Domicile

1) Sybil was born in Malaysia in 1971. Her father had an English domicile and
her mother had a Vietnamese domicile. They happily lived in Mont Kiara for
ten years together. Soon after things turned sour and Sybil’s father divorced
her mother and left for London. Her devastated mother leaves to Vietnam but
doesn’t take Sybil together with her, Sybil is left with her Aunty and Uncle in
Kuala Lumpur. Two years later Sybil’s father was caught in a terrible blizzard
in Central London, where the London Cab he was in overturned and he died
on the spot.

When she was 17 years old, Sybil joined Missy College to study nursing.
During an internship at the hospital she met a young medical student, Dev, a
Malaysian. They started dating and eventually things took a turn for the better
and they got married. Two years after the marriage, Sybil was sent on a
mission to Somalia with Doctors Without Borders which she worked with. She
saw that her help was much more needed in Somalia so she decided to
continue to stay there and help open a Women and Children’s Clinic. Dev, on
the other hand stayed on in Malaysia where he tirelessly slogged at work as a
cardiothoracic surgeon. Sybil loved her life in Somalia so much that she
bought a house there, was actively engaged with the community and
expanded her network of clinics deep into the rural areas. Sybil however
missed her mother in Vietnam very much and she made plans to have her
mother regularly visit her in Somalia. Three years later during a particularly
lengthy 10 hour heart surgery Dev suffered a heart attack himself and died.

Trace Sybil’s domicile.

Sybil’s domicile of origin was English, as it was held in Udny v Udny that a
legitimate child takes on the domicile of their father.

However, Sybil father had acquire dom of choice in Malaysia. In Udny case it
was stated that domicile of choice is a conclusion or an inference which the
law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief residence
in a particular place with an intention of continuing to reside there for an
unlimited time. It must be a residence not for a limited period or particular
purpose but general and indefinite in his future contemplation. This indicates
two factors which need to be proven for someone to acquire a domicile of
choice, namely residence and intention. Residence is defined in IRC v
Duchess of Portland as physical presence in that country as an inhabitant of
it’. Sybil’s father resided happily in Malaysia for at least ten years, fulfilling this
condition. As for intention to reside indefinitely, it can be deduced from the
fact that he settled down and even had a child in Malaysia. He only left after
the divorce. Thus, we can conclude that before the divorce, he had acquired a
domicile of choice in Malaysia. Sybil would similarly acquire a domicile of
dependence in Malaysia, as the domicile of a legitimate child automatically
changes with any change that occurs in the domicile of the father,
propounded in the case of D’Etchegoyen v Détchegoyen.
After the divorce, Sybil’s father effectively revoked his domicile of choice in
Malaysia by moving back to England, as held in Udny v Udny, a person
abandons a domicile of choice in a country by ceasing to reside there and by
ceasing to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely and not
otherwise.

Thus, Sybil’s domicile would revert back to England. In Potinger v Whitman

*General rule*, it was established that a child acquires on the death of the
father, the domicile of the mother. However in Re Beaumont¸ it was held that
the change in the domicile of a minor should be the result of the exercise of a
power vested in its mother for the welfare of the minor, which, she may
abstain from exercising, even when she changes her own domicile. As Sybil’s
mother left Sybil in Malaysia, it can be argued that she abstained from taking
an action to change Sybil’s domicile to hers. Hence, Sybil would retain her
domicile of origin in England. Sybil acquires the domicile of her mother in
Vietnam.

Upon her marriage to Dev, who is domiciled in Malaysia, Sybil also acquired a
domicile of dependence in Malaysia, as seen in Charnley v Charnley, a
married woman acquires the domicile of her husband while the marriage
subsists, even if they are living apart. When Sybil moved to Somalia, this did
not change her domicile as it still remained in Malaysia, following her
Malaysian husband’s domicile.

However, upon Dev’s death, Sybil could acquire a domicile of choice in

Somalia if she had done all that was necessary to acquire it. This is the
principle in the case of Re Scullard Estate. Sybil moved to Somalia where she
resided for at least five years. In Joseph Wong Phui Lun v Yeoh Loon Goit,
the court decided in favour of the plaintiff acquiring a domicile of choice in
Singapore after considering, inter alia, that that was the place of his
employment, where he bought his house and his social life. Similarly, Sybil’s
intention to reside in Somalia indefinitely can be seen from the fact that she
bought a house there, opened her own clinic, expanded the network of clinics,
engaged herself actively with the community, and even made plans for her
mother in Vietnam to visit her regularly in Somalia.

Sybil has shown adequate intention to reside indefinitely in Somalia and has
indeed resided there for five years. In conclusion, her domicile now is a
domicile of choice in Somalia

Issue divorce

-Father domicile
2) Mat has a Malaysian domicile. He went to Qatar on a transfer there to
become an engineer at a sprawling construction company, Wielding Builders
in the capital city of Doha. There he met Zalfaa a particularly attractive Qatari
lady. As you would have guessed it, Mat fell for her and due to Mat’s
successful background, Zalfaa finally agreed to marry him. They lived in Doha
and were blessed with four very cute (due to the mixed parentage) and
precocious children.

Mat continued to climb the ladder in his career, became head engineer at his
company, joined many social clubs including flying clubs, learnt to mingle with
the locals effortlessly due to his fluent Arabic and sent his children to local
schools. The only thing that made Mat unhappy was that he could not stand
the taste of Arabic coffee which they drank after every meal, it drove him nuts.
He always said that once he was rich enough to buy a jet plane he would
return home.

What is Mat’s domicile?

Mat doo is Malaysia. The issue is whether Mat has acquired a domicile of
choice in Qatar.

In Udny v Udny, it was stated that domicile of choice is a conclusion or an

inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his
sole or chief residence in a particular place with an intention of continuing to
reside there for an unlimited time. It must be a residence not for a limited
period or particular purpose but general and indefinite in his future
contemplation. This indicates two factors which need to be proven for
someone to acquire a domicile of choice, namely residence and intention.
Residence is defined in IRC v Duchess of Portland as ‘physical presence in
that country as an inhabitant of it’. As Mat is living in Qatar, he fulfills the
criteria of residence.

As for intention, in Joseph Wong Phui Lun v Yeoh Loon Goit, the court
decided in favour of the plaintiff acquiring a domicile of choice in Singapore
after considering, inter alia, that that was the place of his employment,
matrimonial home and his social life. Similarly, Mat had learnt Arabic,
engaged himself with the local community and participated in numberous
Qatari social clubs, as well as had his matrimonial home and place of
employment there. Thus, Mat fulfills all the elements for him to acquire a
domicile of choice in Qatar.

However, the facts display a possible contingency to Mat’s residence in Qatar.

The two rules of a contingency are that it must be clear and possible and
reflected in the person’s life.

In the case of Re Furse, the deceased was originally an American who moved
to England. He owned a farm in England and often said "I will continue to live
 in my farm as long as I have an active physical life", as he liked taking walks.
His children went to the local schools and one of his children even joined the
military. The issue was whether the contingency factor invalidated his domicile
of choice of England. Based on the facts, the court believed that he would
never leave England and was unlikely to do so. Hence, he had an English
domicile.

In our present case, Mat’s condition is that ‘he would return home once he
became rich enough to buy a jet plane’. This is indeed clear and possible. The
fact that he was steadily climbing the ladder in his career indicates that he
was working towards the goal of earning more money. However, it cannot be
said that it is reflected in his life, as he is heavily involved with the local
community and even sent his children to local schools. Therefore, this would
not affect his domicile, which is a domicile of choice in Qatar.

Winans v AG Does not acquire immediate domicile in Qatar after immediately

moving (Bell v Kennedy)
(tengok held)

A domicile of origin can only be replaced by clear cogent and compelling evidence that the
relevant person intended to settle permanently and indefinitely in the alleged domicile of
choice. A domicile of origin is tenacious; the character of domicile of origin ‘is more
enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off’ than domicile of choice because a
change in domicile may involve ‘far reaching consequences in regard to succession and
distribution and other things which depend on domicile.’ The question was whether it had
‘with perfect clearness and satisfaction’ been shown that the testator had ‘a fixed and settled
purpose’ or ‘a determination’ or ‘a fixed and deliberate intention’ to abandon his American
domicile and settle in England.

Malaysia – sprawling climb in his career, very possible to fulfill it

Bell v kenedy
Pergi Qatar tak semstinya dia abandon dom

Kalau kau analyze facts ngan winnas boleh distinguish tai contingency tu is
this unambiguous or not

Macmullan-for determining doc what the person did than what he says

3) Lorenzo was a slick member of the mafia group El Ricco in the underbellies of
Sicily, Italy. He profited from his criminal ways all his life and never got caught
until one fine day he very narrowly escaped the arrest of the Polizia during a
major drug bust which he masterminded. The Polizia were then hot on his
heels and there was a price on his head. Lorenzo decided he could no longer
stay in Sicily and escaped to Ukraine.
 Lorenzo held a low profile in Ukraine, moving from one town to another to
avoid detection. He lived by doing small odd jobs and staying in rest houses
for fifteen years. Several times the Polizia which worked together with Interpol
came close to detecting his whereabouts. Lorenzo was never at peace in
Ukraine but managed to avoid arrest till his death in a shelling brought about
by the Ukraine-Russia conflict in 2018.

What was Lorenzo’s domicile at the time of his death?

Lorenzo’s domicile of origin is in Italy.

Re Martin

In the case of Puttick v AG, the German terrorist’s leave to enter had been
obtained by the fraudulent production of an invalid passport. Thus, she was
barred from acquiring a domicile of choice in England. A fugitive from foreign
justice will not acquire habitual residence in this jurisdiction simply by reliance
on a temporal period during which the claimant has outwitted authority. It was
held that a domicile of choice cannot be acquired by illegal residence. The
reason for this rule is that a court cannot allow a person to acquire a domicile
in defiance of the law which that court itself administers.

The law is that the residence must be lawful residence and settlement in a
country by an illegal immigrant will not suffice. In respect of proof of intention,
the law will take into account almost any act or circumstance, however trivial.

This is reflected in Lorenzo’s situation. His initial motive for moving to Ukraine
was to evade the Italian police. He had no permanent job or place of
residence, nor did he take any positive steps to show any intention of settling
down in Ukraine permanently. Thus, he does not fulfill the requirement of
intention and had not acquired a domicile of choice in Ukraine. As a fugitive
from foreign justice, his domicile at the time of his death was in Italy

Jangan guna puttick vag

Sini dia cakap dia escape Ukraine tapi taktau dia enter Ukraine illegally or not

Country of refuge

Doc cannot be obtain -re martin pasal volunterisness dia nak volunteer ke
4) Zoe was a historian who loved travelling the world. Her job takes her to
different places around the world where she gets attached to different
universities in different culturally rich countries. She left Malaysia (which was
her domicile country) to go to Turkey to work. She likes it there and decides to
migrate there.

2 years later she decides that she wants a change of air and decides to move
to Jordan. She flies to Petra and while there decides to go on a Desert Tour
around the historical sites before deciding which city she should settle in.
While on the tour at the sandy desert she slips and falls down, hits her head
on a sharp rock and dies.

Which law should govern Zoe’s estate?

The first issue is whether Zoe had acquired a domicile of choice in Turkey. In
Udny v Udny, it was stated that domicile of choice is a conclusion or an
inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his
sole or chief residence in a particular place with an intention of continuing to
reside there for an unlimited time. It must be a residence not for a limited
period or particular purpose but general and indefinite in his future
contemplation. This indicates two factors which need to be proven for
someone to acquire a domicile of choice, namely residence and intention.
Residence is defined in IRC v Duchess of Portland as ‘physical presence in
that country as an inhabitant of it’. As Zoe had lived in Turkey for two years,
she fulfills the criteria of residence.

As for intention, there are no facts to show that she took positive steps
towards showing an intention to reside there permanently. Furthermore, her
job often required her to travel and reside in different countries. A mere
declaration that she liked Turkey does not suffice, as held in the case of Re
Annesley. Mrs Annesley (An Englishwoman) was married to a British
domiciliary. The spouses resided in France until the death of the husband.
Annesley remained in France without taking the steps set forth under French
law for the formal acquisition of domicile in that country and seldom returned
to Britain until her death. She left a will executed in France but in British form
bequeathing her estate to her daughter. By French law, Annesley is not a
domiciliary of France, but by British law, Annesley is a domiciliary of France.
By the laws of France, the estate of Annesley is governed by the laws of her
nationality, but by the laws of Britain, the estate of Annesley is governed by
the laws of the domicile. French law only allows the testator to freely dispose
of one-third of her estate.

The court held that notwithstanding the lack of a formal French domicile,
Annesley is a French domiciliary by British law given the concurrence of
actual residence in a foreign jurisdiction coupled with the intent to remain
there. Thus, French law refers the matter to English law which, in turn, will
refer the matter back to French law. Consequently, in these circumstances,
French law dictates that French courts will apply the domestic law. Hence,
French law governs the succession and Annesley may only dispose of one-
third of her estate.

Therefore, Zoe’s domicile is still in Malaysia. Upon her decision to move to

Jordan, the issue arises whether she had acquired a domicile of choice in
Jordan. Zoe did not declare any intention to reside in Jordan permanently,
 merely that she wanted a change of air. Furtheremore, she had not even
decided which city to live in at the time of death. As intention cannot be
proven, Zoe has not acquired a domicile of choice in Jordan.

Her domicile at the time of her death is in Malaysia. Therefore, Malaysian law
should govern her estate.

(Domicile in Jordan – White v Tennet )

Zoe she decides that she wants a change of air and decides to move to
Jordan. She flies to Petra and while there decides to go on a Desert Tour
around the historical sites before deciding which city she should settle in.
While on the tour at the sandy desert she slips and falls down, hits her head
on a sharp rock and dies.

So basically eventough zoe was only in Jordan for a short while it was enough to satisfy
element of residence as she flew to Petra and was on a Desert tour around the historical
sites before deciding which city she should settle in. If she hadn’t die she
would nove to Jordan, dia da fly to pertar can assume dia da bawa barang dia

FACTS:

The decedent, Joseph S. White, died intestate in West Virginia, on a farm of which about
forty acres was in Pennsylvania. The decedent was born and had his domicile in West
Virginia all his life until about a year before his death, when he sold his farm and then
rented a house on the forty acres in Pennsylvania. He left his former home without any
intention of returning and, in pursuance of that intention, did in fact move with his family
and effects to his new home in Pennsylvania with the intention of making it his residence
for an indefinite time. His wife fell ill, and he moved her to the warmer residence in West
Virginia. The trial court held that the laws of West Virginia controlled the distribution of
the estate. The heirs of the decedent sought a review of the said judgment, arguing that
the personal estate of the decedent should be settled and distributed according to the
laws of the State of Pennsylvania.

ISSUE:

Did the decedent, Joseph S. White, have his legal domicile in the State of West Virginia,
thereby making the laws of the said state the controlling law in the issue of the settlement
and the distribution of the decedent’s estate?

CONCLUSION:
The Court held that the laws of the State, in which the domicile of a decedent was at the
time of his death, control and govern the distribution of his personal estate, although he
may die in another State. According to the Court, where a person entirely abandoned his
former residence in one State with no intention of resuming it and went with his family to
another residence, which he has rented in another State, with the intention of making the
latter his residence for an indefinite time, the latter State was his domicile. The fact that
the decedent left the Pennsylvania house, after he had moved to it with his family and
goods, to spend the night in West Virginia did not revive his domicile at his former
residence.

5) Meera’s father had an Indian domicile when she was born. He moved the
entire family to Canada when Meera was 10 months old. When Meera was
18, her parents came back to India. Meera decided to stay on to continue her
education. Fifteen years later Meera who misses her mother’s cooking
terribly, feels she wants to go back and live with her parents in India, and
decides to go home. On route to India, her plane goes into a violent
turbulence, crashes and she dies.

What was her domicile at the time of death?

Meera’s domicile of origin was in India, as it was held in Udny v Udny that a
legitimate child takes on the domicile of their father. Domicile of Dependence
– Father changed domicile of choice to Canada After she reached the age of
majority, it can be argued that she acquired a domicile of choice in Canada.

In Udny v Udny, it was stated that domicile of choice is a conclusion or an

inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his
sole or chief residence in a particular place with an intention of continuing to
reside there for an unlimited time. It must be a residence not for a limited
period or particular purpose but general and indefinite in his future
contemplation. This indicates two factors which need to be proven for
someone to acquire a domicile of choice, namely residence and intention.
Residence is defined in IRC v Duchess of Portland as ‘physical presence in
that country as an inhabitant of it’. As Meera had lived in Canada since she
was 10 months old, she fulfills the criteria of residence.

As for intention, it is clear that she made the decision to continue her
education and ostensibly her career in Canada. Therefore, she has acquired a
domicile of choice in Canada.

This intention changed fifteen years later, where she made the decision to go
back to India. The issue now is whether she has abandoned her domicile of
choice in Canada and revived her domicile of origin in India.
 A person abandons a domicile of choice in a country by ceasing to reside
there and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely and
not otherwise, as held in Udny v Udny. There must be physical departure from
the country for the domicile to change. In Re Raffenel’s Goods, Madame
Raffenel had a domicile of origin in England but, upon marrying a French
naval officer, had acquired a French domicile of dependence. Following her
husband's death, she decided to return permanently to England. She boarded
ship at Calais with her children and baggage, having closed down her
establishment in Dunkirk, but, before the ship left the harbour, became so ill
that she had to disembark. She returned to Dunkirk where she later died. It
was held that as she had never left France, she had not yet abandoned her
French domiciliary.

In Meera’s case, she had already physically left Canada with the intention to
live in India. Thus, she had indeed abandoned her domicile of choice. Her
domicile of origin in India is revived. (Tee v Tee)

6) Lily lived in Belgium all her life. She was a single mother with a grown up son
named Tony. One day Lily decided to move to Peru because she thought that
it was a good idea but she moved there on condition that Tony joins her within
6 months. One month after moving, Lily who was visiting the Machu Picchu
falls off the cliff of the mountain and dies.

What was Lily’s domicile at the time of death?

Lily’s domicile of origin is in Belgium. The issue is whether she has acquired a
domicile of choice in Peru.

In Udny v Udny, it was stated that domicile of choice is a conclusion or an

inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his
sole or chief residence in a particular place with an intention of continuing to
reside there for an unlimited time. It must be a residence not for a limited
period or particular purpose but general and indefinite in his future
contemplation. This indicates two factors which need to be proven for
someone to acquire a domicile of choice, namely residence and intention.
Residence is defined in IRC v Duchess of Portland as ‘physical presence in
that country as an inhabitant of it’. As Lily had lived in Belgium for a month,
she satisfies this condition.

However, with regard to intention, a conditional intention will not suffice. This
is seen in Cramer v Cramer. A married woman with a French domicile of
origin had a relationship with a married Englishman. They decided to marry as
soon as they were able to obtain a divorce from their respective spouses. In
1985, she was sent by her French employers on a one year’s paid
detachment with a company in England. Soon after arriving in England with
her two younger children, she petitioned for divorce. Her husband argued,
 however, that the English court lacked jurisdiction, on the ground that she had
not acquired an English domicile of choice since she had not yet disposed of
her ties in France; that is, she had not terminated her contract of employment,
not resolved certain property matters, nor had she resolved the matter of the
children’s schooling.

The Court of Appeal held that the correct approach to determine whether a
domicile of choice had been acquired was whether the court was satisfied that
there was a clear and settled intention to reside in England indefinitely, and
not whether there was a reciprocated desire to marry a British national as
soon as possible and live in England. On the facts, the wife’s intention to
change her domicile had not yet crystallised into a certainty, since it was
conditional upon her being able to marry her friend and also upon their
relationship continuing on a permanent basis. Had she intended to live in
England come what may, she would have satisfied the requirement of
intention.

In our present case, Lily’s intention is conditional upon Tony joining her in six
months. Her death transpired before Tony ever moved to Peru. Therefore,
she did not acquire a domicile of choice in Peru. Her domicile at the time of
her death was her domicile of origin, in Belgium.

7) Gary and Leia were married for 40 years and lived in France. After retiring
they both travelled to Ireland for an extended period of time and lived at the
countryside. While canoeing one day, Leia’s canoe went into a whirlpool and
got out of control. She died in that accident. Gary now claims that Ireland is
their permanent home. Gary is entitled to half of Leia’s property under Irish
law.

How do you think the judge would decide on Gary’s domicile?

The issue is whether Gary has acquired a domicile of choice in Ireland. Where
the motive of a person to leave or remain in a country is suspected, the court
may be reluctant to allow for a change of domicile. In Spence v Spence, there
was evidence that the main reason for the parties leaving Scotland was the
defendant's desire to avoid payment of tax on the sale of his shares in
Stirlings (Glasgow) Ltd. Although there are factors which could indicate an
intention to live in Marbella on a permanent basis, the defendant's business
activities showed no direction, continuity or success. He had not taken steps
to become an official resident in Marbella. Thus, the court held that he had
failed to discharge the burden of proving that at the relevant date he had
acquired a domicile of choice in Spain. His apparent lack of positive steps in
this direction shows a lack of settled intention to regard Spain as his
permanent home.
 Here, Gary had lived mostly in France. He was only in Ireland for an extended
travel period. There are no positive steps to show that he intended to make
Ireland his permanent residence. Furthermore, it can be contended that he
only sought for a domicile of choice in Ireland after his wife’s death so he
would be entitled to a larger share of her property. As his motive to remain in
Ireland is suspect, it is likely that a judge would decide that Gary has not
acquired a domicile of choice in Ireland, hence his domicile is still in France.

8) Ariz is 5 years old and lives with his parents in Morocco. His father was a
wealthy business man. When Ariz was 7, his father fell into a bad business
deal with some shady men and was killed in a brawl. Ariz’s mother then
shifted to Algeria where her sister was and lived there with him. According to
Moroccan law, Ariz being the only child will be the sole benefactor of his
father’s property. However according to Algerian law, Ariz’s mother will have a
¾ share in the property of her late husband. What would Ariz’s domicile be at
this point in time?

Ariz’s domicile of origin was in Morocco, as it was held in Udny v Udny that a
legitimate child takes on the domicile of their father. In Potinger v Whitman, it was
stated that a child acquires on the death of the father, the domicile of the mother.
However, the mother cannot change her domicile, and by extension the domicile
of the child if it is disadvantageous to them or it is for some fraudulent purpose.
Here, although Ariz’s mother moved to Algeria after his father’s death, it can be
contended that she did so to have a larger share in the property of her late
husband. As it would be disadvantageous to Ariz, it cannot be said that Ariz’s
mother’s domicile has changed to be in Algeria. Therefore, Ariz maintains his
domicile of origin in Morocco.

Domicile (dual residence)

1) Read the case of Plummer v IRC [1988] 1 ALL ER 49 and come up with a case note.

The taxpayer, Elizabeth Anne Plummer, appeals against the refusal of her claim that she was
domiciled outside the United Kingdom in the tax years 1983–84 and 1984–85. The taxpayer was
born in London of English parents. In 1979 her grandmother bought a house in Guernsey and in
1980, when the taxpayer was 15, her mother and younger sister took up residence in Guernsey
with her grandmother. The taxpayer remained at a day school in London, staying in a hostel
during the week and going with her father (who spent most of the working week in London) to
Guernsey at weekends and holidays. In 1981 she went to a boarding school in England where
she took her A levels. In 1983 she took a secretarial course in London. In 1984 she joined the
London University to read for a degree. She spent weekends and some, but not all, of her
holidays in Guernsey. Since she started at Goldsmiths' College the taxpayer has rarely been able
to spend weekends in Guernsey, but she has been there for part of her vacations. A series of
schedules, showing her movements between the United Kingdom, Guernsey. In 1983–84 she
spent 245 days in England and 106 days in Guernsey and in 1984–85 she spent 247 days in
England and 83 days in Guernsey, the remaining days being spent on holiday abroad.. At the
hearing of the appeal the taxpayer gave evidence of her attachment to Guernsey and of her
intention to live and work there.

Additional evidence in the hearing by the taxpayer

(1)the taxpayer declared that she was domiciled in Guernsey in a will

(2) Ownership of Guernsey House was passed to the taxpayer and her sister upon the death of
where she and her sister is paying the insurance for the house.

(3) taxpayer obtained a passport in Guernsey

(4) The taxpayer has three driving licences, issued in the United Kingdom, Guernsey and Florida
respectively. She bought a car in London in 1984 and kept it there for the first 12 months, taking
it to Guernsey for holidays. Since then it has been kept mostly in Guernsey, where repairs and
maintenance have been carried out by a local garage.

(5) She was on the electoral roll in Guernsey 1984 to February 1985, having applied in at her
father's suggestion, but she failed to reapply for the following electoral year and her name was
removed.

(6) She has been registered as a patient of a Guernsey medical practice since 1983.

(7) She has had an account bank in Guernsey

(8) the taxpayer asked her father to manage her business and tax affairs. and he put forward the
claim to a Guernsey domicile on her behalf.

The commissioners accepted her evidence, but found that she had not become an 'inhabitant' of
Guernsey during the years in question and therefore could not be said to have acquired a
domicile of choice there. The taxpayer appealed, contending that a person whose presence in a
new country was sufficient to amount to residence could, notwithstanding that his chief
residence remained in his domicile of origin, acquire a domicile of choice in the new country by
evincing an intention to continue to reside permanently in that country. The taxpayer said in
evidence that she has regarded Guernsey as her home since 1980 and she would like to live
there permanently and work there and if she were to get married she would want to live with a
man who wants ti live there.

the taxpayer refer to the test in Udny v Udny where there were two elements in the acquisition
of a domicile of choice. First, there must be physical presence in the new country, not casually or
as a traveller but as an inhabitant of it, Second there must be an intention to make one's home
in the new country permanently or indefinitely. Both elements, were fulfilled the taxpayer
argued As to the first, the family home had been in Guernsey since 1980 and the taxpayer had
gone there since then, not simply to visit her parents but because she had fallen in love with the
island and had freely and voluntarily adopted it as her home. She had spent more than 90 days
there in each year except 1984–85, when her course at Goldsmiths' College made it difficult for
her to get away. As to intention, the taxpayer's evidence was clear and emphatic and should be
accepted. She did not want to live permanently anywhere but in Guernsey and she had realistic
prospects of making her life and career there.

The Revenue, submitted that To satisfy the Udny v Udny test, she had to show either that from
her sixteenth birthday Guernsey had been her sole or chief place of residence, where she
intended to reside permanently or indefinitely, or that at some point after that date but before
the end of the two years in question she had voluntarily fixed Guernsey as her place of sole or
chief residence with the intention of continuing to reside there permanently or indefinitely. The
facts did not support either of those propositions

Throughout the relevant period the taxpayer had been resident England, continuing her
education here. Admittedly a person who had previously acquired a foreign domicile would not
lose it if he came here for a limited period in education, as in Miesagaes, but that was a different
case. The taxpayer's education had required her to remain in England,. The decision in IRC v
Duchess of Portland[1982] 1 All ER 784, [1982] Ch 314 showed that a person's chief residence
was usually the place where he spent most time. The taxpayer in this case inhabited England,
whether she wanted to or not. She visited Guernsey, staying in her grandmother's house, where
her mother and her sister also lived and where her father went at weekends and for holidays.
Her longest continuous visit of 42 days could be contrasted with the 10 to 12 weeks spent in
Canada each year in the case of Duchess of Portland, who was nevertheless domiciled in
England. It could not be said that the taxpayer had yet made her chief residence in Guernsey,
even if she intended to do so in the future.

As to intention, counsel accepted the taxpayer as an honest witness, but the evidence of the
propositus and prior declarations of intention always had to be treated with some reserve. the
taxpayer was in England for a limited purpose and, ever since 1980, had gone to Guernsey as her
home whenever she could. The test of chief residence did not always depend on the amount of
time spent in each of two or more places. It was the quality of her physical presence in Guernsey
plus her intention to live there indefinitely which entitled her to claim a Guernsey domicile

Conclusion

The court differentiate the issue in the Duchess of Portland's case was whether the propositus
had abandoned her domicile of choice in England and resumed her domicile of origin in Canada,
whereas the taxpayer in this case claims to have abandoned her English domicile of origin, with
its special quality of adherence, in favour of a domicile of choice in Guernsey

On the question of residence the court state that they had to bear in mind that the taxpayer
cannot have become an inhabitant of Guernsey to the extent required for a change of domicile
unless she had abandoned her English domicile of origin. Throughout the two years under
review the taxpayer spent most of her time in England, completing her second year at Millfield,
doing a secretarial course in London during the year between school and university and then
starting her three-year course at London University. During that time she spent some weekends
and part of each vacation in Guernsey, in her grandmother's house, and she went on family
holidays to Florida and other places. In the second year she was the licensee of a flat at 12 York
Street and responsible for the outgoings, although she did not in fact live in the flat. Those bare
facts are not necessarily incompatible with a claim to a Guernsey domicile. If the taxpayer had
previously left England and settled in Guernsey a return to this country to complete her
education might not have affected her domicile; but that had not happened. She was unable to
join her mother and sister in their move to Guernsey in 1980 nor had she joined them
subsequently. It is understandable of the taxpayer to regard Guernsey house as home since it
was the place to which she normally went, during her school days, when term ended and to
which she continues to go to be with her family. However the court has to consider, whether she
has made it her chief place of residence.

We accept the taxpayer's evidence that she likes Guernsey and enjoys the amenities of the
island when she is there, quite apart from enjoying the company of her family. But
circumstances have not yet enabled her to make her life there; nor is there any immediate
prospect of her doing so since she intends to work elsewhere for a time, though not in England,
after leaving university. It may be that she will one day settle in Guernsey and but it is all in the
future. We do not underestimate the part which Guernsey plays in her thinking but the fact
remains that the taxpayer has throughout her life resided in England for the greater part of each
year and been principally occupied here. The court doesnt see break in that pattern which
would entitle them to find that she had ceased to have her chief residence in England and had
become, in the sense in which the term is used in this context, an inhabitant of Guernsey.

Therefore, there is no requirement to assess the evidence of intention. Until she has settled
down and begun her life in Guernsey.

HOFFMANN J.

Her father, who is an accountant, maintained a residence in London but joined his wife and
younger daughter in Guernsey when he could at weekends and holidays. It is not suggested that
he acquired a Guernsey domicile before the taxpayer's sixteenth birthday on 26 March 1981,
and her domicile therefore remained English until that date. After her mother's removal to
Guernsey the taxpayer remained at a private London day school, staying in a hostel during the
week and going to Guernsey at weekends and holidays. In the autumn of 1981 she went to
boarding school in Somerset and stayed there until she took her A levels in the summer of 1983.
She had a year's break before going to London University in the autumn of 1984, and during this
time she attended a course at a secretarial college in Hampstead, living first in college
accommodation and then sharing a house with friends in Highgate. During her first year at
university she lived in a college hostel in Greenwich and in her second year moved into a flat
available to her father in the West End. That takes the story up to the summer of 1986, more
than a year after the end of the tax years with which this case is concerned. While studying in
London the taxpayer spent many weekends and some, but by no means all, of her holidays in
Guernsey

The judge look at the commissioners question whether the taxpayer had become an 'inhabitant'
of Guernsey for all or part of the relevant period. The term 'inhabitant' as a description of a
resident for the purposes of the law of domicile was taken from Dicey and Morris on the Conflict
of Laws where it is contrasted with being present in a country casually or as a traveller. It is clear
however that the commissioners did not employ the term with this dichotomy in mind, because
although they found that the taxpayer had not become an inhabitant of Guernsey they could
hardly have said that her presence there for more than three months in each year was casual or
as a traveller. They were using the term 'inhabitant' rather in the specialised sense in which
Nourse J used it in IRC v Duchess of Portland[1982] 1 All ER 784 at 790, [1982] Ch 314 at 318–
319, where he said:
'Residence in a country for the purposes of the law of domicile is physical presence in that
country as an inhabitant of it. If the necessary intention is also there, an existing domicile of
choice can sometimes be abandoned and another domicile acquired or revived by a residence of
short duration in a second country. But that state of affairs is inherently improbable in a case
where the domiciliary divides his physical presence between two countries at a time. In that kind
of case it is necessary to look at all the facts in order to decide which of the two countries is the
one he inhabits.'

The judge stated that while he find the contrast between an inhabitant and a person casually
present useful to describe the minimum quality of residence which must be taken up in a new
country before a domicile there can be acquired, the concept of being an inhabitant seems to be
less illuminating in cases of dual or multiple residence.

The judge found that clearer guidance is to be found in a well-known passage in the speech of
Lord Westbury in Udny v Udny(1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441 at 458: 'Domicil of choice is a conclusion
or inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief
residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to reside there for an unlimited
time.'

Therfore the judge infer, that a person who retains a residence in his domicile of origin can
acquire a domicile of choice in a new country only if the residence established in that country is
his chief residence.

Counsel for the taxpayer submitted that a person whose presence in a new country is sufficient
to amount to residence may, notwithstanding that his chief residence remains in his domicile of
origin, acquire a domicile of choice by evincing an intention to continue to reside permanently in
the new country. The court found that this submission is inconsistent with the passage which the
judgehave quoted from Lord Westbury and which has always been treated as an authoritative
statement of the circumstances in which a domicile of choice may be acquired

The judge found that Udny v Udny shows that loss of a domicile of origin or choice is not
inconsistent with retention of a place of residence in that country if the chief residence has been
established elsewhere. Notwithstanding that the taxpayer's continued presence in England
amounted, as counsel for the taxpayer conceded, to residence in this country, the
commissioners made it clear that they would have found that she had become resident in
Guernsey for the purposes of the law of domicile if they were satisfied that she had established
her chief residence there.

Counsel for the taxpayer submitted that the commissioners paid no regard to anything except
the relative amounts of time which the taxpayer spent in England and Guernsey during the years
in question. They ignored the quality of her presence in each country, the fact that she was in
England solely for the purpose of education and in Guernsey because it was her family home. I
do not think that this is a fair reading of the commissioners' decision. They set out at length the
taxpayer's ties with Guernsey and her reasons for remaining in England. In deciding whether the
house in St Peter Port had become her chief residence, they said: 'We accept [the taxpayer's]
evidence that she likes Guernsey and enjoys the amenities of the island when she is there, quite
apart from enjoying the company of her family', and: 'We do not underestimate the part which
Guernsey plays in her thinking … ' Nevertheless they said that these considerations did not
outweigh the fact that the taxpayer had resided for the greater part of the year in England and
that there had been no 'break in [the] pattern' which would justify a finding that she had ceased
to have her chief residence in England. She had not, to use the language of Lord Hatherley LC in
Udny v Udny, settled in Guernsey.

I think that this was a conclusion to which the commissioners were on the evidence entitled to
come. I go further and say that in my judgment it was the right conclusion. If the taxpayer had in
1980 broken altogether with England and settled in Guernsey like her mother and sister and
then, even after a relatively short interval, returned to England for study, the quality of her
presence here might have been such as to prevent a revival of her domicile of origin. But the fact
is that she has not yet settled in Guernsey, and the reasons why she has been unable to do so
are in my view irrelevant. When there is no competing place of continuing residence, settlement
may be established by presence for a very short time, even for a single day. But as Nourse J
pointed out in the Duchess of Portland's case, an inference of settlement from a short stay is
difficult to draw when the person in question divides his physical presence between two
countries at a time. To treat the house in Guernsey as her chief residence simply because it is
the sole residence of her mother and sister would be in the court’s view be attributing to her a
kind of quasidependent domicile for which there is no legal justification. And the fact that the
taxpayer may intend to settle in Guernsey after education and training are completed and then
to remain permanently is not sufficient to give her a proleptic domicile of choice. Therefore, the
appeal is dismissed.

2) Matteo was a well-off 19 year old who lives in Switzerland. His father was from Austria and
his mother from Geneva. He lived in his family estate in Zurich. He owned 10 luxury yachts
and 10 very lavish cars. His father owned a chain of chocolate factories in Zurich and ran a
successful cafe business in the touristy town of Baden-Baden, Germany. Matteo spent a lot
of his time at the chocolate factories hoping one day to take over his father’s business.

Assuming the father had DOC in Switzerland , Matteo has DOO in switzelarxand

One day while dreaming of becoming Willy Wonka and traipsing along the aisles of one of
the factories, Matteo gets insulted by one of the factory workers that he will never be good
enough to run the place as he is an arrogant spoilt brat and takes it personally. In a fit of
rage Matteo accidentally injures the worker who then has to be hospitalized. Matteo
panicked and fearing for his life he ran off to hide in the family lakeside home near the Black
Forest in neighbouring Germany. While in Germany, Matteo works at his father’s café and it
turns out that he actually enjoyed the job very much. Maybe becoming a Jamie Oliver was
more of his calling rather than a Willy Wonka. He joined the Exclusive Gourmet Club in
Germany and got engaged to a country girl from nearby Schiltach.

Matteo visited Zurich a lot and always went there to visit his friends and hold large
gatherings near Lake Zurich while eating a lot of Black Forest cake and Swiss chocolates. He
still sometimes went to his father’s factories rekindling his old dream but never dared to
actually work there due to the bad omen from his past experience there.
 Matteo always said that he would like to move to Germany for good as he liked it there and
his mother also lived there helping him at the café.

Matteo spent his time evenly spread between Zurich and Germany.

One day while skiing on the Swiss Alps thinking that he could outdo some little kids, he made
an overly brave manoeuvre and got into a horrid accident, flied off the mountain and died.

Where was Matteo’s domicile at the time of death?

DOO switzeland-udny v udny

Plummer v IRC

Dom of choice in Germany because he likes it there he resided there and work there ?

DOO-austria follow father

What was Matteo Dom before Germany-residence and intention-in this case both fulfil ada
properties and take care of business. So dom of switz

DOC Germany-

Residence-ada job, live there, club, although he spent time between german and switz so refer to
plummer v irc matteo da begun life already not as traveler so doc in Germany

Re martin-intention so dia nak duduk sana although dia pergi nak hide lepas dia duduk situ so
intention has been form so he intended to live there voulunatrily . intention fulfilled

DOC in Germany

Miss tanya

dream untuk kerja ngan ayah dia matter tal ?- it doesn’t matter anymore dia da abandon for the job
in café

Does the present of his friends to gather prevent to obtain doc in german?-so kena ada intention to
have chief residence so dating for vist je so tak prohibit him , its only one of the pattern connects to
Zurich but ada

How much weight statement nak pindah Germany tu ? case tengok apatah

Jia xin answer jangan apply re martin sebab bukan refugee, so dia contantly coming back dia bukan
lari dari polis bukan dia kena suit so dia Cuma takut je and then lari

-plummer v irc cakap pasal chief residence tu yang penting

-so that he has apatah