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BEST OF HBR 2001

Some people just can’t make


up their minds. The same goes
for some companies. Leaders
Conquering a Culture
can eradicate indecision by
transforming the tone and
of Indecision
content of everyday
conversations at their by Ram Charan
organizations. •

With compliments of...

Reprint R0601J
Some people just can’t make up their minds. The same goes for some
companies. Leaders can eradicate indecision by transforming the tone
and content of everyday conversations at their organizations.

B E S T O F H B R 20 0 1

Conquering a Culture
of Indecision
by Ram Charan

The job of the CEO, everyone knows, is to make Underperformance, however, is not.
decisions. And most of them do—countless times
in the course of their tenures. But if those deci- Does this sound familiar? You’re sitting in the
COPYRIGHT © 2005 HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL PUBLISHING CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

sions are to have an impact, the organization quarterly business review as a colleague plows
must also, as a whole, decide to carry them out. through a two-inch-thick proposal for a big in-
Companies that don’t, suffer from a culture of in- vestment in a new product. When he finishes,
decision. the room falls quiet. People look left, right, or
In his 2001 article, Ram Charan, one of the down, waiting for someone else to open the
world’s preeminent counselors to CEOs, ad- discussion. No one wants to comment—at
dresses the problem of how organizations that least not until the boss shows which way he’s
routinely refrain from acting on their CEOs’ deci- leaning.
sions can break free from institutionalized inde- Finally, the CEO breaks the loud silence. He
cision. Usually, ambivalence or outright resis- asks a few mildly skeptical questions to show
tance arises because of a lack of dialogue with the he’s done his due diligence. But it’s clear that
people charged with implementing the decision he has made up his mind to back the project.
in question. Charan calls such conversations “de- Before long, the other meeting attendees are
cisive dialogues,” and he says they have four com- chiming in dutifully, careful to keep their com-
ponents: First, they must involve a sincere search ments positive. Judging from the remarks, it
for answers. Second, they must tolerate unpleas- appears that everyone in the room supports
ant truths. Third, they must invite a full range of the project.
views, spontaneously offered. And fourth, they But appearances can be deceiving. The head
must point the way to a course of action. of a related division worries that the new prod-
In organizations that have successfully shed a uct will take resources away from his opera-
culture of indecision, discussion is always safe. tion. The vice president of manufacturing

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

thinks that the first-year sales forecasts are tage. It is the single-most important factor un-
wildly optimistic and will leave him with a derlying the productivity and growth of the
warehouse full of unsold goods. Others in the knowledge worker. Indeed, the tone and con-
room are lukewarm because they don’t see tent of dialogue shapes people’s behaviors and
how they stand to gain from the project. But beliefs—that is, the corporate culture—faster
they keep their reservations to themselves, and and more permanently than any reward sys-
the meeting breaks up inconclusively. Over the tem, structural change, or vision statement I’ve
next few months, the project is slowly stran- seen.
gled to death in a series of strategy, budget, Breaking a culture of indecision requires a
and operational reviews. It’s not clear who’s re- leader who can engender intellectual honesty
sponsible for the killing, but it’s plain that the and trust in the connections between people.
true sentiment in the room was the opposite of By using each encounter with his or her em-
the apparent consensus. ployees as an opportunity to model open, hon-
In my career as an adviser to large organiza- est, and decisive dialogue, the leader sets the
tions and their leaders, I have witnessed many tone for the entire organization.
occasions even at the highest levels when si- But setting the tone is only the first step. To
lent lies and a lack of closure lead to false de- transform a culture of indecision, leaders must
cisions. They are “false” because they eventu- also see to it that the organization’s social oper-
ally get undone by unspoken factors and ating mechanisms—that is, the executive com-
inaction. And after a quarter century of first- mittee meetings, budget and strategy reviews,
hand observations, I have concluded that and other situations through which the people
these instances of indecision share a family re- of a corporation do business—have honest dia-
semblance—a misfire in the personal interac- logue at their center. These mechanisms set
tions that are supposed to produce results. the stage. Tightly linked and consistently prac-
The people charged with reaching a decision ticed, they establish clear lines of accountabil-
and acting on it fail to connect and engage ity for reaching decisions and executing them.
with one another. Intimidated by the group Follow-through and feedback are the final
dynamics of hierarchy and constrained by for- steps in creating a decisive culture. Successful
mality and lack of trust, they speak their lines leaders use follow-through and honest feed-
woodenly and without conviction. Lacking back to reward high achievers, coach those
emotional commitment, the people who must who are struggling, and redirect the behaviors
carry out the plan don’t act decisively. of those blocking the organization’s progress.
These faulty interactions rarely occur in iso- In sum, leaders can create a culture of deci-
lation. Far more often, they’re typical of the sive behavior through attention to their own
way large and small decisions are made—or dialogue, the careful design of social operating
not made—throughout a company. The inabil- mechanisms, and appropriate follow-through
ity to take decisive action is rooted in the cor- and feedback.
porate culture and seems to employees to be
impervious to change. It All Begins with Dialogue
The key word here is “seems,” because, in Studies of successful companies often focus on
fact, leaders create a culture of indecisiveness, their products, business models, or operational
and leaders can break it. The primary instru- strengths: Microsoft’s world-conquering Win-
ment at their disposal is the human interac- dows operating system, Dell’s mass customiza-
tions—the dialogues—through which assump- tion, Wal-Mart’s logistical prowess. Yet prod-
Formerly on the faculties of Harvard tions are challenged or go unchallenged, ucts and operational strengths aren’t what
Business School and Northwestern’s information is shared or not shared, disagree- really set the most successful organizations
Kellogg School, Ram Charan has ad- ments are brought to the surface or papered apart—they can all be rented or imitated. What
vised top executives at companies like over. Dialogue is the basic unit of work in an can’t be easily duplicated are the decisive dia-
GE, Ford, DuPont, EDS, and Pharmacia. organization. The quality of the dialogue de- logues and robust operating mechanisms and
He is the author of numerous articles termines how people gather and process infor- their links to feedback and follow-through.
and books, including What the CEO mation, how they make decisions, and how These factors constitute an organization’s most
Wants You to Know: How Your Com- they feel about one another and about the out- enduring competitive advantage, and they are
pany Really Works (Crown Business, come of these decisions. Dialogue can lead to heavily dependent on the character of dialogue
2001). new ideas and speed as a competitive advan- that a leader exhibits and thereby influences

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

throughout the organization. angrily or unkindly, he told the unit manager


Decisive dialogue is easier to recognize than that he would need more than bravado to
to define. It encourages incisiveness and cre- take on a formidable German competitor on
ativity and brings coherence to seemingly frag- its home turf. Instead of making a frontal as-
mented and unrelated ideas. It allows tensions sault, the CEO suggested, why not look for
to surface and then resolves them by fully air- the competition’s weak spots and win on
ing every relevant viewpoint. Because such dia- speed of execution? Where are the gaps in
logue is a process of intellectual inquiry rather your competitor’s product line? Can you inno-
than of advocacy, a search for truth rather than vate something that can fill those gaps? What
a contest, people feel emotionally committed customers are the most likely buyers of such a
to the outcome. The outcome seems “right” be- product? Why not zero in on them? Instead of
cause people have helped shape it. They are aiming for overall market-share gains, try re-
energized and ready to act. segmenting the market. Suddenly, what had
Not long ago, I observed the power of a appeared to be a dead end opened into new
leader’s dialogue to shape a company’s cul- insights, and by the end of the meeting, it was
ture. The setting was the headquarters of a decided that the manager would rethink the
major U.S. multinational. The head of one of strategy and return in 90 days with a more re-
the company’s largest business units was mak- alistic alternative. A key player whose strategy
ing a strategy presentation to the CEO and a proposal had been flatly rejected left the
few of his senior lieutenants. Sounding confi- room feeling energized, challenged, and more
dent, almost cocky, the unit head laid out his sharply focused on the task at hand.
strategy for taking his division from number Think about what happened here. Although
three in Europe to number one. It was an am- it might not have been obvious at first, the
bitious plan that hinged on making rapid, CEO was not trying to assert his authority or
sizable market-share gains in Germany, where diminish the executive. He simply wanted to
the company’s main competitor was locally ensure that the competitive realities were not
based and four times his division’s size. The glossed over and to coach those in attendance
CEO commended his unit head for the inspir- on both business acumen and organizational
ing and visionary presentation, then initiated capability as well as on the fine art of asking
a dialogue to test whether the plan was realis- the right questions. He was challenging the
tic. “Just how are you going to make these proposed strategy not for personal reasons but
gains?” he wondered aloud. “What other al- for business reasons.
ternatives have you considered? What cus- The dialogue affected people’s attitudes and
tomers do you plan to acquire?” The unit behavior in subtle and not so subtle ways: They
manager hadn’t thought that far ahead. “How walked away knowing that they should look
have you defined the customers’ needs in new for opportunities in unconventional ways and
and unique ways? How many salespeople do be prepared to answer the inevitable tough
you have?” the CEO asked. questions. They also knew that the CEO was on
“Ten,” answered the unit head. their side. They became more convinced that
“How many does your main competitor growth was possible and that action was neces-
have?” sary. And something else happened: They
“Two hundred,” came the sheepish reply. began to adopt the CEO’s tone in subsequent
The boss continued to press: “Who runs Ger- meetings. When, for example, the head of the
many for us? Wasn’t he in another division up German unit met with his senior staff to brief
until about three months ago?” them on the new approach to the German
Had the exchange stopped there, the CEO market, the questions he fired at his sales chief
would have only humiliated and discouraged and product development head were pointed,
this unit head and sent a message to others in precise, and aimed directly at putting the new
attendance that the risks of thinking big were strategy into action. He had picked up on his
unacceptably high. But the CEO wasn’t inter- boss’s style of relating to others as well as his
ested in killing the strategy and demoralizing way of eliciting, sifting, and analyzing informa-
the business unit team. Coaching through tion. The entire unit grew more determined
questioning, he wanted to inject some realism and energized.
into the dialogue. Speaking bluntly, but not The chief executive didn’t leave the matter

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

there, though. He followed up with a one- people express their real opinions, not what
page, handwritten letter to the unit head stat- they think team players are supposed to say.
ing the essence of the dialogue and the actions Candor helps wipe out the silent lies and
to be executed. And in 90 days, they met again pocket vetoes that occur when people agree to
to discuss the revised strategy. (For more on things they have no intention of acting on. It
fostering decisive dialogue, see the sidebar “Di- prevents the kind of unnecessary rework and
alogue Killers.”) revisiting of decisions that saps productivity.
Formality suppresses candor; informality en-
How Dialogue Becomes Action courages it. When presentations and com-
The setting in which dialogue occurs is as im- ments are stiff and prepackaged, they signal
portant as the dialogue itself. The social oper- that the whole meeting has been carefully
ating mechanisms of decisive corporate cul- scripted and orchestrated. Informality has the
tures feature behaviors marked by four opposite effect. It reduces defensiveness. Peo-
characteristics: openness, candor, informality, ple feel more comfortable asking questions
and closure. Openness means that the out- and reacting honestly, and the spontaneity is
come is not predetermined. There’s an honest energizing.
search for alternatives and new discoveries. If informality loosens the atmosphere, clo-
Questions like “What are we missing?” draw sure imposes discipline. Closure means that at
people in and signal the leader’s willingness to the end of the meeting, people know exactly
hear all sides. Leaders create an atmosphere of what they are expected to do. Closure produces
safety that permits spirited discussion, group decisiveness by assigning accountability and
learning, and trust. deadlines to people in an open forum. It tests a
Candor is slightly different. It’s a willingness leader’s inner strength and intellectual re-
to speak the unspeakable, to expose unfulfilled sources. Lack of closure, coupled with a lack of
commitments, to air the conflicts that under- sanctions, is the primary reason for a culture of
mine apparent consensus. Candor means that indecision.

Dialogue Killers
Is the dialogue in your meetings an energy drain? If it doesn’t energize people and focus their work, watch for the following:

Dangling Dialogue Remedy: Ensure that the right people are in Free-for-All
Symptom: Confusion prevails. The meeting attendance in the first place. When missing Symptom: By failing to direct the flow of the
ends without a clear next step. People create information is discovered, disseminate it im- discussion, the leader allows negative behav-
their own self-serving interpretations of the mediately. Make the expectation for open- iors to flourish. “Extortionists” hold the whole
meeting, and no one can be held accountable ness and candor explicit by asking, “What’s group for ransom until others see it their
later when goals aren’t met. missing?” Use coaching and sanctions to cor- way; “sidetrackers” go off on tangents, re-
rect information hoarding. count history by saying “When I did this ten
Remedy: Give the meeting closure by ensur-
ing that everyone knows who will do what, by years ago…,” or delve into unnecessary de-
Piecemeal Perspectives
when. Do it in writing if necessary, and be tail; “silent liars” do not express their true
Symptom: People stick to narrow views and opinions, or they agree to things they have no
specific.
self-interests and fail to acknowledge that intention of doing; and “dividers” create
Information Clogs others have valid interests. breaches within the group by seeking sup-
Symptom: Failure to get all the relevant infor- Remedy: Draw people out until you’re sure all port for their viewpoint outside the social op-
mation into the open. An important fact or sides of the issue have been represented. Re- erating mechanism or have parallel discus-
opinion comes to light after a decision has state the common purpose repeatedly to sions during the meeting.
been reached, which reopens the decision. keep everyone focused on the big picture. Remedy: The leader must exercise inner
This pattern happens repeatedly. Generate alternatives. Use coaching to show strength by repeatedly signaling which be-
people how their work contributes to the haviors are acceptable and by sanctioning
overall mission of the enterprise. those who persist in negative behavior. If less
severe sanctions fail, the leader must be will-
ing to remove the offending player from the
group.

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

A robust social operating mechanism consis- ing with one another to win business. There
tently includes these four characteristics. Such were few sanctions for “lone” behaviors and
a mechanism has the right people participat- for failure to meet performance goals. And in-
ing in it, and it occurs with the right frequency. decision was rife. As one company veteran
When Dick Brown arrived at Electronic puts it, “Meetings, meetings, and more meet-
Data Systems (EDS) in early 1999, he resolved ings. People couldn’t make decisions,
to create a culture that did more than pay lip wouldn’t make decisions. They didn’t have to.
service to the ideals of collaboration, open- No accountability.” EDS was losing business.
ness, and decisiveness. He had a big job ahead Revenue was flat, earnings were on the de-
of him. EDS was known for its bright, aggres- cline, and the price of the company’s stock
sive people, but employees had a reputation was down sharply.
for competing against one another at least as A central tenet of Brown’s management
often as they pulled together. The organiza- philosophy is that “leaders get the behavior
tion was marked by a culture of lone heroes. they tolerate.” Shortly after he arrived at EDS,
Individual operating units had little or no in- he installed six social operating mechanisms
centive for sharing information or cooperat- within one year that signaled he would not

GE’s Secret Weapon


Known for its state-of-the-art management companywide e-commerce effort. These ses- must incorporate the companywide themes
practices, General Electric has forged a sys- sions aren’t for the fainthearted—at times, and initiatives that emerged from the CEC
tem of ten tightly linked social operating the debates can resemble verbal combat. But meetings, is subjected to intensive scrutiny
mechanisms. Vital to GE’s success, these by the time the CEC breaks up, everyone in and reality testing by Welch and the senior
mechanisms set goals and priorities for the attendance knows both what the corporate staff. The dialogue in the sessions is informal,
whole company as well as for its individual priorities are and what’s expected of him or open, decisive, and full of valuable coaching
business units and track each unit’s progress her. from Welch on both business and human re-
toward those goals. CEO Jack Welch also uses At Session C meetings, Welch and GE’s se- sources issues. As in Session C, the dialogue
the system to evaluate senior managers nior vice president for human resources, Bill about strategy links with people and organi-
within each unit and reward or sanction Conaty, meet with the head of each business zational issues. Again, Welch follows up with
them according to their performance. unit as well as his or her top HR executive to a handwritten note in which he sets out what
Three of the most widely imitated of these discuss leadership and organizational issues. he expects of the unit head as a result of the
mechanisms are the Corporate Executive In these intense 12- to 14-hour sessions, the at- dialogue.
Council (CEC), which meets four times a tendees review the unit’s prospective talent S-2 meetings, normally held in November,
year; the annual leadership and organiza- pool and its organizational priorities. Who follow a similar agenda to the S-1 meeting, ex-
tional reviews, known as Session C; and the needs to be promoted, rewarded, and devel- cept that they are focused on a shorter time
annual strategy reviews, known as S-1 and oped? How? Who isn’t making the grade? horizon, usually 12 to 15 months. Here, opera-
S-2. Most large organizations have similar Candor is mandatory, and so is execution. tional priorities and resource allocations are
mechanisms. GE’s, however, are notable for The dialogue goes back and forth and links linked.
their intensity and duration; tight links to with the strategy of the business unit. Welch Taken together, the meetings link feedback,
one another; follow-through; and uninhibited follows up each session with a handwritten decision making, and assessment of the orga-
candor, closure, and decisiveness. note reviewing the substance of the dialogue nization’s capabilities and key people. The
At the CEC, the company’s senior leaders and action items. Through this mechanism, mechanism explicitly ties the goals and perfor-
gather for two-and-a-half days of intensive picking and evaluating people has become a mance of each unit to the overall strategy of
collaboration and information exchange. As core competence at GE. No wonder GE is the corporation and places a premium on the
these leaders share best practices, assess the known as “CEO University.” development of the next generation of leaders.
external business environment, and identify The unit head’s progress in implementing The process is unrelenting in its demand for
the company’s most promising opportunities that action plan is among the items on the managerial accountability. At the same time,
and most pressing problems, Welch has a agenda at the S-1 meeting, held about two Welch takes the opportunity to engage in fol-
chance to coach managers and observe their months after Session C. Welch, his chief fi- low-through and feedback that is candid, on
styles of working, thinking, and collaborating. nancial officer, and members of the office of point, and focused on decisiveness and execu-
Among the ten initiatives to emerge from the CEO meet individually with each unit tion. This operating system may be GE’s most
these meetings in the past 14 years are GE’s head and his or her team to discuss strategy enduring competitive advantage.
Six Sigma quality-improvement drive and its for the next three years. The strategy, which

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

put up with the old culture of rampant indi- EDS and its shareholders. It sounds simple,
vidualism and information hoarding. One even obvious. But in an organization once
mechanism was the “performance call,” as it is characterized by lone heroes and self-interest,
known around the company. Once a month, highly visible exercises in conflict resolution re-
the top 100 or so EDS executives worldwide mind people to align their interests with the
take part in a conference call where the past company as a whole. It’s not enough to state
month’s numbers and critical activities are re- the message once and assume it will sink in.
viewed in detail. Transparency and simulta- Behavior is changed through repetition. Stress-
neous information are the rules; information ing the message over and over in social operat-
hoarding is no longer possible. Everyone ing mechanisms like the monthly performance
knows who is on target for the year, who is calls—and rewarding or sanctioning people
ahead of projections, and who is behind. based on their adherence to it—is one of
Those who are behind must explain the short- Brown’s most powerful tools for producing the
fall—and how they plan to get back on track. behavioral changes that usher in genuine cul-
It’s not enough for a manager to say she’s as- tural change.
sessing, reviewing, or analyzing a problem. Of course, no leader can or should attend
Those aren’t the words of someone who is act- every meeting, resolve every conflict, or make
ing, Brown says. Those are the words of some- every decision. But by designing social operat-
one getting ready to act. To use them in front ing mechanisms that promote free-flowing yet
of Brown is to invite two questions in re- productive dialogue, leaders strongly influence
sponse: When you’ve finished your analysis, how others perform these tasks. Indeed, it is
what are you going to do? And how soon are through these mechanisms that the work of
you going to do it? The only way that Brown’s shaping a decisive culture gets done.
It’s not enough for a people can answer those questions satisfacto- Another corporation that employs social op-
rily is to make a decision and execute it. erating mechanisms to create a decisive cul-
manager to say she’s The performance calls are also a mecha- ture is multinational pharmaceutical giant
nism for airing and resolving the conflicts in- Pharmacia. The company’s approach illus-
assessing, reviewing, or evitable in a large organization, particularly trates a point I stress repeatedly to my clients:
analyzing a problem. when it comes to cross selling in order to ac- Structure divides; social operating mechanisms
celerate revenue growth. Two units may be integrate. I hasten to add that structure is es-
Those aren’t the words of pursuing the same customer, for example, or sential. If an organization didn’t divide tasks,
someone who is acting. a customer serviced by one unit may be ac- functions, and responsibilities, it would never
quired by a customer serviced by another. get anything done. But social operating mech-
Which unit should lead the pursuit? Which anisms are required to direct the various activi-
unit should service the merged entity? It’s vi- ties contained within a structure toward an ob-
tally important to resolve these questions. jective. Well-designed mechanisms perform
Letting them fester doesn’t just drain emo- this integrating function. But no matter how
tional energy, it shrinks the organization’s ca- well designed, the mechanisms also need deci-
pacity to act decisively. Lack of speed be- sive dialogue to work properly.
comes a competitive disadvantage. Two years after its 1995 merger with Up-
Brown encourages people to bring these john, Pharmacia’s CEO Fred Hassan set out to
conflicts to the surface, both because he views create an entirely new culture for the com-
them as a sign of organizational health and be- bined entity. The organization he envisioned
cause they provide an opportunity to demon- would be collaborative, customer focused,
strate the style of dialogue he advocates. He and speedy. It would meld the disparate tal-
tries to create a safe environment for disagree- ents of a global enterprise to develop market-
ment by reminding employees that the conflict leading drugs—and do so faster than the com-
isn’t personal. petition. The primary mechanism for foster-
Conflict in any global organization is built ing collaboration: Leaders from several units
in. And, Brown believes, it’s essential if every- and functions would engage in frequent, con-
one is going to think in terms of the entire or- structive dialogue.
ganization, not just one little corner of it. In- The company’s race to develop a new gener-
stead of seeking the solution favorable to their ation of antibiotics to treat drug-resistant infec-
unit, they’ll look for the solution that’s best for tions afforded Pharmacia’s management an

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

opportunity to test the success of its culture- cused on a common task. They shared what
building efforts. Dr. Göran Ando, the chief of they knew about developing and marketing
research and development, and Carrie Cox, the pharmaceuticals and demonstrated how sci-
head of global business management, jointly entists could learn to think a little like mar-
created a social operating mechanism compris- keters, and marketers a little like scientists.
ing some of the company’s leading scientists, They tackled the emotional challenge of re-
clinicians, and marketers. Just getting the three solving conflicts in the open in order to dem-
functions together regularly was a bold step. onstrate how to disagree, sometimes strongly,
Typically, drug development proceeds by a se- without animosity and without losing sight of
ries of handoffs. One group of scientists does their common purpose.
the basic work of drug discovery, then hands Indeed, consider how one dialogue helped
off its results to a second group, which steers the group make a decision that turned a
the drug through a year or more of clinical tri- promising drug into a success story. To sim-
als. If and when it receives the Food and Drug plify the research and testing process, the
Administration’s stamp of approval, it’s handed group’s scientists had begun to search for an
off to the marketing people, who devise a mar- antibiotic that would be effective against a
keting plan. Only then is the drug handed off limited number of infections and would be
to the sales department, which pitches it to used only as “salvage therapy” in acute cases,
doctors and hospitals. By supplanting this when conventional antibiotic therapies had
daisy-chain approach with one that made sci- failed. But intensive dialogue with the mar-
entists, clinicians, and marketers jointly re- keters yielded the information that doctors
sponsible for the entire flow of development were receptive to a drug that would work
and marketing, the two leaders aimed to de- against a wide spectrum of infections. They
Few mechanisms velop a drug that better met the needs of pa- wanted a drug that could treat acute infec-
tients, had higher revenue potential, and tions completely by starting treatment earlier
encourage directness gained speed as a competitive advantage. And in the course of the disease, either in large
they wanted to create a template for future doses through an intravenous drip or in
more effectively than collaborative efforts. smaller doses with a pill. The scientists shifted
performance and The company’s reward system reinforced their focus, and the result was Zyvox, one of
this collaborative model by explicitly linking the major pharmaceutical success stories of
compensation reviews. compensation to the actions of the group. recent years. It has become the poster drug in
Every member’s compensation would be based Pharmacia’s campaign for a culture character-
on the time to bring the drug to market, the ized by cross-functional collaboration and
time for the drug to reach peak profitable speedy execution. Through dialogue, the
share, and total sales. The system gave group group created a product that neither the sci-
members a strong incentive to talk openly entists, clinicians, nor marketers acting by
with one another and to share information themselves could have envisioned or exe-
freely. But the creative spark was missing. The cuted. And the mechanism that created this
first few times the drug development group open dialogue is now standard practice at
met, it focused almost exclusively on their dif- Pharmacia.
ferences, which were considerable. Without
trafficking in clichés, it is safe to say that scien- Follow-Through and Feedback
tists, clinicians, and marketers tend to have dif- Follow-through is in the DNA of decisive cul-
ferent ways of speaking, thinking, and relating. tures and takes place either in person, on the
And each tended to defend what it viewed as telephone, or in the routine conduct of a so-
its interests rather than the interests of share- cial operating mechanism. Lack of follow-
holders and customers. It was at this point that through destroys the discipline of execution
Ando and Cox took charge of the dialogue, re- and encourages indecision.
minding the group that it was important to A culture of indecision changes when groups
play well with others but even more important of people are compelled to always be direct.
to produce a drug that met patients’ needs and And few mechanisms encourage directness
to beat the competition. more effectively than performance and com-
Acting together, the two leaders channeled pensation reviews, especially if they are explic-
conversation into productive dialogue fo- itly linked to social operating mechanisms. Yet

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

all too often, the performance review process ate superior had given him a less-than-honest
is as ritualized and empty as the business meet- review the year before rather than tackle the
ing I described at the beginning of this article. unpleasant task of telling him where he was
Both the employee and his manager want to coming up short. Brown understands why a
get the thing over with as quickly as possible. manager might be tempted to duck such a
Check the appropriate box, keep up the good painful conversation. Delivering negative feed-
work, here’s your raise, and let’s be sure to do back tests the strength of a leader. But critical
this again next year. Sorry—gotta run. There’s feedback is part of what Brown calls “the heavy
no genuine conversation, no feedback, and lifting of leadership.” Avoiding it, he says, “sen-
worst of all, no chance for the employee to tences the organization to mediocrity.” What’s
learn the sometimes painful truths that will more, by failing to provide honest feedback,
help her grow and develop. Great compensa- leaders cheat their people by depriving them
tion systems die for lack of candid dialogue of the information they need to improve.
and leaders’ emotional fortitude. Feedback should be many things—candid;
At EDS, Dick Brown has devised an evalua- constructive; relentlessly focused on behavioral
tion and review process that virtually forces performance, accountability, and execution.
managers to engage in candid dialogue with One thing it shouldn’t be is surprising. “A leader
their subordinates. Everyone at the company is should be constructing his appraisal all year
ranked in quintiles and rewarded according to long,” Brown says, “and giving his appraisal all
how well they perform compared with their year long. You have 20, 30, 60 opportunities a
peers. It has proved to be one of the most con- year to share your observations. Don’t let those
troversial features of Dick Brown’s leader- opportunities pass. If, at the end of the year,
ship—some employees view it as a Darwinian someone is truly surprised by what you have to
By failing to provide means of dividing winners from losers and pit- say, that’s a failure of leadership.”
ting colleagues against one another. •••
honest feedback, leaders That isn’t the objective of the ranking sys- Ultimately, changing a culture of indecision is
tem, Brown insists. He views the ranking pro- a matter of leadership. It’s a matter of asking
cheat their people by cess as the most effective way to reward the hard questions: How robust and effective are
depriving them of the company’s best performers and show laggards our social operating mechanisms? How well
where they need to improve. But the system are they linked? Do they have the right people
information they need to needs the right sort of dialogue to make it and the right frequency? Do they have a
improve. work as intended and serve its purpose of rhythm and operate consistently? Is follow-
growing the talent pool. Leaders must give through built in? Are rewards and sanctions
honest feedback to their direct reports, espe- linked to the outcomes of the decisive dia-
cially to those who find themselves at the bot- logue? Most important, how productive is the
tom of the rankings. dialogue within these mechanisms? Is our dia-
Brown recalls one encounter he had shortly logue marked by openness, candor, informal-
after the first set of rankings was issued. An ity, and closure?
employee who had considered himself one of Transforming a culture of indecision is an
EDS’s best performers was shocked to find enormous and demanding task. It takes all the
himself closer to the bottom of the roster than listening skills, business acumen, and opera-
the top. “How could this be?” the employee tional experience that a corporate leader can
asked. “I performed as well this year as I did summon. But just as important, the job de-
last year, and last year my boss gave me a stel- mands emotional fortitude, follow-through,
lar review.” Brown replied that he could think and inner strength. Asking the right questions;
of two possible explanations. The first was that identifying and resolving conflicts; providing
the employee wasn’t as good at his job as he candid, constructive feedback; and differentiat-
thought he was. The second possibility was ing people with sanctions and rewards is never
that even if the employee was doing as good a easy. Frequently, it’s downright unpleasant. No
job as he did the previous year, his peers were wonder many senior executives avoid the task.
doing better. “If you’re staying the same,” In the short term, they spare themselves con-
Brown concluded, “you’re falling behind.” siderable emotional wear and tear. But their
That exchange revealed the possibility—the evasion sets the tone for an organization that
likelihood, even—that the employee’s immedi- can’t share intelligence, make decisions, or face

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Conquering a Culture of Indecision •• •B EST OF HBR 2001

conflicts, much less resolve them. Those who empowered, and engaged.
evade miss the very point of effective leader-
ship. Leaders with the strength to insist on Reprint R0601J
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