Cahiers de la Méditerranée

The French in Malta 1798 - 1800 : reflections on an insurrection

Henri Frendo

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Frendo Henri. The French in Malta 1798 - 1800 : reflections on an insurrection. In: Cahiers de la Méditerranée, n°57, 1, 1998.
Bonaparte, les îles méditerranéennes et l'appel de l'Orient [Actes du Colloque d'Ajaccio 29-30 Mai 1998] pp. 143-151;

doi : https://doi.org/10.3406/camed.1998.1231

https://www.persee.fr/doc/camed_0395-9317_1998_num_57_1_1231

Fichier pdf généré le 13/05/2018

 THE FRENCH IN MALTA 1798-1800 :
REFLECTIONS ON AN INSURRECTION.

Henri FRENDO
Université de Malte.

More than elsewhere, the Bonapartist spell in Malta was short : only
three months after the cataclysmic and tromatic encounter with the theory -
and more seriously with the suppose practice of it - the Maltese were in revolt.
The French garnison under Général Vaubois were confined to the fortified city
of Valletta and its immediate environs around the Grand Harbour. No less than
elsewhere in Europe beyond the continent where the Bonapartist revolutionary
and conquering crusade spread, Malta's was an intense and difficult time
indeed.
As things turned out, characteristic of the Maltese experience of French
rule was its transitory nature, breaking temporarily with some long-held
traditions, when Malta was governed by the order of St-John (1530-1798).' I
say transitory not only because of the short span of time involved, but also
because this was an unsettled time? The Order's rule over Malta was still
claimed, probably lawfully, by the ousted Austrian Grand master ferdinand
von Hompesch. In 1801 the Britisch had orders to evacuate Malta for the
Order to return, under a treaty of guarantee and a state of neutrality.
Had article 10 of the Treaty of Amiens (1802) been implemented; that
it exactly what they would have done, under one guise or another, the period is
a transitory one, but its "duration ", in historiographical terms, is much longer
than its chronology.
In my documentary history of Maltese development, I reproduced the
original text of grand Master Hompesch' s letter of protest of 12 October 1798,
written from Trieste. In this communique' Hompesch quarrelled with
Bonaparte's vocabulary : the so-called "Convention", or capitulation, was
conceived and dictated by Bonaparte himself, wrote the expelled Grand Master
Hompesch -
"cet écrit n 'étant autre qu 'une loi violente imposée pat-
ci' infâmes traîtres dont l'ennemi s'est prévalu pour remplir
ses desseins... " 2

1 - For a standard and influencial general history of this period see e.g. E.W.Schermerhorn
:

Malta of the knights. Heinemann, London, 1929. There are several other general works on it.
See e.g. the anthology in Hospitaller Malta Mireva, 1996, ed. V. Mallia-Milanes.
2 -Henry Frendo : Maltese Political Development 1798-1964. A Documentary History.
Ministry of Education and Human Ressources. Valletta. 1993. pp. 16-17. Doc.5.
FRENDO H. The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. 144

:
In Testa's recent volume of this period you will find this assertion
given substance by the very detail of the narrative : the evidence, for instance,
that the French troops had disembarked before Bonaparte had as much as given
proper notice of a state of war ; and the ongoing deceipt and sabotage not only
on the part of some well-placed french knights, but of the naval command
itself,3 which failed to respect the norms of conduct which gentlemen,
particularly those versed in chivarly, had been led to believe existed - at any
rate.
I once went to see the multi-media tourist show about Malta in Valletta.
This is a highly successful commercial expedient which tens il not
hundreds of thousands of sejourning visitors to Malta have seen and continue to
pay to watch. One of the pieces of commentary which had impressed me was,
if I remember correctly, that where it said that the Order has surrendered to
the French ' without a single shot having been fired'. It sounds good, but it's
not true. Many shots were fired from some outposts, such as Tigne or the
island of Gozo most of all ; and more would have been fired, had the sabotage
organised by a minority of knights not been so ruthless - as it was, for
example, at St-George's Bay in St-Julian's.
This French landing is at one time seminal and symptomatic of the sad
state of affairs prevailing in Grand Master Ferdinand von Hompesch's Malta.
Let us ponder a little on this one and extract what meaning and historical
consequence it may have. First, he revealing historical narrative :
"At 4 a.M. ( on 10 June 1798 ) a first wave of thirty boats
packed with French soldiers were seen approaching St-
George 's tower and St-Julian 's Bay. ( That is, I link, the
tower you may now see, in I hope a restored state at least,
from one of the sea-view rooms in a very nice hotel over
there ). The Maltese stationed there were amazed when their
commanding officers refrained from giving orders to open
fire. They were more than amazed when among the very
first to step on land they recognized the Auvergne knights
Picot de Moras ( ou Dampiere ), an officer of engineers,
and De Barras. Both had left Malta some time before to join
Napoleon's army. The tower and trenches of St-George's
were defended by 60 "Cacciatori Maltesi" ( as these
soldiers, not hunters, were called ) and 1200 men of the
Birkirkara peasant militia, each of whom only armed with a
musket, a bayonet, and three cartridges ! As soon as the
French stepped ashore the French knight De Preville who
was in command of that sector waved a white handkerchief
and went to meet them as if they were his boon friends.
The Maltese realized their betrayal too late and, being too
few to offer any effective resistance to the horde of heavily -

3 - Carmel Testa : The French in Malta, 1798-1800. Midsea, Valletta . 1998. See also Frans
Sammut's book on the subject in Maltese . SKS 1998, wich is more sympathetic to the French
interlude.
 FRENDO H. The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. 1l

:
armed Frenchmen now landing all along the stretch of
coastline, they fled to safety to Fort Manoel and Valletta.
Not a single shot was fired from St Julian 's battery... " 4
Well, they had no cannon, but presumably nor did the French on their
thirty boats. According to my little calculator, those Maltese called to start the
defence of their coastline could have aimed some 3,780 shots at those thirty
boats, or 126 shots at each one of them. Assuming that the boats were within
range, one or two hits per boat would have disrupted the landing and just
possibly have had every single boat capsize or sink.
The trick was much as strategic as it was psychological : the Maltese
fled, and when the Naxxar militia heard of the plight of the Birkirkara brigade
their hearts sank.
But that was only one episode, and it was not all. Some other incidents
were heroic, others pathetic as when the Maltese seemed to feel on safer
ground aiming their fire in the wrong drection - against each other. That
would be to some extent a metaphor also for the resistance which later
ensured, after only three months and, as we know, the French held on in the
fortified parts in and around Valletta. Behind the bastions built so laboriously
to protect the Faith against the Infidel. The French occupations of Malta and
the consequent popular armed insurrection against it raise many questions.
Some of them, very briefly, I would list here as follows :
How French was the Order which effectively surrendered to France ?
The largest number of Knights were French, but being French did not mean
necessaril being pro-French. Some of the most faithful Knights were
Frenchmen fully aware of the havoc caused to the Order's estates, if not to the
properties and lives of their own families, by the French Revolution and its
aftermath. Nor indeed did being Corsican mean being Bonapartist, considering
that the main attempt at penetrating and taking Valletta on the part of the
Maltese resistance was master-minded by a Corsican settler, the famous corsair
Gugliemo Lorenzi. Lorenzi, betrayed by a squealer and executed together with
scores of other Maltese, including the patriot-priest Dun Mikiel Xerri, was
conveniently dismissed by the British administrator Alexander Ball as a
Russian agent. 5 .
Was Hompesch a hero, a traitor or an incompetent ? Unable to lead,
unable to delegate, unable to tell his friends from his foes, unable to plan
ahead, to negotiate and play a waiting game, when Nelson himself would have
been grist to his mill, and the British need not have taken Malta from him at
all, as the French did ?
On the other hand, wasn't the Order impoverished, in disarray and
anachronism . How central to the whole debacle was espionage, an asset which

4 -Ibid., m. 45.
5 - On Lorenzi, see the three part series by Giovanni Bonello, "On the trail of Guglielmo
Lorenzi" The Sunday Times, Valletta 5-19 Apr. 1998.
 FRENDO H. The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. 146

:
Napoleon fully appreciated ? Was the French take over a consequence of the
Order's decline in the eighteenth century - a thesis which Roderick Cavaliero,
the best writer on this period, rather rejects6 ? Or was it a hurried
precautionary measure by Bonaparte, predicated on a theory of negative value?
Onwards to Egypt, the main design, but first of all grabbing Malta en route,
lest the British were to take it first !
How did islands figure as outposts in the Anglo-French rivalry and how
significantly did Malta, as opposed for instance to Minorca, figure in that
equation ? Was anticlericalism a major cause of the Maltese rising, or were
other factors more provocative ? Given that the British took much better care
to maintain the best possible relations with the Roman Catholic church and
hierarchy then the French had done ( even at the cost sometimes of earning
criticism from Anglican and non-conformist sources ) it may have been
convenient to emphasise, perhaps to over-emphasise, that what had caused
Maltese discontent in 1798 had been France' hostility to the Roman Catholic
Church.
There is no doubt that abuses in that direction were a major factor of
the discontent, but these would have to be seen alongside other restrictions and
impositions, from the curtailment of alms-giving to free hospital care, to
which the Maltese had become accustomed under the Knights Hospitalers.
Initially the French and the Bishop tried to be corteous towards one another
we have evidence that Vaubois tried hard to enforce discipline among his
troops, realising no doubt that ase would antagonise the inhabitants. He had to
content, however, with a brash careerist who was effectively the supremo. In
particular, how should one assess the behaviour of this man, Commissioner
Regnaud d' Angely, whom Napoleon placed in charge of the directorate before
he left for Egypt after barely a week in Malta ? Was the excessive
revolutionary enthusiasm of this man partly, if not largely, to blame for
provoking an all-out anti-French resistance ?
Common people would not have minded so much if titles of aristocracy
were burnt in a " place de la liberté", nor even if coats-of-arms and insignia
recalling chivalry and knighthood were defaced, nor even perhaps parading
the tricolor, or if foreign ecclesiastics were sent home ; but they would
certainly mind if they lost control over goods which they had pawned at te
Monte di Pieta because the new regime was desperate for cash, or having
husbands and even teenage sons shipped off to fight in the Egyptian expedition,
or ceasing to have effective possession over lands and fields they had tilled for
generations by some rash decree, or being thrown outside the city walls for
want of food, to starve outside them ; or, yes, having their churches and

6 - Roderick Cavaliero : The Last of the Crusaders ( London, 1960), notes that priorities shifted
from strategic to cultural, hence the building in the eighteenth century of edifices such as the
Manoel Theatre and the Bibliotecha in Valletta.
FRENDO H. The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. 147

:
monasteries robbed, silver and gold melted at the mint, tapestries and whatever
auctioned to the highest bidder.
Liberté, égalité, fraternité seemed like great slogans, but in fact, in the
here and now, they were faced with arrogant swashbuckling masters bent on
drawing blood out of the stone. Ironically, in Malta as elsewhere, in Italy, in
Egypt, in Spain, in France itself, the slogan became a justification for a
resistance to the praxis.
Was the Maltese insurrection a catalyst of national unity, or a minor
civil war ? A number of well-placed Maltese supported the French arrival and
put their trust in these new liberators who abolished slavery and the
inquisition, introduced municipal and secular ideas, and sought to encourage
education, preferably in Paris, while denouncing aristocracy, theocracy and
privilege. Most, however, were soon disenchanted by what they saw. This in
any case was a relatively small elite, not the mass of the population by a means.
But was the insurrection's true impulse nationalism, or at least patriotism, or
was it essentially about survival, basic interests and needs, ' leave us in peace ',
and force majeure ?
To what extent was this an ideological confrontation at all, with
nationhood or statehood in mind ? Was it a nationalism in the making,
subconsciously ; or was it, above all, a neo-feudal yearning to free oneself
from imposed misery, like a jacquerie ? This question has been argued, and it
is indeed very arguable. It is known that factions existed which were
favourably disposed to other European powers getting Malta, such as Naples,
which had a claim to it ; or Russia, which had a far more "dubious " claim to
it; or indeed the Order of St John itself.
It is also important to evaluate British manipulation of subsequent
colonial historiography : one way of ensuring that Britain stayed in Malta, for
those who wanted that, was obviously to use scare-mongering tactics : if not us,
the Russians are coming ; if not us, the Italians ; if not us, God knows, maybe
the French all over again. So thus and therefore : rule Britannia. And then of
course there was the wider argument, used in the House of Commons, what I
call negative value theory, but a powerful argument it is : it was not so much
Malta in itself that mattered greatly to Britain but, by means of her harbours,
depots and warehouses, the routes to Egypt, to the Orient, to India, and the
Pacific...7
I think these questions already hint at some answers, but I am putting
them as an aperirif to a future thorough analysis of this important episode ; for
enlightening comparative purposes in the academic discourse here ; and for
inducing clearer conceptual definitions as to what actual took place inwhat was,

7 - On this see Henry Frendo : Party Politics in a Fortress Colony : The Maltese Experience
(Midsea, Valetta, 1979 ; 2nd Edition, 1991 ), pp. 4-5.
FRENDO H. The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. 148
1^°

:
essentially, the internal contradiction of our Bonapartist coin : liberation on
one side, domination on the other.
There is no doubt that a general mobilisation ensued, a Congresso
Nazionale was selected, with representatives from all the towns and casali,
there were meetings and ambushes, factional and personal rivalries, but also a
national and regional leadership arrangement, evocations of ideals, beliefs and
honour, there were instances of heroism, many deaths in fighting and
epidemic. Clergy, peasants and gentry rose up in seeming unision. Of the three
main leaders, Emmanuele Vitale was a notary ; Vincenzo Borg, a merchant ;
Francesco Saverio Caruana, an ecclesiastic :
"Our question is : whose revolution was 1798 ? Was it the
one imported and planted by Bonapartism; or was it rather
the unprecedented torrent of popular opposition that that
inleashed ? In other words, was the local rendering of the
French revolution a Maltese revoltion by default ? The
negative value of it lay in provocation to rebel in defence of
cherished customs and values. And to do so armed with at
least one of the three slogans on parade: liberté. In truth,
the Maltese insurgents on 2nd September 1 798 were armed
with little else. Church bells and bare fists ; presumably a
motley collection offarm implements and some shot. They
regrouped and enlisted formations, without military
training, on the run, improvising the means to sustain the
struggle..." 8
A complementary way of looking at the insurrection, with the
advantage of hindsight, is the following account of it :
" In state-making, the Maltese nation too was being
formed. No sooner had the Knights been forced out by
Napoleon that the Maltese were forced to stand up for what
they held to be their rights, values, interests and customs as
a people. The test came upon them with an unexpected
suddenness... the Maltese patria - not merely their heimat -
was at stake. Against the marauding and looting French
troops, grieved by broken promises and newly-imposed
burdens, leaders and led rose to the challenge... To Medina
(Notabile), to the pealing of church bells, the farmers
hurried... After taking the citadel; lieutenancies and
bataillons were formed, cannon and shot and rations
organised ; the citadel at Gozo, and all the Malta villages
and countryside, were soon in rebel hands. In her first
siege since it was built and fortified, Valletta gave
protection to the " infidels "from France. In Valletta and
the Three Cities, beseiged by the Maltese, the French
garnison hid, sometimes tetaliated, and slowly starved...
As was typical of the Napoleonic era throughout Europe

8 - Henry Frendo : Malta 's Quest for Independence : Reflections on the Course of Maltese
History ( Dougall, Valetta, 1989 ), pp. 41-42. See also V. Mallia Milanes, " 1798 : A Genesis
of Maltese Nationalism ? ", chapter 1 in British Colonial Experience : The Impact on Maltese
Society ( Mireva, Valette, 1988, edited by the same author ).
 FRENDO H. The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. 1l

:
and the Mediterranean, the announced revolutionary ideals
were not very well put into practise 'surplace ';asa result
subject peoples thanklessly rebelled.
After all, the principle of popular sovereignty had been a
corner-stone of the Revolution, enshrined in the 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The
1798 insurrection of Malta was ( and remains to this day )
the first and only popular armed national insurrection in the
country's entire history... it brought to the fore, combined
and sharpened the edges of the Maltese identity... The
French left with full military honours ; the Maltese licked
their wounds... " 9
Elsewhere I have quoted the experience of Naples, which I suggest is
comparable. Those who supported the French republic there were maminly
well-to-do families and a handful of intellectuals : Vincenzo Russo, Mario
Pagano, Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel. Were these the true patriots ? Not so, said
the populace ; they were enemies of crown and cross, invaders, collaborates
and assassins. The abolition of feudalism and of primogeniture did not matter.
Queen Maria Carolina and Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo came first. The popularity
of the anti-Jacobin uprising is in no doubt, as may be gauged from this
insurgent song :
" A lu suono de la gran cascia,
Viva sempre lu popolo bascio.
A lu suono de H tammurielli
So risurte H puverielli !
A lu suono de le campane,
Viva, viva li pupulane /
A lu suono de Hi violini,
Sempre morte a ' Giacobbini ! " 10
Ultimately, in the Maltese case, there was despair - which saw the
rebellion moving from Maltese to British designs, and Malta slipping out of
Neapolitan sovereignty at a time when Naples too depended on British aid
against French threats. The British saw the French off after a naval blockade.
The Maltese who had fought with everything they had to get rid of these
strange masters - masters of facts on the ground that, at best, did not match the

9 - Henry Frendo, ' National Identity ', in Henry Frendo and Oliver Friggieri ( Eds) : Malta :
Culture and Identity ( Ministry for Youth and the Arts, Valletta, 1 994 ), pp.9- 1 1 .
10 - Quoted after an interview with Professor Villari in La Repubblica. See Henry Frendo
:

Malta 's Quest for Independence ; Reflections on the Course of Maltese History, op. cit., p. 42.
For a comparative insight at a micro level, see Henry Frendo : Attard : The Life of a Maltese
Casale ( Valletta, 1997 ) especially pp.24-27.
FRENDO H. : The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. 15°

:
ideas in their heads ended up - without as much as a presence in the so-called
capitulation of 1800.
Our insurrection was transitory in more ways than one then : an
interlude between foreign overlords, with generals replacing generals and one
navy replacing another, after Aboukir Bay. In time, the Maltese national
conscience was left with an arousal which died down, but one which also
continued to simmer, occasionally to stir : a memory, a legend ; and also a
pretty useless bellien that the Maltese deserved better from the British because
they had asked them in to defend them against a common enemy, rather than
having been conquered by them in battle. As a plaque in the heart of Valletta,
dated 1814, reminds us still : Melitensium Amor et Europae Vox.
Perhaps, the most salutaty long-term lessons emerging from this
experience were to be incapsulated in the Dichiarazione dei diritti degli abitanti
di Malta e Gozo of 15 June 1802, when Maltese leaders opposed the right of
Britain to return Malta to the Order of St John. This declaration, as early as
1802, may be seen as a cross between other declarations of right, particularly
the American and the French, and could be seen to have been influenced by a
thinking discernable in both. It speaks eloquently not only of right but also, for
instance, of freedom of conscience, and in a thinly veiled presumption of
popular sovereignty, it uses the word ' indipendenza ' .
A reference to parts of its text may serve as a fit conclusion to this
presentation, an invitation to decipher what links it may contain to the
innovative and disappointing, painful but outstanding events that had taken
place only a few years earlier, in which the whole country had become
embroiled. It regards allegiance to the British monarch as a compact in return
for protection, but challenges his or any other power's right to dispose of the
country's destiny. It speaks of ' the free suffrage of the people', of ' our native
rights and privileges ', of ' the blessings offreedom and of just law '.
Article 2 holds that His Majesty had ' no right to cede these Islands to
any power ', and that if He chose to withdraw his protection and abandon his
sovereignty, the right of electing another sovereign, or of governing these
Islands, belongs to us, the inhabitants and aborigines alone, and without
control. ' His Majesty's governors or representatives would always be bound to
observe and deep inviolate the Constitution' (Article 3). Maltese
representatives 'in Popular Council assembled' would be entitled to make
representations directly to the throne, while 'the right of legislation and
taxation ' belonged to the Consiglio Popolare, ' with the consent and assent of
His Majesty's representatives, without which the people are not bound. ' One
can notice a certain caution here, if not a contraction : rights are not, as it were
inalienable, but subject to consent and assent from above.
Similarly equivocal are the following articles ( 6-9 ) wherein on the
one hand the King would be the protector of 'our holy religion', but there
would be no interference in matters spiritual or temporal of no other temporal
 FRENDO H. The French in Malta 1798-1800 Reflections on an insurrection. ^

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sovereign, whereas reference in spiritual matters would only be has to the
Pope and the respective Generals of Monastic Orders.
At the same art. 8 of the Dichiarazione insisted :
1 That freemen have a right to choose theur own religion.
Toleration of other religions is therefore established as a
right ; but no sect is permitted to molest, insult or disturb
those of other religious professions.

'
And art. 9 :
'That no man whatsoever has any personal authority over
the lives, property or liberty of another. Power resides only
in the law, and restraint, or punishment, can only be
exercised in obedience to law. ' ' '
Signed by all the representatives, deputies and lieutenants of the villages
and towns of the Maltese islands, this Dichiarazione was a milestone in the
definition and assertion of constitutional rights, and it was one rather more
tolerant, liberal and fair-minded than what was to ensue in succeeding decades,
when for half-a-century under British rule the Maltese were to be denied of
political representation of any kind.

il - Henry Frendo : Maltese Political Development 1798-1964, op.cit., Doc. 18, pp. 55-56.
See also the introductory notes and annotations to this section, pp. 29-32.