The Army Science Board

Fiscal Year 2020 Study

An Independent Assessment
of the 2040 Battlefield
and its Implications for the
5th Generation Combat Vehicle
(5GCV)

Final Report: Executive Summary

August 2023

Department of the Army

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology)
Washington, DC 20310-0103

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Army Science Board (ASB), organized under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) in 1977, provides the Army with
independent advice and recommendations on matters relating to
the Army’s scientific, technological, manufacturing, acquisition,
logistics and business management functions, as well as other
matters the Secretary of the Army deems important to the
Department of the Army.

The ASB’s members and consultants are eminent authorities in the

disciplines of science, technology, engineering, math, social
science, business, and governance. The Board also draws upon the
expertise of senior retired military officers from all branches of
service. All are dedicated experts who volunteer their time to
provide independent assessments to Army senior civilian and
military leadership.

The following report is a product of the ASB. The statements,

opinions, conclusions, and observations contained in this report
are those of the ASB study members and do not necessarily reflect
the official position of the United States Army or the Department
of Defense.

This document is available in electronic format from the Defense

Technical Information Center (DTIC) at http://www.dtic.mil.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1

Approved Army Science Board Briefing ........................................................................................ 22

Introduction
Secretaries of the Army Mark Esper and Ryan McCarthy tasked the Army Science Board (ASB)
on 4 January 2019 and 6 January 2020, respectively, to study armor/anti-armor warfare circa
2040. Secretary Christine Wormuth reaffirmed the need for such an independent assessment
of future armor/anti-armor warfare when the ASB was reestablished on 14 August 2021. Army
Futures Command (AFC) sponsored the study. Generals John M. Murray and James E. Rainey,
the commanders of AFC during the conduct of the study, directed the effort.

Today’s Army finds itself in a geostrategic and military situation similar to the 1970s with telling
similarities and important differences from the Cold War era. Then, the Army transitioned from
Vietnam and counterinsurgency warfare to confront a modernized Soviet army on a potential
Central European battlefield as the third industrial age took hold, driven by the initial
applications of the microprocessor. Today’s transition is from counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency centered in the Middle East to the potential for large scale combat
operations against two major adversaries as the fourth industrial age accelerates, driven by
networks, autonomy, and artificial intelligence. These adversaries, a comprehensively
modernizing Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) currently centered on the western Pacific
and eastern Asia and Russia’s selectively modernized ground force focused on Europe, create
complexities that in important ways exceed those faced in the Cold War. Comprehensive
modernization programs, the Big Five then and the Big Six today, serve as the vanguard of a
necessarily changing Army.

Based on the 1970-80 transition, the ASB examined the acquisition approaches that the Army
successfully employed to develop the Cold War Big Five and the Multiple Launch Rocket
System. Developing new armor capabilities employing those approaches, conflict insights,
concepts, technology testbeds, and competitive prototyping that were central to the M1
development but updated by modern processes would allow a successful balance between
development risk, affordability, and improved operational capability. These approaches were
critical to the M1 remaining the dominant main battle tank (MBT) capability over the two
generations since its fielding in the 1980s.

In addition to a successful acquisition model, in the 1970s the Army employed “Lessons
Learned” from two Middle East wars, in particular the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, to inform the
development of both Active Defense and AirLand Battle doctrines and necessary supporting
material developments. Today the Army is analyzing “Lessons Learned” from conflicts in Syria,
Yemen, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine, and the ASB has also employed this approach.

Without making such an armor technology modernization investment now, estimated in this
study at $3-4 billion, the Army puts at risk mission success in close combat on the 2040
battlefield. Regardless of the theater of operations, the lack of an overmatching MBT capability
jeopardizes Army mission success. The costs for this program were compared with those
experiences during the 1970-80 period and found to be similar in inflation adjusted dollars.

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To maintain land warfare overmatch, the Army should immediately initiate a testbed and
development program with the creation of requirements for the 5GCV and the creation of an
ATGM CFT. The US ability to deter war and win on future land battlefields is at serious risk
without development of the 5GCV. The M1 Abrams tank, fielded in 1980, was superbly
developed and provided unprecedented capabilities, but will not have the dominant
deployability or mobility, lethality, or protection necessary for success on the 2040 battlefield.
The M1 Abrams development program, with state of the art analytics, provides an appropriate
model for the development of the 5GCV with dominant lethality, protection, mobility, and
deployability essential for the 2040 battlefield. And lastly, the Army must partner with industry,
other USG agencies, and Allies and partners to acquire the best 2040 technologies for a
dominant 5GCV.

Framing Assumptions
The following assumptions were foundational to the performance of the study.

1. Armored combined arms forces remain decisive to land combat, are central to conventional
force deterrence and, if deterrence fails, victory.
2. Fielding of the 5GCV requires an understanding and balancing of competing demands,
technological, financial, operational, and industrial among many.
3. A US geostrategic reset is underway, transitioning from Middle Eastern counterterrorist and
counterinsurgency to great power competition from China and Russia.
4. The Army armored force is required to meet US national security objectives and establishing
conflict deterrence even in the face of strategic mobility issues, particularly in the US Indo-
Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). However, in response to its
Terms of Reference (TOR), the study will address only the deployability and supportability of
the MBT.

The 2040 Battlefield

Based on our findings, The M1 Abrams will not dominate the 2040 battlefield. All of the M1’s
advantages in mobility, firepower and protection are at risk. The M1A2 SEP V3&4 upgrades will
improve effectiveness but will not restore dominance. Near transparency in all domains will
significantly increase the lethality our forces will experience. China and Russia have studied our
forces and doctrine and are fielding countermeasures. We will continue to have to fight
outnumbered, exacerbated by a low MBT operational readiness rate and an aging fleet.

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Insights from Recent Conflicts and Critical Theaters

Recent Conflict Insights

Conflict in South Lebanon in 2006 exposed
shortcomings that drove changes in the Israeli
Defense Force, particularly armored vehicle
protection. The Israelis restored survivability
overmatch with active protection (APS) against
shaped charge ATGMs to retain the ability to
close with and destroy the enemy through
maneuver and fire with protection. In Operation
Protective Edge, the IDF did not lose a single tank
Figure 1 Merkava mounted Trophy APS defeats Kornet ATGM
to ATGM fire, including in very close terrain.

While the Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine wars

demonstrated the importance of armored
operations, particularly the need for combined
arms operations, they also exposed
vulnerabilities from ATGMs, armed unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV) and loitering submunitions,
antitank mines, and the dangers of increasing
battlefield transparency. These conflicts also
Figure 2 Aftermath of Zelenopillya Rocket Attack (2014) reinforce the imperative of maneuver enabled by
Kyiv Post armored combined arms operations to overcome
this more transparent and lethal battlefield with massed fires driving unprotected forces back
into trenches.

The speed and scale of resource consumption and

equipment loss far exceed recent experience. This
conflict’s duration and intensity reinforces the
importance of industrial base production capacity,
system sustainability, and logistics to maintaining
tempo and movement.

Figure 3 Ukrainian Javelin Strike on a Russian T90 (June 2022)

UAF UAV video footage

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 In addition to the operational and tactical insights
above, strategic considerations emerging from this
conflict center on the issue of scale, including the
scale of the battlespace, operations, lethality,
complexity, contested domains, destruction,
casualties, logistics consumption, and
reconstitution requirements.

Figure 4 Russian tank on tank friendly fire incident (April 2022)

UAF UAV video

Russia and US European Command (USEUCOM) Insights

During the Cold War and since its end, Russia has been the pacing armor/anti-armor threat.
And recent conflicts predominantly feature Russian weapons. Yet, Russia’s ability to rebuild
militarily after Ukraine remains in question. This adds ambiguity to defining the duration of
continued M1 dominance and future requirements. However, this ambiguity creates
opportunities to focus development to ensure overmatch, render costly Russian investments
ineffective, and create new dimensions of combat to further US battlefield dominance.

China and USINDOPACOM Insights

Since World War II, armor operations have been common in the Indo-Pacific region. Beyond
current Western Pacific flashpoints, developments like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the
PLA’s mission to protect China’s expanding developmental interests suggest that China’s future
armor capabilities will be shaped to support operations across the Indo-Pacific and beyond,
adding complexity to US armor/anti-armor development.

As part of this modernization effort and in support

of China’s grand strategy, the People’s Liberation
Army Army (PLAA) has fielded significant
armor/anti-armor capabilities. Its most modern
Type-99 main battle tank is reflective of Chinese
association with Russia and Chinese innovation.
Modernization continues, with approximately half
its 5000-tank inventory now Type-99. While not
yet an M1 equivalent, its development
demonstrates China’s intent to field large
Figure 5 Chinese Type 99A MBT quantities of modern armor. It is doubtful that the
Chinese will depart from Russian design
approaches until it gets visibility into US developments beyond the M1. But China will build the
research and technology base to support such a development. This base includes significant
armor and gun research and development (R&D), continually upgraded systems, and
production of new systems while fielding current systems.

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Similarly, the Chinese are developing and fielding significant ATGMs. The Chinese military has
emphasized technology necessary for ATGM development and continuing fielding of advanced
ATGMs is anticipated.

A full understanding of Chinese armor/anti-armor missions and developments remains

ambiguous. To improve understanding, this study reviewed armor operations in the Indo-Pacific
through several lenses.

The study team conducted a tabletop wargame using a near term Taiwan scenario supported
by the Center for Army Analysis. This wargame demonstrated armor’s value in Taiwan’s defense
but struggles with deployment and sustainment precluded US armor’s arrival in sufficient
numbers before China achieved a fait accompli. A review of classified wargame reports and
other analysis suggested similar challenges with deployment and sustainment.

Related to the South China sea, the

study examined the implications of
“third-party intervention” by China
in Korea. Northern Theater
Command, with the capability and
capacity to act without outside
support, intervention would prevent
unification of the peninsula following
regime collapse or escalate
horizontally, splitting US forces
Figure 6 Third Party Intervention
SCMP Map, ASB graphic between Korea and Taiwan. Both
scenarios involved potential US and
Chinese armor engagements, highlighting the challenges of fighting outnumbered against a
fully modernized armor/anti-armor force able to generate combat power at speed, scale, and
reach. Horizontal escalation in Korea with Taiwan risks US Army forces operating without the
degree of air, maritime, space, and cyber support assumed to be part of any US operation.

The study also explored the challenge

Figure 7 The Belt and Road Initiative and Potential Conflicts.
Heritage Institute map and study graphics
“‘resolutely safeguard’ development interests” which extend along the BRI. As China moves to
of future conflict along the BRI. With
BRI investment exceeding $1 trillion,
China seeks to secure key supply
chains (energy, minerals, food, trade)
and economic advantage in Central
Asia and Africa, potentially shifting
important levels of trade and Chinese
supply chains inland. Significant
energy supplies already flow through
Central Asia to China. In 2017, Xi
Jinping charged his military to

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protect these investments, conflict along the BRI in Eurasia has the potential for military land
operations against a peer land force with the US depending on deployments over significant
lines of communication far more challenging than those in Europe or the Western Pacific.

These indications suggest that while China has prioritized air, naval, and rocket force
development in support of its first centennial objective, including ending poverty, economic
growth, regional hegemony, and assimilation of Taiwan, the Chinese recognize that armored
maneuver continues to matter. Moreover, the scope and scale of its military R&D investments
suggests China will likely overtake Russia as this century’s armor/anti-armor pacing threat.

Character of the 2040 Battlefield

Similarities to Today’s Battlefield

While the Indo-Pacific region today is dominated by threats on sea and in the air, a
fundamental of warfare among major powers is that dominance on land is essential to
determine the outcome of conflict among major combatants. Preparation for eventual land
combat is fundamental to defense in the Pacific theater, particularly as China’s interests expand
beyond the Western Pacific.

What is not likely to change in the foreseeable future are the Army’s statutory requirements
(Title 10 US Code) to conduct “…prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land”
and assigned responsibilities from Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, that the Army
“…organize, train, equip, and provide forces with expeditionary and campaign qualities” in
order to…“conduct operations in all environments and types of terrain, including complex
urban environments, to defeat enemy ground forces, and seize, occupy, and defend land
areas”. These tasks have
om re e si e Ba le eld T reats a d alle es mer i i been consistent for
several decades and will
continue to be critical to
the Army’s success as part
of the Joint Force. Indeed,
the Secretary of the Army
recently noted that
providing “counter-attack
forces” was one of five
“incredibly important”
tasks for the Army in the
Indo-Pacific.

Figure 8 Comprehensive Battlefield Threats in 2040

ASB graphic

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Changes Anticipated in the 2040 Battlefield
Insights from recent conflicts, analysis of the PLAA and Chinese R&D, and longer-term
technology trends all point to a battlefield that is expanding across multiple dimensions,
modes, and domains of warfare and geography and actors, and increasing in complexity.
Changes to the character of war in 2040 will involve all domains and warfighting functions,
spanning swaths of geography not seen since WWII. While battles will still be fought over
localized objectives, battles, campaigns, and conflicts will routinely involve global inputs and
consequences. Notably, the battlefield is not expanding in time. The speed of information,
events, and weapons systems are accelerating, compressing decision cycles and reaction times.
This places a premium on leader and unit agility in executing at the speed of decision –
effectively anticipating and acting ahead of the adversary.

T reats to o ed omi a e o t e Ba le eld to

Tactically, adversaries are
increasingly able to routinely
integrate land-based
combined arms capabilities
with effects from air, sea,
space, cyber, and
electromagnetic spectrum
operations. Space targeting,
increasingly prolific land and
air breathing sensors, and
Figure 9 Threats to Continued M1 Dominance network operations will make
ASB graphic
long-range fires more
prevalent and increasingly
more lethal, challenging formations over the breadth and depth of the battlefield. Increasingly
autonomous air vehicles including loitering munitions increase lethality at speed to attack the
least resilient aspects of battlefield systems and platforms.

The 2040 battlefield will likely see significant increases in the use of robotics for combat, ISR,
and logistics functions; AI-aided capabilities to include target location and identification and
platform movement; cyber-attacks on command-and-control facilities; longer-range indirect
fire systems (both artillery and rockets/missiles) with increasingly capable precision munitions
that can defeat anything they can acquire. However, every nation with the capability to develop
and employ these capabilities is also working on counters to them. The future battlefield will
place a premium on camouflage, cover, concealment, deception, and denial (C3D2) using new
technologies that can defeat, disrupt, confuse, and/or spoof enemy sensors and cyber
capabilities that can interrupt, confuse, deceive, and even take over enemy command and
control systems to desynchronize enemy capabilities.

The development of totally robotic (unmanned) vehicles is being advanced in the belief that
such vehicles will be able to do much of what the manned MBT now does. We judge such
capability is unlikely to materialize by the 2040s. The recommended 5GCV technology testbeds

7
will provide necessary knowledge including field data applicable to a robotic vehicle, and these
demonstrators should be considered as being part of maturing both manned and unmanned
vehicles.

While there are many consistencies between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, logistics and support,
difficult in both theaters, are exacerbated by the Indo-Pacific’s longer distances and less
developed infrastructure, including ports and airfields. Further, long-range fires ability to target
logistics infrastructure will make forward support a critical factor and more difficult in the Indo-
Pacific theater than in Europe. Emerging analysis of the Indo-Pacific exposes challenges to the
ABCT, with arrival extending over longer periods, requiring exploration of force designs,
platform capabilities and strategic lift capabilities to mitigate these challenges.

The above challenges do not mean vehicles must be tailored for individual theaters. However,
the requirement for an 5GCV common to both theaters will require accounting for Indo-Pacific
unique logistics requirements. Decisions on 5GCVs should aim to make the entire 5GCV unit
more strategically deployable and sustainable. The 5GCV should be a vanguard for a new, more
agile formation, reversing current trends towards the ABCT getting much heavier with AMPV
(~40 tons) replacing the M113 (~12 tons) and the XM30 (~40-55 tons) replacing Bradley (~27
tons). All study weight projections of the 5GCV are lighter than M1 series. Other follow-on
platforms must follow suit. Additionally, force designs, platform capabilities and strategic lift
capabilities must address the ability to responsively deliver a credible force package to both
areas of interest. The current strategic lift assets are aging out and require significant reception
infrastructure analysis demonstrates will not be accessible in future operations.

Assessment of the M1 on the 2040 Battlefield

Given threat assessments and difficulty of integrating emerging technologies, the M1 is
reaching the end of life. Over the time of the study, briefings by the technology community
universally held that much of the M1’s technology is reaching obsolescence. It is expected that
some new and maturing technology can and should be applied to the M1 series. However, it is
doubtful that the full benefit of this technology can be gained by retrofitting a 1980s MBT any
more than it can be expected that new technology will maximally improve a 1980s commercial
vehicle. For example, robotics and automation promise to reduce crew size by at least one
person. Crew reduction can improve survivability and yield significant weight reductions in a
5GCV. However these advantages are unlikely to be realized by modifying the M1.

M1 survivability is also in question. Contemporary conflict exposes vulnerabilities and adversary

R&D and adversary energetics, ATGM, and main gun R&D investments are robust, exacerbating
battlefield risk over time. In particular, the M1 is vulnerable to top attack. Many current and
future ATGMs, armed UAVs, loitering munitions, top attack submunitions and long-range fires
from both Russia and China have this capability. Modern top attack ATGMs can defeat reactive
armor. Chemical energy warhead lethality is outstripping passive and active armor protection.

Modern adversary tank main guns are larger than the M1’s 120mm main gun and may be able
to penetrate the M1’s passive armor. The M1’s main gun, the smallest fielded by potential
F

8
adversaries, is losing effectiveness against adversary armor. The Russian T-90 and the Chinese
T-99 both have 125mm main guns. The German and French are exploring 130mm and 140mm
main guns respectively for tanks. As the M1X prototype demonstrates, a 130mm gun severely
reduces the onboard magazine, from 40 to 19 rounds, and, without significant improvements in
probability of kill (Pk), drops unacceptably stowed kills, from 36 to 17 (with a .90 Pk), reducing
sustained lethality and doubling munitions resupply requirements. However, as the Nagorno-
Karabakh and
T e alle e of S stai me t the Ukraine
conflicts
demonstrate,
current and
emerging lethal
eed for edi frastr t re to s ort
S stai me t s stai me t for e mo ilityaids e emy om at orma o s a mi ate systems, while
foot ri t is dete o tar e a d i terdi o of dete o y ma e er a d challenging
dete ta le s stai me t systems its a d o era o s amo a e o ealme t a d
de e o t l era ili es e ist i current tank
t e a roa to a d o d t of t e
lose t
survivability, do
not replace
S maneuver, fire,
and shock effect
S
S on battlefield.

At 70 to 80 tons
in its various
models, the M1
has serious
strategic,
o is s i te sity allo s ad ersaries to t S ro d for es asymmetri ally tar e s stai me t it operational, and
i te rated S a d ires to dislo ate isolate a d a rite ma e er forma o s tactical mobility
Figure 10. Sustainment Challenges on a Transparent Battlefield
ASB graphic and sustainment
issues. The M1
constrains air, sea, and land transport options and ports of debarkation in key regions. Weight
limits the use of many rail cars as well as which bridges
and roadbeds can be used. Weight also impacts fuel consumption, power to weight ratios, and
increases maintenance demand. Moreover, logistically intensive units, such as the current
ABCT, demands multiple refueling and rearming operations, as many as three per day. On an
increasingly transparent battlefield, this logistics intensity can create vulnerabilities to the
formations employing the M1, as the units that deliver sustainment dependence on fixed
infrastructure creates predictability than can be interdicted. The enemy can limit armored
operations by fighting the less survivable sustainment system, rather than directly engaging the
armored formation.

Our longest serving MBT, the M1’s economically useful service life has been extended through
multiple rebuilds and refits with no long-term improvements in reliability, availability,
maintainability, or operational fleet readiness. In addition to new combat capabilities, a new

9
platform presents the opportunity to improve size, weight, power, and sustainability resulting
in lower total cost of ownership vs continued M1 sustainment and greater assured operational
availability. Underlying assumptions that drive reliability, availability and maintainability should
be relooked in light of test data, improving system and component reliability, the greater role
of software to reduce unnecessary time and costs.

While the M1 is losing its long-standing dominance, the battlefield imperative for mobile,
protected, firepower systems that can close with and destroy the enemy through maneuver,
fire and shock effect remains indispensable in land combat. That effect is not replaced by high
volumes of long-range fires and armed UAVs, and while robotics can enable armored combat,
the ASB judges that robotics cannot realistically replace armored forces by 2040. A 5GCV that
eliminates contemporary and emerging vulnerabilities and increases its lethality is essential to
the Army’s ability to conduct “sustained combat incident to operations on land.” Such a
capability also furthers the Army’s contribution to deterrence, as General Starry noted, by
reducing “to a minimum whatever incentives enemy leaders might perceive as favoring seeking
military solutions to political problems ... A clear war-fighting capability is necessary to
effectively reduce [enemy] incentives—as they view them.”

Developing an M1 replacement, given the immaturity of overmatching technology and lingering

issues of ambiguity will require more than a decade. Therefore, the M1 like its predecessor the
M60, will be in the force for decades into the future and must be selectively modernized, even
as its utility wanes. To reduce out year risk and deliver a 5GCV as dominant as the M1 was for
generations, the ASB recommends the Army begin 5GCV research and development
immediately.

The Recommended Program to Develop Next Generation Armor

The Opportunity
“It must be the role of technology to provide weapons systems which render ineffective
costly investment by our foes – not simply to try to match something the other fellow has
just fielded. With new weapons we should seek new dimensions of combat.”
GEN Donn Starry
September 1981

The ASB was charged by several Secretaries of the Army, listed in the introduction, to look at
the armor/anti-armor competition in the 2040 timeframe. The above discussion of this charge
established several central points which derive from the framing assumptions. Based on the
ASB look at the geopolitical, military, and technological uncertainties in the early 2020s, a
definition of the requirements for armor/anti-armor capability for 2040 and beyond is
premature. The ASB therefore is advancing in this study a technology maturation program
based on experimental testbeds that will provide operationally and technologically mature
options available for 2040 to hedge against the uncertainty this study encountered regarding
the 2040 battlefield. Such a program will sufficiently mature technology beyond what the Army
Laboratories, Department of Energy Laboratories, and DARPA will accomplish which will allow

10
acquisition programs to begin fielding in the 2040s. Our investigation has established that the
laboratory relevant programs are generally at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 4 or below,
whereas previous ASB studies have shown that a minimum of TRL 7, the goal of the
recommended program, is required to initiate a successful Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) acquisition program. This hedging strategy provides the basis for a range
of manned and unmanned systems that can be leveraged to maximize Army overmatch as
suggested by GEN Starry when the series of strategic, operational, and tactical threats become
increasingly clear. The study recommends that operational concepts for MDO drive the
enabling technology programs similar to what was done with AirLand Battle and the Big Five.

A key
consideration
for the
technology
program
recommended
here is the state
of adversary
science and
technology.
While the
National
Intelligence
Council’s
Science and
Figure 11 Military Technology Competition Technology
Australian Strategic Policy Institute graphic Intelligence
Committee and
Weapons System Intelligence Committee estimates are at higher classifications, a graphic from
a recent Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) technology report, Figure 11, is
representative of the added challenge facing a new start program in this era. China is
increasingly a technological peer, and US technological and attendant overmatch superiority is
no longer assured. This is particularly the case in key areas related to Chinese investments in
armor, tank gun technology and design, unmanned systems, armor defeating shape charges,
and energetics. It will be important to track these developments to stay ahead of them and to
acquire and exploit Chinese weapons systems as soon as feasible.

The testbed program recommended here advances several systems level issues that must be
explored before a 5GCV acquisition program can be undertaken. The first is that of protection
of a combat vehicle when facing the threats shown in Figure 9. This problem is compounded by
the necessity of reducing total vehicle weight. Approximately 50% of the weight of the M1 is
armor. Future approaches which would increase protection and reduce weight would require
approaches that rely less on passive armor and more on active protection. Further, advanced
munitions such as hypersonic missiles are so energetic that they cannot be countered by

11
passive armor further requiring a look at active protective systems. The requirement to look at
total protective systems, including active, and passive armor and reduced size vehicles made
possible by automation and reduced crew size should be explored. The human factors
investigation of such a reduced crew vehicle must be undertaken to assess effectiveness and
insure confidence.

A second systems level issue which must be explored is that of lethality. An investigation of
energetics applied to current main guns should be explores as well as experimentation of new
larger diameter guns being developed by our allies. As one example, US energetics research,
critical to tank gun and munitions lethality and size, is baselined against the energetic material
Octogen invented in 1941. Chinese research is baselined against the significantly more
energetic Hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane or CL20 (China Lake Compound #20) invented in 1987
at the US Navy’s China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station. Notably, CL20, which provides about
40% more lethality and range, is not widely used in US munitions, but is by both China and
Russia. The R&D and product improvement approaches of the last 30 years are insufficient in
this current threat and technology environment.

Also, as part of a lethality program, new approaches to ATGMs must be explored. The Army
explored several hypersonic missiles, the LOSAT and CKEM missiles which demonstrated the
potential of kinetic energy missiles on the armor battlefield. The lethality of these missiles is an
order of magnitude than that of a tank main gun. Ukraine illuminates the need to continue to
advance the capability of ATGMs.

Possible Concepts to Explore Required Capabilities

The approach employed to construct this hedging strategy is to establish several possible
concepts that provide capability believed important to land warfare in the post 2040
timeframe. These concepts, Figure 12, are not advocated as point solutions but rather are
conceived as requiring capabilities that the research program should underwrite. As the
operational requirements become progressively clearer, the appropriate 2040 vehicles can be
defined employing analysis and technology assessments created as part of this research
program. The characteristics of the M1A2 SEP VX are provided for comparison.

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Vehicle M1 A2 SEP VX 5GCV Light Tank Robotic Wingman
Concept 70+ Tons 55-60 Tons 35-40 Tons 20-30 Tons

Firepower 120mm 130mm 130mm or 120mm Hypervelocity Missile

Insufficient Overmatch with Energetics Other ATGM
Overmatch Overmatch

Mobility Strategic: Poor Strategic: Poor Strategic: Marginal Strategic: Good

Operational: Operational: Operational: Good Operational: Good
Poor Tactical: Good Tactical: Tactical: Good Tactical: Good
Marginal Good
Protection Inadequate Good Marginal: Depends Marginal
on
Active Protection
C2 Marginal Good Good Good
Crew 4 3 3-2 1-0
Propulsion Turbine Hybrid Electric Hybrid Electric Hybrid Electric
Engagement 2-3 KM 3-5 KM 3-5 KM Approximately 50 KM
Range

Enabling None Automation Active Protection Robotics

Technologies New Cannon Energetics Hypervelocity Missiles
Autoloader Signature Off-Board Targeting
Management

Figure 12. Concepts for 2040 Enabled by the Proposed Technologies and Testbeds

5th Generation Combat Vehicle (5GCV)

The baseline vehicle of Figure 12 is the lowest risk concept explored. It is a worthy
successor to the M1 and is one of the lead concepts explored in the virtual prototyping
conducted by the NGCV CFT and the Ground Vehicle Systems Center. This vehicle was
explored in the first phase of this study and was found in this current phase to be
significantly more capable than the M1 on the 2040 battlefield. It would have improved
lethality and protection however it would be vulnerable to kinetic energy weapons such as
CKEM. Further, this vehicle when first fielded is projected to be as heavy as the M1 when it
was first fielded and as it matures it would it unable to assist with alleviating the strategic
deployment and operational and tactical mobility issue.

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Light Tank
Discussions with Army leadership and retired General Officers who exercised joint responsibility
in Europe and the Indo-Pacific indicate the necessity of a relook at the weight of the MBT. All
agree that the M1 at 70 tons or greater is not tactically, operationally, or strategically mobile. It
is therefore important to explore the feasibility of significant weight reduction in a next
generation MBT without compromising its protection specifically and operational capability
generally. Further, this program should explore technology which is relevant to reducing the
weight of all tactical vehicles in the ABCT. The goal for this program is to explore the potential
to at least halve the weight of the MBT without compromising operational capabilities outlined
above. While there are many technologies that could contribute to this objective, three will be
explicitly listed here. First an exploration of the potential of active protection against both
kinetic energy penetrators and shaped charge weapons must be undertaken to provide a basis
for tradeoff between active and passive protection. Second, robotics to provide reduction in
the number of crew members must be explored. The number of crewmembers is a major
determinant of the armored volume and as a result, armor weight. And finally, can energetics
chemistry allow use of lethal smaller main guns and failing such progress, is there a possibility
for a missile firing MBT? While such lethality investigations will certainly yield progress,
experimental data is required to assess whether these approaches provide sufficient weight
reduction to justify any operational compromise.

Such lightweight options could require revisions to the current Europe based O&O concept to
accommodate Pacific operations.

Robotic Wingman
The investigation of the 2040 battlefield also indicated that this battlefield would present to the
5GCV based armor/anti-armor formation new opportunities and challenges. The robotic
wingman concept allows exploration of MDO enabled long-range fires extending the armor
battlefield and allowing attrition of enemy armor before approaching friendly positions. These
smaller, lighter, reduced-crew options would allow different deployment and new operational
approaches to armor/anti-armor warfare and to urban warfare. Long-range fires, manned-
unmanned teaming, robotics, and masking (or land stealth) are capabilities that must be
explored as compliments to friendly armor formations or counters to these or similar
capabilities employed by an enemy. The robotic wingman is not advanced as a replacement for
an MBT or a competitor to it. Rather the wingman is a concept which employs advancing
technology which when employing MDO capabilities would complement the MBT by extending
the battlespace. When the M1 was conceived, geographic intervisibility and technology limited
the battlespace to approximately five kilometers forward of the leading elements. MDO and
advanced missile technology might extend this range to tens of kilometers to engage and attrite
an enemy before it can close, possibly uncontested, to lethal distances from friendly manned
formations. Land stealth might counter space or battlefield-based surveillance and targeting
capabilities necessary to employ long-range engagement. Finally, the threat discussion
indicated that potential adversaries are exploring and in several instances fielding main battle
tanks with the ability to fire missiles in addition to conventional tank ammunition. The US has

14
not explored missiles developed to be employed by armor vehicles since the 1960s and the
Shillelagh. Missile technology has significantly advanced since that time and the wingman
concept allows an exploration of new and advancing longer-range ATGMs.

Important to this concept is the ability to explore manned-unmanned teaming approaches. We

do not believe that robotics concepts will be sufficiently mature for fielding in the 2040s.
Should robotics approaches mature more quickly than anticipated, the wingman concept allows
exploitation of this important technology.

These concepts are being advanced to create objectives for a technology testbed-based
research program which is discussed below.

The Recommended Program

Figure 13 outlines a total program to develop a 5GCV based on the M1 template. The
prototyping and EMD programs are proceeded by a technology testbed program shown in
Figure 14. This program recommends undertaking a technology testbed program similar to that
undertaken in the development of the M1. Such a technology testbed program would require
approximately eight years to complete. After completing this technology testbed program,
prototyping and EMD based on the M1 template would take ten years to complete the total
development program. Such a total program would result in a new MBT first unit equipped in
the early 2040s. The study team reviewed the cost of the M1 technology testbed activity and
determined that the $3-4 billion cost for the recommended program for the 5GCV program is
consistent with the cost, in inflated dollars, of the similar program for the M1.

15
 Figure13 Recommended 5GCV Acquisition Program

Technology Development
The study team assessed approximately 60 relevant technologies, and as with the M1 program,
recommended nine testbeds, shown in Figure 14, to assure both mature technology (TRL 7 and
beyond) and understanding the capabilities that these technologies make available to the Army
to meet operational requirements. Such a program is necessary to provide an analytical basis
for the new technologies proposed for this vehicle. The technology testbeds, their schedules,
and the estimated cost is shown in Figure 14.

The 60 technologies contribute to critical future capabilities. Discussions with requirements and
R&D organizations identified several critical technology related capability chokepoints in
addition to those discussed above for weight reduction and lethality: 1) Aided Target
Recognition (AiTR) to reduce crew load, improve mission performance and realize MUMT; 2)
Artificial Intelligence (AI) to increase efficiency, speed mission execution, and enable control of
autonomous vehicles; 3) the network to ensure envisioned and required network capabilities
and provide improved mission execution and lethality without crushing realistically available

16
bandwidth; 4) Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) to increase assured operational
availability and reduce sustainment demand and manpower requirements; 5) Camouflage,
cover, concealment, denial, and deception (C3D2) to reduce the probability of detection,
targeting, and engagement and improve survivability on a transparent battlefield; 6) Light
weight, ballistically resilient armor to improve survivability and reducing system weight to
improve tactical and operational mobility and strategic deployability, and reduce sustainment
requirements; 7) Energetics to improve lethality (range and Pk) at 120mm or smaller caliber; 8)
Power and energy solutions, engine and battery technologies, to improve mobility (speed,
horsepower per ton) and reduce sustainment requirements.

Figure 14 Recommended 5GCV Testbed Program

The recommended testbed program for the 5GCV program is similar to the program for the M1.
However, unlike the M1 program, no analytical framework exists today to design and evaluate a
concept 5GCV. Such a framework is necessary to provide an analytical basis for modern digital
engineering and operational evaluation of the various concepts for the 5GCV.The field test data
obtained from the testbeds would allow verification and validation of the systems analytical
tools necessary to design and evaluate a new MBT. Further these analytical tools will be useful
for assessing any new systems developments employing this technology. However, such an

17
analytical framework will result from the testbed program only if the requirements for analysis
are planned for and funded.

To support a modern analytic framework, the acquisition and exploitation of Chinese and
Russian weapons systems would provide threat data which can be integrated into models and
simulations and which can be used to produce representative test samples for actual testing.

Findings Summary

Intelligence Assessment
The current assessment of the Intelligence Community concerning lessons learned in Ukraine
and the Indo-Pacific and China is summarized below.

The insights from current and recent conflicts and intelligence assessments of the 2040
battlefield indicate the importance of a properly led trained and equipped armor combined
arms team. Deterrence, and if deterrence fails, victory require such a capability.

The threat spectrum against the MBT has significantly increased. Ukraine demonstrates that
long-range fires and ATGMs are an important threat to the MBT. In Ukraine, these fires and
losses to mines exceed tank-on-tank losses.

The challenge of delivering a credible force to important theaters in a timely manner must be
addressed in parallel with a new MBT development to assure that the Army armored force can
get to the fight. The Indo-Pacific is a more difficult theater to deploy and support than Europe.
Further fewer predeployment opportunities and fewer ports to support sealift of an armored
force are available in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. The Indo-Pacific theater has the potential
to fundamentally change the requirements for combat vehicles.

A significantly reduced weight MBT by itself does not assure ABCT deployability. Other
elements of the ABCT are also increasing in weight. Our current ABCT with AMPV and MX30
only make this problem worse. However, reducing the weight of the MBT is a significant first
step as the technology employed to reduce the weight of the MBT will also apply to other
combat vehicles. The Department of Energy and DARPA assisted with the development of
protection means during the development of the M1 and can assist with a new combat vehicle.
The Army should be open to developments of other technical agencies in the government.
Addressing the weight issue of the entire ABCT was beyond the purview of this study. However,
such a study should be undertaken.

Assessments of adversary developments indicates that lethality will be a problem unless

development of new cannon technology is undertaken. Our Allies have begun such a program
and should be considered for any new development.

18
The US is losing its lead in ATGM development to China. Hypervelocity ATGM development can
restore this lead. Department of Energy has helped the Army in hypervelocity missile
development for long range fires. DARPA and DOE helped with ATGM development.

Testbeds and experimentation addressing these problems is not now being undertaken.
Testbeds were employed extensively to test advanced capabilities during the development of
the M1.

The 2040 Battlefield and Its Implications to the Next Generation MBT
When compared to today’s conflicts, the assessment of the 2040 battlefield indicates important
similarities and differences. The mission of the combined arms formation is fundamental to
deterrence and victory and will remain the same in the 2040’s. Battlefield transparency and
lethality will increase requiring significantly better protection and new and innovative solutions
to the lethality capability of a new vehicle. Such a vehicle must be capable of operating on the
world-wide Multidomain Operations battlefield.

The M1 will not be effective on the 2040 battlefield. Its design for protection, lethality mobility
and C2 are not sufficient to dominate the 2040 battlefield. Innovation will be required to solve
the protection issue while simultaneously reducing weight to assure strategic, operational, and
tactical mobility. This study believes that investments in new materials, passive armor, active
protection particularly for kinetic weapons and signature suppression will be required. Issues
include the choice of the main armament and whether the 5GCV is a heavy MBT or a lighter
vehicle.

The current Army ability to perform analysis is significantly less capable than that available
during the development of the M1. Previous studies conducted by the Army Science Board and
the Defense Science Board during the development of the M1 relied heavily on analysis to
substantiate their findings and recommendations. Little or no such capability exists today. The
development of the M1 relied on significant technical and operational analysis to determine its
requirement and such a capability will be required for the development of the successor to the
M1. Any application of modern Digital Engineering for the development of the next generation
MBT will require modern computational tools and analytic models which are not now in
evidence.

Recommendations Summary
SECARMY and CSA: The Army should immediately initiate a 5GCV development and testbed
program with the corresponding activities.
• Make a conscious decision NLT February 2024 that a 5GCV will be fielded by 2040-2042.
• Direct ASA(ALT) to create a PEO- managed program consisting of 9 testbeds IAW ASB
Study following February 2024 decision.
• Direct ASA(ALT) to create a S&T/R&D and preliminary future acquisition strategy based
on the M1 development model reflected in slide #16.
• Direct timely determination by the Uniformed Military of the answers to the 5 questions
in slide #16.

19
 • Direct ASA(FM&C) and DCS G-8 to create POM funding wedge for 5GCV activities in the
next POM cycle.

ASA(ALT) and AFC: ASA(ALT) and AFC address preliminary requirements generations issues,
early S&T/R&D investments, and initial acquisition strategies.
• ASA(ALT): Report on PEO and PEO organizational structure to manage testbed program
NLT February 2024.
• AFC: Report on 5GCV requirements generation structure NLT February 2024, i.e., NGCV
CFT management or new management/organizational approach.
o Brief SECARMY and CSA on preliminary answers to 5GCV development questions
in slide #16 NLT February 2025.
• ASA(ALT) and AFC:
o Prioritize new cannon requirements; work with Governments of Germany
(Rheinmetall) and France.
o Prioritize top attack and underbelly defenses; in coordination with (ICW) DARPA
and DOE seek innovative vehicle and formation protection solutions, especially
against kinetic energy weapons to determine if significant 5GCV passive armor
weight reductions can be made.
o Prioritize combat vehicle weight “bogey”; ICW DOE seek innovative passive
armor solutions.
o Prioritize vehicle designs to reduce width and length of 5GCV.
o Prioritize determination of crew size ICW TRADOC and based on proven
experimentation and analytics.
o AFC ICW TRADOC begin preliminary determination of 2040 operational concepts,
derivative 2040 doctrinal concerns, to include crew-level TTPs and related
combat formation structures.
o AFC ICW AMC identify ways to reduce logistics and sustainment burdens.
o AFC ICW USARPAC, USAREUR-AF, TRANSCOM/DOT and USN identify strategic
mobility issues and solutions, especially with Indo-Pacific. If necessary, HQDA
ICW Joint Staff and OSD address national military strategy issues associated with
constrained strategic mobility resources.

HQDA DCS G-2, NGIC, and AFC: ICW national agencies prioritize intelligence understanding of
Chinese armor and anti-armor R&D investments and fielding developments. China likely to
replace Russia in armor developments. Critical Intelligence Items of Interest include
• Materials
• Energetics
• Use of AI for Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) and Counter-ATR
• Cannon Technologies and Munitions
• Advanced ATGMs
• Hypervelocity Munitions

SECARMY and USA: Re-establish the DUSA(OR) as Army lead agency for Army-wide investments
in state of the Army analytics, modeling, and simulation for modern digital engineering and

20
design, evaluation of kinetic and non-kinetic applications, and assessments of 2040 combat
effectiveness force-on-force scenarios.

SECARMY and CSA: Direct AFC to establish an ATGM CFT to assess Chinese and Russian ATGM
investments and to develop a 2040 Battlefield ATGM strategy.

Conclusion: Future US Success in Land Warfare Is at Risk

The inability to get to the fight in a timely manner with a dominant force would compromise
the ability of the future Army to fulfill its role as an important instrument of US foreign policy.
An innovative program to investigate the ability to reduce weight and ease supportability
requirements without compromising combat capability is a program that would fulfill GEN
Starry’s guidance to explore fundamentally new and generational solutions to Armor and Anti-
Armor capability.

Chinese and Russian developments in lethality, survivability, and mobility are eroding US
conventional deterrence in land warfare in both the Pacific and Europe. A program to restore
lost margins of US technological superiority in armor and anti-armor capability must become a
national priority.

The development of more sophisticated modeling and simulation and experimentation tools
has become a pacing factor in proving 5GCV concepts and must be achieved before Engineering
and Manufacturing Development can begin. A critical priority for analysis is to determine the
added value of convergence and cooperative weapons systems relative to individually
enhancing the capabilities of 5GCVs and other weapons systems.

21
20 July 2023

The Army Science Board

An Independent Assessment of
the 2040 Battlefield and Its
Implications for the 5th Generation
Combat Vehicle (5GCV)

Dr Jim Tegnelia, Study Chair

Christopher Yuknis, Briefer
1
 An Independent Assessment of the 2040 Battlefield and Its Implications for the
5th Generation Combat Vehicle (5GCV) Outline

• Introduction
• Bottom Line Up Front
• Framing Assumptions
• The 2040 Battlefield
• Obsolescence of the M1
• The Recommended M1 Program for the 5GCV
• Supporting Study Findings
• Study Recommendations

2
 The 2040 Battlefield and the 5GCV Technologies Terms of Reference

• Assess the 2040 battlefield

➢ Assess anticipated actions from adversaries
• Examine US doctrine
• Assess available 2040 technologies
➢ Allies
➢ US industry
➢ Other government agencies
• Assess technology testbed and acquisition programs for a 2040 fielded 5GCV
➢ Based on M1 acquisition methodology
• Defense Economics: Is the recommended program affordable?

This study was tasked to only address materiel issues

associated with the M1 Abrams and the 5GCV.
3
 Study Team Membership
ASB Members
• James A. Tegnelia, Ph.D. – Study Chair
• Mark N. Glauser, Ph.D. – Study Co-Chair
• COL(Ret) William S. Crowder – Sustainment and Deployability
• Robert E. Douglas, Ph.D. - Analytics
• William J. Neal, Ph.D. – Networks
• William E. Snowden, Ph.D. – Protection and Lethality
• Albert Buck Tanner, Ph.D. – Vehicle Design and Development
• Anthony J. Tether, Ph.D. – Concepts and Programmatics
ASB Senior Advisors
• Joseph V. Braddock, Ph.D. (deceased)
• Leonard W. Braverman, Ph.D.
Government Advisors
• Jeffrey P. Carie - Ground Vehicle Systems Center
• Robert A. Hay - Army Futures Command
• John W. Miller III - Maneuver Center of Excellence
• Robert W. Sadowski, Ph.D. - Ground Vehicle Systems Center
• James W. Schirmer - PEO Ground Combat Systems
Balance of Experienced Technical and Operational People
ASB Consultants
• Terrence F. Alger II, Ph.D. – Engineering
• COL(Ret) Clinton J. Ancker III – Doctrine and Concepts
• COL(Ret) John F. Antal – Concepts
• COL(Ret) C. Forrest Burke – Logistics
• COL(Ret) Christopher G. Cross, Ph.D. – Technology
• Marilyn M. Freeman, Ph.D. – Technology
• COL(Ret) Herbert J. Gallagher – Protection
• COL(Ret) William W. Hansen –Doctrine and Programmatics
• MG(Ret) William C. Hix – Concepts and Threat
• BG(Ret) Peter L. Jones – Threat and Intelligence
• COL(Ret) Robert J. Kmiecik – M1 Program and Operations
• LTC(Ret) Richard B. Ladd (deceased)– Sustainment
• LTG(Ret) Michael E. Williamson, Ph.D. – Programmatics
• MG(Ret) Walter Wojdakowski – Doctrine and Operations
• COL(Ret) Christopher A. Yuknis – Senior Government Advisor
and Concepts
Study Managers
• LTC Charles G. Bies – Study Manager and Armor Operations
and Tactics
• COL(Ret) Harry K. Lesser, Jr. – Study Manager and Threat and
Intelligence
4
 Research, Data Gathering, and Analysis
Army Organizations Other Government Organizations Intelligence Community
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (RT) • DARPA • National Intelligence Council
• Army Futures Command • US Marine Corps • Central Intelligence Agency
➢ Futures and Concept Center • US Air Force • Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2
➢ Combat Capabilities Development Command • US Transportation Command • National Ground Intelligence Center
- Ground Vehicle Systems Center • Department of Energy • Missile and Space Intelligence Center
- C5ISR Center ➢ Sandia National Laboratories US Industry
• Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate ➢ Idaho National Laboratory • Optimal Outcomes
- Aviation and Missiles Center • Department of Transportation • Potomac Foundation
- Armaments Center • Johns Hopkins Applied Physics • BAE Systems
- Army Research Laboratory Laboratory • General Dynamics Land Systems
- Data and Analysis Center • RAND Corporation • Northrop Grumman
- Next Generation Combat Vehicle CFT • Lockheed Martin
• PEO Ground Combat Systems Allied Industry
• Center for Army Analysis • Israeli Aerospace Industries
• National Training Center • Rafael
• Engineer Research and Development Center • Rheinmetall
• Maneuver Center of Excellence • SAAB
• Sustainment Center of Excellence/Combined Arms Support • Soucy Group
Command
• Space and Missile Defense Command
Research/Literary Review – The study team reviewed over 300 documents, reports, previous studies, briefings, doctrine, armor/anti-armor
concepts, related technologies, threat capabilities, etc. , over 5 years.
Scenario Planning and Analysis - The study team created a structured scenario planning process to investigate potential M1SEPvX and 5GCV
platforms and formations in European and Indo-Pacific theaters. Analysis of these efforts produced a list of critical capabilities and enabling
technologies.
5
 The 2040 Battlefield and the 5GCV Opportunity

The Opportunity

“It must be the role of technology to provide weapons

systems which render ineffective costly investment by
our foes – not simply to try to match something the
other fellow has just fielded. With new weapons we
should seek new dimensions of combat.”

GEN Donn Starry

September 1981

6
 Bottom Line Up Front

• To maintain land warfare overmatch, the Army should immediately initiate a testbed and development
program with the creation of requirements for the 5GCV and the creation of an ATGM CFT.
➢ US ability to deter war and win on future land battlefields is at serious risk without development of the 5GCV.
➢ The M1 Abrams tank, fielded in 1980, was superbly developed and provided unprecedented capabilities, but will not
have the dominant deployability or mobility, lethality, or protection necessary for success on the 2040 battlefield.
➢ The unprecedented M1 Abrams development program, with state of the art analytics, provides an appropriate
model for the development of the 5GCV.
➢ A 5GCV with dominant lethality, protection, mobility, and deployability will be essential for the 2040 battlefield.
➢ The Army must partner with industry, other USG agencies, and Allies and partners to acquire the best 2040
technologies for a dominant 5GCV.

7
 Framing Assumptions
Warfighting Assumptions
• Armored combined arms forces remain decisive to
land combat, are central to conventional force
deterrence and, if deterrence fails, victory.
➢ Ultimate capability to close with and destroy all adversary
tanks on the battlefield and to restore maneuver.
➢ Tanks needed for offensive maneuver and force protection;
and other purposes; tank-on-tank engagements.
➢ No other platform provides necessary shock effect.
• To field the 5GCV requires an understanding and
balancing of competing demands.
➢ Technical threats to combat vehicles.
➢ Robotic tanks not ready for 2040.
➢ Revised combat formations and organizations.
➢ Manpower constraints.
➢ Fiscal constraints.
➢ Sustainability imperatives.
➢ Industrial constraints: manufacturing ability, among others.
Geopolitical and Strategic Assumptions
• Major US geostrategic reset underway.
➢ Then, post-Viet Nam War counterinsurgency, followed by great
power threats from the Soviet Union in Europe.
➢ Today, transition from Middle Eastern counterterrorist and
counterinsurgency to great power competition from China and
Russia.
• Contemporary and future conflict reinforces the
imperative to close with and destroy the enemy with
shock effect, an effect unique to armored forces in all
theaters of operations.
• The Army armored force is a major contributor to meeting
US national security objectives and establishing conflict
deterrence. Must be accomplished in the face of
➢ Strategic mobility issues, especially Indo-Pacific.
➢ Contested logistics, to include Homeland threat.
• 5GCV will be a single platform, capable of worldwide
deployment.
8
 Summary Elements of the 2040 Battlefield
• 2040 Battlefield unchanging elements (FM 3-0 Multidomain Operations).
➢ Take and hold critical terrain.
➢ Defeat enemy in close combat; conduct pursuit and exploitation.
➢ Lethality, mobility, and protection remain key aspects of armor operations.
• 2040 Battlefield changes the character of warfare.
➢ Profoundly transparent battlefield; surveillance in all domains.
➢ Comprehensively lethal, integrated, multidomain, and destructive battlefield.
➢ Ability to strike all elements of the battlefield at any time - there is no sanctuary.
Likely attack from homeports to frontlines.
- Devastating long-range fires
- Increased use of armed UAVs, swarms, and UGVs
- Increasing engagements beyond line of sight
• 2040 Battlefield imperatives.
➢ Strategically Joint and multinational operations; tactically combined arms operations.
➢ Use latest technologies and deny enemy’s use of their technologies.
➢ Lethality, mobility, and protection remain key aspects of armor operations.

US must continue to fight outnumbered and win.

9
 Summary Elements of the 2040 Battlefield (continued)

• 2040 Battlefield Environment

➢ The role of US Army to close with and destroy the enemy and to seize and hold ground will not change.
➢ The totality of the battlefield will be near transparency in all domains and will be subject to significantly greater
lethality.
➢ Overwhelming artillery fires, UAVs, drones, ATGMs in top attack mode, and mines can and will degrade maneuver and
potentially create the most deadly and dangerous battlefield we have ever faced.
➢ An inability to generate overwhelming combat power to enable operational and tactical maneuver will likely result in a
stalemated front and extended battlefield resulting war of attrition.
• Adversaries
➢ China: Growing threat both strategically and operationally; may not fight China but will fight Chinese equipment.
- Will strengthen all military functions, fueled by aggressive, well-funded and technically sophisticated R&D.
- Type 99 tank assessed to exceed Russian T-90 and match German Leopard 2.
- PLAA rapidly supplanting Russia as US pacing threat, modernizing in all military functions.
- Will not move beyond Type 99 until US decides on 5GCV replacement program.
- Understanding Chinese R&D investment critical - significant intelligence requirement.
➢ Russia: Remains a strategic threat; conventional capability greatly diminished by Ukraine.
- Will recover likely over 5-10 years.
- Recovery less sophisticated level due to Western sanctions; decreased domestic R&D.
- Ukraine war not over; many more lessons to be learned and understood.
10
 Profound Change to the 2040 Environment: Strategic Mobility
• Three methods exist to deploy an operationally significant force.
1. Army Pre-Positioned Stocks (APS)
➢ Costs in addition to fielded ABCTs
➢ Requires airlift for personnel, organic enabling equipment
- 10+ C-5 equivalents for personnel
- 14-24 days to generate combat ready ABCT
2. Sealift: Only way to move ABCTs from CONUS; sealift is inadequate
➢ Needs significant sealift assets and SPOE
➢ Many Ro/Ro ships are ageing out; replacement an issue
➢ Longest time to move equipment (90 days representative of
deploying a corps from CONUS to forward staging areas)
➢ Requires airlift for personnel
Source: JP 3-35
3. Force Airlift: Not Feasible
➢ The Air Force has 222 C-17s
➢ 575 C-17 sorties to move an ABCT
➢ 752 sorties for a sustainment brigade
➢ 412 sorties for a combat aviation brigade
• Forward deployment will most likely be required.
Reducing weight and improving reliability for the entire force reduces sustainment tail
and lift requirements.
*RAND report: 01-RR-2259-A, Preparing for Near-Peer Conflict on the Ground 11
 The M1 Will Not Remain the Dominant MBT on the 2040 Battlefield
• Protection margins lost.
➢ Threat weapons have significantly greater accuracy and penetration power.
➢ Vulnerable to long-range artillery fires including smart DPICM, top attack, and under-
body attack.
➢ Limited passive armor upgrades at acceptable weight penalties.
➢ Active protection systems can be overwhelmed by volume of fire.
➢ 2040 threats including hypervelocity missiles, non-kinetic threats such as EW, laser
dazzling, chemical-biological, cyber, and EMP will proliferate.
Russian T-90M MBT
• Firepower margins lost.
➢ 120mm cannon has reduced effectiveness against Russian and Chinese armor.
➢ No advanced cannon or energetics programs in the US program.
➢ Allied, Russian, and Chinese modern gun programs continue.
- German 130mm cannon and French 140mm cannon developments.
- Larger, more lethal rounds cut stowed rounds by 50% or more, increasing logistics demand.
- Smaller caliber gun solutions require new energetics.
• Aging M1 reliability, availability, and maintainability significantly degrades
combat capability and increases costs.
• All forms of mobility degraded - strategic, operational and tactical. Chinese Type 99A MBT

➢ Initial M1 weight 62.3T; M1A2 SEP V3/4 w/APS 77.9T; mine roller 88.7T.
➢ No clear path for significant weight reduction without major redesign.
➢ Conscious decision to drastically reduce weight will result in compromised protection. 12
 Abrams Weight Growth
80
0.26
M1A2 SEPV3 3.9 Structural 40 0.67
70 Turret Appendages
Weight Sources 5.5 Weight 35
60 11.6 Sources Turret Add-On CE Armor 15.3 Structural armor
30 claims 29.7T of
Aux Automotive 40.7T structure
50 Turret Structure/Armor
12 25
Powertrain 40 3.1
Hull Appendages 20 4.5
Lethality 30 15 2.4 Turret/Hull
>50% is Hull Add on CE Armor redesigns to save

Weight (Tons)
20 40.7 Armor and 10 tons (26%) are
Running Gear 10
Structure NOT feasible

Vehicle Weight (Tons)

Hull Add-On Underbody 14.4
10 5
Armor/Structure Hull Structure/Armor
0 0

M1A2 Variants
17.1% Weight Growth 90.9
90 88.7

84.4
(10.8T)

85 M1A1 Variants
Mine Roller

5.4% Weight Growth 81.9

(10.8T)
Mine Roller

80.1 80.8
80 79.4 79.2 79.4
78.5
(10.8T)
Mine Roller

75.9
(10.8T)
Mine Roller

75
(10.8T)

73.6
(10.8T)
Mine Roller

M88, HET,

(10.8T)
(10.8T)
Mine Roller

Tons
(10.8T)

Mine Roller
Mine Roller

(10.8T)
AVLB, DOD

Mine Roller

Mine Roller
4000 Rail

(10.8T)
70

Mine Roller
Europe Bridge 80.1
77.9

(10.8T)
Infrastructure

Mine Roller
73.6
65 70 71.1
67.7 68.6 68.4 68.6 69.3
65.1
62.8
60
M1 M1A1 M1A1DU M1A1SA M1A2 SEPV1 SEPV2 SEPV2 SEPV2 SEPV3/4 SEPV3/4 SEPV3/4
1980-85 1985-88 1999-2006 2006-12 1992-99 1999-2006 2006-09 Mod 1 Mod 2&3 2017-24 w/ APS w/ APS, FP
20012-15 2016-19 2024 - 2024 -
13
 Increasingly Lethal 2040 Threats to the M1

Ukrainian Observations
• Biggest killers have been
➢ Mines
➢ Artillery
➢ UAVs
➢ ATGMs
➢ Other tanks
• Emerging threats include
hypervelocity munitions

The M1 can and will be attacked from every direction.

14
 Critical Findings for Abrams on the 2040 Battlefield

• Abrams will not dominate the 2040 Battlefield.

➢ Today all of the M1’s combat advantages in mobility, firepower, and protection are at risk.
➢ By 2040 today’s combat advantages are likely to be fundamentally compromised and no longer dominant.
➢ M1A2 SEP V3&4 upgrades will improve Abrams effectiveness but will not restore Abrams dominance.
➢ The battlefield will feature near transparency in all domains and significantly greater lethality.
➢ China and Russia have studied the American way of war and are fielding countermeasures – anti-access/anti-
denial strategies, among others.
➢ Abrams equipped units will be at a numerical disadvantage, exacerbated by low operational ready rates of an
aging fleet.
➢ The Army must fight outnumbered and win.

15
 Bottomline from M1 Development for the 5GCV
1963 1970 1972 1973 1976 1980
Yom Kippur War

MBT-70 XM-803 MBT TF M1 Program

Development Contract Production
Start
Awarded Start
Rationale for Testbeds and the Adoption of the M1 Model
• All subsystems and components were proven to work before M1 Capability Priorities
Systems Engineering and Preliminary Design Review were
1) Crew Survivability
completed - only testbeds can provide the answers. 2) Surveillance and Target Acquisition Performance
• No technological breakthrough was required to 3) First and Subsequent Round Hit Probability
successfully field the M1 Abrams. 4) Time to Acquire and Hit
➢ No “Gold-Plated Bells and Whistles” 5) Cross Country Mobility
6) Complementary Armament Integration
➢ Soldiers’ trust and confidence in platform 7) Equipment Survivability
• Operational Testing simultaneous with Development Testing. 8) Environmental Impact
9) Silhouette
• Developed the best system possible with limited money. 10) Acceleration and Deceleration
11) Ammunition Stowage
• Built political and Army Senior Leadership support.
12) Human Factors
13) Produceability
5 Critical Questions for the 5GCV 14) Range
• What should the crew size be? 15) Speed
• How much should it weigh? 16) Diagnostic Aids
17) Growth Potential
• What weapons should it have?
18) Support Equipment
• How can 5GCVs be protected from top and underbelly attacks? 19) Transportability
• How can 5GCVs reduce logistics and sustainment burdens?
16
 Introduction to the Recommended Program

• The 2040 Battlefield requires a 5GCV.

➢ New lighter 5GCV offering a “clean sheet design” with superior combat potential.
➢ Major shift in design paradigm, including manufacturability.
• Time now for innovative solutions for risk reduction and cost restraints.
➢ M1 development experience indicates need for testbeds and experimentation.
- Reduce technical risk.
- Understand needed technical and crew performance standards.
- Need for examination of Human Factors for automation enabled reduced crew.
- Vehicle concepts are helpful to guide testbed activity.
➢ Maturing technology for the 5GCV will help the heavy force and possibly the entire force.

Must start testbeds soon to make a 2040 fielding of a vehicle

that dominates the 2040 Battlefield.

17
 Concepts: Introduction to the Recommended Program

Vehicle Concept M1 A2 SEP VX 5GCV Light Tank Wingman

70+ Tons 55-60 Tons 35-40 Tons 20-30 Tons
Firepower 120mm 130mm 130mm or 120mm with Hypervelocity Missile
Energetics Other ATGM
Insufficient Overmatch
Overmatch Overmatch
Mobility Strategic: Poor Strategic: Poor Strategic: Marginal Strategic: Good
Operational: Poor Operational: Good Operational: Good Operational: Good
Tactical: Marginal Tactical: Good Tactical: Good Tactical: Good
Protection Inadequate Good Marginal: Depends on Marginal
Active Protection
C2 Marginal Good Good Good
Crew 4 3 3-2 1-0
Propulsion Turbine Hybrid Electric Hybrid Electric Hybrid Electric
Engagement 2-3 KM 3-5 KM 3-5 KM Approximately 50 KM
Range
Enabling None Automation Active Protection Robotics
Technologies New Cannon Energetics Hypervelocity Missiles
Autoloader Signature Management Off-Board Targeting

18
 5GCV Testbed Opportunities for Generational Change

5GCV Result
Technology Driven Opportunities • Greater Mobility
(ordered by investment required) • Improved Protection and Survivability
• Materials Design • Devastating Firepower and Lethality
• Energetics Development • Sustainable
• Active Vehicle and Formation • Upgradable by Design
Protection
• Computational Power
➢ Artificial Intelligence
➢ Aided Target Recognition
➢ Autonomy
➢ Networks
• Masking and Signature Management
• Power and Energy
• Greater Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability
 Allied Masking Efforts Lead Those in the US
Visual Spectrum

BAE Visual Saab

BA
Infrared/Thermal
Radar
System Off System On

BAE Saab

20
 Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

Challenges
• While the Army has product improved current ATGM systems (TOW 2B, Hellfire, Javelin), it has
not invested in new ATGM approaches since the end of the Cold War.
• The Chinese and Russians have made significant investments in ATGM technology and are
developing more advanced systems, e.g., Chinese Red Arrow-12, Russian Sokol. KE Missile from a Lightweight Platform
• The Russians have invested in countermeasures to the current US generation of ATGMs.
• No Cross Functional Team proponent within the Army Modernization Strategy.

Opportunities
• Hypervelocity KE missiles can restore these margins. It is unlikely that current protection
approaches can counter hypervelocity technology.
• Sandia National Laboratories has demonstrated with UAS the ability to hit moving
MBT Target Destroyed by KE Missile
point targets beyond line of sight and at extended ranges.
Missile Year Range Energy on Target
Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (km) (MJ)

• US ATGM capability is losing it overmatch dominance to China and possibly our Allies. CKEM 2000 5 10
• Current investment going into upgrading existing missiles. LOSAT 1990 5 40
• New investments required for new missiles with expanded capabilities to include HVM I Concept 10 24-40
beyond line-of-sight engagements.
HVM II Concept 50 17-20
21
 Supporting Study Findings

• Other Technologies – USG Agencies, Industry, and Allies

➢ DARPA and DOE instrumental in M1 development; 5GCV must take advantage of these agencies.
➢ US has only one credible industrial house for tank design and development.
➢ Detailed USG supervision and management of testbed program and acquisition activities required.
➢ US does not have a competitive national advantage in main gun development; must take advantage of
technological expertise from Allies, especially Germany and Rheinmetall.
• Defense Economics
➢ Study found $3-4 Billion testbed program comparable to Abrams program.
➢ Technological complexity of computers and software development will be major developmental constraint.
➢ Significantly more research into cost parameters required.

22
 Funding Calibration
• Test Beds
➢ MBT70 technology program conducted from 1963-1970 cost $300M then or $2.1B in current year dollars.
➢ This program recommends $2.9B and eight years.
• Competitive Prototyping
➢ XM1 prototyping conducted from 1973-1976 and cost $200M then or $1.2B in current year dollars.
➢ GCV prototyping: 2 contractors and took 4 years; it included ATR, turret test stand, and cost $1B in 2012.
• More RDT&E funding available in 2021 than in 1975.
1975 Defense Budget $86.509 B ($428.64 B in 2021 Dollars)
Army Budget $23.718 B ($113.14 B in 2021 Dollars)
Army RDT&E $1.77 B ( $7.57 B in 2021 Dollars)

2021 Defense Budget $696.0 B

Defense RDT&E $106.56 B
Army Budget (Base + OCO) $177.93 B
Army RDT&E $12.81 B

$3-4 Billion for a technology maturation program has historical precedent.

Source: p.190 “Green Book” https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/FY21_Green_Book.pdf
23
FY21 Defense Budget as found in FY21 Appropriations Act
 Recommended 5GCV Program
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
Main Gun S&T
Lg Cal CE KE Ammo S&T
5GCV Program of Record
Firepower Testbed

ATGM S&T
Engineering and LRIP FRP
ATGM Testbed
Manufacturing
Armor S&T Development
Multi-threat APS S&T
Protection Testbed

Masking S&T Continued demonstration and field

Currently funded Masking Testbed testing inform EMD.
relevant S&T
programs and Mobility Testbed
demonstration
projects Command & Control Competitive system prototyping should
S&T be planned to start in FY30 to reduce risk
Command & Control Testbed for 5GCV program (no cost estimate can
be made at this time).
Human Factors S&T
Additional
Technology Human Factors Testbed
aAturation
Needed
Sustainability S&T

Sustainability Testbed

Competitive Integrated System Prototypes

Robotic Systems Testbed

Competitive Acquisition
Additional S&T Testbed Program of Record
Prototypes 24
 Recommended 7 Year Pre-Acquisition 5GCV Program
Total
Additional Testbed
S&T Total
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 BA3 BA3/4
Main Gun S&T
$4.2B 25M 55M 75M 115M --- --- --- 270M ---
Lg Cal CE KE Ammo S&T
funded in
S&T Firepower Testbed --- --- 130M 170M 200M 250M 250M --- 1000M
portfolio
ATGM S&T 15M 25M 50M 60M --- --- --- 150M ---
PB 21-25 is
relevant to ATGM Testbed --- --- --- 100M 100M 150M 150M --- 500M
5GCV Armor S&T
15M 25M 50M 60M --- --- --- 150M ---
Multi-threat APS S&T

Protection Testbed --- --- 50M 50M 70M 80M 60M --- 310M
Masking S&T 25M 25M 25M 25M --- --- --- 100M ---
Masking Testbed --- --- 20M 30M 40M 50M 60M --- 200M

Mobility Testbed --- --- 35M 50M 60M 70M 100M --- 315M
Command & Control S&T 10M 10M 15M 15M --- --- --- 50M ---
Command & Control Testbed ---
--- --- 35M 45M 60M 60M 65M - 265M

Human Factors S&T --- 10M 10M --- --- --- --- 20M ---
Human Factors Testbed --- 25M 20M 30M 20M --- 95M
---
Sustainability S&T 20M 30M 50M --- --- --- --- 100M ---
Sustainability Testbed --- --- --- 10M 10M 30M 50M --- 100M

Robotics Systems Testbed 10M 15M 30M 50M --- 105M

Additional S&T BA3- BA3- BA3-$275M BA3-$275M BA4- BA4- BA4- BA4-
Testbeds Needed BA4-$270M BA4-$490M
BA3-
Needed Totals $110M $180M $575M $750M $805M 25
$840M $2890M
 Supporting Study Findings

• US Doctrine and Warfighting Considerations

➢ Mission of armored combined arms formations is fundamental and will remain the same in 2040.
➢ 2040 Battlefield will require properly trained, lead, and equipped armored combined arms teams for deterrence and
warfighting. If deterrence fails, victory requires such capabilities and competencies.
➢ Threat lethality will significantly increase requiring better vehicle protection and mobility.
➢ 5GCV will require on-board active and passive protection and off-board formation protection solutions.
➢ Strategic mobility issues must be addressed.
- Weight reduction of 5GCV is critical issue for improved strategic mobility.
- ABCTs are increasing in weight; 5GCV weight reductions important first step, but alone does not solve the ABCT strategic mobility
issue for either Europe or the Indo-Pacific.
- US Navy, US Air Force, TRANSCOM, and DOT must be part of the 5GCV strategic mobility solution.
- Inability to solve strategic mobility issues may require a change in national defense and national military strategy policies, i.e.,
possibility of forward deployments or pre-positioning.
- DARPA and DOE can potentially help with weight solutions.

• Modeling, Simulation, and Analytical Capabilities

➢ Modeling, simulation, and other analytical capabilities successfully employed in the M1 development not in evidence
for the development of the 5GCV.
➢ Analytical upgrade requires significant investment to restore capability available to M1 development.
26
 Conclusion - 2040 Battlefield Success at Serious Risk without
Development of 5GCV
• M1 Abrams, while still effective today and maybe to 2030, will not dominate the 2040 Battlefield.
➢ Chinese and Russian developments create losses of warfighting margins in lethality and survivability.
➢ Abrams weight profoundly degrades tactical, operational, and strategic mobility, subjecting it to 360° attack and formation
vulnerability.
➢ Aging M1 reliability, availability, and maintainability significantly degrades combat capability and increases costs.
➢ The 5GCV Program must become a national priority to restore combined arms dominance.
• The M1 Abrams program of the 1970-1980s delivered unprecedented success.
➢ Decision that all sub-systems and components must be proven to work before Systems Engineering and Preliminary Design
Review, coupled with no technological breakthrough required for success and growth margins built into its design, resulted in
40 years of Abrams dominance.
➢ 5GCV program must follow Abrams development model.
➢ If it does, the US will render costly investment by our foes ineffective, will add new dimensions to combat, and allow us to
win on the 2040 Battlefield – achieving the Starry Challenge.
• Outstanding technological and warfighting opportunities exist.
➢ Advanced US computational power, economic strength, and warfighting prowess.
➢ Sophisticated modeling and simulation, emerging digital design and engineering, AI, and robotics.
➢ US defense industrial base and Uniformed Military are second to none.
➢ The Army must partner with industry, other USG Departments, Allies and partners for the best 2040 technologies.
➢ Despite the Russian performance in Ukraine, Chinese and Russian advances demand major adaptations for how the US
military will operate on the 2040 Battlefield.

27
 The 2040 Battlefield and the 5GCV Recommendations
• SECARMY and CSA: The Army should immediately initiate a 5GCV development and testbed
program with the corresponding activities.
➢ Make a conscious decision NLT February 2024 that a 5GCV will be fielded by 2040-2042.
➢ Direct ASA(ALT) to create a PEO- managed program consisting of 9 testbeds IAW ASB Study following February
2024 decision.
➢ Direct ASA(ALT) to create a S&T/R&D and preliminary future acquisition strategy based on the M1
development model reflected in slide #16.
➢ Direct timely determination by the Uniformed Military of the answers to the 5 questions in slide #16.
➢ Direct ASA(FM&C) and DCS G-8 to create POM funding wedge for 5GCV activities in the next POM cycle.
• ASA(ALT) and AFC: ASA(ALT) and AFC address preliminary requirements generations issues,
early S&T/R&D investments, and initial acquisition strategies.
➢ ASA(ALT): Report on PEO and PEO organizational structure to manage testbed program NLT February 2024.
➢ AFC: Report on 5GCV requirements generation structure NLT February 2024, i.e., NGCV CFT management or
new management/organizational approach.
➢ Brief SECARMY and CSA on preliminary answers to 5GCV development questions in slide #16 NLT February 2025.

28
 The 2040 Battlefield and the 5GCV Recommendations (Continued)
• ASA(ALT) and AFC (Continued):
➢ Prioritize new cannon requirements; work with Governments of Germany (Rheinmetall) and France.
- No US National Institution has cannon design competitive advantages.
➢ Prioritize top attack and underbelly defenses; ICW DARPA and DOE seek innovative vehicle and formation
protection solutions, especially against kinetic energy weapons to determine if significant 5GCV passive
armor weight reductions can be made.
➢ Prioritize combat vehicle weight “bogey”; ICW DOE seek innovative passive armor solutions.
➢ Prioritize vehicle designs to reduce width and length of 5GCV.
➢ Prioritize determination of crew size ICW TRADOC and based on proven experimentation and analytics.
➢ AFC ICW TRADOC begin preliminary determination of 2040 operational concepts, derivative 2040
doctrinal concerns, to include crew-level TTPs and related combat formation structures.
➢ AFC ICW AMC identify ways to reduce logistics and sustainment burdens.
➢ AFC ICW USARPAC, USAREUR-AF, TRANSCOM/DOT and USN identify strategic mobility issues and solutions,
especially with Indo-Pacific. If necessary, HQDA ICW Joint Staff and OSD address national military strategy
issues associated with constrained strategic mobility resources.

29
 The 2040 Battlefield and the 5GCV Supplemental Recommendations
• HQDA DCS G-2, NGIC, and AFC: ICW national agencies prioritize intelligence understanding of Chinese
armor and anti-armor R&D investments and fielding developments. China likely to replace Russia in
armor developments. Critical Intelligence Items of Interest include
➢ Materials
➢ Energetics
➢ Use of AI for Automatic Target Recognition and Counter ATR
➢ Cannon Technologies and Munitions
➢ Advanced ATGMs
➢ Hypervelocity Munitions
• SECARMY and USA: Re-establish the DUSA(OR) as Army lead agency for Army-wide investments in
state of the Army analytics, modeling, and simulation for modern digital engineering and design,
evaluation of kinetic and non-kinetic applications, and assessments of 2040 combat effectiveness
force-on-force scenarios.
• SECARMY and CSA: Direct AFC to establish an ATGM CFT to assess Chinese and Russian ATGM
investments and to develop a 2040 Battlefield ATGM strategy.

30
Back-Up Charts

32
 Direct Fire Combat Vehicle Evolution

FM 100-5 Active Defense Threat FM 3-0

Operations and AirLand Battle Next Gen Multidomain Operations
Warfare 5GCV

T GEN 4
E A Russian T14 and
C D GEN 3 – GEN 3.5 Chinese T99
H V M1, M1A2 and SEP V3&4
N A
O N Example Testbeds
L C • Improved Computers, AI, and Networks
O E • Active Protection Systems
G M GEN 1 and 2 • Improved Masking and Signature Management
I E M24, M26, M48, M60 • Larger Main Gun and Autoloader
C2 • Robotic System Interfaces
C N
A T M
L Example Testbeds
• Improved Armor
• Fire on the Move
P F • Turbine Engine
20th Century Tanks 21st Century Combat Vehicles
DESIGN IMPERATIVES AND EVOLUTION OVER TIME
33
 The Modern Battlefield, Recent Wars, and PLAA Modernization
Observations from Ukraine 2014 – 2022,
Nagorno-Karabakh 2020
• Changing Lethality Paradigms Observations indicate top
attack from beyond line-of-sight engagement by indirect
fires, UAVs, ATGMs, have killed/damaged the most
combat vehicles. Bottom attack from mines resulted in
the second most kills.
• Transparency Space, EW and UAV fueled transparency
and stand off fires intensify lethality, challenging armor
survivability.
• Armor’s Role Armored forces remain vital to maneuver
and closing with the enemy on a lethal battlefield; the
effect of massed fires has limited unarmored maneuver,
driving unprotected forces into trenches.
• Logistics The speed/scale of fuel, munition, and
equipment consumption exceed contemporary US
experience; demand is critical to maintaining combat
momentum.
• Russia Fading Losses in Ukraine are militarily
diminishing Russia, and it is no longer the US pacing
armor/anti-armor threat.
China and PLAA Modernization
• 30 Year Effort Galvanized by Desert Storm, PLAA
modernization focuses on overmatching the US, prioritizing
information dominance, lethality, and mobility to out-detect,
out-decide, and out-range US.
• Modernization Focus: Two Centennial Objectives
➢ Western Pacific hegemony in this decade.
➢ Global hegemony by 2050 with the PLAA
protecting China’s expanding interests.
➢ PLA tasked to be a world class (peer) by 2035 and a first-
class military (superior) by 2050.
• Robust Combined Arms The PLAA has modernized ~half its
5k tanks to Type 99 (better than T-90) organized in
combined arms brigades with long-range fires, EW, air
defense, etc., potentially better integrated than Russia,
and complemented ~5km Javelin-like ATGMs.
• Robust R&D PLAA R&D is improving armor, lethality,
unmanned/autonomous systems, hybrid/electric power,
and artificial intelligence to evolve the PLAA from
mechanization, to informationization, to intelligentization,
becoming the armor/anti-armor pacing threat.
34
 The Modern Battlefield - Potential Current and Future PLAA-US Army Flashpoints
Given China’s two centennial objectives, the US Army, as part of the Joint Force, and the PLAA may clash across Eurasia. Should Taiwan be invaded, US Army
operations can expand the fight to prevent China from focusing solely on the Taiwan invasion. Further, as the PLA and expand into Eurasia along the BRI, the US
must prepare to prevent expanding hegemony circa 2040-2050.
2022-2030 2022-2035

Potential Capabilities:
Potential Capabilities:
• Combined Arms, LRPF,
• AMD, LRPF, MDTF,
Attack Helicopters, AMD
Sustainment, Watercraft
Primary Functions:
Primary Functions:
• Counterfires
• Fires
• Maneuver
• Protection
• Protection
• Contested Logistics
• Sustainment

2022-2050 2022-2050

Potential Capabilities:
• SFAT, Combined Arms, Potential Capabilities:
LRPF, Attack Helicopters, • SFAT, Combined Arms, LRPF, Attack
AMD Helicopters, AMD
Primary Functions: Primary Functions:
• Counterfires • LRPF and Counterfires
• Maneuver • Extended Range Maneuver
• Protection • Extended Protection
• Sustainment • Contested, Extended Logistics

Fg g PLAA w g US A F ’ b y p p yv y v g , p y , and sustain

operations over long and f f . US A y’ b y z w
and destroy the enemy remains critical to success. 35