us, is to live a life less than fully human
and not worth living. In this textbook we examine, in a philosophically systematic way,
a wide range of normative judgments about business.
Returning to the skepticism about business ethics mentioned earlier, we see that it
amounts to the claim that philosophical ethics are somehow irrelevant to the practice
of business. In the remainder of this chapter, we examine two common versions of this
skepticism. Ethical relativism holds that there are no objective or rational standards by
which one can judge business. A second view, associated with defenders of free market
economics, claims that business practices and customs already are ethical and therefore it
is unnecessary to employ external philosophical standards beyond the values built into
market economics in order to judge business practice.
ETHICAL RELATIVISM
Ethical relativists hold that all ethical beliefs and values are relative to one’s own culture,
religion, or feelings. On this view, ethics truly is nothing more than the ancient Greek
ethos, or “custom,” and there is no external basis on which to judge anyone’s customs.
Relativists thus deny that any objective or rational standards can be applied across cul-
tures or religions, or between individuals. The most common expression of relativism
is found in the rhetorical question, “Who’s to say what is right or wrong?” Relativism
poses a serious challenge because if it is true that there is no rational way to decide what
is normatively right or wrong, then business ethics is a waste of time. More important,
without some rational standard that is independent of cultures, religions, and individual
beliefs, we are left with only power to settle conflicts. This point has been recognized
from the earliest days of Western philosophy. In a dialogue with the sophist Thrasyma-
chus in Book I of Plato’s Republic, Socrates acknowledges that if there is no rational way
to establish the norms of justice, then we are left with the relativist view that justice is
whatever is to the advantage of the strongest. If there are no objective or rational stan-
dards by which we can judge if some customary norm is right or wrong, then social
norms will be established by whoever has the ability and power to do so.
Fortunately, several considerations count strongly against the validity of ethical
relativism. First, we should be careful to distinguish what people believe is right or
wrong from what is right or wrong. It is true that beliefs about right and wrong, justice
and fairness, differ among cultures, religions, and individuals. Some particular culture
or religion might believe, for example, that women are inferior beings who deserve to
be treated as slaves. But believing that this is right does not make it right.
What is sometimes called cultural relativism acknowledges the fact that cultures
disagree about many beliefs and values. If this is all that ethical relativism involves, there
would be little cause for worry. But ethical relativism is not just this descriptive claim;
it is a normative viewpoint that claims there can be no objective or rational standards
by which we can resolve disputes and disagreements.
The first consideration that counts against the plausibility of ethical relativism
is simply to point out that the truth of cultural relativism—the fact that cultures
disagree—is not evidence that objective agreement is impossible. After all, some cul-
tures have believed that the earth is flat or at the center of the universe. But no matter
how many people believe the earth is flat, it still remains round. If ethical relativism
is to be defended, it must rely on something other than the fact that people disagree
about what is right or wrong, just and fair, good or bad.
Second, we must be careful not to confuse tolerance and respect for diversity with
relativism. Many of us believe we should respect diverse cultures and tolerate a wide
diversity within and among cultures. But we must recognize that the very values cited
in defending these conclusions—tolerance and respect—must be assumed to be ethi-
cally rational and objective. When one claims that diversity ought to be respected, one
has made an ethical judgment. Either respect and tolerance are values that are ratio-
nally defensible, in which case we are justified in making those judgments, or respect
and tolerance are themselves relative to one’s own culture, in which case someone
who disagrees has no reason to accept our prescriptions. The values of respect and
tolerance are not reasons for accepting the legitimacy of ethical relativism.
This raises a third consideration. We need to be careful to distinguish disagree-
ment about ethical principles from disagreement about particular judgments based on
those principles. It may turn out that there is less disagreement about ethical principles
than many relativists assume. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, for example, was adopted without dissent. Every country in the world formally
agrees to it. Of course, people do not always live up to their commitments, and there
is wide disagreement over the application of general principles such as the right to life
and liberty. Again, disagreement alone does not prove the ethical relativist conclusion.
In fact, disagreement over the application of an agreed-upon principle calls for more,
rather than less, ethical reasoning.
A fourth consideration reminds us not to ask too much of ethics. It is tempting
to think that if ethical judgments cannot be proved beyond a doubt, and if one cannot
persuade others to accept ethical conclusions, then they must be relative and unrea-
sonable. But surely few, if any, of our rational beliefs can be proved beyond a doubt.
Logicians would call this the fallacy of a false dilemma: either a judgment can be
proved beyond a doubt or it is unreasonable. Ethics, like most other fields of inquiry,
relies on a standard better understood as “rational justification” than as “certain proof.”
If we can give reasons to support our ethical views, if they can withstand criticism, if
they are consistent with the facts, and if they are coherent with other deeply held val-
ues, then we can be rationally justified in holding them. If we hold ethics to a standard
of certain proof—attainable in mathematics, perhaps, but in few other fields—then
we will be unlikely to ever prove anything in ethics. However, if we use standards of
rational justification—standards common in such diverse fields as medicine, history,
and law—then we can be as justified in our ethical judgments as we are in medical,
historical, and legal judgments.
Finally, we must recognize the costs involved in being a consistent ethical relativist.
The relativist must claim that there is no reasonable and objective basis for establishing
that freedom is better than slavery, democracy is better than totalitarianism, heroism
is better than murder, and friendship is better than hatred. The relativist must claim
that there is no rational ethical difference between a parent who loves and nurtures
her child and the one who abuses and murders her child. Relativists deny objectivity
in ethics because, after all, “Who is to say what’s right or wrong?” and, as suggested by
economist Milton Friedman in the essay that follows, “One man’s good is another’s
evil.” These examples suggest how dangerous such relativist conclusions can be.
Of course, one of the best ways to assess the objectivity of ethical reasoning is to
participate in ethical reasoning.We turn now to the second source of skepticism about
the relevance of ethics, the view that holds that business practices already are ethical
and therefore it is unnecessary to bring in external philosophical standards to judge
the ethics of business. We invite you to participate in some ethical reasoning to assess
the validity of that position.
BUSINESS ETHICS: THE “FREE MARKET” THEORY

The second source of skepticism about business ethics holds that philosophical busi-
ness ethics is unnecessary because an adequate ethics code already governs normal
business practice. That ethical view is implicit within the economic system of free
market capitalism.
In much of Europe, Asia, and North America, but especially in the United States,
there is a specific theory of business ethics that is implicit in the thinking of many
people. What we refer to as the “free enterprise” or “free market” theory provides a
systematic view of the proper role of business in society. For many people, especially
for many business owners and managers as well as many economists and finance theo-
rists, this theory functions as the “official” ethics of business. Like the moral customs
and norms that Socrates discovered when he questioned the leaders of his native
Athens, this theory can serve as our starting point for philosophical analysis.
In general, the free market theory tells us that business managers have one overrid-
ing responsibility: to maximize the profits of business owners. In terms more common
in business schools and finance classes, the overriding goal of managers and finance
professionals is to maximize shareholder value. This responsibility is constrained only
by the responsibility to avoid fraud and coercion, and the obligation to obey the law.
This theory also holds that government’s responsibility is to protect the workings of
the free market and otherwise stay out of economic matters. Markets should be “free”
and unregulated; individuals should be allowed to make choices free from outside
interference, both from other individuals and from government regulation.
This free market perspective can be thought of as providing a normative eth-
ics, offering analyses of and prescriptions for most issues of business ethics. We will
see versions of the free market perspective defended in most of the chapters of this
book. Although we believe that ultimately it is an unsatisfactory ethical philosophy,
it remains an influential, popular, and highly regarded viewpoint. Even if you do not
agree with it, this perspective deserves your close consideration.
Fortunately, free market ethics has many articulate defenders. One such defender
was the economist Milton Friedman, who sketches this view in the now classic article
that follows. As you read through this article, begin your practice of philosophical eth-
ics by asking the types of questions described in this introduction. Why is Friedman’s
view an ethical position? To what values and norms does he appeal? What, exactly,
does he see as the proper role of business in society? How might Friedman respond
to the skeptic who suggests that ethics is irrelevant to business managers and business
owners? What responsibilities do business managers have? Consider what Friedman
might say about the corporate activities mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
What is the proper relationship between business and government? What reasons are
offered to support this view? Are the reasons convincing?
READING 1.1
THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF BUSINESS IS TO INCREASE ITS PROFITS
Milton Friedman
When I hear businessmen speak eloquently about the or corporate executives. Most of the discussion of social
“social responsibilities of business in a free-enterprise responsibility is directed at corporations, so in what fol-
system,” I am reminded of the wonderful line about the lows I shall mostly neglect the individual proprietor and
Frenchman who discovered at the age of 70 that he had speak of corporate executives.
been speaking prose all his life. The businessmen believe In a free-enterprise, private-property system a cor-
that they are defending free enterprise when they porate executive is an employee of the owners of the
declaim that business is not concerned “merely” with business. He has direct responsibility to his employers.
profit but also with promoting desirable “social” ends; That responsibility is to conduct the business in accor-
that business has a “social conscience” and takes seriously dance with their desires, which generally will be to make
its responsibilities for providing employment, eliminat- as much money as possible while conforming to the basic
ing discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those
else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop embodied in ethical custom. Of course, in some cases his
of reformers. In fact they are—or would be if they or employers may have a different objective. A group of per-
anyone else took them seriously—preaching pure and sons might establish a corporation for an eleemosynary
unadulterated socialism. Businessmen who talk this way purpose—for example, a hospital or a school. The man-
are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have ager of such a corporation will not have money profit as
been undermining the basis of a free society these past his objective but the rendering of certain services.
decades. In either case, the key point is that, in his capacity as a
The discussions of the “social responsibilities of corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the indi-
business” are notable for their analytical looseness and viduals who own the corporation or establish the eleemos-
lack of rigor. What does it mean to say that “business” has ynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to them.
responsibilities? Only people can have responsibilities. A Needless to say, this does not mean that it is easy to
corporation is an artificial person and in this sense may judge how well he is performing his task. But at least the
have artificial responsibilities, but “business” as a whole criterion of performance is straightforward, and the per-
cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague sons among whom a voluntary contractual arrangement
sense. The first step toward clarity in examining the doc- exists are clearly defined.
trine of the social responsibility of business is to ask pre- Of course, the corporate executive is also a person in
cisely what it implies for whom. his own right.As a person, he may have many other respon-
Presumably, the individuals who are to be responsibilities that he recognizes or assumes voluntarily—to his
sible are businessmen, which means individual proprietors family, his conscience, his feelings of charity, his church, his
clubs, his city, his country. He may feel impelled by these
From The New York Times, September 13th, 1970. © 1970 The New York Times. responsibilities to devote part of his income to causes he
All rights reserved. Used by permission and protected by the Copyright Laws of the
United States. The printing, copying, redistribution, or retransmission of this Content
regards as worthy, to refuse to work for particular cor-
without express written permission is prohibited. porations, and even to leave his job, for example, to join
Chapter 1 Business, Ethics, and the Free Market
9
his country’s armed forces. If we wish, we may refer to without representation” was one of the battle cries of the
some of these responsibilities as “social responsibilities.” American Revolution. We have a system of checks and
But in these respects he is acting as a principal, not an balances to separate the legislative function of imposing
agent; he is spending his own money or time or energy, taxes and enacting expenditures from the executive func-
not the money of his employers or the time or energy he tion of collecting taxes and administering expenditure
has contracted to devote to their purposes. If these are programs and from the judicial function of mediating dis-
“social responsibilities,” they are the social responsibilities putes and interpreting the law.
of individuals, not of business. Here the businessman—self-selected or appointed
What does it mean to say that the corporate executive directly or indirectly by stockholders—is to be simulta-
has a “social responsibility” in his capacity as businessman? neously legislator, executive and jurist. He is to decide
If this statement is not pure rhetoric, it must mean that whom to tax by how much and for what purpose, and he
he is to act in some way that is not in the interest of his is to spend the proceeds—all this guided only by general
employers. For example, that he is to refrain from increas- exhortations from on high to restrain inflation, improve
ing the price of the product in order to contribute to the the environment, fight poverty and so on and on.
social objective of preventing inflation, even though a price The whole justification for permitting the corporate
increase would be in the best interests of the corporation. executive to be selected by the stockholders is that the
Or that he is to make expenditures on reducing pollution executive is an agent serving the interests of his principal.
beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the cor- This justification disappears when the corporate execu-
poration or that is required by law in order to contribute to tive imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for “social”
the social objective of improving the environment. Or that, purposes. He becomes in effect a public employee, a civil
at the expense of corporate profits, he is to hire “hard-core” servant, even though he remains in name an employee
unemployed instead of better-qualified available workmen of a private enterprise. On grounds of political principle,
to contribute to the social objective of reducing poverty. it is intolerable that such civil servants—insofar as their
In each of these cases, the corporate executive actions in the name of social responsibility are real and
would be spending someone else’s money for a general not just window dressing—should be selected as they are
social interest. Insofar as his actions in accord with his now. If they are to be civil servants, then they must be
“social responsibility” reduce returns to stockholders, he selected through a political process. If they are to impose
is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the taxes and make expenditures to foster “social” objectives,
price to customers, he is spending the customers’ money. then political machinery must be set up to guide the
Insofar as his actions lower the wages of some employees, assessment of taxes and to determine through a political
he is spending their money. process the objectives to be served.
The stockholders or the customers or the employees This is the basic reason why the doctrine of “social
could separately spend their own money on the particular responsibility” involves the acceptance of the socialist
action if they wished to do so. The executive is exercis- view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms,
ing a distinct “social responsibility,” rather than serving are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of
as an agent of the stockholders or the customers or the scarce resources to alternative uses.
employees, only if he spends the money in a different way On the grounds of consequences, can the corporate
than they would have spent it. executive in fact discharge his alleged “social responsibili-
But if he does this, he is in effect imposing taxes, on ties”? On the one hand, suppose he could get away with
the one hand, and deciding how the tax proceeds shall be spending the stockholders’ or customers’ or employees’
spent, on the other. money. How is he to know how to spend it? He is told
This process raises political questions on two levels: that he must contribute to fighting inflation. How is he to
principle and consequences. On the level of political know what action of his will contribute to that end? He
principle, the imposition of taxes and the expenditure of is presumably an expert in running his company—in pro-
tax proceeds are governmental functions. We have estab- ducing a product or selling it or financing it. But nothing
lished elaborate constitutional, parliamentary and judicial about his selection makes him an expert on inflation.Will
provisions to control these functions, to assure that taxes his holding down the price of his product reduce infla-
are imposed so far as possible in accordance with the tionary pressure? Or, by leaving more spending power in
preferences and desires of the public—after all, “taxation the hands of his customers, simply divert it elsewhere? Or,
by forcing him to produce less because of the lower price, mind and that they are seeking to attain by undemocratic
will it simply contribute to shortages? Even if he could procedures what they cannot attain by democratic proce-
answer these questions, how much cost is he justified in dures. In a free society, it is hard for “good” people to do
imposing on his stockholders, customers and employees “good,” but that is a small price to pay for making it hard
for this social purpose? What is his appropriate share and for “evil” people to do “evil,” especially since one man’s
the share of others? good is another’s evil.
And, whether he wants to or not, can he get away I have, for simplicity, concentrated on the special
with spending his stockholders’, customers’ or employees’ case of the corporate executive, except only for the brief
money? Will not the stockholders fire him? (Either the digression on trade unions. But precisely the same argu-
present ones or those who take over when his actions in ment applies to the newer phenomenon of calling upon
the name of social responsibility have reduced the corpo- stockholders to require corporations to exercise social
ration’s profits and the price of its stock.) His customers responsibility (the recent G.M. crusade, for example). In
and his employees can desert him for other producers most of these cases, what is in effect involved is some
and employers less scrupulous in exercising their social stockholders trying to get other stockholders (or cus-
responsibilities. tomers or employees) to contribute against their will to
This facet of “social responsibility” doctrine is “social” causes favored by the activists. Insofar as they
brought into sharp relief when the doctrine is used to jus- succeed, they are again imposing taxes and spending the
tify wage restraint by trade unions. The conflict of interest proceeds.
is naked and clear when union officials are asked to subor- The situation of the individual proprietor is some-
dinate the interest of their members to some more general what different. If he acts to reduce the returns of his
social purpose. If the union officials try to enforce wage enterprise in order to exercise his “social responsibility,”
restraint, the consequence is likely to be wildcat strikes, he is spending his own money, not someone else’s. If he
rank-and-file revolts and the emergence of strong compet- wishes to spend his money on such purposes, that is his
itors for their jobs. We thus have the ironic phenomenon right, and I cannot see that there is any objection to his
that union leaders—at least in the U.S.—have objected to doing so. In the process, he, too, may impose costs on
Government interference with the market far more con- employees and customers. However, because he is far less
sistently and courageously than have business leaders. likely than a large corporation or union to have monopo-
The difficulty of exercising “social responsibility” listic power, any such side effects will tend to be minor.
illustrates, of course, the great virtue of private com- Of course, in practice the doctrine of social respon-
petitive enterprise—it forces people to be responsible sibility is frequently a cloak for actions that are justified
for their own actions and makes it difficult for them to on other grounds rather than a reason for those actions.
“exploit” other people for either selfish or unselfish pur- To illustrate, it may well be in the long-run inter-
poses. They can do good—but only at their own expense. est of a corporation that is a major employer in a small
Many a reader who has followed the argument this community to devote resources to providing amenities
far may be tempted to remonstrate that it is all well and to that community or to improving its government. That
good to speak of government’s having the responsibility to may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may
impose taxes and determine expenditures for such “social” reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage and
purposes as controlling pollution or training the hardcore sabotage or have other worthwhile effects. Or it may be
unemployed, but that the problems are too urgent to wait that, given the laws about the deductibility of corporate
on the slow course of political processes, that the exercise charitable contributions, the stockholders can contribute
of social responsibility by businessmen is a quicker and more to charities they favor by having the corporation
surer way to solve pressing current problems. make the gift than by doing it themselves, since they can
Aside from the question of fact—I share Adam in that way contribute an amount that would otherwise
Smith’s skepticism about the benefits that can be expected have been paid as corporate taxes.
from “those who affected to trade for the public good”— In each of these—and many similar—cases, there
this argument must be rejected on grounds of principle. is a strong temptation to rationalize these actions as an
What it amounts to is an assertion that those who favor exercise of “social responsibility.” In the present climate
the taxes and expenditures in question have failed to of opinion, with its widespread aversion to “capitalism,”
persuade a majority of their fellow citizens to be of like “profits,” the “soulless corporation” and so on, this is
Chapter 1 Business, Ethics, and the Free Market
11
one way for a corporation to generate goodwill as a by- executives; it will be the iron fist of Government bureau-
product of expenditures that are entirely justified in its crats. Here, as with price and wage controls, businessmen
own self-interest. seem to me to reveal a suicidal impulse.
It would be inconsistent of me to call on corpo- The political principle that underlies the market
rate executives to refrain from this hypocritical window- mechanism is unanimity. In an ideal free market resting
dressing because it harms the foundations of a free society. on private property, no individual can coerce any other,
That would be to call on them to exercise a “social respon- all cooperation is voluntary, all parties to such coopera-
sibility”! If our institutions, and the attitudes of the public tion benefit or they need not participate. There are no
make it in their self-interest to cloak their actions in this “social” values, no “social” responsibilities in any sense
way, I cannot summon much indignation to denounce other than the shared values and responsibilities of indi-
them. At the same time, I can express admiration for those viduals. Society is a collection of individuals and of the
individual proprietors or owners of closely held corpora- various groups they voluntarily form.
tions or stockholders of more broadly held corporations The political principle that underlies the politi-
who disdain such tactics as approaching fraud. cal mechanism is conformity. The individual must serve
Whether blameworthy or not, the use of the cloak a more general social interest—whether that be deter-
of social responsibility, and the nonsense spoken in its mined by a church or a dictator or a majority. The indi-
name by influential and prestigious businessmen, does vidual may have a vote and a say in what is to be done, but
clearly harm the foundations of a free society. I have been if he is overruled, he must conform. It is appropriate for
impressed time and again by the schizophrenic char- some to require others to contribute to a general social
acter of many businessmen. They are capable of being purpose whether they wish to or not.
extremely far-sighted and clear-headed in matters that Unfortunately, unanimity is not always feasible.
are internal to their businesses. They are incredibly short- There are some respects in which conformity appears
sighted and muddle-headed in matters that are outside unavoidable, so I do not see how one can avoid the use of
their businesses but affect the possible survival of business the political mechanism altogether.
in general.This short-sightedness is strikingly exemplified But the doctrine of “social responsibility” taken seri-
in the calls from many businessmen for wage and price ously would extend the scope of the political mechanism
guidelines or controls or income policies. There is noth- to every human activity. It does not differ in philosophy
ing that could do more in a brief period to destroy a mar- from the most explicitly collectivist doctrine. It differs
ket system and replace it by a centrally controlled system only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can be
than effective governmental control of prices and wages. attained without collectivist means. That is why, in my
The short-sightedness is also exemplified in speeches book Capitalism and Freedom, I have called it a “funda-
by businessmen on social responsibility. This may gain mentally subversive doctrine” in a free society, and have
them kudos in the short run. But it helps to strengthen said that in such a society, “there is one and only one
the already too prevalent view that the pursuit of profits is social responsibility of business—to use its resources and
wicked and immoral and must be curbed and controlled engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long
by external forces. Once this view is adopted, the external as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
forces that curb the market will not be the social con- engages in open and free competition without deception
sciences, however highly developed, of the pontificating or fraud.”
DOING BUSINESS ETHICS: AN ANALYSIS OF FRIEDMAN

Ethical discussions often involve deeply held values and attitudes. They challenge us
to examine and perhaps even change some of the beliefs that we simultaneously take
for granted and hold most dear. The standards of evidence and reasoning in ethics are
not as obvious as they might be in fields such as science and math. For these reasons,
we should go slowly as we begin an ethical analysis of Friedman’s essay, examining his
argument closely and carefully. We offer the following discussion as a model for the
type of analysis you should conduct for each of the essays in this text. In what follows,
we not only offer an analysis of Friedman, but we also hope to call your attention to
the type of reasoning that will be helpful throughout your study of business ethics.
(Before we begin to analyze the essay, it is particularly useful to review the discussion
of ethical relativism on pp. 5–7.)
Our first step is to develop a clear understanding of Friedman’s ethical views.
Following common usage, we refer to the views expressed in his essay as the “classical
model of corporate social responsibility.” It is a viewpoint that connects the respon-
sibility of business management with the underlying economic theory of free market
capitalism. We call this view “classical” in two senses. First, as previously mentioned, it
is a view that has been presupposed by many people in Western culture; second, it is
a view of business and industry that is derived from classical, free market economics.
The classical model offers recommendations and norms for the responsibilities of
business managers.These responsibilities flow from the role business plays in a free mar-
ket economic system.This economic system itself is justified by appeal to ethical values
that provide the deeper philosophical justification for the role of business managers.
To understand these claims, we now turn to a closer examination of Friedman’s essay.
First, we should be clear that Friedman is advocating an explicitly ethical posi-
tion. Friedman’s conclusions are not ethically neutral, or merely economic. When he
recommends that business managers seek only to “increase profits” and “make as much
money as possible,” he is not suggesting that managers ignore ethical responsibili-
ties and pursue their own greed and self-interest. Rather, he suggests that in pursu-
ing maximum profits a business manager is fulfilling her responsibility to society and
doing what is ethically correct.
Friedman, therefore, is doing more than descriptive ethics; he does much more than
describe what, in fact, occurs in business. Friedman is offering a normative prescrip-
tion for how one ought to act. If Friedman’s recommendations were followed, we
would be required to change our business, social, and political institutions dramatically.
Finally, Friedman is not merely offering his opinion about what one should do
in business. He presents numerous reasons to support these recommendations and,
in this way, he is fully engaged in normative ethics. Friedman does not simply accept
what is customary in business practice. He steps back from what is actually occurring
within business (the widespread assumption that business has a “social responsibility”
to “promote desirable ‘social’ ends”) and offers a reasoned critique of these practices.
In his view, the doctrine of social responsibility violates important social norms and
is therefore ethically irresponsible. Let us look more closely at these normative ethi-
cal claims.
Friedman begins by examining the thesis that businesses have “social responsibilities”
that extend above and beyond profit. He then presents reasons to criticize this account
of corporate social responsibility, and offers reasons that support his own alternative
theory. In arguing against the social responsibility thesis, Friedman suggests that to
sacrifice profits for the sake of some “social objective” such as “providing employment,
eliminating discrimination, [and] avoiding pollution” is potentially to become “unwit-

ting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis of a free
society.” This doctrine of social responsibility is called a “fundamentally subversive
doctrine in a free society.” Thus Friedman rejects the business practice of pursuing
social objectives because doing so violates certain fundamental norms of a free society.
In arguing to support his own alternative, Friedman appeals to the values of a “free-
enterprise, private-property system” and concludes that in such a system a business
manager’s “primary” and “direct” responsibility is to act in accord with the desires and
interests of the business owners. In all but the exceptional case, this means that the busi-
ness manager’s responsibility “will be to make as much money as possible while con-
forming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those embodied
in ethical custom.”To do otherwise, according to Friedman, is to usurp the role of duly
elected government officials by imposing taxes on other individuals and by deciding
how those taxes are to be spent.
Thus we can see that the classical model of corporate social responsibility advances
numerous normative ethical claims. It makes recommendations about how we as indi-
viduals ought to act within business (“act always so as to maximize profits”) and about
how we as citizens ought to arrange our social institutions (“business ought to be free
from government interference in its pursuit of profits”).
Friedman’s Radical Position

In the previous analysis, we can begin to see a wide gap between the actual society
in which we live and the society envisioned by Friedman’s normative ethics. To the
extent that changes in customarily accepted behavior are required, Friedman’s rec-
ommendations are quite radical. He offers a normative principle that will, on every
occasion, determine our ethical responsibilities in business. He tells us that an ethical
individual in business must always make the decision that will increase profits. He
tells us that any government intervention in the market, other than to prevent fraud
or deception, is ethically wrong. In other words, business managers need only look
to their accountants, lawyers, and economists to determine their ethical responsibili-
ties. The manager need not, and should not, be fundamentally concerned with issues
such as fairness, unemployment, or compassion for employees. Managers need only
calculate costs and benefits and consult their lawyers before adopting whatever policy
will maximize profits. So, too, with any other moral or public policy issue. Business
managers can and should ignore all other ethical considerations for the sake of one
overriding principle: maximize profits.
This perspective is quite radical for a number of reasons. First, it conflicts with our
ordinary understanding of ethical responsibilities. Ordinarily, it seems that our ethical
responsibilities, on occasion at least, will require us to restrict our own behavior out
of consideration for the well-being of others. Friedman tells us that, at least in our
role as business managers, we can best fulfill our responsibilities to others by pursuing
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DANCE ON STILTS AT THE GIRLS’ UNYAGO, NIUCHI
Newala, too, suffers from the distance of its water-supply—at least

the Newala of to-day does; there was once another Newala in a lovely
valley at the foot of the plateau. I visited it and found scarcely a trace
of houses, only a Christian cemetery, with the graves of several
missionaries and their converts, remaining as a monument of its
former glories. But the surroundings are wonderfully beautiful. A
thick grove of splendid mango-trees closes in the weather-worn
crosses and headstones; behind them, combining the useful and the
agreeable, is a whole plantation of lemon-trees covered with ripe
fruit; not the small African kind, but a much larger and also juicier
imported variety, which drops into the hands of the passing traveller,
without calling for any exertion on his part. Old Newala is now under
the jurisdiction of the native pastor, Daudi, at Chingulungulu, who,
as I am on very friendly terms with him, allows me, as a matter of
course, the use of this lemon-grove during my stay at Newala.
FEET MUTILATED BY THE RAVAGES OF THE “JIGGER”
(Sarcopsylla penetrans)
The water-supply of New Newala is in the bottom of the valley,

some 1,600 feet lower down. The way is not only long and fatiguing,
but the water, when we get it, is thoroughly bad. We are suffering not
only from this, but from the fact that the arrangements at Newala are
nothing short of luxurious. We have a separate kitchen—a hut built
against the boma palisade on the right of the baraza, the interior of
which is not visible from our usual position. Our two cooks were not
long in finding this out, and they consequently do—or rather neglect
to do—what they please. In any case they do not seem to be very
particular about the boiling of our drinking-water—at least I can
attribute to no other cause certain attacks of a dysenteric nature,
from which both Knudsen and I have suffered for some time. If a
man like Omari has to be left unwatched for a moment, he is capable
of anything. Besides this complaint, we are inconvenienced by the
state of our nails, which have become as hard as glass, and crack on
the slightest provocation, and I have the additional infliction of
pimples all over me. As if all this were not enough, we have also, for
the last week been waging war against the jigger, who has found his
Eldorado in the hot sand of the Makonde plateau. Our men are seen
all day long—whenever their chronic colds and the dysentery likewise
raging among them permit—occupied in removing this scourge of
Africa from their feet and trying to prevent the disastrous
consequences of its presence. It is quite common to see natives of
this place with one or two toes missing; many have lost all their toes,
or even the whole front part of the foot, so that a well-formed leg
ends in a shapeless stump. These ravages are caused by the female of
Sarcopsylla penetrans, which bores its way under the skin and there
develops an egg-sac the size of a pea. In all books on the subject, it is
stated that one’s attention is called to the presence of this parasite by
an intolerable itching. This agrees very well with my experience, so
far as the softer parts of the sole, the spaces between and under the
toes, and the side of the foot are concerned, but if the creature
penetrates through the harder parts of the heel or ball of the foot, it
may escape even the most careful search till it has reached maturity.
Then there is no time to be lost, if the horrible ulceration, of which
we see cases by the dozen every day, is to be prevented. It is much
easier, by the way, to discover the insect on the white skin of a
European than on that of a native, on which the dark speck scarcely
shows. The four or five jiggers which, in spite of the fact that I
constantly wore high laced boots, chose my feet to settle in, were
taken out for me by the all-accomplished Knudsen, after which I
thought it advisable to wash out the cavities with corrosive
sublimate. The natives have a different sort of disinfectant—they fill
the hole with scraped roots. In a tiny Makua village on the slope of
the plateau south of Newala, we saw an old woman who had filled all
the spaces under her toe-nails with powdered roots by way of
prophylactic treatment. What will be the result, if any, who can say?
The rest of the many trifling ills which trouble our existence are
really more comic than serious. In the absence of anything else to
smoke, Knudsen and I at last opened a box of cigars procured from
the Indian store-keeper at Lindi, and tried them, with the most
distressing results. Whether they contain opium or some other
narcotic, neither of us can say, but after the tenth puff we were both
“off,” three-quarters stupefied and unspeakably wretched. Slowly we
recovered—and what happened next? Half-an-hour later we were
once more smoking these poisonous concoctions—so insatiable is the
craving for tobacco in the tropics.
Even my present attacks of fever scarcely deserve to be taken
seriously. I have had no less than three here at Newala, all of which
have run their course in an incredibly short time. In the early
afternoon, I am busy with my old natives, asking questions and
making notes. The strong midday coffee has stimulated my spirits to
an extraordinary degree, the brain is active and vigorous, and work
progresses rapidly, while a pleasant warmth pervades the whole
body. Suddenly this gives place to a violent chill, forcing me to put on
my overcoat, though it is only half-past three and the afternoon sun
is at its hottest. Now the brain no longer works with such acuteness
and logical precision; more especially does it fail me in trying to
establish the syntax of the difficult Makua language on which I have
ventured, as if I had not enough to do without it. Under the
circumstances it seems advisable to take my temperature, and I do
so, to save trouble, without leaving my seat, and while going on with
my work. On examination, I find it to be 101·48°. My tutors are
abruptly dismissed and my bed set up in the baraza; a few minutes
later I am in it and treating myself internally with hot water and
lemon-juice.
Three hours later, the thermometer marks nearly 104°, and I make
them carry me back into the tent, bed and all, as I am now perspiring
heavily, and exposure to the cold wind just beginning to blow might
mean a fatal chill. I lie still for a little while, and then find, to my
great relief, that the temperature is not rising, but rather falling. This
is about 7.30 p.m. At 8 p.m. I find, to my unbounded astonishment,
that it has fallen below 98·6°, and I feel perfectly well. I read for an
hour or two, and could very well enjoy a smoke, if I had the
wherewithal—Indian cigars being out of the question.
Having no medical training, I am at a loss to account for this state
of things. It is impossible that these transitory attacks of high fever
should be malarial; it seems more probable that they are due to a
kind of sunstroke. On consulting my note-book, I become more and
more inclined to think this is the case, for these attacks regularly
follow extreme fatigue and long exposure to strong sunshine. They at
least have the advantage of being only short interruptions to my
work, as on the following morning I am always quite fresh and fit.
My treasure of a cook is suffering from an enormous hydrocele which
makes it difficult for him to get up, and Moritz is obliged to keep in
the dark on account of his inflamed eyes. Knudsen’s cook, a raw boy
from somewhere in the bush, knows still less of cooking than Omari;
consequently Nils Knudsen himself has been promoted to the vacant
post. Finding that we had come to the end of our supplies, he began
by sending to Chingulungulu for the four sucking-pigs which we had
bought from Matola and temporarily left in his charge; and when
they came up, neatly packed in a large crate, he callously slaughtered
the biggest of them. The first joint we were thoughtless enough to
entrust for roasting to Knudsen’s mshenzi cook, and it was
consequently uneatable; but we made the rest of the animal into a
jelly which we ate with great relish after weeks of underfeeding,
consuming incredible helpings of it at both midday and evening
meals. The only drawback is a certain want of variety in the tinned
vegetables. Dr. Jäger, to whom the Geographical Commission
entrusted the provisioning of the expeditions—mine as well as his
own—because he had more time on his hands than the rest of us,
seems to have laid in a huge stock of Teltow turnips,[46] an article of
food which is all very well for occasional use, but which quickly palls
when set before one every day; and we seem to have no other tins
left. There is no help for it—we must put up with the turnips; but I
am certain that, once I am home again, I shall not touch them for ten
years to come.
Amid all these minor evils, which, after all, go to make up the
genuine flavour of Africa, there is at least one cheering touch:
Knudsen has, with the dexterity of a skilled mechanic, repaired my 9
× 12 cm. camera, at least so far that I can use it with a little care.
How, in the absence of finger-nails, he was able to accomplish such a
ticklish piece of work, having no tool but a clumsy screw-driver for
taking to pieces and putting together again the complicated
mechanism of the instantaneous shutter, is still a mystery to me; but
he did it successfully. The loss of his finger-nails shows him in a light
contrasting curiously enough with the intelligence evinced by the
above operation; though, after all, it is scarcely surprising after his
ten years’ residence in the bush. One day, at Lindi, he had occasion
to wash a dog, which must have been in need of very thorough
cleansing, for the bottle handed to our friend for the purpose had an
extremely strong smell. Having performed his task in the most
conscientious manner, he perceived with some surprise that the dog
did not appear much the better for it, and was further surprised by
finding his own nails ulcerating away in the course of the next few
days. “How was I to know that carbolic acid has to be diluted?” he
mutters indignantly, from time to time, with a troubled gaze at his
mutilated finger-tips.
Since we came to Newala we have been making excursions in all
directions through the surrounding country, in accordance with old
habit, and also because the akida Sefu did not get together the tribal
elders from whom I wanted information so speedily as he had
promised. There is, however, no harm done, as, even if seen only
from the outside, the country and people are interesting enough.
The Makonde plateau is like a large rectangular table rounded off
at the corners. Measured from the Indian Ocean to Newala, it is
about seventy-five miles long, and between the Rovuma and the
Lukuledi it averages fifty miles in breadth, so that its superficial area
is about two-thirds of that of the kingdom of Saxony. The surface,
however, is not level, but uniformly inclined from its south-western
edge to the ocean. From the upper edge, on which Newala lies, the
eye ranges for many miles east and north-east, without encountering
any obstacle, over the Makonde bush. It is a green sea, from which
here and there thick clouds of smoke rise, to show that it, too, is
inhabited by men who carry on their tillage like so many other
primitive peoples, by cutting down and burning the bush, and
manuring with the ashes. Even in the radiant light of a tropical day
such a fire is a grand sight.
Much less effective is the impression produced just now by the
great western plain as seen from the edge of the plateau. As often as
time permits, I stroll along this edge, sometimes in one direction,
sometimes in another, in the hope of finding the air clear enough to
let me enjoy the view; but I have always been disappointed.
Wherever one looks, clouds of smoke rise from the burning bush,
and the air is full of smoke and vapour. It is a pity, for under more
favourable circumstances the panorama of the whole country up to
the distant Majeje hills must be truly magnificent. It is of little use
taking photographs now, and an outline sketch gives a very poor idea
of the scenery. In one of these excursions I went out of my way to
make a personal attempt on the Makonde bush. The present edge of
the plateau is the result of a far-reaching process of destruction
through erosion and denudation. The Makonde strata are
everywhere cut into by ravines, which, though short, are hundreds of
yards in depth. In consequence of the loose stratification of these
beds, not only are the walls of these ravines nearly vertical, but their
upper end is closed by an equally steep escarpment, so that the
western edge of the Makonde plateau is hemmed in by a series of
deep, basin-like valleys. In order to get from one side of such a ravine
to the other, I cut my way through the bush with a dozen of my men.
It was a very open part, with more grass than scrub, but even so the
short stretch of less than two hundred yards was very hard work; at
the end of it the men’s calicoes were in rags and they themselves
bleeding from hundreds of scratches, while even our strong khaki
suits had not escaped scatheless.
NATIVE PATH THROUGH THE MAKONDE BUSH, NEAR

MAHUTA
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.
MAKONDE LOCK AND KEY AT JUMBE CHAURO

This is the general way of closing a house. The Makonde at Jumbe
Chauro, however, have a much more complicated, solid and original
one. Here, too, the door is as already described, except that there is
only one post on the inside, standing by itself about six inches from
one side of the doorway. Opposite this post is a hole in the wall just
large enough to admit a man’s arm. The door is closed inside by a
large wooden bolt passing through a hole in this post and pressing
with its free end against the door. The other end has three holes into
which fit three pegs running in vertical grooves inside the post. The
door is opened with a wooden key about a foot long, somewhat
curved and sloped off at the butt; the other end has three pegs
corresponding to the holes, in the bolt, so that, when it is thrust
through the hole in the wall and inserted into the rectangular
opening in the post, the pegs can be lifted and the bolt drawn out.[50]
MODE OF INSERTING THE KEY
With no small pride first one householder and then a second

showed me on the spot the action of this greatest invention of the
Makonde Highlands. To both with an admiring exclamation of
“Vizuri sana!” (“Very fine!”). I expressed the wish to take back these
marvels with me to Ulaya, to show the Wazungu what clever fellows
the Makonde are. Scarcely five minutes after my return to camp at
Newala, the two men came up sweating under the weight of two
heavy logs which they laid down at my feet, handing over at the same
time the keys of the fallen fortress. Arguing, logically enough, that if
the key was wanted, the lock would be wanted with it, they had taken
their axes and chopped down the posts—as it never occurred to them
to dig them out of the ground and so bring them intact. Thus I have
two badly damaged specimens, and the owners, instead of praise,
come in for a blowing-up.
The Makua huts in the environs of Newala are especially
miserable; their more than slovenly construction reminds one of the
temporary erections of the Makua at Hatia’s, though the people here
have not been concerned in a war. It must therefore be due to
congenital idleness, or else to the absence of a powerful chief. Even
the baraza at Mlipa’s, a short hour’s walk south-east of Newala,
shares in this general neglect. While public buildings in this country
are usually looked after more or less carefully, this is in evident
danger of being blown over by the first strong easterly gale. The only
attractive object in this whole district is the grave of the late chief
Mlipa. I visited it in the morning, while the sun was still trying with
partial success to break through the rolling mists, and the circular
grove of tall euphorbias, which, with a broken pot, is all that marks
the old king’s resting-place, impressed one with a touch of pathos.
Even my very materially-minded carriers seemed to feel something
of the sort, for instead of their usual ribald songs, they chanted
solemnly, as we marched on through the dense green of the Makonde
bush:—
“We shall arrive with the great master; we stand in a row and have
no fear about getting our food and our money from the Serkali (the
Government). We are not afraid; we are going along with the great
master, the lion; we are going down to the coast and back.”
With regard to the characteristic features of the various tribes here
on the western edge of the plateau, I can arrive at no other
conclusion than the one already come to in the plain, viz., that it is
impossible for anyone but a trained anthropologist to assign any
given individual at once to his proper tribe. In fact, I think that even
an anthropological specialist, after the most careful examination,
might find it a difficult task to decide. The whole congeries of peoples
collected in the region bounded on the west by the great Central
African rift, Tanganyika and Nyasa, and on the east by the Indian
Ocean, are closely related to each other—some of their languages are
only distinguished from one another as dialects of the same speech,
and no doubt all the tribes present the same shape of skull and
structure of skeleton. Thus, surely, there can be no very striking
differences in outward appearance.
Even did such exist, I should have no time
to concern myself with them, for day after day,
I have to see or hear, as the case may be—in
any case to grasp and record—an
extraordinary number of ethnographic
phenomena. I am almost disposed to think it
fortunate that some departments of inquiry, at
least, are barred by external circumstances.
Chief among these is the subject of iron-
working. We are apt to think of Africa as a
country where iron ore is everywhere, so to
speak, to be picked up by the roadside, and
where it would be quite surprising if the
inhabitants had not learnt to smelt the
material ready to their hand. In fact, the
knowledge of this art ranges all over the
continent, from the Kabyles in the north to the
Kafirs in the south. Here between the Rovuma
and the Lukuledi the conditions are not so
favourable. According to the statements of the
Makonde, neither ironstone nor any other
form of iron ore is known to them. They have
not therefore advanced to the art of smelting
the metal, but have hitherto bought all their
THE ANCESTRESS OF
THE MAKONDE
iron implements from neighbouring tribes.
Even in the plain the inhabitants are not much
better off. Only one man now living is said to
understand the art of smelting iron. This old fundi lives close to
Huwe, that isolated, steep-sided block of granite which rises out of
the green solitude between Masasi and Chingulungulu, and whose
jagged and splintered top meets the traveller’s eye everywhere. While
still at Masasi I wished to see this man at work, but was told that,
frightened by the rising, he had retired across the Rovuma, though
he would soon return. All subsequent inquiries as to whether the
fundi had come back met with the genuine African answer, “Bado”
(“Not yet”).
BRAZIER
Some consolation was afforded me by a brassfounder, whom I

came across in the bush near Akundonde’s. This man is the favourite
of women, and therefore no doubt of the gods; he welds the glittering
brass rods purchased at the coast into those massive, heavy rings
which, on the wrists and ankles of the local fair ones, continually give
me fresh food for admiration. Like every decent master-craftsman he
had all his tools with him, consisting of a pair of bellows, three
crucibles and a hammer—nothing more, apparently. He was quite
willing to show his skill, and in a twinkling had fixed his bellows on
the ground. They are simply two goat-skins, taken off whole, the four
legs being closed by knots, while the upper opening, intended to
admit the air, is kept stretched by two pieces of wood. At the lower
end of the skin a smaller opening is left into which a wooden tube is
stuck. The fundi has quickly borrowed a heap of wood-embers from
the nearest hut; he then fixes the free ends of the two tubes into an
earthen pipe, and clamps them to the ground by means of a bent
piece of wood. Now he fills one of his small clay crucibles, the dross
on which shows that they have been long in use, with the yellow
material, places it in the midst of the embers, which, at present are
only faintly glimmering, and begins his work. In quick alternation
the smith’s two hands move up and down with the open ends of the
bellows; as he raises his hand he holds the slit wide open, so as to let
the air enter the skin bag unhindered. In pressing it down he closes
the bag, and the air puffs through the bamboo tube and clay pipe into
the fire, which quickly burns up. The smith, however, does not keep
on with this work, but beckons to another man, who relieves him at
the bellows, while he takes some more tools out of a large skin pouch
carried on his back. I look on in wonder as, with a smooth round
stick about the thickness of a finger, he bores a few vertical holes into
the clean sand of the soil. This should not be difficult, yet the man
seems to be taking great pains over it. Then he fastens down to the
ground, with a couple of wooden clamps, a neat little trough made by
splitting a joint of bamboo in half, so that the ends are closed by the
two knots. At last the yellow metal has attained the right consistency,
and the fundi lifts the crucible from the fire by means of two sticks
split at the end to serve as tongs. A short swift turn to the left—a
tilting of the crucible—and the molten brass, hissing and giving forth
clouds of smoke, flows first into the bamboo mould and then into the
holes in the ground.
The technique of this backwoods craftsman may not be very far
advanced, but it cannot be denied that he knows how to obtain an
adequate result by the simplest means. The ladies of highest rank in
this country—that is to say, those who can afford it, wear two kinds
of these massive brass rings, one cylindrical, the other semicircular
in section. The latter are cast in the most ingenious way in the
bamboo mould, the former in the circular hole in the sand. It is quite
a simple matter for the fundi to fit these bars to the limbs of his fair
customers; with a few light strokes of his hammer he bends the
pliable brass round arm or ankle without further inconvenience to
the wearer.
SHAPING THE POT
SMOOTHING WITH MAIZE-COB
CUTTING THE EDGE

FINISHING THE BOTTOM
LAST SMOOTHING BEFORE

BURNING
FIRING THE BRUSH-PILE

LIGHTING THE FARTHER SIDE OF
THE PILE
TURNING THE RED-HOT VESSEL
NYASA WOMAN MAKING POTS AT MASASI

Pottery is an art which must always and everywhere excite the
interest of the student, just because it is so intimately connected with
the development of human culture, and because its relics are one of
the principal factors in the reconstruction of our own condition in
prehistoric times. I shall always remember with pleasure the two or
three afternoons at Masasi when Salim Matola’s mother, a slightly-
built, graceful, pleasant-looking woman, explained to me with
touching patience, by means of concrete illustrations, the ceramic art
of her people. The only implements for this primitive process were a
lump of clay in her left hand, and in the right a calabash containing
the following valuables: the fragment of a maize-cob stripped of all
its grains, a smooth, oval pebble, about the size of a pigeon’s egg, a
few chips of gourd-shell, a bamboo splinter about the length of one’s
hand, a small shell, and a bunch of some herb resembling spinach.
Nothing more. The woman scraped with the
shell a round, shallow hole in the soft, fine
sand of the soil, and, when an active young
girl had filled the calabash with water for her,
she began to knead the clay. As if by magic it
gradually assumed the shape of a rough but
already well-shaped vessel, which only wanted
a little touching up with the instruments
before mentioned. I looked out with the
MAKUA WOMAN closest attention for any indication of the use
MAKING A POT. of the potter’s wheel, in however rudimentary
SHOWS THE a form, but no—hapana (there is none). The
BEGINNINGS OF THE embryo pot stood firmly in its little
POTTER’S WHEEL
depression, and the woman walked round it in
a stooping posture, whether she was removing
small stones or similar foreign bodies with the maize-cob, smoothing
the inner or outer surface with the splinter of bamboo, or later, after
letting it dry for a day, pricking in the ornamentation with a pointed
bit of gourd-shell, or working out the bottom, or cutting the edge
with a sharp bamboo knife, or giving the last touches to the finished
vessel. This occupation of the women is infinitely toilsome, but it is
without doubt an accurate reproduction of the process in use among
our ancestors of the Neolithic and Bronze ages.
There is no doubt that the invention of pottery, an item in human
progress whose importance cannot be over-estimated, is due to
women. Rough, coarse and unfeeling, the men of the horde range
over the countryside. When the united cunning of the hunters has
succeeded in killing the game; not one of them thinks of carrying
home the spoil. A bright fire, kindled by a vigorous wielding of the
drill, is crackling beside them; the animal has been cleaned and cut
up secundum artem, and, after a slight singeing, will soon disappear
under their sharp teeth; no one all this time giving a single thought
to wife or child.
To what shifts, on the other hand, the primitive wife, and still more
the primitive mother, was put! Not even prehistoric stomachs could
endure an unvarying diet of raw food. Something or other suggested
the beneficial effect of hot water on the majority of approved but
indigestible dishes. Perhaps a neighbour had tried holding the hard
roots or tubers over the fire in a calabash filled with water—or maybe
an ostrich-egg-shell, or a hastily improvised vessel of bark. They
became much softer and more palatable than they had previously
been; but, unfortunately, the vessel could not stand the fire and got
charred on the outside. That can be remedied, thought our
ancestress, and plastered a layer of wet clay round a similar vessel.
This is an improvement; the cooking utensil remains uninjured, but
the heat of the fire has shrunk it, so that it is loose in its shell. The
next step is to detach it, so, with a firm grip and a jerk, shell and
kernel are separated, and pottery is invented. Perhaps, however, the
discovery which led to an intelligent use of the burnt-clay shell, was
made in a slightly different way. Ostrich-eggs and calabashes are not
to be found in every part of the world, but everywhere mankind has
arrived at the art of making baskets out of pliant materials, such as
bark, bast, strips of palm-leaf, supple twigs, etc. Our inventor has no
water-tight vessel provided by nature. “Never mind, let us line the
basket with clay.” This answers the purpose, but alas! the basket gets
burnt over the blazing fire, the woman watches the process of
cooking with increasing uneasiness, fearing a leak, but no leak
appears. The food, done to a turn, is eaten with peculiar relish; and
the cooking-vessel is examined, half in curiosity, half in satisfaction
at the result. The plastic clay is now hard as stone, and at the same
time looks exceedingly well, for the neat plaiting of the burnt basket
is traced all over it in a pretty pattern. Thus, simultaneously with
pottery, its ornamentation was invented.
Primitive woman has another claim to respect. It was the man,
roving abroad, who invented the art of producing fire at will, but the
woman, unable to imitate him in this, has been a Vestal from the
earliest times. Nothing gives so much trouble as the keeping alight of
the smouldering brand, and, above all, when all the men are absent
from the camp. Heavy rain-clouds gather, already the first large
drops are falling, the first gusts of the storm rage over the plain. The
little flame, a greater anxiety to the woman than her own children,
flickers unsteadily in the blast. What is to be done? A sudden thought
occurs to her, and in an instant she has constructed a primitive hut
out of strips of bark, to protect the flame against rain and wind.
This, or something very like it, was the way in which the principle
of the house was discovered; and even the most hardened misogynist
cannot fairly refuse a woman the credit of it. The protection of the
hearth-fire from the weather is the germ from which the human
dwelling was evolved. Men had little, if any share, in this forward
step, and that only at a late stage. Even at the present day, the
plastering of the housewall with clay and the manufacture of pottery
are exclusively the women’s business. These are two very significant
survivals. Our European kitchen-garden, too, is originally a woman’s
invention, and the hoe, the primitive instrument of agriculture, is,
characteristically enough, still used in this department. But the
noblest achievement which we owe to the other sex is unquestionably
the art of cookery. Roasting alone—the oldest process—is one for
which men took the hint (a very obvious one) from nature. It must
have been suggested by the scorched carcase of some animal
overtaken by the destructive forest-fires. But boiling—the process of
improving organic substances by the help of water heated to boiling-
point—is a much later discovery. It is so recent that it has not even
yet penetrated to all parts of the world. The Polynesians understand
how to steam food, that is, to cook it, neatly wrapped in leaves, in a
hole in the earth between hot stones, the air being excluded, and
(sometimes) a few drops of water sprinkled on the stones; but they
do not understand boiling.
To come back from this digression, we find that the slender Nyasa
woman has, after once more carefully examining the finished pot,
put it aside in the shade to dry. On the following day she sends me
word by her son, Salim Matola, who is always on hand, that she is
going to do the burning, and, on coming out of my house, I find her
already hard at work. She has spread on the ground a layer of very
dry sticks, about as thick as one’s thumb, has laid the pot (now of a
yellowish-grey colour) on them, and is piling brushwood round it.
My faithful Pesa mbili, the mnyampara, who has been standing by,
most obligingly, with a lighted stick, now hands it to her. Both of
them, blowing steadily, light the pile on the lee side, and, when the
flame begins to catch, on the weather side also. Soon the whole is in a
blaze, but the dry fuel is quickly consumed and the fire dies down, so
that we see the red-hot vessel rising from the ashes. The woman
turns it continually with a long stick, sometimes one way and
sometimes another, so that it may be evenly heated all over. In
twenty minutes she rolls it out of the ash-heap, takes up the bundle
of spinach, which has been lying for two days in a jar of water, and
sprinkles the red-hot clay with it. The places where the drops fall are
marked by black spots on the uniform reddish-brown surface. With a
sigh of relief, and with visible satisfaction, the woman rises to an
erect position; she is standing just in a line between me and the fire,
from which a cloud of smoke is just rising: I press the ball of my
camera, the shutter clicks—the apotheosis is achieved! Like a
priestess, representative of her inventive sex, the graceful woman
stands: at her feet the hearth-fire she has given us beside her the
invention she has devised for us, in the background the home she has
built for us.
At Newala, also, I have had the manufacture of pottery carried on
in my presence. Technically the process is better than that already
described, for here we find the beginnings of the potter’s wheel,
which does not seem to exist in the plains; at least I have seen
nothing of the sort. The artist, a frightfully stupid Makua woman, did
not make a depression in the ground to receive the pot she was about
to shape, but used instead a large potsherd. Otherwise, she went to
work in much the same way as Salim’s mother, except that she saved
herself the trouble of walking round and round her work by squatting
at her ease and letting the pot and potsherd rotate round her; this is
surely the first step towards a machine. But it does not follow that
the pot was improved by the process. It is true that it was beautifully
rounded and presented a very creditable appearance when finished,
but the numerous large and small vessels which I have seen, and, in
part, collected, in the “less advanced” districts, are no less so. We
moderns imagine that instruments of precision are necessary to
produce excellent results. Go to the prehistoric collections of our
museums and look at the pots, urns and bowls of our ancestors in the
dim ages of the past, and you will at once perceive your error.
MAKING LONGITUDINAL CUT IN
BARK
DRAWING THE BARK OFF THE LOG
REMOVING THE OUTER BARK

BEATING THE BARK
WORKING THE BARK-CLOTH AFTER BEATING, TO MAKE IT

SOFT
MANUFACTURE OF BARK-CLOTH AT NEWALA

To-day, nearly the whole population of German East Africa is
clothed in imported calico. This was not always the case; even now in
some parts of the north dressed skins are still the prevailing wear,
and in the north-western districts—east and north of Lake
Tanganyika—lies a zone where bark-cloth has not yet been
superseded. Probably not many generations have passed since such
bark fabrics and kilts of skins were the only clothing even in the
south. Even to-day, large quantities of this bright-red or drab
material are still to be found; but if we wish to see it, we must look in
the granaries and on the drying stages inside the native huts, where
it serves less ambitious uses as wrappings for those seeds and fruits
which require to be packed with special care. The salt produced at
Masasi, too, is packed for transport to a distance in large sheets of
bark-cloth. Wherever I found it in any degree possible, I studied the
process of making this cloth. The native requisitioned for the
purpose arrived, carrying a log between two and three yards long and
as thick as his thigh, and nothing else except a curiously-shaped
mallet and the usual long, sharp and pointed knife which all men and
boys wear in a belt at their backs without a sheath—horribile dictu!
[51]
Silently he squats down before me, and with two rapid cuts has
drawn a couple of circles round the log some two yards apart, and
slits the bark lengthwise between them with the point of his knife.
With evident care, he then scrapes off the outer rind all round the
log, so that in a quarter of an hour the inner red layer of the bark
shows up brightly-coloured between the two untouched ends. With
some trouble and much caution, he now loosens the bark at one end,
and opens the cylinder. He then stands up, takes hold of the free
edge with both hands, and turning it inside out, slowly but steadily
pulls it off in one piece. Now comes the troublesome work of
scraping all superfluous particles of outer bark from the outside of
the long, narrow piece of material, while the inner side is carefully
scrutinised for defective spots. At last it is ready for beating. Having
signalled to a friend, who immediately places a bowl of water beside
him, the artificer damps his sheet of bark all over, seizes his mallet,
lays one end of the stuff on the smoothest spot of the log, and
hammers away slowly but continuously. “Very simple!” I think to
myself. “Why, I could do that, too!”—but I am forced to change my
opinions a little later on; for the beating is quite an art, if the fabric is
not to be beaten to pieces. To prevent the breaking of the fibres, the
stuff is several times folded across, so as to interpose several
thicknesses between the mallet and the block. At last the required
state is reached, and the fundi seizes the sheet, still folded, by both
ends, and wrings it out, or calls an assistant to take one end while he
holds the other. The cloth produced in this way is not nearly so fine
and uniform in texture as the famous Uganda bark-cloth, but it is
quite soft, and, above all, cheap.
Now, too, I examine the mallet. My craftsman has been using the
simpler but better form of this implement, a conical block of some
hard wood, its base—the striking surface—being scored across and
across with more or less deeply-cut grooves, and the handle stuck
into a hole in the middle. The other and earlier form of mallet is
shaped in the same way, but the head is fastened by an ingenious
network of bark strips into the split bamboo serving as a handle. The
observation so often made, that ancient customs persist longest in
connection with religious ceremonies and in the life of children, here
finds confirmation. As we shall soon see, bark-cloth is still worn
during the unyago,[52] having been prepared with special solemn
ceremonies; and many a mother, if she has no other garment handy,
will still put her little one into a kilt of bark-cloth, which, after all,
looks better, besides being more in keeping with its African
surroundings, than the ridiculous bit of print from Ulaya.
MAKUA WOMEN

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Contemporary Issues in Business

Ethics 6th Edition

I BUSINESS AND ETHICS

1 B usiness , E thics , and the F ree M ar k et 1

2 P hil o s o phical E thics : U tilit y, R ights ,

3 P hil o s o phical E thics : U tilitarianism and

4 P hil o s o phical E thics : R ights and the

I I B usiness : P urp o se , G o v ernance , and

5 T he P urp o se o f the C o rp o rati o n 7 1

6 G o v ernance and L eadership 1 0 9

Decision Scenario A: Jack Welch’s Leadership 154

III B usiness and E mpl o y ees

8 E mpl o y ee R ights : H ealth , E q ualit y, S peech ,

9 E thical R esp o nsibilities in B usiness :

Honesty, Loyalty, and Trust 250

I V B usiness and C o nsumers

10 P r o duct L iabilit y and S afet y 275

Reading 10.3 Steven Kelman

11 M ar k eting E thics : Advertising, Sales, and

Decision Scenario B: Marketing in School 356

V B usiness and Other C o nstituencies

12 B usiness , E n v ir o nment, and

13 G l o bal B usiness and H uman R ights 3 9 9

The Nonrelativist Approach 402

New to the Sixth Edition

This Sixth Edition of Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics reflects a substantive

• Eighteen classic readings retained from authors such as:

• Twenty-three new Cases and Decision Scenarios (fifty-four total) on such

• Two entirely new chapters, on corporate purpose (Chapter 5) and on gover-

The Affordable Care Act

Religious Freedom at Work

• Retained emphasis on the social, political, and philosophical foundations of

We would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of our reviewers:

Paul Nnodim–Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts; and Csaba Nyiri–University

and structure of business institutions and must acknowledge that responsibility by

BUSINESS ETHICS: THE “FREE MARKET” THEORY

DOING BUSINESS ETHICS: AN ANALYSIS OF FRIEDMAN

eliminating discrimination, [and] avoiding pollution” is potentially to become “unwit-

Friedman’s Radical Position

Newala, too, suffers from the distance of its water-supply—at least

The water-supply of New Newala is in the bottom of the valley,

NATIVE PATH THROUGH THE MAKONDE BUSH, NEAR

MAKONDE LOCK AND KEY AT JUMBE CHAURO

MODE OF INSERTING THE KEY

With no small pride first one householder and then a second

Some consolation was afforded me by a brassfounder, whom I

SMOOTHING WITH MAIZE-COB

CUTTING THE EDGE

LAST SMOOTHING BEFORE

FIRING THE BRUSH-PILE

TURNING THE RED-HOT VESSEL

NYASA WOMAN MAKING POTS AT MASASI

DRAWING THE BARK OFF THE LOG

REMOVING THE OUTER BARK

WORKING THE BARK-CLOTH AFTER BEATING, TO MAKE IT

MANUFACTURE OF BARK-CLOTH AT NEWALA

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I I B usiness : P urp o se , G o v ernance , and