VIRTUE ETHICS

INTRODUCTION
Virtue ethics is a broad term for theories that emphasize the role of
character and virtue in moral philosophy rather than either doing one’s duty or
acting in order to bring about good consequences. A virtue ethicist is likely to give
you this kind of moral advice: “Act as a virtuous person would act in your situation.”
In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East
it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant
approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a
momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-
American philosophy in the late 1950s.
Most virtue ethics theories take their inspiration from Aristotle who declared
that a virtuous person is someone who has ideal character traits. These traits derive
from natural internal tendencies, but need to be nurtured; however, once
established, they will become stable. For example, a virtuous person is someone
who is kind across many situations over a lifetime because that is her character and
not because she wants to maximize utility or gain favors or simply do her duty. This
is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say
that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules.
Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues,
consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have
something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from
consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory.

CHARACTER AND VIRTUE

Modern virtue ethics takes its inspiration from the Aristotelian understanding
of character and virtue. Aristotelian character is, importantly, about a state of
being. It’s about having the appropriate inner states. For example, the virtue of
kindness involves the right sort of emotions and inner states with respect to our
feelings towards others. Character is also about doing. Aristotelian theory is a
theory of action, since having the virtuous inner dispositions will also involve being
moved to act in accordance with them.
It is important to recognize that moral character develops over a long period of
time. People are born with all sorts of natural tendencies. Some of these natural
tendencies will be positive, such as a placid and friendly nature, and some will be
negative, such as an irascible and jealous nature. These natural tendencies can be
encouraged and developed or discouraged and thwarted by the influences one is
exposed to when growing up.
Aristotelian virtue is defined in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics as a
purposive disposition, lying in a mean and being determined by the right reason.
As discussed above, virtue is a settled disposition. It is also a purposive disposition.
A virtuous actor chooses virtuous action knowingly and for its own sake. It is not
enough to act kindly by accident, unthinkingly, or because everyone else is doing
so; you must act kindly because you recognize that this is the right way to behave.
Note here that although habituation is a tool for character development it is not
equivalent to virtue; virtue requires conscious choice and affirmation.

FORMS OF VIRTUE ETHICS

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom
required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate
what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a
whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue
ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue
ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) the ethics of care.

1. Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics

“Eudaimonia” is an Aristotelian term loosely (and inadequately) translated as
happiness. To understand its role in virtue ethics we look to Aristotle’s function
argument. Aristotle recognizes that actions are not pointless because they have an
aim. Every action aims at some good. For example, the doctor’s vaccination of the
baby aims at the baby’s health. Aristotle claims that all the things that are ends in
themselves also contribute to a wider end, an end that is the greatest good of all.
That good is eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is happiness, contentment, and fulfillment;
it’s the name of the best kind of life, which is an end in itself and a means to live
and fare well.
Aristotle then observes that where a thing has a function the good of the thing
is when it performs its function well. For example, the knife has a function, to cut,
and it performs its function well when it cuts well. This argument is applied to man:
man has a function and the good man is the man who performs his function well.
Man’s function is what is peculiar to him and sets him aside from other beings—
reason. Therefore, the function of man is reason and the life that is distinctive of
humans is the life in accordance with reason. If the function of man is reason, then
the good man is the man who reasons well. This is the life of excellence or of
eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the life of virtue—activity in accordance with reason,
man’s highest function. The good life for humans is the life of virtue and therefore
it is in our interest to be virtuous. It is not just that the virtues lead to the good life
(e.g. if you are good, you will be rewarded), but rather a virtuous life is the good
life because the exercise of our rational capacities and virtue is its own reward.

2. Agent-Based and Exemplarist Virtue Ethics

Not all accounts of virtue ethics are eudaimonist. Michael Slote has developed an
account of virtue based on our common-sense intuitions about which character
traits are admirable. Slote makes a distinction between agent-focused and agent-
based theories. Agent-focused theories understand the moral life in terms of what
it is to be a virtuous individual, where the virtues are inner dispositions. Aristotelian
theory is an example of an agent-focused theory. By contrast, agent-based theories
are more radical in that their evaluation of actions is dependent on ethical
judgments about the inner life of the agents who perform those actions. There are
a variety of human traits that we find admirable, such as benevolence, kindness,
compassion, etc. and we can identify these by looking at the people we admire, our
moral exemplars.
 3. Target-Centered Virtue Ethics
The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For
agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-
centered view developed by Christine Swanton, by contrast, begins with our
existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits
are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be
clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do
precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the
motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an
entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students
find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline,
compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits
involve.

4. The Ethics of Care

Finally, the Ethics of Care is another influential version of virtue ethics. Developed
mainly by feminist writers, such as Annette Baier, this account of virtue ethics is
motivated by the thought that men think in masculine terms such as justice and
autonomy, whereas woman think in feminine terms such as caring. These theorists
call for a change in how we view morality and the virtues, shifting towards virtues
exemplified by women, such as taking care of others, patience, the ability to
nurture, self-sacrifice, etc. These virtues have been marginalized because society
has not adequately valued the contributions of women. Writings in this area do not
always explicitly make a connection with virtue ethics. There is much in their
discussions, however, of specific virtues and their relation to social practices and
moral education, etc., which is central to virtue ethics.

OBJECTIONS TO VIRTUE ETHICS

a. Self-Centeredness
Morality is supposed to be about other people. It deals with our actions to
the extent that they affect other people. Moral praise and blame is attributed on
the grounds of an evaluation of our behavior towards others and the ways in that
we exhibit, or fail to exhibit, a concern for the well-being of others. Virtue ethics,
according to this objection, is self-centered because its primary concern is with the
agent’s own character. Virtue ethics seems to be essentially interested in the
acquisition of the virtues as part of the agent’s own well-being and flourishing.
Morality requires us to consider others for their own sake and not because they
may benefit us. There seems to be something wrong with aiming to behave
compassionately, kindly, and honestly merely because this will make oneself
happier.
b. Action-Guiding
Moral philosophy is concerned with practical issues. Fundamentally it is
about how we should act. Virtue ethics has criticized consequentialist and
deontological theories for being too rigid and inflexible because they rely on one
rule or principle. One reply to this is that these theories are action guiding. The
existence of “rigid” rules is a strength, not a weakness because they offer clear
direction on what to do. As long as we know the principles, we can apply them to
practical situations and be guided by them. Virtue ethics, it is objected, with its
emphasis on the imprecise nature of ethics, fails to give us any help with the
practicalities of how we should behave. A theory that fails to be action-guiding is
no good as a moral theory.
c. Moral Luck
Finally, there is a concern that virtue ethics leaves us hostage to luck.
Morality is about responsibility and the appropriateness of praise and blame.
However, we only praise and blame agents for actions taken under conscious
choice. The road to virtue is arduous and many things outside our control can go
wrong. Just as the right education, habits, influences, examples, etc. can promote
the development of virtue, the wrong influencing factors can promote vice. Some
people will be lucky and receive the help and encouragement they need to attain
moral maturity, but others will not. If the development of virtue (and vice) is subject
to luck, is it fair to praise the virtuous (and blame the vicious) for something that
was outside of their control? Further, some accounts of virtue are dependent on
the availability of external goods. Friendship with other virtuous agents is so central
to Aristotelian virtue that a life devoid of virtuous friendship will be lacking in
eudaimonia. However, we have no control over the availability of the right friends.
How can we then praise the virtuous and blame the vicious if their development
and respective virtue and vice were not under their control?

Source:
Rosalind Hursthouse. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Virtue Ethics”.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
Nafsika Athanassoulis. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Virtue Ethics”.
https://iep.utm.edu/virtue/#SH2b