ENERGYEDGE WELCOMES YOU TO

Process Hazard Assessment Using The

HAZOP Technique And HAZOP Team Leader
Training
Instructor:
Alan Borrowman

11 – 15 September 2023 2PM – 6PM (Malaysia Time)

Dear Learners,

On behalf of energyEDGE®, welcome to “Process Hazard Assessment Using The HAZOP Technique And
HAZOP Team Leader Training”.

This Virtual Instructor Led Training (VILT) programme will be delivered through a series of lectures and
interactive sessions. In order to maximize your learning in this training course, please do bring-up your
individual questions to the expert trainer during the interactive sessions scheduled through-out the course.
Please do take full advantage of this opportunity to also share views with your industry peers attending this
training course to capture more insights on this subject matter.

Should you require further clarification about this training course, please do not hesitate to email our
representative who will be available to assist you at amanina@asiaedge.net.

Thank you for your participation at the workshop.

Yours faithfully, Yours faithfully,

Malina Raman Easwaran Kanason

Director, Strategic Learning & Development Chief Executive Officer & Co-Founder
energyEDGE energyEDGE
 COPYRIGHT
All material contained in these training notes are copyright of Mr Alan Borrowman, the
facilitator of this training.
No part of these noted may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form, or by any means, electronic or otherwise without the prior permission of Mr Alan
Borrowman.
The recording will be given if you got disconnected due to poor connection or you need to
leave the session to attend to urgent matters. Its case by case basis as we would need to
protect the course content. The entire recording is copyright by Mr Alan Borrowman. The
recording may not be copied or duplicate by any means without the approval from the
trainer. It will only be used with the permission of Mr Alan Borrowman.

energyEDGE
The Course Organizer
info@petroedgeasia.net
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HAZOP Technique / Team Leader
Module 1 : Introduction
 Course Presenter – Alan Borrowman

– Alan is a chartered chemical engineer and Fellow of IChemE,

– He has been freelance since 2006, chairing over150 studies in HAZOP,
SIL, LOPA, HAZID for operators and contractors in the international oil
industry.
– He also provides expert witness services to lawyers involved in
contractual disputes.
– He has been a Project Engineer and Engineering Manager in the
pharmaceutical industry, a Principal Technical Safety Engineer for
AMEC and KBR in the UK oil and gas industry. Then a director of a
safety consultancy in Aberdeen for 6 years.
– So he has a broad understanding of safe design practice and
operational issues.
• Introduce yourself to the group.

• Your name and company and job title

• What you do in your current role
• An activity that you enjoy doing in your leisure time
 Trevor Kletz (1922 – 2013)

• Short video (3:30 minutes)

• Technical Safety Advisor in ICI

• Professor of Chemical Engineering
• Promoted HAZOP and ‘inherent safety’
• Saying “what you don’t have cannot leak”
 Your Expectations
What in particular to you hope to learn more about ?

Previous expectations from course attendees included :

• HAZOP during life cycle of plant

• Risk assessment / risk matrix
• Managing HAZOP time
• Preparing for the study
• Node selection
• Case study
• Internal vs external leader. How independent ?
 Course Outline

HAZOP TECHNIQUE
Module 1 HAZOP Essentials HAZOP Methodology
Module 2 HAZOP Roles Types of HAZOP
Module 3 Main Syndicate Exercise
HAZOP TEAM LEADER
Module 4 Node Selection Planning a Study
Risk Reduction Recording and Reporting
Raising Actions
Module 5 SIL / LOPA Operability
Human Factors Managing the Team
Meeting Leadership HAZOP Masterclass
 Course Objectives

 to show the power of HAZOP in assessing plant designs

 to promote the benefits of HAZOP

 To be more effective as HAZOP team members

 to understand how accidents are caused

 to understand the process of assessing risk

 Discussion
How is HAZOP addressed in your organisation?

– Who organises HAZOP ?

– How is HAZOP planning and resourcing done ?
– Use of in-house specialists or external support ?
– Do you use special recording software ?
– What happens to the results ?
– What problems do you have with HAZOP ?
 How has HAZOP practice changed ?
20th Century
❖ Major chemical companies like ICI, BP and Shell had large engineering departments
who designed equipment and developed the PFDs and PIDs.
❖ Clients managed the HAZOP studies with the contractor in attendance.
❖ HAZOPs were thorough but time-consuming. Usually 6 – 12 attendees.
❖ Contractors lacked operating expertise and were responsible only for the engineering
design, e.g. plant layouts, piping isometrics and loop diagrams.
21st Century
❖ Few clients have design departments but still manage FEED studies and may
nominate the HAZOP leader.
❖ Contractors are responsible for PID development and manage the HAZOP studies.
Many have staff with operations experience.
❖ Time pressure because HAZOP is on the critical path. Often carried out before PIDs
are ready. HAZOP completion may be linked to a milestone payment.
❖ Duplication of HAZOP roles - !5 or more attendees is common. Meeting leadership
skills become more important.
13
Hazard Technique
Module 1.1 : HAZOP Essentials
 In this module
We will discover when to use HAZOP and cover the
basics of the HAZOP methodology:

 Guidewords
 Causes
 Consequences
 Safeguards

With a simple example to understand how to identify

the causes of deviations.

15
 What is HAZOP ?
HAZOP is :
• a systematic study method for identifying potential hazards and
operability concerns in a process system
• a vital step in the overall risk management process
• a comprehensive, in-depth and documented design check
• a team effort, pooling knowledge and experience
• the most widely used safety technique in process design and operation

HAZOP is not :
• a mechanistic checklist review
• a means of re-designing a system
• a method of solving or analysing problems
• a competence test of the process/design engineer
• A guarantee that the plant is safe
16
 Why HAZOP ?
Process plants are designed and constructed in accordance with good
industry practice based on hundreds of widely recognised engineering
codes and standards. These are based on accumulated knowledge and
experience and are reviewed and updated when accidents happen.

So why do we need HAZOP ? There are several reasons.

❖ Codes and standards tell the designer what he should do. They do
not say what he/she should not do.
❖ Codes and standards are based on what has happened before and
cannot predict new hazardous situations.
❖ Each plant design is different. Hazards can arise from different
combinations of equipment and how process streams interact.
❖ Designers may have to ‘interpret’ codes and standards,
e.g. API standards are based on onshore US refinery practice, not
upstream oil & gas, chemicals production or utilities.

17
 When to HAZOP ?
New Project
❖ Preliminary or ‘Coarse’ HAZOP is carried out during FEED.
❖ Detailed HAZOP for a new project is carried out towards the end of
detailed design, when there is still sufficient time to incorporate findings.
❖ Pre-start up HAZOP is a check that previous HAZOP actions are complete.
❖ Procedural HAZOP may be carried out once SOPs are prepared.

Existing Plant
❖ ‘Validation’ HAZOP is a review ‘by difference’ of a previous HAZOP for the
accumulation of individual changes to equipment, operating procedures,
control system. OSHA 3132 (PHA guidance) suggests at least every 5 years.
❖ ‘Re-HAZOP’ may be required if considerably more time has elapsed since a
previous HAZOP, or if its quality is inadequate for a re-validation HAZOP.
❖ Any HAZOP should only be carried out when PIDs are complete (new
project) or accurately updated (existing plant), and fully reviewed.

18
HAZOP – What if there is …?

Reverse
(Flow
) No
(Flow
)

Misdirected Deviations
(Flow
from Design More
)
(Flow problems) (Flow)

Cycling Les
(Flow
(Flow s
)
)

19
 HAZOP Principle

Problems, either safety or operational, will only arise when there

is a deviation from the design or operating intention.

Parameters / Guidewords
(for generation of deviations)

Causes Deviation Consequences

Human error, From design or Process hazard or
equipt. failure, operating intent operating problem
external event

Safeguards Pre-event Post-event Safeguards

Inherently safe design, Alarm, trip, relief
plant layout, procedures valve
 The HAZOP Process
Select NODE, State INTENT, Select PARAMETER + GUIDEWORD
IDENTIFY

BRAINSTORM
DEVIATION CAUSE

ASSESS
CAUSE
NO IS IT POSSIBLE?
IS IT LIKELY?

CONSEQUENCE
NO CAN BARRIERS FAIL?
DOES IT MATTER?

YES
The HAZOP
Process RECOMMENDATION

21
 What is a DEVIATION
Deviations are possible ways for the plant to exceed its design or operating
envelope.
– Physical: too much flow, too hot or too high a pressure.
– Compositional: different components, phase change
– Operational: no maintenance, bad isolation procedure
– Unsteady state: start-up, blowdown, maintenance, changeover
Deviations are identified by the systematic application of the appropriate
parameter-guide word combinations.

Deviation = Parameter + Guideword

• Flow • More
• Temperature • Less
• Pressure • No
• Level • Reverse
• Composition • Other Than
22
 Types of Deviation

The three major categories of causes in order of likelihood are:

❑ Human error - acts or omission or commission

❑ Equipment failure - mechanical, structural or operating failure

❑ External events - loss of utilities, adjacent plant, weather

23
 Parameters

A) PROCESS PARAMETERS
MAIN SUBSIDIARY
FLOW VELOCITY
TEMPERATURE MATERIAL FAILURE
PRESSURE RADIATION
LEVEL FOAMING
COMPOSITION HYDRAULIC SURGE
VIBRATION
EROSION / CORROSION
SAMPLING
CATALYST
POLLUTION
24
 Other Kinds of Parameter

B) OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS
OPERATING MODES, e.g. bypass, turndown, recycle, parallel steps
COMMISSIONING / START-UP
SHUTDOWN incl. emergency shutdown, blowdown

C) MAINTENANCE PARAMETERS
PLANT ISOLATION / PREPARATION / RE-INSTATEMENT

D) OTHER PARAMETERS
UTILITY FAILURE FIRE & EXPLOSION
EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY DESIGN DOCUMENTATION
HUMAN FACTORS, incl. procedures, ergonomics

25
 Guidewords

GUIDEWORD MEANING COMMENTS

NO Complete negation of the No part of the intention is
design or operating intent achieved
MORE Quantitative increase More of the intention occurs
or is achieved
LESS Quantitative decrease Less of the intention occurs
or is achieved
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase All of the intention is
achieved with some addition
PART OF Qualitative decrease Only some of the intention is
achieved
REVERSE Opposite of the intention The operating intention is
achieved in wrong direction
OTHER THAN Something else happens No part of the intention
occurs
26
 Exercise 1 : HAZOP Principle

plastic
hosereel

variable
jet nozzle

mains Design Intention

water @ to continuously deliver 5 litres of water per minute over a
6 bar distance of 5 metres
What deviations to the design intent are possible and
what are the causes ?
Consider More Flow, Less Flow, No Flow

27
 Hosereel HAZOP
More Flow nozzle becomes detached
nozzle stuck open
Less Flow hose splits
hose kinked
nozzle partially blocked (debris)
valve partially blocked
loss of mains supply pressure
other water user
No Flow nozzle stuck closed/totally blocked
valve stuck closed/totally blocked
water supply turned off
Other hosepipe ban !
28
 Study Method

• Define process elements (nodes) for study

• Understand all operating modes
• Confirm design intention
• Apply guidewords
- Continuous or batch operation
• Find causes of deviation from design
• Assess consequences and safeguards
• Evaluate risk
• Apply additional safeguards if necessary
• Assign actions
29
 What is a CAUSE
Causes are ways that a deviation may be achieved
(Causes occur within the node).

Mal-operation - mistaken closure of a valve

Less Likely

Equipment failure - instrument switch non-operational

Oversight in design - designers don’t communicate
External events - lightning strike

30
 What is a CONSEQUENCE

Consequences are the effect of the cause on the operation or

integrity of the plant
(Consequences may occur anywhere in the plant).

– Economic consequences - loss of production

– Unsafe consequences - release of hydrocarbon
– Escalation to more serious events – missiles

31
 Exercise21 - HAZOP of Domestic Shower

Consider how the shower could

malfunction, using the suggested HAZOP
guidewords (Flow, Temperature,
vent mains supply
Pressure), and make recommendations
for improvement.
header
tank

shower
rose overflow

mixer
valve hot water
cylinder

immersion
heater

32
End of module

Any questions ?

33
HAZOP Technique
Module 1.2 : HAZOP Methodology
 Objectives of this module
To understand the HAZOP process

• Define process elements (nodes) for study

• Understand all operating modes
• Confirm design intention
• Apply guidewords
- Continuous or batch operation
• Find causes of deviation from design
• Assess consequences and safeguards
• Assess the level of risk
• Apply additional safeguards if necessary
• Assign actions
 A Simple Node

End of node

V2 V3
V1

Start of
node

P1
 Which Operating Modes ?
Normal operating mode is the usual steady state.

Other modes may include:

• Start up and shutdown
• Different number of parallel trains in operation
• Equipment bypassed or recycled
• Regeneration of absorber beds
• Batch filling of storage tanks

For upstream oil and gas applications:

• Different wells on stream
• Well testing
 What do we mean by ‘Design Intention’ ?
• It refers to the normal plant configuration and normal
operating conditions.
• Operating conditions include pressure, temperature and
flowrate, and are usually stated as a range of values.
• These are not the same as ‘design conditions’, which are the
plant design limits and not to be exceeded.
• HAZOP considers deviations beyond the operating
conditions, which could potentially exceed design limits.
 Process Guidewords

Flow No, Less, More, Reverse, Misdirected

Pressure More, Less, Transient
Temperature More, Less
Level No/Less, More
Composition Change (phase, concentration, contamination)
Operations Start up, shutdown, human factors
Other e.g. viscosity, corrosion, erosion

Non-process : Utility failure, Plant layout, Maintenance

 Causes of Process Hazards

System Design Material Properties

static electricity pressure

vibration temperature
stored energy flammability
fouling / blockage explosivity
ignition sources catalytic decomposition
poor ergonomics toxicity
equipment failure corrosivity
metallurgy chemical reaction
plant layout radioactivity
 Causes of Deviations

❑ Each deviation may have several causes. Consequences and

recommendations may be different for each one.

❑ Causes have to be credible and reasonably foreseeable

❑ ‘Double jeopardy’ means that two or more simultaneous

causes occur independently.

It is usually a low or very low probability. It can be ignored in

a HAZOP study as long as there is no common cause, e.g.
power failure stops a pump and closes a valve.
 Identifying Causes

• Causes must be in the node under study (except at boundaries)

• List all the causes before considering consequences.

• Specify the cause clearly (e.g. say which valve may be closed)

• Wait until all causes are identified before examining first cause.

• Causes must be ‘credible’ in the team’s judgement.

 Identifying Causes (2)
• Some causes may be better dealt with under another
deviation
e.g. blocked filter in a pump suction line – can be recorded
under ‘Less Flow’ rather than ‘No flow’ if it is likely to block
gradually.

• The HAZOP technique is very searching. Causes missed under

one deviation will often be identified under another.
e.g. Ambient temperature may cause fluid in a line to solidify.
- the team may identify this as a ‘No Flow’ cause, or as a
consequence of ‘Less Temperature’.
 Example – Misdirected Flow
• Valve A must be closed with valves B and C open when receiving a pig.
• If valve A is left open or is leaking badly, the flow through valves B and C may not
be enough to push the pig into the receiver and it gets stuck.

TO OIL
C SEPARATION
A
MOV
MOV
B LC

FROM MOV
PIPELINE
PIG RECEIVER
BAR TEE

LC LC

TO CLOSED TO OPEN
DRAIN DRAIN
SYSTEM SYSTEM
 Example - Higher Temperature

HOT OIL FROM

PLATFORM WELLS
TO FLARE
GAS TO
COLD OIL FROM COMPRESSION
SUBSEA WELLS

1st STAGE SEPARATOR

TO PRODUCED WATER TO OIL STABILISATION /

TREATMENT EXPORT
 Example - Low Level

TO GAS
COMPRESSION

PSV Sized for

PSV
gas flow
TO TO BOOSTER GAS
FLARE COMPRESSION
TO FLARE

FEED
HP LP
Separator Separator
LC

LSLL

TO CONDENSATE
STABILISATION
 Example - Higher Pressure
• Glycol is added to the gas at the well to avoid hydrate formation.
• If the ESDV in the gas line closes, the head of glycol liquid upstream creates a
high differential pressure across the valve.
• The valve seat in ESDV could be damaged when the valve is opened.
• Pressure has to be reduced via a manual by-pass balve.

WELL SITE
EL. + 500 M

Pipeline + piggy backed

Glycol / Corrosion Inhibitor

ESDV

PROCESSING
DATUM 0 M TERMINAL
 Developing Consequences
• Consequences can be anywhere – inside the node, outside
node, plant or facility.
• Consider a logical sequence of events from immediate
consequence (e.g. pump runs dry causing seal damage),
intermediate effects (e.g. loss of containment) to identify
the final consequences (e.g. spillage and possible fire).
• Chain of events should be credible with realistic ultimate
outcomes (but consider how bad it could be).
• DO NOT take safeguards into consideration when
developing consequences. A common error in HAZOPs.
- distorts risk evaluation / understates potential outcomes.
 Consequences & Safeguards
Initially assess consequences without existing safeguards, then
consider the effect of the existing safeguards.
Additional safeguards are required if the combination of cause
and consequence still presents a credible hazard.
Safeguards are systems and procedures that are designed to
•prevent a hazardous event
•detect and give warning of a hazardous event
•mitigate the consequences of a hazardous event

49
 Examples of Safeguards
 Intrinsic mechanical strength of plant
 Separation distances between inventories
 Alarms to alert operators to manually intervene
 Instrument trips
 Mechanical safety devices, e.g. pressure relief & check valves
How effective are they? Hardware devices have to be
specific to the hazard, available on demand and require
regular testing.
 Safe operating procedures.
Caution : Procedure may be the cause of the problem.
Specify exactly what are the procedural improvements.
Well trained and experienced operators is not a safeguard

50
 Assessing Risk

Risk = Frequency of Event x Severity of its Consequence(s)

Why allocate a risk level to each hazard scenario ?

❖To identify the ‘big’ issues ?

❖To prioritise resources ?
❖To justify recommendations for additional safeguards ?
 Assessing Risk
We will deal with risk assessment methods in more detail.

There are 3 possible ways of assessing risk in a HAZOP.

1. Worst case - the unmitigated risk with no safeguards
2. Mitigated risk with the existing safeguards
3. Fully mitigated risks with additional recommended safeguards.

#1 is used to understand the full potential for harm

#2 is the current level of risk (which may be tolerable).
#3 is the ‘residual’ risk which should be at a tolerable level
 Protective Measures

b) Shutdown
Logic
LSHH
a)
Normal
Level
Control
c) LC

A high level trip on a vessel might comprise:

a) a level transmitter or switch, i.e. the sensing element,
b) connections to a dedicated shutdown processor, i.e. the logic element
c) a shut-off valve on the liquid inlet to the vessel, i.e. the field element.
Note: the trip instrumentation is independent of the normal level
control equipment - to avoid common cause failures.
53
 Reliability of Protective Measures
Any protective device has a finite failure rate and its design
should ensure that the availability (to operate on demand) is
based on the consequences of failure.

Human failure
 Operators may not respond to alarms or follow procedures

Hardware failure – revealed or hidden

 Revealed failure (fail-safe) leads to loss of production but
normally not a serious HSE problem
 Hidden failure (fail-to-danger) means that plant is exposed to
a hazard for as long as the device is unavailable.

54
 Improving Availability

Functional testing

On average, a trip will fail halfway through test interval.

Practical limit on test frequency due to access constraints
and time off-line

Redundancy : duplication of sensing and/or field elements

Diversity : alternative design of duplicate elements

Voting systems : to reduce spurious / nuisance (fail-safe) trips

55
High Integrity Protection System (HIPS)
Dual channel
2 oo 3 HIPS logic
voting logic processor

TO FLARE

PT PT PT
OIL FROM GAS TO
WELLS COMPRESSION

Possible HIPS cases:

•Oversized liquid slug
•Failure to shut-in wells TO OIL
PROCESSING
•Blocked outlet
 Assessing adequacy of safeguards

• Potentially the most difficult aspect of the team’s work

• Are they effective in reality ?
e.g. alarms and trip systems can fail even when tested.
CCTV monitoring does not stop anything, it may give
(earlier) warning - if someone is looking at the screen.
• Consider all active and passive safeguards
- safeguarding instrumentation, relief devices
- operator training and vigilance
- mitigation systems, emergency response
• Should be verifiable and effective ( not “we have trained
and competent operators following good procedures”)
HAZOP Technique
1.3 Node Selection
 In this module

• What is a ‘node’
• Guidance on node selection & use
• Node specification table
• Example : node selection
 What is a NODE

A Node is a section of the plant small enough for individual

hazards & operability issues to be uniquely identified by the
team.
– Nodes can be large or small depending on the type of
study
– Nodes can be pipes or equipment
– Nodes are selected by the leader before the study
– Nodes should cover all of the HAZOP scope but without
duplication
 Identifying Nodes
PRODUCTION
MANIFOLD TO FLARE

TO
FLARE PC TO FLARE PC

TO
TO COMPRESSION FLARE

1st Stage 2nd Stage

Separator Separator
INTER-
FACE
FROM
LC LC LC LC
VARIOUS
SOURCES
TO OIL
EXPORT

TO LC LC
HYDROCYCLONES
TO CLOSED TO PRODUCED TO CLOSED DRAIN
DRAIN SYSTEM WATER TREATMENT
 Guidance on Selecting Nodes

❖ Follow the process flow logic from upstream to downstream.

❖ Make each main process vessel / column / separator into a
node.
❖ Include the inlet lines from to the nearest upstream valves.
❖ Include the outlet streams from the vessel up to the first
(pressure/level) control valve.
❖ Include the instrumentation, pressure relief and vents up to
the vent header.
❖ Include drain lines up to the drain header.
❖ Consider the pipework between vessels as a separate node
or nodes depending on the amount of equipment it contains,
e.g. pumps, heat exchangers, filters, compressors.

2
 Node Selection – More Hints

❖ If the node is too complex, i.e. too many changes of flow direction
or pressure or temperature :-
sub-divide it into smaller nodes, stopping at splits / branches /
junctions, but ensure everything is included and not duplicated.
❖ Always be clear where the node starts and ends on each line, e.g.
at the pump inlet or outlet flange, ensuring that any gaps such as
the pump itself are included in one of the nodes.
❖ Use the process specialist to guide you.
If the node is too small – with no equipment, then few findings -
can be demotivating.
If the node is too large – team gets ‘lost’, guidewords can have
ambiguous meaning –leads to time wasting.
 Guidance on Using Nodes

❖ Node boundaries are imaginary points at branches in the main

pipework or on equipment nozzles, where a process parameter
(P/T/F/compn.) changes. Ideally, process conditions should be
constant throughout the node.
❖ When looking for deviations, consider causes inside the node.
❖ Consequences can be anywhere, i.e. in the node, upstream and
downstream of the node.
❖ If the first node is at the start of the process, it is OK to consider
upstream causes as well, but there is no need to define in detail, e.g.
‘increased flow from feed storage tank into this node’.
❖ Nominate a ‘point of reference’ for each node, normally downstream,
to avoid using ‘More flow’ and ‘Less flow’ for the same deviation.
 Defining Nodes

Project title Northwind FEED study

Node No./description 1: 1500 # pipework, topside choke and manual

depressuring connection.
System limits SSSV to inlet flange of heater

Design intent to receive produced fluids from pipeline at controlled

topside pressure
Design conditions 1034 barg; –29 to 175 degree C, max 12,000
bbls/day
Operating conditions 915 barg; –10 to 90 degree C, max 10,000 bbls/day

PID Nos: AB-00-219-0301 Rev A

Notes PSV’s are set at 86.2 barg (1250 psig) , Hi pilot 85

(e.g. safety settings and barg and Lo pilot 5 barg. Assumed normal mode of
operating mode) operation is that heater bypass valve is closed
 Example – Node Selection
Wet hydrocarbon gas at high pressure is dried by lean
glycol (TEG) in a Glycol Contactor column.
The rich (i.e. water wet) glycol is recycled through a
regeneration plant where light oil (‘condensate’) is removed
by gravity separation.
The TEG is then distilled to remove the water and a small
amount of aromatics (called BTX).
TEG is filtered to remove any degradation solids which
would otherwise foul the contactor column.
6 nodes are marked up in different colours on the ‘Glycol
Contactor’ and ‘Glycol Regeneration’ P&IDs.
Glycol Contactor

67
 Glycol Regeneration Plant

TO HAZARDOUS
TC AREA VENT
FROM GLYCOL SYSTEM 43
CONTACTOR
SYSTEM 24 REFLUX
CONDENSER

TO LP VENT PC
SYSTEM 43

GLYCOL REBOILER
LC GLYCOL FLASH DRUM
SPARGE
COLUMN
FUEL GAS
SYSTEM 45

TO RECLAIMED
GLYCOL SURGE DRUM
OIL SUMP
SYSTEM 44

SYSTEM 45

LEAN GLYCOL
BOOSTER PUMPS SYSTEM 43
GLYCOL CARBON
COOLING FILTER FILTER
MEDIUM GLYCOL DRAINS
SUPPLY GLYCOL
SYSTEM 40 SUMP
PUMP

COOLING
MEDIUM GLYCOL SUMP
RETURN
FI GLYCOL
SYSTEM 40
TC COOLER

TO GLYCOL
CONTACTOR LEAN GLYCOL PUMP
SYSTEM 24 GLYCOL REGENERATION

68
 The First Node

When study boundaries have been defined, ask :

1. is there more than 1 design case for upstream processes

affecting flows / temperatures / pressures / composition ?
→ get guidance from sponsor, process specialist, or use common
sense as to which one to select as the basis for this study?

2. are there significant credible upstream disturbances - more / less

flow, temperature, pressure?
→’allow’ these as causes in the first node even though they fall
outside it – BUT avoid extending the study into upstream
equipment. For example, just say ‘pressure increase in upstream
unit’ without giving specific reasons.

3
 Getting Started

• As long as all the P&ID is covered, it does not really matter

how small (or large) the nodes are.

• Consider splitting flows in a complex vessel / tower /

regenerator / reactor into 2 or more nodes, e.g. liquid flow
downwards and gas flow upwards.

• Gas flow, liquid flow, circulating reflux flow, top product,

bottom product, water phase, oil phase.

• ‘Colouring in’ nodes clarifies complex drawings, ensures

nothing is omitted.

5
 Reducing the Number of Nodes

• Factors affecting the number and size of nodes:

- Duplication of service e.g. spare pump

- Duplication of equipment e.g. parallel reactors, dryers
- Both sides of a cooler / condenser covered in node
- Cascade processes with no intermediate isolation

- Improving capability of team

- Familiarity with process conditions
 Node Designation

•Node Definition
– Section of facility to be reviewed as an entity
– Minimum interfaces with other nodes
– Designate the reference point (start or end of node)
– Noding rules of thumb
• Max of 10 ‘No Flow’ causes
• Separate the different phases
•Why is Noding important
– Keeping discussion within the node
– Only consider causes in the node (except at battery limits or boundaries
of study, where causes outside the node can be considered)
– Consequences can be anywhere in project scope
End of module

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