Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUMMARY 1 0 4
KEY TERMS 1 0 5
READINGS
Egoism and Altruism by Louis P. Pojman 107
Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill 111
A Theory of Justice by John Rawls 115
The Entitlement Theory of Justice by Robert Nozick 122
Kant’s Ethics 1 3 2
Critical Thought—Sizing Up The Golden Rule 134
Applying the Theory 135
Evaluating the Theory 136
Kant, Respect, And Personal Rights 137
Learning from Kant’s Theory 138
Natural Law Theory 139
Applying the Theory 141
Quick Review 141
Critical Thought—Double Effect
And The “Trolley Problem” 142
Evaluating the Theory 142
Learning from Natural Law 143
SUMMARY 1 4 4
KEY TERMS 1 4 4
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 1 45
FURTHER READING 1 4 6
READINGS
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
by Immanuel Kant 146
Summa Theologica by St. Thomas Aquinas 155
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives by Philippa Foot 165
KEY TERMS 1 7 8
REVIEW QUESTIONS 1 78
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 1 78
FURTHER READING 1 7 9
READINGS
Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle 179
The Need for More Than Justice by Annette C. Baier 188
CONTENTS Á ix
Feminist Ethics 1 9 7
Critical Thought—Feminist Ethics In History 197
The Ethics of Care 198
Quick Review 199
SUMMARY 1 9 9
KEY TERMS 1 9 9
READINGS
Feminist Ethics by Alison M. Jaggar 201
The Ethics of Care as Moral Theory by Virginia Held 209
SUMMARY 2 3 3
KEY TERMS 2 3 4
REVIEW QUESTIONS 2 34
FURTHER READING 2 3 5
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 2 35
READINGS
A Defense of Abortion by Judith Jarvis Thomson 237
On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion by Mary Anne Warren 247
Why Abortion Is Immoral by Don Marquis 256
Virtue Theory and Abortion by Rosalind Hursthouse 268
Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens by Susan Sherwin 274
KEY TERMS 2 9 6
REVIEW QUESTIONS 2 96
FURTHER READING 2 9 6
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 2 97
CONTENTS Á xi
READINGS
Active and Passive Euthanasia by James Rachels 300
The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia by J. Gay-Williams 304
Voluntary Active Euthanasia by Dan W. Brock 307
Euthanasia by Philippa Foot 315
Killing and Allowing to Die by Daniel Callahan 329
Euthanasia for Disabled People? by Liz Carr 332
KEY TERMS 3 4 1
READINGS
Autonomy, Equality and a Just Health Care System by Kai Nielsen 344
The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care by Allen E. Buchanan 350
Is There a Right to Health Care and, If So, What Does It Encompass?
by Norman Daniels 363
xii Á CONTENTS
KEY TERMS 3 8 0
REVIEW QUESTIONS 3 80
FURTHER READING 3 8 0
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 3 81
READINGS
All Animals Are Equal by Peter Singer 384
The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan 394
Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position
by Mary Anne Warren 401
The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research by Carl Cohen 407
How to Argue for (and Against) Ethical Veganism by Tristram McPherson 414
KEY TERMS 4 3 8
CONTENTS Á xiii
READINGS
People or Penguins by William F. Baxter 442
It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations by Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong 446
Are All Species Equal? by David Schmidtz 458
The Land Ethic by Aldo Leopold 465
READINGS
Racisms by Kwame Anthony Appiah 489
Racism: What It Is and What It Isn’t by Lawrence Blum 499
Dear White America by George Yancy 508
Uses and Abuses of the Discourse of White Privilege by Naomi Zack 511
The Case Against Affirmative Action by Louis P. Pojman 514
In Defense of Affirmative Action by Tom L. Beauchamp 526
xiv Á CONTENTS
KEY TERMS 5 4 5
REVIEW QUESTIONS 5 45
FURTHER READING 5 4 6
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 5 46
READINGS
Plain Sex by Alan H. Goldman 548
Sexual Morality by Roger Scruton 557
Why Shouldn’t Tommy and Jim Have Sex? A Defense of Homosexuality
by John Corvino 5 6 4
Seduction, Rape, and Coercion by Sarah Conly 571
Sex under Pressure: Jerks, Boorish Behavior, and Gender Hierarchy
by Scott A. Anderson 582
Moral Arguments 5 97
SUMMARY 5 9 7
KEY TERMS 5 9 8
READINGS
Why It’s a Bad Idea to Tell Students Words Are Violence
by Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff 601
Restoring Free Speech on Campus by Geoffrey R. Stone and Will Creeley 605
Speech Codes and Expressive Harm by Andrew Altman 606
What “Snowflakes” Get Right About Free Speech by Ulrich Baer 615
The Progressive Ideas behind the Lack of Free Speech on Campus
by Wendy Kaminer 618
KEY TERMS 6 3 1
xv
xvi Á CONTENTS
FURTHER READING 6 3 2
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 6 32
READINGS
The Ethics of Addiction by Thomas Szasz 634
Against the Legalization of Drugs by James Q. Wilson 643
Gun Control by Hugh LaFollette 652
Political Philosophy and the Gun Control Debate: What Would Bentham,
Mills, and Nozick Have to Say? by Stacey Nguyen 663
KEY TERMS 6 7 6
REVIEW QUESTIONS 6 76
FURTHER READING 6 7 6
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 6 77
READINGS
The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense by Ernest van den Haag 679
Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag
by Jeffrey H. Reiman 684
The Case Against the Death Penalty by Hugo Adam Bedau 690
A Life for a Life by Igor Primoratz 698
CONTENTS Á xvii
KEY TERMS 7 2 2
READINGS
Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists by James P. Sterba 726
Drones, Ethics, and the Armchair Soldier by John Kaag 735
Can Terrorism Be Morally Justified? by Stephen Nathanson 737
The Case for Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist by Alan M. Dershowitz 745
My Tortured Decision by Ali Soufan 754
KEY TERMS 7 6 3
READINGS
The Morality of Migration by Seyla Benhabib 766
The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy Revisted: Open Borders vs. Social
Justice? by Stephen Macedo 768
Selecting Immigrants by David Miller 781
Immigration and Freedom of Association by Christopher Heath Wellman 787
Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer by Sarah Fine 808
KEY TERMS 8 2 6
REVIEW QUESTIONS 8 26
FURTHER READING 8 2 7
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 8 27
READINGS
Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer 829
Lifeboat Ethics by Garrett Hardin 835
A Critique of Lifeboat Ethics by William W. Murdoch and Allan Oaten 841
The Case for Aid by Jeffrey Sachs 850
G LOSSARY G – 1
A N S WE R S T O ARG U MENT EXERCISES A– 1
NOTES N – 1
INDEX I – 1
PREFACE
‘’
This fifth edition of Doing Ethics contains the most NEW FEATURES
extensive additions, updates, and improvements
of any previous version. The aims that have shaped • A new chapter on campus free speech, hate
this text from the beginning have not changed: to speech, speech codes, speech and violence,
help students (1) see why ethics matters to society and news-making conflicts: Chapter 16—Free
and to themselves; (2) understand core concepts Speech on Campus. It includes five readings by
(theories, principles, values, virtues, and the like); notable free speech theorists and commentators.
(3) become familiar with the background (scientific, • A new stand-alone chapter on an increasingly
legal, and otherwise) of contemporary moral prob- influential approach to ethics: Chapter 8—
lems; and (4) know how to apply critical reasoning Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care. It
to those problems—to assess moral judgments and includes two new readings by important
principles, construct and evaluate moral arguments, theorists in the field.
and apply and critique moral theories. This book, • A new chapter on the justice of health care—
then, tries hard to provide the strongest possible who should get it, who should supply it, and
support to teachers of applied ethics who want stu- who should pay for it: Chapter 11—Delivering
dents, above all, to think for themselves and compe- Health Care.
tently do what is often required of morally mature
• A new chapter on immigration, immigration
persons—that is, to do ethics.
policy, and contemporary conflicts over the
These goals are reflected in the book’s extensive
treatment of immigrants: Chapter 20—The Eth-
introductions to concepts, cases, and issues; its
ics of Immigration. It includes recent research
large collection of readings and exercises; and its
on some widely believed but erroneous ideas
chapter-by-chapter coverage of moral reasoning—
about U.S. immigration, as well as five readings
perhaps the most thorough introduction to these
that represent contrasting perspectives on the
skills available in an applied ethics text. This latter
subject.
theme gets systematic treatment in five chapters,
threads prominently throughout all the others, • A substantially revised chapter on social
and is reinforced everywhere by “Critical Thought” equality, now covering race, racism, racial
text boxes prompting students to apply critical prejudice, discrimination, white privilege,
thinking to real debates and cases. The point of all and affirmative action: Chapter 14—Racism,
this is to help students not just study ethics but to Equality, and Discrimination. It includes
become fully involved in the ethical enterprise and four new readings on racism and inequality
the moral life. by prominent participants in the ongoing
debates.
xix
xx Á PREFACE
• A revised chapter on sexuality, now including Part 2 (Moral Reasoning) consists of Chapters 3
examinations not only of sexual behavior but and 4. Chapter 3 starts by reassuring students that
also of campus sexual assault, rape, harass- moral reasoning is neither alien nor difficult but
ment, and hookup culture: Chapter 15—Sexual is simply ordinary critical reasoning applied to
Morality. ethics. They’ve seen this kind of reasoning before
• A greatly expanded chapter on personal liberty, and done it before. Thus, the chapter focuses on
now including discussions and readings on identifying, devising, diagramming, and evaluat-
using drugs and owning guns: Chapter 17— ing moral arguments and encourages practice and
Drugs, Guns, and Personal Liberty. competence in finding implied premises, testing
moral premises, assessing nonmoral premises, and
• New sections in Chapter 4—The Power of
dealing with common argument fallacies.
Moral Theories, on social contract theory and
Chapter 4 explains how moral theories work
one called “Devising a Coherent Moral Theory”
and how they relate to other important elements
that shows by example how one might develop
in moral experience: considered judgments, moral
a plausible theory of morality.
arguments, moral principles and rules, and cases
• A new focus on climate change in the envi- and issues. It reviews major theories and shows how
ronmental ethics chapter and more emphasis students can evaluate them using plausible criteria.
on torture and drone warfare in the political Part 3 (Theories of Morality, Chapters 5–8) cov-
violence chapter. ers key theories in depth—utilitarianism, ethical
• Eleven new readings by women writers. egoism, social contract theory, Kant’s theory, nat-
• Thirty-seven new readings in all to supplement ural law theory, virtue ethics, feminist ethics, and
the already extensive collection of essays. the ethics of care. Students see how each theory is
applied to moral issues and how their strengths and
• New pedagogical elements: the inclusion of key
weaknesses are revealed by applying the criteria of
terms at the end of each chapter; the addition
evaluation.
of end-of-chapter review and discussion ques-
In Part 4 (Ethical Issues), each of thirteen chap-
tions; and several new “Cases for Analysis”—
ters explores a timely moral issue through discus-
now called “Ethical Dilemmas.”
sion and relevant readings: abortion, euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide, health care, animal
ORGANIZATION welfare, environmental ethics, racism and equality,
sexual morality, free speech on campus, drug use,
Part 1 (Fundamentals) prepares students for the tasks
gun ownership, capital punishment, political vio-
enumerated above. Chapter 1 explains why ethics is
lence, terrorism, torture, immigration, and global
important and why thinking critically about ethical
economic justice. Every chapter supplies legal,
issues is essential to the examined life. It introduces
scientific, and other background information on
the field of moral philosophy, defines and illustrates
the issue; discusses how major theories have been
basic terminology, clarifies the connection between
applied to the problem; examines arguments that
religion and morality, and explains why moral rea-
have been used in the debate; and includes addi-
soning is crucial to moral maturity and personal
tional cases for analysis with questions. The read-
freedom. Chapter 2 investigates a favorite doctrine
ings are a mix of well-known essays and surprising
of undergraduates—ethical relativism—and exam-
new voices, both classic and contemporary.
ines its distant cousin, emotivism.
PREFACE Á xxi
State University, Fresno), Stephen Finlay (Univer- Virginia University), Daniel Malotky (Greens-
sity of Southern California), Matthew Fitzsimmons boro College), Luke Manning (Auburn Univer-
(University of North Alabama), Tammie Foltz (Des sity), Ron Martin (Lynchburg College), Michael
Moines Area Community College), Tim Fout (Uni- McKeon (Barry University), Katherine Mendis
versity of Louisville), Dimitria Gatzia (University (Hunter College, CUNY), Joshua Mills-Knutsen
of Akron), Candace Gauthier (University of North (Indiana University Southeast), Michael Monge
Carolina, Wilmington), Mark Greene (University (Long Beach City College), Louisa Lee Moon (Mira
of Delaware), Kevin Guilfoy (Carroll University), Costa College), Eric Moore (Longwood Univer-
Katherine Guin (The College at Brockport: SUNY), sity), Jon S. Moran (Southwest Missouri State Uni-
Meredith Gunning (University of Massachusetts, versity), Dale Murray (Virginia Commonwealth
Boston), Don Habibi (University of North Carolina, University), Elizabeth Murray (Loyola Marymount
Wilmington), Barbara M. Hands (University of University), Richard Musselwhite (North Carolina
North Carolina, Greensboro), Craig Hanks (Texas Central University), Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dick-
State University), Jane Haproff (Sierra College), Ed inson College), Jay Newhard (East Carolina Uni-
Harris (Texas A&M University), Carol Hay (Univer- versity), Marcella Norling (Orange Coast College),
sity of Massachusetts Lowell), Blake Heffner (Rari- Charles L. North (Southern New Hampshire Uni-
tan Valley Community College), Marko Hilgersom versity), Robert F. O’Connor (Texas State Univer-
(Lethbridge Community College), Andrew J. Hill sity), Jeffrey P. Ogle (Metropolitan State University
(St. Philip’s College), John Holder III (Pensacola of Denver), Don Olive (Roane State Community
Junior College), Mark Hollifield (Clayton College College), Leonard Olson (California State Univer-
and State University), Margaret Houck (University sity, Fresno), Jessica Payson (Bryn Mawr College),
of South Carolina), Michael Howard (University of Gregory E. Pence (University of Alabama), Donald
Maine, Orono), Frances Howard-Snyder (Western Petkus (Indiana University School of Public and
Washington University), Kenneth Howarth (Mer- Environmental Affairs), Trisha Philips (Mississippi
cer County Community College), Louis F. Howe, Jr. State University), Thomas M. Powers (University of
(Naugatuck Valley Community College), Kyle Hub- Delaware), Marjorie Price (University of Alabama),
bard (Saint Anselm College), Robert Hull (Western Netty Provost (Indiana University, Kokomo), Elisa
Virginia Wesleyan College), Amy Jeffers (Owens Rapaport (Molloy College), Michael Redmond
Community College), Vicki Jenkins (Ivy Tech (Bergen Community College), Daniel Regan (Vil-
Community College, Timothy Jessen (Ivy Tech lanova University), Joseph J. Rogers (University of
Community College, Bloomington), John John- Texas, San Antonio), John Returra (Lackawanna
ston (College of the Redwoods), Marc Jolley (Mer- College), Robert M. Seltzer (Western Illinois Uni-
cer University), Frederik Kaufman (Ithaca College), versity), Edward Sherline (University of Wyoming),
Thomas D. Kennedy (Berry College), W. Glenn Aeon J. Skoble (Bridgewater Community College),
Kirkconnell (Santa Fe College), Donald Knud- Eric Snider (Lansing Community College), Eric Sot-
sen (Montgomery County Community College), nak (University of Akron), Susanne Sreedhar (Bos-
Gilbert Kohler (Shawnee Community College), ton University), Piers H.G. Stephens (University of
Thomas Larson (Saint Anselm College), Matt Georgia), Grant Sterling (Eastern Illinois Univer-
Lawrence (Long Beach City College), Clayton sity), John Stilwell (University of Texas at Dallas),
Littlejohn (Southern Methodist University), Jes- Tyler Suggs (Virginia Tech), Michele Svatos (East-
sica Logue (University of Portland), Ian D. MacK- field College), David Svolba (Fitchburg State Univer-
innon (The University of Akron), Tim Madigan sity), Allen Thompson (Virginia Commonwealth
(St. John Fisher College), Ernâni Magalhães (West University), Peter B. Trumbull (Madison College),
PREFACE Á xxiii
Donald Turner (Nashville State Community Col- Warnken (Granite State College), Jamie Carlin Wat-
lege), Julie C. Van Camp (California State Univer- son (Young Harris College), Rivka Weinberg (Scripps
sity, Long Beach), Michelle Rehwinkel Vasilinda College), Cheryl Wertheimer (Butler Community
(Tallahassee Community College), Kris Vigneron College), Monique Whitaker (Hunter College,
(Columbus State Community College), Christine CUNY), Phillip Wiebe (Trinity Western University),
Vitrano (Brooklyn College, CUNY), Mark Vopat Jonathan Wight (University of Richmond), John
(Youngstown State University), Matt Waldschla- Yanovitch (Molloy College), Steven Zusman (Wau-
gel (University of North Carolina, Wilmington), bonsee Community College), and Matt Zwolinski
Steve Wall (Hillsborough Community College), Bill (University of San Diego). Thank you all.
PART
1
‘’
Fundamentals
CHAPTER 1
‘’
Ethics and the Examined Life
Ethics, or moral philosophy, is the philosophi- all ethical concepts are irrelevant or empty, you
cal study of morality. Morality refers to beliefs assume a particular view—a theory, in the broadest
concerning right and wrong, good and bad— sense—about morality and its place in your life. If
beliefs that can include judgments, values, rules, at some point you are intellectually brave enough
principles, and theories. These beliefs help guide to wonder whether your moral beliefs rest on some
our actions, define our values, and give us reasons coherent supporting considerations, you will see
for being the persons we are. (Ethical and moral, that you cannot even begin to sort out such con-
the adjective forms, are often used to mean siderations without—again—doing ethics. In any
simply “having to do with morality,” and ethics case, in your life you must deal with the rest of the
and morality are sometimes used to refer to the world, which turns on moral conflict and resolu-
moral norms of a specific group or individual, as tion, moral decision and debate.
in “Greek ethics” or “Russell’s morality.”) Eth- What is at stake when we do ethics? In an
ics, then, addresses the powerful question that important sense, the answer is everything we hold
Socrates formulated twenty-four hundred years dear. Ethics is concerned with values—specifically,
ago: how ought we to live? moral values. Through the sifting and weighing of
The scope and continued relevance of this moral values we determine what the most impor-
query suggest something compelling about ethics: tant things are in our lives, what is worth living for,
you cannot escape it. You cannot run away from all and what is worth dying for. We decide what is the
the choices, feelings, and actions that accompany greatest good, what goals we should pursue in life,
ideas about right and wrong, good and bad—ideas what virtues we should cultivate, what duties we
that persist in your culture and in your mind. After should or should not fulfill, what value we should
all, for much of your life, you have been assimilat- put on human life, and what pain and perils we
ing, modifying, or rejecting the ethical norms you should be willing to endure for notions such as the
inherited from your family, community, and soci- common good, justice, and rights.
ety. Unless you are very unusual, from time to time Does it matter whether the state executes a
you deliberate about the rightness or wrongness of criminal who has the mental capacity of a ten-
actions, embrace or reject particular moral prin- year-old? Does it matter who actually writes the
ciples or codes, judge the goodness of your char- term paper you turn in and represent as your own?
acter or intentions (or someone else’s), perhaps Does it matter whether we can easily save a drown-
even question (and agonize over) the soundness ing child but casually decide not to? Does it matter
of your own moral outlook when it conflicts with whether young girls in Africa undergo painful geni-
that of others. In other words, you are involved tal mutilation for reasons of custom or religion? Do
in ethics—you do ethics. Even if you try to remove these actions and a million others just as contro-
yourself from the ethical realm by insisting that versial matter at all? Most of us—regardless of our
3
4 Á PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS
opinion on these issues—would say that they mat- to him by his society, he may very well be a fine
ter a great deal. If they matter, then ethics matters, embodiment of the rules of his culture and accept
because these are ethical concerns requiring careful them with certainty. But he will lack the ability to
reflection using concepts and reasoning peculiar to defend his beliefs by rational argument against crit-
ethics. icism. What happens when he encounters others
But even though ethics is inescapable and who also have very strong beliefs that contradict
important, you are still free to take the easy way his? “He will feel lost and bewildered,” Taylor says,
out, and many people do. You are free not to think and his confusion might leave him disillusioned
too deeply or too systematically about ethical con- about morality. “Unable to give an objective, rea-
cerns. You can simply embrace the moral beliefs soned justification for his own convictions, he may
and norms given to you by your family and your turn from dogmatic certainty to total skepticism.
society. You can accept them without question And from total skepticism it is but a short step to
or serious examination. In other words, you can an ‘amoral’ life. . . . Thus the person who begins by
try not to do ethics. This approach can be simple accepting moral beliefs blindly can end up denying
1
and painless—at least for a while—but it has some all morality.”
drawbacks. There are other easy roads—roads that also
First, it undermines your personal freedom. If bypass critical and thoughtful scrutiny of morality.
you accept and never question the moral beliefs We can describe most of them as various forms of
handed to you by your culture, then those beliefs are subjectivism, a topic that we examine closely in the
not really yours—and they, not you, control the path next chapter. You may decide, for example, that
you take in life. Only if you critically examine these you can establish all your moral beliefs by simply
beliefs yourself and decide for yourself whether they consulting your feelings. In situations calling for
have merit will they be truly yours. Only then will moral judgments, you let your emotions be your
you be in charge of your own choices and actions. guide. If it feels right, it is right. Alternatively, you
Second, the no-questions-asked approach inc- may come to believe that moral realities are relative
reases the chances that your responses to moral to each person, a view known as subjective relativ-
dilemmas or contradictions will be incomplete, ism (also covered in the next chapter). That is, you
confused, or mistaken. Sometimes in real life moral think that what a person believes or approves of
codes or rules do not fit the situations at hand, determines the rightness or wrongness of actions. If
or moral principles conflict with one another, or you believe that abortion is wrong, then it is wrong.
entirely new circumstances are not covered by any If you believe it is right, then it is right.
moral policy at all. Solving these problems requires But these facile roads through ethical terrain are
something that a hand-me-down morality does not no better than blindly accepting existing norms.
include: the intellectual tools to critically evaluate Even if you want to take the subjectivist route,
(and reevaluate) existing moral beliefs. you still need to examine it critically to see if there
Third, if there is such a thing as intellectual are good reasons for choosing it—otherwise your
moral growth, you are unlikely to find it on the safe choice is arbitrary and therefore not really yours.
route. To not do ethics is to stay locked in a kind of And unless you thoughtfully consider the mer-
intellectual limbo, where exploration in ethics and its of moral beliefs (including subjectivist beliefs),
personal moral progress are barely possible. your chances of being wrong about them are
The philosopher Paul Taylor suggests that there substantial.
is yet another risk in taking the easy road. If some- Ethics does not give us a royal road to moral
one blindly embraces the morality bequeathed truth. Instead, it shows us how to ask critical
CHAPTER 1: ETHiCS AND THE ExAMiNED LiFE Á 5
questions about morality and systematically seek to approach the subject. The first division is
answers supported by good reasons. This is a tall normative ethics—the study of the principles,
order because, as we have seen, many of the ques- rules, or theories that guide our actions and judg-
tions in ethics are among the toughest we can ever ments. (The word normative refers to norms, or
ask—and among the most important in life. standards, of judgment—in this case, norms for
judging rightness and goodness.) The ultimate pur-
pose of doing normative ethics is to try to establish
THE ETHICAL LANDSCAPE
the soundness of moral norms, especially the norms
The domain of ethics is large, divided into sev- embodied in a comprehensive moral system, or
eral areas of investigation and cordoned off from moral theory. We do normative ethics when we use
related subjects. So let us map the territory care- critical reasoning to demonstrate that a moral prin-
fully. As the term moral philosophy suggests, ethics ciple is justified, or that a professional code of con-
is a branch of philosophy. A very rough character- duct is contradictory, or that one proposed moral
ization of philosophy is the systematic use of critical theory is better than another, or that a person’s
reasoning to answer the most fundamental ques- motive is good. Should the rightness of actions be
tions in life. Moral philosophy, obviously, tries to judged by their consequences? Is happiness the
answer the fundamental questions of morality. The greatest good in life? Is utilitarianism a good moral
other major branches of philosophy address other theory? Such questions are the preoccupation of
basic questions; these branches are logic (the study normative ethics.
of correct reasoning), metaphysics (the study of the Another major division of ethics is
fundamental nature of reality), and epistemology metaethics—the study of the meaning and logi-
(the study of knowledge). As a division of philoso- cal structure of moral beliefs. It asks not whether
phy, ethics does its work primarily through criti- an action is right or whether a person’s character is
cal reasoning: the careful, systematic evaluation of good. It takes a step back from these concerns and
statements, or claims. Critical reasoning is a process asks more fundamental questions about them: What
used in all fields of study, not just in ethics. The main does it mean for an action to be right? Is good the
components of this process are the evaluation of log- same thing as desirable? How can a moral principle
ical arguments and the careful analysis of concepts. be justified? Is there such a thing as moral truth? To
Science also studies morality, but not in the do normative ethics, we must assume certain things
way that moral philosophy does. Its approach is about the meaning of moral terms and the logical
known as descriptive ethics—the scientific study relationships among them. But the job of metaeth-
of moral beliefs and practices. Its aim is to describe ics is to question all these assumptions, to see if they
and explain how people actually behave and think really make sense.
when dealing with moral issues and concepts. This Finally, there is applied ethics—the applica-
kind of empirical research is usually conducted tion of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases,
by sociologists, anthropologists, and psycholo- particularly those in a profession such as medicine
gists. In contrast, the focus of moral philosophy is or law. Applied ethics in these fields goes under
not what people actually believe and do, but what names such as medical ethics, journalistic ethics,
they should believe and do. The point of moral phi- and business ethics. In applied ethics we study the
losophy is to determine what actions are right (or results derived from applying a moral principle or
wrong) and what things are good (or bad). theory to specific circumstances. The purpose of
Philosophers distinguish three major divisions the exercise is to learn something important about
in ethics, each one representing a different way either the moral characteristics of the situation or
6 Á PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS
the adequacy of the moral norms. Did the doctor Some things, however, are valuable for their own
do right in performing that abortion? Is it morally sakes. They are valuable simply because they are
permissible for scientists to perform experiments what they are, without being a means to something
on people without their consent? Was it right for else. Things that have been regarded as valuable in
the journalist to distort her reporting to aid a par- themselves include happiness, pleasure, virtue, and
ticular side in the war? Questions like these drive beauty. These things are said to be intrinsically
the search for answers in applied ethics. valuable—they are valuable in themselves.
In every division of ethics, we must be careful to
distinguish between values and obligations. Some- THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
times we may be interested in concepts or judg-
ments of value—that is, about what is morally good, We all do ethics, and we all have a general sense of
bad, blameworthy, or praiseworthy. We properly what is involved. But we can still ask, What are the
use these kinds of terms to refer mostly to persons, elements of ethics that make it the peculiar enter-
character traits, motives, and intentions. We may prise that it is? We can include at least the follow-
say “She is a good person” or “He is to blame for ing factors:
that tragedy.” At other times, we may be inter-
ested in concepts or judgments of obligation—that The Preeminence of Reason
is, about what is obligatory, or a duty, or what we Doing ethics typically involves grappling with our
should or ought to do. We use these terms to refer feelings, taking into account the facts of the situa-
to actions. We may say “She has a duty to tell the tion (including our own observations and relevant
truth” or “What he did was wrong.” knowledge), and trying to understand the ideas
When we talk about value in the sense just that bear on the case. But above all, it involves, even
described, we mean moral value. If she is a good per- requires, critical reasoning—the consideration of
son, she is good in the moral sense. But we can also reasons for whatever statements (moral or other-
talk about nonmoral value. We can say that things wise) are in question. Whatever our view on moral
such as televisions, rockets, experiences, and works issues and whatever moral outlook we subscribe to,
of art (things other than persons, intentions, and our commonsense moral experience suggests that
so forth) are good, but we mean “good” only in a if a moral judgment is to be worthy of acceptance, it
nonmoral way. It makes no sense to assert that tele- must be supported by good reasons, and our delib-
visions or rockets in themselves are morally good erations on the issue must include a consideration
or bad. Perhaps a rocket could be used to perform of those reasons.
an action that is morally wrong. In that case, the The backbone of critical reasoning generally, and
action would be immoral, while the rocket itself moral reasoning in particular, is logical argument.
would still have only nonmoral value. This kind of argument—not the angry-exchange
Many things in life have value for us, but they type—consists of a statement to be supported (the
are not necessarily valuable in the same way. Some assertion to be proved, the conclusion) and the
things are valuable because they are a means to statements that do the supporting (the reasons
something else. We might say that gasoline is for believing the statement, the premises). With
good because it is a means to make a gas-powered such arguments, we try to show that a moral judg-
vehicle work, or that a pen is good because it can ment is or is not justified, that a moral principle
be used to write a letter. Such things are said to be is or is not sound, that an action is or is not mor-
instrumentally, or extrinsically, valuable— ally permissible, or that a moral theory is or is not
they are valuable as a means to something else. plausible.
CHAPTER 1: ETHiCS AND THE ExAMiNED LiFE Á 7
’
situations that are relevantly similar. If you say, for
QUICK REVIEW
example, that lying is wrong in a particular situa-
ethics (or moral philosophy)—The philosophical tion, then you implicitly agree that lying is wrong
study of morality. for anyone in relevantly similar situations. If you
morality—Beliefs concerning right and wrong,
say that killing in self-defense is morally permis-
good and bad; they can include judgments, sible, then you say in effect that killing in self-
values, rules, principles, and theories. defense is permissible for everyone in relevantly
similar situations. It cannot be the case that an
descriptive ethics—The scientific study of moral
action performed by A is wrong while the same
beliefs and practices.
action performed by B in relevantly similar cir-
normative ethics—The study of the principles,
cumstances is right. It cannot be the case that the
rules, or theories that guide our actions and
moral judgments formed in these two situations
judgments.
must differ just because two different people are
metaethics—The study of the meaning and logi- involved.
cal structure of moral beliefs. This point about universalizability also applies
applied ethics—The application of moral norms to reasons used to support moral judgments. If rea-
to specific moral issues or cases, particularly sons apply in a specific case, then those reasons also
those in a profession such as medicine or law. apply in all relevantly similar cases. It cannot be
instrumentally (or extrinsically) valuable— true that reasons that apply in a specific case do not
Valuable as a means to something else. apply to other cases that are similar in all relevant
intrinsically valuable—Valuable in itself, for its respects.
own sake.
The Principle of Impartiality
From the moral point of view, all persons are consid-
ered equal and should be treated accordingly. This
Our use of critical reasoning and argument helps sense of impartiality is implied in all moral state-
us keep our feelings about moral issues in perspective. ments. It means that the welfare and interests of
Feelings are an important part of our moral experience. each individual should be given the same weight as
They make empathy possible, which gives us a deeper the welfare and interests of all others. Unless there
understanding of the human impact of moral norms. is a morally relevant difference between people, we
They can also serve as internal alarm bells, warning us should treat them the same: we must treat equals
of the possibility of injustice, suffering, and wrongdo- equally. We would think it outrageous for a moral
ing. But they are unreliable guides to moral truth. They rule to say something like “Everyone must refrain
may simply reflect our own emotional needs, preju- from stealing food in grocery stores—except for
dices, upbringing, culture, and self-interests. Careful Mr. X, who may steal all he wants.” Imagine that
reasoning, however, can inform our feelings and help there is no morally relevant reason for making
us decide moral questions on their merits. this exception for stealing food; Mr. X is exempted
merely because, say, he is a celebrity known for
The Universal Perspective outrageous behavior. We not only would object to
Logic requires that moral norms and judgments fol- this rule but might even begin to wonder if it was
low the principle of universalizability—the idea that a genuine moral rule at all, because it lacks impar-
a moral statement (a principle, rule, or judgment) tiality. Similarly, we would reject a moral rule that
8 Á PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS
says something like “Everyone is entitled to basic that conflicted with a moral principle would be
human rights—except Native Americans.” Such suspect, and the latter would have to prevail over
a rule would be a prime example of discrimina- the former. Ultimately the justification for civil dis-
tion based on race. We can see this blatant partial- obedience is that specific laws conflict with moral
ity best if we ask what morally relevant difference norms and are therefore invalid. If we judge a law to
there is between Native Americans and everyone be bad, we usually do so on moral grounds.
else. Differences in income, social status, skin color,
ancestry, and the like are not morally relevant.
RELIGION AND MORALITY
Apparently there are no morally relevant differ-
ences. Because there are none, we must conclude Many people believe that morality and religion are
that the rule sanctions unfair discrimination. inseparable—that religion is the source or basis of
We must keep in mind, however, that some- morality and that moral precepts are simply what
times there are good reasons for treating someone God says should be done. This view is not at all sur-
differently. Imagine a hospital that generally gives prising, because all religions imply or assert a per-
equal care to patients, treating equals equally. But spective on morality. The three great religions in
suppose a patient comes to the hospital in an ambu- the Western tradition—Christianity, Judaism, and
lance because she has had a heart attack and will die Islam—provide their believers with commandments
without immediate care. The hospital staff responds or principles of conduct that are thought to constitute
quickly, giving her faster and more sophisticated the moral law, the essence of morality. For their mil-
care than other patients receive. The situation is lions of adherents, the moral law is the will of God,
a matter of life and death—a good reason for not and the will of God is the moral law. In the West, at
treating everyone the same and for providing the least, the powerful imprint of religion is evident in
heart attack patient with special consideration. This secular laws and in the private morality of believers
instance of discrimination is justified. and unbelievers alike. Secular systems of morality—
for example, those of the ancient Greek philosophers,
The Dominance of Moral Norms Immanuel Kant, the utilitarians, and others—have
Not all norms are moral norms. There are legal of course left their mark on Western ethics. But they
norms (laws, statutes), aesthetic norms (for judging have not moved the millions who think that moral-
artistic creations), prudential norms (practical con- ity is a product exclusively of religion.
siderations of self-interest), and others. Moral norms So what is the relationship between religion and
seem to stand out from all these in an interesting morality? For our purposes, we should break this
way: they dominate. Whenever moral principles question into two parts: (1) What is the relation-
or values conflict in some way with nonmoral prin- ship between religion and ethics (the philosophical
ciples or values, the moral considerations usually study of morality)? and (2) What is the relationship
override the others. Moral considerations seem more between religion and morality (beliefs about right
important, more critical, or more weighty. A princi- and wrong)? The first question asks about how reli-
ple of prudence such as “Never help a stranger” may gion relates to the kind of investigation we conduct
be well justified, but it must yield to any moral prin- in this book—the use of experience and critical
ciple that contradicts it, such as “Help a stranger in reasoning to study morality. The key point about
an emergency if you can do so without endanger- the relationship is that whatever your views on
ing yourself.” An aesthetic norm that somehow religion and morality, an open-minded expedition
involved violating a moral principle would have to into ethics is more useful and empowering than
take a backseat to the moral considerations. A law you may realize, especially now, at the beginning
CHAPTER 1: ETHiCS AND THE ExAMiNED LiFE Á 9
of your journey into moral philosophy. You may Adherents of one religious tradition may disagree
believe, for example, that God determines what is with those from another tradition on whether an
right and wrong, so there is no need to apply critical act is right or wrong. Sincere devotees in a religious
reasoning to morality—you just need to know what tradition may wonder if its moral teachings make
God says. But this judgment—and similar dismiss- sense. In all such cases, intelligent resolution of the
als of ethics—would be premature, as we will see. conflict of moral claims can be achieved only by
applying a neutral standard that helps sort out the
Believers Need Moral Reasoning competing viewpoints. Moral philosophy supplies
It is difficult—perhaps impossible—for most people the neutral standard in the form of critical think-
to avoid using moral reasoning. Religious people ing, well-made arguments, and careful analysis. No
are no exception. One reason is that religious wonder then that many great religious minds—
moral codes (such as the Ten Commandments) Aquinas, Leibniz, Descartes, Kant, Maimonides,
and other major religious rules of conduct are usu- Averroës, and others—have relied on reason to
ally vague, laying out general principles that may examine the nature of morality. In fact, countless
be difficult to apply to specific cases. (Secular moral theists have regarded reason as a gift from God that
codes have the same disadvantage.) For example, enables human beings to grasp the truths of sci-
we may be commanded to love our neighbor, but ence, life, and morality.
what neighbors are included—people of a differ-
ent religion? people who denounce our religion? Moral Philosophy Enables Productive
the gay or lesbian couple? those who steal from us? Discourse
the convicted child molester next door? the drug Any fruitful discussions about morality undertaken
dealers on the corner? the woman who got an abor- between people from different religious traditions
tion? Also, what does loving our neighbor demand or between believers and nonbelievers will require
of us? How does love require us to behave toward a common set of ethical concepts and a shared pro-
the drug dealers, the gay couple, or the person who cedure for deciding issues and making judgments.
denounces our religion? If our terminally ill neigh- Ethics provides these tools. Without them, conver-
bor asks us in the name of love to help him kill sations will resolve nothing, and participants will
himself, what should we do? Does love require us learn little. Without them, people will talk past
to kill him—or to refrain from killing him? And, of each other, appealing only to their own religious
course, commandments can conflict—as when, for views. Furthermore, in a pluralistic society, most
example, the only way to avoid killing an innocent of the public discussions about important moral
person is to tell a lie, or the only way to save the life issues take place in a context of shared values such
of one person is to kill another. All these situations as justice, fairness, equality, and tolerance. Just as
force the believer to interpret religious directives, important, they also occur according to an unwrit-
to try to apply general rules to specific cases, to ten understanding that (1) moral positions should
draw out the implications of particular views—in be explained, (2) claims should be supported by
other words, to do ethics. reasons, and (3) reasoning should be judged by
common rational standards. These skills, of course,
When Conflicts Arise, Ethics Steps In are at the heart of ethics.
Very often moral contradictions or inconsistencies Now consider the second question introduced
confront the religious believer, and only moral rea- above: What is the relationship between religion
soning can help resolve them. Believers sometimes and morality? For many people, the most interest-
disagree with their religious leaders on moral issues. ing query about the relationship between religion
10 Á PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS
How can we hope to grapple with complex moral match for a transplant—a historic combination. As
issues that have emerged only in recent years? Can Lisa Nash said, “I was going to save Molly no matter
religion alone handle the job? Consider the follow- what, and I wanted Molly to have siblings.”*
ing case: Is it right to produce a child to save the life or
According to a report by CNN, Jack and Lisa Nash health of someone else? More to the point, do
made history when they used genetic testing to the scriptures of the three major Western religions
save the life of their six-year-old daughter, Molly, provide any guidance on this question? Do any
by having another child. Molly had a rare genetic of these traditions offer useful methods for pro-
disorder known as Fanconi anemia, which prevents ductively discussing or debating such issues with
the generation of bone marrow and produces a people of different faiths? How might ethics help
fatal leukemia. Molly’s best chance to live was to
with these challenges? Is it possible to formulate a
get a transplant of stem cells from the umbilical
reasonable opinion on this case without doing eth-
cord of a sibling, and Molly’s parents were deter-
ics? Why or why not?
mined to give her that sibling, brother Adam.
Through genetic testing (and in vitro fertilization),
Jack and Lisa were able to select a child who would *“Genetic Selection Gives Girl a Brother and a Second
not only be born without a particular disease (Fan- Chance,” CNN.com, October 3, 2000, http://archives.cnn
coni anemia, in this case) but also would help a sib- .com/2000/HEALTH/10/03/testube.brother/index.html
ling combat the disease by being the optimal tissue (December 8, 2005).
and morality is this: Is God the maker of morality? The Brothers Karamazov (1879–1880), the charac-
That is, is God the author of the moral law? Those ter Ivan Karamazov declares, “If God doesn’t exist,
who answer yes are endorsing a theory of morality everything is permissible.” This very sentiment
known as the divine command theory. It says that was espoused by, among others, the famous atheist
right actions are those that are willed by God, that philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.
God literally defines right and wrong. Something Both religious and secular critics of the divine
is right or good only because God makes it so. In command theory believe that it poses a serious
the simplest version of the theory, God can deter- dilemma, one first articulated by Socrates two and
mine right and wrong because he is omnipotent. a half millennia ago. In the dialogue Euthyphro,
He is all-powerful—powerful enough even to create Socrates asks, Is an action morally right because God
moral norms. In this view, God is a divine lawgiver, wills it to be so, or does God will it to be so because
and his laws constitute morality. it is morally right? Critics say that if an action is
In general, believers are divided on whether the right only because God wills it (that is, if right and
divine command theory gives an accurate account wrong are dependent on God), then many heinous
of the source of morality. Notable among the the- crimes and evil actions would be right if God willed
ory’s detractors are the great theistic philosophers them. If God willed murder, theft, or torture, these
Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) and Thomas Aqui- deeds would be morally right. If God has unlimited
nas (1225–1274). And conversely, as odd as it may power, he could easily will such actions. If the right-
sound, some nonbelievers have subscribed to it. In ness of an action depended on God’s will alone, he
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DANCE ON STILTS AT THE GIRLS’ UNYAGO, NIUCHI
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.